GESTALT REVPEW

Volume 1
1997

Number 3

Editorial Joseph Melnick, Ph.D.

A Gestalt Approach to Culturally Responsive Mental Health Treatment Deborah L. P l u m , Ph.D,

Varieties o Shame Experience i Psychotherapy f n Leslie S. Greenberg, Ph.D. Sandra C. Paivio, Ph.D.

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SL and Shame: A Gestalt Approach eE Gordon Wheeler, Ph,D.

Shame as a Normal and Somehes Dysfunctional Experience: A Response to the Articles by Leslie S. Greenberg/ Sandra C. Paivio and Gordon W h d e r on Shame

Reinhard Fuhr, Ph.D, M a r tina Gremmler-Fuhr, M.A.

The "Recursive b o p " o Shame: f A n Alternate Gestalt Therapy Viewpoint Robert W. Resnick, Ph.D.
Integrating "Being" and "Domg" i Warlung with Shame n Leslie S. Greenberg, Ph. D. Sandra C. Paivio, Ph.D.

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Reply to Fuhr, Gremmler-Fuhr, and Resnick Gordon Wheeler, PhD.

A Psychometric Examination ofGestalt Contact Boundary Disturbances

Bmce Mills, Ph.D.

Reviws and Notes GestaIt Research Reports

J O S E P H MELNICK, PhD.

If youtre going to San Francisco, be sure to wear some flowers i your hair1 n
o the Association for the Advancement of Gestalt Therapy in f San Francisco, an went occurred-the death of poet Allen Ginsberg-that made me think o the origins of Gestalt therapy and the f cultural context out o which it emerged. At the same time, having the f opportunity to be with GestaIt practitioners from around the world sparked my curiosity about the Gestalt movement today and the diversity of its cultural ground framed by country borders. In fact, as we have more and mere opportunities to be together, ta learn from and know one another, w e are becoming a living, changing, worIdwide community. Gestalt Rmim is committed t helping, i some smaII way, u n i the creation of this community. This commitment is reflected in format n changes I this, our third issue, which will hopefully stimulate debate n and dialogue, and perhaps even inspire you, the reader, to engage with us all i the continued evolution ofGestalt therapy. n

WtE RECENTLY AWING i n t e r n a t i d the second

conference

The Past Our Smiological Roots

On Saturday, April 5,1997, i the midst o the conference, Ginsberg the n f poet laureate of the Beat h e r a t i o n and Ilte originator o the term f "flower power," passed away a b r a brief iIhess. For many at this gathering o psychotherapists, educators, and organizational consultants, his f death cast a deep shadow. In retrospect, the impact of his death was not surprising, for Ginsberg held many of the same philosophical, social, and polticd valus and concerns as did the founders of the Cktalt therapy movement. Both
Dr. McInick b s hemprafticing tea* and writing about Gestalt tEaerapy f rover 20 o 7 H e i i4editor of Gcsfdt Reaim. .s ISnn Fmncim@ writtenby John and Michene Phillips, M e d on the Ode label by Scott McKenzie, spent 10 w e b on the B i l l M top 100 and p a k d at n u m k four on June 1 4 1967.

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0 1997The Analytic P~ress

Ginsberg and the originators of Gestalt therapy were leaders of a progressive social zeitgeist that challenged the dominant conservative social order of the 1950s. They believed, instpad, in a more liberal, open, inclusive, optimistic, and egalitariansociety. Many who partiapated in the conference were first drawn to Gestalt therapy because o these beliefs, as well as the powerful, life-altering f personal encounters with the founders of the Gestalt approach. To say it simply, Fritz and Laura Perls, Paul Goodman, Isadore Fmm, and the others lived their beliefs and had the capacity to make them come alive in front of your eyes. So did AIlenGinsberg who in many ways was their kin. In his hart Emberg was a radical optimist like Fritz Ferls, with w h o m he shared the status of counterculture guru. Like Perls, he began as an outspoken outsider, became a countemIture celebrity, md died a mainstream icon. Also, like Perls, he w a s a man of action who valued creative conflict and the honest expression of differences, no matter what the outcome. When viewed i a deeper way, however, he was most of all like Paul n Goodman, the thinker-poet-soda1 reformer who, like Ginsberg, was unashamedly outspoken about his homosexuality and his antiwar beliefs and was directly invoIvd in the cultural upheaval of the 1960s. Ironically, just as Ginsbergs popularity was based less on his poetry than on his antiwar, p d r u g , sexual freedom stance, Goodman's influence was less a function of his psychology than of his political and social commentaries (Stwh, 1993). At their core, both Ginsberg and Goodman believed that change can occm only at the boundary between the self and the other--between the individual and society--and that ultimately this societal context must be addressed fully.

The Present: Gestalt Around the World

While at the conference I participated in a panel of journal editors entitled 'Why JournalWriting?" with Lars B e r g Malcolm Parlett, and Daniel Khlamov of the Nordic, British, and Russian Gestalt journals. The panel was one of a number that had an international flavor. In fact, twenty of the presenters were from countries outside the U.S., as were many o the f participants. The panel's purpose was to describe the status o journal f writing in our respective countries, as well as how its purpose and mission are tied to cultural ground. Because of my almost total ignorance of the status o Gestalt therapy f in Russia, I found Khlomov's p m t a t i o n informative and fascinating. The Russian Gestalt community, until recently, operated in isolation

from those outside Russia. Much of the training o practitioners was f conducted by trainers from other countries, especially France. M r oe recently, Gestalt therapists from Russia have been attending Gestalt conferences and training programs throughout the world. Although they, like many Gestalt therapists from other countries, have translated the classic Gestalt writings into their native tongue, English-speaking Gestaltisk are just beginning to gain access to Russian writings. C u r rentIy there are over 1000 Ges1.alt therapists i Russia and there are three n Gestalt institutes in Moscow alone. These individuals, supported by their own writings and institutes, attest to the strong roots of Gestalt therapy in Russia. O u r discussion also allowed me an opportuniv to think further about the goals o Gestalt Revim. It I a given that we wish to present highf s quality readable material, sampling from the wide range of w i i g &at rtns emanate from our theory. But this statement concerning high quality says little about what we wish our relationship to be with you, the reader. In simple terms, we wish it to be one o engagement and f dialogue. W e hope to push the edge of Gestalt therapy in order to stimulate and challenge you. Our organizational goals, consistent with Gestalt theory, inform us that this is only possible through lively creative exchange with our environment, between the self and the other "at the boundary." Our "systemic self"is ever evolving. Jt includes, in addition to the writers and reviewers, the readers, editors, advertisers*publisher, printer, producers o ink and paper, postal service, and soon). Like all self-organizing f systems, Gestalt Review is, above all, an ongoing. ever-changingexpert ment. I believe that these process goals are in keeping with the writings o the founders of k t a l t therapy. f Our written tradition, as historically sparse as it has h is replete , with unusual attempts at engagement and contact. Examples include Gestalt ?heraw:Excitement and Growth (Perls, Wefferline, and Goodman, 1951) which chllenged the reader to perform a number of awareness experiments; Gestalt Therapy Verbatim (Perk, 1969a$,which included transcripts o workshop therapy sessions describing a range of powerful, f often confrontative techniques of engagement; and In and Out of the Garbage Pail, (Perls's 1969b) unfolioed autobiography filled with line drawings and commentary. All three of these highly origvlal and unorthcdox books demanded a level of contact and engagement of the reader that went far beyond that of most professional books.

The Future: Dialogue and Change

The third issue of Gestalt Revim contains a number of format changes, that are experimental in nature and that w e hope will stimulate and

engage you, the reader, The first involves the initiation o a Book Review f section under Joel Latner, cine of our associate ditors. To quote from a recent letter to our editorial board outlining his goals: "Our feeling thus f r i that we'd like it tQ be more than bmks and more than reviews. a s We'd like it to fulfill the usual purpose of a book review section-to note and discuss the publication of new books i our field--and then some. n

To mention and discuss books outside Gstalt therapy and out-side psychology altogether:in the sciences, the arts, the humanities. And not only book, but movies, theaterI exhibitions, concepts; any&g that
enriches our lives and work as k t a l t therapists." Latner's first, brief review is o Craiy H o p and Finite Fxperience: Final Essays of Paul Goodman f (Staehr, 19941, followed by Homage fo Robwf Frost (3996) by the three Nobel poets JosephBrodsky, Seamus Heaney, and Derek Walcott. Second, w e are initiating a Gestalt Research Reports section under the auspices o PauIine Rose Clmce and Ansel Woldt. The purpose is to f presmt experimental research tQ the reader in an abbreviated form. We are pleased to present Bruce Milk's "A Psychometric Examination o f Gestalt Boundary Disturbances" as the first brief report. A fuller descript o of fils section appears elsewhere in this issue. in Third, w e are experimentingwith a new interactional format designed to heighten dialogue between writers. Dialogue is a cornerstone o f Gestalt therapy strongly influenced by both Rank and Buber (Mehick, 1997) and reflected most recently i the writings o Friedman (1989), n f Jacobs (1989), and Hymer (1990, 1 9 ) We are pleased to initiate this 91. format by p r e e n k g two papers dealing with the topic of shame-Leslie S. Greenberg's and Sandra C.Paivio's "Varietieso Shame Experience in f Psychotherapy" and "Self and Shame: A Gestalt Approach by Gordon Wheeler. These artides are followed by commentaries by Reinhard Fuhr and Martina GremrnleFuhr ("Shame as a Normal and Sometimes Dysfunctional Experience") and Robert R a i c k ("The 'Rwutsive Loop' o Shame: An Alternate Gestalt Therapy Viewpoint"). These commenf taries are then responded to by the original authors. It seems fitting that we begin this dialogical experiment with the topic of shame, an experience i which dialogue is all but extinguished.Shame n is experienced as a state o collapse, of nothingn-s, of no response, of f being invisible. The antidote to shame is found in finding one's voice and speaking out. As discussed above, Gestalt therapy emerged as a loud voice raised against the repressive societal norms of the 1950s and early 1960s.The founders refused to be shamed, shunned, or silenced. They insisted on speaking out, no matter what the price, We are pleased to begin this issue with an important paper, nA Gestalt Approach to Culturally Responsive Mental Health Treatment" by Deborah Plummer. She argues convincingly for a broad-based, comprehensive Gestalt therapy that incorporates the cultural field as a signifi-

EDITORIAL

189

cant part of the kherapeutic relationship. Of equal importance, Plummer presents a model based on the Gestalt principles of hereand-now awareness and the self as change agent, which provides the clinician with both method and tools required for effective multicultural counseling. I believe that the goals of a journal should be paradoxical in nature, to leave the reader satisfied yet still hungering for mere. As Ghent (1992) states, "A paradox must be accepted on its own tern, without resolution, and at the same time, valued as a pointer t a new level o compreo f hension" (p. 135). Paradox, if presented well, chalIenges habit and shatters convention.So do good journals, good therapists, and g o d poets. So did Perlq Goodman, and, ofcourse, Allen Ginsberg.

References
Bmdsky, J., Heaney, S. & Walcott, D.(19%), Homge to R o w Frost. New York Farrar, Straus & Gimux. Friedman, M. S. (19891, Keynote Address, Eleventh Annual Conference on the Theory and Practice of Gestalt Therapy, Chicago, I . L Ghent, E. ( 9 2 , Paradox and p 19) m . PqehPnnaI. Dial., 2:13S-160. Hymer, R. (1990),The I-Thou relationship and Gestalt therapy. W d f J., 1 : 1 34-

-/1991),B e f m Person and P m n . Highland, NY: The Gestalt Journal

PressJambs, L.(1989),Dialogue in Gestalt theory and therapy. C;astaItJ., 12:25-67. Melnick, J. (19971, Welcome to W a l t Reoicw. W a i f Rm., 1:1-8. Perls, F. (1969a), t n l t Therapy Verbatim.New York: Bantam. G (1 969b), In and Out o the Garbage Pail. New Yark: Bantam. f Hefferline, R. &- Goodman, P. (1951),Gestdt h p y . Nav York: Julian Press. Stoehr, T.(1993), Paul Goodman and the politica1 dimensions of Gestalt therapy. Gestalt I., 16590. ed. (19941,Crazy Hqm and Finite E ~ ' m ~ e . Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic The Press.

54.

17 South Street

Fortland, ME 04101

A Gestalt Approach to Culturally Responsive Mental Health Treatment

D E B O R A H L P L U M M E R , Ph.D. .

This article introduces a Gestalt model for culturally mponsive mental health treatment that focuses on therapist use-of-self and the bididional influence o culhm in the therapist/client system. The four componentso f f the medel-awawness/attitude, behavior, cultural competence, and data-explore the cultural experience o the therapist, particularly at the f level of awareness. The model offers a way for the therapist 2 0 organize his/her awareness i concert with interpersonal and societal influences so n that cuIturaIly appropriate mental health treatment can be provided.

cal orientations of psychotherapy to culturally diverse popdations. The examination o existing paradigms for inclusion of cultural f diversity is continual, and the concept o mental health and iis applicaf tion to minority populations has been challenged by psychological researchers and practitioners for some time mfley, 1990; Sue, 1990). Gestalt therapy has been among those theoretical orientations criticized by multicultural counseling theorists because of its perceived application t only middlwlass, educated, European-descent individuals. Likewise, o Perlasemphasis on the individual in contrast to community has come under attack (Evey, Ivey and Simek-Morgan, 1 9 ) Yet, therapists trained 97. and i m m d k Gesklt theory and know and unherstand its richness when practiced i a multicultural context. Unfortunately, the n totality of the individual's being-in-the-world as operationalized i n Gestalt theory has been given little attention in American multicultural
psychology.
Present models f r muIticultura1 counseling provide a comprehensive o approach to dweloping cultural competencies focusing largely on interDr. Plummer is an m a k e Profesor of Psychology at Cleveland State Uttiversij. and a practicing psychologistspecializing i diversity cmultatirm and training, n

ENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PROVlDElG are among those scientists and h e r s who are moving toward adapting Western theoreti-

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CULTURALLY RESPONSrCrE TREATMENT

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personal and societal cultural variables such as infarnation about culturally diverse populations and the skills necessary to provide services to these populations (Ridley, Mendoza, and Kanitz, 1992). Although the practitioner's own cultural awareness is recogruzed as an important variable in multicultura1 training this is given less emphasis than the other components o the models. I most multicultural training, more amtion f n is devoted to gathering cultural data about clients than to the therapist's use o self as a person-of-culture and its impact on the client as a personf of-culture. Multicultural counseling training programs that focus on the development of self as a personsfdture and inclusion o h e process o f f experiencing are needed. To that end, this article hopes to begin a dialogue between the Gestalt community's understanding o t)le process o experiencingand multiculf f tural theorists who hdd a conceptual framework that incorporates culture as a core concept of the therapeutic relationship. The purpose is to integrate Gestalt theory into the context of multicultural psychology by introducing a model that focuses on practitioner variables, the bidirectional influence o the therapist/client system, and a compdensive f appreciation of the nature of "culture." This model is based on the assumption that when practitioners fully understand their own cultural influences they can better provide culturally competent therapy. Thus, the model differs from other training models in that its variables f a on the therapist's being-in-the-world and the effect of this experience in the therapy process. It is sooted in the basic tenet of Gestalt theory that welldeveloped here-and-now awareness is necessary for the self t be an o effective agent of change. Multicultural counseling theory stresses the importance of seeing the individual in context, considering the cultural background of the client, and finding culturalIy appropriate solutions that may vastly change the way that therapy is conducted (Sue, hey8and Pedesm, 1996). By focusing on the therapist as a "person-of-culture," the model provides clinicians with a method o organizing the intrapsychic, interpemd, md f societal levels o systems that are present, so that culturally appropriate f mental health treatment can be provided. The model, practical i nature, n provides the practitioner wt prescriptive howIedge that is data-based ih and the tools requited for effective mu1ticultural counseling.

The model described below uses the construct of culture as inclusive o f many culturd characteristics, including racial/cultural identity, ethnic heritage, socioeconomic class, gender, age, mental/ physical ability, and sexual orientation.This definition of culture is not intended t understate o the profound psychological impact race has in American society but

rather, i used t emphasize the within-group variability or diversity s o found within racial groups. As a training model for multiculturaI counseling, emphasis is placed on the individual--both the practitioner as an individual and the client as an individual. The model thus utilizes the term "culhre," i a way that embraces more fully individual differences n than does the demographic category of race. Culture, from this standpoint, envelopes differences as a social relation that interacts with other social processes that are historical and changing in meaning. Understanding the changeable nature af culture is critical to Gestalt therapy that tends to focus extensively on the here-and-now experience of the client and that understands human nature as holistic, consisting af many varied parts that make a unique individual. Likewise, it is important to define the term "multicultural" (Ridley, Mendoza, and Kanitz, 1 9 ) The model uses the term multicultural to 92. a d h s cultural diversity both within and between distinct Ameriean cultural groups. M s likely, there is direct appliation to European and ot other cultures that experience multicultural systems;however, the model is designed i an American multicultural, rather than cmssadtural, n

Mode1 for Culturally Responsive MentaI Health Treatment

A
Awareness / Attitude

B
Behaviors

C
Cultural Competence

D
Data

Cultural Identification Historical Influences Primary Activities: Awareness of the 0ire.A Contact Influence of one's Demographics Experiences own culture on Culurall~ wcurate Sociopolitical perceptions Implications behavior & thinking. Secondaly Activitiesv Family Observational Owning one's Ssrns" approprim Chara,-terrstics inlorrnat~onal ate interventions or destructive Educational Issues participat~ve attitudes or beliefs. Culturally specific Cultural Values I experiential skills Norms Embracing a Language muititicultural identity. Rellgious Beliefs &
Practices

Figure 1
The -portents termed cultural identification and culturally accurate perception noted i figure 1 will l discussed shortly i the process section o this arlide. Both n x n f components involve the k a p i s t . and client as a dyad and address the bidirectional nahm o the therapy proass. f

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conkext. The non-American reader is invited to apply the m r e to the oEE multicultural systems in his/her country. T h e use o the term "culture" in the model implies the integrated f dynamics o culture (artifacts, values, and basic assumptions) and f describe the many cultural variabIes that wcapsulate an individual. The model aims t~ facilitate the dwelopment of a therapist though acquisition of a set of genera1 skills for management of the awareness lwel i n cultural interactions. That is not to say that the awareness level is the

only level at which multicultural counse1ing is practiced. However, it is at the level of awareness, particularly of values and assumptions of both the client and h e therapist, that this training mode1 begins and develops as the key to effective therapy. Each of the four componentsof the model describe a necessary but not sufficient aspect for providing cultu~ally responsive services.The components can be easiIy remembered because each component matches the initial letters of the alphabet: A-awareness Jattitude, Wehaviors, C mltural competence, and D-dwta. AR explanation o each component f follows and each is further described in figure 1.

Description ofthe Mod4

The awaseness/attitude component focuses on the practitioner's i n t d organization o culture within the intrapsychic level o system. This f f component includes beliefs the cliician holds about his/her own culture as well as those o other cultures different from &/her own. Awareness f is the first phase and imperative to the functioning of other components of the model. The practitioner develops awareness by examinkg the particular beliefs, stereotypes, messages, and influence about culture (his/kr own and others) that have been assimilated since birth. For example, recalling the first experience one had with a person of a different culture and the context in which it occurred often ilIustrates a particular cultural belief or attitude one hoIds as an aduIt. It is also necessary to examine cultural beliefs espoused in the family about such issues as intellectual potential, cleanliness, capacity f r honesty, sexuality, gender o roles, personal worth, pugnaciousness, and relationship boundaries. 3 have found that gathering this information as an exercise heightens awareness as a person-of-culture. These experiences may be either positive or negative: the valence is not what matters as much as the awareness and ownership of how various culturaI beliefs have impacted the practitioner's behaviors and thinking. This is a first and most important step in being able to manage the intrapsychic process i a cultural n interaction.

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DEBORAH L. 'PLUMMIX

Awamwss of the influence of one's own culture on behavior and thinlung can then provide the basis for developing a multicultural attitude. Developing a muIticultura1 attitude requires more than a basic understanding o racism, sexism, heterosexism and other "isms" (e.g. f ageism, dassism, bias against those who are physicdly challenged, etc.). A w a r e n m must be applied to an examination of o e s own complex n' beliefs and attitudes and the impact of these beliefs on others. Acknowledging the extent to which these attitudes are found in one's life alerts a therapist to notice his/her own bias and supports the work of effective multicultural counseling. Awareness of these attitudes and management of the awareness pmess is a lifelong, dynamic struggle that results in establishing an identity that is either culturally encapsulated, ethnocentric, "melting pot American," multicultural, or transcultural. These identity resolutions will be briefly discussed. The culturally encapsulated identity results i a cocoon whereby n he/she depends on one's own sense o reality and internalized value f assumptions. Through mlhral isolation the therapist may hold onto cultural stereotypes and therefore may became insensitive to cultural variations among individuals ( W m , 1962,1985). The culturally encapsulated counselor typically employs a generic counseling framework that fails to examine cultural factors or considers them irrelevant and impliciffy assumes that traditional definitions o health and psychopatholog f are value neutral and applicable to all human beings (D'Artdrea and Daniels, 1991; Ridley, Mendom, Kanitz, Angemeier, and Zenk, 1994). The contact in this identity is stereotyped and unchanging. The ethnocentric identity is one that a s s u m that o e s n' culture is appmpriate to all situations and therefore relevant to all other cultures. Operating from this identity, the therapist assumes t)rat his/her culture is the best and works towards client adaptation of the therapist's cultural attitudes and values. Ethnocentric counselors typically employ a culturally deficient or culturally deprived approach for therapy, assuming that the client lacks a clear sense o his/her own cultural strengths. f Yet it must be noted that there are those who define ethnocentrism as a form of cultura1 pride that is particularly needed for racial/ethnic minoritis to heal from racist pradces and combat contemporary racism. Therapist of this worldviav would choose to work primarily with members of their own culture and employ culture-specific therapy. Again, contact between therapist and client is solidly molded in a fixed gestalt. The "melting pot American" identity assums that all people have had equal access and opportunity as Americans. These individuals operate horn a position of cultural naivete. They lack the awareness that the "typical" American that used to be of European descent will typically be of African, Asian, or Latino descent i the next century. This worldview n

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adopts an individual perspective when viewing larger social problems. For example, a racist remark may be interpreted as innocence on the part o the sender or sensitivity on the part of the receiver. This worldview f translates into an individualistic therapeutic approach w h e d y locus of responsibility is attributed solely to the client. En the "mdting pot Am&can" identity, the experience o contact at the therapist's environmental f boundary cannot be discriminated between the experience of "self" and the experience of "other," and pushes for confluent interaction. A multicultural identity a s u r n s a healthy cultural identification with one's culture while at the same time respecting and appreciating other cultural p u p s . The term transcultural is often used interchangeably but implies that one goes beyond or transcends cultural boundaries in thinking and behaving. A transcultural identity implies that one is willing to =su e a as m greater degree of responsibility for the quality, effectiveness, and outcome o an interaction between culturally different individuals (Wimbush f and Rainey, 1994). The present model prefers the term "rnu~ticultural identity" as the resolution of the awareness/attitude struggle that m u m in mu1ticultural training. In this identity resolution, change is the nature of the contact pmess, as it is not fixed for all time and for all persons. Contact is a dynamic relationship, changing moment to moment as the therapist and client experience t h m l v e s as persons-of-cuf ture.
MuZticuItural Iden ti9 Awareness

When a person embraces a multicultural identity, one does so intentionally and through a developmental process (Pedersen, 1988). The multicultural identity developmental process takes different avenues for racial /ethnic groups. European White Americans usually develop their ethnic identity synonymously with American identity development. However, it is very necessary for racial/ethnic groups to develop a separate identity apart from American identity, which today is equated with European roots. For racial/ethnic groups, the two identity struggles (American and racial/etlulic) are not mutually exclusive and separate from each other (Perm, Caines, and Phillips, 1993). Thus, developing a multicultural identity for racid/ethnic members quires that they understand, acknowledge and accept their heritage and recognize the influences of American culture and lifestyle on their racial identity development. Whites and racial/ethnic individuals need to live i n congruence with their own cultural heritage and develop a healthy cultural identification that allows acceptance of other cultures as equals. Developing a multicultural identity is culturally complex not only in management of between-group differences but also in recognizing and appreciating within-group variability. There is continued support in the literature t~ examine the within-group variables of minority populations

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DEBORAH L PZ.UMMER

and to move thinking away from monolithic conceptualizations of particular racialJethnic groups. Cultural differences cut across racial and ethnic lines. For example, African Americans share a distincl Aftican heritage but not the same cultural background (i-e.,Caribbean, Central American, Haitian, geographic region of the U.S., etc.). Within any given cultural group there is variance in experience and expression o their f culture. Embracing a muIticullural identity increases a sense of personal power by pmviding the individual with more optitions for interacting in a multicultural society. It does not imply eradicating o e s cultural n' heritage or lessening identificationwith that heritage; rather, embracing a multicultural identity is characterized by healthy cultural identification (evidenced by cultural pride, expression of cultural values, and support of o e s people), awareness of the influence o our o w n culture on our n' f behavior and thinking, and respxt and a p p e a t i o n of cultures different from o e s own. A rnulticultura1identity is a creative adjustment to self n' and environment. Thus, embracing a multicultural identity may alIow an individual to be more fully human. Clearly, effective multicultural counseling is foundd on embracing a multicuIhiral identity that is grounded in one's racial/ethnic heritage yet transcends cultural boundaries. Gestalt therapy is a highly contactful experience in which therapist and his or her cultural assumptions and the client and his/her assumptions meet in direct mum1 awaren-ancing exchanges (Nevis, 1997). As an African American psychologist my own cultural assumptions about what it means Z be African American are particularIy challenged by a African American clients who d a r i b e what has been labeled as "the African Ameriean experience." We are both enriched by the examination o this cultural: labeling. f

The second component of the model addresses the individuaI's external expression of cultural experiences at the interpersonal level of system. What surfaces for the therapist at the awareness level is reality-~ted by
exposure to diverse cultural interactions. In a circular manner, infoma-

tion that is realized on the interpersonal level then becomes part of the data base for intrapsychic exploration. Behaviors are divided into primary and secondary types: primary types are characterized by direct contact activities of a personal nature that extend over time with persons of other culture; secondary types of behaviors are those personal and professional contact experiences a t various IweIs o intensity and o short duration.Sxandary behaviors are f f further divided into observational, informational, participative, and experiential activities (see figure 1). T k e categories are not mutually exclusive, and often the kind o behavior i determined by the intensity f s

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ofthe contact experience, duration of the relationship, and value placed on the behavior by the individuals involved. As a whole, primary and secondary behaviors represent a number o ways for defining cultural f experiences. Examples of primary behaviors include healthy intimate relationships, friendships, and alturaIly diverse shred litring experiences. Examples of secondary behaviors include viewing cuItural movies, plays, art exhibits, dance concerts (observational); reading books, newspapers, aztending c, l workshops, seminars (informationd); attending culturally diverse schools, working in a culturally diverse setting. living in a culturally diverse neighborhood (participative]; experiencing a critical incident that was culturally significant and that influenced one's thinking (experiential). In general, behaviors (as the second component of the model) are at different levels of contact. Without these experiences, o e s awarmess n' and attitude (A of the model) cannot be reality tested, and the individual then has no external proof for how heJshe directs him/herself in a multicdtural environment. Behaviors provide a ground out of w i h the therhc apist conceptualizes and hoses interventions. Awareness and acknowledgement of the experience, when in direct or indirect contact with someone culturally different, helps to t a n the therapist i selfri n management as well as to assist the therapist in providing culturally appropriate services.

