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2009 - 281

2009. 12. 30.

20090329

, (),

1. (Qualcomm Incorporated)
5775
(5775 Morehouse Drive San Diego, CA 92121, U.S.A.)
(Paul E. Jacobs)
2.
1303-22 19

3.
170-9
(William E. Keitel)

, , , , , ,
,

, , , ,
- 1 -

1. CDMA

.
. (Subscriber Unit)
,

. CDMA2000
CDMA2000

. CDMA 2000
, CDMA2000
CDMA2000

2. CDMA2000
CDMA2000

.
3. CDMA2000 RF(RFL, RFR, RFT, IF
) CDMA2000
RF RF

.
- 2 -

4.


.
5.
.
. : 273,197,000,000
. : (60)
. :

1.
.
(United States of America,
) ,
( ) (
), ( RF ),
( PM , RFPM
)
, ( ) 2
1 .
- 3 -

( )
(
) (Code Division Multiple Access,
CDMA ), (Wideband Code Division Multiple
Access, WCDMA )
2 1 .
( QCTK' )

2 1
.
.

,
CDMA WCDMA
( ) . ,

QCTK
. ,
,
.
. , , QCTK

CDMA WCDMA
. , B
- 4 -

2005. 4. 19. 2005. 5. 19. ,1) B


B
, (low-end, )
VIA Telecom Corporation Ltd.( VIA' )
,
B ,

.
QCTK

, . QCTK
2003. 10. 13. 2004. 11. 24. 2) , QCTK
,
,
QCTK
.
QCTK
, , CDMA
1) 2005. 4. 19. :.... I understand the key background of our proposal against VIA and the other low-end
market competitors....
2005. 5. 19. : B to consider non-QCT solution for low-end volume maker.As we are all aware of,
timing is very crucial to defend against VIA in our low-end market. Considering SD management input and
concerns, following is my personal opinion, which I think can be feasible to defend our low-end solution against
VIA in 2H05. 1. () 2. Rebate price proposal would be as follows as SD previously agreed. 3. No Sales price
limitation (like under $50) but make clause "No VIA adaptation" providing following rebate for MSM60XX/60XX.
2) 2003. 10. 13. : Samsung can not sign any agreement that stipulate anything above XX% QCOM
chipset usage rate
2004. 11. 24. : ******** These documents contain HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION on MSM
cost/pricing and performance data NOT suitable for distribution ********
Performance
* Nokia2112 and LG2233(Via based) traffic channel gains are much better than QCT's 60XX based B phone.
* Both Via based handsets(LG2233 and LGT NS1000) have pretty solid performance compared to
based B and K.
Key takeaways from the discussion was that Nokia remains a very potent competitive threat w/ their low cost
structure, performance edge, commitment to CDMA, and brand power; and Via chipset has enabled solid
commercial products such as the LG Flex2233 handset.

- 5 -


, , , QCTK
. (
.)
.
4
. , Qualcomm CDMA Technology Segment CDMA
, 2008
60% . , Qualcomm Technology Licensing Segment
( )
, 2008 33% . , Qualcomm
Wireless and Internet Segment ,
Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives Segment
, 7% .
.
< 1>

1
2
QCTK2

( 1: 2008. 6. 15. , , 2: , )


7,511
1985
15,400

50
1997.9.12 CDMA
33

50
1999.12.6
127

- 6 -

< 2>

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004


3,197 2,680 2,915 3,847 4,880
723 39 840 1,573 2,129
622 578 360 827 1,720

< 3>

2005
5,673
2,386
2,143

2006
7,529
2,690
2,470

(: )
2007
8,871
2,883
3,303

2008
11,142
3,730
3,160


( : , 9. 30. )

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008


3,043 2,626 5,155 5,445 6,762 6,637 7,687 8,595 9,698
168 205 372 403 528 512 604 677 762
86
46
45 -221 -36 65 -38 92 772

< 4>

QCTK
( : , 9. 30. )

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006


932 2,739 4,434 6,289 8,398 12,936 20,012
69 202 328 465 663 958 1,482
43 122 152 108 143 131 426

2007
22,855
1,694
790

2008
29,385
2,176
-658

.
(1)
()

, 3)
3)


, Hz, 1Hz 1 1 .

- 7 -

,
. D 824849Mhz, 869894Mhz
, E 17501770Mhz, 18401860Mhz
. ,

(International Telecommunication Union, ITU )
.
()
1) (cellular)

,

, 4)

.
,

,
,
,

, .
4)

.
10Mhz ( 10khz) 1,000
.

- 8 -

,


.
2)

2
. 1983
AMPS(Advanced Mobile Phone
System) . 800Mhz , (FDMA)
, 30Khz . 1984
1996 CDMA
. ,
Motorola Incorporated( ) N-AMPS(Narrowband
Advanced Mobile Phone System), TACS(Total Access Communication System),
C-450, C-Nezt, NMT450, NMT900, NTT .
2 1 0
, ,
.
CDMA(Code Division Multiple
Access) , 1992 (Telecommunication Industry Association,
TIA ) TDMA(Time Division Multiple Access) , TDMA
900Mhz GSM(Global System for Mobile
Communication) .
3 , 5)
- 9 -

CDMA2000 WCDMA
.
() CDMA WCDMA
CDMA
()
. TIA 1993 CDMA
.
CDMA (IS-95A ) ,
CDMA2000
. CDMA
.
CDAM IS-95A IS-95B ,
CDMA2000 . CDMA2000 3
. CDMA2000 1x, CDMA2000
1xEVDO, CDMA2000 1xEVDV .
EVDO CDMA2000 1x
, EVDO CDMA2000 1x
, EVDV
, .
WCDMA ,
CDMA2000 ,
. CDMA2000
GPS
5)

- 10 -

, WCDMA 512
.
< 5>

CDMAone

IS-95A
IS-95B
CDMA
1x
CDMA2000 EVDO
EVDV
WCDMA WCDMA WCDMA

CDMAone IS-95A
CDMAone IS-95B
CDMA2000 1x
CDMA2000 1xEVDO
CDMA2000 1xEVDV
WCDMA

()
1984
, 5 AMPS
. , 1988 7

(Handy phone) .
1993 CDMA
6), 1996 SKT CDMA
CDMA
. 1996 7
CDMA .
2000 12 SKT, KTF, ( LGT' ) 3
IMT-2000 , 2007 3 SKT KTF 3
WCDMA 2
6) CDMA
,
.

- 11 -

CDMA 3 WCDMA .
< 6>

()
(%)

SKT
22,875,785
50.5

KTF
14,258,546
31.5

LGT
8,140,180
18.0

(2008 9)

45,274,511
100

(2)
()
CDMA GSM
. CDMA
, GSM NokiaSonyEricsson
.
, ,
,

.

.
.

.
.
- 12 -

,
.
,
, ,
, .

.
< 1>

* , , PDA ,

()
1)
, , , (
), 5 80% .
- 13 -

< 7>

()

2001
140
(35.6%)
28.6
(7.3%)
58.6
(14.9%)
27.9
(7.1%)
10
(2.5%)
128
(32.6%)
393.1
(100%)

2002
150.6
(35.1%)
42.3
(9.9%)
70.4
(16.4%)
22.9
(5.3%)
16
(3.7%)
127.1
(29.6%)
429.2
(100%)

* : Strategy Analytics

2003
179.8
(34.8%)
55.8
(10.8%)
75.1
(14.5%)
27.2
(5.3%)
27.4
(5.3%)
151.9
(29.4%)
517.2
(100%)

2004
207.6
(30.5%)
86.6
(12.7%)
104.5
(15.4%)
42.5
(6.2%)
44.4
(6.5%)
194.9
(28.6%)
680.5
(100%)

2005
264.9
(32.4%)
102.9
(12.6%)
146
(17.9%)
51.1
(6.3%)
54.9
(6.7%)
197.2
(24.1%)
817
(100%)

( : )
2006 2007
347.5 437.1
(34.7%) (38.9%)
113.7 161.1
(11.3%) (14.4%)
217.4 159
(21.7%) (14.2%)
74.8 103.4
(7.5%) (9.2%)
64.4
80.5
(6.4%) (7.2%)
184.1 181.5
(18.4%) (16.2%)
1001.9 1122.6
(100%) (100%)

2)
CDMA GSM
CDMA GSM
. CDMA , , 3
5060% , < 8> .
< 8>

()

CDMA
( : )
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
9.5 (17.5%)
13.8 (21.6%)
21.3 (19.0%)
26.0 (20.9%)
30.4 (22.3%)
38.5 (21.2%)
38.7
(16.5%)
14.2 (22.4%)
17.7 (20.7%)
20.4 (20.6%)
28.2 (18.4%)
26.7 (14.9%)
25.6 (16.8%)
30.7
(24.7%)
8.3 (20.7%)
16.3 (18.0%)
17.7 (12.3%)
16.8 (11.8%)
17.1 (18.1%)
31.2 (16.8%)
30.6
(14.4%)
- 14 -

6.1
(10.6%)
6.5
(11.3%)
13.0
(22.6%)
57.6
(100%)

10.4
(13.2%)
7.7
(9.8%)
12.8
(16.3%)
78.7
(100%)

* : Strategy Analytics

10.9
(11.0%)
12.3
(12.5%)
16.0
(16.2%)
98.7
(100%)

14.2
(10.4%)
17.2
(12.6%)
34.4
(25.2%)
136.8
(100%)

10.6
(7.3%)
18.8
(12.9%)
41.9
(28.8%)
145.5
(100%)

8.8
(5.1%)
18.0
(10.4%)
50.2
(29.1%)
172.3
(100%)

10.7
(5.9%)
9.3
(5.1%)
62.2
(34.1%)
182.2
(100%)

GSM 2005 38.4%


, 17.4% .
< 9>

GSM

()

2001
98.2
(39.0%)
40.8
(16.2%)
14.2
(5.6%)
24.2
(9.6%)
0.3
(0.1%)
74.3
(29.5%)
252.0
(100%)

2002
117.2
(42.3%)
37.4
(13.5%)
22.8
(8.3%)
17.8
(6.4%)
2.2
(0.8%)
79.3
(28.7%)
276.8
(100%)

* : Strategy Analytics

2003
146.0
(42.2%)
38.4
(11.1%)
33.8
(9.8%)
22.5
(6.5%)
6.1
(1.8%)
98.8
(28.6%)
345.6
(100%)

2004
178.7
(36.9%)
68.5
(14.1%)
58.0
(12.0%)
38.5
(7.9%)
18.4
(3.8%)
122.7
(25.3%)
484.8
(100%)

2005
244.2
(38.4%)
110.4
(17.4%)
76.2
(12.0%)
48.7
(7.7%)
24.5
(3.9%)
132.1
(20.8%)
636.1
(100%)

( : )
2006 2007
329.4 (46.2%)
427.8
(40.7%)
169.3 115.7
(20.9%) (12.5%)
88.1 130.4
(10.9%) (14.1%)
72.3 (10.9%)
101.1
(8.9%)
25.9 (4.5%)
41.8
(3.2%)
123.8 (12%)
109.7
(15.3%)
808.7 (100%)
926.5
(100%)

3)
, , (
)7), .
7)

2002 8 .

- 15 -

< 10>

8)


2006
8,062 (50.2%)
3,476 (21.6%)
2,925 (18.2%)
1,604 (10.0%)
16,067 (100%)

* :

2007
10,264 (49.1%)
5,426 (25.9%)
2,322 (11.1%)
2,902 (13.9%)
20,914 (100%)

( : )
2008
7,160 (51.5%)
3,600 (25.9%)
1,960 (14.1%)
1,180 (8.5%)
13,900 (100%)

CDMA
, .
()
1) FRAND
)

. ,

. Windows
,
, .
, ,
.

.
8)

- 16 -

.


. ,

. ,
.
,
,
.
,
, ,

.

. ,
.
.

,
. , ,

.
) FRAND

.
- 17 -


.
.

