The Maps of Fredericksburg: An Atlas of the Fredericksburg Campaign, Including all Cavalry Operations, September 18, 1862 - January 22, 1863

THE MAPS OF FREDERICKSBURG

An Atlas of the Fredericksburg Campaign,

Including all Cavalry Operations,

September 18, 1862 - January 22, 1863

Bradley M. Gottfried

© 2018 by Bradley M. Gottfried

The Maps of Fredericksburg: An Atlas of the Fredericksburg Campaign, Including all Cavalry Operations, September 18, 1862 - January 22, 1863

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

First edition, first printing

ISBN-13: 978-161121-371-3

eISBN: 978-1-61121-372-0

Mobi ISBN: 978-1-61121-372-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015945527

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The seventh volume of

The Savas Beatie Military Atlas™ Series

To my grandchildren:

Aiden and Amelia Nieman

Adina and Elias Nieman

Silas and Harrison Swanson

Contents

Introduction

Map Set 1: Recovering from the Maryland Campaign

Map Set 1.1: The Army of the Potomac Refits but does not Pursue

Map Set 1.2: Lee’s Army Refits

Map Set 1.3: McClellan Finally Moves

Map Set 1.4: Stuart Begins His Ride Around McClellan

Map Set 1.5: Stuart Ends His Ride Around McClellan

Map Set 2: McClellan Moves, but President Lincoln Makes a Change

Map 2.1: McClellan Finally Moves South

Map 2.2: Lee Responds to McClellan’s Advance

Map 2.3: McClellan is Removed from Command

Map 2.4: Burnside Assumes Command of the Army

Map Set 3: The Opposing Armies Shift to Fredericksburg

Map 3.1: Burnside Plans a Campaign

Map 3.2: Burnside Prepares for His Move South

Map 3.3: Dahlgren Undertakes a Reconnaissance

Map 3.4: Burnside Moves South

Map 3.5: Burnside Approaches Falmouth

Map 3.6: Burnside Approaches Fredericksburg

Map 3.7: Both Armies in Motion

Map 3.8: The Armies Head for Fredericksburg

Map 3.9: Longstreet’s Corps Reaches Fredericksburg

Map 3.10: Stonewall Jackson to the Rescue

Map Set 4: The Armies Settle in at Fredericksburg

Map 4.1: The Confederates Prepare for a Fight

Map 4.2: The Federal Infrastructure is Prepared

Map 4.3: Burnside Weighs His Options

Map Set 5: Lee and Burnside Prepare for Battle

Map 5.1: Burnside Prepares for Battle

Map 5.2: Burnside Completes His Battle Plans

Map 5.3: The Bridge Building Effort Begins

Map 5.4: Barksdale’s Brigade Halts the Building of Bridges

Map 5.5: Stalemate on the Federal Right, Success on the Federal Left

Map Set 6: The Infantry Fight for Fredericksburg

Map 6.1: Infantry Breaks the Stalemate on the Federal Right

Map 6.2: The 7th Michigan Breaks the Stalemate

Map 6.3: The Bridgehead is Expanded

Map 6.4: Additional Reinforcements Arrive

Map 6.5: Fighting in the Streets

Map 6.6: The 20th Massachusetts Goes In

Map 6.7: Barksdale Finally Withdraws

Map 6.8: The Battlefield

Map Set 7: The Time for Battle Approaches

Map 7.1: The Rest of the Union Army Prepares to Cross

Map 7.2: The Union Army Settles in on the West Side of the River

Map 7.3: Stonewall Jackson Reunites with Lee’s Army

Map 7.4: Burnside Prepares for Battle

Map 7.5: The Confederate Army Prepares for Battle

Map 7.6: The Armies Complete their Plans for Battle

Map 7.7: Final Preparations for Battle

Map Set 8: Franklin Prepares to Attack Lee’s Right

Map 8.1: The Antagonists Finalize their Positions

Map 8.2: Franklin Plans his Attack

Map 8.3: Reynolds Prepares for Action

Map 8.4: Pelham Wreaks Havoc Before Retreating

Map Set 9: Meade Breaks Through Jackson’s Front

Map 9.1: Meade Prepares for Action

Map 9.2: Meade Begins His Advance

Map 9.3: Meade Reverses Course as the Artillery Returns to Action

Map 9.4: Meade Resumes his Attack

Map 9.5: Meade’s Men Halt Near the Railroad

Map 9.6: The Right Side of Meade’s Division Prepares to Leave the Railroad

Map 9.7: Gregg’s Brigade is Defeated

Map 9.8: Archer’s Brigade is Defeated

Map Set 10: Gibbon’s Division Enters the Battle

Map 10.1: Meade Attacks Lane’s Brigade as Gibbon Prepares for Action

Map 10.2: Gibbon’s Division Finally Advances

Map 10.3: Root’s Brigade Takes Up the Fight

Map Set 11: Stonewall Jackson Strikes Back

Map 11.1: The Two Sides Seek Reinforcements

Map 11.2: The Confederates Drive the Pennsylvania Reserves from the Right of Their Line

