The End of an Era: India Exists Tibet (India Tibet Relations 1947-1962) Part 4

Introduction

The last volume of our study on the relations between India and Tibet (1947-62), undertaken under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence of the United Service Institution of India, is rather depressing, as it narrates the last years of the Indian presence in Tibet which ended under the most dramatic circumstances - a War. But first let us take a brief look at the first three volumes¹.

Volume 1

The first volume (1947-1951) recounted the tragedy that befell Tibet; not only did the Dalai Lama and his people lose their country, which had lived blissfully ignorant of the great revolutions reshaping the rest of the world, but it was a tragedy for India too as it lost a peaceful neighbour. Suddenly India had to share a border with Communist China whose ideology was the opposite of Buddhist values. At that time Delhi did not realize it, but a few years later, when India would understand that it had no more a secure northern border, it was too late.

Some wiser Indian officials and politicians immediately saw the implications of the change of neighbour, but their views were not honoured.

Letters, cables, telegrams and notes accessed by us, showed that two schools of thought emerged during the tumultuous months of November/December 1950: on one side were Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and KM Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed by an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’; the other side feared the strategic implications for India.

In a way, the fate of Tibet and India’s borders with Tibet was sealed once Sardar Patel, who clearly foresaw and articulated the dangers of the Chinese annexation of Tibet for the Indian frontiers, passed away on December 15, 1950; it was hardly two months after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Eastern Tibet. Nehru’s policy would have disastrous consequences which can still be felt today on the Indian borders, whether in Ladakh, Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh.

Volume 2

The second volume (1951-1954) looked at the consequences of the signing of the 17-Point Agreement in May 1951; the Tibetan delegates had no alternative but to accept that the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland of the People’s Republic of China and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet.

A two-phase operation was meticulously planned by Mao Zedong; the first part culminated in the Battle of Chamdo which saw the Tibetan forces being decimated; the Great Helmsman’s second step was ‘diplomatic’, the weak Tibetan State was forced to put its thumb impression on an agreement allowing Communist China to take over the Land of Snows.

This period also saw the beginning of the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing. Over the next months and years, the Indian officials posted on the Roof of the World would discover the true attitude and objectives of the Communists; but nobody in Delhi or the Indian Embassy in Beijing was ready to listen.

The slow break-down and deterioration of the age-old Indo-Tibet relations, gradually being replaced by a cruder relation with the new occupiers of Tibet, has been looked into in depth.

It ended with the signing of the 1954 Tibet Agreement² to which the Tibetans were not even invited to participate. India’s long border with Tibet (now China) was wishfully deemed ‘settled’ in the process, while the Chinese would wait to raise the issue at the ‘appropriate time’.

Volume 3

The third volume (1954-1957) studied the Chinese consolidation on the plateau after having secured the Indian withdrawal from Tibet through the 1954 Agreement.

Paradoxically or ironically, this period already witnessed the first Chinese intrusions in Barahoti, a small flat grazing ground located in today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand. Though the first two of the Five Principles³ spoke of ‘Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and Mutual non-aggression’, the Chinese troops walked into the Indian Territory, before the ink on the treaty had hardly dried.

It was during this time that Delhi started noticing serious cartographical aggressions by Communist China.

In Tibet itself, it was time for India to wind-up its presence on the plateau; the negotiations would take many more months than expected, but in early 1955, an agreement was finally reached.

India’s withdrawal from the Roof of the World and the happenings on the plateau left Tibet’s small neighbours, Sikkim and Bhutan, deeply worried; at that time, the first revolts took place in Kham province of Eastern Tibet; it was followed by a violent repression by the Chinese Army.

These momentous events as well as the creation of the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, which was to bring new ‘reforms’ have started to be resisted by the Tibetan ‘masses’.

The last chapters were consecrated to the visit of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to India on the occasion of 2500th anniversary of the birth of the Buddha. It is striking that at no point in time were the Tibetan Lamas involved or even consulted in the acceptance of the invitations.

Eventually, the two Lamas returned to their homeland, to give the Communists a ‘last chance’ to respect their promises.

Volume 4

The period covered in the last volume (1958-1962) witnessed the most dramatic events of the bilateral relations between India and Tibet; first, the consolidation of China’s military presence on the plateau, then the Uprising of the Tibetan masses in March 1959, which prompted the Dalai Lama to flee to India, where the Tibetan leader and tens of thousands of his followers became refugees. Though the Chinese propaganda projected the March 1959 events as the ‘emancipation of the serfs’, the reality was very different.

Even today, the Chinese propaganda claims the opposite of the historical truths.

The reports from the Indian Trade Agents in Gartok, Gyantse and Yatung, as well as the Consul General of India in Lhasa are looked into in detail. An era was coming to an end; Mao’s China did not want any Indian presence in ‘their’ new colony. A sense of jealousy towards India prevailed; Beijing clearly resented the existence of an age-old civilizational relation between India and Tibet. In these circumstances, it became clear that the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement would not be renewed and the Trade Agencies in Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok would have to be closed; it happened in the Spring of 1962.

The two years before the closure of the Indian diplomatic missions, saw a constant harassment of the Indian diplomatic personnel in Tibet who had to deal with thorny issues such as the fate of the Indian traders, the vicissitude of the pilgrims to Mt Kailash, the status of the Kashmiri Muslims, known as Kachis, or the nationality of the Ladakhi monks in the Tibetan monasteries.

On the diplomatic front, one can only regret that the 1960 talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and the Indian government did not bear fruit; this volume does not deal at length with this issue, as it is out of the scope of this research; however the less known talks between the Indian Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing and a senior Chinese diplomat have been covered.

