Armor Command: The Personal Story of a Commander of the 13th Armored Regiment: of CCB, 1st Armored Division, and of the Armored School during World War II

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Text originally published in 1958 under the same title.

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

ARMOR COMMAND

by

BRIG.-GEN. PAUL MCDONALD ROBINETT

The Personal Story

of

A Commander of the 13th Armored Regiment, of C C B, 1st Armored Division, and of the Armored School during World War II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

DEDICATION 4

FOREWORD 5

MAPS 6

ILLUSTRATIONS 6

CHAPTER I — PROLOGUE 7

CHAPTER II — FORT KNOX TO NORTHERN IRELAND 11

CHAPTER III — IRISH INTERLUDE 20

CHAPTER IV — PREPARATIONS AND MOVEMENT TO NORTH AFRICA 32

CHAPTER V — THE CAPTURE OF ORAN 51

CHAPTER VI — MOVEMENT TO TUNISIA AND CONTACT 69

CHAPTER VII — TURNED BACK AT THE GATES OF TUNIS 80

CHAPTER VIII — THE BATTLE FOR MEDJEZ EL BAB 96

CHAPTER IX — REORGANIZATION AND REHABILITATION 115

CHAPTER X — CORPS RESERVE IN CENTRAL TUNISIA 130

CHAPTER XI — OUSSELTIA VALLEY 138

CHAPTER XII — ARMY RESERVE 157

CHAPTER XIII — THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL TUNISIA 169

CHAPTER XIV — TUNISIAN INTERLUDE 206

CHAPTER XV — THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN TUNISIA 213

CHAPTER XVI — RESURRECTION AND REDEPLOYMENT 224

CHAPTER XVII — PRELUDE TO FINAL VICTORY IN AFRICA 230

CHAPTER XVIII — THE END OF THE ROAD 245

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 250

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 251

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 252

DEDICATION

To

The Officers and Men

Who served with Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, during the North African Campaign of World War II

The research and writing of this book were made possible by a grant from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.

FOREWORD

Armor Command is a candid book presenting the activities and observations of an armor commander who was among the first overseas and in action against the European Axis in World War II. All who are interested in the activities of combat troops that make or break the reputations of high military figures and all those who desire an understanding of life in the combat zone will find this book of compelling interest. Military men will find it of professional value for it deals with the problems of a small command in the initial campaign against the German-Italian Allies. Among other things it deals with the problems of the meeting engagement and the withdrawal—two of the most difficult operations in war.

The thread of logistical, organizational, technical, and tactical improvisation runs throughout the story. The effectiveness of General Robinett’s command was due in considerable measure to his diligent and aggressive supply and maintenance measures. An important lesson illustrated by the operations described is the necessity of providing our troops with armament and equipment which can compete effectively with those of the enemy.

Lacking personal knowledge of the matters included in the narrative, I cannot comment upon General Robinett’s reaction to personalities and circumstances described. But having known him well for a long time and having the greatest respect for his ability and character, I believe that any Army officer seeking to improve himself as a commander will find many important and helpful lessons in the book. Robinett’s clear narration gives a realistic picture of the vicissitudes, problems, and heroic qualities of our men, and their need for the most skilful understanding and constant leadership by all commanders. I also recommend this book to all who are interested in the fighting men of the Army whose efforts and sacrifices have contributed so much to the success of our arms.

LT. GEN. WILLIAM K. HARRISON

United States Army

MAPS

TUNISIA

Capture of Oran

Battle of El Bathan

Battle near Medjez el Bab

Ousseltia Valley Operations

Battle of Sbeitla

German Counteroffensive in Southern Tunisia

Plan For The Recapture of Kasserine Pass

Battle of Kasserine

Final Victory

ILLUSTRATIONS

Lt.-Col. Todd’s Command Post

1st Lt. Davis and M-3 Medium Tank and Crew

Comparison of American and German Tank Ammunition

Lt.-Col. Gardiner and M-4 Medium Tank Henry III

Lt.-Col. Ringsak

Field Marshall Rommel and Staff in Tunisia

Brig.-Gen. Robinett and Staff at Forward Command Post in Southern Tunisia

CHAPTER I — PROLOGUE

Upon graduation from the Army War College in June, 1937, I was detailed on the War Department General Staff (WDGS) and upon reporting was assigned to duty with the Operations Branch, Military Intelligence Division. A new chief, Col. E. R. W. McCabe, arrived about the same time and soon became a staunch supporter of a program that gave the Army its first comprehensive military intelligence doctrine. In time military intelligence was covered in Field Manuals, Army Regulations, Staff Officers’ Field Manuals, and Field Service Regulations. After World War II, Col. Benjamin A. Dickson, G-2, First Army, wrote that "This series [Field Manuals] had a monumental influence on our conduct of World War II and hundreds of G-2’s and S-2’s made the same comment, The Book was right!"