.


. ,
,
(RAND : Reasonable and non-discriminatory)
. (The European Telecommunications
Standards Institute, ETSI ) RAND (Fair)
Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory ( FRAND )
. , FRAND

.
FRAND
,
.
,
, FRAND
.
2)
)
- 18 -

CDMA CDMA CDMA2000


1x EVDO 90%, WCDMA 20%
. CDMA
< 11> .
< 11>



EoNex 02.10.28 CDMA 2000 CDMA2000

1x EVDO
CDMA2000 WCDMA,
93. 8.31 TD-SCDMA

CDMA2000 WCDMA,
93. 8.31 TD-SCDMA

CDMA2000, CDMA2000 1x

02. 1. 7 EVDO, WCDMA,
TD-SCDMA
CDMA2000 1x
97. 8.12 CDMA2000,
EVDO
CDMA2000, CDMA2000 1x
KTFT 03. 2.12 EVDO, WCDMA,
TD-SCDMA
CDMA2000 1x
VK 04. 4. 2 CDMA2000,
EVDO
CDMA2000, CDMA2000 1x
97.
7.29,
WCDMA,
SKT 00.11.30 EVDO,
TD-SCDMA Infrastructure

CDMA2000 1x
LGT 06. 6. 9 CDMA2000,
EVDO Infrastructure

ASIC9)
XXXX%

Up-front fee $XX


Running Royalty
- XX%
- XX%
Up-front fee $XX
Running Royalty
- XX%,
- XX%
XX%,
XX%
XX%,
XX%

XX% XX%
XX%,
XX%

XX%

- XX%
- XX%

CMOTECH(2005. 7. 1.), ERON Technologies(2000. 10. 4.,


2001. 12. 21.), ETRONICS(1996. 12. 26.)
CDMA2000, CDMA2000 1x EVDO, WCDMA, TD-SCDMA
.
9) ASIC

Application Specific Integrated Circuit .

- 19 -

, , 100 ,
Agere Systems, Lucent Technologies, Texas Instruments 14 , MS
Technologies, Fujitsu 41 Infrastructure .10)
)
.
, . ,
CDMA
.

. , ,
.
, (Up-front fee)
(Running Royalty) (2-part
tariff) .
, (Cross-Licensing)11)
.
(Licensee)
3 .
()
1)
10) http://www.qualcomm.co.kr/technology/licensing/subscriber.html

11) .

- 20 -

. ,
MSM(Mobile Station Modem, ),
Memory, MIDI, Power Management
, RF Rx, Tx .
< 2>

< 3>

()

()


Application processor , MSM
Application processor ,
MSM
- 21 -

Application processor .
MSM RF Rx, Tx, LNA(Low Noise Amplifier)
. LP5500 Rx LNA
LNA , LNA RF Rx .
2)
) CDMA
CDMA CDMA

,
.
)
CDMA 90%
, CDMA
MSM CDMA .
CDMA MSM
. 1999 MSM2xxx ,
MSM3xxx, MSM5xxx, MSM6xxx MSM7xxx .
23 MSM6xxx , QDSP12) ,
ARM13) . MSM ,
, , MSM
.
12) Qualcomm Digital Signal Processor,

13) ARM ARM7, ARM9, ARM11

- 22 -

MSM 5xxx ,
ARM Application Processor
MSM7xxx, RF MSM
QSC60xx .
)
Texas Instruments Incorporated ( TI' )
2003 5, 1
TI, RF ST
CDMA . TI 2003 11 CDMA2000 1x
CDMA2000 1x EV-DV , 2004 CDMA
TI CDMA2000 1x EV-DV
.
CDMA GSM TI
WCDMA CDMA
, .
, platform CDMA WCDMA
.
,
. TI CDMA
.

1999 IS-95A/B (Scom3200) 100
- 23 -

, . 2000
CDMA 2000 1x 5000 , 2003 5
CDMA2000 1x ( SPH-X9000) KTF 8
, .
( EoNex )
2000 4 () , 2002
CDMA . 2005 10,
CDMA2000 1x (N1000) (ECM1000)
SKT . CDMA
WCDMA , EoNex
.
VIA
2002 5 LSI CDMA
VIA CDMA1x CBP4.0 , 2004 7
LGT ( NS1000)
.
3) RF
) RF
RF(radio14) frequency)
. RF ,
() ,
14) radio , ,
.

- 24 -


.
< 4>
. CDMA
, 10k20k IF Tx
.
LNA
, Rx, IF, CDMA
.
< 4>

RF


10k20k



10k20k

800M
900M

CDMA

IF
IF

Rx
Tx

PA
LNA

RF
(Transmitter Tx), (Receiver Rx)
.
- 25 -

(LNA),
(IF),
(Power Amp) .
RF . ,
Tx Rx ,
.
RF .
.
< 12> CDMA 4,
RF 4 Rx, Tx
. 1700Mhz 1900Mhz
3 . , WCDMA 3
2,100MHz .
< 12>

(2005 12, : )

CDMA
GSM
WCDMA

(MHz) 450 800 1700 1900 900 900/1800 1800 1900 2100
185,0

272
78,673
18,825
96,207
15 401,260 68,228 69,010 40,832

()
193,977
723,513
40,832
1
,,
,,
,,,
,
,,

,
,,
,
,,

,
, , ,
,,

1 : , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
* : , (2006 4)

) RF
RF RF
< 13> .
- 26 -

< 13>

RF


Receiver(Rx)
Transmitter(Tx)
LNA
IF


RFRxxxx
RFTxxxx
RFLxxxx
IFTxxxx, IFRxxxx

MSM RF Rx, Tx
, RF QSCxxxx
.
RF , RF ,
GPS .
RF RF
. , LNA Rx
LNA .
) RF

1996 CDMA IF , CDMA IF CDMA Rx
. 2004 2 Zero-IF RF15) S1M8690
RFT, RFL, RFR
.
Skyworks Solutions Incorporated ( Skyworks )
Skyworks CDMA RF, GPRS RF,
GSM/GPRS Power Amp . CDMA RF
15) IF

RFT, RFR RF

- 27 -

CDMA/PCS/GPS Sky74100(Rx), Sky74068(Tx), Sky74092(LNA)


, 2005 RF RF MCM16)
CDMA/PCS/GPS ,
.
( FCI )
FCI RF DMB IC CDMA RF
2007 . CDMA
RF RFL6000 FC7510, FC7530 ,
RFR6125 FC7350, RFT6120 FC7410 . 2005
, , FC7510 $2,100,00017)
.
Maxim Integrated Products Incorporated ( Maxim' )
Maxim RF PM
. Maxim CDMA RF
.
2.
.
(1)

16) MCM(Multi Chip Module) :

17) $1 1 . .

- 28 -

. CDMA
,
CDMA EoNex CDMA XXXX%
.
, CDMA
CDMA
.18) Subscriber Unit19)(
)
(Up-front fee)
(Running Royalty, Running
Royalty ) . , 1993
$XX ,
( )
XX%, ( )
XX% , ,
X% .
(2)
B 2004 , A 2004 ,
C 2004 (
2004 ) .20)
2004
18)
19)

WCDMA 2004 CDMA based wireless applications IS-95, CDMA2000, WCDMA


CDMA .
CDMA( GSM CDMA) ,
, 2004
Subscriber unit (any subsequent
generation product)

20) , 2004. 4. 1. .

- 29 -



,
.
.
()

(Net Selling Price, ) .
, B A

RF CIF 21)
.22) 2004

.


.
XX% ,

CIF XX% .
21) CIF(Cost, Insurance and Freight) :

22) A 1993 (INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUBSCRIBER UNIT LICENSE AND TECHNICAL


ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT)
1. HEADINGS AND DEFINITIONS
"Net Selling Price", with respect to each Reportable Product Sold by LICENSEE, shall mean .....()
(a)(c) ( )
Selling Price"means .... ()

- 30 -

()
2004
X% X% .
MSM CDMA ASIC23),
Qualifying Subscriber Unit,
Eligible Subscriber Unit 24), Eligible Subscriber Unit
X% ,
X% . , C Eligible
Subscriber Unit X% ,
XX X% .25)
C, B
X% , A

X%
.
()
( XX% XX%)
,
23) WCDMA

24) C 2004 (Amendment to infrastructure and Subscriber Unit License and Technical Assistance
Agreement(the "Amendment")
1. Headings And Definitions
"CDMA ASIC" means .... ()
"Qualifying Subscriber Unit" means .... () "Eligible Subscriber Unit" means .... ()
"Non-Eligible Subscriber Unit" means .... ()
25) C 2004
2. Royalty Rate for Eligible Subscriber Units.

- 31 -


. ,
$XX $XX ,
$XX .

. 1993 A B
$X . , 2001. 4. 1.
,
$XX . B
$XX , B A
$XX .26) C
$XX ,
$XX .
, 2003 10
,
$X $X.
.
(1)
()

CDMA
26) B
2004
(), the maximum royalty to be paid by LICENSEE or its sublicensed Affiliates to QUALCOMM under the License
Agreement for each Qualifying Subscriber Unit Sold by LICENSEE or its sublicensed Affiliates during the
calendar quarter beginning...()

- 32 -

.


.

.
,

.

.
,
. , ,


. CDMA
CDMA .

.
CDMA
CDMA
. ,
CDMA CDMA ,

,
- 33 -

CDMA
.
CDMA, GSM,
WCDMA
CDMA, GSM, WCDMA
.

CDMA GSM
WCDMA 27), CDMA
GSM, WCDMA
CDMA GSM, WCDMA

.
()
,

.


.
CDMA CDMA

27)


. SKT KTF WCDMA
2000 2007 1 9 .

- 34 -

CDMA . CDMA
.


.

3
.
3
CDMA .
,
.
.
, CDMA
,
.
(2)

CDMA2000 . 3.
. .
.
(1)
- 35 -


32 ( )
1 .
1. ~ 2. ()
3.
4. ~ 5. ()
.


5 ( )
~ ()
32( ) 1 3
1
.
1. ~ 3. ()
4. 1 3

~ ()
1 5
.


.
1.~ 2. ()
3. ( 32 1 3)
(1) ()
(2)
,
.
.~. ()
.
- 36 -

( 5 3 4)
(1) ()
(2)

(3) ~ (6) ()

(2)
()
.


,
, ,
.
4
1 .
CDMA

.
()
, ,

,
,
- 37 -


.
BAC
,
.
, .
V. 2.
,
. . 2. . (4) 28),

.
CDMA
CDMA2000
.

CDMA
CDAM2000 , 32
, 2. .
23 1 1 .
()
1)
28)

. 2. . (4) ()
() 2

- 38 -

)
, 2004 , FRNAD
,
.

2004


.29)
B 2004 2003 5 10
CDMA2000 E D
. , B CDMA
2003 2 XX%, 2003 4 XX%
.
A 2004 2004 7
VIA CDMA2000 . , A
2004 1 X%, 2
XX%, 3 XX% .
2004
29)

1999
. 1999
(IS-95) 1999 10 2003 5
X% .

- 39 -

2004

. , B A (CDMA
) XX% , 2004 2005 XX, XX, 2006
XX , C CDMA ASIC
XX% , 2004 2005 XX, XX, 2006
XX .30) 2004
,
.31) ,

. ,


.
FRAND


FRAND .

.
, 1993 4 IS-95
30) B
2004
8.2 Termination of this Amendment
8.2.2. In addition to any other remedies available, QUALCOMM may terminate this Amendment by providing
thirty (30)days written notice to LICENSEE in the event that:(1) LICENSEE and its Affiliates cease to purchase
from QUALCOMM or its Affiliates, in any one calendar year, at least (a) XX percent(XX%) of LICENSEE's and
its Affiliates' requirements of CDMA ASICs(for the aggregate of all CDMA standards for which QUALCOMM
offers to sell CDMA ASICs to LICENSEE) for incorporation and use in Subscriber Units Sold by LICENSEE and
its Affiliates, or (b) XX CDMA ASICs in 2004, XX CDMA ASICs in 2005 and XX CDMA ASICs in 2006 and each
year thereafter, provided that( )
31) B 2004 8.3 Effect of Termination or Expiration

- 40 -

TIA
.32)
, 1997 5 (Telecommunication Technology
Association of Korea, TTA' ) 800MHz Band

TTA .