The PLA’s preparations for a war were evident, except for Delhi who was living in a dream world; the reports from Lhasa should at least have opened the eyes of the Indian intelligence agencies; it was not to be the case.

Another tragedy was the closure of the Indian Consulate in Lhasa around mid-December 1962, three weeks after the unilateral declaration of ceasefire by the Chinese.

Trying to reconstitute what happened from the few sources available has been a hard job; unfortunately the Ministry of External Affairs still zealously keeps classified all documents related to 1961-62.

Does it help India’s interests? Certainly not. And it leaves more questions than answers.

During all these events, a sense of inexorability prevailed.

Using new sources, the volumes ends with by a couple of not-too-well known aspects of the 1962 China-India War, in particular, the five- year ‘training’ of the PLA during the Tibetan insurgency which greatly helped the Chinese forces become familiar with the terrain and other logistic difficulties on the plateau. Our personal research on the fate of the PoWs kept in Tibet, reveals another tragedy, within the greater tragedy which was the 1962 War.

In Volume 3, we quoted Apa Pant, the Political Officer in Sikkim, saying that the Chinese officers were not interested in harmony and compassion but in power and material benefit; Pant spoke of the confrontation of two different worlds: The one so apparently inefficient, so humane and even timid, yet kind and compassionate and aspiring to something more gloriously satisfying in human life; the other determined and effective, ruthless, power-hungry and finally intolerant. I wondered how this conflict could resolve itself, and what was India’s place in it.

An ancient world disappeared in 1962 and in the process, India lost a friend, a kind neighbour and a peaceful border.

To end, we shall cite the personal experience of a senior Indian officer who spent some six months in a PoW camp in Tibet.

The officer recounted: One other episode of our stay in the PoW camp is worth recording. After we were allowed to sit on top of our house in the sun, we would often see an old lama in the monastery above and if he caught our eye, he would take out his hand from under his robes for a split second and make a sign of blessings, as it were. After a few times we felt convinced that he was conveying goodwill to us. So, we would also make a quick sign of salutation with folded hands in return. He would never stay long in our sight.

The narrative continues: "One day, towards the end of our stay, at our request we were taken to see the palace and the monastery. It was a shock to see the palace with all the beautiful Buddha statues of all sizes and fabulous scrolls (thankas) lying broken, defiled and torn and trampled on the ground. In the monastery, a couple of lamas were still staying including the one we ‘knew’ by sight. When we were walking through the usual dark corridors on the conducted tour, this lama was just ahead of me with a guard in front. He sought my hand in the darkness and pressed it. I quickly responded with both my hands. This episode is mentioned just to illustrate the true feelings of Tibetans towards us Indians."

When Beijing speaks of reopening Old Silk Roads, it should be reminded that the roads between India and Tibet were based on centuries of kinship and shared values. No doubt, the Peoples’ Republic of China has been able to annex Tibet by force of arms; whether they will be able to assimilate Tibetans into their system is a moot question, the answer to which only the future holds.

1In footnotes, we shall often refer to chapters of the previous volumes.

2Also known as the Panchsheel (Five Principles) Agreement, for its preamble.

3Panchsheel in Hindi.

01

Tour of the Political Officer in Sikkim to Tibet: An Eye Opener

We left our narrative after the return of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas to Tibet in early 1957; promises were made in Delhi to suspend the reforms for a few years. In this context, the visit of Apa B. Pant, the Political Officer (PO) in Sikkim, to Tibet was important, as it allowed the Government of India to take stock of the situation on the ground.

A Rare Visit to Tibet

On November 28, 1957, Pant sent a report of his tour to Tibet to BK Acharya, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs¹; it gives important insights into the prevailing atmosphere in the Land of Snows at the end of 1957; the following months, the situation would seriously deteriorate, but it was already tense.

Pant was conscious that a few months earlier, he had the unique opportunity of spending nearly three months with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama during their tour to India²: I could then come into intimate contact with not only those two high dignitaries but also with some of the most remarkable monks and important members of their staff and advisers. The PO and his colleagues in the Ministry of External Affairs also met several Chinese officials working in Tibet as well as others posted in the Embassy in Delhi.

Pant saw his visit to Tibet as a continuation of the various contacts that he had established with the two Lamas and their entourage: It was thus not as a stranger that I was to visit Tibet, but as a friend, he wrote.

Better Relations with the Chinese?

In his Annual Political Report for the Year 1957, addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs,³ Maj SL Chibber, the Consul General in Lhasa, mentioned that India’s relations with the Tibetans were still rather cordial: Our social contacts with the Tibetans increased slightly. On arrival of the Chinese, our social contacts with the Tibetans came more or less to an end. This was due to the Chinese instructions to the Tibetans to contact foreigners only through them. Even before [my] arrival, the social contacts with the higher class of Tibetans were only through Foreign Bureau …as they do not wish to displease their rulers, wrote Chibber.

There was a change after the visit of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to India in 1956-57, the situation improved to some extent.

For the Chinese, a serious issue was the fact that the Tibetan officials were leaving for India, not wanting to return: This has made the Chinese ask the Tibetan Government not to grant leave to any Tibetan official unless it is approved by them. The Consul General added: it cannot be said that our contacts are free with Tibetans, as the Tibetans still feel reluctant to meet us openly as they never know that one day Chinese might twist them for not observing their instructions.

The social contacts of the Consulate with Chinese were however limited to the Foreign Bureau⁴ staff and they were rather formal.

It is in this context that Apa B. Pant decided to visit Lhasa; according to Chibber, it was an important event in the annals of the Tibet-India relations: Due to various reasons no visit of the Political Officer took place after 1949. Harishwar Dayal was the last PO to have visited Lhasa in October 1949, the Consul General commented in his report: During Mr. Pant’s stay at Lhasa, the Chinese, as well as the local authorities, gave all possible assistance. Practically, it meant that the Chinese wanted to give the ‘trial’⁵ a chance.

