Climate Change: Observed Impacts on Planet Earth

Climate Change

Observed Impacts on Planet Earth

Third Edition

Editor

Trevor M. Letcher

Emeritus Professor, School of Chemistry, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa

Table of Contents

Cover image

Title page

Copyright

Contributors

Preface to Third Edition

I. Introduction

1. Global warming—a complex situation

1. Introduction

2. The greenhouse effect and global warming

3. Feedback mechanisms to further increase the heating of the planet

4. Our present situation

5. Urgent action is required

6. Global warming, climate change, and the new pandemic—COVID-19

7. Why is the world so slow in overcoming global warming?

8. Social and ethical impacts of climate change

9. What can we do?

10. Conclusion

Chapter 2. Greenhouse gases and the emerging climate emergency

1. Introduction

2. Myths about the greenhouse effect

3. Origin of the greenhouse effect: primary and secondary effects

4. The physical properties of greenhouse gases

5. Interpretation of data for the properties of greenhouse gases

6. What has changed in the past decade?

II. Tools used to investigate and predict climate change

3. Climate change through Earth history

1. Introduction

2. Climate models

3. Long-term climate trends

4. Early climate history

5. Phanerozoic glaciations

6. The Mesozoic—early Cenozoic greenhouse

7. Development of the Cenozoic icehouse

8. Astronomical modulation of climate

9. Milankovitch cyclicity in Quaternary (Pleistocene) climate history

10. Quaternary sub-Milankovitch cyclicity

11. The Holocene

12. Climate of the Anthropocene

13. Conclusions

Chapter 4. Numerical modeling of the global climate and carbon cycle system

1. Introduction

2. Numerical modeling for climate and the earth system

3. Modeling the global carbon cycle

4. Summary and conclusions

Glossary

III. Indicators

Chapter 5. Global surface temperatures

1. Introduction

2. Basic data availability

3. Analyses of land surface air temperature

4. Analyses of sea surface temperature

5. Global changes

6. Uncertainty quantification

7. Characterization of extremes and variability

8. Future research directions

9. Conclusions

Chapter 6. Arctic sea ice

1. Introduction

2. Observed changes in the state of arctic sea ice

3. Classifying and comprehending the observed changes

4. Conclusions

Chapter 7. Antarctic sea ice changes and their implications

1. Introduction

2. Why Antarctic ice is different

3. Snow on the ice

4. The annual ice cycle and its changes

5. What is happening to the ice?

6. Response of the Antarctic to changes elsewhere

Chapter 8. Land ice: indicator, and integrator, of climate change

1. Introduction

2. Mass balance of glaciers and ice sheets

3. Long-term behavior

4. Observations of recent changes

5. Concluding remarks

Chapter 9. Glaciers and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Observing glacier change

3. Components and drivers of glacier mass change

4. Mass balance feedbacks

5. Recent glacier changes

6. Future glacier changes

7. Concluding remarks

Chapter 10. Poleward expansion of the atmospheric circulation

1. Introduction

2. The general circulation of the atmosphere

3. Evidence for circulation change

4. Cause for circulation change

5. Emerging dynamical mechanisms

6. Summary, outstanding problems, and conclusions

Chapter 11. Rising sea levels as an indicator of global change

1. Introduction

2. Is sea level rising?

3. Why is sea level rising?

4. Are contemporary rates of sea level rise unusual?

5. Conclusion

Chapter 12. Ocean current changes

1. Role of the ocean currents in the climate system

2. The Atlantic meridional overturning circulation

3. Conclusions

Chapter 13. Ocean acidification and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Evidence from observations

3. Model predictions of future change

4. Impacts

5. Biogeochemical cycling and feedback to climate

6. Adaptation, recovery, and mitigation

7. Conclusion

Chapter 14. Permafrost and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Characteristics of permafrost

3. Observed trends in recent permafrost conditions

4. Impacts of recent changes in permafrost

5. Conclusions

Chapter 15. The jet stream and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Expected changes with climate change

3. Observed changes

4. Future impacts of changing jets

5. Summary

Chapter 16. Extreme weather and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Temperature extremes

3. Precipitation extremes

4. Tropical cyclones

5. Conclusions

Chapter 17. Bird ecology

1. Introduction

2. Indicators of change

3. Conclusions

Chapter 18. Insect communities

1. Introduction

2. Range changes

3. Changes in phenology

4. Physiology

5. Responses to other climatic variables

6. Insect communities under climate change

7. Conclusion

Chapter 19. Sea life (pelagic ecosystems)

1. Pelagic and planktonic ecosystems

2. Observed impacts on pelagic and planktonic ecosystems

3. Conclusion and summary of key indicators

Chapter 20. Changes in coral reef ecosystems as an indication of climate and global change

1. Introduction

2. Tropical coral reef ecosystems

3. Coral reef fishes

4. Conclusion

Chapter 21. Marine biodiversity and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Climate change in the oceans

3. Effects of climate change on marine biodiversity

4. Cumulative impacts and indirect effects of climate change

5. Biodiversity as insurance against climate change impacts

6. Conclusions

Chapter 22. Intertidal indicators of climate and global change

1. Introduction

2. Climate change and biogeography

3. Mechanisms and microclimate

4. Additional impacts of global change

5. Conclusions

Chapter 23. Lichens as an indicator of climate and global change

1. Introduction

2. Predicted effects

3. Observed effects

4. Uncertain effects

5. Habitats with vulnerable lichens

Chapter 24. Plant pathogens as indicators of climate change

1. Introduction

2. Climatic variables and plant disease

3. Evidence that simulated climate change affects plant disease in experiments

4. Evidence that plant disease patterns have changed due to climate change

Chapter 25. Invasive plants and climate change

1. Introduction

2. A brief introduction into plant invasions

3. How can climate change influence plant invasion success?

4. Current and projected levels of plant invasions under climate change

5. Can plant invasions influence climate change?

6. Conclusion

Chapter 26. Biological diversity and climate change

1. Introduction

2. A quick history of biodiversity impact assessments

3. Observed changes in biodiversity

4. Future changes in biodiversity

5. IPCC's reason for concern diagram

6. Are the Paris Accords effective to protect biodiversity?

7. Conclusions

Chapter 27. The role of forests in the carbon cycle and in climate change

1. Introduction

2. Climate change

3. Disturbance

4. Climate change—disturbance interaction

5. Reforestation/afforestation, restoration, and forest management

6. Conclusion

IV. Other possible contributing factors to climate change

Chapter 28. The variation of the Earth's movements (orbital, tilt, and precession) and climate change

