Paul Morphy and the Evolution of Chess Theory

1859

Introduction

Paul Morphy needs little introduction. This opening sentence from the Batsford reprint of Lowenthal’s classic Morphy’s Games of Chess fairly reflects a popular modem attitude. Morphy was, after all, the most famous chess player ever. Certainly the outline of his story is familiar to all chess players: The Pride and Sorrow of Chess; the great natural player who came from nowhere to conquer his countrymen and later to vanquish the greatest masters of Europe. Too soon afterwards he withdrew from competition, failed as a lawyer, failed in private life generally suffered delusions, died young. But we celebrate the queen sacrifice by which Morphy pried open Louis Paulsen’s king position. We remember how he sacrificed practically everything to mate the Duke of Brunswick, between acts at a Paris opera. What more is there to know?

Indeed I thought I needed no introduction to Paul Morphy. But when I finally got around to a more comprehensive study of his play, I was surprised to discover how many of the games that I had not been shown previously were, in their own manner, more interesting than the usual anthology pieces. Morphy’s brilliancies, for all their beauty and instructional value, lack something in the way of drama and struggle. They’re just a bit too elegant, too fine. It’s hard to imagine them as games actually played in the atmosphere of hope and fear that animates over-the-board chess. On the other hand, if the unknown Morphy games lack that glittering final combination needed to ensure their immortality, it’s all the more fascinating to see Morphy’s familiar combinative vision straining against the rich uncertainty of practical play.

I offer this book as a guide through Paul Morphy’s chess - not the greatest games tourist route, but also the back streets where real struggles were decided. (Which is not to say we won’t glimpse some historical landmarks too!) Part I reflects upon some popular preconceptions and prejudices concerning the pride and sorrow of chess, where they came from, and the very different impressions that can arise from examining Paul Morphy’s games first hand. Part II presents every available Morphy game, collected together in an English language volume for the first time. (Throughout the book, braces {} indicate a reference to a game score from Part II.) Finally, for added historical perspective, Part III makes available some thoughts on Paul Morphy by two of chess’s greatest champions, Wilhelm Steinitz and Alexander Alekhine.

I am indebted to Dale Brandreth for access to this latter material and the various illustrations, all of which appear with his permission. More generally, I am indebted to many analysts and authors whose work I consulted. Most are acknowledged in the text when I quote a particular variation or evaluation. Three sources deserve special mention here, each of them having been essential to the creation of Paul Morphy and the Evolution of Chess Theory. If this volume is found to contribute materially to the body of Morphy literature, that will be largely thanks to the foundation they provided:

Morphy’s Games of Chess. By J. J. Lowenthal. London, 1860.

Paul Morphy. By Geza Maroczy. Leipzig,1909.

Morphy’s Games of Chess. By Philip W. Sergeant. 3rd ed., London, 1919.

My trusty Olms reprint of Maroczy’s book is the source for the bulk of Part II’s game scores. However, I also incorporated many corrections and additions that have surfaced during the eighty-plus years since Maroczy first published. I found these mainly in books by Philip Sergeant, David Lawson, and some scattered magazine articles by Andrew Soltis (in which he too acknowledges Lawson as a source).

Macon Shibut

December, 1992

PART I - Analysis

1

Paul Morphy and the Play of Our Time

Paul Morphy’s masterpieces are ubiquitous in chess literature. Couple that with the brevity of his career, and it’s easy for students to imagine they already know every Morphy game. In truth, most chess players probably have seen only a few dozen - but these they’ve seen a hundred times apiece.

Too often a champion’s legacy derives from a minuscule, unrepresentative sample of his total product. In Morphy’s case especially, the public has been conditioned to believe his games were all brilliancies and none of his contemporaries could make him break a sweat. This impression began to arise even while Morphy was still active. It was well-established by the time he died in 1884, at just forty-seven years of age. One year later, Wilhelm Steinitz attempted to impart some perspective on the Morphy Myth with his essay, Paul Morphy and the Play of His Time. Writing in his International Chess Magazine, Steinitzargued that,

By mixing up Morphy’s blindfold, off-hand, and odds games with those of his serious encounters against strong masters, popular prejudice has [wrongly] credited Morphy with the faculty of creating positions against his strongest opponents, in which brilliant sacrifices formed a distinct feature...