CulturaI Competence
As the general population becomes more aware of mental health issues

and increases their use of mental health services, mental health providers are coming into contact with more culturally diverse clients. Ethically, mental health professionals are responsible for providing culturally competent practice, Two key components of cu1turally carnpetent practice for the practitioner are demonstrating culturally specific skills-the mastery of clinicaE competencies--and employing culturally appropriate interventioMoosing among the repertoire of skills, Employing culturally specific skills as a component o the model f requires that the practitioner be responsible for becoming culturally competent and receiving adequate training in multicuItura1 psychology. It i naive and dangerous to assume that if one is a skilled therapist in s general, that he/she can provide culturally competent practice of psychotherapy. Becoming culturally competent i an on-going process s requiring a lifelong commitment to personal and professional growth. Ethically, practitioners are required to respect and consider using alternative treatment approaches that are culturally relevant (e.g., collaborating r with native healers or medicine persons with African American o

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Native American clients o that tradition) and are required to consult on f cultural-specificproblems with which they do not have expertise. A practitioner who demonstrates culturally appropriate interventions organizes hs/her awareness/attitudes and behaviors (A and B o the f model) in a way that supports the client. This does not imply a blind approach ("I dnt see color . . age, sexual orientation, class, etc.) or a o' c o n d m d i n g manner ["Some of my best friends are. . .") but rather dictates that the practitioner hold these components as ground i detern mining diagnosis and i treatment planning. Due to the heterogeneity n that exists w i t h and between cultural groups, it is impossible for any one practitioner to be knowledgeable about every distinct culture and worldview; however, it is possible for practitioners to keep in their awareness how their own cultural attitudes and behaviors (A and B of the model) influence the psychotherapy process. Awareness of cultural experiences in cultural interactions aids the therapist in making appropriate choices among interventions to employ during the therapy process. Moreover, the therapist is encouraged to d i s t the assistance of the client in designing culturally-sensitiveinterventions. Thus, the culturally competent practice of psychotherapy requires on the part. o the service provider an understanding o the influence of f f culture on behavior, an intelleslual flexibility, a willingness to experiment with other healing approaches, and a reliance on the culturally diverse client as the "truth teller" for his/her cultural experience and interpretation of that experience. From this perspective, Gestalt therapy's self-process and self-as-concept are useful orientations. As a processoriented therapy, Gestalt orientation quires that decisions about behaviors are mo~tored any given point of contact with the environat ment. A culturally competent therapist remains in an experiential stance.

Data The collection o cultural data can be a fascinating process in the evoluf tion o a cultutally-responsive clinician. The prof allows the practitioner t be creative in gathering information about a particular culture. o A variety of data needs to be collected including historical influences, demographics, socio/political implications of being a member of that culture in America, general family characteristics, educational issues, cultural values and n o m , language usage, and religious/spiritual beliefs and practices of a culture. The most obvious way and perhaps the most structured way o f colleding these data are through reading and coucsework. This allows the learner to take in information at his/her own pace and t be exposed o to a great deal of cultural infarmatian in a short period of time. However, to bypass the countless other opportunities for enhancingthis knowledge

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would be unfortunate. Persdnal interviews (formal and informal) with elders of the culture permit one to soak up the richness of the culture and get a sense of the m c e of what it is like to be a member of that culture in America. Choosing to engage in participative behaviors such as living in a culturally diverse neighborhood, working in a culturally diverse
setting shopping and eating out in culturally diverse environments are all opportwrities for personal and professional growth. Noting what gets woked and becorns figural during these experiences is an important aspect of gathering cultural information. This experiential information, along with attitudes/awareness (A o the model}, cultural behavioral f experiences (0 of the model), and culturally competent skills and interventions (C of the model) are integral components o the process of f multicultural counseling from a Gestalt approach. Process

Each component of the model is a necessary but not sufficient aspect for cuIturally responsive mental heaIth treatment. To have expertise in any one area does not mean that one delivers culturally appropriate services. The components work together as a gestalt for effeclive treatment. Traditionally, multicultural training programs concentrated on components C and D Classes emphasized cultural information and even provided very . specific interventions f r special populations. For example, students o were instructed that Asians do not utiIize direct eye contact, African Americans express themselves better nanverbally, and Native Americans value silence. These generalizations proved useful in discussing clinical cases in the classroom and answering exam questions but were not always helpful (and sometimes even destructive) when the novice practitioner encountered an Asian American who looked him /her directly in the eye, a verbal, articulate African American, or a Native American who wondered what was going on i the session during the long periods of n silence. Thus, to demonstrate proficiency in one or two components of the model not only may provide culturally inappropriate counseling but m a y decrease the effectivenessof therapy in general. The importance of therapists understanding themselves as cultural beings and attending to this aspect of themselves In the therapeutic proces has been well documented. This aspect is highlighted i all of n components o the model. A therapist brings to every session these f awarenesses and attitudes (A) and the impact of their influence on behaviors (B). The cultural data one holds @), be it minimal or maximal, accurate or inaccurate, act as ground for how a therapist conceptualizes clients. These conceptualinations then form the basis for cuIturally appropriate perceptions (C) that a therapist creates of clients. The three

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components (A,B,D) further interact in such a way to influenee any thee apeutic inkemention (C) the therapist uses. As a person of cdture, the therapist also has his/her o w n degree of cultural identification (C) that influences diagnosis, treatment planning, and conceptualization in the therapy process. Likewise, clients coming to therapy hold their own particular set o awmegses and attitudes about themse1ves as cultural f beings (A o the model). They have also engaged over the years in f diverse behaviors upon which their own conceptualizations for cultural interactions are based (B of the model). Further, they bring t each o session their own sense of cultural identification, their own cultural perceptions about the culture o their therapist, and their own set o f f general cultural data (C and D o the model). f As a dyad, the therapist and &ent engage i a process that begins on n the awareness level (their intern1 organization) and moves to an interpersenal level (the interactions between the two) and i constantly influs enced by phenomena taking place on a societal level. This process is illustrated i figure 2. The circle, which represents the therapist as a n cultural being i grounded i the data of cultural knowledge (Dl. This s n information is always i the background as the therapist works with the n client. Superimposed on this background are the awareness/attitude (A) and behavioral experiences (B)o the therapist which directly contribute f to the choice of ccul turally appropriate interventions and consideration of cultural specific skills to use with the clienk (C). The oval represents the

F i p2

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client who pdhis/her own set of awareness and attitudes (A), has his/her own repertoire of behavioral experiences (B), has his/her own level of cultural identification, and brings to the session his/her own cultural perceptions about the therapist as a person o culture (C), and f has hisJher own cultural knowledge base (D).In the process of psychotherapy, the therapist's and client's presentation of the components (A, B, C, and D) of the model will be different. The culturallycompetent therapist organizes aspects of the components i a manner n useful to the therapeutic process; the client presents the components in whatever manner is meaningful to him or her. For purposes o the figure, f the client%components (A, E, C, and D) are placed in a line. The arrows between the circle and the oval illustrate the bidirertional influence of culture in the therapy process.

A dinicaI case from my own practice is presented to further illustrate this process. I chose an initial interview session, for it provides a cleaner example of the model than a more complex interaction of a later session. A request is made by an Asian Indian female for a therapist who has skills in working with culturally diverse populations. My knowledge base about Asian Indian culture is primariIy on the level of informational and research data (books and articles> and limited in experiential howledge. When 1 meet this client, I am aware of the myriad of images and ideas that run through my mind. I hold these images and ideas as ground and choose to use them as a data pool for darification questions in the sessions. For example, instead o interrogating the client about her f culture as a routine part of social history, I choose to inquiry about her as a person-of<ulture. I encourage her to tell her story and then elicit her thoughts and feelings about her parents' criticism of her as "tm American." I use other data given in the session, such as her Jewishboyfriend and beliefs about relationships, to form a tentative conceptualization about her culturally "American identity" (moreso than an Asian-Indian identity). I am making these cultural assumptionsbased on m y academic understanding o a prominent lndian value o privay (not sharing f f problems outside of the family), the importance of arranged marriages, a strong fatalistic view of life based on basic spiritual beliefs, and the role of women in this culture. In contrast, she i eager to share her woes i the s n session i a direct manner, exercises a great deal of choice in her selection n o a partner, expresses no direct concern of her "dharma" and "karma," f and firmly establishes her role professionally and personally as a woman o the '90s. My assumptions about her cultural identity resolution f process remain to be explored.

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Simultaneously in my awareness are some warm feelings about two dose Asian Indian friends from my undergraduate college experience and positive feelings as a thesis advisor for a wonderfully competent Asian Indian graduate student. These feelings provide a certain kind of positive energy that I have in the session. As 1 st with this positive i energy, I am further aware that the client must relate to me as an African American woman and that she sits with her own set of beliefs about who 1 am and what 1 am about. As I draw from my educational background and experience as a kherapist to consider interventions to use with this client, I am cognizant that I must continue to check out any cultural assumptions and allow the dient to check out her assumptions for effective therapy to take place. I hold the belief that I do not have to be an expert in Asimhdian culture f r effective therapy to take place. However, I do have to undero stand myself as an African American therapist (A of the model), understand the impact my past and present behaviors on these interactions (B of the model), understand the role of culture i my choice o intervenn f tions and check out her cultural perceptions (Cof the model), and use whatever information I have about Asian Indian culture as part o the f background for the therapy process (D of the model). This complex integration of systems may not change the actual choice of therapeutic intervention but dearly manages cultural "mismatch shock" that o h takes place i the therapy process. When in "mismatch shock", therapeun tic goals cannot be achieved. Thus, effective multicultural rownsehng occurs when m&gful contact is achieved by a therapist who has the willingness to experience the client in his/her cultural context.

Therapt Process Questions As a wtalt, h e components of the model organize the therapist's cultural ground in a manner conducive for culturally responsive treatment. The culturally competent therapist i authentic in his/her presens tation, thus providing additional facilitation of growth and change i the n client by being an appropriate model of health processes. The therapist's own awareness, assimilated skills, theoretical knowledge and personality characteristics are integrated. The following is a checklist of process
questions incorporating all four components of the model:

What cultural common ground do I share with this client? What evidence (behavioral indicators, use of checkdut questions) do 1have that this is truly common ground? 2. What cultural differences do I acknowledge, respect and welcome? 3, 'What cultural differences do I fear, resist, dismiss or minimize? How do I manage these differences i and out o the session? n f
1.

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Do I behave or think differently about this client than I do with other clients? How comfortable am I with my own cultural identificationwith this client? What is the kind and quality of contact (B of the model) I have with individuals from this client's culture (class, age p u p , etc.)? Do 1 routinely check-out with the client if my cultural percep tions are accurate? Do I atknd to my use of language to make sure terms and phrases used have a collaborativeunderstanding? Do J ask if what I am doing or saying is useful to the client? Do I check-out if I am reading non-verbals correctly? Do I hold the client as expert of his/her own cultural experi-

ence?
In treatment planning and diagnosis do I consider culturespecific intewentions and culturebound syndromes?.
Conclusion

Mental health professionaIs are faced with the challenge of sewicing an increasingly culturally diverse American population. Despite the indusion of multicultural courses in training programs across the United Stat=, mental health practitioners are seriously undertrained in this regard. Clinicians, regardless of theoretical orientation, base their therapeutic strategies on the observationsand interpretations made of clients' behaviors. Thus, it is critically important to understand onds cultural lens that is used to view clients' behaviors. Gestalt theory provides the framework for interpreting what in seen through one's cuItural lens. One cannot understand what is not in his or her awareness. Heightening awareness of cultural influences on behavior, particularly lone's own, is imperative for the therapist. Without such understanding one risks misinterpreting the behavioral cues of not only culturaIIy diverse clients but all clients. Some of the obstacles to effective psychotherapy with culturally diverse clients do not reside solely in the individual or the society but are housed in the practitioner. Most often, these practitioner obstacles are not lack of clinical-technicalexpertise but are due to blind spats in the therapist"^ use-of-self. Gestalt theory's principle of hereand-now awareness has a d d m this critical area in a powerful way. This key construct is an important contribution to multicultural psychology, especially for how therapist process their cultural attitudes and behaviors in a way that benefits the client. The model presented encourages the fuller compliment of Gestalt theory and practice as a means to address the sometimes neglected and

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often m i n i m i d variable o the therapist's cultural experience i relation f n to his or her client and its influence i the therapy process. It offers n opportunities for further investigation, most obviously by more fully developing, processing, and evaluating the specific components i the n training of therapists. As multicultural counseling theories conhue to grow, the effectiveness of Gestalt therapy and practice in a multicultural context will need to be demonstrated. This model serves as a invitation to the Gestalt community to further that communication.

References
D'Andrea, M. & Daniels, J. (1991),Exploring the diffeient levels o multicultural f counseling training in counselor education. J . Counding b Development, 70:143-150. Ivey, A. E Ivey, M.B. & Siek-Morgan, L. (1997), Counseling and P s y c h n t h , Baston: Allyn and Bacon. Lefley, H.P. (1990),Mental heaIth training across culture. In: Handbook o Crow f ~ u l f u r CounseIing and Therapy,d. ~edersen. d P. New York: Praeger, pp. 259246.

Fedefsen, P . (1988), A Handbook for Dezwloping Multimltural Awarenms. Alexandria, VA:American Association for Counseling and Development. Penn, M. L.,Gaines, 5 . 0 . & Phillips, L.(1993), On the desirability o own-group f preference.1.Black Psychof., 19:303-321. Ridley, C.R., Mendoza, D. W. & Kanitz, B. E.(19921, Program designs for multiculturar training.J. Psychol. & Christianity, 11326-336. Mendoza, D. W,Kanitz, B.E, Angemeier, L.& Zenk, R. (1994), Cultural sensitivity in multicultural counseling: A perceptual schema model. 1. Cound i n g PsyckoF., 41:225-136. Sue, D. W. (19901, Cultuml-specific strategies in counseling: A conceptual framework.Profess. Psychol.: k r c h b Pmctice, 21:42. Ivey, A. & Pedersen, P. ( 9 6 , A Thmy of Multimltumf Counseling and 19) Therapy. Pacific Grove, CA: BmoksJCole. Winbush, V. & Rainey, M. (1941,Key termsfrom n trnns~tllfurd petspeclim. Paper presented at meeting of Multimltural Training Institute, Cleveland, OH, September. Wrenn, C.G . ( 9 2 ' The culturally encapsulated counselor.Hmoard Educatid 16) h 32344-4-449. . , (2985), Afterword: The cultmalty encapsulated counselor revisited. In: H a d b o o k o Cross-Cultural Courtding and Therapy, ed.P.Pedersen. New York; f kaeger, pp. 323-329.

Clmland Sfate University 2300 ChesfmAm. Clewland, Ohio 44114 d . p l u m ~ m o h i oedu .

Varieties of Shame Experience in Psychotherapy

L E S L I E S G R E E N B E R G , Ph.D, . S A N D R A C P A I V I O , Ph,D. .

Shame appears in a variety o forms and in different states of mind. f Different forms of shame, such as adaptive shame at violating internal standards, maladaptive internalized shame fmm being treated as Iacking in human vdue, and secondary shame about one's feeling or impulses, all require different forms of intervention. W e argue for the importance of a differential treatment perspective in working with shame and all emotions. The transcript o an episode ofworking with shame from abuse f is presented as an example of one form of work with shame.

o m EFFORT TO FURTHER UNDERSTAND the role of emotion i n psychotherapeutic change we have been working on the clarification o the nature o emotion i general and o the role o f f n f f specific emotions in therapeutic change (Gfeenberg and Safran? 1986; Greenberg, Rice, and Elliott, 1993;Greenberg and Paivio, i press).In this n article, after briefly prmting our approach t emotion and a processo oriented approach to the diagnosis o momentary state, we will focus on f the role o shame in psychotherapeutic change. f

Emotion in Psychotheraw

Emotions i general play an organizing, rather than a disruptive, role in n human functioning. As Perls, Hefferline and Goodman (1951)suggested, emotion is a prime means o orientation to, and organizer o potential f f
&lie S.G r c e n k g , PkD, is Professor of Psychology at York Univemity T-to and Dircdot o the Psychotherapy Rearch Centre. H i in private practice and has written f e s extensively and done training and research on Gestalt therapy and emotion in thmapy. Sandra C Faivio, PkD. is a member o the Canadian Psychological Assadation and the . f Swicty for Psychotherapy Research. She i Assistant Professor o Psychology at the s f University o Saskatchewan and is involved i the training o psychothempists, as well as f n f maintaining a private practice in Saskatoon.

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action on, the environment. The fallowing four features of emotion are helpful in understanding their role in therapeutic change (Frijda, 1485; Safran and Greenberg. 1981; Greenberg and Korman, 1993; Greenberg and Paivio, i press): n

Emofions are biologically adaptive. Wants come into the world with a biologically adaptive emotion system and with a Set of discrete emotions including at least anger, sadness, fear, disgust, interest/excitement, and joy/happiness. It is unclear whether shame exists as a discrete in-wired emotion at birkh with uniquely identifiable facial expressions, physiologid responses, and action tendencies, as do the above six emotions, o whether it is developed out. of an interaction of cognition and r affect, as the child develops the capacity for self-consciousness. 2. Emotions move us. The discrete emotions are each characterized by specific action tendencies that organize us for specific actions. For example, shame organizes us to hide. Anger organizes u s to thrust forward, feat to run away, an$ disgust to expel. Emotion provides an action readiness or tmdenq that only trecornes action by choice. 3. Emotions infmrn us. Emotions give us feedback about our reactions to situations. By means of a taat apprehension of pattern, emotions process complex situations for their significance to our well-being. This appmhension process occurs long before we can consciously analyze the situation, Shame, for example, tells us that we have violated a standard related to our social worth and connectedness. Anger tells us we have been violated. 4. Emotions are a concern relm~ncesystem. Emotions often arise from the appraisal of a situation in relation to a need/goal/ concern (Frijda, 1985). Emotions thus tell us what is relevant to our concerns. As a concern relevance system emotions are thus the "royal road" to motivation and attention to emotions in therapy provides an ideal route to access needs and goals (Greenberg and Korman, 1993). In shame the goal of concern i s the protection o a sense o worth and connection. h anger the f f goal i protection o boundary violation, while sadness aims s f
1.

initially at seeking the lost object.

From our study of the role of the discrete emotions i a large number of n Gestalt-informed, process-expetiential therapis (Greenberg, et al, 1 9 ) 93, we have observed that the different emotions play different roles in

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the change process. Sadness and anger, for example, are accessed predominantly f r their biologically adaptive action tendencies and o information. Shame and fear, on the other hand, are often accessed, not for their biologically adaptive tendencies, but as a signal of dis-ease. They are emotions that most need to be transformed in therapy. Given the recent interest on shame in the general literature (H. Lewis, 1971; Kaufman, 1989; M. Lewis, 1992; Nathanson, 1992) and more recently in the Gestalt therapy literature (Lee and Wheeler, 19%; Wheeler, 1996; Jacobs, 19961, it seemed that a presentation of our observations on shame in the change process would be of particular interest. In our efforts to understand how shame is ttmformed in therapy, we collected episodes in which shame appeared and studied the tapes and transcripts. It became dear that shame occurs in a variety o f forms in therapy, as do the other emotions, and needs to be worked with in different ways, at different times, depending on what type o shame i f s being experienced.
Emotion a d Process Diagnosis
how to work in a processsriented experiential manner, we have proposd that it is possible to identify particular moments in-sessions that mark particular kinds of emotional states, such as splits or problematic reactions (Rice and G d r g 1984), and that these states act as process diagnoses that guide intewention. In studying the role of emotion in therapy we have proposed a fourpart process diagnostic scheme for assessing different types of emotional expression and guiding intervention. According to this scheme an emotional expression at any particular moment can be viewed as either a primary adaptive emotional expression, a primary maladaptive expression, a secondary expression, or an instrumenta1 expression (Greenberg and Safran, 1986,1989; Greenberg et al., 1993; Greenberg and Paivio, i press). Primary emotions are fundamental, initial emotional n responses to situations such as anger at violation, sadness at loss, and fear at threat. These are emotions whose adaptive values are clear. Secondary and instrumental emotions are more highly mediated and socially influenced. k o n d a r y emotions are reactions to identifiably more primary emotions or thoughts or a m emotions about emotions. They are thus secondary in time and sequence to internal procewm, such as the expression o anger when feeIing afraid or uying when angry or f feeling afraid of my anger or ashamed of my fear. Instrumental emotions, on the other hand, are expressed because of their learned effecton others. They are expressed i order to achieve an aim such as to intimidate or t n o evoke sympathy. Finally, primary maladaptive emotions arise when the emotion system goes wrong as a function o learning or trauma, as i f n

In developing a formal theory of

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certain phobias and panic and some shame reactions. Here an originally adaplive emotion, such as fear or shame at abuse, becorns generalized to situations that are no longer dangerous, setting off alarms of danger or humiliation when none i p m t . According to this scheme primary s emotions need to be a c d for their adaptive information and action tendencies. Primary maladaptive emotions are accessed for quite a different m n , t make them accessible to change. Secondary and o instrumental emotions on the other hand need to be explored to get at their more primary sources, or regulated when too disruptive. We will now look at shame within this context.

