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Solid Homes, Inc. vs.

Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79 (1989)

FACTS: Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA. ISSUE: W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages HELD: SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction. In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law. On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission 14 SCRA 620 (1965) FACTS: The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange. Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commissions order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its permission amounted to prohibition. Issue: Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question? Held: None. 1. Test for determining the existence of authority

The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Head before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation. The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. 2. Commission without power to impose prohibition

The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an

administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against double listing.

TAULE vs. SANTOS August 12, 1991 G. R. No. 90336

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void. Facts: An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court. Issues: 1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC. 2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest. Decision: Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted. Ratio Decidendi:

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it. 2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the VicePresident shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision. Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.

US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1 On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 148 SCRA 659 Date of Promulgation: March 20, 1987 Ponente: Cruz, J. QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause. Facts: 13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao). This amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age. Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedeas bong of P12,000.00 Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed validity Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC. Petitioners arguments: 1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. 2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. 3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.

Issue/s: WON EO 626-A is constitutional.

Ruling: EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to petitioner. Ratio: On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to review of the Supreme Court. ..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal. Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.

On the presumption of constitutionality Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted

On due process Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient; flexibility MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing intended as safeguard against official arbitrariness. On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by Pres. Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the extraordinary power

Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the same with the fit between means and objective test) 1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs. Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation of carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: nontransportation of carabaos.

Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10, 1993 Facts: P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said law, allemployers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, and such should be paid onDecember 24 of every year. The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 containedprovisions defining 13-month pay and basic salary and the employers exempted fromgiving it and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and RegulationsImplementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter alia set items of compensation not included in the computation of 13-month pay. (overtime pay, earnings andother remunerations which are not part of basic salary shall not be included in thecomputation of 13-month pay). Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated on August 13, 1985 M.O.No. 28, containing a single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month. More than a year later, Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the13-month pay law was promulgated by the then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon, among otherthings, defined particularly what remunerative items were and were not included in theconcept of 13-month pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed orguaranteed wage plus commission or commissions were included in the computation of 13thmonth pay)A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of petitioner. Finding thatpetitioner had not been including the commissions earned by its medical representatives inthe computation of their 1-month pay, a Notice of Inspection Result was served on petitionerto effect restitution or correction of the underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to1988 of Medical representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the Noticeof Inspection Results, and expressing the view that the commission paid to its medicalrepresentatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13-moth pay since the lawand its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary and therefore exclude allremunerations which are not part of the REGULAR salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas issued anorder for the payment of underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. Amotion for reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la Sernaaffirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned of medicalrepresentatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity date of MO 28 and its implementingguidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay.Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of Phil. Fuji Xerox where itwas found there was underpayment of 13th month pay since commissions were not included.In their almost identically-worded petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attributegrave abuse of discretion to respondent labor officialsHon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.

ISSUE: Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month pay HELD: NO. Contrary to respondents contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal, supersede orabrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of MO No. 28, it merely modifiedSection 1 of the decree by removing the P 1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Monthpay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and whileentitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basicsalary of not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basicsalary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given tothe term basic salary was defined in PD 851 applies equally to basic salary under M.O. No.28. The term basic salary is to be understood in its common, generally accepted meaning,i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments asbonuses and overtime. In remunerative schemes consists of a fixed or guaranteed wage pluscommission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the basic salary for this is what theemployee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra effortsexerted in consummating sales of other related transactions. They are, as such, additionalpay, which the SC has made clear do not from part of the basic salary.Moreover, the Supreme Court said that, including commissions in the computation of the 13thmonth pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" asdefined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detractfrom the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adoptedunder legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisionsof the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. Anadministrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia (239 SCRA 386)

Facts: On June 26,1990, Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos issued memorandum circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB, Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial buses operators to charge passengers within a range of 15% above and 15% below, the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. On December 5, 1990 private respondent PBOAP filed an application for fare rate increase to P0.085 and again it was reduced to P0.065 per kilometer rate. The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation Inc. that the proposed rate were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate o return on December 14, 1990. Public respondent LTFRB granted the fare rate increase on March 16, 1994. Petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, it was dismissed for lack of merit, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to reduce and increase fare rated based on the circular order issued by the LTFRB?

Held: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority, Potestas delegata non delegari protest what has been delegated further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate inandated to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is a delicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both public utility and the public.