But a popular prejudice, once entrenched, is not easily displaced. Steinitz’s essay attracted notice and controversy in its day, but few modem players have had an opportunity to read it. Meanwhile, everyone has seen Morphy’s famous game with the Duke of Brunswick! Thus a handful of Morphy’s light workouts, against mostly weak amateurs, have come to be esteemed as the standard of 19th century master chess.

There are over four hundred recorded Morphy games. In setting out to explore them, a modem player will want to treat each move and each position with an open mind, to play the board, not the man. In this regard, analysis of older games demands a special psychological discipline. The truth is that we do possess hindsight knowledge, not only regarding a particular game, but the players’ whole careers and the age in which they played. Like it or not, this knowledge tends to intrude into the domain of objective analysis.

For example, old fashioned openings invoke a prejudice in modem players. The resulting middlegame structures look unsophisticated, and it becomes all too easy to substitute historical perspective (he played thus because they didn’t understand pawn weaknesses back then...) for hard analysis.

Knowing the outcome of a game can likewise distort our assessment of its individual moves. The loser’s mistakes will be mechanically identified and condemned; the winner’s exploitation will be accepted uncritically. This danger exists even when dealing with modem games. The tendency is exacerbated with a game from another era, all the more so if a near-mythical figure like Morphy is involved. Annotators who want to educate or entertain are not interested in tearing apart an instructive Morphy combination. Rather, they want to find characteristic errors in the opponents’ play, and they want the hero’s consequent victory to seem a matter of course (and the more elegantly achieved, the better).

The effect of such presentations in countless beginner’s texts has been to reduce Morphy’s games to a collection of fables. Their moral is understood to be something about developing pieces, or the evils of chasing pawns in the opening. Whatever the pedagogical value of such portrayals, the games, so presented, can’t help but appear shallow compared to modem grandmaster warfare.

The contrast between black-and-white morality plays of the 19th century, and the rich ambiguity of modem chess, is often ascribed to evolution in strategic understanding. Even back in 1885, Steinitz emphasized that, it would be misleading if we were to represent Morphy’s play as a model for our time, when, as a matter of fact, the game has made progress since his period in all directions. While there can be no denying the effect of this progress, it doesn’t follow that modem play should seem more complex in a subjective sense. The impression that Morphy played a somehow simpler variety of chess has more to do with the fact that his games are rarely subjected to serious analysis nowadays, and their appearance in the literature is mainly limited to primers. On the other hand, there are many Morphy games that haven’t been embraced by anthology editors and textbook writers precisely due to the difficulty and obscurity of the play, which renders them unsuitable for such books. Even some of Morphy’s better-known efforts don’t seem so cut-and-dried once subjected to the sort of probing investigation that is popular today.

Morphy - de Riviere Paris 1863

Position after 8...Be7

A move indicative of the era in which it was played. In his Morphy’s Games of Chess, Philip Sergeant cheekily observed how, in nothing was Morphy so fortunate as the frequency with which his opponents played P-R3. But Morphy himself was more apt to play this move than would be a modern master. So we have here a concrete example of evolution in strategic understanding; today, beginners are warned against such wastes of tempo. But as we shall see, such inaccuracies don’t render the ensuing play transparent. Moreover, it’s one thing to criticize on the strength of theory and general principles, and quite another to assess the merits of a particular move in a specific position. So here, how much better are the modern alternatives to Morphy’s 9th move? A modem grandmaster might consider 9. Qf3 0-0 10. e5?!

Position after 10. e5 (analysis)

But then 10...Ng4! 11. Nc6 Ne5 12. Ne5 de5 13. Rd1 Qc8 14. Qe2 f6 15. Be3 Be6 gave Black a good position in Tal-Böök, Stockholm 1961. Incidentally this variation even reveals some purpose behind Morphy’s choice! 10. Re1 (instead of 10. e5) would have been more patient, but then Black could play either 10...Rb8 or 10...Re8 to get an acceptable game.

9. b3 introduces another possible plan that might appeal to modem tastes.

Position after 9. b3 (analysis)

9...0-0 10. Bb2 Re8 11. Re1 Bf8 12. Qd3 g6 13. Rad1 Bg7 is a plausible continuation. Other moves are possible of course, but we can say this for Black’s position: It looks no worse than what he might get from some topical Lopez defense.