The Foreign Bureau attached two officials (one Chinese and one Tibetan monk official) as ‘guides’ to Pant during his visit; later two different Chinese officers accompanied the PO on his journey back to Yatung.

A Thaw on the Roof of the World?

In his Report, Chibber observed Mr. Pant and party were received cordially wherever they went during their sojourn in Lhasa. Mr. Pant on his return journey stayed for four days at Shigatse. He called on His Holiness the Panchen Lama twice and visited Tashilhunpo monasteries, primary school, power station and [the] Chinese hospital. He was also entertained by the Panchen Lama.

The visit came at a time when China had decided not to immediately implement the so-called political reforms, i.e. making Tibet a Communist province.

Chibber in his note gave the political background at the time of the visit: When His Holiness the Dalai Lama was in India number of Tibetan officials including Cabinet ministers came to the Consulate to have radio telephone talk with their counterparts in India without coming through the Foreign Bureau. The fact that it was allowed was a sign of relaxation.

Chibber also cited a ‘return’ call of the Shapes⁶ on the Consul General; the Foreign Bureau was not informed about their visit; the Chinese permission was not sought.

Further, at the time of Apa Pant’s visit to Tibet, a number of Tibetan noblemen and ladies called on him and Mrs. Pant, without passing through the Foreign Bureau; in all probability, the Chinese knew about it, but did not object, though the Chinese Intelligence in Lhasa was always well-informed.

One of the reasons for not protesting was perhaps that the Chinese have now full hold on the Central Tibet and thus do not mind relaxing slightly their vigilance on Tibetans about their social contacts. Except for formal functions when the invitations to Tibetan officials were sent through Foreign Bureau, on a number of other occasions, Tibetan officials attended parties given by the Tibetans without formally receiving their invitations through the Foreign Bureau.

Apa Pant’s Report

We shall now quote from the Political Officer’s report to BK Acharya.

The tour took place between September 26 and November 12, 1957. It was to be the last tour of a Political Officer to Tibet. Out of 47 days on the plateau, 26 days were spent in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital; the party stayed five days in Shigatse, two days in Gyantse, two days in Samye and seven days in Yatung. Pant was delighted to spend time in Samye, the famous 1,200 years old monastery constructed and established by the great Indian Yogi-Pandit Guru Padmasambhava. He could also spend time in a few Tibetan villages on the way to Samye.

In Lhasa, he reported that he paid homage to the three pillars of the Tibetan society, the monasteries of Drepung (7,700 monks), Sera (5,500 monks) and Ganden (4,400 monks). In Nethang, he saw the shrine of Pandit Atisha⁷ who had come from Bengal during the 11th century to teach the Buddha Dharma.

That was not all; he had three encounters with the Dalai Lama and also met Yang Gongsu⁸, the director of the Chinese Foreign Bureau at Lhasa, looking after Tibet’s foreign relations. Following the Dalai Lama’s suggestion, he had a long discussion with the Dronyer Chemo⁹ and the Ta Lama, two confidants of the Dalai Lama as well as with the Tibetan leader’s sister, Tsering Dolma, and her husband, Phuntso Tashi, the head¹⁰ of the Bodyguard Regiment.

The Dalai Lama also advised him to meet the abbots and high lamas of the three monasteries. During most of these meetings, representatives of the Foreign Bureau were present, though in some cases, he met the representatives of the monasteries without Chinese presence. Pant also reported his lengthy discussions with the abbots and monks of the monasteries at Samye, Thalungthar¹¹, Nethang and Kundeling.

Though Chibber said that the PO met the Dalai Lama twice (once as he arrived in Lhasa and the second time as he was leaving), in his report Pant said that he met him thrice, but each time accompanied by Yang Gonsu, the head of the Chinese Foreign Bureau at Lhasa. The PO also met Gen Zhang Guohua¹², the acting representative of the People’s Government in Tibet and the Tibetan Kashag¹³.

Apa Pant observed: At most of these conversations the representatives of the Foreign Bureau were present whilst on few other occasions representatives of these monasteries came and saw me all alone.

Meeting Tibetans

Pant met several Tibetan leaders, both monk and lay, conversed with many rich and noble personages, and as I visited quite a few villages I could come in contact with the common mass of people …and could also try to understand their reactions to the present set up in Tibet.

Interestingly, on his way back under somewhat different and also rather difficult circumstances, he met the Panchen Lama for a couple of hours: The Panchen Lama had organized my meeting [with] some of the highest monks in the Tashi Lhumpo monastery and I had nearly three to four hours talks with these monks also. The nature of most of these talks, naturally, was mainly religious, cultural and spiritual.

Pant wanted to know whether they felt at all responsible for guiding and helping the common mass of people in Tibet in their present state of affairs.

Further Sonam Topgye Kazi, Pant’s interpreter was called twice by the Dalai Lama to intimate to me some important matters which he wanted to be conveyed to the Prime Minister.¹⁴

Pant commented about Sonam Topgye: He is not only an excellent and capable interpreter but also if handled properly a useful officer.

When the Dalai Lama came into exile in 1959, Sonam Topgye would become his personal interpreter on deputation from the Ministry of External Affairs.

The Details of Trip to Tibet

Let us start the visit at the beginning.

The party drove from Gangtok to Nathu-la by jeep; the new Gangtok-Nathu-la national highway was opened till Mile 22 from Gangtok; later the PO and his staff used ponies and mules up to Rinchengang, the first village in Tibet located 13 miles from the border pass and four miles away from Yatung, the main settlement in the Chumbi Valley.

