CANVAS Analytic Department September, 2010 SUBJECT: Analysis of the situation in Venezuela, September 2010.

(DRAFT INTR DUCTI N! This analysis ten"s to #o$er Sit!ati"n #I$, %illar& "' S!pp"rt #II$ (ey pp"&iti"n Sta)e*"l+er& an+ t*eir allie& #III$, ,i&t "' p"tential i&&!e& in t*e campai-n #IV$ in Venezuelan So#iety in the fa#e of forth#omin% parliamentary ele#tions in September 2010, an" it is base" on Strate%i# &stimate performe" by 'A(VAS an" its Venezuelan partner 200),series of in"epen"ent, a#a"emi# an" institute analysis in 200)*200+. as ,ell as opinions from rele$ant international analysts in -anuary 2010. .ts %oal is to pro$i"e basis for more "etaile" plannin% potentially performe" by intereste" performers an" 'A(VAS. The follo, up of this analysis ,ill appear in /lan Format later "urin% the pro#ess after #onsultations ,ith sta0ehol"ers. BRIE. ANA,/SIS: &le#tions in 2010 are per#ei$e" as important by ma1ority of Venezuelans. This is the first opportunity for the opposition to %et ba#0 into a position of po,er, or at least %et the ele#toral seats (after boy#ottin% last parliamentary ele#tions of 2002 in the le%islature. The mo$e essentially han"e" the %o$ernment to 'ha$ez, ,ho pro#ee"e" to #entralize state apparatus un"er himself, in#lu"in% unitin% the "isparate left* leanin% parties into the 3nifie" So#ialist /arty of Venezuela (/S3V . Sin#e then the %o$ernment has sur$i$e" all attempts by the opposition to #hallen%e 'ha$ez4s po,er. This has in part been be#ause 'ha$ez maintaine" suffi#ient popularity to %ain a ma1ority in re#all referen"a an" ele#tions. The first point of ,ea0ness appeare" in De#ember 2005 ,hen a #onstitutional re,rite propose" by 'ha$ez ,as re1e#te" in a referen"um (all or nearly all elements of the propose" amen"ments ,ere later ena#te" by the (ational Assembly ,ithout $oter appro$al . Sin#e then 'ha$ez has #ontinue" to s#ore more $i#tories ** in#lu"in% the elimination of term limits on politi#ians ** ho,e$er, 'ha$ez has been losin% popularity in part "ue to the "e#line of the e#onomi# situation an" %ro,in% #rime rate an" in part be#ause his authoritarian measures ha$e #ause" s0epti#ism. (e$ertheless, the re%ime is hi%hly offensi$e in nature ,ith re%ar"s to the lar%ely fra%mente" an" strate%i#ally "i$i"e" opposition. The politi#al or%anizations left o$er from the fra%mente" "emo#rati# system that #ontrolle" the #ountry prior to 'ha$ez form the #ore of the Venezuelan politi#al opposition, ho,e$er, their su##ess has been limite" by the la#0 of unity, soun" strate%y an" $ariety of their in"i$i"ual %oals. As a result of the failures of the entren#he" politi#al parties to unite into a stron% opposition front to 'ha$ez or offer an alternati$e politi#al mo"el, non*formal opposition %roups to the re%ime are %ainin% more support. At this point it is un#lear ,hether they ,oul" be #apable to influen#e 2010. ele#tion results. The 0ey to the ele#tion results therefore, may lie in the 6uestion ,hether the Stu"ent 7roups an" other 8non*formal a#tors9 are #apable to buil" their infrastru#ture an" e:ploit their le%itima#y, ,or0 on ,i"er #oalition amon% themsel$es, #reate an" "e$elop soun" strate%y for the ele#tions ,ith its partners, "e$elop #ooperation ,ith prominent opposition lea"ers in or"er put a pressure on opposition parties to unite in forth#omin% ele#tions, #arry on mobilization an" 87et out to $ote #ampai%n9, repeat su##essful attempt to monitor an" report on the results from last referen"um, an" mobilize people to "efen" ele#toral results in the #ase of ele#tion frau" by the re%ime. (e$ertheless, the a%%ressi$e patterns of the 'ha$ez a"ministration ma0e it li0ely that there ,ill be attempts to un"ermine opposition politi#ians as mu#h as possible, in#lu"in% the possibility that some of most prominent opposition in"i$i"uals ,ill be barre" from #ampai%nin% ** a ta#ti# that has been utilize" ,ith effi#a#y in the past.