As my work in G-2 progressed, I ultimately reached the field of technical intelligence. A survey of the various offices of the chiefs of arms and services revealed a failure to keep abreast of developments in other armies. For example the Ordnance Department had no systematic way of recording the many advances then being made in armored equipment. In Germany, however, Dr. Von Ing. Fritz Heigl, had made a thorough study of armored vehicles of all nations, including the United States, and had published his findings in the Taschenbuch der Tanks. The data compiled by Heigl indicate that he had a profound understanding of the factors that determine the fighting value of armored equipment. No doubt his study had a material influence upon the German tank program. Gen. Heinz Guderian in his book, Panzer Leader, has inferred as much.

Another factor contributing to the backwardness of armor organization and equipment in the United States was the assignment of tanks to the infantry by the National Defense Act of 1920. A broader role for armor was soon envisaged after the passage of the law. In 1928, Gen. Charles P. Summerall, Chief of Staff, acting on instructions from Secretary of War Dwight Davis, issued a directive to Organize a Mechanized Force. A beginning was made, but the lack of tanks capable of rapid cross country movement to a considerable distance and the lack of funds for the research of such equipment soon proved the idea fallacious to all but the most ardent advocates of mechanization. In the meantime, pride in craftsmanship probably played a minor role in retarding progress. Independent American inventors, such as Walter Christie, were in advance of the Ordnance Department in many things, but their work was not accepted. Christie’s tank suspension was modified and adopted by other nations. Finally, during World War II, even the United States adopted a modified form known as the torsion bar suspension, which greatly improved American tanks.

Col. Adna R. Chaffee and his associates pioneered the development of mechanized cavalry organization, tactics, and equipment. Chaffee worked indefatigably for the incorporation of the various arms and services in an armored force capable of restoring maneuver to the battlefield. Although Chaffee’s ideas were never fully carried out by the United States Army, they made possible the mighty Armored Force of World War II.

While I was working on the intelligence program, Colonel McCabe sent me on maneuvers to study what was actually being done by the various staffs and I witnessed a gradual improvement from the slim beginning at the Plattsburg Maneuvers in the summer of 1939. There I observed the 7th Cavalry Brigade, Mechanized, in operations against a conventional field army organized along the lines of World War I. At the conclusion of the maneuver, Lt.-Gen. Hugh A. Drum, the army commander, stated that the mechanized brigade is a powerful arm and a great asset. But from my point of view, it demonstrated the decisiveness of armor. Before the troops reached their home stations, German panzer troops had been largely responsible for the destruction of Poland, thus demonstrating this decisiveness in actual battle.

The Polish campaign and those against the Low Countries and France had profound diplomatic and military repercussions in the United States. Within the Army a determined effort was made to develop weapons capable of defeating the tank. This started an unfortunate cycle that ultimately led to the squandering of research talent, resources, and labor on inefficient weapons such as the 37-mm towed gun, the 37-mm gun mounted on a three-fourth ton truck, and the 75-mm gun on a halftrack. To these inadequate weapons was wedded a tactical doctrine of Seek-Strike-Destroy. These developments probably delayed the production of highly efficient tanks and tank guns.

Other maneuvers followed the Plattsburg beginning, but the true power of massed armor was not fully appreciated or tested. Armor was frequently used on inappropriate missions and the techniques of the tank-infantry-artillery-air team were not fully developed. These details could not be worked out in grand maneuvers which were advantageous to higher commanders and staffs but of limited value to small unit commanders or the troops. This failure to develop the tactics of the combined arms was, therefore, an initial blindspot in our preparations. Nevertheless, a new and more powerful cavalry was formed and I resolved to join it just as soon as possible.