The Foreign Bureau ‘solicitously’ collaborated with the party putting at their disposal an air-conditioned jeep¹⁵ and two American jeeps: Heavier transport for carrying our baggage was also put at our disposal. Three huge Russian made Chinese trucks carried our baggage from Yatung right up to Lhasa and back again.

Maj Chibber told the PO that the Foreign Bureau refused to take any payment for the three jeeps; they even did not want anything for the petrol.

Pant calculated the motor journey alone during these 47 days must have come to about 1,500 miles. It would be awkward for us to accept this facility given by the Chinese.

He thought that the Chinese were perhaps trying to ‘pay back’ for his help during the visit of the Dalai Lama to India.

In any case, the PO appreciated the Chinese help : the officers of the Foreign Bureau and other Chinese officials were extremely courteous and helpful to us throughout our journey. Two officers from the Foreign Bureau, one of them obviously a secret service person, were attached to our party. …These liaison officers were extremely correct in their behavior.

Of course, the Chinese ‘officials’ were constantly around, whether in Yatung, Lhasa or Shigatse; attending the parties given for the PO, providing hospitality by organizing magnificent feasts.

According to Chibber’s report, Pant met Gen Zhang Guohua who was also Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) in the absence of Gen Zhang Jingwu; Pant noted that he met Yang Gongsu, Gen Zhang Guohua, Gen Fan Ming¹⁶ and Tan Guansan¹⁷ altogether three times.

He had lengthy talks with other dignitaries in Yatung and Shigatse, where the local members of the Foreign Bureau called on him and gave the PO the usual ‘elaborate and highly entertaining receptions’.

Apart from the visit to development projects, the Chinese organized cultural entertainment and cinema shows. Delhi was informed that the Chinese had been thanked for all this.

Increased Military Deployment in Tibet

It was Pant’s third visit to Tibet. In 1955, he had stayed some ten days in Yatung on his way to Bhutan and a year later, he made a trip up to Gyantse and Shigatse, where he spent about a month; in his report, he said: with each visit, my first impressions have been confirmed that Tibet is a country forcibly, with the might of military strength, ‘occupied’ by the Chinese.

He further noted that the military establishments around Yatung, Gyantse, Shigatse have been growing and this year it was not very difficult to estimate that around Lhasa alone there were more than 15,000 Chinese troops stationed.

He noted that roads were being constructed very rapidly: the Lhasa – Tsinghai [Qinghai] highway going to the northern parts of Tibet is nearly 35 feet wide and extremely well constructed.

Comparing his previous trip from Yatung to Gyantse a year earlier, which then took nearly eleven hours to complete 145 miles as the road was extremely bad: the same journey could be accomplished in less than seven hours.

While discussing with Gen Zhang Guohua about the Chinese way to build roads, the latter told Pant that once they decided on the construction of a road or a project they put at the disposal of the ‘director’ of such a project the necessary personnel, the funds, the raw materials, and the transport, and asked him to complete the job within a specific period.

Verification of the accounts was done once the whole project was completed; if the project was completed satisfactorily, the ‘director’ received a reward, if not…

The General mentioned the road from Rinchengang in the Chumbi Valley up to Nathu La, a new alignment of 25 miles would be constructed in less than 24 months: on my way back, a month later, I saw that the work was already underway and large batches of surveyors and engineers were chalking out the road up to Nathu La, noted Pant.

The PO’s conclusion was that he had no doubt whatsoever that before the road on our side is completed the road on the Tibetan side would be ready.

More than 60 years later, is the situation different?

The Conditions in Tibet

During his visit, Pant noticed that there was no big monastery in and around Lhasa without a Chinese military encampment nearby; "60 miles from Lhasa at Yangpachen and down the Kyichu river¹⁸ valley towards Kongbo there are many more military establishments and within a radius of hundred miles from Lhasa there would not be less than 30,000 troops stationed."

He made similar remarks for Shigatse and Yatung, where the hospital built by the Chinese could entertain only five civilian beds, while having a capacity of 60 beds for military personnel. The PO added that in Shigatse and Gyantse: large buildings are being constructed at a very rapid rate to house additional military personnel. In the streets of Yatung, Shigatse and Lhasa after 6 pm, there is strict curfew and no Tibetan is allowed to walk the streets. Every Chinese personnel, whether he is civilian or military carries fully loaded automatic machine guns or at the least very discreetly a fully loaded revolver. This was at the end of 1957. It would become far worse during the coming years.

Pant also remarked that even while attending dramatic, cultural programs or even public meetings, the Chinese were inseparable from their guns.

Mentally or Emotionally Not Submitted Themselves

Apa Pant noticed that the Chinese were now in effective occupation of Tibet; it had taken them seven years. However even though they literally spent millions on constructing roads, schools, hospitals, and they had taken innumerable Tibetans to China for indoctrination and education, as well as for sightseeing, it is evident that the Tibetans have no love lost whatsoever for the Chinese.

The PO estimated that at least 5,000 persons have been taken for sightseeing tours in China and nearly 6,000 students have been educated and returned to Tibet.

The report expounded on the feelings of the Tibetans: The impressions that the Chinese have made on the Tibetan’s mind is negligible and at best very superficial. Due to fear and the realization of their military, [as well as] the weakness of the Tibetans [they] are keeping quiet but have neither mentally or emotionally submitted themselves to the Chinese rule nor accepted it as the final dispensation.