1. Introduction

2. Astronomical parameters

3. Orbital-induced climate change

4. Conclusion

Chapter 29. The role of volcanic activity in climate and global changes

1. Introduction

2. Aerosol loading, spatial distribution, and radiative effect

3. Volcanoes and climate

4. Summary

Chapter 30. Atmospheric aerosols and their role in climate change

1. Introduction

2. The life cycle of tropospheric aerosols

3. The spatial distribution of tropospheric aerosols

4. Aerosol–radiation interactions

5. Aerosol–cloud interactions

6. The net radiative forcing of aerosols

7. The role of aerosols in climate feedback mechanisms

8. The role of aerosols in potential climate engineering schemes

Chapter 31. Climate change and agriculture

Abbreviations

1. Introduction

2. Agriculture and climate change

3. Sources of emissions from agriculture

4. Accelerated soil erosion

5. Mitigation potential of agriculture

6. Conclusions

Chapter 32. Changes in the Sun's radiation: the role of widespread surface solar radiation trends in climate change: dimming and brightening

1. Introduction—solar radiation basics

2. Solar radiation above the atmosphere

3. Bottom of the atmosphere radiation

4. Trends in surface solar radiation, or global dimming and brightening

5. The causes of dimming and brightening

6. Influence of solar radiation changes (global dimming and brightening) on climate

7. Conclusions

Chapter 33. Space weather and cosmic ray effects

1. Introduction and modern climate change models

2. Solar activity, cosmic rays, cloudiness, and climate change

3. The influence on the Earth's climate of the solar system moving around the galactic center and crossing galaxy arms

4. The influence of molecular-dust galactic clouds on the Earth's climate

5. The influence of interplanetary dust sources on the Earth's climate

6. Influence of planetary dust sources (natural and anthropogenic) on the Earth's climate

7. Cosmic rays/space factors and global warming

8. The influence of asteroids and great meteorites impacts on the Earth's climate

9. The influence of nearby supernova on the Earth's climate

10. Discussion and conclusions

V. Societal aspects of global change

Chapter 34. Engineering aspects of climate change

1. Introduction

2. The role of the engineer

3. Global greenhouse gases

4. Engineering aspects of the spheres

5. Engineering and the carbon cycle

6. Nutrient engineering

7. Albedo engineering

8. Engineering-based decision-making

Chapter 35. Societal adaptation to climate change

1. Introduction

2. Risk and vulnerability

3. Disease occurrence and transmission

4. Ocean and large-scale surface water changes

5. Resilience

6. Extreme events

7. Food and water supply

8. Conclusions

Index

Copyright

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Contributors

Rob Alkemade

Environmental Systems Analysis Group, Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, The Hague, The Netherlands

André Aptroot,     Laboratório de Botânica, Liquenologia, Instituto de Biociências, Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso do Sul, Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil

Martin J. Attrill,     School of Biological and Marine Sciences, Marine Institute, Plymouth University, Drake Circus, Plymouth, United Kingdom

Jonathan Bamber,     Bristol Glaciology Centre, University of Bristol, School of Geographical Sciences, Bristol, United Kingdom

Jane A. Catford,     Department of Geography, Kings College London, London, United Kingdom

Shabtai Cohen,     Department of Environmental Physics and Irrigation, Institute of Soil, Water and Environmental Sciences, Agricultural Research Organization, The Volcani Centre, Rishon LeZion, Israel

Anne Sophie Daloz,     Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), Oslo, Norway

E.D. De Wolf,     Department of Plant Pathology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States

Lev I. Dorman

Cosmic Ray and Space Weather Centre with Emilio Segrè Observatory on Mt Hermon, affiliated to Tel Aviv University (city Tel Aviv), Ariel University (city Ariel), Shamir Research Institute (city Katsrin), and Israel Space Agency of the Ministry of Science (city Tel Aviv), Israel

Cosmic Ray Department of Pushkov's IZMIRAN Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russia

Martin Edwards

Marine Biological Association, Plymouth, United Kingdom

Marine Institute, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom

P.D. Esker,     Department of Plant Pathology and Environmental Microbiology, Penn State University, University Park, PA, United States

Wolfgang Fiedler

Department of Migration and Immuno-Ecology, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Radolfzell, Germany

Department of Biology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

Helen S. Findlay,     Plymouth Marine Laboratory, Plymouth, United Kingdom

Nicola L. Foster,     School of Biological and Marine Sciences, Marine Institute, Plymouth University, Drake Circus, Plymouth, United Kingdom

Jennifer Francis,     Woodwell Climate Research Center, Falmouth, MA, United States

K.A. Garrett

Plant Pathology Department, Food Systems Institute, Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, United States

Department of Plant Pathology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States

Ed Garrett,     Department of Environment and Geography, University of York, Heslington, York, United Kingdom

Roland Gehrels,     Department of Environment and Geography, University of York, Heslington, York, United Kingdom

L. Gomez-Montano,     Department of Plant Pathology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States

Patricia Handmann,     GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research, Kiel, Germany

Jim Haywood,     University of Exeter and Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter, United Kingdom

Regine Hock

Department of Geosciences, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK, United States

Matthew D. Hurteau,     Department of Biology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, United States

Matthias Huss

Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research (WSL), Birmensdorf, Switzerland

Laboratory of Hydraulics, Hydrology and Glaciology (VAW), ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

Department of Geosciences, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland

Chris D. Jones,     Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter, United Kingdom

Torsten Kanzow

Alfred Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research, Bremerhaven, Germany

Bremen University, Bremen, Germany

Alica Košuthová,     Department of Botany, Swedish Museum of Natural History, Stockholm, Sweden

Rattan Lal,     Carbon Management and Sequestration Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