During my last six months on the War Department General Staff, I served in the immediate office of the Chief of Staff. On 1 July 1941, I was reassigned as Intelligence Officer (G-2), General Headquarters (GHQ). In that position I followed the titanic struggle between Soviet Russia and Germany. The initial German successes deceived most intelligence officers, including me. No intelligence officer would have believed then that Germany had invaded Russia without having prepared for a winter campaign. Later, Russian successes were equally deceptive.

World War II did not come as soon as many anticipated. But some of us never doubted that it was only a question of where and when the fighting would break out on a grand scale, for irreconcilable mass-leaders gradually maneuvered the various nations into a political impasse beyond which was war. We knew that military men would have to resolve this impasse and thus complete the cycle to prove the words of cynical, wise, old Voltaire who said: There never was an age which had not some famous statesmen and soldiers; politics and arms seem unhappily to be the two professions most natural to man, who must always be either negotiating or fighting.{1}

The inevitable shake-up in the War Department organization that followed Pearl Harbor gave me my chance to break away from the Washington scene in February 1942. I was happy to be on my way to the Armored Force. Before I left, however, one of my last jobs was with the Combined, British-United States, Chiefs of Staff, during the Arcadia Conference. There President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill and their military chiefs took stock of the problems created by the events of 7 December 1941 and the whirlwind campaign of the Japanese. During the conference they laid the basic plans for the conduct of the British-United States war effort. Germany was fixed as the first target and unity of command was accepted in principle for all future theaters of operations. Finally, the African invasion was approved as the first offensive project, and many of the details of the operation were worked out at GHQ.

During my time on the General Staff many commanders and staff officers who were to play prominent roles at home and abroad in World War II were associates of mine or passed before my eyes. On the whole they were keen, hard-working men who did their best to insure the national security in the rising crisis that ultimately ended in war. There were some who did not pull an honest oar and a few of these climbed very high. They were the exceptions in a splendid organization. But I stayed to witness the breakdown of that organization because of the failure of certain individuals in key places and a reluctance to displace them. I saw the Air Corps take advantage of the situation to advance a long cherished desire for autonomy. Although its authority was repeatedly enlarged, it was never satisfied. The big bomber men were in complete control of air policy and the ground troops never effectively raised the issue of close air support. I saw other nations given priority of equipment over American troops moving out to advanced stations and I witnessed the persistence and effectiveness of Civilian Control in dispersing our means in support of a foreign policy not well thought out. I witnessed at close range our involvement with an unnatural Ally in a struggle that promised no bright, after-victory prospects for the United States.

Now that I have experienced battle and all the shifting scene that led up to it, I am convinced that recorded history is too smooth, too devoid of clashing interests and personalities, and unfolds in an unreal atmosphere of calmness and high reason. The winners appear too good owing to the partiality of historians, who generally follow the stream of fortune, and content themselves with praising the conqueror.{2} But Voltaire, perhaps, has expressed it better: The most fortunate [statesman or soldier] is accorded the greatest, and the public frequently attributes to merit what is only the effect of a happy success.{3} The losers generally appear too mediocre, but it is probably right that they should, for there are no second prizes in war.

The environment in most military writings is also left too much to the imagination. Though the scene is dreary and oftentimes tragic, it is frequently touched with warmth of feeling and good humor in the combat zone. Some of the leading figures subordinate nearly everything to their own personal and official advantage. Others, the true knights, are irreproachable in both personal and official conduct. They are the George Washingtons, the Ulysses S. Grants, the Robert E. Lees, and many lesser ones whose bright names add luster to our military legends. But the real heroes are the little people, who are in or near the scene of action. They are the shadowy background of history of which little is known.

American military literature is replete with the personal accounts of high ranking commanders, but a great void exists in all the lower ranks. This piece will be one more to help fill the void in the middle ranks. It deals with the activities of a small command—13th Armored Regiment or Combat Command B (CC B), 1st Armored Division. The story covers many but not all activities of these units and subordinate elements from March 1942 until May 1943. It, therefore, treats of the first contact of American and German troops in World War II and of the delicate relations between our troops and those of Great Britain and France with which a part of the force was mixed in those critical days. The story should prove of value to those of the future who may face the complex problems of the meeting engagement in association with allies. It should also be of value to those responsible for developing superior weapons and equipment in the American Army and for the coordination of the combined arms on the battlefield.

