Académique Documents
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Legal Issues
Pricing Policies
Discounts
Product Policies
Exclusive Dealing
Pricing Policies
Prices and price levels can be influenced in many ways throughout marketing channels. In fact, we have just finished discussing two of them market coverage and customer coverage. Because these policies are both aimed at reducing or restraining the amount of intra-brand competition, the indirect effect of the reduction is, in theory, supposed to be an increase in the price of the brand from its level in the absence of the policies.
In other words, restrictions on intra-brand competition are indirectly supposed to result in higher prices and, thus, higher gross margins. Obviously, price competition induced by inter-brand competitors can upset this arrangement. Two policies that have a direct effect on price - price maintenance and price discrimination. We separate the discussion of the two because they have very different motivation, implementation, and anti-competitive concerns.
Price Maintenance
Price maintenance in marketing channels is the specification by suppliers, typically producers, of the prices below or above which other channel members, typically wholesalers and retailers, may not resell their value offers. Thus, the policy is frequently called resale price maintenance (RPM).
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Price Maintenance
RPM inhibits competition between stores carrying the same brand. If a producer deems service to be essential, it can be required of all retailers through dealership contracts, rather than through minimum RPM. Despite these arguments, setting minimum resale prices remains a legal activity as long as it is not done as part of a concerted effort among multiple parties.
Legal control over resale prices by producers is possible under various conditions: Act unilaterally; statements and actions should come only from the producer. Avoid coercion; don't use annually renewable contracts conditioned on dealer adherence to producer's specified resale price. Vertically integrate; form a corporate vertical marketing system. Avoid known discounters; establish screening and performance criteria difficult for discounters to meet.
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It is generally held to be unlawful for a person or organisation in commerce knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price. To violate this concept, buyers must be reasonably aware of the illegality of the prices they have received. This section prevents large, powerful channel members from compelling sellers to give them discriminatory lower prices. It would be enforced on the grounds that this use of coercive power is an unfair method of competition.
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Functional Discounts.
In the discussion of channel flows previously, the Equity Principle was introduced. That principle involves the use of reward power in granting discounts to individual channel members based on the functions, or marketing flows, they perform as they divide distribution labour. A functional discount is a means of implementing the Equity Principle directly. It provides for a set of list prices at which value offers are transferred from the producer to a downstream channel member, plus a list of discounts off list price to be offered in return for the performance of certain channel flows or functions.
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Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing is the requirement by a seller that its channel intermediaries sell or lease only its value offers or brands, or at least no value offers or brands in direct competition with the seller's value offers. If intermediaries do not comply, the seller may invoke negative sanctions by refusing to deal with them. Such arrangements clearly reduce the freedom of choice of the intermediaries (resellers). Some of the managerial benefits of exclusive dealing follow: Resellers become more dependent on the supplier, enabling it to secure exclusive benefit of the reseller's energies. Competitors are stopped from selling through valuable resellers.
With a long-term exclusive relationship, sales forecasting may he easier, permitting the supplier to achieve more precise and efficient production and logistics.
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Exclusive Dealing
Resellers may obtain more stable prices and may gain more regular and frequent deliveries of the supplier's value offers. Transactions between resellers and the supplier may be fewer in number and larger in volume.
Resellers and the supplier may be able to reduce administrative costs. Both may be able to secure specialized assets and long-term financing from each other.
Resellers generally receive added promotional and other support as well as avoid the added inventory costs that go with carrying multiple brands. Requirements contracts are variants of exclusive dealing.
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Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing lessens inter-brand competition directly, because competing brands available from other suppliers are excluded from outlets. To be illegal, such arrangements must have a tendency to work a substantial, not merely remote, lessening of competition in the relevant competitive market. "Substantiality" may be determined by taking into account the following factors: The relative strength of the parties involved The proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area The probable immediate and future effects that preemption of that share of the market might have on effective competition within it The duration of the contracts The likelihood of collusion in the industry and the degree to which other firms in the market also employ exclusive dealing The height of entry barriers The nature of the distribution system and distribution alternatives remaining available after exclusive dealing is taken into account
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Tying
Tying exists when a seller of a value offer that buyers want (the "tying value offer -product") refuses to sell it unless a second ("tied") value offer (goods and services) is also purchased, or at least is not purchased from anyone other than the seller. Thus, a producer of motion picture projectors (the tying value offer) might insist that only its film (the tied value offer) be used with the projectors, or a producer of shoe machinery (the tying product or value offer) might insist that lessees of the machinery purchase service contracts (tied service) from it for the proper maintenance of the machinery. Many of the business reasons for using tying policies are similar to those for using exclusive dealing.
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Reasons for tying, beyond those that apply from the discussion of exclusive dealing, are:
Transferring the market demand already established for the tying value offer (e.g., can closing machines) to the tied value offer (e.g., cans). Using the tied value offer (paper) to meter usage of the tying value offer (copying machines). Using a low-margin tying value offer (razors) to sell a high-margin tied value offer (blades). Achieving cost savings via package sales. For example, the costs of supplying and servicing channel members might be lower, the greater the number of value offers included in the "package." Assuring the successful operation of the tying value offer (an automobile) by obliging dealers to purchase tied value offers (repair parts) from the supplier. 22
Tying
A tying agreement in effect stops competing sellers from the opportunity of selling the tied commodity or service to the purchaser. Indeed, like exclusive dealing policies, the critical issue in the condemnation of tying is the foreclosing of inter-brand competition from a marketplace. But tying contracts are viewed much more negatively by the courts than are exclusive dealing arrangements or requirements contracts. However, certain types of tying contracts are legal. There have been rulings that if two value offers are made to be used jointly and one will not function properly without the other, a tying agreement is within the law. (Shoes are sold in pairs, and automobiles are sold with tires.) In other cases, if a company's goodwill depends on proper operation of equipment, a service contract may be tied to the sale or lease of the machine.
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Full-Line Forcing
One special form of value offer policy is called full-line forcing. Here a seller's leverage with a value offer is used to force a buyer to purchase its whole line of goods. This policy is illegal if competitive sellers are unreasonably prevented from market access. Therefore, the presumption against tying arrangements is not quite as strong as the per se rule against horizontal price-fixing conspiracies.
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