Battles of the Boer War

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Text originally published in 1964 under the same title.

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BATTLE OF THE BOER WAR

BY

W. BARING PEMBERTON

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

DEDICATION 4

PREFACE 5

ILLUSTRATIONS IN PHOTOGRAVURE 8

THE MAPS 9

ONE—INTO BATTLE 10

TWO—BELMONT 24

THREE—MODDER RIVER 35

FOUR—MAGERSFONTEIN 51

FIVE—COLENSO 99

SIX—SPION KOP 119

EPILOGUE 150

BIBLIOGRAPHY 153

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 153

PRINTED SOURCES 153

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 156

DEDICATION

To Maria

PREFACE

IT WAS SOME time before the Boer War was seen in its true perspective and its place determined in what might be called the Genealogy of War. Sandwiched between the Crimean and the First World War, it was for the British Army at once the last of the Gentlemen’s Wars with courtesies and chivalrous exchanges passing between opposing commanders and the first of modern wars with a foreshadowing of that ruthlessness implicit in the use of arms of precision. But for the lessons it taught, 1914 might have ended in a military defeat.

Considerations of space having imposed a limit of five battles, I have thought it advisable to select those which seem to conform to some sort of pattern. The five so chosen were fought within a period of exactly three months in the course of two parallel and contemporaneous campaigns. They were fought by troops newly landed in the country and under generals held in high esteem. Sir Redvers Buller, to those who served under him, was ‘the greatest general on the active list of the Army’. Lord Methuen, a less publicized figure, had a chest generously covered with medals for services in Colonial wars. The battles were all waged on British South African territory: a fact which, one might have supposed, would give Buller and Methuen an advantage but which, through typical Whitehall parsimony, did nothing of the kind. Their purpose was not directly to overthrow the enemy and occupy his capitals, but to relieve Kimberley and Ladysmith, the fall of which, or even either of which, would severely have damaged Britain’s prestige not only in Africa but throughout the Empire and the world. Kimberley would enormously have increased the Boers’ financial resources as well as almost certainly sparking off a rebellion amongst the numerous Cape Dutch; Ladysmith could have led to the occupation of the weakly defended Durban and, with the Boers in possession of a seaport, to foreign intervention.

In the battles for the relief of these two towns (there was to be none for Mafeking) lies most of the drama and suspense of the War. By the time the fifth battle, Spion Kop, was over, though Kimberley and Ladysmith were still unrelieved, it was impossible that the Boers could win.

Three of the battles belong to the Kimberley and two to the Ladysmith campaign. One from each campaign contributed to the disasters of Black Week and all that this meant to a country still sublimated by the emotions of the Diamond Jubilee, that spectacular affirmation of British Imperialism. Although, as indicated, they failed in their immediate objective, these five battles had made certain of ultimate victory by teaching the British Army from commander-in-chief to private that they were no longer fighting tribesmen and savages, equipped with muzzleloaders and spears, but an enemy of European blood, completely mobile and armed with the best that France, Germany and (it must be added) England could produce in the way of rifles, quick-firers and guns. Although none of the five battles, nor indeed any battle in the war, had the grandeur and majesty of a Waterloo or an Alma, and by twentieth-century standards would be regarded as hardly more than engagements, they inducted the British Army into the elements of modern warfare.

I am aware that what I have written must tend to be one-sided, being based largely (though not entirely) on British sources. Unfortunately the best Boer accounts have never been translated and I know no Afrikaans. Nevertheless, within my limitations I have tried to avoid extremes. I have ignored nearly all accounts written by ‘Our Special Correspondent in South Africa’. Except when from the pen of Sir Winston Churchill, these are of little worth and are deeply coloured by prejudice. Accepted avidly by a jingoist British public, they passed into common currency where they are still to be found.

For the same reasons I have deliberately avoided reference to infractions of the Geneva Convention. Amongst the eighty or ninety thousand Boers there were assuredly some from the remoter areas to whom it came natural to misuse the white flag, to employ dum-dum bullets and fire on the wounded; but such conduct was abhorrent to the great majority. Nor was the British Army without its black sheep. With few exceptions the Boers were worthy and chivalrous foes. Cunning and ruthless in battle, they showed neither arrogance nor exultation in victory and treated their wounded enemies with the greatest consideration.

