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F-4 Phantom II vs MiG-21: USAF & VPAF in the Vietnam War
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Commencer à lire- Éditeur:
- Bloomsbury Publishing
- Sortie:
- May 20, 2013
- ISBN:
- 9781472803931
- Format:
- Livre
Description
Informations sur le livre
F-4 Phantom II vs MiG-21: USAF & VPAF in the Vietnam War
Description
- Éditeur:
- Bloomsbury Publishing
- Sortie:
- May 20, 2013
- ISBN:
- 9781472803931
- Format:
- Livre
À propos de l'auteur
En rapport avec F-4 Phantom II vs MiG-21
Aperçu du livre
F-4 Phantom II vs MiG-21 - Peter E. Davies
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INTRODUCTION
In the peace deal following the end of French colonial rule in Vietnam in 1955, the country was divided at the 17th parallel. Since it was clear that the Viet Cong guerrillas operating in the South had full support from North Vietnam, it was inevitable that the USA, propping up South Vietnam, would have to cut off their supplies from the North. US ground troops began to arrive in December 1964, but air strikes were a more immediate method of attack. They were triggered by North Vietnamese attacks on US installations, leading first to Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965.
A series of limited air strikes was regarded as a better way to persuade the Hanoi government to disengage. In fact, it had quite the opposite effect.
Intense patriotism inspired the fledgling Vietnamese Peoples’ Air Force (VPAF). Its pilots endured years of instruction from unpopular Russian mentors as they learned to fly the 65 MiG-17s that they had been given. Although their aircraft were a generation behind the American F-4 Phantom IIs and F-105s, they learned to use the simple jet’s manoeuvrability and heavy guns to exploit the weaker areas of the sophisticated Western fighters’ performance envelopes. The arrival of a few MiG-21s in late 1965 provided the USAF with a more credible opponent, although it was well into 1966 before VPAF pilots had mastered the supersonic fighters and learned appropriate strategies.
When air attacks began, the North relied mainly on its 1500 anti-aircraft guns, but soon incorporated Russian Barlock
and Flatface
early-warning radars to give fighters from their two jet-capable airfields the chance to intercept incoming American strikes.
Assuming that Hanoi would realise the folly of flouting the increasing threat of US air power after a few strikes, President Lyndon Johnson’s government advocated a policy of gradualism
in attacking targets of increasing strategic value, but stopping short of a series of decisive blows.
F-4 Phantom II pilots were also hamstrung by tight, constantly varying, Rules of Engagement. The most irksome for those who escorted bombing strikes was the requirement to identify enemy aircraft targets visually, rather than relying on the radar in their jets, which was designed to give them the advantage of firing their long-range missiles before the enemy could attack with guns or short-range missiles.
A USAF Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations) report later in the war pointed out that on several occasions US fighters found that by the time visual identification of the MiG had been made they were no longer in the prescribed missile launch or range envelopes. The engagement then became a short-range manoeuvring encounter which further compounded the problem of accurate missile launch.
This requirement was introduced at the start of the war, and was barely relaxed even in the latter stages when better means of identification were available.
Once it was established, the pattern of strikes by formations of USAF and US Navy aircraft (each service having its own areas of responsibility, or Route Packages
) was almost unvaried throughout the war. USAF Phantom IIs were sent out as flights of four to accompany the bomber packages
and to protect them from MiGs. Although the vast majority of US losses on those raids were attributed to anti-aircraft fire or SAMs, VPAF fighters, particularly MiG-21s, were seen as a significant threat. They usually appeared in very small numbers, if they appeared at all, but their effect in disrupting a bomber formation and forcing it to jettison its war load and defend itself was out of all proportion to the size of the MiG-21 force.
The prospect of shooting down an enemy aircraft in combat is central to any fighter pilot’s ambitions, and it also attracts considerable propaganda importance. Although the aerial conflicts over North Vietnam were regarded even by fighter leader Col Robin Olds as a small part of the war, they were a powerful and visible focus for the rivalry and professionalism of the opposing forces.
The air war in Vietnam was mainly a bombing war
for USAF Phantom II crews, although they had to be ready to face MiGs on any mission up north.
This 8th TFW F-4D at Ubon RTAFB is being loaded with slick
bombs from an MJ-1 jammer
vehicle, but it also carries an SUU-32/A gun pod, AIM-7E missiles and an AIM-4D Falcon (on its inner pylon). The 497th TFS Night Owls’
emblem is just visible above the nose-gear door.
CHRONOLOGY
Two R-3S-armed MiG-21PFs man the alert at Noi Bai in August 1967. In the foreground, the pilot is being helped with his seat straps. His aircraft was amongst the first Fishbed-Ds
delivered to the VPAF in April 1968.
The F-4C-17-MC in the foreground first flew on December 18, 1963, and it was later converted into a prototype YF-4E to help with the development of the gun-nose
Phantom II. The first F-4Cs in Vietnam wore this Navy
gull gray and white color scheme.
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
F-4 PHANTOM II
James Smith McDonnell founded his aircraft company in 1939 after several years as a designer for the Glenn Martin Company. Initially a subcontractor helping larger manufacturers such as Douglas fulfil World War II defense orders, he made enough money out of producing parts for C-47 Skytrains and A-20 Havocs to build a large factory at St Louis, in Missouri, in which he planned to produce his own designs.
On January 1, 1943, McDonnell was told to begin work on the US Navy’s first carrier-borne jet, and within two years he had commenced delivering 60 FH-1 Phantom fighters, followed by larger-scale production of the bigger F2H Banshee fighter-bomber in 1949. The latter jet saw combat in the Korean War, and variants were developed for photo-reconnaissance, night/all-weather (with radar) and nuclear strike. McDonnell learned with the F2H that growth potential and adaptability made