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A 0ey to 'ha$ez4s #urrent ,ea0ness is the "e#line in the ele#tri#ity se#tor. There is the %ra$e possibility that some 50 per#ent of the #ountry4s ele#tri#ity %ri" #oul" %o "ar0 as soon as April 2010. <ater le$els at the 7uris "am are "roppin%, an" 'ha$ez has been unable to re"u#e #onsumption suffi#iently to #ompensate for the "eterioratin% in"ustry. This #oul" be the ,atershe" e$ent, as there is little that 'ha$ez #an "o to prote#t the poor from the failure of that system. This ,oul" li0ely ha$e the impa#t of %al$anizin% publi# unrest in a ,ay that no opposition %roup #oul" e$er hope to %enerate. At that point in time, an opposition %roup ,oul" be best ser$e" to ta0e a"$anta%e of the situation an" spin it a%ainst 'ha$ez an" to,ar"s their nee"s. Allian#es ,ith the military #oul" be #riti#al be#ause in su#h a situation of massi$e publi# unrest an" re1e#tion of the presi"en#y, mal#ontent se#tors of the military ,ill li0ely "e#i"e to inter$ene, but only if they belie$e they ha$e suffi#ient support. This has been the pattern in the past three #oup attempts. <here the military thou%ht it ha" enou%h support, there ,as a failure in the publi# to respon" positi$ely (or the publi# respon"e" in the ne%ati$e , so the #oup faile". I: SITUATI N =ey &lements of A#tual Situation (politi#al, Soi#o;e#onomi#, .nternational an" military ! a />?.T.'A?! 1. 'ha$ez offensi$e $s. "efensi$e opposition an" partly a#ti$e (but mostly R&a#ti$e #i$il an" stu"ents %roups an" in"i$i"ual sub1e#ts in bussines an" me"ia. 2. &:isten#e of 8Demo#rati# fa@a"e9! throu%h in#rease" #on#entration of the publi# po,ers an" institutions. &$en in hi%hly #entralize" system ele#tions for parliament in 2010 are per#ei$e" 8important9 or 8$ery important9 by the ma1ority of population. A. Re%ime puttin% most of the resour#es to re*assure reele#tion throu%h "ire#t #ontrol o$er ele#toral po,er, use of state propa%an"a an" abusi$e use of the le%al apparatus (in#lu"in% restri#tions on potential opposition #an"i"ates some of ,hi#h ,ill be banne" from runnin% on the ele#tions. B. >pposition parties! per#ei$e" is ,ea0, ,or0in% for their o,n interests, relate" to former e#onomi# elites, unarti#ulate", un#lear an" ,ith ,ea0 lea"ership, ,ithout i"eas an" #re"ibility. /oliti#al parties an" #i$il so#iety4s ina#ti$e an" immobilize". =eepin% opposition runnin% in 8many lines9 on September ele#tions ,ill enable re%ime #an"i"ate4s easy $i#tory. There is spa#e for ne, i"eas an" politi#al mo$ements. a. 'ha$ez has repeate"ly presente" opposition parties as ,ea0, self*intereste" institutions that are finan#e" by the 3nite" States an" 'olombia. Ce has sai" the opposition feels 8embol"ene"9 by the 'olombian base a%reement an" propose" that opposin% parties4 po,er be limite" throu%h le%islation. Ce "i" not spe#ify ,hat this le%islation #oul" be. 'ha$ez has "enoun#e" alle%e" #oup plots by opposition lea"ers, presentin% himself as the only "efense a%ainst bloo"she" an" e:ploitation if the opposition returns to po,er. 'ha$ez is #areful to present opposition $i#tories as aberrations, su#h as after the De#. 2005 #onstitutional referen"um. b. >pposition members #laim that they ha$e been the tar%ets of %o$ernment le" harassment in the past. A##ion Demo#rati#a (AD Se#retary 7eneral Cenry Ramos Allup has sai" fe"eral in$esti%ati$e a%ents ha$e follo,e" him an" 7lobo$ision presi"ent 7uillermo Duloa%a #laime"