My debt to those who in one way or another made possible this book is very great. Lord Methuen supplied me with numerous extracts from his father’s private papers; General Sir R. Pole-Carew’s account of Modder River was made available by the kindness of his son, and Colonel Hughes-Hallett transcribed for me his father’s report on Magersfontein. From the Earl of Selkirk came the letters and papers of R. M. Poore, from Mrs. Roger Poore her husband’s letters, from Sir Anthony Weldon his father’s diary. Lady Birdwood allowed me to consult the Birdwood papers, Lady Levita her husband’s manuscript memoirs, and Major-General Renton his father’s letters. Brigadiers Latham and Wood and Major Kaestlin, all of the RA, and Mr. Bailey of the Royal Signals Museum answered a number of technical questions. The Northamptonshire Regiment lent me the Barton papers, the Black Watch the diaries and journals of Captain (later General) C. E. Stewart. Mr. King and his staff at the War Office Library were, as always, untiring in their help.

For firsthand accounts and information conveyed either by letter or word of mouth I am deeply indebted to the late General Sir Hubert Gough, who also lent me his letters written at the time, to General Sir Torquhil Matheson, to Colonel Bulloch and Colonel the Hon. Malise Hore-Ruthven of the Black Watch, Colonel Lang of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and Colonel Bradley, to Colonel Jorduain, Colonel Trench, Colonel Radice and the late Colonel Hobson who also lent me his privately printed History of the XIIth Lancers.

From South Africa, Mr. Winters, Kimberley’s Publicity Manager, sent me much valuable information, Mr. Benjamin Christopher, the well-known Ladysmith solicitor, gave me the benefit of his close study of Colenso, Miss Paviour transcribed Private Jeoffreys’ Spion Kop reminiscences, and from Mr. Hampshire came the remarkable Joubert anecdote. Commandant W. du Plessis and Adjutant Brink replied to my questioning.

I should also like to thank Colonel Baker-Carr.

To all these, as well as those many correspondents who lent or gave me books, letters, photographs or maps, and to Granada TV who enabled me to see a private viewing of their Boer War film, I offer my most profound thanks.

Billingshurst, 1963

W.B.P

ILLUSTRATIONS IN PHOTOGRAVURE

The surrender of General Cronje to Lord Roberts, February 27th, 1900 (Radio Times Hutton Picture Library)

General Joubert (Radio Times Hutton Picture Library)

President Kruger (Radio Times Hutton Picture Library)

Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen (Radio Times Hutton Picture Library)

General J. H. De La Rey (Radio Times Hutton Picture Library)

The battle of the Modder River as seen by the Grenadier Guards (From a drawing after a sketch by a British Officer) (The Mansell Collection)

The Battle of Belmont. Less far-fetched than most war-artists’ drawings, this shows a recognizable ‘Table Mountain’ on left, ‘Mount Blanc’ on right, with ‘Grenadier Hill’ in foreground (The Mansell Collection)

The 4.7-inch naval guns in action at Colenso (From a drawing by A. Forestier) (The Mansell Collection)

Some of the dead on Spion Kop (Radio Times Hulton Picture Library)

Colonel C. J. Long

General Sir Redvers Buller (Radio Times Hulton Picture Library)

Magersfontein kopje from the east at about the point where MacFarlan and beyond him Cox and Wilson broke through. The monument is to the memory of the Scottish regiments (The Kimberley Municipality)

Men of the Rifle Brigade in action (By courtesy of Sir Anthony Weldon and the Royal United Service Institution)

General Sir Charles Warren (Radio Times Hulton Picture Library)

Major-General the Earl of Dundonald (Radio Times Hulton Picture Library)

THE MAPS

South Africa, showing the two parallel campaigns

Belmont

Modder River

Magersfontein

Colenso

Spion Kop

Spion Kop—Summit

ONE—INTO BATTLE

People here do not seem to look upon the war sufficiently seriously. They consider it too much like a game of polo with intervals for afternoon tea.—Lord Kitchener

‘THAT’S WHAT WE’RE FIGHTING FOR!’ These words, addressed by his companion to that fine batsman Robert Poore as they rode towards Johannesburg, and accompanied by a sweep of the hand towards the gold-mine tips, would to some have succinctly epitomized the causes of the Boer War. To others, who had studied its origins more profoundly, it was not as simple as that.