Although this is not a history but a personal story, I have tested my source material, memory, and impressions against those of others present and have made such corrections as seemed appropriate. I have talked with many participants of the British, French, and American Armies and with one of the opposing German commanders and have utilized such material as could be secured. I have also made use of a number of other historical writings that have a bearing on the African campaign. References to all of this material will be found in the footnotes to the manuscript.

CHAPTER II — FORT KNOX TO NORTHERN IRELAND

Upon the breakup of GHQ as an operating headquarters in March 1942, I reported to the Armored Force, Fort Knox, Ky., for assignment to duty. After a brief visit with Brig.-Gen. Ernest Harmon, chief of staff, I reported to Maj.-Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, Armored Force. He greeted me and after welcoming me to the Force talked briefly of various problems concerning my job. When I had first met General Devers, he was a colonel preparing for a shift in duty from director of athletics at West Point to chief of staff, Panama Canal Department. Unlike some others going abroad, he made a comprehensive study of Panama and the Canal Zone before departing for his new station. At that time I had noted his thoroughness and had marked him down as one who would go places.{4} He had already gone a long way in filling the shoes left vacant by my old squadron commander, Maj.-Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, who was the father of the young Armored Force.

The joining of the Armored Force was the fulfillment of a long cherished desire on my part. From a distance, I had followed the rise of mechanized cavalry and had studied the writings of Maj.-Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, British Army, who was far ahead of his contemporaries and thus earned for himself their displeasure, which ultimately ruined his military career. I was also familiar with General Chaffee’s struggle for armor. This put him ahead of his contemporaries and marked him for distinction or ruin. But Chaffee received important support following the fall of France and had gone a long way towards forging a formidable thunderbolt before he died and left his work to another.

Before arriving at Fort Knox, I knew that I was to command the 80th Armored Regiment. My old chief, Maj.-Gen. Orlando Ward, the division commander, had requested my assignment to the 8th Armored Division upon my release from GHQ. I had served under him in the Military Intelligence Division and in the Office of the Chief of Staff. Col. Robert W. Hasbrouck{5} was chief of staff. I had served with him at Fort Myer, Fort Leavenworth, and the Army War College and on the WDGS. I considered myself very fortunate to be associated again with such capable officers and friends. The division had the usual problems of an outfit about to be rather than those of one already in being. Much to my regret, however, I learned that the 8th was to be a training division which meant that we would bring the men along for a time, transfer them to other outfits, take a new batch, and repeat the process.

But before the 80th Armored Regiment was fully organized, I was transferred to the 13th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division. General Ward had replaced Maj.-Gen. Bruce Magruder in that division and had requested my assignment to the 13th. In the reshuffle, Hasbrouck went along as chief of staff. It was a great honor to be assigned to the old 13th Cavalry, which was the second cavalry regiment mechanized. I had known the former horse outfit well at Fort Riley, Kans., and many of the men still present were carryovers from those days. Although the regimental standard flew no battle streamers, it had performed well in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico for which a streamer was later awarded. The 13th and 1st Armored (Cavalry) Regiments constituted the tank elements of the 1st Armored Division. I had served nearly four years with the 1st Cavalry on the Mexican Border. It was the most decorated regiment in the Army, carrying 61 battle streamers on its standard.{6}

On reporting to General Ward, I learned that the Division was packing for movement overseas. Without going into details, he said, The condition of the 13th is not the best in the world, though it is a going concern and on the whole excellent. I took over command at once on his verbal orders.

After introducing myself to the officers, I made it my first job to inspect the entire outfit. It was no easy task, for the regiment, at authorized strength of 2,474 officers and men, was scattered over a rather large area in tents and dilapidated World War I buildings.{7} Vehicular equipment, including 63 light and 116 medium tanks and 390 other types, had already been prepared for shipment by rail or movement by marching. Although the quality of assigned personnel appeared to be excellent, the saluting, smartness, and personal appearance of the men seemed anything but impressive. But the regiment had spent months in the field, had furnished cadres for a number of new outfits, had absorbed elements of an infantry-tank outfit, and had been working hard for the movement overseas.

Most regiments have definite characteristics, or what might be called a soul or composite personality. They reflect the quality of the commander who, on taking over a new outfit, is fortunate indeed if he has sufficient time in which to accomplish the changes he desires before being snapped up by a superior. As it turned out later the new commanders in the 1st Armored Division were given little or no time in which to make progressive changes.