Rik Leemans,     Environmental Systems Analysis Group, Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands

Trevor M. Letcher

University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa

Laurel House, Stratton on the Fosse, United Kingdom

Heike K. Lotze,     Biology Department, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada

Lucas J. Lourens,     Department of Earth Sciences, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Audrey M. Maran,     Department of Life Sciences, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, United States

Nova Mieszkowska

School of Environmental Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

Marine Biological Association of the UK, The Laboratory, Citadel Hill, Plymouth, United Kingdom

Julian B. Murton,     Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom

M. Nita,     School of Plant and Environmental Sciences, Virginia Tech, AHS Jr. AREC, Winchester, VA, United States

Sarahi Nunez,     Environmental Systems Analysis Group, Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands

Shannon L. Pelini,     Department of Life Sciences, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, United States

Deepa S. Pureswaran,     Canadian Forest Service, Laurentian Forestry Centre, Quebec City, QC, Canada

Thomas Reichler,     Department of Atmospheric Sciences, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, United States

Nathalie Schaller,     Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), Oslo, Norway

David Schroeder,     Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling, Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

Clemens Schwingshackl,     Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), Oslo, Norway

Jana Sillmann,     Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), Oslo, Norway

A.H. Sparks,     University of Southern Queensland, Centre for Crop Health, Toowoomba, QLD, Australia

Gerald Stanhill † ,     Department of Environmental Physics and Irrigation, Institute of Soil, Water and Environmental Sciences, Agricultural Research Organization, The Volcani Centre, Rishon LeZion, Israel

Norbert J. Stapper,     Büro für Ökologische Studien, Monheim am Rhein, Germany

Georgiy Stenchikov,     King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, Thuwal, Makkah, Saudi Arabia

Martin Stendel,     Department of Climate and Arctic Research, Danish Meteorological Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark

Peter Thorne,     ICARUS Climate Research Centre, Department of Geography, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland

Richard Tuckett,     School of Chemistry, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

Anna Turbelin

Department of Geography, Kings College London, London, United Kingdom

Université Paris-Saclay, CNRS, AgroParisTech, Ecologie Systématique Evolution, Orsay, France

Carol Turley,     Plymouth Marine Laboratory, Plymouth, United Kingdom

Daniel A. Vallero,     Pratt School of Engineering, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States

Kok (C.M.) van Herk,     Lichenologisch Onderzoeksbureau Nederland, Soest, The Netherlands

Martin Visbeck

GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research, Kiel, Germany

Kiel University, Kiel, Germany

Peter Wadhams,     Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Rachel White,     Department of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Mark Williams,     School of Geography, Geology and the Environment, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

Paul D. Williams,     Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

Tim Woollings,     Department of Physics, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

Boris Worm,     Biology Department, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada

Jan Zalasiewicz,     School of Geography, Geology and the Environment, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

†  

Deceased May 3, 2019. Gerald Stanhill was a pioneer of Agricultural Meteorology, and his major contribution to global dimming is part of his legacy.

Preface to Third Edition

Since the first and second editions of Climate Change: Observed Impacts on Planet Earth were published in 2009 and 2016, the evidence of a changing climate has become even more apparent. As a result, the time had come to put these new developments into a new book. This, together with the interest shown in the first two editions, has culminated in the third edition of Climate Change. Many new chapters have been added, and chapters for the first edition have been updated to highlight new evidence that our climate is changing. The third edition will have 35 chapters of which 11 will be new topics and new authors.

The evidence that our climate is warming is overwhelming. This evidence comes not only from land and sea surface temperature records but also from indicators such as the coverage of Arctic sea ice—all of which, and much more, is discussed in this book. Most scientists in the world now accept that anthropogenic activities and specifically the emissions of greenhouse gases are responsible for the major part of the observed warming. May 9, 2013, was an auspicious day for the warming of the planet, when it was reported by both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Scripps Institute of Oceanography that the daily mean concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere at Mauna Loa laboratory exceeded 400 ppm (400 μmol/mol or 400 × 10 −⁶) for the first time in millions of years. It reached a maximum of 417 ppm on June 10, 2020.

This book, like the earlier edition, is not intended to compete with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports but offers support through a different approach. Many of the authors were not involved in recent assessments of the IPCC, and here they present fresh evaluations of the evidence testifying to a problem that was described by Sir David King in the first edition as the most severe calamity our civilization has yet to face.

Unlike other books of similar title, this book has the advantage that the chapters have once again each been written by world-class scientists and engineers working in their respective fields. As a result, the new volume presents a balanced picture across the whole spectrum of climate change. With this lineup of authoritative and well-researched topics, any doubts about whether climate change is taking place or not will be immediately dispelled on reading this book.

The new edition is divided into five sections:

• Introduction

• Tools Used to Investigate and Predict Climate Change

• Indicators

• Other Possible Contributing Factors to Climate Change

• Societal Aspects of Global Change

This edition contains 36 chapters as opposed to the 33 in the second edition and 25 in the first edition. The new chapters are as follows:

• Climate change: a complex problem

• Modeling of carbon and greenhouse gas cycles in relation to climate change

• Loss of oxygen in the oceans and climate change

• Permafrost and climate change

• The jet stream and climate change

• Extreme weather and climate change

• Melting glaciers and climate change

• Insect communities and climate change

• Invasive plants and climate change

• Biological diversity and climate change

• The role of forests in the carbon cycle and climate change

The audience we hope to reach are policy makers in local and central governments; students, teachers, researchers, professors, scientists, engineers, and managers working in fields related to climate change and future energy options; editors and newspaper reporters responsible for informing the public; and the general public who need to be aware of the impending disasters that a warmer Earth will bring. A summary is provided at the beginning of each chapter for those interested in a brief synopsis, and copious references are provided for those wishing to study each chapter topic in greater detail.

The IPCC assessments have produced two basic conclusions: firstly, that the current climate changes are unequivocal, and secondly, that this is largely due to the emission of greenhouse gases resulting from human activity. This book reinforces these two conclusions and the chapters on Indicators and on the Other Possible Contributing Factors to Climate Change are particularly relevant. Furthermore, the section on Modeling further supports these conclusions through simulations of past climate changes and projections of future climate changes.