Shame is about the whole self and is distinctly different f o guilt which rm i often about a moraI transgression. In shame one feels naked, lacking in s dignity or worth. Shame is often the failure to live up to an ego ideal or personal values. We feel shame about being seen as weak o worthless. r People don't feel low self-esteem; rather, they feel ashamed, worthless, acutely embarrassed. The self feels exposed, defective, diminished, or often totally destroyed. The experience of shame often arises from a situation that involves a sudden decrease in self-&eem. There is a sudden shock ofexposure. Tomkins (1963) has proposed that barriers to the experience of interest, excitement, or joy, that dampen, but do not eliminate these feelings, activate shame. Thus, the excited child, whose excitement is not supported by parents, feels overexposed and pulls back in shame. Prototypes o shame experience are suddenly appearing naked f in public and/or being found to be defective. Guilt, on ttre other hand, generally involves internalized values of right or wrong; i involves moral imperatives and is experienced i terms t n o how society or others hoId that one should be. We feel guilty for doing f bad things. Guilt is about something one has done, behaviors that have harmed others, whereas shame is a b u t who one is, about the self not being good enough. We are ashamed about who we are, not simply about what we do. In shame the action tendency is to hide, to break facial communication b avoid being seen. Shame i often referred to as losing face. The s linguistic roots ofshame are to hide or cover up. This tendency to hide distinguishes shame from guilt. In guilt the ackion tendency is to atone, I shame, experience can only be hidden not forgiven, Shame in its most n fundamental adaptive form is possibly a process o protecting our social f connectedness. Shame has to do with our acceptability, worth, and connection to others. It: is about the fit between me and my world. Shame is a signal that my worth or state of social connection is threatened o r needs attention. Shame paradoxically divorces us and disconnects us

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from others in the service of protecting our connection. Shame thus helps me fit in and protects m e from being cast out.W e soon learn not to show that w i h will be judged unacceptable. Shame thus acts to p m e hc privacy and protect identity.

The Interpmonal Nature o Shame f

Shame involves h e experience of being looked down on by others, of contempt in the eyes o the other. Sartre has emphasized that in f embarrassment it is the viewing of oneself negatively in the ys of the e other that i critical. He writes, "The shy person is physically and s constant1y conscious of his body not as it is for h m but as it i f r the i s o Other. . . . I cannot be ernbarrassd by m y own body as I exist i it. It i n s my body as it is for the Other which embarrases me" (Sslrtre, 1948). There is a special kind of visibility and exposure at the core of shame, Shame is thus basically about interpersonal experience, about vulnerability to social judgement,and is reflective of disturbance in the self and its relationship to the other. Shame and i derivatives, embarrassment and shyness, are all selft s conscious emotions concerned with diminishment in the eyes of others and depends on a sufficient degree of cognitive development to discriminate s l and other. Although shame is innate and emerges as an ef aspect o "stranger anxiety," it is the development o object and selff f awareness that heralds the onset of much shame (Lewis, 1992). The awareness ofseeing and being seen becomes a crucial human experience. Shame then rapidly develops out of experiences of public failure, lack of support, and experiences of others' scorn and disgust. Pride, on the other hand, develops from success and others"recognition o ane's action. f
Intmmalized Shame

There is a crucial distinction that needs to be made between the innate affect of shame as an emotional response and shame that i internalized s and rnagnifid to become a primary sense of self that guides many behaviors (Lewis, 1971; Kaufman, 1989). Much child rearing occurs
through shaming. Children are told certain behaviors are not acceptable, and parents pull faces of disgust to indicate what is unacceptable. When the child's desires, inkrests, and needs are shamed, when they are unsupported by parents, or when they go unnoticed or are not accepted,

the children's healthy shame pulIs them back from exposing those parts that are judged unacceptable. With repetition, or wen with an intense single experience, children can associate their needs, feelings, or desires with shame. When they again experience the shame-linked feeling or urge, shame about the seIf is automatically experienced. En this way

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shame comes to pervade their sense of self wen though memories of the shameful events may have faded. Shame can become internalized and can be felt even when the other is not present, debasing or condemning the self. Shame is thus acquired
interpersonally but gradually becomes internalized. Tnternalized shame often results from the intense humiliation and powerlessnm of emotional and physical abuse. Repeated beatings are a recurring source of shame for abused children. Rape and incest can also involve the same type o intense humiliition, powedessness, and violation. Having k e n f violated, the experience of helplessness and violation often is disowned; the self withdraws and cuts off in order to escape the agony of exposure to shame. In addition, the fomenting part of the self often identifies with the aggressor and brutally torments the self with disgust or contempt and is scornful ofthe self for being so pathetic. Varieties o Shame Experiences f

I worlung with shame in therapy, it is important to identify different n forms of shame experience and expression. Process diagnosis facilitates different types of therapeutic responses to different shame states. Primary adaptive shame needs to be responded to, to access its positive information. It, in turn, needs to be discriminated from primary maladaptive shame, which needs to be transformed, and from secondary shame, which needs to be explored.
Primmy A+&e Shame This emotion occurs when one feels overexposed. It can be seen in therapy when a client exposes something new or shows some emotion and then feels unsupported by the therapist and withdraws. Another marker of primary adaptive shame is the emergence i a session of n embarrassment about what is being talked about.This is o h a positive indicator that the person is revealing something previously hidden and is risking exposing themselves. The task then i ko encourage these clients, s to stay focused on what is being revealed, to tolerate the embarrassment and to accept and assimilate the revealed material into their self view. Primary adaptive shame can also be a response to violations of implicit or explicit personal standards and values, such as shame at engaging in deviant behavior or public loss o control. Here the person's feelings of f shame need to be acknowledged for its prosocial information and as a guide to behavior. Adaptive shame therefore can indicate either that interpersonal support for excitement is missing (Tomkins, 1963; Lee and Wheeler, 1996) or that one has violated standards or values that ace deeply important to oneself (Kaufman, 1989), like valuing being a g o d parent and feeling ashamed that one has been neglectful.

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In the former case the rupture in the reIationship needs to be empafhically addressed. I the latter case, interventions aim at helping n the client acknowledge and accept the shame, acknowledge the values, accept the mistake and the consequences,forgive him or herself, and find ways to avoid the mistake in the future. In clarifyrng values and standards and i having the desire to Iive by them empathically n understood, the motivation and commitment to uphold t e are hm enhanced.
Prima y MaIadnptiwe Shame This experience o shame invoIves a deep feeling af humiliation and a f sense of the worthlessness of the whole self. This shame aften comes froma history of being shamed and forms part o the core sertse of self as f worthless, inferior, or unIovable. This shame may be unacknowledged and covered by secondary processes such as reactive rage a slights. t Here, intervention involves accessing the core sense o self, exposing it to f acceptance, and strengthening self-esteem by accessing aItemte internal resources and strengths and integrating these into the core sense ofself. For example, a female dient who was infertiIe had a dream of herseIf as a piece offruit, ripe on the outside but rotten at her core. Sharing the pain, shame, and loss with her empathieally attuned therapist led to the alleviation of some of the shame of being defective. Accessing some of her strengths as a professional and an adoptive parent led to greater acceptance of herself as worthwhile and not rotten
Seconday S h m e This form o shame is generated by identifiable negative self-evaluation, f introjects, and feelings o self-con tempt. The distinction between f maladaptive primary shame and the secondary shame of negative selfevaluation appears to be one of chronicity. Chronic lack of support and maltreatment leads to such internalization o the contempt that it results f in primary maladaptive internalized shame as a core self-experience. One just feels wretched, dirty, and worthless, whereas more transient experiences of self-evaluation, i specific situations, that can be made n canscious, result in secondary sl-tame. In the former the self i riddled s with shame such that any expression of the seIf is automatically accompaniedby a sense ofshame. One feels globdIy bad or rotten to the core. In the latter one is more concerned with internalized judgements i n a more concrete, situation-specific way, such as feeling that one is contemptible for having been so cowardly In that situation. Another fom of secondary shame or embarrassment i more a s function o introjeck and projection. A social experience in which a f person feels foolish or exposed generally involves an attribution of a judgement to others, for example thinking that others are looking down on you for a social error, such as using the wrong knife at a dinner party.

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Shame also can be secondary to, and a cover far, some other emotional experience such as feeling secondary shame about feeling hurt, weak, needy, angry o afraid. This is shame abouf one's internal experiencesI r shame about deires and feelings, and shame about exposing and disclosing self. This i an important state encountered in therapy and s differs from a core shame feeling, in that people have some separation from that which is shameful. Thus, they are ashamed about their sexual fantasies or their weakness, as opposed to feeling totally shameful. h secondary shame about some other experiential state, the shame is often related to avoidance of weakness and vulnerability. Here intervention involves tolerating the shame and facing the disavowed weak state.
Shame-related Secondary Emotions Two secondary emotions*anxiety and rage, are important i working n with shame. Anxiety about shame and fear of embarrassment are powerful motivators of avoidance. People take preventive measures to avoid possible embarrassment, to avoid revealing anything a b u t themselves that might be embarrassing. They are cautious about exposing themselves and the more cautious they are the more they close themselves off and become isolated. Anxiety about shame therefore leads to isolation from others and the inability to reach out and satisfy o e s n' interpersonal n & . This anxiety needs to be overcome in therapy by encouragement and support, and the shame needs to be faced. Rage is often a secondary reaction to loss of self-esteem or threats t a o fragile sense o self, as in "narcissisticinjury." The experience ofshame at f the felt loss o dignify is extremely painfd, and rage serves to cover it. f Much marital violence s l e w from a shame rage cycle where the abuser, most often the man, is unable to deal with his powerless dependence.He feels shame and erupts in rage as a secondary response to the primary feeling o shame. f Adaptive mger as opposed to rage, empowers an individual t o overcome shame. It is important to assess the difference between rage and adaptive anger to know how to intervene. Intervention for reactive rage requires attunement to clients' primary feelings of shame. The rage needs first to be accepted, and then the core sense of self beneath the reactive rage needs t be explored for internal strengths. o

Therapeutic Perspectives on Workingwith Shame Pragdle SelfFacess andpn'mmy Shame Certain people with more fragile or shame-based sense of self require particular ongoing attention to the dynamis of shame. With these clients primary shame operates everywhere in therapy, governing how it i s permissible to be and what it is acceptable for them to disclose. For others, shame and loss of self-teem is important at particular moments,

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when for example support is not present when they ate revealing any vulnerable, newly forming sense of self. In other instances it is more the disclosure of a specific shame-filled experience to an accepting therapist that is a critical, potentially healing process. In thew cases revealing the shameful breaks the person's sense of isolation, while the experience of acceptance by the therapist can disconfirm the shame producing and promote greater self-acceptance. Acceptance and empathic affirmation of experience i thus most s crucial at times both of fragile vulnerability and of emerging newness (Greenberg et al,, 1993). Many clients report that the most helpful and healing aspect of treatment involves revealing their vulnerable, fragile disorganized and hidden aspects o self and having these empathicalIy f received by another human being. The experience of being confirmed,of simply being seen, heard, and accepted, despite o e s own f d i s of n' unworthiness and desperation, is highly validating. Inknrentions that attempt to interpret, advise, or fix the person, at this time, act only to invalidate and have people feel that they shouldn't feel what they feel. Attention to empathic failure in the therapy itself, as potentially invalidating and shame-inducing, is an important asp& o healing f alliance ruptures (Horvath and Greenberg 1994; Safran, Muran, and Samstag, 1994). Thus, it is not only working with who shamed clients in the past that is important, but a h working with shameinducing interactions in the present with the therapist. I additian, i order to overcome primary shame, it has to be actively n n approached, not avoided or denied. The shamed self has t come out of o hiding. This is a form of exposure in which, by facing the shame with another, it becomes more and more tolerable. Clients need to learn that, if they expose themselves to others, they will not be shamed again. They need to learn that they will not be seen as fundamentally flawed o r diminished if they rweal themselves. People also need to learn that mistakes do not mean that they are worthless, just that their behavior was at fault, rather than their whole selves being shameful. In therapy, the therapist's continual empathic affirmation, the following of each of the person's disclosures with empathic understanding and acceptance, assures them that they will not be abandoned or ridiculed again and that they can allow the shame and experience it without disintegrating. Therapy, in addition to being concerned wt providing empathic ih confirmation, also needs to focus on the reorganization o the self s f shame-producinginternal relations. This is discussed below. SAame-Producing Splits and Second9 Shame
values or introjeckd

Contempt and disgust directed at the self for violations of personal standards induce feelings of shame. Disgust is a

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primary emotion that is adaptive when directed at rejecting or expelling an offensive action, such as abuse. However, disgust and contempt directed at the self are not adaptive and evoke maladaptive Mings of shame. Thus, a person who was violated or has internalized messages of scorn or disgust from others has w sense o him or h e d f as dirty, f defective, contaminated, spoiled, or inferior. I extreme circumstances, n p p l e may view themselves as disgusting and disavow, distance, o r reject parts of themselves. Indeed, it has been argued that internally generated shame of this type, rather than guilt, is central to depression (Knufman, 1989). When a person is experiencing shame, the person may respond at any moment either with self-contempt or with shame or with both. When a person responds with self-contempt, part of the self becomes a critic, judge, and condemner. This involves a lifting of the upper lip in a contemptuous sneer and a pulling away o the head and nose from the f offensive aspect of self as though it smells rank. Shame in turn results from this self-condemnatim, for falling short of o e s goals. When the n' self is in a state of feeling ashamed, the head is hung in shame and the face may blush. The person here is highly selfxonscious and feels humiliatingly exposed as worthless and without: dignity. This i shame s that is secondary to self-contempt and disgust. I therapy a person often alternates between identifying with that part n of the self that condemns and the other part that hangs its head i shame n (Tornkins, 1963; Greenberg, 1979, 1983). I the condemnatory role, the n self experiences the emotion in which the salient object of contempt and disgust is the self. In the shamed role the self experiences the emotion in which the self is salient, that is, shame. An important therapeutic f o m i n this situation becomes one o transforming contempt f r the self into f o acceptance and self-soothing.Two-chair dialogue (Perls et al., 1951; Perk, 1969) is most helpful in a c c ~ i n g and restructuring shameproducing beliefs (Greenberg, 1983; Greenberg et al, 1993). The rmlution of this internal dialogue has been related to relief in depression and ta an alleviation of variety of forms of emotional distress, particularly insecurity and low seIf-eskm (Greenberg 1979,1983; Greenberg Elliokt, and Foerster, 1991; Greenberg et al, 1993; Greenberg and Watson, in press). Reolution of these splits mmrs when clients become aware of their mponsibility in producing the shame feelings and when they Challenge the contempt and shame messages from an internal sense of worth Wken these adaptive m p o are supported by the therapist, clients ~ are able to articulate more clearly the shaming introjects and core maladaptive beliefs about the self, and primary feelings and needs that help them to challenge the inbojecb occur. People reevaluate their harsh criticisms, become less judgmental, and no Ionger condemn themselves

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totally, They accept mistakes they may have made and become capable o more compassion f r the self. They counteract the internalized f o contempt with a newfound sense of pride (Greenberg et al, 1993). Clients need to come to accept themselves, and those who have violated their o w n standards need to cease seeing their regretted actions o errors as meaning that they are totally shameful. Although it may r sound countertherapeutic, it is highly therapeutic to turn latter forms of shame into guilt o regret. This transforms the experience ham one that r is so close to the self, that it is a part of self, to a regretted action that i a s result of, rather than a part of, the self. This can be remedied. Turning shame into guilt i these instances returns the person's sense of agency. n An error o mistake i something one can do something about, such as r s not repeating it. Interventions with secondary shame need to turn whole into parts, conveying the idea that the sense of shame i only one among s many self-organizations; is only a "part" of who the person is. it
Primary Mahiuptive Internalized Shame

The most severe therapeutic problem state involving shame appears to be internalized shame from maltreatment. Abuse leads people to feel that they must have been unworthy in order to have been abused. They internalize the shame into their core sense of self and f e d they are worthless and dirty. This is primary maladaptive shame. Below we give an example of work with this form of maladaptive, primary shame, internalized from childhood maltreatment. In this example we focus on an episode involving the restructuring of maladaptive shame in an empty chair dialogue for resolving unfinished business. The process of restructuring unfolds according to a step-like sequence that we have extracted as being the heart of this type of work with emotion (Greenberg and Paivio, in press). Steps involve (1) evoking the bad feeling, often secondary feelings such as anxiety or dread; (2) exploring these to accss the previously unavailable primary emotion:in the case of maltreatment in the example below, it is primary maladaptive shame that one finds at the core; and (3) expressing the previously unexpressed adaptive feelings and needs. h this case the needs for protection o worfh and for inviolacy are accessed; (4) maladaptive f beliefs formed at the time are accessed, beliefs suchf as "I'm worthless and despicable." (5) Adaptive emotions and needs are then supported by the therapist, and the client reorganizes around the newly mobilized feelings and needs to challenge the maladaptive belief from the newfound sense of entitlement (6) Finally, the person begins ko affirm the self. In the example below a 33-year-old man from our unfinished business project (Paivio and Greenberg. 1995) is dealing with his sexual abuse by a

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priest in his preadolescence. The therapist engages him in an empty chair dialogue with the abuser according to specified principles of unfinished business dialogue {Greenberg et al, 1993; Greenberg and Foerster, 1996), Some of the intentions guiding therapist actions are shown in brackets at the end of the therapist response. Intentions that w e noted are ones such as directing attention to intemaI experience, evoking of memories, symbolizing meaning or feelings, intensifying arousal, analyzing expression, empathic affirmation,and establishing needs or intentions.
C s Example "Like Dirt All Over Me" ae

Creating the expmerrment

T . ..And so 1 wonder if you would like to try some of that {C. yeah) .
sort to work through some stuff that you have expressed at some earlier session, some feelings o just feeling shameful and (C. u m ) Ok. f h C. Yeah, that sounds g o d . T. And my suggestion is that we work with the feelings around P just , notice what you really feel when I mention his name, notice your breathing. Can you tell m e what you're feeling? What's going on for you inside? [attend to internal experience] C . Well there's huh, kida butterflies going on (T.mhum, h u m ) i n h i s area. T That's good that you're abIe to get i touch with that, sort of a kinda . n o nervous,jittery feeling in your stomach. f C . And urn there's kin& of a, I don't b w what you call it, closing (T. tightness) in the throat. T. Uh, O ,so stay with that experience; somehow just the mention o k f these experiences with P kinda tightens. See if you can actually go back to being younge4eing twelve, eleven, around the time that all these experiences were happening. What does it feel like to be S at age twelve? [memoryevocation] C. Huh, I remember I used t have vety, physically, I used to have very o stiff style around the neck area, very stiff, very tight.

Evak Bad Feeling by Accessing Emotiond M m m y

See if you can come up with a memory o images of being with him r and maybe we can sort of try and work with your sensory experience with him, and yourself. C . Well, I haw an image. I can see one place in the halIway in our house. T Right, desaibe this. . C . Well, it's, uh, the ceiling are high, there's a light hanging from a chain, there's a stairway, uh, that winds upstairs, there's a large hallway

T.

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open and a big front door that leads onto a very large porch, and it's a bright snowy day, and T'm walking out o the door i t a large open f no space. Uh, he's coming over and now the room seems disproporbionately, you know, constrained. Well at the same time I seem disproportionately small in relation to this world, and urn everything is closed and the image.of a light, is an open image. You know I mwalking out into the ' open world, and now my world is closed in and very, very strict ways. T. Ok, just stay with this sense of feeling dosed i . Ok, check what it n feels like to be closed--have everythrng so closing i on you. What does n it make you feel inside? Check that feeling,A at 12, what is the feeling? (Attend) C. Well, I'm feeling. uh, under control, uh, under outside control and feeling dread, I'm feeling . . . T. Stay with the dread; go once again into the feeling inside. C. Well, it's the butkerflie. T. Uhuh uhuh, so somehow, stay with the dread and the queazy and the busterflies in your stomach, queazy feeling, somehow just dreading that he is corning ...what are you dreading about him? what he will do or . . . [Symbolize] C. Well, I'm dreading the effect it's had, u n he mated a situation r, which there's we've done things. Now they have to be total secrets from everyone and he's an adult and has power and I'm a child and I don't, and it isn't like a secret with friends o of the same age; that's not that r kn-ts not that kind of s e t It, um, it's the type of secret that would idi' make you know that closes my life in on every side. You know, if the secret was known by my friends, by my family, urn, my whole social life and my whole social world can't know about this secret, and so he has control over m e now. T. And somehow the feeling of just being alone with this secret . C. Well, yeah, being alone under his control, you know it's like I'm living wi& my parents and I'm really under his control, and som&ow my world has just colIapsed around this, urn, one thing, this secret, and uhuh there are many secrets and.. .I don't even want to spend time with him. I mean even aside from the sexual stuff, it's just the (T. ok) unbalance in my life. T. So say that again, say that again, and imagine him in front of you, "I don't even want to spend t m with you" [htemifyl ie C. No, I don't want to spend time with you; I don't want to do all h s e activities. You know because you keep pushing that on me. T. Uhuh, somehow notice what you're doing with your hands, (Client i s making sweeping and dismissive gestures with his hands.) Right, ok, as you speak, you're doing this, so do this some more, put him there, and what do you say?"I don't even w n to be with you." [Expression] at

..

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C. "Sweepinghim out of my life, dirt (laugh). T OK so stay with that actually, and do that some more. What are your . hands saying? C. These hands are sweeping the dirt away from me, the filth.
A c 5 Primary MuIaduphe Shame ce 5

T. Right so just filth, tell more about the filth on you. C. It makes me feel so humiliated; it i like having dirt on me, on my s
clothing around my body, because people can see it. They could see it, maybe they aren't seeing it, but they could see it and this could be embarrassing and social; Urn, I could be socially ostracised, urn, I dan't want it on me. T. See if there is some memory of what he did that comes up A. Uhuh, uhuh, just check what you're &ling inside. See if you can remember something that he did which made you feel dirty."[memoryEvocation] C. Well, I'm, I'm feeling ashamed and I don't want to say these things. ..- 1don't want to say them because I m ashamed of them. ' T Uhuh, of course, wanting to bury them. . C. We did things that make me feel so ashamed that even a s an adult I don't want ta wen, 1 can remember them, but I dan't even want to say them because they're just too . . yeah and humiliated. They make me feel low and they make feel, I always felt that after we did something that I would go and relate to 0 t h people I carried that with me, that they could somehow perceive or it didn't matter whether they could or not, that I had sex with him or did this or that. I mean I could perceive it, 1 mean I had just done this right or had done this the other day and now I'm playing with my friends. Now I'm with my parents and now I'm here, and those memories were there, and like I said I just hoped he would disappear and go away all the time. T Somehow powerless and just carrying this feeling. [Empathic . affirmation] C. Well, because there were these constant experiences and then I would take those experiences back with me to all the things I did and .. . urn you know the rest of my Iife was urn o could have been interesting r and fun and exciting but it was made to be, urn, everything else in my life was just tainted by this,. . . 1 carried the memory with me. I carried the understanding and the thought with me. T. Right Somehow the feeling inside of just being feeling bad and somehow dirty and having to keep this secret, to hide (C. yeah), is what sort of you carried into situation to situation and that kinda colared how you felt in relating to other people. [Empathic affirmation, symbol*] C. Ya, well, we were doing shameful things and I felt ashamed, and I felt, you know I felt bad! Urn I felt bad, urn, I felt ashamed of myself all the time and that people if they ever found out it would, but even if they

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didn't find out, I was ashamed of myself all the time, but at the same time I felt out of control. T. Somehow feeling dirty but also not having control because he did this; he (C. Right) he imposed this. [Symbolize]
Amsing Adaptiue Anger toRestructure Shame and MaIadoaptive BeZig5

T. Tell him you make me feel dirty, try saying that to him, s 1want you o to get away. [EstablishIntents] C. Yeah, I want to, I don't know, cleanse my life of you . . filth, worthless, garbage, junk, . . . like something dirtying everything i my n life, like someone who came over and just slung mud at you all the time, and you just, urn, you know his presence is just. . . T. Uhuh, so somehow stay with that feeling o mud being thrown at f you, just something shitty being put on you. 'Fell him how mgry you are about that, him shaming you. C. Ya, I am angry. You slime bag, you coerced me, you used m , sure I e was curious, all adolescent boys are sexually curious, that doesn't give you the right.. . T Ya,you had no right to use m e . . telI him. . C. Yeah, you had no right t do what you did. I'm not dicky. You"re u dirty.

In this episode, adaptive anger and, later in treatment, disgust at the abuser were accessed to develop a stronger sense of self, to combat the internalized negative beliefs that the self was bad and to define a boundary between himself and that experience. Later in this therapy, the client's need for the missed protection from others, particularly from his parents and authorities, was also a c c d and used to mobilize internal support and promote the development of his sense of entitlement to safety and his right not to be violated. This mobilization of unmet needs for safety and protection was used to combat any remaining beliefs he had that he was to blame. Client reports and data from questionnaires after this session and after treatment indicated that the above episode

represented a significant moment of change far this client.

Conclusion
Moment by moment assessment of different types of emotional states that leads to differential intervention is at the heart of a process-oriented approach to treatment. In this article w e have discussed the identification of a variety of different shame states and the different types of interventions that are likely to be most helpful. This provides a differentiated view of the role of shame in therapy.