The property of the regiment was in bad condition. Several companies were still carrying items of horse equipment. Some armor equipment was missing and many obsolete spare parts were still on hand. There were many shortages but surpluses, as well, in some items. In the past there had been numerous changes of command within the regiment without any formal transfer of property, making it impossible to determine who was responsible. After much hard work in the companies and by Capt. Hyman Bruss, Regimental Supply Officer, and his small staff, the regiment was squared away for the movement overseas.

The tanks, early M-3 light and M-3 medium models, and half-tracks were shipped by rail. The tanks had been through exhausting maneuvers and were considered obsolete, since new M-4 models went into production in February 1942. All experienced tankers were familiar with the salient characteristics of the M-4: 75-mm gun mounted in a 360° traversable turret, low silhouette, welded instead of riveted armor, improved power train, and improved suspension. Naturally, they very much preferred the new model. But we were not to have the new equipment which was going to the British under terms of the Lend-Lease Act. The tank situation in Africa had become critical in early 1942 following serious British reverses and the United States had released a large number to make good these losses.{8} Because of an acute shortage of cargo ships, it was, however, all the more regrettable that we were sent overseas with obsolete equipment. At the time, enemy submarines were playing havoc with American shipping in the Caribbean and along the east coast. So serious were the losses that on 19 June 1942 General Marshall wrote to Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, in part: The losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war effort.…{9}

The wheeled vehicles moved overland by marching in a number of serials or march units, one of which I commanded. The march to the staging area at Fort Dix, N. J., started before dawn in order to clear Louisville before civilian traffic interfered with the movement. As we moved out I heard someone remark: When the 13th marches, it rains! I was to become familiar with that tradition in the days ahead. The countryside was beautiful, as it always is in April along the Ohio River. The bluegrass was lush, the redbud was almost gone, and the dogwood was blooming. The people along the route of march were mildly interested but quiet. In the smaller towns there was some cheering.

The custodians of regimental lore were not long disappointed for it soon began to rain and continued to do so for most of the way. There is nothing so depressing as making camp in the rain, but it is easier in a mechanized than in a horse outfit. Even so, our overnight halt along the great Pennsylvania Turnpike in a torrential downpour was not pleasant. A police escort met us on the outskirts of Philadelphia and conducted us-through the city in the shortest possible time. We were, of course, happy to meet the guides who conducted us to assigned quarters at Fort Dix.

Fort Dix was a staging area where troops prepared for movement overseas. The barracks were comfortable and the training facilities, including drill grounds, motor parks, combat courses, obstacle courses, maneuver areas, and pistol, grenade, rifle, mortar, machinegun, tank, and artillery rangers, were available. In time we used all of these facilities.

The division prepared a master training schedule upon which the subordinate units based their own. General Ward was a distinguished artilleryman and took a personal interest in the firing of heavy weapons. His influence gave great impetus to this instruction. Air-ground training was rather sketchy. But within limits of available time, equipment, and ammunition all phases of training were covered. The officers of the 13th Armored Regiment fired the pistol course at night in an indoor range. Carrying out an old practice, I offered a dollar to each individual who outshot me. No one collected the money as indeed no man ever had except a distinguished pistol shot in Troop F, 3rd Cavalry, who always made me eat crow. Special teams were trained and made responsible for the stowage and preparation of vehicles for overseas shipment. More emphasis was placed on disciplinary and individual instruction after the equipment had been moved to port.