Projections of our global warming indicate that the temperature will exceed the 2°C global average regarded by many scientists as the upper limit in temperature within the next 50 years. If we do not take action to halt this rise in temperature, we must expect the serious consequences of extreme weather: droughts, floods, sea level rises, winds, wild fires, excessive heat, unpredictable extreme weather patterns, and storms. The book is a clarion call to humans to take immediate action to reduce the amount of CO2 that we are pumping into the atmosphere, which arguably can best be accomplished by reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. We must strive to stop burning coal and oil in our power stations with the ultimate aim of keeping most of the fossil fuel in the ground and find new, renewable ways of producing electricity and propelling our vehicles.

The International System of Quantities (SI units) has been used throughout the book, and where necessary, other units are given in parentheses. Furthermore, the authors have rigorously adhered to the IUPAC notation and spelling of physical quantities. For example, the symbols for minute, hour, day, and year are min, h, d, and a, respectively. Also, the relationship between a physical quantity and its unit is given by physical quantity = number times unit, and by example temperature = 270 K or rearranged to give: 270 = temperature/K. This relationship makes the statement concerning units unambiguous.

The book has an international flavor with the chapters written by authors from at least 15 countries including Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The success of the book ultimately rests with the 60 authors and coauthors, and as editor, I should like to thank all of them for their cooperation and their highly valued, willing, and enthusiastic contributions. I wish to thank my wife, Valerie Letcher, for her help with difficult grammatical issues and for help while I wrote and edited. Finally, my thanks are due to Naomi Robertson of Elsevier whose expertise steered this book to its publication.

Trevor M. Letcher,     Laurel House, Fosse way, Stratton on the Fosse, BA3 4QN, United Kingdom

I

Introduction

Outline

1. Global warming—a complex situation

Chapter 2. Greenhouse gases and the emerging climate emergency

1: Global warming—a complex situation

Trevor M. Letcher ¹ , ²       ¹ University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa      ² Laurel House, Stratton on the Fosse, United Kingdom

Abstract

In this chapter, the greenhouse effect, global warming, and the feedback mechanisms are presented in terms of concentration of greenhouse gases. The present global warming situation is discussed together with the problem of CO2 pollution and the slow replacement of fossil fuel by renewable forms of energy. The urgency of the need to reduce CO2 pollution is stressed. The possible relationship between COVID-19 and other zoonotic diseases is commented on, and the question is posed as to why the world is so slow in overcoming global warming? The social and ethical impacts of climate change and, finally, possible solutions to overcoming the reticence of the general population and governments in tackling global warming are discussed.

Keywords

Covid-19 pandemic; Ethical impacts; Feedback mechanisms; Global warming; Greenhouse effects; Social justice

1. Introduction

The onset of global warming is relentless. Its impacts are escalating each year as the chapters in this book will confirm. Global warming is now widely accepted as being due to the rise of CO2 in the atmosphere, and details of why most scientists believe it are given in Chapter 2 as part of the Introduction to this book. Chapter 2 is the pivotal chapter as all impacts of climate change depend on global warming and indeed on the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. Hence, for this edition, it has been moved from the section on contributing dactors.

In this chapter, I want to focus on the magnitude of the problem that is global warming or as Richard Tuckett says in Chapter 2, Global Heating, I also pose the question: Why is the world so slow in acting on such a potentially devastating global change? And finally, we look at what can be done globally to combat future global warming.

2. The greenhouse effect and global warming

The United Nations organization [1] has summarized the conclusions relating the concentrations of GHGs and global temperature:

• The concentration of GHGs in the earth's atmosphere is directly linked to the average global temperature on earth.

• The concentration, and mean global temperatures along with it, has been rising steadily since the time of the Industrial Revolution.

• The most abundant GHG, accounting for about two-thirds of GHGs, carbon dioxide (CO2), is largely the product of burning fossil fuels.

What follows here is a brief scientific explanation to support the UN's summary.

For many thousands of years (possibly in excess of a million years), the earth's climate has been in a state of equilibrium with the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide at about 280   ppm (in parts per million which refers to the ratio of number of molecules of CO2 in the atmosphere to the number of molecules of all the gases in the atmosphere; 0.028%). It is this small concentration in the upper atmosphere that has kept the earth at a relatively warm temperature. Without the CO2, the average global temperature would be about 33°C cooler than it is today [2]. This greenhouse effect is due to the adsorption, by the vibrating bonds of the CO2 molecules (and other GHGs such as water), of the infrared heat leaving the earth after the earth has been heated by the sun's rays (largely by ultraviolet short-wave radiation). The vibrating bonds have the same frequencies as sections of the infrared radiation from the earth—hence the sympathetic adsorption of energy. Since the Industrial Revolution, the CO2 levels have increased; in 1960, it was 316   ppm, and in 2020, it has reached 417   ppm [3]. This rise, largely due to human activities (such as the burning of fossil fuels), has caused an increase in global temperature. This temperature rise has increased the concentration of water vapor in the air by evaporation from the oceans. This, in turn, has resulted in further heating of the earth as H2O is a significant greenhouse gas (in fact nearly 30 times more effective than CO2). This feedback mechanism is crucial in understanding global warming, and it has been estimated that H2O is responsible for 60%–80% of global warming. The role of CO2 is to act as a trigger in enhancing global warming.

The total amount of CO2 in the atmospheric and its concentration value are the most dependable measurements we have for the progress of global warming. In 1960, the rate of increase of CO2 (as measured at Mauna Loa, in Hawaii) was less than 1   ppm per year. It is now 2.4   ppm per year [3]. It is this rate of change that is the best indicator of any progress we are making in reducing global warming. At the moment, there is no sign that this is happening; in fact, the reverse is true. Even if we stopped burning fossil fuel, the CO2 levels will take a long time to decrease as the lifetime of CO2 in the upper atmosphere is of the order of hundreds of years.