Pant mentioned the postponement of the ‘Liberation of Tibet’ for six years which was discussed in Delhi during Zhou Enlai’s visit to India.¹⁹

For the Indian officer, it was indicative of the stubborn resistance put up by the Tibetans: Many people told me that the ‘liberation’ was postponed because the Chinese were finding it extremely difficult to get Tibetans to work for their projects.

The PO was also told by Tibetan officials that the Chinese had made ‘great mistakes’ in Kham in trying to ‘liberate’ the people; ultimately they turned the entire population against them: as a result, they had decided to go slow in Tibet proper in order to not have to fight a war in two places at the same time.

The ‘Reforms’ in Tibet

Thubten W. Phala, the Dronyer Chemo told the PO that the ‘hasty and irresponsible’ action of the Chinese in Kham had perhaps saved Tibet; in Kham while shouting slogans about ‘liberation’, the Chinese collectivized all the land and turned the peasants into mere slaves. They insisted that from collectivized farms a certain quota of food-grains should be delivered every year, failing which severe punishments were meted out to the workers.

Let us not forget that the ‘Great Leap Forward’ was to soon start in China; Mao wanting to increase China’s economy and industrial output. It began in 1958 and ended in 1961. Not only did the scheme fail to industrialize China, but it triggered a famine during which tens of millions died.

Phala explained to the PO that in Kham, and in other parts of China, unless one had a registration certificate, one could not purchase food from the cooperative shops: Every peasant who grew food had to surrender all of his produce to these government shops and get re-issued to him grain on the strength of his registration certificate. This means that every person was under the control of the bureaucracy as without their help he could not get food.

It is what the Chinese called the ‘reforms’.

Introduced in Kham, it resulted in the taxation of every object of personal use with the exception of a Mao suit and a pair of chopsticks. The Chinese started taking away children from the peasants and even sending the wives away to separate establishments to work. Pant remarked that Tibetans used to family life, did not appreciate the new communal life.

The Dronyer Chemo further explained that the Chinese followed the Communist pattern of development:

a)Collectivize the land

b)Make the surplus from land pay for the industrialization of the country

c)In the process control strictly the private and public lives of every individual

d)Execute their policies with a thorough ruthlessness disregarding the cost in human suffering

e)Turn a blind eye and deaf ear to the chaos caused by these policies in the communist countries themselves and ignore the possibility of any other method or policy for the balanced development of a country.

Interestingly, the Khampas, who had always been antagonistic to Lhasa rule, were now asking the Dalai Lama to intervene on their behalf.

Phala further asserted that the rate of taxation had gone up considerably in Kham. He told the PO that the rebellion that had broken out in Kham areas a year earlier was continuing: "It is a fact that beyond Kongbo, 350 miles east of Lhasa, no Chinese civilian can travel, unless he is in a convoy of at least 100 vehicles with full military escort and the Sikang highway²⁰ constructed at such heavy cost is now not under general use."

The Lord Chamberlain asserted that rebels in Nyangchen, Minyak, Nyrong, Derge, Batang, Litang, Sertha and Golok have time and again cut this road and made traffic impossible. In reprisal, the Chinese wiped out thousands of rebels and bombed villages and monasteries.

Phala was a firm believer that Tibet should fight for its independence.

They Did Not Hate the Invaders

Pant gave some examples of Chinese ‘unsympathetic attitudes’ towards the local population in Central Tibet; he cited buildings constructed by the Chinese in places like Phari or Gyantse: All Chinese buildings have strong fortifications around them and have at the corners round watch towers with rifle holes [used] for protecting the fortress! The Chinese seem to be all prepared to fight and destroy anybody or any move that can be termed anti-Chinese at the slightest provocation of the Tibetan.

The PO noted that due to their cultural and religious background, the Tibetans were not afraid of the Chinese and because of their happy go-lucky way, they did not seem either to hate or despise the invaders: I saw many instances when the Chinese escorting us talked and joked with the local personnel and it was more or less obvious that the Tibetan has very little animosity or anger against the Chinese as a person. When, however, the same person starts talking about the Chinese rule and the ‘occupation of Tibet’, he expresses strongly and vehemently his determination to fight and to get rid of the ‘invaders’!

It is an interesting remark showing the Tibetan character; unfortunately, the long reports from Pant were not often read in the corridors of power in Delhi.

The Mimang Party

One day in Lhasa, the PO was met by a group of leaders of the Mimang, or ‘People’s Party’, fighting for the freedom of Tibet. Pant knew that the Mimang had grown more powerful; he had also been told that the Mimang wanted to give him ‘great reception’ to thank India for what had been done for the Dalai Lama while he was in India. As a token of deep gratitude and veneration, the delegation presented a scarf to Pant for the Indian Prime Minister: "It is a well-known fact now that the people of Tibet consider India as the only country which can and will help their plight and the Prime Minister, [known in Tibet] as the Chogyal Nehru – Dharma Raja Nehru – would protect religion not only in Tibet but in the whole outside world."

Pant was told by the delegation that the people of Tibet from Tatseinlu²¹ in Sikang to Ladakh would be united in defying the Chinese rule; they were ready to lay down their lives in fighting for their freedom. They invited Dharma Raja Nehru to visit Tibet to see for himself.

They said that they understood that poverty and ignorance should disappear and there should be no inequality in matters of wealth or power; they also admitted that when the Dalai Lama was a minor, the Regents and advisers had misruled Tibet and misguided the people.

The delegates added that they were not against material or scientific progress, but that they were certain that the major problems of life could only be solved through ‘True Dharma’; the entire country believed in the teachings of Buddha.

The leader of the Mimang Party in Tibet was Gompo Tashi Andruktsang, who a year later would head the Khampa armed rebellion against the Chinese.

Pant remarked that the Mimang was not a minor or insignificant organisation and the Chinese were greatly afraid of them and were nervous that large Mimang numbers could come one day to the Indian Consulate.