Gestalt Rm'm,1(3):221-244,1997

Self and Shame:A Gestalt Approach

G O R D O N WHEELER, Ph9.

Shame, both a universal human feeIing and also one of the most potentially disorganizing ofall affect experiences, has been ~latively e g l e e d n in clinical writing until recent years and even today mrnains in unclear foms in much of our dominant clinical tradition and thinking about selfmodels. Both this neglect and this lack of foms are much clarified by a Gestalt model of self-experience and s e l f - p r o m a perspective which raises paradigmatic questions for our thinking about human natuE and relational process. h w i n g on the tradition of affect theory and Goodman's radical =vision o traditional self-thebry, this article examines f the terms of the underlying assumptions about self and relationship that have informed our traditional c i i a models and offers a new model of lncl shame, support, and their dynamic interplay in self-pmcess and self integration. Shame then emerges as a key signal affect in a field model of =If, much as anxiety stood in this mle in an older, individualist model. Implications f r clinical practice a* then considered, with an examination of o five thematic clusters of possible thempeutic interventions, aimed at bringing shame issues to light i the therapeutic mlationship itself, and n offering the promise of transforming self-inhibition and disorganization into new self-development and growth.

HAT IS SHAME, and why do w e consider an understanding of shame dynamics to be besentid in working with individual and relational pracess?l What does this understanding add to the

Gordon Wheeler, Ph,D, i a member d the teaching hculty of the G d t M t u t e of s Cleveland and Director o GIC Press. H is i private practice of psychothapy with f e n children and adults in Cambridge, Masachtwtb, and teaches the G M t model widely amund the world. l~he ideas i this article and the model presmtd here are very much a work i n n progress, developed collahratively over a period of several years with Robert G. Lee, PhW., coeditor of The Voice of Shame, Siknce and Cmnection in Psychothexqy (Lze and Wheeler, 1996). For critical input and support, by no means always in agreement with us, we are aim indebted t Sonia and Edwin Nwis, Iris Fodor, and the members o the New o f England G-talt Study G m p , as well as to Jim Kepner, Mary Arm Kraus, Mark McConville, 1 h Melnick, Malmlm Parlett, Jean-Marie Robine, the GISC Writem' Conference, and our many stimulahng colleague and participanb at AAGT, GIC Child

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process picture of human experience and behavior we develop using other lenses and perspectives; what might we miss without it? Why is it h i the experience o shame and its dynamic reIationship to other f emotions have been relatively neglected in both psychodynamic and Gestalt literature until recent years, and what does this neglwt tell us about our underlying concept of human nature and human experience and development? In this article I will be arguing that the mIe of shame in organizing and modulating experience i general cannot be s e n and understood clearly n from the older, fundamentally individualistic point of view that has characterized much psychodynamic and early Gestalt writing because o f the inherent limitations o that view of human nature and pmcess. f Rather, this dynamic sale artd its implications only come t light when o w e take up a more relational and more phenomenologically based view of self and self-process, one that can accommdate the crucial dimension ofsupport (and its absence) in experience and development. The Gestalt model of self, outlined briefly by Paul Goodman and his colIaborators (Perk, Hefferline and Goodman, 1951) provide a richer basis for this new tmders.t.andingo shame feelings and shame dynamics, while at the f smm time a coonside~ationo the interactive dynamic o shame and f f support in self-process helps us to fill out the picture and the self model sketched so radically and suggestively by Goodman some 50 years ago. But first some words o definition. Shame i a broad term, and one f s often used fluidly or Suzzily to refer to (I)an emotion (in the sense o a f complex experiential schema including cognition/interpretation as well as sensation o feeling); (2) an experience, which i dose to the first sense r s as long as we understand the term emotion as including cognition and (social) construction; (3) an "affect" (in Tomkins's sense of a more basic o innate body sense, ?before" the operation o interpretation and social r f construction, though certainly that 'before" is very much under challenge nowadays; see, e-g., Tomkins [1963];also Kuehlwein 119961 for an example o current constructivist challenges to a "pure affect" point o f f view); (4) an interpersonal transaction, as i the verb "to shame," and/or n
an internal "state,"a kind ofpersonality or self-disorganization(see, e.g., Bradshaw 119941 or any o a number o other writers i the self-help f f n and recovery movements); and (5) several other senses, including an unhappy event ("what a shame"), a characterization or imputation ("shame on you!"), a blot on honor or decency (a ' i g shame," wn "shameless"),and so on,Moreover, it is common t see all these uses i o n
and A d o f m t Conheme, Cambridge Family htitutc, and rWmMW other workshop and confermce settings. To be sure, Robert Lee himself would s r p r w and has at pressed m e o thme ideas differently and i not rrsponsible for inrompletions ar unclarities here f s (see, e.g., Lee, 1 9 ) 95.

an immense range o intensities, from the mildest social embmmmnent f YI'm ashamed t say.. .") to an acute level which we associate d i n i d l y o with strong risk of suicide or other violence. A I of these uses have valid E i y if not dways dear bondark, and we will use and examine the term t, i all these senses h e d o p e f u l l y with clarity about which sense we are n talung up w h . I addition, a acid part ofthis p m t a t i m will be t n o introduce yet another s n e o this deeply familiar, often poorly distines f guished duster of meanings. This will be our understanding o shame as f a social field perception or conditim, contrasted with support, which we will offeras the indispensable missing link between the social behavior o shaming (which we link to withdrawal of support), the apprehensive f feelings o anticipatory shame (which is close to Kaufman's ;[I9801 f term "internalized shame" ) and the subjective or phenomenological experi, ence o shame, in interadion always with other thoughts and M i . f This is where a redefinitiono self is cmaal, in our view, t~ darifymg the f confusing and sometimes contradictory clinical discussion of shame h current literature. Likewise this i whem the Gestalt modd, w e submit, i s s essential to that new and more experiencenear definf tion of self.

T h e Experienceof Shame: Shame as Zsect and Facling

To begin with, when we speak of shame we are talking about afeeling, in a broad cluster or continuum o affect that ranges all the way from mild f everyday embarrassment and chagrin t the acute states of panic and o
paralysis that most o all o us have experienced at one time or another in r f more than a few o us experience chronically, o organize f r our personal field and styles of contact to avoid experiencing, often in debilitating ways. Here the experience af shame i above a l a sense of s l personal inadequacy o some kind, the sinking app~hension I a m not f that going to m e a w e up to something or somebody, that I will be shown up as deficient (or possibly too much) in some important way. At their most extreme, shame experiences are among the most intensely negative and debilitating, even Iifethreatening feeline that we can have. This is because the experience of shame in extreme forms has a way of cutting to the bone o our sense o basic worth and capacity to sumiue and cope, a kind f f o background feeling that underlies ather feelings and experiences and f may be subjectively felt as un&mgeable--and therefore hopel- a a t given painful moment. That i, if shame seems to have to do with my s "bein&" and not just my "doin&" then there may also seem to be "nothing 1can do about it," which in turn i why s t a m of extreme shame s are r e c o p k d clinically as s t a t e ofgreat vulnerability and reactivity for self-and other-destructiveness(seediscussion in Lee 1995; also Wheeler and Jones, 1996).h the related feeling w e call guilt, P may feel that I have "done a bad thmg" or even am "a bad pwson8';still, there is the possiour liv-d

bility o reparation (guilt derives from the old German gelt, a payment or f compensation), some sense o strength and agency, which could be f turned from bad t good. In extreme shame, by contrast, I am power]-, o unable t "face"people or life from such a position o w&ess: thus the o f close conmction between s h e and sudden explosions ofdisorganizing rage, turned against the self or the world. Here is the description of extreme shame states offered by Gershen K a u h (1980), perhaps the foremost o the affect theorisb writing f today about shame and how deeply feelings of shame can cut into the core of our basic h e m a s o viability and selfeskem: f
Shame iitself js a mtrme to the self, It i the affect ofindignityt o n s f

defeat, of tram-ion, of inferiority, and of alienation, No other affect is closer ta the experienced d f . None i more central for a s source of identity. Shame is felt as an inner torment, as a sichess of the soul. It is the most poignant experience o the self by the self.. f a wound felt from the inside, dividilng us both from ourselves a d horn manother.

Shame i the affect which i the s s

source o many complex and f disturbing inner states: depression, alienation, self-doubt, isolating loneliness, paranoid and schizoid phenonema* compulsive disorders, splitting of the self, perfectionism, a deep sense o inferiority, f inadequacy or failure, the s d e d borderline conditions and disorders of nateissism. These are the phenomena which are roofed i shame.. . Each is mot& in s i p F c a n t intmprsanal failure.. . . n

(italicsadded).

contact with others becomes intolerable . speech is silenced. Exposure itself eradicates the words, t h e d y causing shame to be almost incommunicable to others.. . . The excruciating observation of the self which results, this torment of seIdidousness, becomes so acute as to create a binding, dmmt paralyzing effect upon the self [p.vii]

The binding eff& of shame invalves the whole self. Sustained eye

..

Plainly K a h has been there, as have w e ail to one d e p or another. And small wonder then if shame feelinp are also among the most denied o all the affeds, to the self m well as to others-with the f result that the more time we spend studying and thinking and talking about shame, the more we come to recognize or hypothesize it elinidly by the defensive reactions and compensatory strategies which ate often its hallmarks: denial of feeling, anger, rage, criticalness and other corntershamhg moves, self-righteousnew, character attacks, deep anxiety

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and self-medication i all its forms including addition, and finally n violence large and small, toward others and/or toward the seIf. In extreme forms, feelings W acute and this isolating simply cannot be borne and stayed with for long-r at least not without the m ma u f1 levels o relational support that can be found, at times, i deep fiendf n ship, intimate loving contact, &in p u p and spiritual experiences, or psychotherapy, all at their best. At the same time, if a given feeImg i so unacceptable or so unbearable s as o h to be denied, even to the self, then how are we t recognize it at o all? H o w do we know, p e d y or cliicalIy, when angerI say, or depression is usefully thought o as in part a reaction t or defense f o against shame, and when this is more our suggestion t h t e client's h own reality? This is of course a question that wmes up in any clinical dialogue, about any feeling states and experiences. As clhi~ans, evert if w e rej& an older authoritian or rigidly interpretive stance, we still know that our own attention is directed somewhere, that that direction i partly s d e b m i n d by our own theory and clinical experience, and that in this w a y our theoretical biases can have a powerful iduence on what t e h client attends to and haw he or she makes meaning ofher/his own experience. The answer here, developed below, will be not to argue right d wrong clincial answersrbut rather to ask where our clinical conversation will be supported to go, what we md the client together will attend more b, if w e assume as w e do that hidden shame may o h be playing a much greater role in experience than we have often realized in the past. Specifically, the introductiond the shame topic will serve to refocus our attention on the much neglected issue of support, i the context of the n revised model of self which w e daim the Gestaft: mode1 offers. That model, its impIications for issues of support and shame, and some ofthe clinical impliatim and applications of it will all be dweIoped below, after considering some of the ways shame has been understood by other mod& i the past. n

A&& Thcoqc Sharne as an & k t Modulator

Up to this point w e have been talking about shame as a fee*

much

like other f e e l i n v g e r , say, or sadness, excitement, fear, and sa on-nIy perhaps wen more aversive than o h r negative feeline, at te t m s anyway, because of the isolation and impotence which Kaufman ie speaks o ,which are s often associated with extreme feelings o shame. f o f But shame as w e see it is something more than "just a feeling" parallel t and constructed like other feelings i our experiential process. This o n something more i already reflected in the language of affect theory, s which addthe partidm relationship of shame feelings not just to

the world a d md the people in that world, but t other feelo and motivational dusters as well. Both Tomkins (2987) and Kaufman (1963), as well as other writers on affect theory, speak o the role of shame as a f "modulator a W , " one whose function is to govern or modulate the intensity o other affects,ultimately to protect the self-parkicularly the f affects Tomkins calls "in-t-exatement," which are of mwse all thse feelings that push or pull us out into the world, toward some desired object or state or pition. That i, when I a m moved to extend myself s out into the social field--and t that extent am exposed t adverse o o reaction or even dangw-then I'm immediately in need o some other f cognitive/ affective feedback Imp, something that can take ongoing information about my sense d '%ow I'm doing" and feed it back i a n way that will regulate o modulate this "going out" energy. Without this r kind o m d v e process structure, not just my quality o social living f f but m y actual survival will likely be compromised. Shame, then, is something I a m "pt feel (and all the affects are basically o "pmired," in his view), as a sort of safety regulator when the social ground doesn't feeI firm enough t support my e x k d h g myself any o further. (Of course, there are many other considerations and feelings that may make us pull back from a given overture, before or after the fad, mostly having to do with estimation o bad practical or emotional f outcome.Shame i particular, i the affectW r y view and i our view, s n n i that it actual1y acts to dampen the positive f d m g s or desires n t h e d v ~ which i not so much the case with other feelings that may , s

come up, OF with practical outcome -rnents.) To put this affect theory discussion in more everyday personal terms, w e may say that a state o need or desire is always, at least potentially, a f stafe of enrlnerability. When I need something I am t that extent depeno dent on the field around me;and dependency as an experience i aiways s evwtive o issues of exposure, risk, power, and controL Shame is the f flashing d light waming me to pull back from a risky exposure, some overture which is not going to be well received in the social field. This pullback may be situational and momentary, as in unexpected embarrassment o humiliation after the exposure, or it may k more anticipar tory, protecting me from k e public exposure iWIf (but at times still h extremely aversive privately, which I may well struggle to conceal). If t h e expierrces o public or anticipatory shame are severe enough and f chronic enough, then the dynamic interaction of shame and desire or need may o course become earlier and earlier, until eventually we lose f dl awareness of our own desire and feelings in a given kind ofsituation and experience only the sinking or deadening feeling that that stimulus comes to evoke. This is then what Kaufman calls "internalid shame" (1980),which he regards, as we do in slightly d i b t language, as a

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problematic interruption i personal process, a kind of distortion of the n o r i p d , func2iOnal/protective operation ofthe shame dynamic. All Zhis is highly contextual, fundamentally constructivist, and deeply phenomen010gica, in the "experience-near"-which is to say, very much in tune with c u m t fhinking in developmental theory and cognitive/affecSive models (and with the fundamental precepts o Gestalt f psychology) (see, e.g, Lewin, 1935; also Astington, Harris, and Olson, 1988). But it i net at all close to our dominant received clinical models of s self theory and therapeutic intervention. Rather, those dominant models, in particular the older psychodynamic and behaviorist models, are based on an entirely different self-model, which yields a quite different tmderstandii o shame-to the extent that they support any useful clinical f discourse ancl dialogue b u t s h e experience at all (see, e.g, Mastson, 1976; also Bijou and Baer, 1961, for a 'behavioral approach to developmentaP theory). To see just how different--and how limited-that inheria view is, we d t turn briefly to the background ofpsychoano aIytic self theory itself. This background is the individunlisf parndigm 4 human nahrre, a mode1 and a heritage, w e believe, which is most usefully deconstructmi and recontextualized by a Gestalt field model o self. f

The P a y d d p u i e Model i the Context ofIndivid& n

Traditionally in the West, our understanding of self and reIationship has come out o , and been deeply colored by, the dminant paradigm pf f individmlism as an underlying worldview and mode3 of human nature and process. This m d e l has roots that reach at least as far back as the Greeks, and then forward and on down to us i a consistent stream, n through the JudecKhrktian tradition, Rmaissance humanism, Enlightenment and 1 9 h t u r y scientism, and on i t our own century, where no psychology has attempted t break with its own tradition as a branch o o f speculative philosophy and ground itself in empirical process. Fundamentally, individualism presupposa (and it is the nature of a paradigmatic view, as Kuhn [I9701has usefully pointed out t presuppose, more o oftenthan t state openly) that something i the essence of each individo n ual person preexists relatiaship and context, and exists meankgful1y apart from the social environment. Thus tfie individual is in some important sense more real than relationship o community, which are not r themselves part o our basic makeup but are more i the nature o pragf n f matic arrangements t acrrommodate individuai needs. o This view is sometimes calIed the "monadic" selb-model, after the EnZightenment philosopher Leibniz, who posited that the basic building blocks of reality were "windotvlessmonads," individual soul/sefvs set in motion by the will o God, and then spinning and bouncing off each f

other endleasly, all according to Nature's laws. This view-minus God, o course-reacIres its apogee in psychology in the work o F r e d , whose f f complex system aims to show how, without God and without any assumption o basic benevolence, people could nwerthelw form bonds, f live i society, and possibly reach some uneasy truce with their own n savage biological nature. People do form attachments in the classical Freudian system, but the bonds they form are by definition secondary and instnrmental i nature, a fragde compromise between kill and be n killed, wer at the point of reverting to an outbreak natural ag%ressiveness and rapacity. The highest value o the system, as befits an imperialf ist age, is masfmy, including importantly self-mastery, which in this model i coextensive with mastery ofnature. Any "social instinct" is just s a soothing fiction, much Eke religion or the "spiritualism" that was popular in the times (altruism i-If i one o the defenses added by Anna s f Freud t.o the "classic nine" defense mechanisms she gleans from he^ fathefs writings; s e A. Freud, f 936). And if separateness is our basic nature (and mastery our necessary survival goal), t m maximum self-dwelopment, the high& realization h o that nature, will be found i the developmental ideal of mnximum f n autonomy, -mum mtioml indepenhcefrom other people. The child, by nature and by necessity, is dependent; the mature adult, by contrast, is independent o the social field, self-driven and self-judging by an intern[ f skandard, and in a real sense cut off from connections with others {for discrussion and critique o t i self-ideal from a contemporary feminist f hs perspective, see any o the valuable works o Gilligan [e-g., 19821 or the f f writers o the Stone Center and their We11esIey assuciates [e-g, Miller, f 1976;Wenky et al. 19861. But how to get from infantile dependency t nature autonomy md o field independence? The answer i the centerpiece o classid Freudian s f developmental theory and brine us back t o w discussion o shame and o f shame theory here. The developmental solution lies o course in the f oedipal crisis, the crewendo o inwitabIe conflick between the rapacious f animal nature o the growing child (presumably male) and the demands f o a possessive and presumably equaIly predatory male parent. h u g h f identification with the ar (again, see discussion in A. Freud, 19361, the father's dominance is internalized as the superego o the growing f boy/child, and thus the standards and demands o society, which keep f animal aggression and Ifiido i check, are intemalizd and carrid on. n With resolution of this crisis, p i i f rqlaces skame, us a s o d (or socially dm'wd1madulafor on inrpuIse, w e f i f e , mtd behavior (S.Freud, 1 3 ) To the 93. extent that the individual remains subjeck t shame fdings, he or she i o s by definition immature. The '%he or she" is important here because another implication o this system, and one much critiqued by feminist f and other writers, i that women by definition nwer achieve this hll s

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autonomy from the social field or a full transformation from &f mntrol fhrwgh shame t seEf-cmtrol through guilt (mrnembering here that we are o talking about classical psychodynamic h u r s e , not the many modern revisions, away from drive theory and toward "object relations" and related newer schools). This p d e r dime follows necessarily from the fact that women are nwer subjed to the dull castration h e a t of oedipal rivalry and thus nwer identify fully with the aggressor, never completely intemalii the superegs remain, by definition, in a o condition o more or less w t e d devePopment: more fieldSependent, f less abstract in moral judgments (on this subject see Gilligm's [1982j critique o Kohlberg), and w e subject to sham. f Thus shame i the infantile form of guilt--the affect of: s children, women, "primitive" cultures, and immature, mother-dependent menbut not felt at all, suppody, by the healthy, mature male individual,in fully evolved (iz, indlividualist) Western societies. In other words, shame itself is sham+I, a sign o weakness, pathology, and immaturity. Small f wonder then if the classid mode! did not and could not serve as a supportive theoretical grownd for & W o n o this complex and f troubling (and sociable) a W , the most "field-relaw of all the afkds (even including love and desire, which are related to the field in this model only in an " o b j j or d d w r g e m d e ; altruism, remember, i not s a basic impulse but a secondary defense agailast basic impulses). And thus we find little attention paid t shame in psydmanalytic o writing, at least until about a p e r a t i o n ago, and even h many chi, d writers continued to be marked by the "self-imisolation" flavor of classical drive theory and thus seem ill at ease with the way attention t o shame tends t take us toward a focus on some re1dionaI disconnect, past o or pment (a failure o empathic b r i n g in the language of self f psychology), and struggled t find a way to contain the shamediscussion o w i t h the framework o the isolated Freudian seIf (see, for exampleI f Morrison's [I9871dissent from Nathanson's d d - c o n t e x t view of shame far an example of this skmggle within the psychoanalytic tradition; affect theorists, from Darwin [I8721 to Kaufman [I9801 and b e [1995], tending as they do to view the self in a social context, have not had this difficulty. See also Wheeler, 1995). I our view, this struggle t contain clinical discourse abaut shame n a within the bounds o the separate Freudian self and la have a meaningful f discussion of shame i purely o heavily internal terms (much like the n r Freudian discussion o, say, anxiety) cannot succeed. The reason for this f has ta do with the contradiction between our experience o shame, so f doquently rend& by Kaufmsn above, with its f l theme6 of being et seen, s h h k n g and wishing to disappear from view, on the one hand, and the terms of the d i v i d d i s t self model, which has t assert o that feelings like this a e not universal and deeply s e l f - a r p i z h ~ r but

[lw

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exceptional, pathological, and developmentally infantile (and fm'mtre) (see discweion i Wheeler and Jon=, 19961, n In simpler, more experiential terms, w e can say that we just ae' like rnt that' and our living experience isn't like that. Even among succwsful and privileged adult men--supposedly the group most completely impervious to shame in the psychodynamic/individualist model-it i coms monplace, now that the subject is "up; i the popular culture, to hear n people say, ruefully, that si%tuficantparts o their lives and experience f are at least partly organized around managing and avoiding shame, while the corporate bushes and professional culture of this society are manifestly deeply structured around dimemiom o status, defemce, f and fiercely subtle gradations o hiermchy-a world, in the words o one f f o our management trainees, af "shameor be shamed." f Affect theory offers a picture doser to the world we h o w and live, o f a self guided by affect (and the "meta-afkt" of shame) i its negotiation n ofl the social world. Yet such a picture, with the social-field emphasis inherent i a tradition derivd from evolutionary m r c h and theory, n neglects the dynamic "inner" wodd o personal history and selb/social f construetion o meaning which the psychodynsunic model did at least f address itself t (which is why, in our view, the psychodynamic model o has been dominant for so long, despite its many and often-cited difficulties in reconciling theoretical constructs with empirical research and fell

subj&ive experience). A comprehensive and radicdy new approach to all thee i s e ,we sus believe, is found in the terms o the Gestalt field model o self and f f "contact." It is t this new model that we turn our attention now, first i o n its theoreticaI approach to these and related questions o self-process and f self-experience and then to ils cliical applications.