Map 11.3: Lane’s Line is Restored; Walker’s Brigade Prepares for the Fight

Map 11.4: Walker and Paxton Stabilize the Center of Stonewall Jackson’s line

Map 11.5: Other Confederate Units Arrive

Map 11.6: Gibbon’s Men are Finally Defeated

Map Set 12: Birney’s Federal Division Finally Arrives

Map 12.1: Gen. Birney Hesitates

Map 12.2: Meade is Defeated as Birney’s Division Advances

Map 12.3: Atkinson’s Brigade Attacks the Union Line

Map 12.4: Atkinson’s Brigade is Finally Stopped

Map 12.5: The Battle on the Federal Left Ends

Map Set 13: Sumner Begins Attacking the Confederate Left

Map 13.1: The Combatants Finalize their Plans

Map 13.2: Federal Troops Deploy in Fredericksburg

Map 13.3: French’s Division Opens the Assault with Kimball’s Brigade

Map 13.4: Kimball’s Skirmishers Engage the Enemy

Map 13.5: The Remainder of Kimball’s Brigade Prepares for Action

Map 13.6: Kimball’s Attack Stalls

Map 13.7: Cobb’s Brigade is Reinforced at the Stone Wall

Map 13.8: The Rest of French’s Division Moves Out

Map 13.9: French’s Attacks Fails

Map Set 14: Hancock’s Division Attacks the Confederate Left

Map 14.1: Federal Artillery Enters the Fight

Map 14.2: Couch Prepares Hancock’s Division for Action

Map 14.3: Zook’s Prepares his Men for Battle

Map 14.4: Zook’s Brigade Attacks Marye’s Heights

Map 14.5: Zook’s Brigade Is Defeated as the Irish Brigade Prepares for Action

Map 14.6: The Irish Brigade Attacks

Map 14.7: The Irish Brigade Is Defeated

Map 14.8: Hancock Commits His Last Brigade to Battle

Map 14.9: Caldwell’s Brigade Battles the Enemy

Map 14.10: Hancock’s Last Brigade is Defeated

Map Set 15: Howard’s Division Enters the Battle

Map Set 15.1: Howard’s Division Approaches the Battlefield

Map Set 15.2: Owen’s Brigade Launches its Attack

Map Set 15.3: Owen’s Attack Loses Steam as Hall’s Brigade Prepares for Battle

Map Set 15.4: Hall’s Brigade is Fed into the Battle

Map Set 15.5: Howard’s Last Brigade goes into the Battle

Map Set 15.6: The II Corps is Defeated

Map Set 16: Willcox’s IX Corps Enters the Battle

Map Set 16.1: Ferrero’s Brigade Arrives at the Front

Map Set 16.2: Ferrero’s Brigade Attacks

Map Set 16.3: Sturgis’ Second Brigade Under Nagle Appears

Map Set 16.4: Nagle’s Brigade Attacks

Map Set 16.5: Sturgis’ Division is Defeated

Map Set 17: The V Corps Arrives: Griffin Storms the Heights

Map Set 17.1: Griffin’s Division Approaches the Field

Map Set 17.2: Griffin’s Division Prepares For Battle

Map Set 17.3: The Rest of Barnes’ Brigade Attacks

Map Set 17.4: Barnes’ Brigade is Defeated

Map Set 17.5: Sweitzer’s Brigade Enters the Battle

Map Set 17.6: Sweitzer’s Brigade is Stopped; Carroll’s Brigade Begins its Attack

Map Set 17.7: Carroll’s Brigade is Defeated as Stockton’s Brigade Prepares for Battle

Map Set 17.8: Stockton’s Brigade Begins its Attack

Map Set 17.9: Stockton’s Attack Fails

Map Set 18: Humphreys’ Division Goes In

Map Set 18.1: Burnside Commits the Rest of the V Corps to Battle

Map Set 18.2: Humphreys’ Division Approaches the Battlefield

Map Set 18.3: Confederate Artillery Redeploys, Humphreys’ Division Prepares to Attack