Pant was right to believe that it was not an insignificant organization.

The Three Big Monasteries

When they called on the PO, the representatives of the monasteries offered a khata for the Indian Prime Minister and said that they wanted to ‘publicly’ invite him to Tibet.

They also affirmed that India had done so much for the Dharma and for Tibet during the last two years "that it was their duty to repay part of this debt by offering hospitality to the Chogyal Nehru."

Without having done much for Tibet, the Chogyal was getting high credit.

The monks, however, added that if India ‘loses interest in Tibet’, the Chinese materialists will put down religion and turn this Land of Dharma into a land where greed, hunger and debauchery will flourish.

Pant gave the representatives a lecture, whether arms, rifles and bullets, would be able to defeat the enemy and as to where from they would get these arms. The monks answered that over a long period Truth and Dharma will certainly prevail.

In the meantime, the minds of the people may be turned away from religion due to certain attractions and instigations.

The monks were not against redistribution of land or bringing equality into the Tibetan society, but it was necessary for the people to understand the true perspective of life. Unless the mind of man was full of serenity and happiness and unless anger, greed and despise were taken out of his mind all actions of human beings will lead to conflict, confusion and misery.

The lecture continued for some time and finally they requested that the Indian Prime Minister should not only visit Tibet but should send great scholars and pundits to Tibet to study the knowledge that they had preserved and studied throughout the centuries.

Pant’s report became philosophical; he said that the entire Tibetan society was geared to one purpose, the Realisation of Truth. The goal set before every individual was Enlightenment.

He concluded: Suffice it to say at this juncture that the Tibetans are indeed aware of the real nature of the fundamental conflict that they are facing with the advent of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, …I did come in contact with some remarkably interesting and very highly developed monks during my tour in Tibet.

The lecture continued thus, Pant, however, observed: I found that most of these monks were really only vaguely aware of these social responsibilities that they have to shoulder but that they really had no guidance and felt leaderless in achieving practical results. They did, however, possess the ideological and emotional background and training to understand these problems and act selflessly.

Robert Ford, the British Radio Operator working for the British Government in Eastern Tibet had written that Tibet needed something more Churchilian, than just praying and burning incense.

The Tibetan Aristocracy

According to the PO, the lay officials, in other words the aristocracy seemed to be biding their time and making hay while the sun shines. He explained: The landlords and the richer class of Tibetans are today given some kind of a protection by the Chinese and it is this class of rich landlords and lay officials who are more or less willingly cooperating with the Chinese!

It is not entirely correct, other sources mention the clergy also collaborating at least during the first years of occupation.

Pant remarked that the officials felt that as they have no support from the mass of the people their existence depends upon the Chinese bayonets.

Once again it is a generalization from a romantic mind; Pant, however, reported that the lay officials have no idea whatsoever of the future course of events in Tibet and are at the best living from moment to moment. A large number of them have sent their jewels to India.

He made a comparison between the lay administrators and the monk officials who were getting keenly aware of the conflicts and the problems that face them. Again, it was perhaps not proper to generalise.

The Role India Could Play

For Pant, the hopes of the Tibetans were centered on India: Everybody feels that a great miracle will be performed by India and Nehru. The visit of the Dalai Lama to India and the receptions that he was given here has given ‘hope and heart’ to the Tibetans. It is rather surprising as it was Pant himself, as the Political Officer in Sikkim, who closed the doors to the pro-independence elements living in Kalimpong.²².

Pant believed that thousands of Tibetan monks saw India as the ‘Land of Dharma’ ruled over by Chogyal Nehru; the PO’s visit tremendously encouraged them, and though they had been losing faith, it was revived now; they felt that if India believed in them, then they cannot lose against the Chinese, asserted the PO.

Was the PO’s report written partly to please his boss in Delhi?

It is difficult to say; he, however, wrote: The moral and emotional self-confidence gained by the Tibetans since the visit of the Dalai Lama to India has been of positive and enormous value to them.

India would disappoint the Tibetans in the following years, at least in the political domain.

Encounters with the Dalai Lama

After noting that he was the first Political Officer ever to be given a lunch by the Dalai Lama, Pant observed: The Dalai Lama was anxious more than anyone else for the return visit of the Prime Minister of India to Tibet.

The Chinese had admitted that the visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Tibet would be ‘a very great occasion’, but they would have to consider the matter more carefully. The Communist officials said that though some people in India had genuine ‘religious and cultural’ interests in Tibet, others had political motives and China needed to be very careful about the Tibetan contacts with India.

They had also argued that though India and China were friends, American and British imperialists were ‘influencing Pandit Nehru’; they had to be careful as Nehru may side with the imperialists.

One day, the Dalai Lama secretly sent a message to Pant requesting him to publically ask him (the Dalai Lama) if he had an answer to the letter sent to the Indian Prime Minister; the Tibetan leader told Pant that if he (the PO) asked for an answer, the Chinese will be obliged to pass on his letter to us [India]. That would help him and Tibet, believed the Dalai Lama.

Pant eventually asked the question in front of Yang Gongsu; the Tibetan leader then promised that he was going to send a reply to the Prime Minister of India very soon.

The letter was probably never sent, but Nehru would visit Yatung in Chumbi on his way to Bhutan in September 1958, instead of Lhasa.

One of the Dalai Lama’s worries was that he could be taken away to China; he felt that he may be kept there for a couple of years: If this happens the people of Tibet may be provoked by the Chinese to start a fight and then crushed or they may try to break their spirit by threatening them that unless they agreed to their proposals the Dalai Lama would not be returned back to Tibet, he remarked.