We've h d y said that down through Western tradition, "self"has been taken as denoting something deeply private and internal-very close to our received tradition and discourse about " s o u l ' f - - s o m e ~that e n d m and defines the individual and marks his or her existence prior to and apart h m (and possibly after) the social field o relationship and f connectedness. The problem then, in self theory as i philosophyy has n always been, how does this separate and private entity connect up with the world? Mbniz held, basicdly, that it d-n'f (the monads or individual soul-kernels were "windowless"); connection is only i the mind o n f God. Descarks struggled with the qustion and posited a dual nature: body belongs t the world; soul or mind to another realm (which leaves o us where we started--how does "soul" influence "body"?) Spinoza tried

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bo finDesuwb's dualism, with a mow subtle dualism of his own: ' M y " and "mind" or "soul" were two "parallel aspects" of divinity4 bit o pantheism for which he was won excommunicatedfrom his Jewish f mmmunity and rowdy condemned by the Church for good measure. In the 19th century, with the asemdance o a more atheistic materialism, the f old "mind4mdy" problem was said t have been resolved-in favor of o biology, which became the new ground for self theory. And yet s u b j e c tivity and self-experience &d, and renained to be explained. The subjective, f Zt difference between an "inner mt private experience e o f and self-organizing drive and a m , m the m e hand, and an "outer realm," o the social and physical environment on the other, was still the f organizing difference underlying the experience3 o awareness and sense f of self. Thus in this century the new philosophical movement o f phenomenology, articuIatedby Husserl and others, attempted to a d d m these ancient questions from a new point of view, one based on the terms and given structures o subjective experience itself. f The Gestalt writer and social critic Paul Goodman, deeply s k p d in an earlier, more radical Freud and also i the works of h t and Musserl, n drew on these a d other sources to attempt a new and more s o d a approach t the old ''human nature" problem and t articulate a new o o approah to the o d problems o self, self-experience, and self-process as l f a sourn or organizer o agency i the behavioral field. Basing his d e l f n on the then-new insights o .the Gestalt movement i psychology, f n Goodman (like Kohut and many others of his contemporaries) emphasized the organizingfcmtrtich'msf capacities of the p e m n as the essential function and defining activity af the prt>cesses we call "self (Perk e al, t 1951). But what is it exactly that is being organized, tuad how dees "self" or "self-ptocess"accomplish this -tial activity, so that what w e get i s both the cohesive "selfexperience" emphaskd by Kohut (1977) and coherent action in a complex and intensely sodal world? GbodmEul"s answer, which i enormously fruitful f r constnrcting an "experiences o near" self model, was to reloente d, decentering it from the "inner individual" t a supraordinate position i relation to the whole field, o n "outer"as well as "inner"(or as he would say, "at the boundary"). W e may reformulate a QdmarGbased argument this way: first there is the field, into which I am born. This field i everything that is, and thus s everything that f have to draw on and be a part o , jn the ongoing f w a t i v e process of setf-organkation. Awareness i by definition the s capacity to respond t the field; self-awareness i the awameS6 that 1am o s doing that, while I'm doing it. In other words, the most basic characteristic o experience, for the self-aware subject, is a. sense o difference or f f boundary i the field (as Goodman would put it+ n felt, qualitative difference i experience between "inside" and "outside" o , in everyday n r terms,between "me"and "you."I must be awam of both these d m , to

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live and grow; that i, E have to orient to both the inner world o desk s f {again, to take Goodman's term) and the outer world o people and f things. L f m i s t s , in fact, in relating the one realm to the other, hte ie grating the world o needs and desires (and dislikes and fears) with the f world o resource3 and opportunities (and frustrations and dangers+ f this is what living i, i experimtia1 or phenomenological terms. s n Wf, i process terms, is the acfinify of that itztegrntion; thus self i n s "located," Goodman argues, not somewhere deep inside, i the secret n reco the individual psyche, but "at the b o u d q , ' ' I a position to f n a d on and integrate the whole field of experience, "inner" as well as "outer," into coherent, usable wholes of understandii d g , and action i the field (or perhaps w e should say "ofthe field," since self i n s 'nota separate entity, apart from the field, but rather a sort o position, o f r metapasition, in or o it; serfi we might say, is a "point o en'#" and an f f activity in and of that field). Now stripped of phenomenoIogica1 jargon, this is a wholly "mmmo~icd" position about self and self-pGoodman would be the first to proclaim--and one h t m e s the test of being et #I experience-near," as ea modd that has the same "feel" as the living processes it is meant to represent. But the jmplications of it are quite radical, in some subtle and some not-so-subtle ways, for our under standing of human relationships in general, o shame experiences i selff n pmess, and o that special kind o relationship we c l psychotherapy. f f al First o all, note that in this perspective it suddenly no longer makes f sense, really, t speak o "self and other," in our familiar everyday way or o f i clinical discou~se(much less o "self versus other," which was the n f flavor at least o much clinical writing i the k i t century o psychology's f n f existence as a self-conscious discipline). Rather, "self"is the organizing, field-resolving process that yields a sense o "me" in the first place and a f sense of you, w "not meF''at the same time. You are a part o my field and f thus a part o my self, which organizes that field mearungfully for me. f You are in a different place in my field from my own place, but we are not and m o t be separate in any ultimate sense. Thus the problem of aplainjng relationship, or relatedness, which the new "self-in-relationship" theories try to do by adon relational needs to a psychodynamicdly derived self-theory, doesn't: really come up (see for example Miller, 1986). R a h , the field is understood as afield of relatedness, which is itself the ground of self-prom, a constructivist act resolving that field into a coherent "point o view." f h the same way, t e field of relationshipand self-processis inherently h m intersubjec6r've field. Your "iIUW" p m , like mineI i a park o the s f whole field. Yours is a part of my fidd, and mine i a part of your field. s Our experiential fields, in this smse, interpenetrate; and certainly my ability t negotiate the field and reach some satisfymg integration of o

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need and outcome i crucially dependent on my ability t know s o something,at least h u t the inner worlds o other people. This kind o f f intersubjective bowing i developed surd refined dialogically, through s inquiry and active listening--as for that matter i my knowing o my s f own inner life, which is dependent, at least developmentally, on some intersubjective reception and inquiry from others, which let m e begin to know something about how to structure &at sensate worfd with language and meaning. Plainly with this mode1 and this approach w e are in a quite different discourse a d a different realm here from the 19thmtury positivist world of classical Freudian metapsychology--a different world where self i understom! not only in process terms (as opposed t the older s o entity or "homunculus" model), but as an organizing dynamic that i s coextensive with the whole field of experience and not just the "inner" part of that field. Plainly t , in turn will have important implicam this tions for our notions o health, relationship, even plitics, as well as for f clinical work i general-and shame theory i particular. n n

UnderstandingShame from a G e d t Fidd Ptrspective

As we have seenI if the pinnacle of healthy self4evelopment involves CEetachmentjhm the soci~lfteld~ shame has t do in some way with our and o interpersonal reception, then by definition shame will be seen as the affect o w e h e s s and failure, and developmental arrest, and win itserf be f shame-tinged attd f a h o as a subjecf. But in the mntexhd self model we have been outlining in the section above, them's no such thing as "detachmentfrom the sorial field:-r rather, it is that detachment itself that would be seen as problematic, even patllogical (and indeed, the caricatud male developmental ideal in the cIassical psychdynamic system is something we might have a hard time distinguishing meaningfully from a schizoid structure8 or pod'bly an endemic post-traumatic stress syndrome, as a character style; again, t3zis is a point that has been raised, i somewhat different terms,by a number of feminist critics o the n f older drive theory model). The issue, in a field mode1 of self process, i not a simple bipolar one s of attachment/detachrnent (with attachment understood as dependency, and dependency typed as weak and dangerous). Rather, the issue i what s kinds o integratd resolutions qf i n w and outer world me possible, which f paths to integration of the whole field (which i living itself) are open s and which ones are dosed, which are supported and which a e r wrsupparted, both developmentally for the individual person and as dynamic conditions in the current field. In personal terms, what parts of

myself, what urges and desks, what thoughts and feelings, can be receivtd a d mnnected with in my social environmmt (immediate o r symbolic)? What parts will meet with resonance and energetic response (including at times energetic opposition), and on the other hand which pa* wilI be met with a pulling away, a dimnnect, often in an overtly belittling or punishing form that we think o as active shaming? That is, f in this model w e understand shame as the ofled 4 thaf disconnect in the freld, that sense o the field pulling away from me, not receiving m ,with f e all khe judgment and associated feeling that are carried by that field structure. Shame, that is, i the experience o an unwilling (to me) s f discorneck with my vital &a1 field (not to be confused with opposition or limits, which may well be felt as a kind of engagement, and are not necessarily shaming). But--and here is where the clifferenee i self models m k s an w o e n ae mous m c e in how w e conceive our clients' (and our own) experience-the "field" we are talking about, in this perspedive, i not just my s "envimnment," not just "'object" or "other" to me, not just "my enviment," i the sense of something "outside myself." The field in n this sense (and i our lived experience, w e would argue) is an essentisl n and integral part 4n tnlJ as essential a realm of experience and connectty edness as m y own inner world. The field, that is, is "my world," in the same sense that my inner world is "mine;" and a break in identification, in Lhis sense o ownership and self-identity on the "outer" level is actuf ally as disturbing and potentidly damaging as we know a break in that kind o self-identity is when it is felt In relation to the "inner self" (see f discussion i Kohut, 1977). Of course, it goes without saying that such a n sense of break or alienation (literally, "otherness") in identification with khe "outer" world is one o the hallmarks o modem Western culture and f f identity. Under this field model of the d ,this is seen not as the f "existential truth" o the human condition, but as the clinical pathology f of our t i m ~ . A break in the field, as we understand it, is always at 1 t potentially a h k in %If-process and cohesive serf-infegrdion, which i to say,a break i s n the self. I the context o development, the growing ( fierd-depenn f d dent) M d , as we h o w , is highly sensitive to breaks and threats o break f o this kind--places where a part o the inner d o o self-experience (a f f E r f behavior, a feeling a meaning a voice) cannot be received and, as Kohut would say, "mimFed"in the outer field. If these gaps, these experiences of nonresonsnce o shame, are tea central and too chronic, the mdt r is the dampening and ultimately the atrophy of those parts o the f inner field (the "self," in weryday, individualist language) that were
unreceived. Up to this point we me still in substantial a p m e n t with many of the revisionist, post-Freudian psychodynamic schools in p e t a l and with

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their way of segdhg the self in dwelopmmt. The growing child is extremely semsitive to the empathic break, which i felt as shame and s which may become deeply srtu in limiting or distorting ways, for the developing self-processand sdktsu-. Where w e may differ from some o these models i in our view of the continuing importance of the f s social field ta the mature person (a point Kohut [e.g, 19771 has h t i o d express, i individualist language, with his notion ofthe lifelong impor n tance of "intemalkd self-objjects"). We do not "ouigr~w" our fieldorientation, our sensitivity to our reception or response in the field; rather, our field-sensitivity and fieId-interdependence is lifelong and i s one ofthe two defining poles of self-experience. Where we do grow, t be sum, is i our ability to organize needed md o n relevant support from one part d the field ( e x h n d as well as internal), to compensate far a lack of connection or an experience o direct shamf ing, i or from another part. W e are no longer so reactive and dependent, n as a young child must be, to h e immediate social surround (though we do feel that response or lack o it), but can "'hold" other referential f supports. This is quite a different stakment from the individualist ideology, which holds h t in maturity we "rise above" infantile field orientation. Moreover, these parts o h e field do not fall out. neatly dong f "inraerJouter" lines, as the older individualist model would suggest {where "set f-supports"' are e x e to replace "field-dependency," meaning the outer field; see for example the work of Lewis I 9 7 or for 181 that matter Perls [1969]). Rather, we would emphasize fhat a disconnect, and threatened or felt shaming i one part o the fidd can mly be supported and managed in a n f heafthy way (a way that leaves m e well enough supporkd t be open t o a further growth and development) by appeal to anofher social reference group (often a refermce group not immediately p-tIr t provide the o requisite validation and s e l f - r - m : this is the -tial social field orientation that is part of our basic makeup, not something w e "kanscend" on the way t mature autonomy. Something like this is the o case, w e would argue, i cases o "solitary heroism," one person n f standing against the crowd for the sake of a principle. In nearly all cases o heroes o conscience, w e find i their writing and spiking that they f f n seek support and social validation by making explicit reference to some other valued group, in their own lives or in history, with whom they identify t h d v e s in their stand, thus knitting up the ruptum offered by their immediate social context. In other cases, w e may make appeal to outer support to manage and reframe an "inner" shaming voice. The rejected lover may talk obsessively to friends or therapist, or even relative strangers, about how badly he/she was treated: we would view this need to talk as the attempt to repir the shame, by seeking an empathic mmection that = t o w the

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wholeness o the self. The-obsessive quality suggests h t the attempt i f s not workmg-in our view aften because the real shame feelings are being talked around and avaidd (perhaps with countershaming and blame), not named and supported, and thws not reading a new integration that would enable the person t move on. The listener may f e l entrapped, as o if sheJhe has either to agree r e , what a jerk") or else risk M e r ys shaming of the distressed person ("get over i, or "well, I think the t" picture w s a little more compliatd-you had your contribution there a too")--or else just keep silent, perhaps avoiding the suffering friend altogether for a time (the fate o many people in an acute state of shame). The f simpler and more empathic response, whether from friend or therapist, might be something more like, "You must just feel terrible about yourself, to be Zreated like that," or wen, if it fits, "When I'm rejlike thatI I feel humiliation and shame." Lf shame i the affect of an unwanted s discom&, then it is to that place offelt rupture itself that we need fo go, to make a healing intervention-as a friend, ws a couple or family member, or as a psychotherapist. To recap, both the inner and outer worlds are integral pads o selff experience,the two dynamic poles whose integration is the self i action, n and the process o Iiving self-definition and mlution. A rupture i f n reception o the inner pole of self in the outer f d is always a potentially f id disorganizing experience, a rupture i self-process itself, and must be n met with some new organizing, connective move--reactivity (anger and blame, even violence), reconnmtion w t another part of the field, placaih tion and "'self-abnegatiorq" self-dulling (chemically or otherwise) and self-distraction (the behavioral addictions+r m outreach and srcppmt coming from some sipifcant person or group in fkfieId (such as the listening of a friend, the extraordinary holding w e extend t people i stat= of a n sudden loss, or the relational process of psychotherapy). The felt experience of this kind o disconnect is the affect duster w e f call s h e , ranging from mild discomfiture and embmaggment through deep humiliation, all the way to states of blind rage and decompensation. These feelings, we submit, are not exceptionaI or immature but are always at issue when there is a loss of field connection-ven if they are often shown by their compmsations and avoidanmI as much as by direct experience of shame itself. This is not to say we always "feel shame" when we have a loss or are otherwise not receivd; much 1 - is it to say that we don't have a whole range of other fee-, besides shame and /or accompanying h e . Rather, we are saying that shame is an experiential, dpamic counterpd and counterpale t cannection and o support:when those are disturbed, shame dynamics, shame issua, and possibly direct shame feelings arealways "up."

SELJ AUD SHAME: A GESTALT APPROACH

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Implications Sor P d c c

d this mean for our work with people and our work i l n psychotherapy in particular? To begm at least to round out this more theoretical d i s d i o n , the following are some o the areas of dinical f focus where we believe a field model ofself and shame makes a difference i practice and offers better support for interventions that balance n attention to internal, dynamic concerns, with attention t social context o factorsand to the crucial dynamic interplay h e m and among these domains, which is often accessed experientially through attention to feelings o f
What does

shame: (1) A rtframing o wr issues: First of dl, a field/umstructivist f o t perspective such as that offered by the Gestalt modd means a shift of angle of vision, from a primary emphasis on "seff" o "internal"supports r ("self-talk," self-soothingself-objed use and constancy,and so o d 1 of them o course using S e l f i the traditional sense of " i n t e d self"), in f n the favor ofa wider lens, one that directs our view Ward conditions of support and reception in the outer field, as much as toward "inner resou-." This fens can be turned on the conditions o the cIient's or f patient's life in general, or directly on the process dynamics within therapy itself. What we are prticularfy interested i here is not just problem solving n in the outer field, but thefelt conditions ofcannectzon, ~eceptim, d suppurt a or disconnection, lack o resonance and understandin&and shameI i the f n person's relevant social world. If w e take a field model seriously, then we have to regard whatever i, whatever happens, as a phenomenon of the s whole field-meaning that what is, i what is supported in the fidd in s some way (including of course the " i n t M fields of the person and o f other people). This does not mean that we forgo our more usual focus, i n dynamic therapy, on "internal" dynamics and processes: history and the construction o meaning cognitive framing affect and aifect managef ment, self-constancy {including in our model, "other-constancy,"' which after all is an asp& af self as we see it), attachment and l s , expmsion os and voice, "mistance" and energy,body experience and so on. Rather, it means that we take up a more compIex lens, so as t see a 1 these t h u p o 1 as well as t)le conditions o the "outer" field, the "inner" and "outer" f worlds as contexts and p u n & for each otherI and the dynamic interplay between them. To take an example o what we mean, a marital f separation, for instance, which may be felt as a deeply shaming experience by one o both parhers, has entirely different dynamic conser qu-e depending on both past history of loss and shaming and current conditions of support and affirming m n m e (or lack o it) in t e f h

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p m t social field (hclu&g o course psychotherapy).It i this last, the f s external supports, that are most likely to be neglected or incompletely s e w if we work from a more individualistic hame.
Of course, such a shift i a shift o focus for the client as well as for the s f therapist. If we inquire, "do you feel shame about the break-up?" or "'Where w e you feeling shame in your current life otherwise?" o even, r "Whereme you not enough supported?"we may well draw a blank stare or a series of energetic protab and deflections, even mocking and shaming from our interlocutor, all of which are signs of insufficient support for the contact figure w e mean to be offering. But if we move Joser to fe?t experience artd familiar vocabulary and inquire, "Who affirmsyou right now, around you, as you me, the way you redly want t o be held and s e n and affirmed?" w e may draw a more articulated answer, or h s or unlock an underlying despair born of years and years m,

o low-grade, avoided, or habituated s b . Or 'Who doesn't? who do f you wish would support you i this way, right now? who wer did? how n do you carry that now-is it here, v t for you as a resource? have you thankdl them? what d m it.feel like, in your body, i your presence n and self-p-tation? what can you do differently in the world, now, if you think of yourself as grounded ( rnot) in that affmnmg place?" o (2) T h e m s o f s h m : We"vealready said that feelins of nonsupport ah and disconndan, which are themselves denied as needs or even glorified as maturity in our culture, may clearly tend to get masked and overlaid with other, more acceptable f e e h e o behaviors, even ones r that don't seem so acceptable o dsirable at first glance. The fact is, for r many people, perhaps specially some men i this culture, the social and n self-reproach o being a violent abuser or a drunk may be less than the f felt shame o being seen, or seeing oneself, as dependent, "too d y , " or f weak. When we are dealing with any abusive pattern in t h e r a p y h m addiction t physical menace to hypemiticalnesI character assassination o and other emotional abuse--we d to put a boundary on the behavior and pay attention to the issue o underlying s h e feehgs, and how to f receive and support them in the therapeutic relationship. Justdoing the former without the latter cannot work, i our view, because without n strong additional interpersonal support, people will mow toward the path o lesser s h e . They have to, again because o the terms of our nature as f f we understand it in this model: w e cannot simply bear a severe felt rupture or disconnection in the most relevant social field (which is not n e c a r ily to say, again, the most immediately present) without the support of other resonance and reaffirmation (we do bear it, o c o r n I but not f simply: without &at other support, we n e c d l y have m u s e to countershamhg, numbing schizoid or hyperautonomy, d i d a t i o n , or some other strategy to take the edge o f the unbearable). If that rupture is f there, and without strong additional support to reconnect elsewhere in

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ihe field, people will do whatever it takes (up to and including suicide) to
exape those unbearable feelings. Less extremely, we look at criticism, denial, hypetautommy, chronic a g r and blame, as wdl as grief, depression, seif-doubt, "dependent" ne patterns, a d less drastic behavioral addictions, with a eye t surfacing n o the hidden ground o felt support and felt rupture/shame, undm the f figure of these uppermost feelings and actions. S h e will most often present as an accompaniment to other feelings, and partly or wbJly masked by them. We are not h-ted in telling people what they "must be feelmg"; w e are i n m t e d i namingfeelings that go unnamed, hquir n i & sharing our own shame feeling, and sip11ing the receptivity that n often makes voice itself come to life i the intimate social field of theran peutic relationship. (3) Listening for the longing: This i a phrase I take from Robert Lee's s writings (e.g, 19951, which follows, again, from the terms of the model we're p m t i n g . The issue of s h e remember,when the person is feeling desire or n d - - t h e affects Tomkins calk interest and excite rnent. If anger and blaming d depression may aIl often be signs o f hidden shame, shame is always a sign of an underlying desire or needoften hidden, because the chrmialIy urnnet need is almsf afield &finition 4 s k . This may be a simple matter, when the client is saying to his/her partner, "You never Tisteq you always think of yourself," and so forth, o responding with the inquiry: "How do you long t be listened f o torheld, d v e d ? Tell h e r / k about that," Or t e longing may be more h embedded, under a proclamation o self-sufficiency, instance, or a f for barrage ofofher criticism. To frame a desire i terms of a r e p r o a h n e n o the most frequent and troubling of problematic patterns in f c o u p l t~be, w e submit, a sign ofshame, of an inner conviction of o insufficient pemod "weight" when it c m s to vulnerable needs and oe feelings in the social field. Such a conviction always goes beyond the boundaries of the couple and is rmted more widely and deeply in the person's sense o self-in-theworld. To trmfbrm that cumidion from a f lonely M i 4 which is used defensidy against the parhrer, into a skared challenge held intimately by both p m , is one of the great healing gifts couples fhq to o# we belime, to both m b of the relationship. has f, (4) Nmning and owning shame: Again, w e are not interested i telting n people what h y are feeling or are not feeling or ought to be fding (if e only hey were more "in touch").These moves are themselves potentidy shaming in our view, and thus not likely to lead t articulation of new o self-experience, new understandings of one's dynamic interadion with a d in the whole field. At the same time, if we imagine that w e do not carry any preconceptions into the encounter with another person, or that we oufselves could possibly be "justreceptive: and not always subtly support focusing attention i one direction aver motherI then in our n

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view we risk h b g into a dimgemus clinical fiction of "objectivity" (dangerousbecause it ~AIES for the other person t have an it impossible o easy dialogue with us about what those preconceptions are, which we are necessarily c a q h g , but which then remain denied and thus dosed to influence}. This m y h c objectivity also completely violates &e constructivistassumptions ofthe Gestalt model itself. Our answer to this kind af diEem-how to give the client the h e fit o our point o view without violating or denying her/his experlf f ence-is t came right out. with it. W e m y say, for example, "That kind o o feeling you're talkmg about, o b e i i ignored and completely f f discounted or &mi&, i a feeling I (or a lot of people) think of as s shame. f i t happens for you if you put h t word on it, or think o it f that way?" If the client then chooses mother word for the feelings-denigrated, or not seen, o impotent, or not taken seriously-then we r listen d accept that word. But we don't want to court the risk that a stronger word like shame is going unspoken, because of being itself felt as shameful to feel and t own. ( R e m d , Ming shame means being o susceptible to the field, able to be influenced by the field, which itself is often typed as weak an$ immature and, t repeat, feminine. Note here o how shame and gender are inex~ably bound up together in our swiety; indeed, gender as a social schema can be read as a differential code 4 sham). O we may approach the topic by owning shame ourselves, as in r ''When I'm treated like that, I'm aware sometimes of an involuntary, irrational feeling o shame. They're being abusive, and I'm feeling the f shame imtead o them!" Or again, w might offer a shame feeling that f e we"whaving aut~eIves the moment, as in, "For instance, right ROW J'm at f d h g impotent to help you, which always give me a certain urge to "be helpful," i the sense of offering solutions, advice, and so on. If I n mist that w p e c i a l l y if I don't state it openly like t i -h hst m I'm aware o a certain discomfort that could begin to feel like shame, like I'm f not good enough at my job, there's somem n g with me." Of course, selfstatements like this depend on our -mat that the relational field we've built with the client can support ahat much o a spotf light on the therapist's world and f&gs, by which we mean that the client can make use o the m d l and the information and get back to f oe hs/her own focus. I the best case, a mode1 for self-traclung and selfn acceptance of this kind can have a strong field impact in the therapeutic relationship i a supportive and W i g way for the client. n (5) Naming and owning shaming: Here perhaps more than mywhere? the exanpje of the fierapist is crucial. When a client hesitates to speak, "loses voice," becomes critical or defensive (often self-critical), perhaps even feels shame directly, then in aE these cases w e have intervention I choiees. W e can concentrate whoUy or principally on issues and sources

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and relational failures from the past, or at l a s t outside the immediate field o therapy, & o f / r we m qvm a dialogue about our own shaming offhe client, in the here and now. Again, this can be done naturalistidly, i the n ongoing dialogue, as when a client says he/she is not ready to talk Pibout w m d i n g and w e might respond, 'That's good, I want to support your paying dose attention to that feeling. and honoring it. If anything try to stay with the reluctance, the side that wants to be more sure before opening this up. Meantime, can I ask you about what I am doing sight now, o not doing, that would make it harder, that w d d make your r comfort level go down?" If that doesn't connect, then '"What might I do that could make this easier o harder?" 'So the client who says it has r nothing to do with us, we might (or might not) persist, 'WelE, I think it should!I think you need t~ be &dung a b u t what kind o support is f available and what k i d o madion you may get, and how you may feel f afterwards, before you shrt opening something up b another p e m . I want to offer support for paying a lot more attention to that, right here, especially if t a ' not somehts y u r used t thinking about. I don't o'e o want to see you exposed u n c i y ne-l, t anybody--and it sounds like o you may need the practice, in thiabout this kind o tiwig." f T i kind ofintervention (like any intervention) is an experiment and hs needs to be p - t d in the knowIdge that oflm o support in atld of f fhemeloes may p m k e feeIings of shame, at times quite strong feelings.h that case, our best connective move may be t share our own dilemma, o our helplessness, possibly our own shame (e-g., "Now l'm in a bind, because I feel like I'm kind ofstuck between si here and letting you feel w o w or trying to offer support with the risk that that too may make you feel worse?And 1 sort of feel like I ought t be able t find a creative o o way out of that dilemma,but right now I c d t find one, other than to tell you about it like this.") The general principle here i that we canmt enfm deeply into an i d m u t e s &id of the cIimt's profound longings, losses and fears munfhouf promking both and feeling shame. This fact, which we believe follows from the kind of experiencenear m d l we are outlining here, leaves us with only two oe broad kinds o choices: t deny the feeling, in the way of the individualist f o self-model (rising"manfullf' above it), o t bring it to m m e s a f l d make r o it pmt o the intimde discuurse and dialogue o tkmqy. f f (6)R40cusing again and again on supports: A theomtical focus on a field model o self-and/or a dinid focus on the subjective experience o f f shame-leads our attention back again and again t felt conditions of o support (internal and external) i t experiential field. To make a change, n k we must change the conditions of supporf--again, internal and external, Often i psychotherapy, as in the culture, w e concentrate heavily or n exclusively on the internal domain. If 1 only understand better, frame it differently, learn new strategies {thought-stopping, selfsoothing

meditation, selfrtalk, a ) a h all try harder, then I can "make" a *and , change. W e agree emphatically with the importance o "self-supports" f and for that matter "trying" and "making": all these tluqp are essential t change, as they ate to satisfying living. But t h y are not the whole o pic-. m is aften neglected i the different focus we have if we think t s about "allowing" and "supporting" a change. And most o h , .this means changing arid seeking new and different supports i the outmfield n as well, which is to say,fyom and with 0 t h people. In this culture, to the simple question "Who can help you with this (desired change, new projed, shift of goal, etc)?" w may be often met again--at first-with a e blank look (nfact, we've grown used t blank looks w h we first bring i o up almost an that contradicts the prevailing autonomy ideology of our individualist culture). In AA, to take a familiar example, m h espoused value is $aced an self-responsibility and support horn a "higher power" (however one may regard or experimce that). But the reality of AA recovery is broader than this. Not only is the program groupbad to start with, but many people report that the single most important factor in their recovery (and also at t i m ~ single hardest the "pill 50 swallow") was their relationship with their sportsor, whom they could, and often did, ring up a y i e 24 hours a day. ntm, Why i support o this kind shame-tinged and a "bitter pill," a felt s f addit i d failure? Bemuse o our individunlist ideology, which supports the f pretense that any o us functions in a healthy way, or can function i a f n healthy way, in the ideally autonomous mode the culture holds up as the highest level of "df4we1opment."Again we see the pewasivw e believe pervasive destructiv-f the exaggeratd individualist %If-modelin our culture, the need for a new model such as the one w e are working t ~ w here, and the crucial experiential link between d support and shame.

