Specificity

Case: Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) [p. 163]

Summary: In 1992, the City of Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits
people from loitering with one another in any public place. The question is whether the ordinance violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague. It did not provide sufficiently specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the
police (and so may encourage discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement), nor did it provide sufficient notice
to citizens who wish to use the public streets.

Class Notes
• Specificity - no vague criminal statute
• Reqs of ordinance
o Reasonable belief by police that at least one gang member
o Loitering with no apparent purpose
o Refuse to obey dispersal order
• Problems with the ordinance:
o Vagueness of "loitering" - how do you know if someone is loitering without an apparent
purpose
o Dispersal order is vague - what is required to obey the dispersal order
o No warning b/c you can’t know what is and isn't illegal
o Give police too much discretion (may encourage discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement)
o Liberty issues - how can we punish people for sitting around doing nothing. If you can't
define it, then you can't criminalize it.
• Rule of Lenity
o If a criminal statute is ambiguous, court should construe statutes narrowly (in favor of Df)