2004. 8. 7. QCTK
.33)
)

FRAND ,
,
.
FRAND

. ,


34)
32) To encourage the early disclosure and identification of essential patents, the TIA should consider consistent
adherence to a policy that requires, prior to accepting any participation or contribution by a company, a
commitment to licence essential patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions, which
commitment cannot be retracted"
33) Design-win A 100% onto our solution...kill
reduction from X% to X%.....

.....continue with the X% chipset rebate, continue with the royalty

34) .

- 41 -


.
,
FRAND
.35) FRAND
,
FRAND
.
TTA CDMA


FRAND . CDMA
CDMA2000
FRAND CDMA 2000
.
A licensor exercising bottle-neck power that discriminates in licensing in order to handicap its competitors and
favor its own downstream sales can create or enhance market power in downstream market for
standard-compliant products and services.......We suggest this possibility is(or should be taken to be the principle
justification for the RAND nondiscriminatory requirement. Daniel G. Swanson and William J. Baumol, Reasonable
and Nondiscriminatory(RAND) royalties, standard selection, and control of market power, 73 Antitrust Law
Journal 1(2005)
The only plausible anticompetitive explanation for [discriminatory license pricing]is an act of foreclosure by a
vertically integrated monopolistIP AND ANTITRUST : AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13.5c at 13-53(2003)
35) EU
.

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.,() Indian Head Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501,506-07(1988) EU
3
(2001. 1. 6. EC Commission notice: Guidelines on the
applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cperation agreements, paragraph 174 )
FRAND
.
Qualcomm was discriminatory among licenses of the essential WCDMA technology by charging more and higher
fees to those who do not use Qualcomm's UMTS chip sets. Such factual allegations of anticompetitive conduct
are sufficiently specific to satisfy the first element of an attempted monopolization claim.Broadcom v.
Qualcomm 501 F.3d 297(3d Cir. 1997)

- 42 -


CDMA
CDMA2000
CDMA
.
,


.


, VIA, EoNex
.

. VIA
<VIA Competition update>
.36)
, CDMA
CDMA2000

CDMA2000
.

36) <Strategy Discussion>
In the low-end space, the PRICE is key.
- Are we prepared to go all the way with VIA in a price war? VIA is in a life-or-death mode.
- What is the "QCT premium" in the low-end? very low to nill....

- 43 -


CDMA2000
.


$X . 2009. 5. 26. 1
124 126, 2001 2006
$X, 2004 7 2006
$X
. <
12> $X . ,

,
.

.
$X
. B
<B Low Tier Pricing(@XXmillion volum)> , B
VIA
, $XX, $XX , $XX
VIA . , A
37) , A VIA
$X A $X
37)

.....Our solution is $XX higher than Via on total e-BOM.....if A goes to VIA(XX
set price) and allow Via to survive and stay with our
additional $XX on top of $XX on MSM6000......

- 44 -

in Q405, XX in 1H06 our chip

account A. That is reason why we suggested

VIA A
.


.
A B
.38)
)

.

( RF )
.
< 5>


38)

(/$) : 2004(1144.67), 2005(1024.31), 2006(955.51), 2007


(929.20)

- 45 -

RF .
RF
.
A XX
39) 40) < 6>
< 7> .
< 6> 2004 2 2007 2 A

(Out-lier) , , .
XX% , XX% .
A
XX% .
< 6>

39) (

)/( )

40) ( ) - ( )

- 46 -

A < 7> .
A $XXXX , 2005 $X
. A
$X .
< 7> A

A B XX

< 8> < 9> .
< 8> 2004 2 2006 4 B

(Out-lier) , , .
XXX% , 2005
XX% . B
XX%
.
- 47 -

< 8>

B < 9> .
B $X , 2005 $X .
B $X
.
< 9>

- 48 -

)

XX%41) .
A XX

(Out-lier) , ,
< 10> . $X ,
$X . A
$X .
< 10>

B XX
A < 11> .
$XX , $X . B
$X .
41) X%-X%/X%

- 49 -

< 11>

)
$XX42)
. , DMB, , PDA
. LCD, , RF, ,
Application processor
$XX
. ,
.
B XX

< 12> .
42)

$XX , $XX $XX

- 50 -

< 12>

B < 14>
2006 X% ,
.
< 14>

2004 1H


XX%

2004 2H
XX%

2005 1H
XX%

2005 2H
XX%

2006 1H
XX%

2006 2H
XX%

A B ,
XX
< 13> .

- 51 -

< 13>

*A 2004 1

, 2003 10
$XX ,

,
$XX
.




.
2004
5 .43)
- 52 -


1993 CDMA
,
2001 ,
.

2. . (2) () 1) ) () ()
. ,


VIA .

. ,

.

. RF $1 ,
LCD $10 .
,

.


43)

A 2007. 7. 1. X%

- 53 -

3. .

.

, (MSM)
(RF, PM)
.44)


, .

.


,
.
2)
) 45)


.
, .
44)

3. . .

45) . ,

( 2007. 11. 22. 20028626).

- 54 -

< 14> A CDMA


. A 2004 2 100%
, A 2004 7 VIA CDMA2000 2004
3 96% , VIA
A
.
< 14>

, A VIA CDMA2000
2004 7 A
, A VIA
. 2004 A CDMA
2004 4 2005 3
XX% .
< 15> B CDMA2000
- 55 -

. B 2003 5 2003 10 CDMA2000


E D . 2003 2 B

2004 1 . 2004 3 B
,
B .
< 15>

< 15> 1993


CDMA
100% . 2003
CDMA
,

.

- 56 -

< 15>
()
(%)

CDMA
2002
20,285,645
99.99%

2003
33,585,344
99.99%

2004
43,438,396
98.27%

2005
44,198,748
98.47%

2006
48,263,547
98.67%

, EoNex, VIA, TI CDMA ,



,
.
)


. CDMA
, GSM Skyworks,
Agere, NXP, TI .
, < 16> 2005 2006 CDMA
GSM 19%, 26% ,
CDMA GSM .

CDMA
.
< 16>
GSM
CDMA

CDMA GSM
2005
6.28*
7.82*

5.50*
7.46*

* FORWARD CONCEPT, Cellular Handset & Chip Markets (2007)


** IDC, Worldwide Mobile Phone Semicondocter 2007-2011 Forecast
- 57 -

2006

( : )
6.00**
7.33**


,
,
.
()
1)

.
, 1993

,
.
, ,
.
, 2004 XX%

. ,
, B A
, , ,
, C 2005

.
- 58 -

, .
,

.
,
.
, 2004
(WCDMA )
1993 . 1993
2004
1993 , 1995
.
,
, ,

,
.
,



. ,
( XX% )
,
.
- 59 -

, C



. ,



.
2)
.
,
-

.
,
$X
, 2004 4 A
X%
.
,
. ,

.
- 60 -

, .
, ,
. -
. -
,


.46)
,
,
.

,47)
CDMA
.
,
,
$X
, < 16> 2004 2 2006 2
46)

3. . (4) () 3) )

47) Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 794, at 83


- The anticompetitive feature of package discounting is the strong incentive it gives buyer to take increasing
amounts or even all of a product in order to take advantage of a discount aggregated across multiple products
- Depending on the number of products that are aggregated and the customers relative purchase of each, even
an equally efficient rival may find it impossible to compensate for lost discounts on products that it does not
produce
LePages Inc. v. 3M Co. 324 F.3d 141(3d Cir. 2003)
- Principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that when offered by a monopolist they
may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse
group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.

- 61 -

B X%
48) $XX ,
, 2004 2
2006 4 B A
$XX $XX

.
,
,
.
A
X% A
. , 2005 3 <VIA
Competition Update in Korea/Taiwan>
49), QCTK
2004. 11. 24. VIA
MSM60XX 50) VIA
. ,
VIA
.
,
,

.
48)

oo oo

49) 37)
50) 2)

- 62 -

(3)

CDMA

. , 2. . 32 1 3
5 3 4 .
.
(1)

23( )

( ) ,
.
1.
2. ~ 8. ()
.
~ ()


36( )
23( ) 2
1 .
()

1 (36 1 )
2.
23( ) 1 1
- 63 -

1 .
.


. ~ . ()

(2)

()
2. . (2)
,
,

.
()
. 2. .

, 2. . CDMA 2000
.

, ,

,
. , . 2. . ()
,
.
1) CDMA 2000
- 64 -

2. . (2) () 1) )

. ,
, 2. . (2)
() 1) ) CDMA 2000
.
, 2. . (2) () 1) )


.
CDMA
CDMA 2000 .
2)
2. . (2) () 1) ) 2004

,

.
3)
2. . (2) () 1) )
$XX $XX . ,

- 65 -

$X ,
. 2. . (2)
() 1)
. ,
2004 7 A VIA


.
4)
2. . (2) () 1)
2004 5 , 1993
.
(3)

CDMA

. , 2. . 23 1 1 36
1 1 2 . .
.
2. .
32 1 3 5
3 4 23 1 1 36 1
1 2 . .
- 66 -

3.
.
(1)
A B CDMA2000
,
.
(2) A
() ( )
2000 A (Memorandum of Understanding)
, A 2000. 7. 1. 2005. 6. 30. (Chipset Purchase
Commitment)
.
(Baseband) ( 1) IF/RF ( 2) .
1 : CDMA51) XX%
.
2 : IF/RF XX%
.
2 ,
IF RF .
, ,
( XX, XX) .
51) IS-95, CDMA2000, WCDMA, TD-SCDMA

- 67 -

IF RF RFR, RFL, RFT, RTR, IF


, IF RF
.
< 17> .
< 17>

XXXX*
XXXXXXXX*
XXXXXXXX*
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXX

A
XX%

0
893,000
1,056,000
1,300,000
1,950,000
2,275,000
2,600,000
2,925,000
3,250,000

IF RF
XX% XX%
0
0
1,031,000
1,168,000
1,218,000
1,381,000
1,500,000
1,700,000
2,250,000
2,550,000
2,625,000
2,975,000
3,000,000
3,400,000
3,375,000
3,825,000
3,750,000
4,250,000

* : XXXX

, < 18> .
< 18>
A

XXXX*
XXXXXXXX*
XXXXXXXX*
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXX

XX%

0
3,575,000
4,225,000
5,200,000
7,800,000
9,100,000
10,400,000
11,700,000
13,000,000

( : , $)

XX%

0
1,375,000
1,623,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000

( : , $)

IF RF
XX%
XX%
XX%
0
0
0
4,125,000
4,675,000
5,500,000
4,875,000
5,525,000
6,500,000
6,000,000
6,800,000
8,000,000
9,000,000
10,200,000
12,000,000
10,500,000
11,900,000
14,000,000
12,000,000
13,600,000
16,000,000
13,500,000
15,300,000
18,000,000
15,000,000
17,000,000
20,000,000

* : XXXX
- 68 -


,
A
.
() ( )
A 3. . (2) () 2004
, 2004
(Chipset Purchase and Incentive Agreement) 52).
2004. 7. 1.2009. 6. 30. A RF
RF (the aggregate dollar amount actually paid by A and its affiliates to
Supplier for CDMA2000 chipsets) .
, RF ,
< 19> .
,
CDMA WCDMA
.
< 19>

A CDMA2000

CDMA2000 RF
53)
XX%
XX%
XX%

CDMA2000 54)
XX%
XX%
XX%
X%
X%
X%
X%
X%
X%
X%
X%
X%

52)

, .
XX%
XX% .
, 2005. 6. 30.( )
2005. 6. 30. .
53) RF ASIC Purchases in Calendar Quarter Relative to CDMA2000 RF ASIC Requirements: A MSM6xxx, 7xxx

- 69 -

A
,

.
, 2009. 6. 30. 2009. 7. 1.
55) . , A
(2004 XX , 2005 XX, 2006 XX)
.
2005 2005
, . , CDMA2000 RF RFR,
RFL, RFT, RTR , RF
MSM .
CDMA2000 RF RF ,
MSM .
< 20> . , RF MSM
(MSM6 MSM7) < 20>
XX%
CDMA2000 RF .