The goal i this article has been t p m t , theoretically and ~Iinically, n o a new and quite djfhent understanding and approach t the dynamic role o o sham in human experience and therapeutic process. To do this, we f have reviewed the backpund of treatment of this issue i other clinical n and psychoIogica1 models, particularly classical psychdynamic and affect theory, wKich derives from the work o Darwin, as elaborated in f this century by Tombs. Underlying the classical Freudian model in
particular w e h d a deep md paradigmatic ideology o individualism, f which has mlored our clinical and cultural view of shame, tending t o cast shame issues and experiences as developmmtal failures in contrast to an explicit ideal ofindividual autonomy and field independence as the hallmarks o maturity. f

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In the terms a the Gestalt field model of experience, particularly as f articulated by Goodman (Ferls et al., 19511, we find the basis for a new model of self-experience and self-process, m e radically decentend from the older individualist models and dosely W on a phenomenological approach, the study o the structure o lived experience. This model, f f which i inherently constructivist and intersubjective, opens up a new s perspective on shame and its dynamic role in the construction o experif ence and the management o Iife goals and problems. In this view shame, f rather .than being a failure of mature autonomy and a sign o excessive f fieEd dependencyI emergs as the crucial affedive rnafker of supporf and nonsupport in the social field. Using this lens, w e are then in a position t a reexamine shame experiences, both i personal dwelopment and in thern apeutic process. Keys to wing this perspedive in therapeutic relationship include (I) reframing support issues in wholefield , so that it becomes legitimate, not shaming to consider support in the external social field as an essential part o any goal o change process; ( )l o o w f r 2 for shame experiences beneath and M d their characteristic defensive hallmarks and compensations (to experience shame is itself shaming in the individualistic model; thus extra support i needed to stay with and s explore these experiencs]; (3) i the same way, being attuned to the n issue of hidden longings, which underlie the dynamics o shame; and (4) f supparting the naming and owning o shame feelings-first and faref most in ourselves as therapists, both i our awn development and in the n therapeutic dialogue itself, Our clients will be supparted t bear and o explore shame feeEings only to the extent that we ourseIvs can be open to these difficult and isolating experiences. It is our belief and our contention that this theoretical and experiential reframing o the meaning and dynamic role o shame i regulating both f f n interpersonal and in2rapersed experience can provide the basis for a deepening o therapeutic dialogue and ptocess, and for raew growth and f healing for client and therapist alike. I the process, this stance and this n reframing informed and grounded by the Gestalt field model, lead directly to a deconstrudion o our inherited paradigm o individualism f f as a self-model and a self-ideal, 'Tne mdt is an opening to a m r e relational basis for both psychotherapy and living In general, one more i n tune with the inherent intersubjectivityo our lives and our nature. Thus f we find that consideration o shame issues leads us to a richer under f standing o out deeply constnzctivisk, fundamentally social, meaningf making selves.

Astington, J., Hamis, P.Br Olson, D,eds.(1988),M o p i n g T h r k oJMind. New York Cambridge Univetsity Prew.

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BelenkypM ,Clinchy, B, GoldbergerI N. k Tarule, J. (19861,Women's W y 4 . as

Knowing. New York: Basic Books. Bijou, S & her, D. ( 9 1 , Child M o p m m t , Vol. 1. New York: Appleton. 16) Century-Croft. Bradshaw, J. (19941,W i n g the Shante That Binds Us.Deerfield Beach, FL. b i n , C=(18721,T?re E+on o the Emotions in Mmr and A n i d s . Landon: f Murmy & Co. Freud, A. (19361,T e Ego and fhc ?&dmimao D $ , . New Y&: International h f

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F m d , 5 (19331,New i n d u c t m y- 1 .
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on psychoanalysis. S f a d d Edition, 225-182, London:Hogarth Press, 1964. Gilligan, C. (1982), In a DifSmt Vuim. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Kaufrnan, G. (19801,S k ,fhc Power $Caring. Rochater VT: S c h h . (19891, The Psychology o Shame. New York:Springer. f Kohut, H. The Theoration o fhc SeEf. Madieon, CT:Internatid Universif

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Kuehlwein, K ( 9 ) Interweaving themes and heads o meaning-making. In: 1%, f Constructing Wities, ed.H. Rosen & K Kuhlwein. San Francisco: Jossey-hss, pp. 491-512. Kuhn, T. (19701,llic Structu~eo Scientific h f u f i m . Chicago: University o f f Chimga Pms. Lee, A. (1995),Gestalt and shame: The foundation for a clearer understanding o f field dynamics.Brit. GesfaIt J.,4:14-22. & Wheeler, G. (I=), 7 % Voice o S h .SWIFrandseo:Jassey-Bass. ~ f Lewkr, K (1935),A Dynamic Theoy of PersonaIify.New York: McGraw-Hill. Lewis, H. (1987),Shame and the narci~tic personality. In:The Mimy F m of S h m e , d. Nathanson. New York Guilfod, pp. 93-132. D, Mastemon, J. (19761, Psychotbmpy o the BorderIine Adult. New Yo* f Bmrmet/MazeI. Miller, J, ( 9 6 ,T 17) d a New Psychology of W m , Boston:BBaoon Pms. (I%), What do we mean by relationships? Working P p r Wellesley, ae. MA:The Stone Center. Momson, A. (1887), The eye t u m d inward: Shame and the self. In: The M y F m $Shame, ed.D. Nathansrm. New York: Guilford, pp. 271-291. Nathanson., D , ( 9 7 , The?&my Facts oJSkame. New York: Guilford. . ed. 1 8 ) Perls, F. (1969),In and Out ofthe Garbage PmI. Moab, UT:Real PeopIe m. Heffwline, R. & GoodmanI P. (19511, G&df VumpyTheraW. New York: Julian W s . Tomkins, S. (19631, A ~ / r m a g e y K h s c i o m : The Negatiw Affects. New 11. York: Sptinger. UrheeIer, G. (1995),Shame in two paradigms o therapy. Brit. W a l t J., k76-85. f & Jones, W.( 9 ) Finding our sons. k The Voice o Shame,ed.R.Lse & G. l%, c f Wheeler. 5an Fmcisccl: Jossey-Bolas,pp. 61-200.

GIC Press
29 Chrmnq Sf&

Gnnbn'dge, MA 02138

Shame as a Normal and Sometimes

Dysfunctional Experience
A Response to the Articles by Leslie S. Greenberg/Sandra C . Paivio and Gordon Wheeler on Shame
R E I N H A R D FUHR, Ph.D. MARTINA GREMMLEkFUHR,MA.

In this article, we fimt reconsmet Greenberg and Paivio's and Wheelefs

mceptualizatiuns of shame. Possible additions and modifi~~tions to these authors" conceptual~tionsam then suggested, focusing on the importance o values and childhood experiences in generating shame. A s f far as Whseler's position is concerned, we indicate some confusion and doubts about the utility of a radical constructivist view and a one-sided field approach to shame within the frame o a "newparadigm."At the end f o the article, we indicate our own wneeptuEllization o shame in theory f f and practice as a (sometimes necessary and functional) b k o vdue f orders o different scope. Last we discuss the protective fundions o f f shame in therapy and i everyday life. n

Optninga D i i o n Among Colleagues

the

HE INVITATION rXmND?33 US by JosephMehick, &tor o GesSalt TO f Revim, t open a discussion an the a r t i c l ~by two of o w o lrespedd colleagues and prominent writers may lead us right into middle o the dynamics of shame itself, which i the topic of our f s

discussion. The authors o both articles have elaborated on their underf standing o shame within the context o the theory and practice o f f f Gestalt therapy and, in doing this have exposed t h d v e s to a greater
Reinhard Fuh, PkD., i a S&or k h m m a the University o Gothgen, Germany. s t f Mmth G r e u u n l a W , M A ,has a private practice i ~ c h o k k m p y T q have a .. n .h r h h h g center for Gestalt thmapy, and supvision and have published exferrsively on Gestalt b p y a d ils appHmti-

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public. This itself is a daring step because m y a u k writing on something that is closely corureded with his or her p m h i m l i t y and that is even close to his heart may know. With the topic of shame, this may even be mare daring than usual because shame touches on deep feelings and asp33 of one's s l . At the same time, when an author ef explains what he or she beliw~ be right and wrong when dealing to with shame, he or she m a y unintentionally s h e the readers, who might feel h a t they have not been careful or conscious enough i dealing with n their dients' shame issues a d their own shame issues in contact with their clients. Momvet, writers like us, who are invited to comment and possibly criticize some ofthe statements and findings ofthe authors, may alternativelytrigger s h feelings with the colleagues. Can we avoid such dynamics? We believe that the s t cartnot avoid entanglement i some kind o shame dynamics with one another. n f This assumption already touches on a basic premise w e would like t o offer when deafig witkt shame: as self-reflexive beings we are prone to feel ashamed every now and then, particularly in public discussions and in learning situations. The same i b e , as Zeslie Greenberg and Sandra s Paivio explain, for ontology: at some time in h e development of the infant,the mentaI self awakens fram the previous slumber and &es d o u s o R i m l f or herself d i thedore prone to feel ashamed f s every now and then. We can, however, try t minimize tfie risk of shamo ing our colleagues and of king s h e d by them in their response, by being as dear as possible concerning our intentions and the functions w e attribute t this discussion on s h e . o As a k t step i this direction, we would like to clarify our role i this n n undertaking. W e could define ourselves as reviewers o the authors' texts f by explaining what we like and consider to be valuable contributions to the topic and by criticizing what we think to be deficient in some way and describing how they cauld do better. They,in turn,wodd be able to do the same thing with our comments i their response. This k n o n id f interaction has a long tradition in the scientific community and elsewhere, and i seems t be unavoidable in many contexts (e-g. i the t o n process o reviewing manuscripts for publication),but at the same time f this procedure mhar1~e6 possibility o shaming one ma*. the f Anather p h i l i t y , the one we psefer here, is t stark a discussion o with our colleagues on equal terms. h t i, we would like to show those s areas where w e believe we have a conunon ground with the authors and those areas where w e deviate fron their assumptions an$ opinions. Our intention, therefore, is t explain where our position is similar in some o respects and differmt in others, but not better. h this way wd one hopes the readers as well-will learn horn each other with as little selfopinionatednessas possible.

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h order t find out where our mumptiom m shame issues meet o those of the authors and where we probably differ from them, we h e to explore first where our disxwion partners are. We wl therefore try t il o
reconstruct the main propositions a d findings o Bach author and indif cate where we do not understand them dearly, by as* questions or by offering o w interpretation o what they mem. En the next step, we will f briefly sketch o w position in agreement with o in contrast t the posir o tions of our colIeague.

Leslie Greenberg and Sandra Paivio: Ada* and Maladapfiwz Shame

Greenberg and Paivio dwackim s h e as an emotion that i closely s related to our needs and concerns, and they maintain that diffment emotions have different hctions in proc-riential therapies-shame indicating a disease that mostly needs transformation whenever it is maladaptive. Shame i strongly related t our self-worth and s o c o n n e c ~ e s s .Greenberg and Paivio distinguish guilt from shame; shame is about the whole self a d i trigger& when w e fail to live up t s o an ego ideal o personal value. G i t i about a moral h m ~ i o and r ul s n involves internalized values, h t is, how society holds that one should be, Although Greenberg and Paivio's pmpmal that s h m refers to the way w e me and guilt to what we do is plawible, w e are a little confused about the role of value systems in this distinction.It seems that with both shame and guilt, we have not lived up to certain value. Are there different values involved in s h e and guilt, o are the values applied i a r n different way--in the case of sham^ i the way w e are and in the case of n g d t i the way we behave? n Greenberg and Paivio emphasize the interactional nature o shame., f that it discom& us from others i h e sentice of protecting our connecn tion with others, and they briefly discuss the generation of shame in a person's dwehopment, primarily i childhood. Although shame experin ences in a person's earIy life seem to have a great impact on further pe&ty development, we might-according to &e prior definition and meaning o sham-ume f that, for example, "intense humiliation and power1essness o emotional and physical abusep'can happen any f time, i adult life as in childhood, dthough m b with v g n ye + impact on personality development. Greenberg and Paivio distinguish three kinds of shameprimary adaptive shame, maladaptive shame, and secondary shame--and d a b rate a treatment model f r shame, which appears t be very consistent. o o

They state quite clearly that shame can have a very important ptokdve function and can be a normal and "healthy"reaction o the organism. f
The strategy for treatment i six steps, which Greenberg and Paid0 n have extracted from their work (consistentas it appears to us in itself) is not quite clear to us i the function it should have. Is it meant as a model n that trainees or practitioners can apply when dealing with shame, or i it s rather a model for reflection and a d p i s ? A similar question arises for the diagnostics ofshtlme: Do the authors suggest a diagnosis of the kind ofshame involved first and then design a hatment? Or should a possible distinction be made, for example, in the supervision o therapeutic f practice? Both functions muld make sense, w e believe, but they would
have different implications for the therapeutic approach. A second and final question we would like to ask is about the me o f the therapist in Greenberg and Paivio's approach. It i one thtng to s defme shame i interactional terms and another to deal with shame i a n n dialogical way in therapy. In the example the authors quote, the therapist appeals to be very empathic and affirming at times and confmntative at other times, and it all appears to make sense and appeals t us. But the o therapist as a person does not become visible, and heretote this piece of work looks more like a medical treatment than a therapeutic ddogue (which may partly be due t the fact that we have to i n k the therapist's o role from the written word only). Far from criticizing this procedure, we would like the authors to be more explicit in terms o the herapist/dient f relationship when dealing with shame issues.

Gordon Whelm Shame as a Lack ofF l Support ld t

I contrast to Greenberg and Paivio, who build their concept of shame n on the interactional psychological tradition and research and expand it by integrating Chtalt p ~ c i p l e s , Gordon Wheeler pleads for a radical change o paradigm and argues khat the old one is not appropriate for f dealing with shame issues. We have, however, some difficulties in understanding this position. Wheeler pays much attention to the wider philosophical backgromd of his concept of shame, yet w e become lost in much of his argument, which may well be due t our own limitatiam. o Therefore we c m only try t explain where we became lost in Wheeler's o general theoFetical discussian and, consequently, in much of what he says about the therapeutic aspects o shame as well. f Wheeler mainfains that the role o shame cannot be seen and underf stood clearly h m the "old"paradigm bat from the "new" one. But what does paradigm mean here? There me almost as many definitions or understandings o paradigm as there are paradigms themselvet and h y f e all can som&w be b d on K h (1971) book (published in 1969 i n

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German). As far as we understand Wheeler, he seems to conceive pradigm i an encompassing swse, n because he extends his discussion to such diverse and encompassing scientific baditions and worldviews as individualism, phenomenology, wnstructivism, objectivity, field theory, feminism, and relational thmking. But sometimes we also have the impression that Wheeler could mean paradigm to be a set of basic beliefs and convictions referring t the understanding o me's self and to one's o f world view-* ideology, so to speak. Wheeler characterizes the "old" paradigm as being "limited;' "mytluc" (in connection with objectivity, and even "pathological" i connection with today's society in contrast to n the new paradigm. I this to say that the new paradigm should repkce s the old one? As far as w e understand the discussion on paradigms, a "new" paradigm i Thomas Kuhn's sense would always be more encompassing n than the respedive older one: it transcends and indudes the older one (Wilber, 1985, pp. 274-275). If this i h e , there would be m rreed t w s disparage the rep-tatives of the older paradigm, namely, those of psychodynamic and behavioral models in general and old Freud in particular (even though we may well criticize them). The new paradigm i Wheeler's sense is characterized by, among n others, constructivism A main assumption of comtnrctivism, though, i s that the living organism has no direct connection with reality outside, but rather enacts its own reality, and that the organism c m o t be determined from outside by "instructive interaction" because it follows its internal structures only, It is operationally closed to the outside world (Varela, Thompson and Rued, 1991), quite similar to Leibniz's windowless monads, which Wheeler, however, counts among the views of the old paradigm of individualism. According to constructivists like Maturana and Varela ( 9 7 , von Foerster (1993), o Portele (19891, are 18) r we autonomous through and through. Therefore, these scientists strongly recommend king conscious o this fact because a person's autonomy f would be the basis of the respect and love of others and o dialogue f instead o power plays and war. f But Wheeler strongly criticizes the concq~to an autonomous self, f which he relates to individualism, and he would like to see it replaced by a relational self. Does this mean that WheeIer would like to substitute the old sgocentric Cidividualistic)view by an ecocentric view ("ego" instead of "KO")? This would make sense (whether w e agree with it or not), but it does not appear to be i tune with constructivism or selforgmhtion. n theory, which w e understood to be two pillars of Wheelef s understanding of the new paradigm (see also Wilber's elaborate analysis of this issue, 1995, pp. 430454). Although w e can understand and agree to much o the p k e n m l o g y f of shame as d e s ~ l b by Wheeler, we camtot quite grasp the meaning he d

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REINHARD FUHR AND MARTINA GREMMLER-FUHR

gives t t i b k r of feeIings i terms of a lack of suppork in the field. u hs n But, again, this may l due to our failure to understand his premises. If x "ecological Mdmg" i to replace '"qpcentric thdmg" it would indeed s make sense t characterize shame by a lack o support in the field, o f mainly or only. There is m, clear distinction between field and self because "the field ... is m =tid and integral part of m y self," and therefore the self almost totally dies on the support in the field i critical n
situations. From this perspective it would make sense to bring to awareness wery issue o shame i the intimate discourse and dialogue o therapy as f n f a way to )leal the wounds o shame that have been inflicbed on us. But f perhaps w e have not, grasped properly Wheeler's concept of shame md have therefore been unable to do justice to his position and we remain a little helpless and confused.

Out Concept ofshame

As indicated before, we would now like to set our wwkstandmg o f shame against what w learned and understood from G d e r g and e Paivios's and Wheeler's concepts o shame. W e will start with a definif tion o s h e , explain the meaning w e give t shame, and finally hint at f o a few asp& of our hrapeutic practice i dealing with shame issues. In n doing so, w e refer t tome of what w have written previously on this o e topic (Fuhr and G d e r - F u h r 1995a, b) with some amendments, revisions, and additions that have been stimulated by the two articles. '

Much in agreement with both authors, w e see shame a a cluster of s sensations and emotions i combination with impuks to hide and to n withdraw; that i, shame is a word for diverse painful and wen shocking s inner experiences. Shame means that w feel exposed to others in a way e w e do not want t~ be exposed. This can happen in social situations, as well as when we are by ourselves, while imagining how others would see
us or might have seefl us or how wen we ~erceive om3e1ves from an outside perspective. These kinds of experiences accompany our lives wery now and &en from young d r i l b d to old age. Shame very often is comeded with guilt feelings. W e would like to distinguish shame from guilt ~ F O S S Om d o much as G e n e g and Paivio rebr and Wheeler (and, e.g, Nichols, 1994) do by saying h i t shame refers to how we are and guilt to what we do. On second thought, however, we think it necessary to elaborate on what may be meant by 'how we are" and "what we do." Periodically, we encounter cIienis who feel much ashamed and guilty for having been born and for being i this world n

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because, for example, they werr! unwanted o iUegitimate children or r children who greatly disturbed the live o their mothers or parents. By f
being born, they have not actually done a y u g and yet they feel guilty. ndn Often, clients feel ashamel for having done something unworthy (an issue G k g and Paivio also take up), W e su-t a modification of the distinction between guilt and shame: shame refers t ourselves, t our very existence; guilt refers t the impact o o o we have on our mviromentt The fact that I was born had an impact on my parents, and if I learned fmm them that I was not welcome and, that I distuhed or wen destroyed their lives ( n their views, which 1may have i i& n) *, I may feel guilty and shameful simuItaneously. The difference i owed to the perspective from which I look at the experience, s which produce8 a difference in meaning that again m a y have an impact on my feelings. The same event, therefore,be i t an action or a behavior or a fact, may trigger shame o guilt or both. As with many other feelings, it. r is the meaning we give to the primafy sensational and mental experience b t makes the difference that makes a difference (to take up a famous dictum by Gregory Ba-n). To come back to shame proper: it is the price we have to pay for having left paradise and awakened from our biological slumber to the human mind, that is, for having become self-reflexive; w e become aware of ourselves, which makes us vulnerable and prone t shame. I our o n Geman language, we actually use a reflexive verb for expressing the feeling of shame: Ich schaem mich.