Map Set 18.4: Humphreys’ Division Begins Its Attack on the Stone Wall

Map Set 18.5: Allabach’s Brigade is Defeated; Tyler’s Brigade Enters the Battle

Map Set 18.6: The Attack of Humphreys’ Division Grinds to a Halt

Map Set 19: Humphreys’ Division Leaves, Reinforcements Arrive

Map Set 19.1: Humphreys’ Division Regroups as Other Units Appear

Map Set 19.2: Getty’s Division Enters the Battle

Map Set 19.3: The Attacks on Marye’s Heights Finally End

Map Set 20: Fighting Along the Center of the Line

Map Set 20.1: Skirmishing along the Railroad

Map Set 20.2: The Tar Heels Carry the Day

Map 20.3: Stonewall Jackson Plans a Counterattack

Map Set 21: The Nation Takes Stock of Fredericksburg

Map 21.1: Aftermath

Map 21.2: A Stunned Army of the Potomac Takes Stock of its Defeat

Map 21.3: Burnside’s New Offensive Plan Falters

Map 21.4: Burnside Plans a New Offensive

Map 21.5: The Offensive Fails

Epilogue

Appendix: Orders of Battle

Endnotes

Bibliography

Introduction

The idea for this series came about when I was seeking several years ago a better way to visualize, understand, and appreciate the battle of Gettysburg and other major campaigns in the Eastern Theater. What began as a simple idea in my home library has since developed into the book you are holding—the seventh volume in the Savas Beatie Military Atlas Series™. My goal is to research and illustrate every major campaign of the Eastern Theater; the intent of the series is to cover the entire Civil War.

The first effort in 2007 resulted in The Maps of Gettysburg, which served as a springboard for a second book two years later, The Maps of First Bull Run. Soon after the Gettysburg volume appeared, my publisher expressed an interest in expanding the series to the Western campaigns. I was flattered and agreed it was a good idea, but because my primary interest rests in the East, other historians would have to be found to assist elsewhere. The first two who came aboard were David Powell (text) and David Friedrichs (cartography), whose outstanding collaboration produced The Maps of Chickamauga in 2009—the same year my First Bull Run study appeared. Other Western Theater campaign studies are in various stages of completion (Chattanooga, Franklin and Nashville, the Atlanta Campaign), as are atlas books dealing with Napoleon’s 1812 invasion of Russia and WWI campaigns. This is personally gratifying. The only way to really understand a military campaign (besides walking the ground) is through good maps, and the unique presentation of these Savas Beatie atlas titles unlocks other books on the same subjects and makes them more usable and accessible. My third title, The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, Including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2 - 20, 1862, appeared in 2011, with the fourth, The Maps of the Bristoe Station and Mine Run Campaigns, appearing two years later. In 2016, The Maps of the Wilderness: An Atlas of the Wilderness Campaign, Including all Cavalry Operation, arrived. You now hold what is my sixth book (the seventh the series) entitled The Maps of the Fredericksburg Campaign. I have also largely completed work on the Spotsylvania volume.

The Fredericksburg Campaign has always been one of my favorites. As with all of my prior atlases, I have learned so much by researching and writing this book and drafting the maps. Originally, the focus of my interest has been the activities at the stone wall at the base of Marye’s Heights. As I researched this book, however, I gained a new-found respect and appreciation for what occurred at the opposite side of the line on Stonewall Jackson’s front in general, and Prospect Hill in particular. The Maps of Fredericksburg begins where with the conclusion of the Antietam fighting and discusses the strategy and tactics used by both armies as they headed toward the showdown along the Rappahannock River. It ends with Burnside’s ill-advised Mud March and removal from command. Eventually, a volume on the Chancellorsville Campaign will pick up where this volume leaves off.

To my knowledge, no single source until now has pulled together the myriad of movements and events of this mammoth campaign and offered it in a cartographic form side-by-side with reasonably detailed text complete with endnotes. Like the volumes that have come before it, The Maps of Fredericksburg dissects the actions within each sector of the battlefield for a deeper and hopefully more meaningful understanding and reading experience. Each section of the book includes a number of text and map combinations. Every left-hand page includes descriptive text corresponding with a facing original map on the right-hand page. One of the key advantages of this presentation is that it eliminates the need to flip through the book to try to find a map to match the text. Wherever possible, I utilized firsthand accounts to personalize the otherwise straightforward text. I hope the reader finds this method of presentation useful.