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the %o$ernment #onsi"ere" arrestin% him to silen#e his TV station. 3p to 25 persons ,ere arreste" "ue to a (o$. 200+ ban0 inter$ention an" nationalization, in#lu"in% former 'ha$ez ally Ri#ar"o Fernan"ez Earrue#o an" Arne 'ha#on, brother of former %o$ernment minister -esse 'ha#on. There are also #on#erns about the potential re"ra,in% of ele#toral "istri#ts in se$eral states to fa$or %o$ernment #an"i"ates ahea" of the 2010 parliamentary ele#tions. The #riteria for "efinin% ele#toral "istri#ts in some states for the 2010 ele#tions ha$e not yet been "efine". The un"efine" states potentially affe#te" by this re"istri#tin% are AnzoFte%ui, Ara%ua, Earinas, EolG$ar, 'arabobo, 7uFri#o, ?ara, Hiran"a, TF#hira, Dulia an" the #apital "istri#t of &l ?iberta"or. 3p to 2IJ of potential $oters are lo#ate" in the "istri#ts that are #urrently up for re$ision. 2. 8<innerKs * ?oserKs /er#eption9! &$en the $i#tories of the opposition, li0e those on Referen"um on 'onstitutional #han%es an" ,innin% the seats of Hayors an" 7o$ernors in lo#al ele#tions are effi#iently un"ermine" by re%ime, ,ho is still per#ei$e" to ha$e upper han". There is a stron% 8intan%ible fa#tor9 element amon% Venezuelan $oters to 8support the ,inner9, a. /resi"ent 'ha$ez has publi#ly #alle" for opposition to be limite" in up#omin% ele#tions, but has remaine" silent so far on e:a#tly ,hat the means to a#hie$in% this ,ill be. The Venezuelan 'omptroller 7eneral release" a list of 12A persons that, for "ifferent #rimes or infra#tions, ha$e been forbi""en from runnin% for or hol"in% publi# offi#e. The list spans the perio" from 2002*200+, ,ith t,o former %o$ernors of 7uari#o an" Hiran"a states re#ei$in% 12*year bans from politi#al life. .t is un#ertain ,hy most of the persons are on the list, as the offi#ial "o#ument "oes not state the reasons for their politi#al bans. Dulia %o$ernor /ablo /erez has publi#ly state" that the list is nothin% more than a metho" to ,ea0en non*/S3V parties ahea" of ele#tions. The /S3V lea"ership has state" that it e:pe#ts most of its 1B1 le%islators to be reele#te" in the Sept. 2) parliamentary ele#tions. ). =ey >pponents! Amon% institutions not*ali%ne" ,ith %o$ernment Stu"ents Ho$ement an" The 'hur#h are per#ei$e" as #re"ible, an" sho, stron%er support ratin% by the people that most of %o$ernmental institutions an" opposition parties. a. The stu"ent mo$ement has parti#ipate" in se$eral publi# hun%er stri0es, most re#ently in (o$. 200+ in front of the 'ara#as hea"6uarters of the >r%anization of Ameri#an States. The stu"ent mo$ement also allies itself ,ith other se#tors of so#iety in protests, ba#0in% %roups su#h as the Ara%ua le%islati$e #oun#il employees on stri0e. 7o$ernment a#tions a%ainst the stu"ent mo$ement in#lu"e attempts to #riminalize protests an" the o##asional shootin% "eaths of stu"ents, e$ents that ha$e prompte" massi$e protests in the past ** in#lu"in% a Dulia stu"ent lea"er in 200I an" a Ta#hira stu"ent ,as also shot by un0no,n %unmen at a protest in De#. 200+. Stu"ent mo$ements loyal to the %o$ernment also e:ist, su#h as the Frente 3ni$ersitario So#ialista "e Ta#hira, these %roups are 0no,n to re#ei$e a#ti$e %o$ernment support, an" often "emonstrations "esi%ne" to #ounter opposition protests ,ill in$ol$e the %o$ernment bussin% pro*%o$ernment stu"ents to sta%e the "emonstrations. 'ha$ez has "ismisse" anti*%o$ernment stu"ent mo$ements as 8opposition #annon fo""er9 an" has ba#0e" #laims by pro*%o$ernment stu"ents that paramilitaries are infiltratin% the

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stu"ent mo$ement. The stu"ent or%anizations remain perhaps the best opportunity to present a unite" front a%ainst the re%ime. b. The 'hur#h. The 'hur#h ,as finally too0 stan#e. Ar#hishop Roberto ?u#0ert sai" that the 'hur#h #annot remain in"ifferentL #ountry is hea"in% to,ar"s September ele#tions an" situation is #riti#al. 7ro,in% $iolen#e in the #ountry, #orruption, inflation are some of the problems Venezuelans shoul" fa#e. Venezuelans so#iety is seriously un"er threat, #ertain $alues an" prin#iples of the human bein% are un"er 6uestion, an" number of youn% people ,ho are loo0in% opportunity outsi"e Venezuela is %ro,in%.