Both guilt and shame refer to how we should be and what we should do (orrefrain from do. In the case of shame, we have not lived up to our wholeness and connedion (as Gteenberg and Paivicr explains); i the n case of guilt, we have not lived up t the m o d rules of others (which w e o may or may not have internalized). I both cases, values are implied, and, n as said before, it is the perspective w take that makes us fee1 guilty or e shameful. h many cases, w e may at first feel guilty for something we have done and then feel ashamed for how w e a= because o having done f this. So what we do is related to what we are and vice versa. At any rate, shame refers i a self-reflexive way to our worth and value as human n
beings. Since shame is always, we think, mmwcted with our being exposed to (real or imagined) other b e i i and because the way we are is not intune with the way we should be, shame (asmuch as guilt) can be considered to be a serious b a k of confienu with the environmental field (RobineI 1992), "confIuence" here meaning t be identifid with the value systems o o the surrounding culture. This break o confluence, which i indicated f f s

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by shame feelings, is unavoidable i many situations, Any major &eln

opmental process, for example, requires a major break o confluace with f our environment field in some respect. Moreover, we often f d c m d with d loyal to more than one social field (or subculture) simultaneously, each of them cherishing different, s m t m s even oeie opposing, value systems, In many crucial decisions in life; we have to take sides; that is, we cannot avoid violating one side to which we are loyal and to its hierarchy o values, and therefore w e may feel a s b e d f in some respect. That is, shame cannot generally be avoided; it is part of our lives and goes dong with our personal development and growth, o , r in plain words, there i nothingsacred about shame feelings (aswith any s other feeling}, although shame feelings need special attention owing to their existential quality of touching our very sense of dignity and worth as a person. As much as shame is part o our human fate, there may be s h e f feelings that me adquate i a given situation and others that are not. We n therefore very much support G r e e n k g and Paivio's distinctionb e t w m what they called "adaptive" and "maladaptive" shame and what we called "functional" and "dysfunctional" shame. We also believe Greenburg and Paivio's further distinction o dysfunctional shame into f "primary maladaptive h e " and "secondary shame" as a consequence o more transient embarrassments te be helpful because they require a f different approach in therapy. Shame gabs meaning in the inkrational perspective o Gestalt therf apy because it refers to different value systems prevailing in the organism/environment fields. We would, however, suggest applying the term mztironmental jield not only to social orders, but to more encompassing orders as well. I may feel ashamed for not havinglived up t the expectao tions o my dead ancestors, or 1 may -me f c o d o u s o not having f fully fulfifled my potential for living a mative, meaningful, and passionate life, irrespective o whether my present or past social environment f field would expect or support this or not. In this case I look at myself i n the face o u n i v d orders-and may feel ashamed for not having lived f up to tlrern.1 Because shame refers to o w very existence as human beings i a selfn reflexive way, shame reactions also help to protecf our worth and dignity. Here, too, we would like to join Greenkg and Paivio, who make it an explicit point that shame has a protective function, in that it disconnects us from others in order to p-e our connection with our mvimnment field and, w e would add, to pteserve our dignity. Wheeler dl o mentions is
LThisi a distinction Rollo May intduced for guilt: we may becwne guilty towards s d v e for not having Lved up t to potdid. But the same, we fhid, may be true for o shame.

the pmtective fundion of shame in passing but, as far as w e have under s t d his position, does not make this a strong point in his therapeutic practice. We would further w e that, as shame p r o w our s l i relaef n

tion t the environment field, guilt protects the integrity o the envirom o f ment field. aherefore, we can become relieved o our (fun&&) guilt by f reparative actions i the service o the environment field, which is quite n f different from shame: shame cannot be taken from us by anybody else; we can only stand and overcome it by regaining our w o r h and dignity i n the eyes ofothers and particularly in our own eyes. S h e i this protecn tive function, thus undeniably, i a kind o self-support, wen though it s f m a y be an inadequate one i a given situation. n
Some Though&Abut Shame Issurca in Thmapmric&a~n~ce

More often than not, w e are &ted both i therapy and i weryday n n life, not with shame proper but with shame avoidance. Because shame represenls very inkwe and painful feelings, w e quite naturally try to avoid it as much as possible. This i particularly the case if w e are prone s to be s h e d when feeling ashamed i the actual environment field. n There are some indicators for a person feeling ashamed (like blushing, looking away, a d withdrawing bodily) without knowing or telling, but mostly we can only guess that our clients may feel ashamed at some moment, for example, when they suddenly become reactive or when they regurgitate very intimate iriforrnatiotion without warning (which possibly may mean that they jump over their anxiety of the hidden feelings o shame) or when they quickly deflect from intimate t more f o general topics or levels of abstradiun. The same may also apply t the o therapist and his o her shame issues. According to our experience, r f therefore, the hardest piece o work in m e c t i o n with shame usually starts much before we can actually work with issues of shame themselves as exemplified by Greenberg and Paivio. For dealing with such avoidan- of shame Wheeler has some very useful suggestions. In working with shame issues proper, we fully agree with Wheeler that it is most important to give as much support t clients as possible o and as is needed--as in any other sihlation when clients come into contact:with very painful feelings. Hawever, ti kind o support may be hs f as necessary for the dients as for the therapists; hat is, the therapists, too, have t check what they are ready to bear when Iistenhg and o accompanyingthe clients' sufferings from very intimate, humiliating and shameful experiences. And w e beIiwe the kind o support has to vary f considerably according t the kind o shame involvd (functional or o f dysfunctiod, primary o secondary) and according to the phases in the r contact proclesses. W e would therefore Iike to elaborate on the issue o f support a little further.

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Because we consider shame t have a very important protective funco tion, the rep& o the pemna1 boundary indicatd by shame seems to f be most important in therapy. It may be as helpful and supportive for the dialogue between therapist and client to stop the clients from tallung about shame issues prematurdy as it may be t animate them to t d k o about them freely. Therefore, w e would also be a little hesitant i n subscribing to Greenberg and Paivio's dichrm that clients need t learn o &at, if they expose themselves to ethers they will mt be shamed again. Unfortunately, our everyday experiences do not g m d y support h i s : it may be rather dangerous at time6 as an adult to expose oneself because it does happen that one is shamed by others. This i particularly true when s our partners use one of the most hquent methods o avoiding shame, f which consists o shaming others, instead o feeling ashamed t h e d v e s . f f We would suggest a rnodificatian o Greenberg and hivio's principle: f Clients must learn to distinguish when it is appropriate and safe to expose themselves to others, and when they are i danger o being n f sham4 again. In other words, we would suggest one respect the boundary indicated by shame feelings as much as one would support the selfexposure o shameful experiences i the case o a trusting and reliable f n f

relationship. Because we do not:believe shame t be explainedsufficientlyby a lack o o field support (as w e have the impre9sion Wheeler does), we plead for f dealing with shame in much the same way as with any other h u e of existential importance-this is to say with an adequate mixture of empathic affirmation and confKmtative support as i Greenburg and n Paivio's example. W e would add one precaution, however: it may be much more dangerous to unintentionally push or tempt a client toward a shame issue than i other cases,because shame touchs on very existemn tial issues, and this can be more than clients a d therapists can bear to suffer i a specific situation. Yet shame is, as w e said before, a very n n o d and often unavoidable human experience. (It would a & d y be pretty intolerable an imagination to have to Eve in a "shameless"world). A most important step then would be t accept the experience o shame o f and thus to free it from mythxc mmdations. We would therefo~enot have to adaptively feel a s b e d of our shame any longer, whenever it turns up.

Fuhr, R. & GmmnIerFuhF, M.(1995a), Walt-Atlsatz. C;nrluikm+e ud-nw&Ele nus w Pmpekt-im.Kdn:Edition Humanistische Psychologie. k(1995b1, % m e i teaching/leaming settings: A Gestalt n appmach. Brif. Gesfdt J., 291-100. Kuhn, T. S. (19Tl),Die EnstAung dm Neuen. Fmnkfurk Suhrkamp.

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Maturana, H. Varela, F.(1987), Der Bmim der Erkennfnis. Bern: Seherz. & Nichols, M. (1994), Nur kknefds~he P. Schrn. Duesseldorf: &an. PorteIe, G. (1989),Auf momie, Mucht, Liebe. Frankfurt: Suhrhmp. Rebine, J. M.(1991), La honte, rupture de confluence. Gestalt (%&C Fmgdse de Gestalt), 299-54. Varela, P.J., Thompson, E.S. & R o b , E. (19911,The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT. vun Foerster, H. (1993), Wissm tmd Gnmsxn.Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Wilber, K.( 9 3 Ewlogy, Spiritunlity.New York:Basic. 19, Sen,

The "Recursive Loop" ofShame:An Alternate Gestalt Therapy

ROBERT
W, RESNICK, Ph.D.

Shame has bamme the issue "de jour" o psychotherapy-the healleged f cause o almost dl psychological difficulties. Too much o the Gestalt f f thshame Iiteratue appears to have abandoned our integrative

worldview-self regulation, field theory, phenomenalog.r, and dialogue. Eclipsed with superimposed "'expert"theapy and practice, the client's phenomenological experience is frequently overruled i favor o hterpre n f tation, for example, of "hidden shame." M n clinical applications are ay themselves accused of being a source o further shaming. CIinicaI work f that goes beyond the thempist's nonshaming acceptance and/or the exp~ssion unfinishd business is discussed. I the waters o h e , of n f these are the views of a Gestalt saImon.

If the only tool you have i a hammer, you tend t see every s o problem as a a i l [Abraham Maslow, Pearls Wisdom).

U R Z N G ~ P A S T ~ ~ Y E A K S O R S O , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ rush o activity and i n h t in shame, first in t e popular f h psychology literature (e.g,, Bradshaw), and then i the psychon analytic professional literature (e.g, Lewis, 1992; bufman, 1989; NathaTlson, 1987) and i the Gestalt therapy professional literature (e.g, n kand Wheeler, 1996; Jacobs,1995; Wheeler, 1995; k 1995; Greenberg , and Safran, 1986,19893. For some, shame appears to have become the clinical phenomenon "de jour" used as an explanatory concept far j s ut about werythmg from rage and anxiety ta depression and mania, to embarrassment and shyness, to issues of self-esteem and grief, and s on o (Wheeler, 1997). I take a somewhat jaundiced view of any phenomenon o concept that begins to approach a universal explanatory schema. r Additionally, I have difficulty with treatment modalities that report
Robert W. M c k , PkD, is the k o r fmbm of the G d t Therapy M W of I m Gestalt Rmim. I ' " d y , he has k e n a b h h g &rapist i bothindividual and muples therapy h yeas. n 30

Angel- and an assdate d t w r d

2!%

O 1997 The Analytic h s s

THE "

m LOOP" OF SHAME

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"truths" that are not congruent with my petsonal experience or my clinical practice. The twa articl~ shame in this volume of Gestalt RaiewI Gordon on Wheeler's "Self and Shame: A Gestalt Approach" and Les Greedmg and Sandra Paiviors "Varieties of Shame Experience i Psychotherapy," n reflect more o this m f t interest in shame. Wheeler's articlef more closely rerelated t Gestalt therapy Wy systematically and clearly o r, d d b e s a field/support model ofunderstanding shame where shame is seen as a rupture o support in the field and a diso~ganhtion f self f o process. Wheeler's discussion references the larger field of psychotherapy with tespect to lthe imporkame of support of the field, interdepe dence, and other paradigmatic differences with the more traditional (psychoanalytic) individualistic m d l . Greenberg and Paivio's article oes describes both an interesting taxonomy o various types o shame, along f f with differential, clinical treatment considerations. Both papers are erudite and, i places, compelling although 1 both agree and disagree n with aspects ofboth articles. Rather than attempt a point by point discussion o areas o agreement and disagreement, I have chosen to identify a f f few fundamental issues that are, for m ,crucial to the understanding and e treatment o shame. ConamentIy, I am also questioning and/or f d i s a p i n g with some of the meta theoretical issue that form the background for this discussion. It is important to note that m y fundamental concern with much of the current Gestalt therapy literature discussing the tkretical and clinical aspects o shame (inclusive of some o both Wheeler and Greenberg and f f Paivio) i that some o this literature seems t be reverting back t nines f o o teenhenfury positivist (including psychoanaIytic) models and appears t~ violate some basic tenets o Gestalt therapy as I d m t d them f CJacobs,1995; kt Wheeler, 1996; Wheeler, this volume). This is not and to imply that there are not o h areas within this same literature that creatively expand the boundary of Gestalt Therapy ~peciallyn terms of i selfprocess (Wheeler, this volume). Any theory of psychothempyI to stay vital and useful, must be a constantIy dialectic process betwen the deductr'pe reasoning of a meta psychology and the inductim noticing of actual clinical phenomenaexperience-near data. Wfiile deductive operations are wider and add efficiency, they are also vulnerable to being unrelated to the d t y of others. Inductive operations, on the other h d , while experimtiaFly verifiable, do not always form useful, sequential and meaningful whales. Hence, the dialectic and dialogic engagement between the two allow for the best possible modes of theory buiIding-ngoing, constantly adding new data, always receptive t changwach of the two domains contindly o influencing the other. My concern i that most o the Gestalt therapy s f literature about shame, Enelusive of both Wheeler and Greenberg and

Paivio, has emphasized the deductive (mow conceplual/abstract) at the exprrrse o the inductbe (more clinical/phenomenologid). While shame f theory can usefully inform clinical practice, we must stay vigilant that it d o e not rigidify ancl stultify clinical practice.

What Is Shame? There appears t be a cluster o obsewations, speculations, and predico f tions regarding the nature o shame, which most writers actively advof cate or seem to a p e with implicitly. There are other dimensim o x viewpints about what shame is and how to work with shame clinically that are more controversial+ The following a e samples o both consent f sual and controversial points o view repding shame theory and c S i f cal work A very brief review of this author's pasition about what constitutes Gestalt therapy's worldview i followed by a critique o much of s f
the Gestalt therapy shame literature today.

Shame is the affective experience of believing o n e l f to k totally useless, "bad," basically lacking i value, and so on n Guilt is the affective experience o believing oneself to have f done something 'bad." Guilt is about a p a r t i a h behavior; shame is about a total person. Some shame is '%ealthy,'' and forms of shame may be maladaptive. Shame is d e s t physically by a dropping s the head and a f contradon and withdrawal o the body. f Phenomenologically, people experiencing shame want to withdraw, hide and disappear. S h m i on a continuum with shyness and embarrassmentt s Feering shame i in itseIf shameful. s Shame is so painful that much behavior i organized around s avoidmg shame, including overing shame with other emotions (e.g., rage, depsession,dwid, etc.). Shame, i some form, is an innate part of human beinp. It i n s wired into our genetic blueprints d DNA. Shame i either a basic, primary emotion (along with the m u s ally d e x r i i primary emotions o anger, sadness, joy, and f f a ) o it i a closely allied secondary and s e l f d o u s er, r s emotion. The latter is seen, as mom copitively media&!, for example, s h e , jealousy, envy, gurlt, and so on. Shame, i most c d m I i used in child rearing i an attempt n s n to build in a regdator/modulator o behavior that will insure f

THE "RECURSIVE LOOP" OF S

29

11.

that the child's behavior stays within dze norms and mores o f the family and the culture. Many writers puzzle whether o not there are univeml Z r i p r for shame, for example, e x p u r e of buttmks, incest fantasies, exmetion a d h i t i s , and s fortfi. o

Some C o n ~ m i a l h eA h t S h e s

TAeorchd I. Shame i at the root of mast, if not all, psych61ogid s

distutbanccs. When the dient is not aware of exPer;&g shame within a context where shame would be expected and/or suspeded, then the shame may be just too painful for the dient to identify with and therefore =ides within the client as "hidden shame." 3. Shaming by the therapist (albeit inadvertent) always occurs during the course o therapy. f 4. Shame is essentially the emotion experienced when there i a s rupture and dkmnnection o support (of the field). f 5. Shame is essentially an irreducible emotional experience that therefore can only be worked with in very Iimited ways. n 6. Attempting to work witfi shame i other ways m y very we11 lead to further shaming o the dient. f
2.

cli;ra
Therapists bear a "~pohsbility" seeking out shame issues for i the Client. n 2. Shame, when denied by the client, may very we11 be indicative o 'Tiidden shame." Anger and depression, for example, m y f also be indices o "hidden shame." f 3. Clients frequently do mt h w how to properly articulate their experience. Given the proper 'lslnguaguyf and support, many clients will quickly identify with shame isso-. 4 The manifestation of #3 i the preceding section (shaming by n the therapist [albeit inadvertent] always occurs during the course o therapy) requires the &empist t be vigilant and f o aware of his/her contdbution to shaming the client. 5. Tberapisfs need to receive the client's shame in a nonshaming mvironment either individually o in a group, hereby providr ing a corrective emotional experience. 6 It is frequently helpful for the h a p i s t to share hisher own . p m n a l shame and shame issues, thereby demonstrating the humanness o such experiences and perhaps "normalizirng" f
1.
them.

z6a

ROBERT W.RBMCK

Please note that these lists of consensual and controversial issues regarding shame theory and clinical work are not meant to be exhaustive nor are they n d y representative o the positions advocakd by f either Wheeler or G m k g and Paivio. I order t comment on some o n o f these controversial issues, it may be useful to outline very briefly this author's perspective regarding Gestalt therapy's basic worldview because tfiis i germane to the difference3 and criticisms o much of the s f Gestalt therapy s h e literature today, which follows.

As Gestalt therapists I believe w e hold a worldview that dows US t o discriminate what theoretical and clinical perspectives can be integrated with Gestalt therapy and which cannot. It is not that our worldview is the reality, nor is our worldview exempt from modification. It is also not t o
say that other worldviews are not equally valid for those that hold such views. Rather, our worldview provides us with the aware phenomenological organizing ptalten (meta lenses) t do the actual discriminating o and integrating. If, however, new data that i so compelling does not fit s within our worldview, we must consider altering our worIdview. Once again, healthy boundaries need to be defined and strong while remajning permeable and flexible. Briefly, the above describes a worldview that supports an infegrative approach as compared to an ~IecCicapproach, which has no real organizing/inkgrating gestalten (worldview) but is more fragmented and Machiavellian i nature, for example, "I do a little n o everythmg including some htdt--whatever works!" f Basically, Gestalt therapy's worldview sees human beings as selfregulating organisms ofthe organismic/environmwtal field, who create meaning via their phenorneno~ogical organk~tiom inclusive o " h e r " f and "outer"domaim, me and non-me, "at the boundaq."Wheeler has a truly excellent dmription o this org@zkng matrix o process and f f functions "at the boundary"-what Perk, Hefferline, and Goodman (1951) defined as the "self."It is crucial (and hopefully humbling) for us to remain aware Zhat our worldview too is only one way o organizjng f "reality." If experimental gestalt perceptual psychology's task was t iden* o any parterns b t were common to how people organize their worldshmed p x e p u a l patterns of organkition-then Gestalt therapy is a method of exploring and idenhfying p p t e ' s idiosynrrratic ways o orgaf nizing their world. This i the constructivist, meaning-&g s backbone o Gestalt therapy. The role o personal meaning-making (phenomme f f logy) is crucial to both the understanding of and the clinical working

withshame.

THE "RECURSIVE LOOP" OF SHAME:

261

Meaning is the relationshtp between figure and grarndf meaning i not s in the figure and not in the pund, it i in d w relationship between s the two. H o w people choose, organize, d contribute to the construction o what becomes figural for them and what backf ground(~) they bring to bear, are critical. This i what creates their s phenamenologkl reality in the moment and contribuw to how they create their life over time.
Patterns o backpund influences which are recurring and invarif ant ( n other wards they are amtextual), are what we call &e i "'bed" gestalten, the matrice3 which make up character. Character then influences the creation of what becomes figural and what the relationship is between figure and ground, and thus profoundly affece meaning. Character Is a freeze-framingo what was once an f adaptive and usually healthy response and is now acontextual, anachronistic and obsolete. The crystaked patbems o organizaf tion which make up "character" me based on the history o that f field, and they strongly influewe the phenomenolojcal realities
meatd.

It is crucid and perhaps even revolutionary, t note that o psychotherapeutic and dwelopmental theories are not exempt from this process. Themy can k seen as the e v i d e n t o "chQt.actmv. f Ideas, concepts and organizations can become crystaFBzd too [ R d c k , 1995, p. 41.
Therefore, i discussing theories of shame (or m y other fheori~),it i n s fundamental to remember that these idiosyncratic ideas, now raised t the o level o "theories," are someone's phenomenological organization, f which, regadmi of their complexity and degmce, were essentially "made up" and written down--lest we forget our meta theoretical roots while looking at our theone. And yes o course, even our meta theories f are witkin the same noble academic and intellectual traditions; we made them up.

Some Major Critiques ofthe UGeetaltTherapy'' Shame Llt~ratufe '

Shme Xb at tke Root o Mast, YNotAZZ,F3ydolo@onlD~~c11Z6es f

Kaufman (19801, as quoted i Wheeler: n

Shame is the affect which is the source of many complex and disturbing innet states: d v i o n , alienation, d-doubt, isolating

lone-, paranoid and whimid phenomena, compulsive d i s o ~ ders, splitting o the self, perfectionism, a d q sense o inferiority, f f inadequacy o failure, the so-called borderline conditions and f disorders o narcissism. These are the phenomena which are rooted f in shame.. Each is me in sign+nt i n t ~ m n a f td failure [italics added in Whelm].

..

Importantly, Wheeler italicizes the importance o the locus (of the f field) as depicted by Kaufman as "rooted in significant inkpersonal fdure."Realistically, therapists would be h a d p d to come up with many issues dealt with i psychotherapy that are nof organized around n difficulties in interpersonat relationship-"rooted i sigdficant intern p e m l failure." Wheeler (1997) further states
The felt experience o this kind of disconnect is the M v e duster f we call shame, ranging from miid discomfiture and embmi~ssrnmt Zhnough deep humiliation, all the way to s k a M o blind rage and f
decornpensation."
at criticism, denial, hyperautonomy, &nic anger and blamwell as grief, depression, self-doubt, "codqxndent'"patterns, and less drastic behavioral addictiohswith an eye to surfacing &e hidden ground o felt support and felt f rupture/shame, under tlae figure of these uppermost feelings and actions.

Less extremely, we look

It would seem from quoting K a u M s assertion and Wheeler's own point of view, that little psychological distubance has escaped or eluded shame as its inevitable wellspring o origin. f There is little evidence for this assertion that cannot be parsimoniously ahiuted to the manner of observing or the m w of framing the questions and intervening. The lens you use limits and detwrniraes the kind of data you wit1 find (Renick, 19%). The pandemic application o the shame lens probably contributes to creating much o the shame f f seen by the clinicians who hlieve shame is the root o most psychoEogif cal disturbance. For example, imagine the d i e m t kind of data you would " h d " (thereby confinning your new bias) from clients if you framed your *erapatic assumptive lens such that lack of lme i at the s mot of most psychologicai difficutti~. Consider postulatingfem ws that omnipresent etiologica1 factor. What h u t various theorists' t h e ries/pmjections o life force, for example, Adler's power Freud's sesuality, f

THE " R K U R S M i LOOP" OF S E U h E

263

Pr' aggr&m? For women, what about penis envy as the invariant els some?Unresolved Oedipal issues for men? pi 1 pool o pain? rm f In a phenomenologically b d therapy such as Gestalt therapyI the therapist would need to follow the phenomenological method oflistening by bracketing off as mu& d &/her valus, beliefs, theoris, intefpretatim, biases, and so forth as possible, i order t be impn o && and anew by the client. Universal explanatory ronstructiolls that appear to explain almost everythmg therefore inform us o very little f other than tfie projectionsfiases of the theorist or therapist. It is freshness m d difference that are crucial, and it is the differences that make a difference,which are truly important and informing. The assumption o omnip-f f shame violates both our phenomenological way of listening, as well as aur respect for the client's phenomenology. It also clearIy violates our meta worldview, which would sugger that orrr meaning-making about where, how much, and what constitutes shame no more reflects "realityf' then any other person's, especially the particular client w h his/her personal experience is the referent.This point o view clearly appears to be at odds with most of the f Gestalt therapy shame literature today. h the waters o shame, I may be f a Gestalt therapy salmon. If we all shared the same phenomenology and therehe the same meanings, then Shalom Als character Golde ( nFiddlet on the Roof i based on Tevye and His Five Daughters) would be absolutely right when she &Us her husband Tevye "You tell me what you dreamed and I'll t l el you what it means!"

Tkbe asumption o '%iddmshame," when the client wither initiab nor f confirms the therapist's suggestion or interpretation of shame, i clearly a s return to the psychoanalytic assumption o therapist as expert on the f ofher's experience-described classically as "manifest content and latent content":w a you think you mean and "I know" what you really mean. ht The danger of so-called '%iddens h e f ' gaes even farther by having yet another layer of explanation (theory) as t6 hdw it i h a t the climt does s not identify with the alleged shame (e.g,, it's too painful, it's too frightening he/she needs to deny it for now, etc.). Such a position retwns the thetapist as "expert" and also t an insulated c l o d system where "we o know what we know" m d any data that disconfirms what we ")Enow" can be explained by yet another thing we "know."Either I'm right o I'm r right. Either you expetie~ce shane, o you deny it and then that becomes r evidence for ' "hidden shame." Either way, the therapistsY/shame e h rists' phenomenology prevails. Monumental psychoanalytic "chutipah"!