CDMA2000 RF A RF .
54) CDMA2000 MSM Purchases in Calenda Quarter Relative to CDMA2000 ASIC Requiremts : CDMA2000
MSM
55) A 4
.(expiring on the earlier of (i) the date of any termination of the License Agreement or (ii) the date
that A ceases to constitute one of Supplier's largest four Chipset customers) 2009. 7.
15. .

- 70 -

< 20>
MSM60XX
MSM60XX
MSM6300
6
MSM7500
7

CDMA2000 RF

RFR
100%
100%
100%
100%
86%
86%

RFL
90%
100%
95%
100%
100%

RFT RTR
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
-

MSM 4 RF

.
(3) B
() ( Master Rebate )
2004 B (Component Supply
Agreement, Master Rebate )
CDMA standard, WCDMA( UMTS), CDMA2000
.
2004. 9. 27. 3 1
, 2008. 12. 31.
.
1) CDMA standard
2004. 9. 27.2007. 9. 30. B
(CDMA ASIC Purchase Requirement) < 21>
.
- 71 -

1 : CDMA Standard (CDMA2000, WCDMA)


XX% .
2 : CDMA Standard XX%
.
< 21>

XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX

( : , $)

CDMA standard
XX%
XX%
XX%
XX%
0
0
0
0
4,500,000
5,000,000
5,500,000
6,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
6,500,000
7,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
7,500,000
8,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
8,500,000
9,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
9,000,000
10,000,000

2) WCDMA 56)
2005. 6. 27.2007. 9. 30. B WCDMA
XX% , 2. . (3) () 1)
< 22> .
< 22>

B WCDMA
XX%
X%

XX%
X%

XX%
X%

3) CDMA2000
2004. 9. 27.2005. 9. 25. B CDMA2000
XX% , 2. . (3) () 1) 2. .
(3) () 2) $XX .
56)
WCDMA ,
.

- 72 -

() CDMA ( Low-end Rebate )


VIA 2005
.57) 2005
B MSM60XX MSM60XX
CDMA (Agreement for CDMA Subscriber Units,
'Low-end Rebate' ) , .
: 2005. 7. 1.2005. 12. 31.
: CDMA2000 XX%

: B
60XX 58) 60XX 59) ,
60XX Chipset $XX 60XX
$XX (open credit memo)
Master Rebate(Component Supply Agreement)
60)
, Master Rebate Low-end Rebate
, Low-end
Rebate Master Rebate , Master
Rebate .
.
57)
2005 6 B, 2005 11 A, 2005 12 I, J, K
Low-end Rebate . A B (XX%
) RF
B Low-end Rebate .
58) MSM60XX, RFR6122, RFT6122
59) MSM60XX, RFR6122, RFT6122
60) This agreement shall become effective as of the Effective Date and, unless earlier terminated, shall terminate
upon the earlier to occur of the (i)completion of the parties' obligations required to be performed hereunder, or
(ii) termination of the License Agreement and/or the CSA.

- 73 -

(1)
CDMA2000
.


.
() CDMA2000 GSMWCDMA


. CDMA2000 WCDMA
, GSM, PDC PHC
.
CDMA2000 GSM WCDMA
.
CDMA2000GSMWCDMA
.

.
CDMA2000, GSM, WCDMA
CDMA2000, GSM, WCDMA
,
CDMA2000
GSM WCDMA , CDMA2000
- 74 -

GSM, WCDMA

.
() CDMA2000GSMWCDMA
CDMA2000GSMWCDMA
.

.

.
.
< 23>

GSM
CDMA 1x
WCDMA

2005
6.28
7.82
28.0

2006
5.50
7.46
25.0

( : )

2007
4.00
6.71
22.0

*
** : Forward Concept

()
2006 , CDMA2000
CDMA2000 CDMA2000
.
AB
XX% GSM , CDMA 2
- 75 -

, CDMA2000
(VIA, , EoNex)
. CDMA2000
GSM WCDMA
.
(2)
CDMA2000 .


.
CDMA2000 CDMA2000

.


. ,
CDMA2000
.
() CDMA2000


.

- 76 -

.

.

.


.
.
,

3 .

,
. ,

.

.
()


.

.
- 77 -


,
. ,
.

.


.

.


.

.


.
() CDMA2000
CDMA2000
. ,
,

61) .
- 78 -

< 24>

CDMA

2002
2003

XX(XX)
XX(XX)

XX(XX)
XX(XX)

XX(XX)
XX(XX)
* :

< 25>

2004
XX(XX)
XX(XX)
XX(XX)

2005
XX(XX)
XX(XX)
XX(XX)

MSM6050

2002
2003

XX(XX)
XX(XX)

XX(XX)
XX(XX)

XX(XX)
XX(XX)
* :

2004
XX(XX)
XX(XX)
XX(XX)

2005
XX(XX)
XX(XX)
XX(XX)

( : $, %)

2006
XX(XX)
XX(XX)
XX(XX)

( : $, %)

2006
XX(XX)
XX(XX)
XX(XX)

.
(1)

32 ( )
1 .
1. ~ 4. ()
5.

61)

C, L MSM6050 2004 XX
$XX $XX XX% MSM5100 2003 XX
$XX $XX XX% . B T
MSM5100 2003 XX XX $XX $XX XX%
.

. C
L MSM6050 MSM5100 C
.
()
.

- 79 -


5 ( )
~ ()
32( ) 1 5
1 .
1. ()
2.

1 5
.


.
1.~ 4. ()
5. ( 32 1 5 )
. ()
.
( 5 5 2) :
,
.

(2)
.


,
, ,
.
- 80 -

() 98%
98%
4 1 .
< 26>

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

37,169 48,000 68,504 71,929 74,167



12
152
988
576
0

37,181 48,152 69,492 72,505 74,167


99.97% 99.68% 98.58% 99.21% 100.00%
* : 4(B, A, C, D)

( : )

2007
73,572
0
73,572
100.00%

2008
84,660
518
85,178
99.39%

()
1)

. ,
. 150
200 .
CDMA2000

. CDMA2000 EoNex
XX (up-front fee) ,
X% .62)
62) EoNex (N1000) $2 XX
XX EoNex 370
.

- 81 -




.

.
2)
.
,
.

. ,
,

.
(3)
A ,


.
5 2 2


- 82 -


.
32 1 5
,

.
,

.
,
(
23 1 5 1 7. .) ,
5 2
2 .
,

.

.


. , ,

.

- 83 -

( )
.
,


, 100%
. ,
RF
,
.
(4)
,

.


.63)
,
.
()
1)
63)

2007. 11. 22. 20028626

- 84 -


,
.64)


,

.
)

,
,
.
1999 IS-95 , 11 VIA(
LSI Logic) KDDI VIA
. 2000 A
, 2000 3 .
2003 4 CDMA2000 1X ,
5 SKT, 10 KTF . VIA
2004 7 LGT, 9
4(, , , ), 12 Moviestar
. 2004 A
, B 2004
. Master Rebate . 2005 VIA
64)

2009. 7. 9. 200722078

- 85 -

,
Low-end Rebate .
< 16>


,
B A .
VIA
,

.
)

A B
. < 27>
- 86 -

, .
, A VIA, TI, EoNex
, EoNex
(2004. 10. 28. <Competition Update>), QCTK B
MSM60XX/6XX5 deal65) VIA
(2005. 4. 19. ), A VIA

(2005. 5. 4. ).
< 27>

Competition
Update ,
04.10.28. CDMA
TI, and Via A
Status QCT
Strategy

04.7.30

66)

05.3.26.

67)

05.4.1.

68)

65) Low-end Rebate


A VIA, TI, EoNex
,

A has an internal plan to design Via Based Phone, TI and
EoNex following Major Solution Provider
- QCT. QCT to hire key Engineers who are working at
EoNex and 3rd Party Design House.
- QCT to provide bundle pricing with RF CMOS/PM6610
- Volume counter and rebate program
VIA C VIA

It seemed that C will commercialize Via based phone
anyway in Jay 2005. I believe we need to try to minimize
their portion and maximize our presence for mentioned
market. Again, , need your counter proposal to make
it happen as you and I talked on the phone yesterday.
$X, $XX
,
VIA
We are talking $X off of the and $XX off of the
other players. This should be a significant event to hit the
handset ASPs and to significantly reduce the VIA threat.
VIA
Subject : VIA and Samsung ZIF RF Competition update

- 87 -

'05.4.19.

05.5.4.

05.5
05.5

As all of us become aware of the situation, the competition


from VIA Baseband and Samsung ZIF RFIC are getting
serious and now we can see the impact even in our market
numbers. now we have to take actions immediately
without any 2nd thoughts before it is too late.
B VIA

Regarding MSM60XX/60XX deal, please refer to the B's
feedback as attached. Basically, B is glad to be proposed
this price reduction but the concern is our ASP limit term. I
69)
understand the key background of our proposal against VIA

and the other low-end market competitors but as explained in


the attached feedback, B do not want to join this ultra
low-cost pricing war. I believe B's low-end volume based
on our MSM60XX/60XX can naturally defend/offend against
VIA and other low-end competitors in India/LATAM market
accordingly.
B VIA
, VIA

Now there is strong atmosphere inside B to consider
non-QCT solution for low-end volume maker. () As
we are all aware of, timing is very crucial to defend
against VIA in our low-end market. Considering SD

management input and concerns, following is my personal

opinion, which I think can be feasible to defend our


low-end solution against VIA in 2H05.
1. ()
2. Rebate price proposal would be as follows as SD
previously agreed
3. No Sales price limitation (like under $XX) but make
clause "No VIA adaptation" providing following rebate
for MSM60XX/60XX.
A Master (VIA)
incentive

Analysis

vs. VIA
T/F , 5 18
ACTION VIA

ITEMS
ASIA VIA pricing discussion still not closed / Need to close this
SALES /
week - Number one issue/threat at A - Create task force
MARKETING to block Via - - Closed - First meeting schedule for
- 88 -

SUMMIT

5/18/05
(B) Low-end Rebate , VIA

Sales
Monthly
05.5
Report Low-end strategic pricing deal (MSM60XX/60XX) was
mutually agreed and successfully defense VIA CBP 4.1 threat
VIA 1x

, VIA
. VIA

(OVERVIEW)
VIA activity in Korea started in 2H'04. So far VIA has
engaged with LGE, Curitel and Compal. Lately VIA is
promoting its new reference platform named TORNADO to
VIA
OEMs. QCT should make a counter-strategy immediately and
Competition
'05.10 update in Korea make it executed timely to protect 1x market which is still
volume zone.
/ Taiwan our(STRATEGY
DISCUSSION)
In the low-end space, the PRICE is the key.
- Are we prepared to go all the way with VIA in a price
war? VIA is in as life-or death mode.
- What is the "QCT premium" in the low-end? Very low to
nill...
Is VIA really worth all this headache? Is purchasing
VIA(before they gain more market share and market value) an
option worth pursuing again?

)


.
66)

(director)

67)
68) QCTK
69) QCTK

- 89 -

. , CDMA2000 ,
A XX%, B XX%,
. B
.
, (individualized threshold)

,
.70)

.