5. 'ha$ez en1oys har"*#ore popular support by mostly the poor an" lo, e"u#ate" people, as ,ell as state employees. There is a stron% element of in"o#trination of follo,ers * 'ha$istas are #ontinuously fe" state propa%an"a in or"er to 0eep them bol" an" rea"y to a#t M in#lu"in% the physi#al a#ti$ity a%ainst opposition %roups. a. This may be #han%in% re#ent (an" as yet unrelease" polls sho, that 'ha$ez4s popularity has "e#line" "ramati#ally in the ,a0e of the ele#tri#ity #risis. The parliamentary ele#tions in September shoul" be #onsi"ere" as $ery important from another point of $ie,* 'ha$ez ,ill not be on the ballot. >f #ourse, 'ha$ez ,ill be tryin% to personalize ele#tions as mu#h as possible, but opposition ,ill ha$e an opportunity to atta#0 the re%ime ,ithout #onfrontin% 'ha$ez "ire#tly. .n that ,ay, opposition #oul" pro$i"e a better position for the presi"ential ele#tion 2011, if they #ome out unifie" in September an" ta0e o$er some of the 100J 'ha$istas #ontrolle" parliament. >pposition ,ill ha$e to pro$i"e a politi#al alternati$e, to be unifie", an" #onne#te" to the people. /opularity of 'ha$ez politi# is lo,est in past se$en yearsL 1ust A) per#ent of Venezuelans appro$e his performan#e. These ele#tions are har" to pre"i#t be#ause there is a lar%e number of un"e#i"e" $oters, about N of $oters "on4t 0no, for ,hom they ,ill $ote for an" they #oul" be mo$e" by last minute e$ent. >pposition nee"s to ,in 2A*22J of the $ote to ,in 20J of the seats, an" anythin% is possible.

b S>'.A? A(D &''>(>H.'! 1. >il base" e#onomi# resour#es, use" for #o$erin% basi# nee"s an" so#ial #ontrol sho,s its ,ea0ness as pri#es of oil #ontinue to fall on ,orl" Har0et. This pro"u#es plenty of "iffi#ulties for the almost e:#lusi$ely >il base" e#onomy. 'riti#s a##use 'ha$ezOs %o$ernment of se$ere in#ompeten#e an" #orruption, an" many people are unhappy that VenezuelaOs oil*"ri$en e#onomy remains in a re#ession ,hile all other South Ameri#an #ountries are seein% %ro,th 2. Ci%h inflation rate #auses e#onomi# "e#line, ,hi#h is refle#te" in %ro,in% "issatisfa#tion amon% people. Eut, 'ha$ez irresponsible politi#s is not re#o%nize" as a main reason for faile" e#onomy, an" ma1ority of the population are a##usin% #orrupt ministers, bureau#rats, an" forei%n po,ers. .f opposition #oul" #han%e this ,i"esprea" opinion, it ,oul" attra#t the poor an" lo, e"u#ate" people ,ho are the 'ha$ezPs stron% support.