Opening manuals condemn the Steinitz Defense as cramped, lifeless, etc. But most of the great champions found a place for it in their repertoires at one time or another.

Position after 14...Bf6

Bg7 was a sensible alternative.

By 19...f5! Black could apply meaningful pressure against the center, the tactical justification being 20. e5? Qh3. But the text move is fine also, a fact that has been obscured by those annotators who were already looking for the seed of Black’s defeat!

Position after 24...Qd8

Because the pawn may be lost eventually, this decision of Morphy’s has been portrayed as a dynamic, risk-loving enterprise. Actually, there was little choice since the only alternative, 25. ed6 cd6, gives Black an easy game.

Inaccurate. White should play 26. Nd5!

Position after 26. Nd5 (analysis)

The tactical point is 26...Re6? 27. Nd4! Re1 28. Nc6, favoring White. If instead 26...Qc8 White could transpose to the game by 27. Ng1 or try to improve by 27. Nec3!? In any event, he avoids the possibility in the next note.

26...Bc3 27. Bc3 was not good either. For instance, in Morphy’s Chess Masterpieces, Reinfeld and Soltis show that both 26...Ng7 28. e7! Qd7 (or 28...Re7 29. Bf6 Re2 30. Qe2 Qf6 31. Qe7) 29. Bf6; and 27...Be4 Ne4 surrounding White’s pawn, would have secured a plus.

Position after 26...Nf6 (analysis)

White can’t reply 27. Nd5 as 27...Nd5 28. cd5 Bb5 wins the exchange. The protected passed pawn would offer no real compensation because Black can dissolve the center with ...c6 whenever he feels ready.

White’s point is 27...Re6? 28. Ne7 etc.

Opposing on the long diagonal takes the sting out of both ...Nd5 (see the game) and ...Ne4 (see the next note).

The complications would favor White after 28...Ne4?! 29. Bg7 Kg7 30. Re4! For example:

Position after 30. Re4 (analysis)

30...fe4? 31. Qc3 Kh6 (if 31...Kg8 32. Nf6 Kf8 33. Nh7! Kg8 34. Nf6 Kf8 35. Nd7! Bd7 (or 35...Kg8 36. Qf6) 36. Qf6 Kg8 37. Qg6 Kh8 38. Qf6 Kh7 39. Qf7 Kh8 (39...Kh6 40. g4!) 40. ed7) 32. Nf6 (32. f5 looks good too) Re6 33. Ng4 Kh5 34. Qg7, White wins.

30...Bd5 f6 and Qe3 White’s attack is irresistible.

It was natural that de Riviere preferred not to allow cd5, reconnecting the pawn on e6. But neither the text nor 29...Nb4 30. Qc3 was fully satisfactory for him. 29...Kg7! was best after all, and on 30. cd5 Bb5 31. Qc3 Kg8 32. Rf3, Black could undermine the pawn chain by 32...c6.

Here also Black should have cut off the pawn by 32...Be4. Then 33. Ree4 fe4 34. Qf6 Qd7 35. Qf7 Kh8 36. Rh4 looks menacing but 36...h5! proves to be a surprisingly tough defense. If 37. Qg6 Re7. Or if 37. Re4 (winning without much trouble according to Reinfeld and Soltis) Qf5! White has no obvious win.

Position after 32...Qa6

Morphy elects to dissolve the kingside. But Black can evacuate the danger zone, and White winds up exposing his own king. 34. Qe3! was much stronger. For example, 34...Bd7 35. Nf3 h6 36. Rh4, etc.

Perhaps 38. Qb8? was Morphy’s original plan, but it would have backfired after 38...Qa2 39. Kg3 g5! So White must surrender the initiative.

Qe1 doesn’t seem any safer) Qa5 43. Qg7 Re8 with all variety of unpleasant threats (Qe1; Re1; Re3).

Here de Riviere merely compounds his difficulties by making his queen passive, whereas from a6 her threat to take a2 or worm in on the dark squares (Q-a5-e1/c3) was irritating to White. It would have been preferable to unashamedly retract his previous move by 41...Bc6!