( )
.
,
.71)


.
70) EU
Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings( EU )
. An individualised threshold - one based on a percentage of the total requirements of the customer or an
individualised volume target - allows the dominant supplier to set the threshold at such a level as to make it
difficult for customers to switch suppliers, thereby creating a maximum loyalty enhancing effect.
71) EU
(incremental rebates)
(retroactive rebates) . EU . In general
terms, retroactive rebates may foreclose the market significantly, as they may make it less attractive for
customers to switch small amounts of demand to an alternative supplier, if this would lead to loss of the
retroactive rebates. The potential foreclosing effect of retroactive rebates is in principle strongest on the last
purchased unit of the product before the threshold is exceed.

- 90 -



.


.
,

.
)


.
, B A
.
,
VIA
,
.


- 91 -

. ,
,

.72)

.
CDMA2000 A B
(
) ,
.
CDMA , A
B
. A
Design Win A B
.73)
Low-end Rebate GSM
Low-end Rebate GSM
.
72) EU

, EU
Intel . Indeed, according to Hoffmann-La Roche, "an undertaking
which is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers - even if it does so at their request - by an
obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the said
undertaking, abuses its dominant position." This approach has been reinforced in Irish Sugar : "It is of little
importance in that respect to determine whether the applicant (the dominant company) or SDL took the initiative in
the product swap", and in BPB Industries : "The fact (...) that the promotional payments represented a response to
request and to the growing buyer power of the merchants does not, in any case, justify the inclusion in the
supply contracts (...) of an exclusivity clause. (* : EU ))
73) Some actions from umts #1 mtg (2005. 2. 8. ooo )
Job #1 : get A as a QCT customer to hurt P
Luis will drive this
If no design win at A (for H3G, DoCoMo, etc.) then OO says we will cut A off as customer and
focus on B.

- 92 -

, Low-end Rebate GSM


, VIA
. , < 27>
, 2005. 4. 19. XXX
Low-end Rebate
XXX VIA
. B
. B
Low-end Rebate VIA
74) .



.
, .


. ,


.75)
74) I understand the key background of our proposal against VIA and the other low-end market competitors but as
explained in the attached feedback, B do not want to join this ultra low-cost pricing war. I believe B's low-end
volume based on our MSM60XX/60XX can naturally defend/offend against VIA and other low-end competitors in
India/LATAM market accordingly.
75) EU
Intel EU . While price competition
constitutes the basic mechanics of a market, according to the Court, a dominant player cannot make unlimited use
of such pricing responses. The Court held that: "It follows from the nature of the obligations imposed by Article
82 EC that, in specific circumstances, undertakings in a dominant position may be deprived of the right to adopt a
course of conduct or take measures which are not in themselves abuses and which would even be unobjectionable
if adopted or taken by non-dominant undertakings. (...) Even if alignment of prices by a dominant undertaking on

- 93 -

,
, , .


.
,
.

.
, A
(2004 XX, 2005 XX, 2006 XX)
.

.
,

. , B
XX% XX% XX%
76) .
those of its competitors is not in itself abusive or objectionable, it might become so where it is aimed not only at
protecting its interests but also at strengthening and abusing its dominant position."
76) B ( : , $)

XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX

CDMA standard
XX%
XX%
XX%
XX%
0
0
0
0
4,500,000
5,000,000
5,500,000
6,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
6,500,000
7,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
7,500,000
8,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
8,500,000
9,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
9,000,000
10,000,000

- 94 -

XX% XX% , XX%


B
XX% .
, ,

.
.

,
.
)

.
, VIA
, .
,
.

,
,
.
2)
- 95 -

)
CDMA
. , ,
,
.
CDMA CDMA
,
. 2007
5,700 , 35,000
. R&D R&D 2005
$1,000,000,000 2007 $1,540,000,000 .
CDMA
, (application)
.

. ,
(assured base) .

.
,
. , ,

.

- 96 -

. ,
CEO Dual mode, CDMA+WCDMA TI
, TI resource
, TI CDMA
.



.
)

CDMA2000

. A 2000. 9. 1. 2004 7
, B 2004 Mater Rebate 2005
Low-end Rebate
.
A CDMA XX%
, CDMA2000
XX% .
, B Master Rebate , CDMA2000
XX% $XX , CDMA2000 WCDMA
XX% ,
- 97 -

XX% $XX, XX% $XX .77)


( WCDMA XX%, XX%, XX%
X%, X%, X% .)
B Low-end Rebate CDMA2000 XX%
.
A XX%
,
(2000 3 2004 2)
$XX$XX , (2004 3 )
$XX$XX . B XX%
, XX%
, X%
.

,

.
. ,

.
,

.
.

, .
77)

- 98 -

XX%
,
.78) A 2009. 7. 17. XX%, XX%,
XX%
.

.


.
< 28> A
IF/RF
. , IF/RF
.
XX% 79)
.

78) EU
. The
higher the rebate as a percentage of the total price and the higher the threshold, the greater the inducement
below the threshold and, therefore, the stronger the likely foreclosure of actual or potential competitors.
79) A CDMA XX%
.

- 99 -

< 28>


XXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXX

A
XX% *
Zero
-

IF RF
XX%
XX%
Zero
Zero
138,000
137,000
162,000
163,000
200,000
200,000
300,000
300,000
350,000
350,000
400,000
400,000
450,000
450,000
500,000
500,000

( : , $)

XX%
Zero
207,000
242,000
300,000
450,000
525,000
600,000
675,000
750,000

* XX%

A
. CDMA2000 X%
X% ( RF )
.
< 29> , B
, XX%
$XX
. , B XX% $XX
,

.

- 100 -

< 29>

XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX

( : , $)

CDMA standard
XX%
XX%
XX%
XX%
zero
zero
zero
zero
4,500,000
5,000,000
5,500,000
6,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
6,500,000
7,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
7,500,000
8,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
8,500,000
9,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
9,000,000
10,000,000

B , B
(2004 42006 4)
, < 29> XX%
.



. ,

.

.
,

.80)
80)

72)

- 101 -



.


.
. , CDMA2000
, A XX%, B XX%,
.
(individualised threshold)


.81)

i)
, , ,
,
.
CDMA 1989 CDMA
4
81) EU
. An individualised threshold - one based on a percentage of the
total requirements of the customer or an individualised volume target - allows the dominant supplier to set the
threshold at such a level as to make it difficult for customers to switch suppliers, thereby creating a maximum
loyalty enhancing effect.

- 102 -

. 1993 CDMA
, 1996 CDMA .

, ,
,

. , B A CDMA 1, 2

, .
CDMA2000 ,
CDMA2000 .
1x EVDO rel0, 1x EVDO relA
, < 17> value platform low-tier
. B A CDMA2000
1x EVDO rel0, 1x EVDO relA
.
< 17>
CDMA2000 (2005 10)

- 103 -

VIA 2005 VIA


MSM60XX, MSM60XX, MSM6050
, Value
Platform . Value Platform
.


.
,

.
CDMA2000


.
,

.
,

.82)
ii)
82) EU

,
. As with exclusive purchasing obligations, the likelihood of anti-competitive foreclosure is
higher where competitors are not able to compete on equal terms for the entire demand of each individual
customer. A conditional rebate granted by a dominant undertaking may enable it to use the 'non-contestable'
portion of the demand of each customer (that is to say, the amount that would be purchased by the customer
from the dominant undertaking in any event) as leverage to decrease the price to be paid for the 'contestable'
portion of demand (that is to say, the amount for which the customer may prefer and be able to find substitutes).

- 104 -

( )
. (requirement)

. ,

.
.
A (XX% ),
(XX ), RF (XX% )
, RF
. A
CDMA2000 CDMA2000 RF

.
B ,
. , CDMA
XX CDMA (CDMA2000, WCDMA)
XX% , CDMA XX%
. ,
2004. 9. 27. 2005. 9. 25. CDMA2000
XX% $XX .

, 2005. 7. 1. 12. 31.
CDMA2000 XX%
, MSM60XX MSM60XX
. B
- 105 -

, CDMA ,
CDMA2000 , CDMA2000
MSM60XXMSM60XX , B

,
.

,
.

.83)

.
,
.

85% 84) BAC
83) EU
Michelin II (2003)
Michelin , EC 82
. Furthermore, the quantity rebates formed part of a complex system of discounts, some of
which on the applicant's own admission constituted an abuse. The simultaneous application of various discount
systems - namely, the quantity rebates, the service bonus, the progress bonus. and the bonuses linked to the
PRO Agreement and the Michelin Friends Club - which were not obtained on invoice, made it impossible for the
dealer to calculate the exact purchase price of Michelin tyres at the time of purchase. That situation inevitably
put dealers in a position of uncertainty and dependence on the applicant.
84) ( : )

2006
8,062(50.2%)
3,476(21.6%)
2,925(18.2%)
1,604(10.0%)
16,067(100.0%)

2007
10,264(49.1%)
5,426(25.9%)
2,322(11.1%)
2,902(13.9%)
20,914(100.0%)

- 106 -

2008
7,160(51.5%)
3,600(25.9%)
1,960(14.1%)
1,180(8.5%)
13,900(100.0%)

85) (A B CDMA
1, 2 ),
.

A 2000 9
, B 2004 4 3
, 1 .86)
,

.

.

,
.

,


.
,

.
85)
C , RF
C .
86) 2008. 12. 31. B .

- 107 -

)
VIA A B
.
VIA
(Counter Advancement)
VIA .
A
A 2005 A
MSM60XX MSM60XX VIA
.
< 18>
Master incentive $XX, $XX, VIA
$XX, $XX .
, CDMA2000

5 . ,
$0.5 ,
$2.5
.

- 108 -

< 18>

< 19> A Low-tier VIA


Master incentive , Counter
Advancement Impact .

- 109 -

< 19>

( < 20>)
, ( ) VIA $XX
A VIA , A

.
A VIA
VIA A
"financial penalty" 87) .
< 18> < 19> ,
,

87) The key here is that A maybe able to go with small quantities to
, however, if they go to the multiple
millionsthen there is a financial penalty that makes VIA more expensive than QCT's. Not to mention quality,
performance, incremental test gear, opportunity cost of having multiple suppliers

- 110 -

.
< 20> A
* OO

From : OO [mailto:OO@OO.com]
Sent : OO
To : OO
Cc : OO
Subject : OOOOO
..()

,
(OO )
. , MSM60XX
MSM60XX XX VIA
.
,
MSM60XX 2005 4 XX, 2006 XX ,
.
2005 4 2006 1 A VIA

. MSM60XX
MSM60XX
. VIA MSM60XX
MSM60XX
. ,
MSM60XX 2005 4
, VIA
VIA .
- 111 -

2005 4
, 2005 4

.

,
.
,
,
(VIA)
.
B
B A
. < 21> 2005 B
MSM60XX MSM60XX VIA
. 160 270
, 160 Master incentive ,
VIA . , MSM60XX
$XX VIA $XX ,
.

- 112 -

< 21>

< 22> A VIA


Master incentive MSM
.
< 22>

- 113 -

, VIA 270
VIA . Master incentive
$X , $XX , A

. < 23> 2005
, VIA $XX
VIA $XX .

.
< 23>

< 24> 4 low-tier XX%


. 270 ,
low-tier MSM6050
VIA low-tier XX% .
- 114 -

CDMA2000 XX%
($XX) , low-tier XX%
.
VIA B .
< 24>

, B

.
)
CDMA2000

.
.
- 115 -


,
.
.
A B
X% , XX%
. XX%
.
, ,
.
,
$XX ,
$XX .
.
$XX $XX
.


.

,
.

,

- 116 -

. ,
, ,
R&D
.
)

VIA CDMA2000 1x EV-DC Rev.A. CBP 7
, CDMA2000 ,
.
, VIA CBP 7 2009 2

.
Design Win"

Design Win"

.
, CDMA ,
, ,

. ,

- 117 -

"Design Win"
.