Before 18th century, the earth's climate had been in a state of equilibrium, and weather patterns were more or less predictable. This equilibrium no longer holds, and it is becoming impossible, with the destabilizing effect of GHGs, to predict future climate and weather patterns with any certainty. What would be good is that global warming stabilizes and the climate of the earth reaches a new equilibrium, which we could learn to cope with. But with a steadily increasing levels of GHGs, largely as a result the burning fossil fuels and an increasing global population, we are moving toward an ever-increasing unstable climate in which record levels of rising global temperatures and extreme heat and heatwaves, wildfires, tornadoes, hurricanes, droughts, floods, and food shortages become the new norm. Furthermore, this destabilizing effect creates economic, political, and social chaos, which is being felt in every part of the world. The stabilizing of a warmer climate is the very best we can hope; the levels of CO2 that we have now will be with us for a very long time. It is not only the vibrating GHG molecules and the evaporation of water feedback process that we have to worry about, but there are also other feedback mechanisms at play, which further exacerbates global warming.

3. Feedback mechanisms to further increase the heating of the planet

There are many feedback mechanisms at play in our complex world related to GHGs. Five of them are summarized in the following.

The most important of the feedback mechanisms is the water vapor feedback mechanism, which has been discussed earlier.

The melting of ice contributes to another very important feedback mechanism. When ice melts, land or open water takes its place. Both land and open water are on average less reflective than ice and thus absorb more solar radiation. This causes more warming, which in turn causes more melting, and this feedback cycle continues.

Another important feedback mechanism is the release of CO2 from the oceans. The warmer the oceans, the less CO2 it can hold, and CO2 is released. This, in turn, leads to increased global heating.

Another feedback mechanism is at play in the peat bogs and permafrost regions of the world, such as in Siberia and in Greenland. Rising global temperatures are melting the permafrost and will in time release vast quantities of methane gas (CH4). This gas is over 25 times more effective than CO2 as a greenhouse gas, and its increased presence in the atmosphere will cause further heating and so the feedback cycle continues.

Yet another feedback mechanism involves methane clathrates, a form of water ice that contains methane within its crystalline structure. Extremely large deposits of it have been found under the sediments on ocean floors. An increase in temperature breaks the crystal structure releasing the caged methane. Rising sea temperatures could cause a sudden release of vast amounts of methane, resulting in a runaway global warming event.

4. Our present situation

This past year, 2019, was again one of the hottest on record [5]. According to independent analyses by the NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), earth's average global surface temperature in 2019 was the second warmest since modern record keeping began in 1880. Globally, 2019s average temperature was second only to that of 2016 and continued the planet's long-term warming trend: The past 5   years have been the warmest of the past 140 years. This past year was 0.98°C warmer than the mean temperature measured between 1951 and 1980, according to scientists at the NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) in New York [4]. It shows that we are not doing enough to reduce global warming, and the only way to do that is to reduce the amount of CO2 we are pumping into the air, and if possible, begin removing CO2 from the atmosphere.

At present, about 40% of all energy sources, used to produce electricity, are either renewable (wind, solar, hydropower, biomass, tide, and geothermal) or nuclear (10%) [5,6]. The major electricity-producing energy source is coal that still produces 37% of the world's electricity. The changeover from fossil fuel to renewables is slow, and the prediction for 2040 is that renewables would produce 45% of the world's electricity, with coal still being a significant supplier of energy. Replacing fossil fuel is going to be a mammoth task.

Table 1.1

It has been estimated that, in 2019, human activities contributed 36.8   ×   10⁹   t of CO2 through burning coal and other fossil fuels, cement production, deforestation, and other landscape changes. It has also been estimated that since the Industrial Revolution, over 2000   ×   10⁹   t of CO2 has been added to the atmosphere. Human activities emit 60 or more times the amount of carbon dioxide released by volcanoes each year [7].

The population of the world is increasing and so is the need for more energy with a greater demand for more electricity. The world population (it is now 7.8   ×   10⁹ according to the latest 2020 United Nation estimate) is expected to reach 9   ×   10⁹ in 2050. It is increasing at a rate of 1.05% per year at the moment (2020) down from 1.14% yr −¹ in 2016 and down from a recent peak in 1963 of 2.2% yr −¹. The expected rate of growth in energy demand over the next decade is greater than the growth rate of the population; this is largely due to the increased demand for electricity in developing countries. Electricity generation is expected to increase from 25   ×   10¹²   kWh in 2017 to 31.2   ×   10¹²   kWh in 2030, an increase of almost 2% per year [8].

The relative breakdown of electricity producers and future predictions is given in Table 1.1. At the moment, coal is still the largest producer of electricity worldwide and is not expected to be overtaken by renewables until 2040. This illustrates the energy dilemma of our time—the positive and encouraging increase in the deployment of renewable forms of energy is masked by the increasing overall energy needs of the world, and that increase is still being met by further increases in fossil fuel usage. The present and future world electricity generation is dominated by the burning of fossil fuels (over 60%), and the prediction for 2040 is not much better (58%). This is driven by a number of forces including the relative economics of fossil fuels versus renewable energy; the massive inertia linked to status quo investments and situations; and the fear of things new as opposed to well-tried technologies.

Electricity production is not the only producer of CO2 in our atmosphere. The various sectors responsible for CO2 generated as a result of human activity are given in Table 1.2.

If there is the necessary political will to do so, we can replace the fossil fuel–derived electricity with renewable forms of energy, or nuclear energy or hydropower. However, we do have a problem with replacing transport fuel. We could one day have electric cars replace petrol vehicles and possibly even diesel vehicles, but replacing fossil fuel for air travel and sea travel is difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, some industrial processes such as cement manufacture, involving the heating of CaCO3 resulting in the waste product, CO2, are also problematic. Attempts at replacing petrol in transport with renewable fuel derived from biomass (sugarcane as done in Brazil or corn as done in the United States for petrol, and palm oil in Malaysia for biodiesel) has had some success, but the overall contribution has been relatively small. In 2018, the biofuels contributed 3% to the world's transport fuels. The United States, Brazil, and Malaysia are the world leaders in biofuels [11].

Table 1.2

All of this does indicate that the world is not on top of solving the global warming problem, in spite of the steady increase in the deployment of renewable forms of energy. The changeover from fossil fuel to renewables is just too slow. It is predicted that renewables will increase their share of electricity production from 26.7% in 2020 to 29.2% in 2040 (less than 0.3% per year) (see Table 1.1). We will have to work very much harder to replace fossil fuel as the main driving force of our energy industry.