His other fear was that if the Dalai Lama was forcefully sent away from Lhasa, the power of the Panchen Lama would increase; Pant had been told that the Chinese were building up a large army for the Panchen Lama in Shigatse.

The Dalai Lama believed that this could lead to a civil war and end in military rule. Pant was asked by the Tibetan leader the course he should follow if the Chinese press him to go to China. The PO replied that he could not give him any direct answer; he, however, believed that the idea of inviting Nehru was excellent: it would have a very healthy and salubrious effect upon the Chinese actions.

The Tibetans believed only the Prime Minister and India had shown some interest to save Tibet from utter destruction.

It was indeed a day-dream, India had never taken a stand for the Land of Snows: As long as you watch us, the Chinese will not do their worst as they have done in Kham and in Mongolia, observed the Dalai Lama, who was nevertheless disturbed by the fact that in an interview, the Indian Prime Minister had affirmed that Tibet was never a free country; Pant tried to explain that Nehru was misquoted; the PO was asked to publish the true version of the interview. Unfortunately, Nehru had probably made this statement.

The Chinese Behaviour

The Political Officer noted that during his stay, the Chinese were correct and courteous, though extremely careful. Their ‘guides’ carried cameras and took photographs of everything he photographed …and of every person who came to see him: They have thus a full record of all that I saw and of all of the persons I met.

Pant also noted that at the Kargyu monastery at Lhasa, in Drepung, Sera, Ganden or Samye, everywhere, the Chinese went ahead and strictly instructed the monks not to give me any welcome!

But the Tibetans came out in full force at most of the places and their enthusiasm and goodwill was so obviously over-whelming that the Chinese got more and more perturbed and worried at each stage.

The PO explained that he tried to take the Chinese along and remove their fears and suspicions as much as possible. Ninety per cent of my meetings and talks with the monks or other officials were in the presence of the Chinese.

The PO wrote: I had nothing at all to hide from the Chinese nor did I try to say ever in those interviews which I had all by myself that which I could not have talked in front of the Chinese.

Here again, it is a romantic view; as an officer of the Ministry of External Affairs he could not in any case tell ‘everything’ in front of the Chinese.

Lecturing the Generals

Pant explained to Gen Zhang Guohua, Gen Fan Ming or Yang Gongsu that India’s interests in Tibet were cultural and religious only; he also mentioned trade and …looked forward to the day when the road from Nathu-la to Yatung will be completed so that goods from Tibet and China could come to India and from India go over the Himalayas to Tibet to satisfy the needs of our great neighbours.

He then lectured the generals about ‘true religion’!

He told them how in ancient times, India, China and Tibet developed a great science for the understanding of the very nature of mind and to study the structure of the very faculty which is today capable of inventing such great things like the Hydrogen and the Atom bombs.

The tough PLA generals must have been scratching their heads.

He talked to them about Mahaguru Padmasambhava, Asangha²³ and Vasu Bandha²⁴ for the understanding of the human personality and transcending its limitations.

He said that Zhang Guohua and Yang Gongsu were deeply interested: I hope that I managed to convince them that our interests in Tibet were genuinely religious and spiritual. I quoted to them the words of our Prime Minister spoken in Hong Kong and in Hiroshima about the necessity of developing a ‘new dimension’ to the mind for the adequate tackling of the problems that beset the modern world.

He thought that he had convinced the high military dignitaries from China.

Retrospectively, it was obvious that the PLA generals were harder nuts to crack.

During one encounter, Gen Fan Ming said that the cost of living in Tibet had gone up because of the ‘imperialistic intrigues’; but when the PO questioned the general about the prices pre ‘liberation’, Fan Ming changed the subject.

Pant said that he found both the generals and Yang Gongsu extremely intelligent and capable persons. They were no doubt convinced and fighting communists but were none the less alert and receptive to new ideas.

The PO added that Zhang Guohua had a reputation of being very large hearted, but at the same time, when necessity dictates, a ruthless person.

Gen Zhang would lead the Chinese troops five years later in the NEFA and inflict on India its worst military defeat. But in September 1957, at the time of his visit, Pant believed: Six years stay in Tibet has perhaps mellowed him a little. Pant remarked that it was interesting to see how the atmosphere of Tibet affects even those hard boiled and highly intelligent communist-materialists from China.

The PO was told by his Tibetan friends that in the beginning, Generals Zhang Guohua and Fan Ming could discuss issues concerning Tibet only on an ideological basis: but when they found that the Tibetans had answers to all their questions, they stopped [their] arguments on basic policy matters and started to dictate to them saying that was the order from Beijing.

Pant commented that he had a feeling that both the generals were worried that all their efforts to convert the Tibetans to their point of view had failed: Perhaps they are even a little worried that at some stage they shall have to bring in the strong armed tactics.

According to Pant, for their prestige, the Chinese preferred not to use strong armed tactics in Tibet, they would rather work up opposition to the Dalai Lama’s power from within and then come in as liberators.

He was mistaken to believe that the generals were desirous to do good to the people of Tibet, though he admitted, their doing good is of course according to the Chinese communist pattern and plan.

He also believed that this type ‘do gooder’ couldn’t understand, limited as their vision is by their dogmas, why the Tibetans do not appreciate their good actions; When a ‘do gooder’ gets upset and angry, he could be more vicious than the most vicious person, wrote Pant.

It was, however, true that the Chinese leaders in Tibet were convinced that the only salvation for the people of Tibet is through communism and when all their efforts are ending in failure in respect of converting the Tibetans to their point of view, they are naturally finding some cause and reason for this failure such as imperialistic intrigue.

Is it different today?

Pant thought that they were pushed inevitably towards the course of pressure tactics and strong armed methods; therefore the rapid building of roads and the stationing of troops.