Very poor, leaving the Black king at least as exposed as Morphy’s, not to mention weakening the queenside pawns. 42...Bb1 was still a fight, at least.

Finally, de Riviere jettisons his g-pawn in the hope of exposing Morphy’s king. But the prospects for such a sacrifice are much worse than they would have been at move 40!

Maybe 48...Qh6 was a little better, although to immediately trade queens would be no endorsement of Black’s pawn sacrifice.

Position after 53...Kc8

It takes a lot of mistakes to lose a chess game! Black should maneuver his queen, beginning 54...Qa1 or 54...Qd2. The text wastes time, as White can just reposition his queen with check and continue pushing the g-pawn.

Now the knight does a capital job shielding the White king.

Position after 63...Qd4

So Morphy wins, as he usually did, but the analysis reveals that it was no walk in the park. On the contrary, both sides had chances, and there is little evidence of Morphy coasting on a technique not equaled until the 1870s, to quote The Oxford Companion to Chess. Even some seemingly powerful moves (e.g. 24. g4 - Breaks up the king’s side pawns, to start the final attack, in the judgment of Chernev) appear to be not the best, upon closer scrutiny. Still, Morphy won.

The overall structure of this game was not unlike something that could arise from a modem opening system. Other examples look more dated in this respect.; but they too have aged well as absorbing, intense struggles. Moreover, some of these contests can help us to place the question of Morphy’s brilliance in proper context. In some old issues of Shakmatny Vestnik (Chess Bulletin), Alexander Alekhine discussed the fallacy, as he considered it, of seeing the center of gravity of Morphy’s game in its beauty. Alekhine wrote:

Yes, Morphy sometimes played beautifully (if by this you mean the creation of cheap effects like sacrificing the queen with the calculation of two or three moves, etc.), but for the most part he succeeded in doing this only against opponents having a very remote idea of the necessity for a normal development of the pieces, and in general rather weak in consideration. When he encountered players of his own class, he no longer achieved victories with these rattles.

But victories he did still achieve, and when victory was not possible, he often snatched half a point even from desperate-looking positions. He collected his points thanks not so much to his brilliance but, rather, the fact that at moments of crisis, he was a tougher infighter than any of his rivals.

Again quoting Alekhine:

In the sixties and seventies of the last century in London, and principally in Paris where the traditions of Philidor were alive, where the immortal works of Labourdonnais and McDonnell were still remembered, at the time, finally when Anderssen was living - beauty alone could scarcely have astonished anyone. Strength, Morphy’s unconquerable strength - that is the reason for his success and the guarantee of his immortality. And that the essence of that strength consists of the fact that Morphy always played positionally goes without saying, in the broad sense of the word ... That is, he clearly pictured to himself in each separate instance just what the given position required, and adopted himself to these requirements.

We examine the following game with these remarks in mind. The opponent, Lowenthal, was among the world’s leading masters, i.e. a reasonable claimant to membership in Morphy’s own class. Still, he was not Paul Morphy, and modern students may reflexively give benefitof the doubt to White’s (Morphy’s) moves, while always dropping the burden of proof onto the poor underdog. Prejudged this way Morphy’s sacrificial attack might easily be interpreted as typically brilliant and daring. But a sober analysis reveals a different state of affairs. The introductory phase of the attack is, in fact, positionally incorrect, so that Morphy soon found himself in grave danger. But he appraised this situation correctly and recognized that extreme risks were justified, indeed there was hardly anything left to lose. In this light, the sacrificial phase that followed is revealed to be a desperate scrapping for chances, during which Morphy’s true strength showed itself and the lost game was saved.

Morphy - Lowenthal London 1859

More about this later!

While it may not be so familiar to modern players, this Normal Position of the Evans Gambit was a staple in the repertoire of nearly every 19th century master, including Paul Morphy. The two main continuations are 9. d5, associated with Anderssen, and 9. Nc3, associated with Morphy and praised by Reti as positionally more astute. In fact, Morphy was equally fond of both moves.