BA
,
.
, CDMA B A
,
. C
RF
(4. . (4) ), C .
3)



( 2007.11.22. 20028626 ) .88)
, VIA


88)
EU Intel EU . the Courts do
not look into the actual impact of the alleged anticompetitive conduct on the market in the analysis undertaken in
cases like Microsoft or British Airways either, Indeed, even with regard to conduct that does not constitute
fidelity discounts within the meaning of the Hoffman La Roche case law the Community Courts have established
that "for the purpose of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the

abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned. It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate
that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition or, in other words,
that the conduct in question is capable of having or likely to have such an effect,"

- 118 -

.

.
()
1) 89)

, . , 2005 5
<Sales Monthly Report> , MSM60XX/60XX Low-end Rebate
VIA 90) . 1999
2002 B 2005
.

AB
.
) A
A 2000 ,
A . A
(2004 2, 1.3%)
.
A
( : $XX )
89)

46)

90) Successful MSM60XX/60XX low-end strategic pricing deal


- low-end strategic pricing deal (MSM60XX/60XX) was mutually agreed and successfully defense VIA CBP4.1
threat,

- 119 -

()( : X% )
,

.
A 91) A 92)
.

XX (RF
). A
,
.
A

.
,
A 2006 1
.
91)
A A
. A OO OOO 2009. 7. 17.
A . , A
.
. .
92) A CDMA2000 (: 1,000)

1
6,112
(100%)
0
(0%)

6,112

1
6,889
(97.63%)
167
(2.37%)

7,056

2003
2
3
4,332
5,877
(100%)
(100%)
0
0
(0%)
(0%)
4,332

5,877

2005
2
3
8,127
9,745
(99.44%)
(99.73%)
46
26
(0.56%)
(0.27%)
8,173

9,771

4
6,933
(100%)
0
(0%)

1
6,194
(100%)
0
(0%)

6,933

6,194

4
8,222
(98.18%)
152
(1.82%)

1
10,043
(100%)
0
(0%)

8,374

10,043

- 120 -

2004
2
3
6,791
6,246
(98.69%)
(94.38%)
90
372
(1.31%)
(5.62%)
6,881

6,618

2006
2
3
8,671
12,042
(100%)
(100%)
0
0
(0%)
(0%)
8,671

12,042

4
7,962
(96.XX%)
272
(3.XX%)
8,234

4
7,476
(100%)
0
(0%)
7,476

< 25>

) B
< 26> B
0% .

5.6% .

, B 2004 4
1.11%, 2005 1 1.25% 2005 2 0%
. B CDMA2000
93) ,
93) B

CDMA2000 (: 1,000)

1
5,813
(95.51%)
273
(4.49%)
6,086

2003
2
3
4,299
4,434
(98.47%)
(97.56%)
67
111
(1.53%)
(2.44%)
4,366
4,545

4
5,750
(97.01%)
177
(2.99%)
5,927

1
5,643
(94.38%)
336
(5.62%)
5,979

4
7,107
(100%)
0
(0%)
7,107

1
6,792
(100%)
0
(0%)
6,792

2005

1
8,443
(98.XX%)
107
(1.25%)
8,550

2
5,148
(100%)
0
(0%)
5,148

3
7,060
(100%)
0
(0%)
7,060

2004
2
3
9,151
9,384
(96.89%)
(99.23%)
294
73
(3.11%)
(0.77%)
9,445
9,457

4
6,958
(98.89%)
74
(1.11%)
6,627

2006

- 121 -

2
5,749
(100%)
0
(0%)
5,749

3
7,989
(100%)
0
(0%)
7,989

4
5,591
(100%)
0
(0%)
5,591

B 94) 2004 4
2005 1 B
100% .
95)
, B

. ,
,
100% .
< 26>

94) B

( : , $)

Q'ty()
MSM
Rebate

2004 4Q

2005 1Q

7,139,000
100%

8,420,600
100%

2005 2Q
7,102,709
100%

2005 3Q
8,093,650
100%

Q'ty()
CDMA2000
rebate

7,088,000
100%

7,813,400
100%

5,673,809
100%

6,250,050
100%

WCDMA
rebate

36,920,871

3.0%

95) the total number of CDMA digital baseband ASICs that are used in Subscriber Units sold by Buyer and its
Affiliates

- 122 -

2)
,
,
.
<Challenges for 2003 and beyond(2002. 12. 4.)> ,
,
5 .
96) .

, .
2005 3 <VIA Competition Update in Korea/Taiwan> ,
97)
. QCTK OO OOO 2004. 11. 24.
,
VIA MSM60XX
98) .99)
,
,
96) We have had come some serious quality issues in the last year.
Defects per million in MSMs is over XXX.
Many of our customers are unhappy with our quality. They suffer thru it because they don't have many other
options.
97)

37)

98) 2)
99) , VIA
. , , VIA

. ,
, VIA
.

- 123 -


.
,

.
3)
) - 100)
-
-

.
, -
101)
,
.
, -

. ,
,
100)
(Commercially Viable Share,
,
. CVS ) , CVS


101) -
(2009. 5. 11. Section 2 Report ), EU
(2009 6 ICN EU Intel ),

- 124 -

. , ,

.
102),
.
, .
, .
, , ,
,
.

.
-
,
.103)

-
, .
-
-
.
102)

103) EU
. This will require that sufficiently reliable data be available.
Where available, the Commission will use information on the costs of the dominant undertaking itself.

- 125 -

, ,
.

,
. ,
.
,
,
.
$XX
$XX, $XX, $X($X-$X-$X)
.
, 100%
.
.
CVS
.
)



. ,

,
.
- 126 -

,
. ,
() ,
.

.
)


.
, A
6 , , , R&D , roadmap, software
flexibility, size .
.
,
.

. , ,


. A .

.
,
.
- 127 -

,
.

,
.104)


105) .

<VIA Competition Update in Korea / Taiwan>
. , .
VIA ?
106) . ,
(In the low-end space, the PRICE is the key.)
(What is the "QCT premium"
in the low-end? Very low to nill.) .
, B 2007. 11. 20.

.
.
,
104) EU
Intel , Intel HP Intel Intel
5% Intel Intel , Intel
Intel HP
Furthermore, if indeed HP had had a strong
preference for Intel which would naturally have led it to purchase no more than 5% of its x86 CPU needs from
AMD, it is difficult to understand why it was necessary for Intel to put conditions on its rebates and to explicitly
remind HP of the fact that they were material conditions of the rebates.
105) 2), 97)
106) 37)

- 128 -

.
. .
)

. ,

, ,
, 4G
.
,
.107)
,
, ,
,

108), .
107) EU
Michelin
EU (Michelin
II(2003) ).
108) EU .
The Commission considers that a dominant undertaking may also justify conduct leading to foreclosure of
competitors on the ground of efficiencies that are sufficient to guarantee that no net harm to consumers is likely
to arise. In this context, the dominant undertaking will generally be expected to demonstrate, with a sufficient
degree of probability, and on the basis of verifiable evidence, that the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled:
- the efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct. They may, for example,
include technical improvements in the quality of goods, or a reduction in the cost of production or distribution,
- the conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies: there must be no less anti-competitive
alternatives to the conduct that are capable of producing the same efficiencies,
- the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative effects on competition and
consumer welfare in the affected markets,
- the conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or
potential competition. Rivalry between undertakings is an essential driver of economic efficiency, including
dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation. In its absence the dominant undertaking will lack adequate
incentives to continue to create and pass on efficiency gains. Where there is no residual competition and no
foreseeable threat of entry, the protection of rivalry and the competitive process outweighs possible efficiency
gains. In the Commission's view, exclusionary conduct which maintains, creates or strengthens a market

- 129 -

.


. 3. .
32 1 5 5 5 2 .
4. RF
.
(1)
RF
. A
CDMA2000 RF WCDMA RF ,
B C CDMA2000 RF .
(2) A
A RF

. RF
.109) , 2000
, 2004 7 ,
CDMA2000 RF WCDMA RF .
position approaching that of a monopoly can normally not be justified on the grounds that it also creates
efficiency gains.
109)

2009. 7. 15. .

- 130 -

,
IF/RFL/RFR/RFT
110), MSM 6xxx
MSM 7xxx RFL / RFR / RFT /
RTR 111).
(3) B
2005. B RF (Agreement for RF Units)
, 2005. 7. 1.2006. 6. 30. CDMA2000 RF RF
.
RF RFL , RFR , RFT ,
MSM
. , RFR LNA( RFL )
RFL RFL , MSM
LNA RFR .
RF .
RFL6000
RFL = MSM112) - (RFR
6120, 6122, 6125,6135)
6122, 6125, 6135)
RFR = (RFR 6000, 6120,
MSM
(RFT6100, 6120, 6122)
RFT =
MSM
110) For the purpose of clarification, the IF/RF ASIC Requirements shall be calculated separately for each IF ASIC
and RF ASIC such that A shall not be viewed as satisfying the IF/RF ASIC Purchase Commitment unless A meets
the XX% Point for each and every IF ASIC and RF ASIC that is used in Subscriber Units Sold by A and its
Affiliates over the subject Three Month Period and Purchase Year.
111) CDMA2000 Chipset Purchase Commitment and Chipset Rebate : For each calendar quarter during the
Commitment Period, Supplier shall provide a CDMA2000 Chipset rebate to A that is calculated based upon () (
) and () the lowest percentage obtained by dividing for each of Supplier's RF ASICs in each generation of
Supplier's 6xxx series or subsequent generation (e.g., 7xxx series) CDMA2000 MSMs (the "CDMA2000 RF ASICs")
( )

- 131 -

RF < 30>
RF .
< 30>

B RF

RFT < XX% or


RFT XX% and
RFT XX% and
RFT XX% and

RFR < XX% or


RFR XX% and
RFR XX% and
RFR XX% and

RFL < XX%


RFL XX%
RFL XX%
RFL XX%

RF
$XX
$XX
$XX

{("RF " ) - (RF )}


(RF ) . , RF RF
RF .
"RF " RFL6000, RFR6000, RFT6100 .
(4) C
2005. C (Agreement for subscriber units)
, 2005 3 2006 3113) CDMA2000 RF
.
C . , (i)RFR6000,
6120, 6125, (ii)RFL6000, (iii)RFT6100, 6120
< 31> , MSM(MSM 6050, 6100,
6500, 6550), RFT6100, RFL6000, RFR6000 .
< 31>

112)

C RF
XXXX
0

XXXX
$XX

XXXX
$XX

XXXX
$X

CDMA MSM, MSM60XX, 60XX, 6050, 6100, 6500, 6550

113) 2006 2, 2006 2 2006 3

- 132 -

.
(1)
RF
CDMA2000 RF (Rx, Tx, LNA, IF) .


.
() CDMA2000 RF GSMWCDMA RF

RF .

RF .
CDMA2000, GSM, WCDMA
CDMA2000, GSM, WCDMA RF
,
CDMA2000 GSM
WCDMA RF

CDMA2000, GSM, WCDMA
RF .
() CDMA2000 RF
- 133 -

Rx, Tx, LNA, IF RF


RF
.
RF
, RF .
(Rx), (Tx), LNA, IF
.114)
RF
. 2008 MSM60XX series
ZIF(zero-IF)
IF Rx Tx . , RF


.
RF (, A
2000 ) IF .
IF
.
(2)
RF .

114) RF

< 13> .

- 134 -


.
() CDMA2000 RF

CDMA2000 RF RF
.

. RF
,
3 .
CDMA2000 RF 115)
Skyworks Skyworks RF


.
() RF
RF
RF RF
.
RF
115) 2007

CDMA2000 RF (%) .

Skyworks

(%)

95

* : Forward Concept

- 135 -

RF
. RF

RF
.
.
(1)
l
32 ( )
1 .
1. ~ 4. ()
5.

.


5 ( )
~ ()
32( )1 5
1 .
1. ()
2.

1 5
.


.
- 136 -

1.~ 4. ()
5. ( 32 1 5 )
. ()
.
( 5 5 2) :
,
.