Anything more than a brief review of the causes of the Boer War falls outside the scope of this book. Yet some attention must be paid to these causes, because only through them is it possible to convey what is indispensable to an understanding of the battles to be described—an impression of the men who were to challenge Britain in her Imperial high noon, their ideals and manner of life, their military virtues and shortcomings and, not least in importance, some idea of the country for which and over which they were to fight.

Admittedly the gold mines could be a powerful inducement to any country even as rich as England; but it is hard to believe from the evidence since available that, for no nobler objective than these, statesmen of the stature of Chamberlain and Milner were prepared to propel their country into war.

The roots of the Boer War lie deeper than any gold reef on the Witwatersrand. If there had been no gold and consequently no Uitlanders with their catalogue of grievances, real or imaginary, it is hardly conceivable that British Imperialism, thrusting north into the sub-continent in fulfilment of its ‘Manifest Destiny’, would not, at some time or another, have clashed with a backward, penniless, intransigent Transvaal Republic sprawled across its path. The finding of gold hastened a clash and incidentally gave it a character which it might otherwise have lacked.

It has been said that none can know the Boer who does not know his past. Descended from tough Calvinistic stock, infused by some vigorous Huguenot blood, the Boer carried to the threshold of the twentieth century those traits reminiscent of Macaulay’s seventeenth-century Puritan, with one significant change. The left hand still clasped the Bible, but the right hand held no longer the two-edged sword but a Mauser magazine rifle of the most up-to-date manufacture.

In 1814, when by right of conquest and purchase (£6,000,000 paid to the Netherlands) Britain acquired Cape Colony, the Boers after 162 years passed unwillingly under alien rule. Resentment was soon increased when their new master evinced ideas regarding the black man different from their own. In their Bible there was nothing to forbid slavery. Consequently to impose it upon the sons of Ham was as natural for the Boer as to let his beard grow. Deprived in 1834 by the Emancipation Act of their Hottentot slaves at one-third of their market value, parties of indignant Boers loaded up their Cape wagons and set out for the hinterland to where King William’s writ did not run. For some this Great Trek ended between the Orange River and the Vaal, for others, penetrating still farther north, it ended between the Vaal and the Limpopo. The first set up the Orange Free State, maintaining because of their proximity many ties of friendship with the Cape. The second, more remote and more Philistine, became the Transvaal Republic. Both won Britain’s recognition of their independence, the Transvaal by the Sands River Convention in 1852, the Orange Free State two years later.

Except that by these Conventions he could no longer exercise slavery, the Boer had achieved his purpose: he had thrown off the detestable British yoke; he was free to live his own life in pastoral pursuits and in patriarchal conditions. The Transvaal Boer in particular neither sought nor cultivated society; government he disliked; taxation he evaded. If from his own stoep he could not see the smoke of his nearest neighbour, it was a cause of satisfaction. His fare was frugal, his life hard. His reading matter was limited to the Bible, to which for guidance in all human affairs he looked with absolute assurance. Chance strangers he viewed with suspicion, offering them grudging hospitality. Of the world beyond the nearest township he knew nothing and cared nothing. The farmer who seriously asked a British officer if England was visible from Cape Town was almost certainly not exceptional in his ignorance. On the other hand his manner of life developed in the Boer knowledge and skills and qualities which made him a surpassing fighter.