As I have written in previous introductions, the plentiful maps and sectioned coverage makes it easier to follow and understand what was happening each day (and in some cases, each hour) of this complex campaign. The various sections may also trigger a special interest ripe for additional study. I am hopeful readers who approach the subject with a higher level of expertise will find the maps and text not only interesting to study and read, but truly helpful. If someone, somewhere, places this book within reach to refer to now and again as a reference guide while reading other studies on the campaign, the long hours invested in this project will be worthwhile.

And now, a few caveats. The Maps of Fredericksburg is not the last word or definitive treatment of the campaign, the various battles, or any part thereof—nor did I intend it to be. None of the books in this series were created with that intent. My primary reliance was upon firsthand accounts and battle reports, followed by quality secondary scholarship. Therefore, there are few if any new theories or evaluations of why the campaign or some particular aspect of the battle unfolded as it did. I am very familiar with the battlefield described in this study and have walked it many times over the years, often in the company of other historians. Whenever a book uses short chapters or sections, as this one does, there will inevitably be some narrative redundancy. I have endeavored as far as possible to keep this at a minimum.

The sources can and often do conflict on many points, including numbers engaged, who moved when, where and why, what times specific things happened and, of course casualties. I have tried to follow a generally accepted interpretation of the campaign and the fighting (I hope with some success) and portray the information accurately and with an even hand. Because of all these discrepancies, I have pieced the evidence together, discussed it with other historians, and, on occasion, reached conclusions that differ with those made by others. It is common to be confronted with multiple recollections by the men who were present when and where events occurred. The simple fact is that we will never know or fully understand exactly how and when everything transpired.

Inevitably, a study of this magnitude is likely to contain mistakes of one variety or another in the final text and/or maps, despite endless hours of proofreading and the help of a copy editor. I apologize in advance for any errors and assume full responsibility for them.

* * *

The Maps of Fredericksburg could not have been written without the assistance of a host of people. As always, Theodore P. Savas of Savas Beatie heads the list. A good friend and effective editor, Ted has always supported my efforts. Because he is also a distinguished historian and author in his own right, Ted understands the researching and writing process and is always supportive. I am also appreciative of the assistance provided by Daniel Davis, Phillip Greenwalt, Ryan Quint, and Kristopher White for their thorough reviews of the manuscript. All authors and historians, they were most helpful in pointing out errors and inconsistencies. A work such as this could not have been completed without their assistance and support.

The rangers/historians at the Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania National Military Park were most helpful. These included: John Hennessey, Eric Mink, and Donald Pfanz, all distinguished authors. Special thanks to historian Frank O’Reilly for patiently answering a myriad of questions about the campaign and for producing his multi-map set on Fredericksburg, which was indispensable to this volume. I spent many hours scanning the exceptionally valuable bound volumes which contain a wealth of first-hand accounts. Kudos to retired park historian Robert K. Krick for his outstanding contributions to the study of the Civil War in general, and expanding our knowledge of the Army of Northern Virginia in particular.

As always, my wife, Linda, has been a constant source of encouragement and companionship. She has patiently listened to endless stories about the campaign, has ridden with me on many battlefield trips, and allowed me the time to complete this project.

Bradley M. Gottfried

Cobb Island, Maryland

THE MAPS OF FREDERICKSBURG

An Atlas of the Fredericksburg Campaign,

Including all Cavalry Operations,

September 18, 1862 - January 22, 1863

MAP SET 1: Recovering from the Maryland Campaign (September 18 – October 20, 1862)

Map Set 1.1: The Army of the Potomac Refits but does not Pursue (September 18 – October 5, 1862)

While Gen. Robert E. Lee was profoundly disappointed with the outcome of the Maryland Campaign, this was not the case north of the Potomac River. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan felt satisfied with the results of the bloody September 17 battle, for Maryland was free of Rebels and he was the Union’s savior. Many of his troops felt the same, though many did not.

Questions about the manner in which McClellan had managed his army arose even before the battle ended. Reinforcements and fresh troops had given him a sizable strength advantage while Lee’s battered army was still lodged in Maryland with the Potomac blocking its easy exit. McClellan thought otherwise, estimating instead that Lee’s army numbered at least the same as his. With his own supply of artillery shells dwindling, and three of his corps (I, II, and XII) in poor condition, McClellan decided against undertaking further action against Lee on September 18. He wrote later he would not hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. It did not help matters that a recurring bout of dysentery returned during this time. After reconsidering his decision late on the afternoon of the 18th, he ordered Maj. Gen. William Franklin’s VI Corps to launch an attack against Lee early the following morning. By that time, Lee was gone.¹