(2)
, CDMA2000 RF
.


,
, ,
.
() 70%
70%
4 1 .116)
< 32>

( : )

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008


75,705 106,142 136,836 160,670 152,763 114,496 97,955

116) CDMA2000 RF (Rx, Tx, LNA, IF)


CDMA2000 RF .
2005 Rx 97%, Tx 80%, LNA
97%
.

- 137 -

7,101 9,395 40,579 33,690 30,085 45,675 39,567

82,806 115,537 177,415 194,360 182,848 160,171 137,522


91.4% 91.9% 77.1% 82.7% 83.5% 71.5% 71.2%
* : (B, A, C, D)

()
1) RF
RF ,
. RF
RF
RF . RF
. , RF
Tx(RF ,
RFT ) .
CDMA2000 ,
CDMA2000 CDMA RF
. RF
MSM
.

.
RF RF RF
. RF

.

.
- 138 -

2)
.
,
.
RF . ,
RF ,

.
(3)
A ,


.
5 2 2



.
32 1 5
,

.
,
- 139 -


.
,
(
23 1 5 1 7. .) ,
5
2 2 .
,

.

.


. , ,

.

( )
.

,

,
100%
- 140 -

. ,
RF
,
.
(4)

.


117),
,
.
()
1)

,
118),
,

,

.
117) 2007. 11. 22.

20028626

118) 2009. 7. 9. 200722078

- 141 -

)


.
. , CDMA2000 RF , A
XX%
XX%, B RFTRFRRFL XX%, XX%,
XX%. C , (i)RFR6000, 6120, 6125, (ii)RFL6000,
(iii)RFT6100, 6120 ,
MSM(MSM 6050, 6100, 6500, 6550), RFT6100, RFL6000, RFR6000
C .
(individualised threshold)

, .

.

( )
.
,
.119)
119)

72)

- 142 -



.


.



. ,

.
)

BA RF
. < 33>
, .
RF RFT6100
RF
(2005 3 Sales Monthly Report), C RF
(2005. 3. 31.
Samsung ZIF Competition Update).
- 143 -

< 33>

Monthly
05.3 SalesReport

Samsung ZIF
'05.3.31. Competition
Update

'05.4

RF( RFT6100 ) ,
RF

Samsung ZIF attach rate


- serious ZIF RF threat continues, especially on RFT6100
- MSM discount deal for a certain RF attach rate threshold
percentage is a possible idea to win back our socket.
C OEM RF

C B 2005 4
, C
RF

- RF
(* : C
)

Also Samsung LSI has made design-wins in other OEMs. So
far Curitel, UTStarcom got in the list,
Actions taken by sales team
- Drove C to commit no more development start with
Samsung RF from Apr '05. C R&D procurement team
committed verbally
Actual MSM/RF bundle deal should be seriously considered
ASAP particularly for RFT.
- RF attach rate based incentives rebate structure for B?
- New pricing structure : keep MSM price up while going to
rock-bottom RF rebate?
(2005. 4. 9.)
: give the same money but tie it to something they need from
us namely the msm may work in some cases here issue is
to block on several msm's
RF

B
As all of us become aware of the situation, the competition
from VIA baseband and Samsung ZIF RFIC are getting
serious and now we can see the impact even in our market
numbers
- 144 -

'05.5

Samsung
ZIF RF

Skyworks
RF threat &
05.8.12. Master
Incentive
Impact in A

QCT Strategic
Plan
05.8.25. 20062008
: ZIF
Competition
Update

We are compiling list and priorities of models to target for


getting back the RF sockets. I also agree that any deal we
decide to propose to B, tieing it to a MSM discount would
get the most bang out of our bucks.
RF

2005 4 RF

Flat price can NOT compensate price gap of SS Semi in
2H05
Practically 2Q/3Q model switch over can't be possible and
it's high time to make a deal to win back RF socket from
early 4Q05 and after.
Skyworks A Master
Rebate : XX
vs

Skyworks RF threat & Master incentive impact in A
- CDMA : CY06 82.6% attach rate estimation, CY07
significant impact
- $XX potential loss in master incentive vs. A's market
share increase/brand image up thru small/slim?
B FCI ,
RF
Skyworks A

< B : B LSI and FCI Competition >
FCI ZIF RFICs
- FCI, Pre-IPO in Korea is promoting its ZIF RFICs which
can be interfaced with our MSM6XXX : B is developing
some models with FCI RFICs, FC7510 and 7530
Measures to win back QCT ZIF sockets at B
- Maximize ZIF RF win-back deal as of Q4CY05
- Time to consider aggressive pricing for RFCMOS against
FCI/SS Semi.
< A : Skyworks MCM Competition >
We must make working counter plans ASAP
- Short term : reviewing plausible price factor to brake the
first launch, rebate program for attach rate.
- 145 -

)

RF
.
,

.
, B A
,
.

. RF

.
,
.120)



RF

.
,
120)

73)

- 146 -

B
. , RF , RF
121)(2005 3 <Sales Monthly
Report>)", "C 2005 4
122)(2005. 3. 31. <Samsung ZIF Competition Update>)", "
RF , B
123)(2005 4 )
.
2)
)

CDMA RF

. A 2000. ( ) 2004 7
( ) , B 2005 RF
, C 2005
. .
A CDMA2000 RF XX%
121) B ZIF attach rate
- serious ZIF RF threat continues, especially on RFT6100
- MSM discount deal for a certain RF attach rate threshold percentage is a possible idea to win back our
socket
122) Actions taken by sales team
- Drove C to commit no more development start with Samsung RF from Apr. '05 C R&D procurement team
committed verbally.
123) As all of us become aware of the situation, the competition from VIA baseband and Samsung ZIF RFIC are
getting serious and now we can see the impact even in our market numbers. We are compiling list and priorities
of models to target for getting back the RF sockets. I also agree that any deal we decide to propose to B, tieing
it to a MSM discount would get the most bang out of our bucks.

- 147 -

, CDMA2000 RF
XX%, XX%, XX% . B
CDMA2000 RF XX% ,
XX%, XX% .124)
RF XX%
, A
$XX , $XX .125)
C A B
C
,
.
< 34> C
, 2005 3 C
XX . CDMA2000 RF CDMA2000
CDMA2000 , C
C RF . RF
XX RF
.
< 34>
MSM6050
MSM6100
MSM6500
MSM6550

C RF
3
XXXX
XXX
XXX
XXXX

* : C
124)

2004

4
XXXX
XXX
XXX
XXXX

, RFT XX%, XX%, XX%

125) : 2000 3 2004 2


: 2004 3

- 148 -

1
XXXX
XXX
XXX
XXXX

2005

( : )

2
XXXX
XXX
XXX
XXXX

* C


RF

. ,

.
,

.
.
,
.

.

( )
.
,
.126)


.
126)

72)

- 149 -



.
.
A , RF
(IF/RFL/RFR/RFT)
. RF XX%, XX%, XX%
RF .
B , RFTRFRRFL
. , B
RFT (XX%,
XX%, XX%), RFRRFL
(XX%, XX%, XX%).
4. . (3) () 2) ) , C
C
.

,
.

i) RF
- 150 -


RF , RF
. '
RF ' RF
RF
RF . ,
RF 20% RF
.
A RF
. RF
RF
.
RF , RF
.
RF
, < 35>
.
, RF RF

RF .
RF
.
< 35>

RF

Monthly RF MSM
05. 3 SalesReport
RF
- 151 -

'05. 3. 31.

'05. 7

05. 8. 25.

05. 10


MSM discount deal for a certain RF attach rate threshold
percentage is a possible idea to win back our socket.
RF attach rate win-back deal
C 2005 4
, C
- ( ) MSM6050 $XX

MSM RF( RFT)

- B RF

MSM RF
Samsung ZIF -Actions
by sales team
Competition - Drove taken
C to commit no more development start with
Update
Samsung RF from Apr '05. C R&D procurement team
committed verbally.
- Will send commitment letter soon to get an agreement
from C with $.XX discount allowance on MSM6050.
Actual MSM/RF bundle deal should be seriously considered
ASAP particularly for RFT.
- RF attach rate based incentives rebate structure for B?
- New pricing structure : keep MSM price up while going
to rock-bottom RF price?
RF MSM
Sales Monthly

Report MSM rebate


deal to win back QCT ZIF RF sockets
MSM RF( RFT)

- RF
QCT Strategic - MSM RF
Plan Actual MSM/RF bundle deal should be seriously considered
2006-2008
ASAP particularly for RFT.
- RF attach rate based incentives rebate structure
- New pricing structure : keep MSM price up while going
to rock-bottom RF price?
B MSM6050/6500 ,
RFT6100 B 2005
RFT6100 210
Sales Monthly B12
sign off MSM6050/6500 rebate Agreement(11/2)
Report
- Korea office tied this deal with RFT6100 backlog acceptance
(XX) and B agreed to receive XX Mu of RFT6100 backlog
within DecCY05.
- 152 -

ii) RFL, RFR, RFT


RF
RFL, RFR, RFT . ,
RF

. RFT
. RFT
127) .
A ,
IF/RFL/RFR/RFT ,
MSM6xxx
, MSM7xxx RFL/RFR/RFT/RTR
.
B , RFT , RFR , RFL
AND
.
C , (i)RFR6000, 6120, 6125, (ii)RFL6000,
(iii)RFT6100, 6120
, MSM(MSM 6050, 6100, 6500, 6550), RFT6100, RFL6000, RFR6000
. C
RFT, RFR, RFL RF
127) 2005 3 <Sales Monthly Report> : serious ZIF RF threat continues, especially on RFT6100
2005. 3. 31. <Samsung ZIF Competition Update> : Last year's allocation situation opened the wide door to
Samsung ZIF and attached rate of QCT RF, particularly RFT6100 is getting drastically reduced at B.
2005. 8. 25. <QCT Strategic plan 2006-2008> : Beginning with a dual-band Tx ZIF RFIC, B is launching ZIF
RFIC pin-to-pin compatible with QCT versions. / Last year's allocation opened the door wide to Samsung ZIF
and the attached rate of QCT RF is decreased drastically (particularly RFT6100).

- 153 -

.
RF ,
. RF RF
RF
, RF
. , RF Tx(
RFT ) .
RFT
RFL, RFR, RFT RF
RF RFT .
, B , RFL6000, RFR6000, RFT6100
$XX 128), RFL, RFR, RFT
$XX $XX .
RFL, RFR, RFT , RFL6000
RFR6000RFT6100 ( 'RF '
) .
$XX
, RF $XX
. , , $XX
.
,

.
128)
Sliding , Credit Memo ,
$XX .

- 154 -

)
A Skyworks RF (Master
incentive) A
.
< 27> , A Skyworks RF
, 2006 4
XX%
. A Skyworks RF
$XX .
< 27> ASkyworks RF

)
RF

- 155 -

RF
.
,
RF
, RF RF
RF .
, RF
. RF
129) . RF
RF
. RF (Tx), (Rx), (LNA),
(IF) , RF
, RF
.
B RF RFT RFRRFL
130) , A RF
RFTRFLRFRIF
, RF
. RF RFT
131) , RFT
.
129) CDMA2000

Skyworks
VIA
EoNex
*

RF (2007)

98%
2%
0.5%

RF
95%
5%
-

: Forward Concept

130) B RF
131) , "serious ZIFF RF threat continues, especially on RFT6100(2005 3 <Sales Monthly Report>)" .

- 156 -



RF 1
RF
.
, RF CDMA
,
RF .