One slight glimmer on the horizon is the fact that natural gas, methane (including shale gas), is better for the planet than burning coal and, in many countries, coal is being replace by natural gas. The reason why natural gas is better than coal is that the amount of CO2 produced from burning CH4 per unit of energy (50   g/MJ) is less than it is for coal (92   g/MJ), and moreover, coal burning produces particulates. Of course, the burning of CH4 still produces CO2:

CH4 + 2O2   =   CO2 + 2H2O

5. Urgent action is required

There is a growing threat of environmental collapse in the future, as a result of changes in our present climate. We are beginning to see this with extreme weather events such as flooding, droughts and water crises, high winds, runaway fires, wash-aways and mud flows from land denuded of its natural rain soaking properties, and high seas in coastal areas, together with rising sea levels, to mention a few. One consequence of climate change is the migration of insects and animals to more hospitable climates. A more frightening involuntary mass migration has already begun: of humans from lands unable to support the growing of crops and from areas where rising sea levels are beginning to threaten livelihood. It is not only natural disasters but also human-made disasters, which result indirectly from global warming, that are a cause for concern. These include the reduced ability of land to soak up rain water as a result of land clearances and urban development, resulting in flooding; chemical pollution in the form of pesticides, endocrine disruptors, and hormonally active agents used on farms to increase yields; nuclear disasters through extreme weather; and land-use decisions for agriculture; oil fires, coal mine fires, and even tyre fires, which add their own contribution to rising CO2 levels [12].

Most world governments have accepted the assessment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that a 2°C rise in mean global temperature above the preindustrial level must be the maximum limit. To meet this objective, studies generally indicate the need for global GHG emissions to peak before 2020 with a substantial reduction in emissions thereafter.

We need to reduce the amount of CO2 entering the atmosphere, and if possible, we should find ways of removing some of the CO2 presently in the atmosphere. Present day CO2 levels in the atmosphere exceed the natural equilibrium of dissolved CO2 in the oceans and with the CO2 uptake by biota on land. Unfortunately, this rising nonequilibrium amount of CO2 remains in the air for a very long time [13]. The reason is that CO2, unlike other GHGs such as CH4, is very unreactive. It does not naturally react with most chemicals, and in thermodynamic terms, it has a very high Gibbs free energy of formation. To bring about a reaction of CO2 with another chemical, a significant amount of energy must be given to the system (e.g., heat energy). This is also the reason why it is so difficult to get rid of waste CO2 from chemical reactions (e.g., cement manufacture, or even from burning fossil fuels) and why it is rarely used as a chemical feedstock in industry.

Much of this chapter relates to the need for the world to replace fossil fuels with renewable forms of energy to reduce the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Another reason, which we tend to overlook, for moving to a world powered by renewable energy, is that the fossil fuel reserves are finite. It has been estimated [14] that globally, we currently consume the equivalent of over 11 billion tons of oil from fossil fuels every year. Crude oil reserves are vanishing at a rate of more than four billion tons a year—so if we carry on as we are, our known oil deposits could run out in just over 50 years. If we increase gas production to fill the energy gap left by oil, our known gas reserves give us just over 50 years left. Although it is often claimed that we have enough coal to last hundreds of years, this does not take into account the need for increased production if we run out of oil and gas. If we step up production to make up for depleted oil and gas reserves, our known coal deposits could be gone in 150 years. Another set of estimates have been given by BP in 2018. The figures were a little less optimistic. Their estimation of the time left for fossil fuel as a result of present-day usage was predicted to be: Oil will end in 30 years, gas in 40 years, and coal in 70 years [15].

Our future mind-set must, however, not be seduced by the convenient properties of fossil fuel, but for the sake of the planet, the reserves must stay forever below ground and non–fossil fuel sources of energy should be embraced.

6. Global warming, climate change, and the new pandemic—COVID-19

The coronavirus pandemic has been linked to climate change issues. There seems to be little doubt that there is a link between population density, human encroachment on natural areas, and zoonotic disease transmission [16]. Climate change through drought, flooding, rising sea levels, and unpredictable weather conditions is slowly reducing the arable land in many parts of the world, forcing people to move into areas close to wildlife populations that humans had not previously been in close contact with. The disruption of pristine forests driven by logging and mining, the need to find new places to live, and the spread of urban development and population growth are bringing people into closer contact with animal species. In the case of COVID-19, the contact was most likely with bats. As Jane Goodall says, Covid-19 is a product of our unhealthy relationship with animals and the environment and that our exploitation of animals and the environment has contributed to pandemics, including the Covid-19 crisis. Wildlife trafficking, factory farming and the destruction of habitats are drivers of zoonotic diseases [17]. With global warming on the increase, we can expect that climate change will further impact on the spread of infectious diseases through animals as it has in the past with rabies, the plague, Ebola, SARS, MERS, and ZIKA to mention but a few recent zoonotic diseases.

The present COVID-19 pandemic has shown that all the countries of the world can work together to fight a common enemy. This is exactly what is needed to reduce the onset of global warming. The carryover to climate change when the pandemic has run its course could well have been made that much easier.

The lockdown over the pandemic has not reduced the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. On the contrary, the levels hit an all-time high as judged by the latest measurements taken at Mauna Loa in Hawaii (417 ppm) in June 2020. This is because the CO2 concentration does not drop once we reduce pumping it into the atmosphere, but feedback mechanisms such as the oceans releasing CO2 continue as the atmosphere heats up. The pollution (NOxs and particulates) in the cities has on the other hand been significantly reduced in the 3-month lockdown period. This is largely due to a reduction in the use of cars, lorries, and vans.

Another spin-off from the COVID-19 pandemic is that during lockdown, people have had the chance to look at their future and compare it with the less polluting, less frantic, and calmer times. Life may never return to what it was, and the fight against climate change might just have gone up a step.

Yet another spin-off is that the world population has got used to listening to scientists for direction, and perhaps, this will help overcome the barriers hindering an international effort to reduce the emission of CO2 and replace fossil fuels with renewable energy.