Maj.-Gen. Edmund L. Daley was in command at Fort Dix. He and his V Corps staff were anxious to make themselves felt. The 1st Armored Division, though good in some things, was made to their order, for the standards of military courtesy, dress, and personal appearance were low even by armored measuring sticks. There were reasons for these conditions, but a new senior commander is not apt to look for them. General Daley did not; on the contrary, he set about to rectify them at once. While his objective was sound, it totally ignored essential combat instruction and the chain of command and failed to take into account the peculiarities of an armored command. His methods were unusual but included some of the old artifices of a leader, such as being seen and heard by the men and stamping one’s personality upon them. He was everywhere from morning to night brandishing his swagger stick and demanding a rising standard of speed in running to him and a snappier style of saluting and reporting. The program was carried so far as to become ludicrous. One morning he caught and worked me over with the rest. After this personal encounter, I doubted that I would make the transport. The official skinlist that followed all but eliminated the doubt. But after estimating the situation and recalling days on the Mexican Border under an even more difficult commander, I evolved a plan. I deliberately adopted General Daley’s methods, believing that if we pleased him in the little things he deemed important we would not be molested in more important ones. Swallowing my pride, I decided to play to his idiosyncrasies, hoping thereby to survive until good fortune would bring a new commander. My old chief, Gen. Malin Craig, once said: If you find yourself under a difficult commander, control your temper and be patient for sooner or later you will get a new commander and very likely a better. Accordingly, I directed the officers to carry out General Daley’s system whenever I was around. In the meantime Daley was raising so much hell that certain high-ranking officers were said to be staying indoors rather than risk being disciplined by him. Some had been dressed down like raw recruits. The second time he inspected the 13th Armored Regiment it was cited for excellence.

At the climax of General Daley’s war, as it became known, all senior officers were ordered to report to him in his office. One by one each stepped briskly before his desk, saluted, and announced name, rank, and organization. Each officer was critically inspected during this performance and some were sent out to try again and one or two failed to meet his standards. They were hazed and threatened with relief. It was a very serious affair and everyone was unhappy about it. Unfortunately, General Daley’s chief of staff only made matters worse. His aide-de-camp, Capt. Henry E. Gardiner, was the only member of his staff who seemed to be trying to smooth things out.

Although engaged in many activities, we also carried out an amazing amount of administrative work at Fort Dix. Individual records were checked and rechecked and the men checked against the records. Everyone was vaccinated and inoculated for everything in the book and in case of doubt shot anyway. But the inoculation for yellow fever struck me as odd since we were going to Northern Ireland. Shortly after taking the yellow fever shots many men came down with yellow jaundice in a very severe form of the disease. We lost many men in those last days at Fort Dix and still more later while others were very low in vitality for a long time afterwards. Most of the replacements received were not armormen and thus contributed to our difficulties.

As the sailing date approached, a number of white-feather individuals began to show up. Some went over the hill, while others pretended to be sick. But the most brazen example of cowardice was demonstrated by a replacement officer. He begged to be left behind, saying that he was afraid of water and could not stand the sight of blood. I asked him why he had taken R.O.T.C. training and accepted a reserve commission. He replied that he had taken the training because of the social advantages it afforded. In spite of his cowardice, I resolved to take the man along but was not successful. He managed to slip out through some political pull or by going to the hospital. But this man did not represent the real R.O.T.C. man. The same university from which he was graduated furnished my command some of the most capable and courageous officers I have ever known. In fact, R.O.T.C. graduates were generally of the highest caliber. None, regardless of source, could have been better. The value of that institution to the United States cannot be estimated. Someday, perhaps, military education in the United States will be restudied in the light of modern developments and reorganized so as to take advantage of the unparalleled ability and skill of the average American boy. Only by introducing military training into all high schools and colleges can we hope to perpetuate our American institutions, to shorten the time between the declaration or outbreak of war and the initiation of operations, and to give the young men of the future a fair chance in battle.

1 May 1942 was the 41st anniversary of the 13th Armored Regiment. Such an occasion affords a commander an opportunity to stimulate regimental pride and team work—solid forces in fair times and bad. The program for the day was designed accordingly. During the morning the troops were massed on the standards. General Ward, Brig.-Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, commanding CC B, and Brig.-Gen. Raymond E. McQuillin, commanding Combat Command A (CC A) and a former regimental commander were present.{10} Chaplain Harry P. Abbott pronounced the invocation and 2nd Lt. Dan W. McCravey, Jr., the junior officer in the regiment, read the regimental history. Attempting to improve morale and esprit de corps and add to the immense advantage inherent in the traditions of an honored regiment, I then spoke to the outfit. Complimenting them upon the progress of training and upon having been selected as the first to go overseas, outlining our objective as the defeat of the enemy and noting the hardships and sacrifices this would entail, I concluded on a historical note as follows:

As long as the United States Army shall last, our accomplishments will, constitute a part of its traditions, part of its very being, part of the spirit which makes our Nation feared and respected by all nations. In the years to come, when the 13th Armored Regiment celebrates other organization days, men standing where you now stand will gain courage, faith, and devotion from the deeds we are setting out to perform.