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2. Violent #rime is $ery #ommon in Venezuela. a. .n the first 11 months of 200+, Venezuela ha" 12,225 homi#i"es. &arlier this month, .nterior an" -usti#e Hinistry "ire#tor of se#urity an" sur$eillan#e Caitam Sabe#0 ,as shot si: times in an apparent theft. =i"nappin% is also a ma1or an" %ro,in% problem, thou%h the e:a#t numbers are not 0no,n "ue to ,i"esprea" un"erreportin%. This #rime situation is e:a#erbate" by the failure of the la, enfor#ement to a#t, an" in many #ases la, enfor#ement offi#ials are a#tually the perpetrators of the #rimes. A. 'ontinuation of 8(ationalisation9 #arrie" by state a%ainst "omesti# an" international business se#tor "eteriorates the situation in e#onomy. Hore firm proofs that9 The State is in fa#t $ery ba" mana%er9 are 8spin9 by state propa%an"a but #onse6uen#es are %ettin% re#o%nize" by employers. B. .n#rease of use of 8'oer#i$e /illars9 by the re%ime! 3se of fear an" e#onomi# "epen"en#y as tools for so#ial #ontrol. /ressure to,ar"s Eusiness an" 3nion Asso#iations, alon% ,ith the 'hur#h, &na#tment of repressi$e la,s, Cuman Ri%hts are $iolate" an" not %uarantee". There is a risin% le$el of Dis#rimination a%ainst "issi"ents a. T,o main metho"s by ,hi#h the #limate of fear an" "epen"en#y are #reate" is throu%h the fabri#ation of the threat of international in$asion, an" the use of e#onomi# pressure. The possibility of atta#0 from the 3nite" States an" its ally 'olombia are #onstantly bein% raise" by 'ha$ez an" his %o$ernment. .n Au%ust 200+, he sai" that the military nee"e" to be rea"y for a #onfrontation ,ith 'olombia, be#ause the 3S plans to e:pan" their presen#e there pose" a threat. Eusinesses are threatene" an" fre6uently nationalize". Threats on business are rife, as Venezuela has use" the nationalization of ban0s in the #ountry to arrest ,ealthy ban0 o,ners (althou%h there are in"i#ations this ,as relate" to a personal $en"etta . 'ha$ez also re#ently threatene" to seize businesses that raise" pri#es after the "e$aluation of Venezuela4s #urren#y. b. /ressure on "issi"ents #omes in a number of "ifferent forms. The %o$ernment has $iolently bro0en up protests an" rallies, as ha$e pro*%o$ernment %roups. A""itionally, opposition %roups an" politi#ians are harasse" in a number of ,ays. 'ha$ez has a##use" the opposition %o$ernor of Ta#hira of se#essionism an" attempte" to remo$e him from offi#e. The opposition mayor of Hara#aibo, Hanuel Rosales, ,as for#e" into e:ile. #. The Venezuelan &pis#opal 'onferen#e ('&V seems to be the reli%ious institution most oppose" to the %o$ernment in Venezuela. '&V lea"ers ha$e #riti#ize" the %o$ernment for its mishan"lin% of so#ial problems su#h as #rime an" its attempt to outla, publi# protests. '&V has publi#ly si"e" ,ith persons affe#te" by ban0 nationalizations an" ,ith politi#al prisoners. The 'hristian Demo#rati# party '>/&. is another sour#e of reli%ious opposition an" is lin0e" to the Demo#ra#ia 'ristiana 3ni$ersitaria mo$ement in the uni$ersities. '>/&. has most re#ently atta#0e" %o$ernment monetary "e$aluation, #laimin% it ,ill be

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use" to finan#e re$olutionary pro1e#ts in (i#ara%ua instea" of benefittin% Venezuelans. '>/&. is a self*"es#ribe" 'hristian Demo#rat an" #entrist party. 2. Hass He"ia un"er #ensorship an" a self*infli#te" #ensorship. ?imite" free"om of e:pression. 'ontinuous #ra#0"o,n on pri$ate me"ia in or"er to narro, the politi#al spa#e a$ailable for the opposition. a. 7lobo$ision tele$ision ,as atta#0e" by supporters of the rulin% party in Au%ust, ,hi#h the "ire#tor of 7lobo$ision blame" on 'ha$ez. The %o$ernment re$o0e" the li#enses of 2B0 ra"io station in -uly, in a mo$e that ,as seen as an attempt to silen#e $oi#es #riti#al of 'ha$ez. b. .n -anuary 2010. R'TV, Ra"io 'ara#as Tele$ision of Venezuela "roppe" pro%rammin% un"er threat of losin% their li#enses. A tele#ommuni#ations la, passe" last year re6uires #able #ompanies to #onform to the same rules as broa"#ast #hannels, in#lu"in% transmission of 'ha$ez spee#hes. R'TV "i" not sho, an appearan#e by the presi"ent at a politi#al rally, an" station is banne" for $iolatin% a la,. The "isappearan#e of R'TV from #able menus pro$o0e" stu"ents protest for atta#0in% free"om of e:pression. <ith the e:#eption of 7lobo$ision, most net,or0s ha$e respon"e" to %o$ernment pressures, a"1ustin% their ne,s #o$era%e. Ey rene,in% its atta#0 on R'TV, %o$ernment is ris0in% of more support to,ar" opposition. ). Ci%h le$el of positi$e e:pe#tations of opportunities, "eterioratin% publi# #onfi"en#e in state institutions "espite 'ha$ez stea"y #harisma, #onfrontational "is#ourse, populism an" "ema%o%y 5. 3se of non*#on$entional #onfrontation a%ainst #on$entional or%anizations #arrie" out by the re%ime.

