NON-ARISTOTELIAN FOUNDATIONS: SOLID OR FLUID? STUART A. MAYPER * ERIOUS CRITICISM has been made of weaknesses in the theoretic foundations of general-semantics.1_ Philosophers of language, out of a modern logico-empirical but staunchly aristotelian orientation, assert that Korzybski’s non-aristotelian assumptions involve “logical incoherence” and “vicious circles.” If this criticism can be sustained, then whatever benefits are claimed for general-semantics may be dismissed as due to pure chance or the appeal of novelty, to become less and less de- pendable as the quarter-century-old novelty wears thin. The first question that confronts us is that of the standards by which this charge of logical incoherence shall be examined. We could take the position that theoretical arguments are futile, and rest our case on empirical testing, as Anatol Rapo- port did in one special application: The question of the applicability of general semantic methods to psychotherapy cannot be resolved at this time on theoretical grounds. Not enough is known. . . ; The value of any method will be established not by argument but in practice . . . Only when reasonably objective cti- * Associate professor of chemistry, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Conn. Professor Mayper’s last contribution to ETC., “The Zen Koan and the Lapidus Principle,” appeared in the September 1960 issue. 1] have asked the editors to retain the hyphen, even though it is not ETC.’s usual style, It is my own extensional device for empha- sizing that general-semantics involves itself in generalizations beyond language, and is something more than just the nonspecific aspects of linguistic, philosophical, or “mere” semantics. 427ETC.: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS VOL. XVII, NO. 4 teria of mental health are established and controlled comparison of methods becomes .. . common .. . will it be worthwhile to argue the relative merits of various methods and to seek their theoretical justification.2 This might be taken to apply equally well to applications of genetal-semantics to education, group discussion, law, or liter- aty criticism. But where a question of fundamental logical weakness has been raised, it cannot be evaded. We can tolerate gaps in our theoretical structure, but the mere suspicion that it contains inconsistencies must have a powerful dampening effect on our zeal in applying it to problems, and on the willingness of others with borderline faith in it to get involved in such an untespectable field. In addition, we will be discouraged from the essential task set forth in the sharp words of Joshua A. Fishman: Now would seem to be the time for general semantics to sum up, map new campaigns .. . Which of the orig- inal commandments has been tested, refined, altered, abandoned, or supplemented by general semanticists since Korzybski? . . . Is general semantics in any way concerned with testing the validity of its hypotheses? 8 To make further application and theorizing possible, we must face up to these criticisms. If anything is capable of being settled by argument, a matter of logical coherence ought to be; logic is a discipline much more rigorous and productive of definite answers than is psychotherapy. Y= we should not make the mistake of examining these criticisms solely in a framework of aristotelian logic; that would be begging the question. Edmund N. Todd, in an article which introduced the helpful ideas of “flat, horizontal’’ logical relationships and “vertical” ideas of multiordinality, warned: 2"Reply to Norman Locke,” ETC., XV (1957), 37. S Review of Language, Meaning, and Maturity, in ETC., XU¥ (1956), 225. 428FEBRUARY 1962 NON-ARISTOTELIAN FOUNDATIONS It is easy now to see why an analysis of general se- mantics, or a presentation of it, in terms of a “flat” propo- sitional system must inevitably invite criticisms. For at the very least this must result in a radically over-simplified view. More frequently, however, it results in fundamental ambiguities and distortions because of the “‘flattening” inherent in the usual forms of conventional discourse. It is indeed unfortunate that considerations of style and general acceptability penalize non-aristotelian writing. Yet, unless writers on general semantics make every effort to work with and explain the full dimensionality of the discipline, they invite ridicule or at least run the risk of not being taken seriously. . . . I seriously doubt that Korzybski’s formulations can be presented in conventional “flat” logical terms without producing the appearance of some degree of triviality or nonsense.* Fishman was a little more acid: “The issue seems to be whether members of the fraternity should be expected to apply to their own conduct those same rules which they commend to the attention of the uninitiated.” The criticisms, then, had better be examined in a non- aristotelian framework, which is taken as an assumption to be tested. When they are considered in this light, in a not purely logical but a logico-empirical-intuitive way, then if they are found to lead to inconsistencies which interfere with the use of either general-semantic principles or of the strict logic itself (where its use is applicable), doubt will be cast on our assumption. This won't “prove” that the aristotelian orienta- tion is “right,” of course, but it will mean that something is very wrong with ours, The most recent forceful exposition of these alleged weaknesses is the article by Francesco Barone, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Pisa.5 In it he tries to deal with theoretical aspects of general-semantics sepa- 4“Is General Semantics ‘Logical’?” ETC., XI (1954), 125-129. 5“La semantica generale,” in Semantica (1955, No. 3) of Archivio di Filosofia (Rome). I shall quote from the translation by Walter E. Stuermann, ETC., XV (1958), 255-266. 429