After the fight at Shepherdstown on the 19th, most of McClellan’s army rested in the fields around Sharpsburg. The dead were buried, doctors tended to the thousands of wounded, officers reorganized their commands, and arms and other items were collected. Many of the soldiers wrote letters home to let their loved ones know they had survived yet another battle, while their officers began gathering what information they would need to pen their after-battle reports. McClellan was among the most active. Those in whose judgment I rely, he wrote his wife, tell me that I fought the battle splendidly & that it was a masterpiece of art. To Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, the often maligned general in chief of the Union army, McClellan noted, Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland & Penna. are now safe. The Rebel army had been severely handled, and had retreated. This was victory enough for President Abraham Lincoln to finally issue his Emancipation Proclamation.²

The blunting of Lee’s invasion pleased Lincoln, but he grew less happy and more frustrated with each passing day because of McClellan’s inaction. After receiving a stream of excuses as to why the army could not cross the Potomac River to take on Lee, Lincoln decided to pay McClellan a visit to see the army’s condition firsthand. The army is not in condition to take the field at present, claimed Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks. Our men are tired out, and they are out of clothing, discipline, every thing that goes to make efficient soldiers.³

Lincoln arrived on October 1 and stayed through the 4th, touring the battlefield, visiting the wounded, and reviewing the troops. For the most part, the foot soldiers welcomed his visit, though many were disappointed by his plain features and common dress. One man thought the president looks like some old farmer, while another observed, he looks tired and worn out.⁴

The most important part of Lincoln’s visit was his time with McClellan. Little affection existed between them. The general had been rude to Lincoln, had not captured Richmond during the Peninsula Campaign, and was now refusing to vigorously pursue Lee. McClellan did not believe the president had given him the support he had promised, did not believe in his strategy to win the war, and thought he meddled too much in the affairs of his army. Lincoln realized McClellan was a superb organizer of armies and his men loved him, but that he was reluctant to commit them into battle. He has got the slows, is how Lincoln characterized McClellan.⁵

No record of the conversations between the two men exists, but it is clear Lincoln told McClellan that he expected the campaign against Lee to be vigorously continued while the weather permitted. When he returned to Washington, Lincoln confided to a friend that he had warned McClellan that he would be a ruined man if he did not move forward rapidly and effectively.⁶

Map Set 1.2: Lee’s Army Refits (September 18 – October 1)

Once across the Potomac and with the fighting at Shepherdstown over, Gen. Lee halted his army along Opequon Creek near Martinsburg in western Virginia.

Given the state of his disorganized understrength army and shortage of supplies, Lee had his men march to more permanent camps about ten miles south of Bunker Hill, where he intended to rest and reorganize his command. Desertion and straggling were rampant. Robert Chilton, Lee’s adjutant, estimated some 40,000 men—many of them lightly wounded—were absent from the rolls wandering the roads and fields of northern Virginia. Although men were arriving daily, Lee still had only some 36,000 effectives at this time.⁷

The army’s time along Opequon Creek allowed the officers and men to reflect on the campaign. Most believed they had lost a real opportunity to defeat another Union army—this one on Northern soil—and perhaps end the war. I suppose, wrote Lee’s adjutant Walter Taylor, that it will be generally concluded that our march through … Maryland was decidedly meteoric. Brig. Gen. William Pender bluntly wrote to his wife, My only regret is that we crossed it [Potomac River] in the first place.⁸

The ranks gradually swelled as men returned to their units. One officer grimly noted that our Army has been increased by the poor barefooted fellows. Artilleryman E. Porter Alexander recalled that it was really wonderful how our numbers increased during this month [early October]. By the middle of November, Lee’s army was approaching 80,000 men, a size it had not enjoyed since the Seven Days’ Battles. For the first time since he took command of the army Lee had the luxury of devoting time to daily roll calls and drilling. The former was important as a way to keep men in the army. Although his men had proven themselves on field after field, fighting time and time again against often improbable odds, Lee had not fully realized his strategic objectives. Morale had fallen after the Army of Northern Virginia’s first clear-cut failure. With time now to rest and refit, spirits slowly but surely rose once more.⁹

Lee’s mounted arm had also suffered heavily during the grueling campaign. As one trooper noted when he and his comrades returned to Virginia, the horses were terribly taxed and exhausted. The lush bounty of the Shenandoah Valley soon restored the health of both men and mounts. Cavalry commander Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown (Jeb) Stuart, whose ranks swelled with each passing day, soon boasted a command nearly 6,000 strong. His job had not ceased with the river crossing; Stuart’s troopers ranged widely along the Potomac watching the fords and bridges to avoid any surprise move by McClellan’s army.¹⁰