A .(T&R(AT.>(A? A(D H.?.TARQ! 1. Allian#e ,ith 'uba an" other strate%i# #ountries, su#h as! .ran, 'hina, ?ibya, et#R (repla#ement of Venezuelans ,ith non*Venezuelans M Cuman resour#e an" s0ills an" 0no,le"%e Relati"n& 0it* Iran: Venezuela "e$elope" #loser ener%y partnerships ,ith .ran in 200+, enterin% into a fuel "eli$ery a%reement throu%h ,hi#h Venezuela ple"%e" to "eli$er shipments of up to 20,000 barrels of %asoline to .ran. .ran also ple"%e" to in$est S5)0 million in the Dobo0ubi an" Aya#u#ho oil fiel"s in Venezuela. There are #ontinuous rumors that .ran an" Venezuela are #ooperatin% in uranium e:ploration in Venezuela to supplement the relati$ely small reser$es of uranium that .ran #urrently has. There ha$e also been alle%ations that .ranian militant pro:ies su#h as Cezbollah an" Camas #oul" be usin% Venezuela as a trainin% %roun" an" as a ,ay to raise fun"s throu%h "ru% smu%%lin%. Relati"n& 0it* C*ina: Venezuela a%ree" to ship )A0,000 barrels of #ru"e oil per month to 'hina in 2010. A #ommission to re$ie, 1oint 'hinese*Venezuelan #onstru#tion pro1e#ts ,as establishe" in

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De#. 200+. The #ommission ,ill reporte"ly re$ie, ener%y, te#hnolo%i#al, e#onomi# an" politi#al #ooperation a%reements. 'hina4s interest in Venezuela is relati$ely peripheral. The ener%y a%reements are primarily for 'hina to se#ure from Venezuela the orimulsion te#hnolo%y so that ,hen it "e$elops other hea$y an" sour oil "eposits, it ,ill be able to pro#ess the #ru"e into fuel. So ,hile 'hina appears to be 6uite intereste" in Venezuela, it is primarily for its o,n e#onomi# purposes. Relati"n& 0it* R!&&ia an+ arm& p!rc*a&e&! Venezuela has ma"e a%reements for more than S) billion ,orth of arms pur#hases from Russia. .n a""ition to pur#hases of fi%hter 1ets an" other military e6uipment, 'ha$ez re#ently announ#e" in (o$. 200+ that shipments of armore" $ehi#les an" antiair#raft systems ha" alrea"y be%un arri$in%. 'onstru#tion also be%an on a Russian*ba#0e" =alashni0o$ fa#tory in the state of Ara%ua. The =alashni0o$s are reporte"ly "estine" to arm the militia or%anizations that support the re%ime.

2. 'ha$ez 8#rusa"e 8a%ainst 83S imperialism9 pro$i"es him ,ith #harisma in the re%ion an" aroun" the ,orl", mimi#0in% the rhetori# of 'uba4s Fi"el 'astro. There is #ontinuous (ational an" .nternational 'ommuni#ations #ampai%n #arrie" out by the re%ime, in or"er to e:ploit anti*3S sentiment in the #ountry an" internationally (/artly harme" after 8Satan Eush9 lea$in% offi#e for more internationally popular an" %enerally more mo"erate presi"ent >bama . A. (eutralization an" #ontrol of the Hilitary, also throu%h #reation of reser$e troop un"er 'ha$ez4s "ire#t #ontrol. Formation of /arallel politi#al enfor#ement or%anizations, su#h as Eoli$arian street mobs, the Eoli$arian Arme" Front, Reser$e Army. These or%anizations ser$e as a #he#0 on both the population an" the military. Any mo$e to stri0e at 'ha$ez4s rule throu%h a #oup ,oul" be met ,ith arme" resistan#e ,ithin the #ities an" from the #ountrysi"e. a. %SUV S"ciali&t %atr"l&: The #reation of /S3V so#ialist patrols ,as announ#e" in -uly 200+ in &l ?iberta"or, but their ultimate purpose an" operations remain un#lear. /S3V patrols are reporte"ly #ompose" of 20*A0 persons an" are #reate" aroun" the employees of %o$ernment institutions, namely /DVSA. These persons are meant to 8"efen" national so$erei%nty an" the re$olutionary pro1e#t,9 a##or"in% to the mayor of &l ?iberta"or. /S3V so#ialist patrols ha$e parti#ipate" alon%si"e %o$ernment sol"iers in the -an. 200+ #ra#0"o,n on alle%e" spe#ulators an" pri#e manipulators in the ,a0e of the "e$aluation of the boli$ar. b. C"mite& +e De'en&a Inte-ral #Inte-ral De'en&e C"mmittee&$: These %roups ,ill form part of the (ational Hilitia (H(E . The #ommittees are meant to be a#ti$ate" by the presi"ent in times of #risis an" are to be or%anize" an" traine" by H(E members. >pposition %roups ha$e sai" these are li0ely to be use" to put "o,n protests instea" of for national "efense. /DVSA reporte"ly alrea"y has its o,n militias #omprise" of employees. The inte%ral "efense #ommittees ha$e been atta#0e" by (7>s. #. B"li1arian Nati"nal 2ilitia #2NB$: The H(E is ,hat the army reser$es are no, #alle", but their role has shifte" from simply supplementin% the stren%th of the a#ti$e military units to that of trainin% the .nte%ral Defense 'ommittees. The ne, role of the reser$es ,as reporte"ly #on#ei$e" in 2002, in the ,a0e of the 2002 #oup a%ainst 'ha$ez. This reform is a result of the 200I ?ey >r%ani#a "e la Fuerza Arma"a (>r%ani# ?a, of the Arme" For#es. 'ompulsory one*year military ser$i#e for Venezuelans a%e" 1I*)0 is also part of the le%islation.

