Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, GR No.

L-630, November 15, 1947; 79 Phil 461 (Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands) Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI, the court rendered judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds. Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines. Held. No. Public agricultural lands mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court stated: Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December 20, 1994 (Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands) Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought the said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the administration of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondents husband. Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale. Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private lands. G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988 FACTS: Background: CFI and IAC: ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest Development Granted to Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown title to the parcels of land being claimed. LOCATION: Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province and Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province LAND AREA: Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, together with whatever improvements existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, Lot 4 - PSU-112592

PARTIES: 1. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicantappellee 2. Republic of the Philippines Oppositorsappellants ON WHAT GROUNDS: 3. the applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928 4. Oppositor: that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for. The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case, that the Roman Catholic Church, as a corporation, is disqualified from owning properties from the public domain based on Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution and that the registration was applied after the effectivity of the 1973 constitution. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private corporation, for purpose of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution. 2. W/N the lots are part of the public domain. HELD n 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518). No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows: Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive bequests G.R. No. 133250: Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation 09 July 2002, Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the

constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. LRC (1957) G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957 FACTS: October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar affidavit declaring the same. June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an affidavit but not in the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it was ownership through donation and this was purchased As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151) LRC: o In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen o ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a place ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time),

in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. o In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters corporation sole 1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever 2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole 3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole. Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple) undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens o presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious landholdings. as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997 Facts: Governor General William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 on June 13, 1913 which reserved some square meters of land in Barrio Naga, Albay for provincial park purposes. On December 9, 1916, The CFI of Albay ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by E.O. No. 40 to Diego Palomo. Two months before his death, Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heir, Ignacion Palomo and Carmen Palomo which was allegedly covered by an Original Certificate of Title. President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced in E.O No. 40 into Tiwi Hot Spring National Parks and Wildlife. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of public domain and therefore is neither susceptible to disposition nor registrable. The Palomos, however continued in possession of the property and paid real estate taxes and introduced improvements by planting banana, pandan and coconuts. On May 7, 1974 petitioners filed a civil case against private respondents who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered their land and cut down bamboos. The Republic of the Philippines also filed a Civil Case for the annulment

and cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of land. RTC ad CA ruled against the Palomos. Issue: Whether or not the lands claimed by the Palomos are alienable lands of the public domain which may be acquired by adverse possession? Held: No. The lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. There was no proof that the petitioners predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. The decisions of the CFI were not signed by the judge but merely certified true copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof no matter how lengthly, cannot be converted into private property unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. CAs decision was affirmed. SPOUSES PALOMO v. CA (G.R. No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997) Civil Law/Land Titles/Public Lands/ Adverse Possession/Grant of Title: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots. Palomo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95608, 21 January 1997, Second Division, J. Romero. The adverse possession which may be the basis for the grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. Forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it to private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. The principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the acts of its agents. ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M. ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents. G.R. No. 85322. April 30, 1991.* FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in Barrio Pampangin, Pateros, Rizal, and described in Survey Plan Psu-128539. It was originally owned and possessed by EmilianoAlmeda, father of the petitioners, by virtue of an Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial executed on June 15, 1935, between him and his brother Adriano, wherein they attested the fact that the land in question was inherited from their parents, VedastoAlmeda and Josefa C. Concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents (great-grandparents of herein petitioners). After Emilianos death on May 1, 1948, his wife, Ana Menguito, and their children received the produce of

the land and rented out to third persons portions of the property where Emiliano had three houses built. Upon Anas death on April 3, 1950, her children with Emiliano inherited the property and the lessees moved out. On June 9, 1980, the brothers Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto executed an extrajudicial partition adjudicating the land to themselves. The Almeda brothers applied for the registration of the land in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI. ISSUE: Whether or not applicants possession of the disputed land prior to January 3, 1968 was valid for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. RULING: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

HALILI vs. CA GR # 113539, MARCH 23, 1998 FACTS: Private respondents, both American Citizens, inherited real properties from Simeon de Guzman, who died intestate, located in the Philippines. His wife, Helen, executed a deed of quit claim assigning, transferring and conveying to their son, David Rey, all her rights, titles and interests in and over 6 parcels of land which the 2 of them inherited from Simeon who himself was an AMCIT. David thereafter sold the land to private respondent Emiliano Cataniag. Petitioners, the adjoining lots owners, questioned the validity and constitutionality of the 2 conveyances, i.e. from Helen to David and between David and Emiliano. They also claimed ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art.1621, NCC. HELD: The SC ruled that although Helens deed of quit claim -in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David all her rights, titles, and interests over the property she had inherited from her husbandcollided with Sec.7, Art. XII of the 87 Constitution. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a FILCIT, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served. Non Filipinos can not acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. However, if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, 12 March 1998, First Division, J. Panganiban. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is deemed cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. If the rationale of the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who subsequently become Filipino citizens by naturalization, or the transfer to Filipino citizens.

petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots. JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000 FACTS: The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a sale. Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasakis right of first refusal under the JVA be exchanged for the right to top by five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead. During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summits bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECOs capital stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the stock. ISSUE: Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECOs stocks HELD: In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No. 146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a shipyard was not a public utility. But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec. 1 of PD No. 666. Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands. A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is therefore required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate. Thus, under the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock. The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization. Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its right of first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus, Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint venture on account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINIA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant,

PALOMO v. CA G.R. No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997 FACTS: Diego Palomo ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in his name on December 9, 1916; December 28, 1916; and January 17, 1917. Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513,169, 176 and 173 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.[7] The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913and 3914 sometime in October 1953. On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registerable Alpha Bonifacio. Cherry Chao. Myra Chavez. Harriett Gutierrez. Jose Sotelo. KimVillanueva Case Digest Land, Titles & DeedsIntroduction & Modes of Acquiring Ownershipunder the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). The Palomos, however, continued inpossession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introducedimprovements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascualmortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 toguarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands. ISSUE: Are the natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons? HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not register able and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for

vs. LUI SHE, in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased,defendantappellant. FACTS: This is the second motion that the defendantappellant has filed relative to this Court's decision of September 12, 1967. Accepting the nullity of the other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7), the defendant-appellant nevertheless contended that the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) is so separable from the rest of the contracts that it should be saved from invalidation. In denying the motion, we pointed to the circumstances that on November 15, 1957, the parties entered into the lease contract (in favor of Wong Heng) for 50 years: that ten days after, they amended the contract so as to make it cover the entire property of Justina Santos; less than a month after, they entered into another contract giving Wong Heng the option to buy the leased premises should his pending petition for naturalization be granted; that on November 18, 1958, after failing to secure naturalization and after finding that adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted, the parties entered into two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years and fixing the period of the option to buy at 50 years which indubitably demonstrate that each of the contracts in question was designed to carry out Justina Santos' expressed wish to give the land to Wong and thereby in effect place its ownership in alien hands, that "as the lease contract was part of a scheme to violate the Constitution it suffers from the same infirmity that renders the other contracts void and can no more be saved from illegality than the rest of the contracts." The present motion is for a new trial and is based on three documents (1 Codicil and 2 wills) executed by Justina Santos which, so it is claimed, constitute newly-discovered material evidence: Codicil- Justina Santos not only named Tita Yaptinchay LaO the administratrix of her estate with the right to buy the properties of the estate, but also provided that if the said LaO was legally disqualified from buying she was to be her sole heir. Wills- Justina Santos enjoined her heirs to respect the lease contract made, and the conditional option given, in favor of Wong. ISSUE: WON the lease contract executed by Santos is valid. HELD: This is a misrepresentation of the grossest sort. The documents were known to the defendantappellant and her counsel even before the death of Justina Santos. Nor is there anything in the documents that is likely to alter the result we have already reached in this case. With respect to the 1957 codicil, it is claimed that Justina Santos could not have intended by the 99-year lease to give Wong the ownership of the land considering that she had earlier devised the property to Tita Yaptinchay LaO. Without passing on the validity of her testamentary disposition since the issue is one pending before the probate court, it suffices to state here that even granting that Justina Santos had devised the land in dispute to LaO, Justina Santos was not thereby barred or precluded from subsequently giving the land to Wong. The execution of the lease contract which, together with the other contracts, amount to a transfer of ownership to Wong, constitutes an implied revocation of her codicil, at least insofar as the disposition of the land is concerned. As for the 1959 wills, it is said that they manifest a desire to abide by the law, as is evident from the statement therein that Wong's right to buy the land be

allowed "anytime he or his children should be entitled to buy lands in the Philippines (i.e., upon becoming Filipino citizens)". It seems obvious, however, that this is nothing but a reiteration of the substance of the lease contract and conditional option to buy which in compensation, as our decision demonstrates, amount to a conveyance, the protestation of compliance with the law notwithstanding. In cases like the one at bar, motives are seldom avowed and avowals are not always candid. The problem is not, however, insuperable, especially as in this case the very witnesses for the defendant-appellant testified that Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural when she said. "This is what I want and this will be done." In particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper, she said 'you just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality.'" The ambition of the old woman before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doa Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog. She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquired Filipino citizenship, being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen. The other points raised in the motion for new trial either have already been disposed of in our decision or are so insubstantial to merit any attention. ACCORDINGLY, the motion for new trial is denied. (lease contract not valid)