An interesting remark: the Chinese and the Tibetans hardly met or lived on the same plane of existence and even though they sometimes met at social and non-religious functions, yet there was no common ground on which the ‘two nations’ could act together and cooperate; Pant admitted that the generals were indeed aware of this: Even the construction works carried on in Tibet are entirely manned by Chinese personnel.

Pant noted that for the Chinese the easiest solution would be large scale Chinese settlement in Tibet: If within the next five-ten years they can push in six, seven million Chinese into Tibet their main task will only remain then really to protect the Tibetan minorities.

That is what has happened after 1959.

A Visit to Shigatse

Pant noted that his visit to Shigatse was in many respects an eye opener: Perhaps what we saw in Shigatse would be the pattern of life if the Chinese were to get full hold over Tibet.

He mentioned an invitation letter that he had received from the Panchen Lama before he left for Tibet. After the young Lama told him that he was keen to offer his monastery’s hospitality, the PO thought he would have an easy and friendly time at Tashilhunpo. But to his surprise, the jeeps with the Indian officials were stopped by the troops of the Panchen Lama on the bridge crossing the Nagchu river, two miles before Shigatse; they were almost searched.

The Indian party could not stay at the monastery, the Chinese put them up in a Foreign Bureau’s guest house; though relatively comfortable, we were as it were ‘imprisoned’ inside this fortress and no Tibetan friend of ours like the Dile Rabden or Tashi Rabden were even allowed to come and see us!

When Pant tried to invite some Tibetan officials for a meal, the Chinese argued that it was not convenient to invite ‘those people’: I found that in Shigatse the fear in the minds of the Tibetans who were with the Panchen Lama was astounding and most of them were really mortally afraid of even being seen in our company by the Chinese!

Apa Pant reported that the Panchen Lama’s main adviser, Dile Rabden who usually lived in India was not allowed by the Chinese to proceed beyond Yatung and meet us during our stay in Shigatse.

When the PO called on the Panchen Lama²⁵, the Foreign Bureau’s officials told him that only eight people were allowed to be with him. The PO was surprised because he knew that the Panchen Lama was fond of him, but he had no choice but to strictly follow the ‘hospitality’ rules; at the end, he had to walk out of the Panchen Lama’s room when the hour was up!

For the next visit, Pant was told that he could only see the Panchen Lama for 15 minutes: I left the room in 10! The behavior of the Foreign Bureau officials in Shigatse was not only indiscreet but at times downright insulting.

Pant, however, noted that at the end the officials had undergone a radical change for the better: My long interviews with the lamas in the monasteries and also my discussions with some of the Chinese officials …convinced our friends that at worst, I was perhaps not a bad sort of a chap! Finally, everyone parted as good friends.

Next Stop: Yatung

The PO and his party made the 200-mile journey from Shigatse to Yatung in one day; when he arrived, Pant received a message from the Panchen Lama to apologize for all the inconvenience and hardship caused at Shigatse!

Pant was told that the young Lama sincerely desired that the Prime Minister of India should visit Tibet for the good of the Dharma and for the sake of Tibet.

The message also indicated that the letter for the Panchen Lama, handed over to the Foreign Bureau inviting Prime Minister Nehru to Tibet had been ‘misunderstood’ by the Chinese. Apparently, the Chinese had even threatened him that he would be sent away if he misbehaved in this way.

Like for the Dalai Lama, Pant openly mentioned in front of the Chinese that the Indians were aware of the existence of the letter, but the Chinese were ‘jealous’ of the friendly feeling that the Tibetans had for India and the Indians and they were ‘upset’, because the Tibetans would not ‘love them’ whatever they did!

The Reforms

The Political Officer observed that the Chinese were going slow in Tibet because they had not succeeded in winning over the Tibetans to their side.

Some 2,000 to 3,000 Tibetan students were being indoctrinated in China and Beijing hoped that in the future, these would work for the Communists and transform Tibet.

Interestingly, Pant reported that the Chinese were keeping a good watch across our frontier, establishing their contacts with Bhutan and with our North East Frontier Areas.

Citing the example of Samye, the PO said that he had seen many Monpas from Tawang travelling in the Lhoka area: I learn on good authority that these Monpas are contacted by the Chinese and given all facilities for trade and also given some special work. If one day Tibet really is ‘absorbed and digested’ by the Chinese and if in Tibet the rule of Tibetans who are properly indoctrinated and are pro-Chinese is established, I have no doubt that the tendencies for expanding the frontiers of Tibet especially towards Ladakh, Tawang and Nepal areas would be encouraged.

For India, this was a very serious issue, which unfortunately was not noted by many in the Ministry at that time.

According to the PO, the Chinese cadres, whether in the Foreign Bureau, hospitals, schools or roads, were young and enthusiastic: Most of them know very little about the outside world but take great pride in the achievements of the communist regime in China and have a sense of dedication and service for the Tibetan people.

He noticed that most of the Chinese cadres. i.e. the doctors, teachers or engineers, could not understand why the Tibetans were resisting their overtures: They also do not understand why the Tibetans would not accept the Communist system of life immediately, wrote Pant.

The Development Projects

During his stay in Tibet, Pant visited state farms, hydel projects, power houses, hospitals and even secondary schools; in these places 90% of the personnel were Chinese. The PO was told that Tibetans were still being trained and when once the ‘liberation is completed’, the Tibetans would take over.

However, in primary and lower middle schools most of the teachers were Tibetan though most of them are appointed as teachers more for their political views than for their teaching capacities.

New methods of teaching Tibetan were introduced; while it used to take 15 years before a student could read and write properly Tibetan