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1. 2. A. B. 2. ). 5. I.

IIC*a1e34& pillar& "' &!pp"rt #(ey In&tit!ti"n& an+ "r-ani3ati"n& &!pp"rtin- t*e act!al re-ime$: Hilitary an" /oli#e. -u"i#iary an" Euero#ra#y. >il .n"ustry an" other nationalize" e#onomy se#tors &"u#ational System. He"ia '(& Forei%n re%ional A#tors! 'uba an" Eoli$ia Forei%n 7lobal A#tors! Russia an" .ran

... =ey /layers an" /otential Allies .n"i$i"uals #onsi"ere" by this analysis are #omin% from "ifferent parties, but as in #ase of Serbia are #onsi"ere" to be important either be#ause of formal ele#te" positions (thou%h Hayoral po,ers are hea$ily "iminishe" by #entral %o$ernment ,ith a set of re%ulations after opposition Hayors has too0 their offi#es in (o$ember 200I , or be#ause of their authority an" %ro,in% potential. Follo,in% the su%%este" mo"el of 3nity buil"in% use" effi#iently in Serbia, mo$ement 3nity efforts shoul" fo#us first on sele#te" prominent in"i$i"uals, an" then, e$entually to the apparatus of 12 opposition parties an" numerous or%anizations liste" as 8potential allies9. 1. Ant"ni" ,e+e3ma, 2ay"r "' Caraca&,an" lea"er of the #entre*left Fearless /eople4s Allian#e, potential role mo"el for %atherin% in the #apitol, as ,ell as "e$elopin% #ommon strate%y ,ith mo$ement from the formal position 2. Carl"& E+!ar+" cari3 5ar. &:*H/, has be#ome a politi#al referen#e of the opposition to /resi"ent Cu%o 'hF$ez. .n the ele#tions hel" on (o$ember 2A in 200I ,as ele#te" to the post of mayor of the Su#re muni#ipality in 'ara#as. As Su#re represents 8typi#al 'ha$istas en$ironment9 ,ith hu%e number of barrios an" hi%h #rime rate this is role mo"el for su##essful battle%roun" efforts ,hi#h, if su##essfully e:ploite" by mo$ement #an apply to other parts of the #ountry, spatially in mobilizin% poorest #itizens. 'ha$ez is V&RQ a,are of this potential an" therefore fo#use" on >#ariz an" Su#re re%ion. 3. 6enri7!e Caprile& Ra+"n&)i, %o$ernor of Hiran"a State, ,ith authority sprea"in% to his pre$ious ele#toral base of Earuta Huni#ipality an" e:perien#e from /arliament ,here he has ser$e" as youn%est ele#te" member in pre$ious term. 4. ,e"p"l+" ,8pe3 2en+"3a, pre$ious mayor of the 'ha#ao Huni#ipality of 'ara#as, later banne" from runnin% by the %o$ernment. Ce also #arries symboli# an" e:ploitable relationship to Simon Eoli$ar, as ,ell as re#0o%nizable international me"ia attention.