Position after 9...Nce7

One of Morphy’s more celebrated attacks, also versus Lowenthal in 1859, illustrates the problem with the natural-looking 9...Ne5. The continuation was 10. Ne5 de5 11. Bb2 (11. Ba3! is even stronger.) Qe7? f4 was better, but even this is promising for White.) 12. Bb5 Bd7 13. Bd7 Kd7 14. Qg4 f5 Nc4 would be disastrous.) 15. Qf5 Ke8 16. Be5 Nh6 17. Qf4 Kd7 (Setting a trap. Now 18. Nc3? unexpectedly drops the bishop to 18...RaeB) 18. Nd2 Rae8 19. Nc4 Bc5 20. Rad1 Bd6 21. Bd6 cd6 22. Rb1 b6 23. Rfc1 24. Rb6! ab6 25. Nb6 Kd8 26. Rc8#) Qf6 24. Qe3 Ng4 25. Nb6! ab6 26. Rc7! Kd8 (26...Kc7 27. Qb6 Kd7 28. Qa7 Kd8 29. Rb8#) 27. Qb6 Qf2 28. Qf2 Nf2 29. Ra7 Nh3 30. gh3 Kc8 31. Kf2 1-0.

Position after 24...Ng4 (Morphy-Lowenthal sub-game)

If instead 9...Na5, the game might continue 10. Bb2 Ne7 11. Bd3 0-0 12. Nc3 with mutual chances. In fact, this is theory’s preference. But the text (9...Nce7) is equally playable.

The book move, both today and in 1859 as well. But many of these old variations have hardly been reexamined since Morphy’s time. 10. e5 risks overextending the White position. 10. Bb2 would better serve the purpose of building towards a long term initiative.

Play the Evans Gambit by Cafferty and Harding credits Steinitz with inventing this defense in 1862. But several of Morphy’s opponents used the move prior to that.

Straightforward development by 13. Nc3 was more advisable. In fact, Morphy himself played that move and won quickly after 13...c6? (13...0-0 is better) 14. Ng5 Ne5 15. Bf4! g6 (if 15...Nc4 16. Nf7 Qc7 17. Bd6 Nd6 18. Nd6 Kf8 19. Qf3) 16. Nf7 in Morphy-Kennedy, London 1859. {274}

Nonetheless, it is a fact that Morphy used the text move more than once. Another example went 13. Ng5 0-0 14. Qh5 h6 15. Nf7 Rf7 16. ef7 Kh7 (Morphy - de Riviere, Paris 1859).

Position after 16...Kh7 (Morphy-de Riviere)

In this position Sergeant recommended 17. Bg5 Qf8 18. Nd2. Morphy actually played 17. Bd3 and eventually lost. {251}

These games with 13. Ng5 provide another illustration of the selective criticism applied to Morphy’s chess. Because Morphy didn’t win either game, the anthologies have not featured these 13. Ng5 trials. On the other hand, a game that did indeed become famous is Meek-Morphy Mobile 1855, which began 1. e4 e5 2. Nf3 Nc6 3. d4 cd4 4. Bc4 Bc5. At this point Meek tried 5. Ng5, prompting Richard Reti to comment in his book Modern Ideas in Chess, Morphy would certainly never have made this move, an attacking one instead of a developing one. This remark came as part of a broader explanation of Reti’s theory that Morphy was the author of a novel, development-oriented style. Reti drives his point home by showing the instructive difference between the inferior reply 5...Ne5? (tempting because it attacks the bishop, but itself a non-developing move that justifies White’s premature attack) 6. Bf7 Nf7 7. Nf7 Kf7 8. Qh5 g6 9. Qc5 ±, and the superior, developing defense that Morphy actually chose: 5...Nh6! 6. Bf7 Nf7 7. Nf Kf7 8. Qh5 g6 9. Qc5 d6 . {96}

All very nice; but then we come back to these other games where Morphy did in fact play 13. Ng5. True, the position was not exactly the same as in Meek-Morphy, but close enough to embarrass Reti’s flat claim that Morphy would never play such a move.

Position after 13. Ng5

The combinative 15. Qg6? 15...Ng6 16. e7 d5 17. ed8(Q) Rd8 18. Rd1 overlooks 18...c6!, putting White with two units en prise.

If 16. Bh6 gh6 17. Qh6 (or 17. Nh6 Kg7) Bd4! is too strong. The text threatens Nh6.

This strong move turns the tables. White can’t afford 17. Bd3 Be6. But 17. Bd5? Qb5, forking the bishops, would be even worse. The effect of White’s 10th and 13th moves has come to light, and Morphy must resort to the tactics of obfuscation. Therefore...