.
3)
RF


.
()
1)
) B
20042005 RF
RF . ,
RF ,
.
- 157 -

2005 3 <Sales Monthly Report> , "2004


RF RFT6100 ,

"132) . 2005. 3. 31. <Samsung ZIF
Competition Update> , "2004
RF , B RF
RFT6100 . C RF
, FCI RF B FCI RF
"133) . 2005. 4. 1.
" VIA RF
134)
. 2005 5 <Samsung ZIF RF> , 2005 RFLRFR
, RFT
RFRRFL 135) .
B RF
B RF B RF
.
132) Serious ZIF RF threat continues, especially on RFT6100
Key factor of attach rate issues
- severe allocation opened the door for competition all through 2004
- staple electrical performance of Samsung ZIF comparable QCT ZIF
- price delta $XX and it expects $XX in early 3Q05
133) Last year's allocation situation opened the wide door to Samsung ZIF and attached rate of QCT RF,
particularly RFT6100 is getting drastically reduced at B.
Current price comparison at B
device
RFT
RFL
RFR
Total

QCT
XX
XX
XX
XX

B
XX
XX
XX
XX

Price Delta
XX
XX
XX
XX

C decided to review Samsung ZIF while the severe allocation was continuing in Q404
C considers Samsung ZIF for both running and new models : currently shipping 90K/Month
Lately, FCI, Pre-IPO in Korea is promoting its ZIFF RFICs which can be interfaced with our MSM6xxx : B is
developing some models with FCI RFICs.
134) As all of us become aware of the situation, the competition from VIA baseband and Samsung ZIF RFIC are
getting serious and now we can see the impact even in our market numbers.
135) RFL/RFR attach rate will be decreased continuously in 2H05 (Now it's not only RFT win-back issue but also
RFR/RFL defense issue in 2H05)

- 158 -

B . 2005 3 <Sales
Monthly Report> , B RF

, B
136) . 2005. 3. 31. <Samsung ZIF Competition Update>
MSM RF( RFT)
, B RF MSM
RF 137) . 2005 5
<Sales Monthly Report> , Low-end Rebate
, B RF (threshold) B
R&D B RF 138)
.
RF
B RF . B

. .
2005 7 <Sales Monthly Report> , B
, B RF
RF ( RF) RFT6100 139)
136) MSM discount deal for a certain RF attach rate threshold percentage is a possible idea to win back our socket.
Discussion continues with SD for the financial analysis for the possible rebate structure to start negotiation with
B.
137)

How to win back and further actions to take


actual MSM/RF bundle deal should be seriously considered ASAP particularly for RFT.
- RF Attach rate based incentives rebate structure for B?
- New pricing structure : keep MSM price up while going to rock-bottom RF price?

138) successful MSM60XX/60XX low-end strategic pricing deal


- low-end strategic pricing deal (MSM60XX/60XX) was mutually agreed ( )
MSM rebate deal to win back QCT ZIF RF sockers
- B approved their internal report of XX% RFT XX% RFR/RFL plan in 4Q05 and their working level of R&D
and procurement are trying to change B RF to ours for W.
139) MSM rebate deal to win back QCT ZIF RF sockets
- RF flat pricing was finalized as : $XX / $XX / $XX per specific attach rate of RFT/RFR/RFL
- RF Conversion from Samsung Semi to QCT is under way.

- 159 -

. 2005 8 <Sales Monthly Report> , B 2005 12


RFT6100 210 , B 2005 4
1(RFT XX%, RFL RFR XX% )
140) .
2006 2 B
RF . , 2006.
2. 6. <Competition Status at B> , B RF
B RF 1
141) . 2006 2 <Sales
Monthly Report> , B 1
RF 142) .
, RF ,
,
,

.143)
MSM rebate deal to win back QCT ZIF RF sockets
- Samsung changed two major volume models from SS Semi to RFT6100 based on draft ZIF agreement deal
140) MSM rebate deal to win back QCT ZIF RF sockets
- B gave RF6100 XXM forecast on DecCY05 so we expect B can reach step1(RFT XX%, RFL/RFR XX%) on
Q4CY05.
141) We have very good lessons learned
- Achieved step1 quad-band RF attach rate (XX% RFT / XX% RFL, RFR) through rebate deal
142) We are winning back quad-band RF ZIFF sockets through rebate deal
- Achieved step1 quad-band RF attache rate (XX% RFT / XX% RFL, RFR)
143)
B 1 , B RF
. , B , RF 2005 3~2006
2 RFT (XX%) 2005 4
.
. RF
, RFR . (B RFT
(XX%) .) < 34> B
.

- 160 -

B
. , B
.
< 28>

) C
, FCI RF
RF . B
C RF
.
C . 2005. 3. 31. <Samsung
ZIF Competition Update> , C RF
, C 2005 4 RF
C .
C MSM6050 $XX , C
RF
144) . <C
- 161 -

RF Win-back Plan> 4 RF
C 145) .
C
RF ,
.
, 2005 7 <Sales Monthly Report> , C
C RF
, C
RF
146) . 2005. 8. 25. <QCT Strategic Plan 20062008>
, RF 2006 1 C
RF XX% 147) .
2005 10 <Strategy Session> C 2005
RF 148) .
144) C decided to review Samsung ZIF while the severe allocation was continuing in Q404.
C considers Samsung ZIF for both running and new models : currently shipping XXK/Month
Actions taken by sales team
- Drove C to commit no more development start with Samsung RF from Apr '05. C R&D procurement tema
committed verbally.
- Will send commitment letter soon to get an agreement from C with $.XX discount allowance on MSM60XX.
- However, C cannot help maintaining Samsung ZIF RF on the current models because of their committed
handset schedule.
145) Closely working with C procurement team to convert Q4 launch models to our ZIF
146) ZIF RF attach rate move
- RF rebate agreement works for defending Samsung RF's additional engagement in C model line-up
- C procurement team actively guided R&D team to use QCT ZIF to get RF rebate
147) ZIF RF attach rate move
- SEC ZIF based N. America model's low demand increased QCT ZIF attach rate by 13% in Q3/05 comparing to
previous qtr
- Maintain close to XX% RF attach rate from Q1/06 as EOL of major SEC ZIF based N. America models by
Dec05.

SEC Attach Rate


QCT Attach Rate

Q1
4.5%
95.5%

Q2
26.1%
73.9%

Q3
12.9%
87.1%

Q4
19.2%
80.8%

CY2005
15.5%
84.5%

Q1
12.3%
87.7%

Q2
12.4%
87.7%

148) SEC's RF threat


- Successfully defended against SEC RF penetration in 2H/05 - RF rebate to apply from Q3/05

- 162 -

1H/06
12.3%
87.7%

< 29> C
.
, C
.
< 29> C

) A
2004 A RF
RF bare die
. A
Skyworks RF MCM(Multi Chip Module) .149)
A SkyworksFCI RF
, 2005 3 <Samsung ZIF
Competition Update> . , RF
Skyworks FCI .
B FCI RF A Skyworks RF
149) In the early 2004, A requested QCT to provide bare RF dies so in order to develop RF MCM but QCT was not
ready to support bare die business. Since then, A has worked with Skyworks to develop front-end MCMs.( QCT
Strategic Plan 2006-2008, 2005. 8. 25.)

- 163 -

MCM 150) .
Skyworks RF .
2005. 8. 25. <QCT Strategic Plan 2006-2008> A : Skyworks MCM
Competition , Skyworks MCM
, RF
Skyworks
151) .
A Skyworks MCM RF
(Master incentive) ,
Skyworks RF . < 30> , A
Skyworks MCM
.

150) Last year's allocation situation opened the wide door to Samsung ZIF and attached rate of QCT RF,
particularly RFT6100 is getting drastically reduced at B.
Other ZIF competitors are emerging in the market as well followed by Samsung.
- Skyworks is working with A to commercialize ZIF RF MCM.
- FCI, Korean pre-IPO promotes its ZIF RFICs to OEMs.
Lately, FCI, Pre-IPO in Korea is promoting its ZIF RFICs which can be interfaced with our MSM6XXX : B is
developing some models with FCI RFICs.
A and Skyworks are working closely together on ZIF RF MCM with Skyworks RF dies.
151)

Short term
Sales : reviewing plausible price factor to brake the first launch, rebate program for attach rate
- Actually hard to stop the 1st launch of Skyworks MCM in Domestic market but we need to try to can
minimize the share with smart pricing negotiation
Mid Term
Dual-band MCM development collaboration with A
- Must make a TF team to co-develop with A ASAP and must stop dual-band Skyworks MCM with which
they target NA market
Long Term
Timely launch of single-die RFIC : RTR6500, RTR6280
Re-consider direct bare-die business again, if customers strongly request it.

- 164 -

< 30>

2006 Commodity 1 (A )

< 31> , A
Skyworks $6,100,000
.
(Skyworks)
.
< 31>

2006 Commodity 2 (A )

- 165 -

A FCI
, A RF
FCI
FCI . .
< 32> , A FCI FC7510 RF
20% , 2006 8
6,737,000 .
< 32>

FCI 1 (A )

, < 33> , FC7510


(Master incentive) 100%
(). , Master incentive
5% FCI Skyworks
Master incentive
().
.
- 166 -

, FCI RF
RFL6000
(). ,
RFLRFRRFT
.
, A FCI
().
.
< 33>

FCI 2 (A )

A

. < 34> .
- 167 -

< 34>

2)
,

.
2005 5 RF
<SAMSUNG ZIF RF> () RFR/RFL ()
RFL FCI 152) , 2005 8 <Sales
Monthly Report> B R&D RFT6100

153) . 2005 10 <Strategy Session>
Samsung ZIF Competition Update
.
152) RFR/RFL compatible SS chip was qualified and RFL of FCI was qualified too.
153) B R&D engineer complained power variation & cost add-up of RFT6100 against competitors so they may
request improvement of it.

- 168 -

RF RF
.154)
, RFT6122
FCI FC7412 . RFT6122 FC7412
. FCI
B FCI
2 . FCI
(HDET155) Circuits) , RF
. RFT
RFT6100 . B
RFT . RFT
156). .
A Skyworks RF
,
Skyworks MCM
Skyworks
.
, RF
.
154)

Reasons why we are losing


Severe allocation open the door for competitors all through 2004
Price delta
Too frequent PCNs by QCT requiring multiple qualifications
Stable electrical performance of Samsung ZIF comparable QCT ZIF

155) HDET(High power DETector) :


,
156) The attached file is the comparison spec between our RFT6122 and FCI's FC7412. You can find our RFT6122 will
have more power variation than FCIs. As you know, it will be worse in cold temperature. Also I heard from Samsung guy
that the power variation of RFT was almost 2 times of FCI. One more serious issue is the HDET circuits. Our RFTs must
use HDET circuits, even though other company's RFTs such as B Semi and FCI not required the HDET circuits. It affected
the total material cost and needed more PCB space. These two differences are almost same in other RFT chips specially
RFT6100. It's very difficult to convince B and other customers to use our RFT chip. We should improve the power variation
of RFT and consider of elimination the HDET circuits.

- 169 -

3)
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,
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RFT
, RFT6100 . B
157)

157)

- 170 -

RFT (These two


differences are almost same in other RFT chips specially RFT6100. It's very difficult to convince
B and other customers to use our RFT chip.) ,
RFT6100 RFT
.
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RF

RF . 4. .
32 1 5 5 5 2 .
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2004 , CDMA
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(Invalid or Expired Patents) XX%
.158) (Amendment)
158) INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUBSCRIBER UNIT LICENSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT(
1993 )
5.5. Invalid or Expired Patents. The obligation for LICENSEE to pay royalties to QUALCOMM under Section 5.2
shall be reduced by fifty percent(XX%) of the applicable royalty rate in the event all patents which are licensed
hereunder by QUALCOMM and used by LICENSEE have expired or are invalid. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is
a copy of the relevant patents issued. QUALCOMM will from time to time promptly update this Exhibit by
delivering written notice to LICENSEE.

- 171 -


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- 173 -

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- 176 -


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(Provisions imposing royalty payments even after Qualcomm's
patents have expired) , Qualcomm's
Reply to Complaint' 2001
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above shall terminate in the event that all patents which are licensed hereunder by QUALCOMM and used by
LICENSEE expire or are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid

- 177 -

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- 186 -

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- 188 -