As September gave way to October, Lee became more optimistic that McClellan would be content to settle in for the winter. The Southern chieftain worried that his men had been pushed too hard and were ill-equipped to take on another campaign. Speaking for many in the army, a North Carolinian remarked, the condition of our troops [is] now demanding repose. Lee also realized the winter would offer a different set of hardships. We were sorely in need of clothing and shoes, and there was not a blanket in the command, complained a member of the 3rd Arkansas. A South Carolinian in Maxcy Gregg’s brigade agreed, adding that it was difficult to describe the condition of the troops at this time, so great and various was their wretchedness.¹¹

Resupplying his army was just one of Lee’s priorities. Another was figuring out how to replace his line officers with competent men. Since the opening of active campaigning outside Richmond four months earlier, dozens of generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels had been killed or wounded. Each had to be replaced. The efficiency of Southern armies was also hampered by a Confederate law that did not permit any unit larger than a division. Lee had gotten around this stricture by organizing his army into two wings of divisions, one each under Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson. The situation was resolved on September 18 during the Maryland operations when President Jefferson Davis signed a law allowing for a corpssized organization led by a lieutenant general. Seven weeks later on November 6, the Army of Northern Virginia was officially organized into two corps. Lee submitted Longstreet and Jackson (in that order) for promotion to the new corps rank.¹²

Map Set 1.3: McClellan Finally Moves (October 6 – October 20, 1862)

President Lincoln returned to Washington hoping McClellan would cross the Potomac River to pursue Lee, but knew the odds were against it. By October 6, Lincoln realized he needed to put his demands on paper.

On that same date, Gen. Halleck wrote to McClellan, The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. Lincoln’s offer of additional troops was intended to offset McClellan’s constant refrain of not having sufficient numbers of men to face the Army of Northern Virginia. Halleck’s telegram also indicated that fewer troops would be provided should McClellan cross farther north into the Shenandoah Valley. While Lincoln preferred the interior line closest to Washington, Halleck informed McClellan that he was free to take whichever route he wished. His only request was to be informed of the selected route.¹³

McClellan replied to Halleck on the same day: It is important in making my decision regarding the route to be taken by the army that I should know, first, what description of troops I am to be re-enforced with upon the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other route between the enemy and Washington.¹⁴

Despite the offer of reinforcements, McClellan was worried about the condition of his depleted regiments and he had made that clear in a communication to Washington at the end of September. Halleck addressed his concerns on October 7, informing the general that 2,000 convalescents were returned to their regiments and extra-duty men, such as teamsters, were being handed rifles and sent to infantry regiments. We are making every possible effort to fill up the old regiments, but not much can be done at present. Halleck also indicated that a plan to institute a draft was underway. He concluded by writing, It [the army] must move, and the old regiments must remain in their crippled condition.¹⁵

McClellan finally stirred on October 8 by moving his headquarters to Harpers Ferry. When he arrived there, he informed Halleck of his new position and wrote, I am pushing everything as rapidly as possible to get ready for the advance. Large quantities of supplies reached the army at Harpers Ferry, but they were not, McClellan claimed, enough to begin the requested offensive. Days passed with no sign of McClellan making plans to cross the Potomac into Virginia.¹⁶

Lincoln’s frustration boiled over when he learned of a Confederate cavalry raid into Pennsylvania (see Map 1.4). The president sat down and wrote a long note to his dallying army commander on October 13. The general’s ongoing magnification of the obstacles facing him, complained Lincoln, was more than frustrating. Somehow, he added, Lee’s army was able to do so much with so little. Should you not claim to be of at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? he asked. Lincoln also reminded McClellan that his army was closer to the Rebel capital at Richmond than was Lee’s. Why not make a forced march and capture the capital? Were Lee’s soldiers better marchers than his own? I say ‘try’: if we never try, we shall never succeed, concluded the president. It is unmanly to say they cannot do it. The letter depressed McClellan, who confided to a friend that he expected to be removed from command. The general replied to the president that he would move as soon as his men were ready, and that he would give Lincoln’s views the fullest & most unprejudiced consideration.¹⁷

McClellan also complained that he did not have enough healthy horses to move against Lee. Our cavalry has been constantly occupied in scouting and reconnaissances, he explained, and this severe labor has worked down the horses and rendered many of them unserviceable … no more than one-half of our cavalry are fit for active service. The enemy, however, is well mounted. An irate Lincoln shot back a telegram to McClellan: I have just read your dispatches about sore-tongued and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?¹⁸

Map Set 1.4: Stuart Begins His Ride Around McClellan (October 8 - 9)