Not necessarily brilliant, just the best practical chance!

Later, Lowenthal. determined that 17...Be6! was stronger. After 18. Bf8 Qf8 19. Nh6 Kg7 20. Bd3 Qf6! he’d be threatening 21...Qa1; 21...Rh8; and 21...Nf4. Morphy might have stirred up something, but Black is surely on top.

Position after 19...dc4

Compared against the variation in the previous note, White retains his menacing dark square bishop. That improves his chances, but Black still has a material advantage. White must show why he’s not simply losing.

It’s hard to blame Lowenthal for this and his next move, developing as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, 20...Qf4! would have been better. In this way Black could prepare to develop his bishop more aggressively (if now 21. Nf3 Bg4 etc.), make a threat (...Qd2), and protect the c4 and h6 pawns. Quite a lot for one move! White has nothing better than 21. Rae1 Qg5! 22. Qg5 (22. Qf3 Nh4) hg5 23. Bf6 (23. Ne4 and 23. Nc4 are alternatives, but not encouraging) Kf7 24. Bg5, which favors Black.

21...Bd3 deserves attention, especially since the reply 22. Ne4?! Be4 23. Re4 Kh7 is not convincing. But White could play 22. Qh6 Re7 fails against 23...Bd3, reinforcing Ng6; and of course not 23. Re7? Qf2 and mate next) Nd5 24. Rf1, threatening Ng5. This would give White enduring pressure, e.g. 24...Qh7 25. Qg5 c6 26. h4 etc.

Now Ng5 is threatened.

If 23...Bf1, Maroczy analyzed a remarkable drawing variation: 24. Re7! Qe7 25. Qg6 Kf8 26. Ng5! 26...Bf2! 27. Kh1 Rd1 28. Bg7! Qg7! 29. Ne6 Ke7 30. Qg7 Kd6 (30...Ke6 31. Qg4 picks off the rook) 31. Qf8 Ke6 32. Qe8 with perpetual check.

Position after 26. Ng5 (analysis)

Attempts at strengthening White’s attack fail. For instance, 26. Bf6?! looks interesting at first glance, but Black can advantageously play 26...Bf2 27. Kh1 Qf7! 28. Qh6 Ke8 29. Ne5 Bg2! 30. Kg2 Qd5 31. Kf2? (31. Kh3! looks like a draw: 31...Qe6 32. Kg2 etc.) Qd2 32. Qd2 Rd2.

A critical juncture. It seems like there ought to be some way to cement Black’s defenses, since White is still a bit short on direct threats. But the basic difficulty - lack of pawn cover for Black’s king - never disappears, and the attacker has the luxury of creeping in gradually. Even without direct threats, proliferous threats to threaten may eventually swamp the defense.

In any case, 24...Bf1?! isn’t good. Black already has a material plus, and the Rf1 can’t go anywhere, so it doesn’t make sense to exchange the crucial defender Bd3. Thus 25. Re7 Qe7 26. Qg6 leads to the draw examined above, and White might even try for more by 25. Kf1?!, threatening Re7 and also brandishing such ideas as Bf6; or Re6; or Ne5 with the twin threats Ng4 and Q-g4-e6.

24...c6!? is more interesting.

Position after 24...c6 (analysis)

By defending d5, Black prepares to play ...Rd5 with better results than he achieved in the actual game. Moreover, 24...c6 permits Black’s bishop to defend his rook, unpinning the sensitive Ne7. Nonetheless, White retains a confusing array of attacking possibilities. 25. Bf6 (other ideas include 25. Qg4 Ng5 and Qe6, which might lead to 25...Bc7 26. Ne5 Be5 27. Re5; and 25. Re6!?, when 25...Rd5 26. Ne5 Bd8!? might defend) Rd7 (Here 25...Rd5 26. Qg4 adds Ng5 to White’s arsenal. If then 26...Bf5 27. Qc4) 26. Ne5 Bc7 27. f4 Be5 28. Re5 Bf1 (28...Kf7!?) 29. Be7 Re7 30. Re7 Qe7 31. Qg6. This messy variation should result in a draw.