Once the pandemic is over and even with the CO2 levels still rising, people of the world are a little more prepared to collectively tackle the next major world catastrophe—global heating.

7. Why is the world so slow in overcoming global warming?

In spite of the physical impacts of global warming such as increasing number of unprecedented weather patterns, wildfires, heatwaves, droughts, tornadoes, and hurricanes; rising sea levels; extreme weather conditions; and rising average global temperature, which we read about almost daily in our newspapers, and also the impacts on human life and society such as hunger, poverty, and diseases such as coronavirus pandemics, diarrhea, and malaria, there are some skeptics that believe the root cause of global warming has nothing to do with the anthropomorphic burning of fossil fuel. Anyone working in the area of climate change or who cares about climate change must find the comments from deniers, very tiring. Climate change has become a contest and nowhere is this more apparent than in the United States with the democrats supporting climate change legislation and the Republicans supporting further fossil fuel investments and developments. President Trump's first term has been a relentless drive for unfettered fossil energy development [18], and hence a confused public. On a related topic, the UK government does support renewable energy. For example, it is spending £5.8 billion between 2016 and 2021 to support the development of renewable and low carbon heating through the Renewable Heat Incentive. Between 2015 and 2021, the government has committed to spend up to £505 m on Energy Innovation to accelerate the commercialization of innovative clean energy technologies. However, the majority of funding for renewable energy is made up of consumer-funded levies. The government has provided £30.7   ×   10⁹ (£30.7 bn) of support for low-carbon electricity since 2010 through the Renewable Energy Obligation (RO), Feed-in-Tariffs (FiT), and Contracts for Difference (CfD) schemes. This has all come from consumer levies. Levy spending was £1.3 bn p.a. in 2010 and is forecast to exceed £10 bn p.a. by 2020/21. The government has committed up to £557 m of annual support for further CfDs, which is the main scheme for bringing forward new large-scale renewable energy power generation. There is much discussion on the UK governments subsidy of fossil fuels—this might well be based on the fact that UK rate of VAT on domestic gas (and electricity) is 5% as opposed to the standard VAT on most other items, which is 20%. Overall, emissions in the UK power sector were reduced by 58% between 2010 and 2019. At the same time, renewable electricity generation rose from 7% to 36.9% of total generation. The United Kingdom plans to be carbon-zero by 2050 [19,20].

Attitudes to climate change vary from country to country. The percentage of people in a country that feels that climate change is a major threat is highest in Greece (90%) and South Korea (86%), followed by France (83%), Spain (81%), and Japan (75%). In the United Kingdom, Australia, United States, Canada, and South Africa, the figure is between 59% and 66%. Countries such as Poland (55%), Russia (43%), and Israel (38%) all feel that climate change is real, but it is a minor threat. At the other end of the spectrum, Saudi Arabia (16%) and Indonesia (18%) have the highest proportion of people doubtful of manmade climate change [21,22].

There are many reasons for people to deny that climate change is taking place. Here are a few reasons:

1. Climate change is a distant and abstract concept and does not have the necessary characteristics for a major effort—unlike fighting Hitler where there was a definite and obvious enemy. The global warming/climate change debate is not unlike the tobacco control debate of the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s with the final banning of smoking in public places in the United Kingdom in 2007. But, there was more direct evidence for tobacco/cancer link, which makes the acceptance of the links between global warming, climate change, and GHG concentrations even more difficult.

2. The fact that we cannot do the crucial experiment of stopping anthropomorphic generated CO2 and GHGs for decades makes it even easier for some people to be deniers. When I give people all the facts of climate change and its relationship to CO2 and GHGs, they sometimes say: I hear what you say but I am not convinced.

3. Deniers have been rubbed up the wrong way with facts and figures pushed down their throats.

4. People with vested interest in coal and oil and gas do not want their investments to suffer.

5. People do not like to think of a change and what that will entail; this might include power shortages or higher costs and may unknown disruptions. It goes against their worldview.

6. People can take a position based on their preexisting values. Basically, climate change denial is a conflict between facts and cultural values. To them, accepting climate change might just seem wrong.

7. After listening to the facts about climate change, people feel that instead of living with and acting upon their worries, they suppress the truth. In some cases, people glimpse the horrible reality but defend themselves against it by denying its existence. Sigmund Freud described this negation of reality as an active mental process.

8. People who passionately hold the status quo as the way life should continue to be will be inclined to deny major climatic changes.

9. Politics also seems to play a part, and in Western societies, political affiliation seems to play a part, with conservative voters (Republicans in America) more likely to discount climate change. This denial might be based on the institution's view and not on a person's understanding of the science behind climate change.

10. It is well established that fossil fuel companies have long invested heavily in conservative foundations and think-tanks that promote scientists with anticlimate change views and moreover publicly promoted doubt through paid adverts and articles. This was the case in the 1950s with tobacco/cancer issue. Confronted by compelling peer-reviewed scientific evidence of the harms of smoking, the tobacco industry, beginning in the 1950s, used sophisticated public relations approaches to undermine and distort the emerging science. Claims of scientific uncertainty and lack of proof were their lawyer's basic arguments. After the major report by the US Surgeon General's report of 1964, tobacco sales have since declined. In the United States, in 1965, approximately 42% of adults were smokers, and in 2018, the figure had dropped to 14% [23]. The largest five stock markets listed that oil and gas companies spend nearly $200 m (£153 m) a year lobbying to delay, control, or block policies to tackle climate change, according to a 2019 report. Chevron, BP, and ExxonMobil were the main companies leading the field in direct lobbying to push against a climate policy to tackle global warming [24].

11. When a person is looking for excuses, there is now a ready supply in the social media aimed at spreading disinformation. To some people, if it is in print or in the media, it must be right. Nothing can be further from the truth.

12. The reason for not accepting science-based arguments might indeed go deeper and into our primitive mind-set. In a recent book Paul, Goodwin [25] quotes cognitive scientists Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber that our ability to reason did not evolve so that we could discover truths. Instead reasoning developed so that we could justify our actions and decisions to others, thereby improving our communication and cooperation, defending our position in arguments served to increase our prestige and status. There was no incentive in overweighing the evidence and choosing lengthy logical statements—it was all in the rhetoric, which could well have been wild exaggerations.