Jeb Stuart’s Confederate cavalry, now some 6,000 strong, used the weeks after Sharpsburg to refit, rest, and picket the Potomac River from the area opposite Williamsport, Maryland, down to Harpers Ferry. The only real interruption was on October 1 when about 700 Union cavalry crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and headed for Martinsburg. Stuart directly oversaw the action that pushed the enemy troopers back across the river.¹⁹

Never one to languish in camp, the resourceful Stuart developed a plan to ride around McClellan’s Potomac army, disrupt its communications, collect horses, learn of its dispositions, and create general havoc. He pitched the idea to Gen. Lee on October 6 and was given the go-ahead two days later. Lee allowed him to take 1,200 to 1,500 well-mounted men, suitable for such an expedition. Stuart’s ultimate destination was Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, where he intended to destroy the railroad bridge over Conococheague Creek.²⁰

Stuart set off on his expedition with 1,800 men from three of his cavalry brigades under Brig. Gens. Wade Hampton, Rooney Lee, and Grumble Jones. John Pelham’s four-gun horse artillery battery accompanied the troopers. The expeditionary force assembled at Hedgesville, Virginia, on October 9 while Stuart and his staff rode north at midnight to McCoy’s Ford to reconnoiter the crossing site. Because the ford was defended, a small detail from the 10th Virginia Cavalry crossed at another ford 200 yards upstream about three hours later. Riding downstream, they drove the Federal pickets away from McCoy’s Ford, but not before their presence warned the Federals of a crossing by enemy horsemen. Federal pickets exaggerated the size of Stuart’s force, but they accurately predicted it was heading for Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. By daylight, Stuart’s troopers were across the river and riding north.²¹

Stuart’s men were acting under very specific orders read to them the previous night by their officers. Any civilians whose property was seized would be issued a receipt to enable the individual to have recourse upon his Government for damage. Only officers could authorize such seizure, which could not be for private use. One-third of the men were detailed to lead up to three captured horses and would be positioned in the center of the column, protected by troopers on the flanks. Perhaps most surprising was the order to take into custody all public functionaries, such as magistrates, postmasters, sheriffs, &c. These men would be used for exchange purposes to free Southern civilians being held in Federal prisons.²²

The gray troopers captured a signal station on the National Road and continued into Pennsylvania. Some 600 of the 1,800 men were tasked with capturing horses. Over every field and in every direction, men could be seen chasing horses, each one trying to capture the most, wrote Lt. Richard Watkins of the 3rd Virginia Cavalry. They would meet wagons in the road, take the horses and leave the poor wagoner either swearing with rage or mute with astonishment. Any threat or exhibition of rage was only laughed at. As one angry farmer was told, this was what we called making the [Union] men feel the war.²³

About noon, the column thundered into Mercersburg, where the men went to work collecting supplies, despite orders to the contrary. A member of the 3rd Virginia Cavalry estimated that thousands of dollars worth of goods were taken by way of hats, books, cloth &&. A local physician confirmed the Rebels behaved very decently. They were gentlemen’s robbers. The troopers rode out of town with their saddle bags bulging and their stomachs full, dragging along civilians who could be used for exchange.²⁴

With rain steadily falling, the column finally approached Chambersburg shortly after 7:00 p.m. Bells tolled and about 75 members of the Home Guard gathered as a drum beat assembly. Concerned that he might be riding into a trap, General Hampton sent Col. M. C. Butler into the town with a detail of 25 men from the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry with a flag of truce to demand the town’s surrender. A small group of officials rode out to meet the column and asked for terms. Unconditional surrender, was Hampton’s reply, though he promised that civilians would not be harmed and their property would not be confiscated unless of military value. The officials agreed, and by 8:00 p.m. Hampton’s men occupied the town.²⁵

Map Set 1.5: Stuart Ends His Ride Around McClellan (October 9 - 13)

Jeb Stuart, who tapped Hampton to act as military governor of Chambersburg, assured the town’s inhabitants they would not be molested. Their belongings were another story, and Hampton’s men roamed the streets searching out anything of value. According to one of Stuart’s aides, the men got every thing they wanted & a great many things they did not want. Among the captures were blue uniforms, which many of the Rebels donned.²⁶

Meanwhile, the rest of Stuart’s command roamed the countryside in search of horses and other supplies of value. The men spent a miserable night when they bivouacked. We were soaked to the skin & had to lie down in puddles of water, in a farmer’s field, noted a sergeant in the 10th Virginia Cavalry. A bonanza presented itself the next morning in the form of government railroad buildings outside of Chambersburg. The men helped themselves to clothes, boots, and weapons. Prior to leaving the area, Stuart made sure that his men destroyed the buildings, the railroad locomotives, and cars.²⁷