24...Rf8! is the best of all. If 25. Bf6 Rf6 26. Qf6 Qf7 looks solid. Or, if 25. Ne5 Rf5 defends. Otherwise Black is always threatening to disrupt White with the exchange sacrifice on f3.

Whatever the value of these more or less promising defenses, we can appreciate the practical difficulties confronting Lowenthal, who had to make the tough choice over the board. Considering White’s plainly dubious situation a few moves earlier, that was an accomplishment on Morphy’s part! The move Lowenthal. finally selected was quite natural, but it initiates a sharp, forcing sequence that ultimately resolves into an equal ending.

Position after 24. Qg5

This tactic became on after Black’s rook went to d5, relying on the defense of Ne7.

Position after 28...Kh7

Much blood has been spilled, but even now the combination isn’t over. White recovers the pawn by force.

Of course not 33. f4? Be5 34. fe5 Kg6 35. h4 Kf5 winning. But 33. Bd6 would be a tougher call. Sergeant dismissed this with no analysis, merely a claim that it also leads to a draw. But after the likely 33...cd6 34. Ke2 a5 35. Kd3 a4! White is losing.

Position after 35...a4 (analysis)

For example:

36. Kc3 d5 37. h4 (37. a3, now or on any of the next several moves, will lead to something akin to a variation that’s given below. Meanwhile, White can never go 37. Kb4? d4 etc. It will become clear that White’s king is already sitting on the only acceptable square. It remains for Black to immobilize the kingside pawns - he doesn’t have to directly threaten them - and White will be in zugzwang.) 37...Kg6 38. f4 Kf6 39. h5 Kf5

Position after 39...Kf5 (analysis)

Although the kingside pawns defend one another, they’ve run out of safe moves. White must upset the delicate queenside balance. The only question is whether or not he wants to play a3. 40. a3 (If 40. Kd4 the breakthrough takes a different form: 40...b4 41. Kd3 a3! (but not 41...b3? 42. a3! d4 43. Kd2 Kf6 44. Kd3 =) 42. Kc2 d4 43. Kb3 d3 etc.) 40...Kf6 (still zugzwang) 41. Kd4 b4 42. ab4 a3 43. Kc3 d4 44. Kc2 (or 44. Kb3 d3) a2 45. Kb2 d3 Black wins.

36. Kd4 a3-+ as above; not 37...b3? 38. a3! =) b3 38. ab3 a3 39. Kc3 d5 is winning for Black, e.g. 40. b4 d4 41. Kb3 d3 42. b5 d2 43. Kc2 a2.

36. a3 d5 37. Kc3 (by now 37. Kd4 b4 etc. needs no elaboration) Kg6 38. f3 Kf5 39. h3 (39. h4 Kf4 is likewise zugzwang) Kg5 40. Kd4 b4 41. ab4 a3 42. Kc3 d4 etc.

Position after 38...Kf5 (analysis)

Position after 33. Bd4

Fracturing Black’s pawns by 35. a4? doesn’t achieve the desired result, but the variations are interesting: 35...ba4 36. Bc1 (or equivalently 36. Ke2 a3 37. Bc1 c4) c4 37. Ke2 a3 38. Kd2! (The best try. 38. Kd1 c3 39. Kc2 a2 wins straight away.)

Position after 38...Kd2 (analysis)

Now 38...a2 39. Bb2 c3? 40. Kc3 (40. Bc3? Bb4 promoting) a1(Q) 41. Ba1 Be5 42. Kb3 Ba1 43. Ka4 Bc3 doesn’t work. Even though Black retains the right color bishop and rook’s pawn combination, after 44. f3 Kg6 45. h3 White’s pawns again safeguard one another from attack by the king. If Black captures either of them, or if he plays his king towards the queenside, White can use his remaining pawn to deflect the bishop from its defense of a5.

The correct way is 38...Bf4 a2) 41. Kb1 Kg6. The extra material is of no consequence, but the fact that Black’s pawns are far advanced proves decisive: 42. h3 Kf5 43. f3 Kg5 zugzwang.

(For the record, Black can also win by 38...a2 39. Bb2 Bh2! (instead of 39...c3? above) but it’s trickier: 40. Ke3! (40. Kc2 a4 41. Bc3 a3 followed by maneuvering the bishop onto the