8. Social and ethical impacts of climate change

Our book focuses on the physical and biological (mammals, birds, insects, plants, marine lives, and plant pathogens) impacts of global warming and on the role of GHGs and other possible causes of global warming. Apart from one chapter on societal adaption to climate change, there is little comment on the effects of climate change on the human population. The impact on humans is significant and is increasing; examples are food production; relocation issues as a result of sealevel rising, flooding, tornado, and typhoon damage; risk issues; the effect on the insurance industry and hence all insurances; and an economic imbalance between the first world and developing countries. The question of who pays when poor countries are devastated by unprecedented disasters resulting from global warming and the rise of CO2 produced by the richer industrialized nations with their history of burning fossil fuel leads to issues of social justice, ethics, and international law as associated with the problems of climate change.

The social injustices linked to climate change issues have been discussed by Alice Venn in Ref. [26]. She quotes Mary Robinson, the former UN High Commissioner on Human Rights and Special Envoy on Climate Change: In the US as elsewhere, the injustice of climate change means the most vulnerable people in society – the poor, the young, the elderly, the unemployed and the marginalised – are most affected by climate impacts such as severe flooding and prolonged drought. These remarks were made on the announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement in June 2017, which poignantly illustrate the social injustice inherent in climate change impacts and, often, climate policy responses themselves. Venn continues in this chapter [26] to summarize the issue of justice and climate change: Substantive rights to life, health and an adequate standard of living should form the basis of measures to address the disproportionate loss and damage being suffered by climate-vulnerable groups, providing a minimum level of protection beneath which the international community's response, should not be allowed to fall. Procedural justice safeguards similarly find reinforcement in human rights provisions for legal remedies, democratic participation, and non-discrimination in the exercise of fundamental rights, which can offer guidance in the implementation of measures designed to tackle the underlying social justice barriers to essential procedural engagement, particularly access to justice as a neglected component of international climate responses. The reference made to the rights of indigenous communities, children, persons with disabilities and other climate-vulnerable groups in the Paris Agreement preamble represents a tentative first step toward the integration of human rights and social injustice into the climate framework. More focused efforts are however required to meaningfully address the underlying socio-economic injustices, and the procedural barriers which serve to reinforce them, at the sub-national level if climate justice is truly to be attained.

Little has been done internationally to come to terms with the social and ethical issues of climate change as highlighted by many chapters on the subject in a recent book: The topic has, however, been discussed by John McEldowney [27] who states Climate change sets many legal and regulatory challenges on how best to address global warming and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Law has a critically important role, but, too often, its role is overlooked and misunderstood. At both national and international levels law offers a system of adjudication, conflict resolution and dispute settlement. Law provides environmental standards and a means to implement adaptation and mitigation strategies. The UK's Climate Change Act 2008 is a flagship of its kind providing a legal framework that incorporates many aspects of climate change together with a net zero emissions target by 2030. International as well as domestic law may offer solutions. It has to be admitted, however, that law has limitations largely dependent on policy makers and politicians who may find it politically impossible to adopt robust responses to climate change.

One of the very difficult issues created by climate change is that of climate refugees. The has also recently been discussed by John McEldowney [28] Defining the meaning of climate refugee in legal terminology is complicated. The main reason for this is the impact of human-induced greenhouse gas emissions, is extremely broad and might apply to the plight of many millions of refugees. It is hard to find an acceptable legal definition in international law since climate refugees are not formally protected in any Treaty. There are concerns that changing the current definition of refugee to include climate refugee" would be too controversial and would have the unintended consequence of weakening the protection for refugees in general. While Paris COP 21 did not make direct reference to climate refugees, it recommended setting up a task force to provide integrated strategies to minimise displacement relating to adverse climate change. Estimating the number of people around the world that have been forcibly displaced because of floods, windstorms, or droughts is challenging, as major natural disasters occur with some regularity and the number of refugees or displaced people varies yearly. Some move within their own country and others seek refuge abroad. The number of climate refugees appears to be rising but estimates are hard to establish. Even so, since 2008, the United Nation's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has monitored migration numbers on an annual basis and there are on average 26.4 million people displaced throughout the world because of extreme weather events. It is predicted that 200 million or more people will migrate because of climate change factors by 2050."

9. What can we do?

There are a number of things we can do:

1. Money talks, as the saying goes. In discussing the replacement of fossil fuel by renewables, it is encouraging to note that the commonly held belief that renewable energy is expensive is simply not true! Solar power and onshore wind are the cheapest renewable ways of electricity, meaning the energy they produce is cheaper than using nuclear, gas, and fossil fuels. The cost of renewables has fallen faster than predicted.

    The relative costs of producing electricity have been analyzed by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [29] in 2018. The figures are given in Table 1.3.

    The cost of generating power from onshore wind has fallen by around a quarter since 2010, with solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity costs falling by over 70% in that time, according to new cost analysis from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [30]. The report also highlights that solar PV costs are expected to halve by 2020 and that the best onshore wind and solar PV projects could be delivering electricity for an equivalent of USD 3 cents per kilowatt hour or less within the next 2years.

2. When discussing fuel costs, the environment should be counted in. Today, when buying fossil fuels of any kind, or electricity produced from fossil fuels, we do not pay for cleaning up the pollution that burning the fossil fuels generates. The environment should be considered in the costing and accounting. It should be part of every transaction, be it plastic or fuel or electricity. Adding cleanup costs to fossil fuels will make the argument for renewables even more attractive. The environment and the atmosphere, in particular, are limited resources, and cleanup costs are expensive. The atmosphere will absorb only so much GHGs and black carbon before it is deemed unclean. Logically, there is no reason why people buying electricity made from fossil fuels should not be paying for the cleanup. Furthermore, the longer we leave it, the costlier will the cleanup get. As described by the United Nations [1]: "Climate Change is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining moment. From shifting weather patterns that threaten food production, to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding, the impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented in scale. Without drastic action