The ceremony was concluded with the 13th Cavalry March and the Star Spangled Banner.

During the afternoon we had a field day which ended with the traditional baseball game between the officers and the non-commissioned officers, which, as usual, the non-commissioned officers won. In the evening there were dances for both officers and enlisted men, many of whose families were living nearby, having come for a last visit. For some it was to be the last.

Working under handicaps, we accomplished much good at Fort Dix. Discipline and training were greatly improved in the 13th Armored Regiment. Even General Daley’s petty tyrannies had some good effect. With few exceptions, everyone entered into the spirit of the thing and gave him what he demanded, seeing the humorous side of it. Long afterward John Todd and a few others continued Daley’s ritual in reporting to me, but with a gleam in their eyes. We had done so well with the corps commander, however, that I was appointed commanding officer of troops aboard the Queen Mary. General Ward remarked, perhaps a little facetiously, You have been selected because you get along so well with General Daley. The reward was a dubious honor that involved a lot of responsibility and plenty of work.

Organizational equipment was specially treated and packed for overseas shipment. At the port the tanks were sealed after all working parts had been thoroughly greased or cosmolined. Much of this work was done aboard cargo ships known as the sea train. These ferry-like, wartime ships were hurriedly constructed for the transport of vehicular equipment. The troops were to be transported aboard commercial liners. Among these was the giant, 81,273 gross tons, Queen Mary of the Cunard Line—the second largest afloat.

I had three days in which to contact the port and Cunard Line officials in New York and to make arrangements for the embarkation and the organization of the troops for movement. This included the preparation of plans for abandonment of ship under various assumptions, for the defense of the ship against air and submarine attacks, for fire protection, for the police of the ship, and for inspections and messing. Fortunately, I had a little experience that helped for I had observed the operations of Army transports for about five years in the Canal Zone and San Francisco and had studied the loading of transports as G-4 of the Army troops participating in Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 in 1932. However, it is a reflection upon our system that the meager staff of a regiment should be required to assume the responsibility for such a movement when corps, division, and combat command staffs were present but idle.

A functioning transport has standardized routine that has been perfected over a considerable period of time. Passengers coming aboard such a ship have only to fit into a groove and learn the routine, but at that time there were no precedents on the Queen Mary. It had made no trans-Atlantic crossing since the outbreak of World War II. When I inspected the ship, the carpenters were still installing bunks. Even the swimming pool, cocktail lounge, promenade deck, and the fashionable staterooms, as well as tourist class cabins, and mess rooms were built in with bunks from deck level to deck level. Nearly 10,000 men were to be carried and more would have been added if time had permitted the construction of additional bunks. The great dining room was the troop mess. The second class mess was reserved for officers.

There was a strict division of responsibility among the ship’s officers. Capt. J. G. Bisset was master of the ship. Staff Capt. H. Grattidge was responsible for the internal security, police, and safety of the ship. Following British custom, he suggested that our personnel be loaded according to rank. This would have resulted in separating officers and non-commissioned officers from their units with consequent loss of control. I insisted on putting the troops aboard by tactical units which, fortunately for all concerned, was approved. The four-striped mess steward was in control of the galley and dining rooms. Contrary to American practice, he insisted on feeding three times a day even though four sittings would be required for each meal. Each man on going aboard was to be issued a mess card. These were equally divided into four colors which represented the order of sittings or standings. Tactical unity was thus destroyed in the mess and control with it. Then, I made a mistake which later contributed to the confused situation by staffing the galley and dining rooms with a detachment made up from all organizations aboard.

Administrative personnel and advance parties were aboard and instructed before the movement from Fort Dix to the port was initiated. The troops were brought up by rail, transferred to a ferry and landed at the pier. Each individual carried his own equipment and personal belongings. Officers were allowed a traveling bag and enlisted men a barracks bag. The loading began at dark and was completed by daylight. All night long columns of weary, perspiring men slowly jostled their way up the gangplanks. Each unit was met aboard ship by a guide who conducted it to designated quarters. When the men reached their bunks, they flopped fully clothed, and were soon fast asleep.

Tugboats pushed the Queen Mary away from the pier at daylight Monday morning. The black hulk of the half submerged French liner Normandie rested on its side at an adjoining pier. From the bridge the Queen Mary seemed like a ghost ship for the blackout curtains were in place and the men