Most of Stuart’s force headed for Chambersburg on October 9, but Stuart selected Grumble Jones and the 600 men from his brigade to ride along the railroad to destroy the bridge spanning Conococheague Creek—one of the raid’s major strategic objectives. Jones ordered Capt. Thomas Whitehead with a detachment from the 2nd Virginia Cavalry to finish the task. Civilians warned the Virginians the bridge was made of iron. Because it would be impossible to destroy it with the tools he possessed, Whitehead turned back. The driving rain did not motivate the exhausted troopers to ride on and see the situation with their own eyes. If they had, they would have discovered the bridge was in fact made of wood.²⁸

With only some of his objectives complete Stuart decided it was time to ride back to Virginia. But which route should he take? The shortest was to simply retrace his steps, but he knew enemy infantry and cavalry were probably following him, so that route all but promised an unwanted and unhappy collision with the enemy. Heading south via Cashtown would allow his pick of many fords over the Potomac near Leesburg, Virginia, some of which were probably undefended.²⁹

Stuart’s column rode through the South Mountain range to Cashtown, Pennsylvania, where the road turned south. Stuart was acutely aware of the dangers facing the column as it trotted closer to the Union army. Passing through Fairfield, the column reached Emmitsburg, Maryland, where they were given a hero’s welcome. To throw off his pursuers, Stuart angled southwest toward Frederick, returned to his original route, and made his way to New Market. Along the way, Southern sympathizers told Stuart that Union cavalry was combing the area. Gen. Halleck was so infuriated by the raid that he wired McClellan, Not a man should be permitted to return to Virginia. McClellan responded that he would do his best, but most of his cavalry had ridden to Cumberland to oppose an enemy force that had been sent there to draw attention away from Stuart.³⁰

Although patrols scoured the countryside in search of Stuart’s column, McClellan knew that his best chance of catching the Southern cavalry was at the Potomac fords, which were heavily defended. After the orders were given for covering the fords upon the river, I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the capture or destruction of his force was perfectly certain, he wrote. Union cavalry commander Alfred Pleasonton, however, miscalculated. He believed the crossing would be made near the Monocacy River, and so concentrated his men here.³¹

With the enemy working desperately to block the fords, Stuart turned to someone with intimate knowledge of the area for help. The guide suggested he head for the little-used White’s Ford and cross there. During the approach to the ford the Southerners encountered Federal cavalry. Both sides sported blue uniforms, which confused the Federal troops who had no idea Stuart’s men had changed uniforms in Chambersburg. Part of the 1st Virginia Cavalry thundered toward the hesitating Union horsemen and sent them flying. With the ford clear, Rooney Lee’s men splashed across and promptly encountered several infantry companies from the 99th Pennsylvania posted along a bluff. The men scattered when approached by the imposing column of Confederate horsemen who screamed for them to surrender. Stuart ordered the rest of his command across the river. The rear guard made it, but barely in time.³²

MAP SET 2: McClellan Moves, but President Lincoln Makes a Change

Map 2.1: McClellan Finally Moves South (October 13 – November 7)

Jeb Stuart’s ride was a tremendous accomplishment. In just under 60 hours his command rode 120 miles, collected 1,200 horses, secured a large amount of equipment and supplies, destroyed about $1,000,000 worth of equipment, paroled about 300 sick and wounded Union soldiers, and returned with 30-40 civilian hostages. Stuart’s lost just two men. The results of this expedition … can barely be estimated, bragged Stuart, and the consternation among property holders in Pennsylvania beggars description. Lee was also exuberant: I take occasion to express … my sense of the boldness, judgment and prowess he displayed in its execution, and cordially join with him, in his commendation of the conduct and endurance of the brave men he commanded. Although clearly exhausted, the troopers were also ecstatic. One boasted it was one of the greatest raids on record. Northerners were also complementary. Alexander McClure, who helped surrender Chambersburg to Wade Hampton, wrote, our people were confounded with astonishment at the brilliant audacity of the rebels penetrating twenty miles in Gen. McClellan’s rear.¹

The wide-ranging ride did not impress everyone. Temporary division commander Jubal Early called it the greatest horse stealing expedition [that only] annoyed the enemy. Usually left unsaid was the fact that hundreds of the raiders’ horses had broken down during the expedition and had to be left behind, and while a large number of horses were captured, many were only suitable