It might almost be said that for the Boer child the saddle was his cradle, the gun his plaything; for according as he became an accomplished horseman and a first-class shot, so he improved his chance of survival. The horse gave him mobility, the gun protection in the constant native wars and sustenance (for his kine were too precious to be slaughtered) through the pursuit of wild game for the table. The Boer excelled, because to live he had to excel, in all forms of veldcraft, the employment of cover, the cautious outflanking of his enemy or his prey, the accurate estimation of distance in the deceptively clear atmosphere of the high veld. With cartridges rare and costly he learnt to hold his fire till the most effective moment.

Indebted for survival to none but himself, the Boer, like all frontiersmen, developed those virtues of self-reliance and self-sufficiency which may be summed up in one word, individualism. Only when threatened by an enemy in strength did he see the need for combining with his neighbours and for this he evolved the commando, a highly effective compromise between his own unyielding individualism and his country’s military needs. Each electoral district, of which there were twenty-two in the Transvaal and eighteen in the Orange Free State, produced a commando unit out of all male members between the ages of sixteen and sixty, registered in each ward by a field cornet. Once called up, the Boer still did not forfeit his individual freedom. He could not be ordered to do anything, to attack anything against his will: he could go home whenever he felt inclined. He voted to create his officers and by his vote they could be dismissed. Discipline was non-existent, but in its place obtained what might be called herd responsibility. A kriegsraad or war council (which all could attend) was required to be held before any line of action was taken; but once the reasons had been explained and accepted, the decision would as a rule be loyally obeyed. Thereafter his superb fighting instincts guaranteed that what the Boer did he did well. In effect every Boer was his own general–a general who knew nothing of strategy, but a great deal of tactics. Needless to say that in an army of 50,000 Biblically-minded generals there was no headquarters staff, and no Sunday fighting.

Not only was the Boer military organization unlike anything known to contemporary Europe, their military philosophy was unique. It is best expressed in a single sentence which, with slight variations, was heard from many prisoners’ lips: ‘You English fight to die: we Boers fight to live.’ With the security and future of the homestead depending upon the safe return of its males, the Boer saw no virtue in dying for his country. Such was the value placed upon white life that in family or civil strife, of which there was plenty, there was never any intention to kill, but merely to stage a gewapende, or armed protest. In war proper, that was against the Zulus or the British, he saw nothing heroic or romantic. Such a war was a business, stark and practical, to be carried through to victory at the lowest possible cost, ruthlessly, cunningly, but (where the enemy was white) chivalrously. There was no ignominy in flight. Having discharged his rifle against the advancing enemy, the Boer would not stay to die, but would mount his pony, laagered never far to the rear, and gallop off to the next line of defence, or work round the flanks. If his own flanks were menaced, he slipped away, merging himself into the vastness of the veld. The bayonet, which he dreaded, would have been as useless to the Boer as a grappling iron. Hand-to-hand fighting, except in counterattack which could not be avoided, were no part of his tactics. What mattered was fire-power at the right moment, mobility when required and subtlety at all times.

The supply problem, so cramping to British strategy, hardly existed for the Boers. Accustomed to frugal fare and rough living, they could carry on for days on little more than some biltong or dried meat, a pound or two of coffee and a blanket for covering at night. They enjoyed a freedom of movement in war far beyond the reach of any British or European troops.

Nevertheless the qualities which made the Boers the finest mounted infantry in the world rendered them only indifferent citizens. They had a poor civic sense. The Transvaal was torn by personal and local jealousies and dissensions; its government was feeble, bankrupt and without authority. In reply to constant Zulu barbarities retaliatory barbarities were committed. To the British authorities matters seemed to be heading for a ‘native conflagration’, which would leap the frontiers to the south. Action was indicated and this meant annexation. It was carried out in 1877 with surprisingly little opposition. Followed by wise and tactful government, this hoisting of the Union Jack in Pretoria could have led to a permanent and peaceful solution of the Boer and Briton problem in South Africa. With the Orange Free State relations had always been amicable and it required only a more or less reconciled Transvaal for an Anglo-Boer South Africa to emerge, based on equal rights and privileges for both races.

But the Transvaal was not wisely or tactfully governed and