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5. Ale9an+ra Belan+ria, stu"ent a#ti$ist an" TV 1ournalist, one of foun"in% members of 8'AHE.>9 %roup ,hi#h ,as initially mobilizin% pre$iously neutral an" ina#ti$e stu"ents in 200) an" 2005. (8an#estor9 of the %roups %roups ,hi#h later booste" in stu"ent mo$ent as ,e 0no, it to"ay. 7reat plannin% s0ills an" $ariety of e:perien#e in #ommunity or%anizin%, in#lu"in% series of 8>T/>R9 li0e pro$o#ati$e an" humorous a#ti$ities in barrios. 6. /"n :"ic"ec*ea, Venezuelan la, stu"ent at 3ni$ersi"a" 'atTli#a An"rUs Eello an" a#ti$e in the opposition to the %o$ernment of Venezuelan presi"ent Cu%o 'ha$ez. 7oi#oe#hea ,as one of the main or%anizers of the Ho$imiento &stu"iantil Venezolano (Venezuelan Stu"ent Ho$ement #ite" as a 0ey fa#tor in the re1e#tion of 'ha$ezOs propose" #onstitutional #han%es in the De#ember 2005 Venezuelan #onstitutional referen"um.

,i&t "' p"tential "pp"&iti"n allie& t" be c"n&i+ere+ in t*e campai-n: 1. /oliti#al parties that ,ill oppose 'ha$ez on &le#tions (hopefully unite" . 2. Stu"ent an" 'i$il 7roups, potentially a#ti$e in mobilization of youth, 7et >ut To Vote 'ampai%n an" 8#ontrol the ballot bo:es an" "efen" the $otes9 a#ti$ities. A. He"ia! .n"epen"ent, forei%n, B. 7uil"s, 3nions an" /rofessional Asso#iations! 1ournalists, me"i#al, en%ineerin%, la,. 2. Fe"era#ion 'ampesina ). Fe"era#ion Venezolana "e Haestros 5. Fe"e#amaras I. Fe"ena%as +. &ntertainment an" #ultural a#tors (fin" out if they are or%anize" 10. .mmi%rant #ommunities in V& (Aso#ia#ion .talo*Venezolana, Cerman"a" 7alle%a, et#R 11. (ei%hborhoo" Asso#iations 12. Asamblea "e 'iu"a"anos ("is#uss politi#al situations 1A. Asamblea "e /a"res y Representantes 1B. Fe y Ale%ria 12. Di$i"en"o Voluntario para la 'omuni"a" 1). Rotary 'lub 15. Sports #ommunities (baseball players in the 3S, F.FA 1I. Former oil ,or0ers an" e:e#uti$es 1+. 'atholi# 'hur#h 20. 3ni$ersity Fa#ulty Hembers .V ?ist of issues ,ith potential to be e:ploite" in the #ampai%n! 1. 'rime an" inse#urity! 1I000 mur"ers a year an" #omplete areas in barrios un%o$ernable by se#urity for#e. The Situation has tremen"ously "eteriorate" sin#e 200). &le#tions "ramati#ally! Reason for #han%e 2. &"u#ation! 7o$ernment is ta0in% o$er the e"u#ation system! /rofessors nee" to %et fire" up. They ,ill ha$e to lose their 1obs or submitV They nee" to be en#oura%e" an" there ,ill be a ris0. <e ,ill ha$e to #on$in#e them that ,e hol" them to the hi%hest le$els of so#ietyL they hol" the most $alue"

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A. B. 2. ). 5. I.

responsibility. Tea#hers ,ill moti$ate the stu"ents. <ho ,ill influen#e themW Co, ,ill ,e tou#h themW Qouth! The messa%e nee"s to be tailore" to,ar"s the youn% people, not 1ust uni$ersity stu"ents. &#onomy! >il is Venezuela4s, not the %o$ernment4s, it4s your money, is your ri%htV <elfare an" So#ial Se#urity. <omen! <hat "o mothers ,antW Rule of ?a,, poli#e un"er lo#al authorities. <e ,ill allo#ate the ne#essary resour#es. <e "on4t ,ant any more thu%s. Transportation! <or0ers nee" to be able to rea#h their 1obs. .t4s your money. <e nee" to be able to hol" %o$ernment a##ountable, an" ,e #annot "o it as it is ri%ht no,. 7o$ernment! Re"istribution of ,ealth, e$eryone must see an opportunity. T*ere i& a &tr"n- pre&i+entiali&t tren+ in Vene3!ela; Can 0e c*an-e it< 6"0 can 0e 0"r) 0it* it<

'>('?3S.>(! Detaile" analysis of the situation shoul" be #omplete" "ue to en" September 2010. <ith rele$ant sta0ehol"ers, an" use" for further analythi#;plannin% purposes. D" n"t cite "r Di&trib!te 0it*"!t pri"r c"n&!ltati"n; Eel%ra"e, September 2010. 'entre For Applie" (on$iolent A#tion An" Strate%ies, #opyri%hts reser$e".

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