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ROBERT W.RESNTCK

To follow a phenommologieal/dialogic method would su-t that tracking and r q e d h ~ g dienVs phenomenology would be o gmat the f m c e m d value. However, the therapists' phenomenology must also, with discrimtzation, be honored if the encounter is to be truly dialogic. It i here that &e subtle dance o the therapist identrfylng hisher beliefs s f and interpretations about shame neds t be presmted to the client and o "held lightly" as the fher'~pzst's speculation m t h e q @cw i the therapist) n rather than as a definition o thedient's experience (locus in the client). It f is crucial for the therapist to discriminate between organhtions that are mated i phmomenobgidly bracket& dialogue with a client and n orgmkitio~lsthat the herapist brings into the consulting room as procrustean sten& regardless of who the client is. How and when the thempist introduces the idea o shame to the client is pivotal, f h either case it i crucial that the therapist be scrupulous in a t b d h g s to the client's reception and reaction to such a presentation. Intrajechg without &isaiminationis as damaging as dismissing without discrimination. Obviously, the built-in hierarchy and d_lsproportional power distributicm inherent in most therapeutic relationships would tend to tilt the client in the d i d o n of embracing the therapst's point o view and f pleasing the therapist and therefore m a t be too dose1y tracked. E d w d Sapir, the linguist from the early part o this century and w f teacher o 3enjamin Whorf o ''Whorfian hypothesis" fame, said: f f "Language is a mold into which infant minds are p o u d " (Sapir, 1921). Wharf's hypothesis was that language controls and hfIuences perception and therefore meaningmaking (Whorf, 1956). Therapists' languaging with such words as shmne is similar to using words such as m u d and injury in psychotherapy when the client had not brought this lexicon into the therapy. The language of the therapist will dearly affect the meaningmaking o the client, and as such, 1 believe Gestalt therapy advocates f remaining primarily with t e client's la~guage/phenomenology h when referencing that client's experience. S h a m l an UnwanMRuplbrrc a d r Dkonncch'on o Supprnt (f fhc Fie14 f o
This assertion, eloquently described by Wheeler in his article, i an s artremely important concept that i congruent and confirming to Gestalt s therapy's worldview. W e indeed are of the field and are inkdependent within the field while dearly d i d a t i n g our worldview from any kind o individualistic model citing or implying independem as a major f god. Laura Perls commented that "Independence without connection is a

THE "RECURSIlrE: LOOP" OF SHAMB

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masquerade for isolation" ( e k 1971, p e d cwununication]. Pr, Wheeler maks a strong case for restoring balance t Gestalt therapy o theory by b i n g more on the importance o t?ie environment and f support issus. Although this idea is not new t Gestalt therapy, the o pendulum may have swung too far away from support, eco systems, and field considerations as Gestalt therapy aged and "steep& in our p r i d y individualistic culture. Although ''Chicken Soup Is Poison" (Resnick, 1968) i still true for many of us much o the time, not eating s f (taking in nourishment/supprt from the field) can be equally Zoxic. Fritz PerIs maintained that healthy people are "selfsupportive," which indudes commerce with and sometimes dependence on and within the larger field, rather than striving t be serf-stlfln'ent. This distinction has o frequently been corrfused with the multing distortion that PerIs's and Gestalt therapy's goal was for people b be totally self-sufficient. The orgmkmic/envimnmental fieEd is one.. Personally, I would have prefermi Gordon Wheeler to have emphasized that shame i the affect (of the effect) o a rupture and withdrawal s f o support o the field mly when that withdrawal i u m n t e d . Although f f s Wheeler does explicitly state this at one point in his discussion, "Shame, that is, i the experience o an m i l l i n g (to me) discom& with my vital s f social field," for most o the article he d m not make that proviso f expliat I am concerned that he could be essentially read t be assuming o that all withdrawal of support leads t shame. Clearly, this i not the o s case. Similarly, having support from the field do= not guarantee that a person will not experience shame.

The TBer+tNmLF toR&c C h A Shame in a N o m h i n g Environment adfrIsHc~f;lJfbr T h + t co SkcHisAYrn the Own P m n a l S h m c

Regarding actual clinical work, these two assertions, while frequently codbmhg, soothing and relieving to the dent, do not i my view n constitute good therapy with shame. Although they frequently provide some grad md Eotlndatid support for the work to pmgms, the shame-creating phenomenological p o rare not yet a c c d and assimilated. Empathic support in a nonshaming environment may often help the c i n who i experiencing shame feel better; howwer, this i not let s s the "end gain" of therapy. Although frequentIy alleviating the phenotypical shame, the patypical shame is rarely effected i an ongoing and n sustaining way. It i here that G ~ t a l therapy, with its emphasis on the s t importance o the field and its phenornmologicd/dialogic method o f f inquiry, is exquisitely suited t do the very fine and delicate work of o deconstruding shame when it is not i the m i c e o the person/envin f

merit m d

supporting the shame md regret when it is 'Wfhf'

shame.

Importantly, Gwmbmg and Paivio also see much shame as mcd i n origin and needing t be deconstnrcted. Although much o their fine o f d i s ~ i o n this crucial issue focuses on the techniques of t& of w work, they emphatically go M e r with working with shame than empathy, support and connection They focus on what kind o information f emand what domains are accesed (affective,cognitive, and SETWF rial), boundary disruptions/an~naIies, "unfinished"business, and so on. Greenberg and Paivio (1997)state:

Two chair dialogue...is most helpfd in accessing md restructuring shame producing beliefs.. Resolution occurs when dients become aware af their responsbirity in producing the shame feetings and when they challenge the contempt and shame r n e i s a p . When these adaptive mponses are supported by the therapist clients are able to more clearly articulate the shaming intmjectsand core maladaptive beliefs about the self, and begin to challenge them from an intemal sense of worth,

..

Greenberg snd Paivio, however, do not d m i e a dialogic model (or example) o therapy, but rather putsue a rmmwer band o access ta the f f i n t r o j d , affects, cognitions, and sa on via an "empty chair dialogue" through a sequenced model o inquiry designed to eliat the (1) "ad f feeling," (23 "primary emotion," (3) "unexpadaptive feelings,'' (4) "maladaptive beliefs," (5) "adaptive feelings," and (6)"self-affirmation" in that order (Greenberg and Paivio, 11997). Wheeler, conversely, implies, if not s u g p t s , that meting a 7 ' s shame in a w m , nonshaming and confirming environment and perhaps sharing personal shame experiences may be as far as a therapy
can go.

Wheeler states:

W would view this need to talk as the attempt to rep+ fhe shame, e by seeking an empathic cormedion that restom the wholeness o f the self. The simpler and more empathic response, whether from
friend or therapist, m g t be something more like, 'You must just ih feel h i l e about yourself, to be treated Iike that," or wen, if it ft, is "When I'm rejected like that, I feel humiliation and shame." If shame is the ajfect o unwanted disconnect, then i to that place u felt f s f rupttae ikIf that we need to go, to make a healing intervention.

Wheeler (1995) states, "The goal of therapy, we may say, is the trangbxmation of fhe experience o sham into the q e r i e m e o c m c t i o n in thefield f f

and ~e development of the slcills and proto support that b n a+ formation ongoingly in the patient's Me" (p. 84). Others sometimes wen maintain that, when a person is experiencing
and dealvlg with their shame, attempts ta continue clinically are insensitive and probably induce additional shame for the client by the very pracess of further exploration. In working with shame, it is imperative to attend t first-order l m o ing (the shame "feelings" and content at hand), second-order learrdng (the particular "software" o the shame), and W y athending t the f o third-order Femning (how and when mrmedion and support were withdrawn to shape the q u i s i t e bttrojmb Zlre disapprova1 and contempt that may also have been intmjected and the affects, sematim and other cognitions surrounding the interactions-al1 o which make up the f gerveric maladaptive shame). This i probably some o the most v u k s f ble and fragile clinicaI work in therapy and i not done quickly if it i t s s o be assimilated.

ShameTheory and Workingwith Shame: An Alternate Gestalt Thetapy Ve iw

"Healthy" shame is the (usually) inadvertent violation o an assimilated f value, for example, privacy, not hurting others, and so on. F. S Perk . rnaintaind that shame and disgust were the "quislings o the organism,'' f meaning that these experiences act as corrective bdIast when a person has violatd his/her own i t g i y Healthy shame then, according t nert. o Perls, i the modulator o assimilated values. It is here that the phage s f "He/she has no shame.. .or is s h e I m " has imporkant meaning. Such a person has no way of self-correcting, nor any sense that selfcorrection is eves even due the situation-+ healthy sense of "duty" (Perls, 1975, personal communication), Maladaptive (characterological/neu~)tic) shame is esswtially a s o d artifad and not a irreduaile primary feeling. h n e is primarily a method of social control and child rearing where fie child's fundamental 0rganismic/emtimmta1/fieId "lifeline" and support (love?) is r u p hmd and withdrawn when the M d does not embrace (introject) the primary caretaker's values, beliefs, and behaviors. This occurs at a time developmentally when the child needs loving codurnation and support for emotional surviva?,The child "of the field,'"i trying ~ C make meann J ing o these events, s,only surmise that there i sometf s fundamentally wrong wikh what, who, and how heJshe i. Frequently, shaming s adults are all too cleat. a b u t their disapproval, criticism, contempt, and even disgust for the child. The experience o shame (no value, withf drawal, wanting to disappr) leaves the child desperate to please the

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ROBERT W. R E N I C K

caretaker, to avoid further ruptures, and to avoid the noxious experience o shame itself as much as possible. In mafadaptme shmne, the child nof only f introjecf5 fhc walues and norm of the other, he/she also introjeds the other's d i s c ~ p p r m land perhaps contempt and disgust for him. Later on, the child (and later as an adult) may project the inltsajected disapproval onto generic o h and then respond to that alleged disapproval. Thus, a destructive and recursive s h e loop is established that continues to mpikdate and replenish itself. htellixtually rejecting the introjected parenltal/societal values without dealing with the introjwed conkmpt. and &gust is o 1itt:Ie therapeutic value. f The deconstruction o characterolo~l/netvotic shame r q h f more than attunement and empathic resonance with the person experiencing shame. Such therapeutic work further require3 helping the client focus on and track his/her phenomenological expienee while both the therapist and the client hopefully bracket off any current theories or beliefs about shame. This phenomenologccal exploration and focusing when accompanied by the therapist's contactful support, allows the client t enter the habitual (charactemlogical) and fixed phenamenologio cal organizinggetalten h t result in the shame experience. Any combination ofthe four primary emotions o anger, sadness, joy f and fear may emerge during this p yor all o w i h may need f hc to be experienced and expressed i order t begin to wave! and n o "'unpack" the processes and sequences of this phenomena. Most importantly, the client must discover the matrix of pamtal/cultural inimjects below the rehflections and projectiorts and below the anger, fear, and sadness that are informing hisJher cognitions, affects and sensations. The reai~zationand understanding of what shame is, how it is constructed d developed (the sortwate), and Plow it was used may also be quite helpful t the client in dealing with the cluster of Introjds o his/her behavior has violated. O course, this approach, too, relies on the f commonly held theory o s f h being intmpmonally ronstnrctd. It allows, however, for both experience-near validation and the predictive validity o tracking over time, o whether the work is becoming selff f generative. If so, &e client will have more functional choices than he/she previously had +kg shame, shame avoidance, and ather shame issues. It i a process mudel rather than a content mode1 and therefore s makeg no precIictiom as to what s w c emotions, cognitions, or sensations will come up during such work or where the work will go. When working well, the &erapist makes no assumption that $hame is the irreducible lendpoint o the work nor that it must go further. The work hopef fully follows and focuses the cIient's phenomenology rather than attempting to reorganize it. Our theory, based in organismic self-regdam tion, would suggest Ehat when a person is i touch with and MIy identin

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fies with all of himherself, change will occur oqpismically when and if it i in the best inter& o both the person and the field. s f

Shame i an important clinical h u e that i gainkg perhaps an inordis s nately high profile within the Gestatt k p y and the psychoanalytic literature. It seams dear that primarily those who are convinced that shame i such a fundamental "cause" o psychlagicaI disturbances are s f wising about this topic, which would tend to skew the appearance o the f importance of s h e to diniaans i general. "If the only tool you have is n a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail" (Maslow, 1 7 ) 95. Those theoris& ancE therapists who do not see shame as the source of most psychological disturbances are not as Likely to be writing about shame. To speak of "hidden shame" and to advocate the therapist's sedmg out shame, reframing material i t shame, believing shame i at the rmt no s of most psychological d k t u r b m i to violate Gestalt therapy's s phenomenological, nonexpert, and dialogic relational position. Important3y, in much o &e Gestalt therapy shame literature today f ( i hthe exception of Greenberg et al. and perhaps others) the dinid wt work with shame i frequently Ilmited to the attunment and empalhic s reception o the person's shame i a rwnshaning envkmment with f n normalizing and supportive acknowledgment o the therapists' own f pasonal experiences with past and crrrrent s h e . Other-acceptance and self-acceptance, other-sootlung and self-soothingand, the awareness that shame is sometimes part o being a human are often preen& as the f " s h e qua non" o therapy. Theoretical and clinical difficulties with this f model were discus&. A field theoretical, phenomenological, and dialogic rnehdology of working with s h e inclusive o the phenomenological focusing of the f client on their affects, cognitions, and sensations was briefly premted, which does mt assume s h e is irreducible. I actuality, this way o n f working with shame i not qualitatively different than mu& o tke thers f apeutic work o Gestalt therapy today--shame or no shame. f
Coda

If the system o introjectd values and the intmjectd (and pmjectd) f disapproval, contempt, and disgust of important others when not acting in accohnce with t h m values remains intact and undissolved, shame can and will be repeated. Having one's shame (and one's self) accepted i a nonshaming environment by the therapist--as wonderful and n

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ROBERT W.R E N I C K

confirming as that h t i U l e a v ~ client nevere~dingly the vulnerable and captive t Wig controlledby the threat of s h e , shamed yet again, o and having to engage i shame avoidance behaviors and felings. As n long as the "software" remains operational, the client is not free and selfregulating. Assuaging today's manifestations of this shame software may do little more h provide emotional Novm&feeling better todaybut with the basic foundation m i n i n g intad. What a shame.

..

Bracishaw, J. (1988), M i n g fke S h ffard Binds You.New York: Health Communications hc. G m b e r g , L.& Safmn, J. ( 9 6 , Emtion in P y h f f r p . 1&) s c o l e a y New York:Guilford. & (1989), Emotion i psychotherapy. A m . PsydtoI., M19-29. n Jambs,L.(1995), Shame in the therapeutic dialogue. Brit. Gestdf Rm.484-91. Kaufmq G.(1489),The Psychology of Shm.New York Springer. Lee, R. (1995), Gestalt and shame: The foundation f r a clearer undemtandingo o f field dynamics. Brit. Malt 1. k14-22. & Wheeler, G., (1996), Voice of S M .San F d s c o : Josaey-bas. The Lewis,M.(I%'?-),S h : The ErposarI Selff New York E m P m . Madow, A. (1975), P 4 s of Wisdom New Yo&: Harper & Row, 1987. Nafhanson, D.(1987),The Many Faces of Shame.New York Guilford. Pals, F, Hefferline, R.& Goodman, P.(19511,Gatalf Thmspy. New York: Julian . PESS. Resnick, R. (1968$, Chicken mup i poison. VmoIm, A m . A d . Psychthep., 6: s J.

75-78.

I*, 43-13.

( 9 5 , Gestalt therapy: Principles, prisms and perspectives. Brit. W l 19) at

(19961, Df ithat separate, m that corm& A reply to Wheway and Cantwell. Bet. Gestalt J.,5:4&53. Sapir, E.(1922), Language. New York:Harrourt, 8-. Wheeler, G. ( 9 5 ,Shame in two paradigmso therapy. Brit . Gesff f J., 4:7&86. 191 f Whorf, B. (1955), Lrmguage, Thwrght and Reality. Boston: Institute o Technology. f
M a l f Thcrqy Idtwte
1460 7fhS M , Suite 30 Sanfa h i m , CA 90401
o f b s Angel&

Integrating "Being" and "Doing" in Working with Shame

L E S L I E S. G R E E N B E R G ,Ph.D. S A N D R A C . P A I V I O , Ph.D.

In mponse to comments, we argue for the integration of an empathic

confirminp:vim with a more intentional, sstructurine view o tmtment f and for t integration o a purely phekwnologic> approach with a k f causal, explanatoq model-building appmach to theory o funciimhg, to f form a new Gestalt. This integra~ve appmach to howing and working prvvides for the dwebpment o general m d e l a o what is common in f f h u m experience while promoting the application o these models i a f n
context-sensitive manner, to mpture the uniqueness o a person's concrete, f

actual experience.

N OUR ORIGINALARTICLEw e clearly state that each emotion occurs i a n variety of different ways in therapy and that, i our view d d b i n g n different types and states of emotional experience and expression will help therapists intervene differentially. W e focused on shame in this article not because we believe it is the myd road to healing but because

we believe that:

1)

2)

The ~ecent burgeoning o interest in shame reflects and f attempts t remedy a prior lack of focus on the experience and o dynamics of shame and the especially important role it plays in self*teem problems, selfcriticahess, selfconternpt, and working with fragile procw. It is important to provide furthet discrimination in working with this previously overlooked emotion in order to remedy a possibly overly monolithic view of this complex state. W e have, to this end, suggsted that there are different shame s t a b and experiences and that clients will h e f i t most from therapist identification o , and differential response to, different states of f shame. We have provided an example of work on m e o these f types o shame episodes-the restructuring o maladaptive f f primary shame.
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INTEGRATING "BEING" AND "DOINGu

273

maladaptive experience (Greenberg, Rice and Elliott, 1993; G m b e r g and Paivio, i p m ) . I this view "being w i W involves a real doin& and n n "doing"i n v o l v ~ real way ofbeing with, h e n both are nonimposing a and respectful. The discussion o shame i therapy d m , however, serve f n to highlight the potential damage to certain styles o restructuring such f as frustration, as well as the dangers of certain types o unsupportive f responding as possibly invalidating clients' emerging experience. Although the example we provided, involving empty chair work, emphasizes retruchrhg, the therapist was entpathically attuned to the dient's feelings and was highly present and confirming. This episode o f udhkhecl busin- work was both preceded and followed by episodes of more dialogical interaction. In addition, we do not see the therapist ( n i training) in this transcript, obtained from one of our research projects (Paivio and Greenberg, 1995) as having been conhntive. Neither do w e see confrontation as necessary, although i line with our views, we do n beliwe that at certain times some forms o respectful, person-to-person f confrontation may be helpful. In r-ponse to Fuhr and Gremmler-Fuhr's proposed alternatives about the real difference between shame and @t, we agree with their view that both do relate t values. Rather than simply differing on a dmeflsion o ofbeing and doing, as w e and others have suggested, a more important distinction, as they point out, is probably that p i 1t i about individuals' s and societies" values about what is right and wrong and the attendant fear ofpunishment, while shame is about peaple's values about what is important to their sense o validity and belonging. Public nudiw for f example, i a naked society would not produce shame. n Inregard t the Fuhrs' questions about the function ofprocess diapoo sis and the six steps ofinteryention, we see t h e both as offeringmodels that can act as a guide to practice and as offering theuretical models o f important states and change processes. As a guide to treatment, the states and inmention steps need to be integrated and applied to a procesksetlsitive manner. The therapist wouId not explicitly diagnose the type of shame the person was expressing or deliberately design a treatment o intervention, as might occur i more instructional or modir n ficational approaches. Rather, once the ideas and discriminations about shame and intervention had been integrated, they would act as tacit guides to the therapist's moment-by-moment r-ponses. However, on reflection, o in supervision, the -licit r type of shame or intervention and its aim and impact might be able to be more dearly articulated. In conclusion, it seems that not only is the notion of differential moment-by-moment, episodic, intervention related to different shame or states important, but aIso that a differentid treatment pspective is important to help conceptualize how to work with different people's shame. Some very fragile peopIe, lacking a strong sense o self, find f

274
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LESLIE S. GREENBERG AND SANDRA C. P A M 0

interactions with the therapist potentially shaming and with them, it i important to be alert to the pmible o m n i p m c e of shame s and for the treatment t be highly confirming. For others with a stronger o sense o self, shame may not be that much of an ongoing concern, and f treatment may be more restructuring. However, safety i of concern to s most people. Dialogical confirmation seems crucial in helping many people reach their deepst vulnerabilities. Exposing me's most vulnerable, o h shameful, as i interhuman confirmtion, helps d i m n firm one's maladaptive beliefs about one's lack of worth. This i highly s therapeutic.

Reply to Fuhr, Gremmler-Fuhr,

and Resnick
G O R D O N WHEELER, PhD.
OBSERVED, as sex was ta F r e d a century ago now, s was a-ion o t him and his contemporaries [including o Perls) a half century or M, later: namely, the experimce a d behrmiw that could not be fully owned and talked about in the culture. Robert Lee and I, together with a number o other writ- and teachers, have come to feel f that sometlung like this i the case today with the experience of shame, s which many of us are working to articulate i a new way i Gestalt, as i n n n other models. The joining i on this convemtion by Grenberg, Fuht, n GremmlerFuhr, and Resnick (long a prominent and influential teacher and mento~linician, from whom we do not hear enough in print) is welcome company i n d d i this exploration, and clarifymg to m y own n thinking in a number o ways. f Fuhr and Gremder-Fuhr open the questioq &nost never adi exchangs of this kind, of the present dynamic role of shame i this m w n n safion itseIf. This Ts exactly the kind o exploratory spirit and perspdve h i f which I am trying to take up, much under Robert L e s inspiration. If my e' perspective on self and shame is unclear to them, then how are dl o us f to hold that experience? In an individualist paradigm I am "myself" before I j i the relationship, and plainly in a world o such separate on f " s l e " my practical pals have to center mund self-establishment, 'evs influme, and selfdefense. To be questioned or not understood is then t o be threatened with self-diminishment and shame, and likely my response will be (in best h e - b a s e d academic tradition) to restate my posifiom in much the smtre way, only more vehemently this t m ,with at least the ie s u m t i o n that if there is any remaining failure of understanding (and thedore inadequacy), the problem must be on their side. This i the s countershaming deferwe which i so often the first sign o umcknozoledged s f shame in the field. All o us are familiar with academic and clinical f "debatd ofthis flavor, where the manifest text is some theoreticd point or othe-ut the subtext i shame. And as Perk suggested long ago, s using his "topdog/underdog" metaphor:subtext rules.

sE m E N

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276

GORDON WHEELER

How do w e break out o &is potential shame-bind, which L e and T f e are suggesting is built prepotmtly into OW contact field by the very terms and assumptions o the individualist paradigm? First and f cruciaUy, as Fuhr and Grander-Fuhr suggest and exemplify, ty apming a dialogue about experience, trot just a debate about points. With the support of this dialogic contact, we then have Zhe necessary ground for the inkwentiom Resnick emphask, o exploring and experimenting with f the tern, pmceses, and orgins o aur own experience, our own f meaningful construction o the field. Both these kinds o activities, which f f are the ground and the figu~e f new Gestalt formation, new wholes d o understanding, are essential, I believe, and ReSnick is probably right to observe that 1have been emphasizing the formerf as often neglected in practice, and not h l h g enough about h e latter. To me, a fond fantasy experiment i this ongoing contact would be to ask Fuhr and Gremmlern Fuhr to translate one o my shame articles or chapters i n t ~ a n , as a f b way of continuingthe exploration (and I would do the same of course far t e ) I think o this because i their 1993 translation o an earlier book hm. f n f of mine (Gestalf Reconsidered), they pushed me vigorously to d m a a $ number o confusing and unclear points i the text, with the result, I f n thought, h t their German version was in many ways be& and more dearly articulated than the English mi@. Renick is further eancwned that i the pron of raising questions about unacknow1ed@ or unarticuhted shame,we will lead the patient o dimt, in a way that reintroduces the "expert perspedive" of the clasr sical psychodynamic/ interpretive method, violating the phenomenological spirit and premises o our Gestalt model. I have no doubt that this f c d d happen. The issue hrnge6, it seems t me, on the question o o f "Gestalt interpretation," In h e objectivist, right-wrong or expert paradigm, an hterpretation i the m e r . I our model, interpretation is s n rather the question-which is to say, in Gestalt an interpretation is held as a kind o experiment. Not "You're feeling shame (and by implication f you won't admit it)" but rather, "What happens now if we think of this experience as an experience o shame and shaming?"Or perhaps, '"where f is the potential shame in the field right now, in what you are telling me (or in the contact between u ) " Certainly we influence the dialogue by s? raising these questions rather than some other on-; but this is not m error that can be avoided by sticking to the client's phenomenology. Rather, the metaexpiment o diabgue itself is the ody method en to f us to evlme that phenomnulogy, that constructing of experience in the field. The Gestalt m d d insists, I believe, that there is no way for me to enter ti dialogic contact "tabula rasaM-that is, without organizing it hs meaningfully in terms of my own beliefs, Wries, biases, and so forth. This is part o the ground o any p m t figure, m d as Resnick rightly f f insists, meaning lies in &e relalionship-hopefuIly dynamic and

REFLY 'FO FLTHR, GREMMLER-FUHR, AND RENICK

277

fluid--between new figure and held ground C i this case o both partners f in the dialogue). If I tell myself that I can "bracket off" that ground so as to see new figure mare h h l y , will I not just s u c d i burying my own n assumptions, effectively remuving them from the client" view and rendering the deconstmctive process more difficult or impossible? Is it not more productive to put those assumptions right aut-but put them out as experiments infield mganiznfion-lor t e client (and the therapist) to h work and play with? This is the direction o my concerns, and I would f very much like to hear ncre from Resnick on this, because o my impresf sion that our concerns are very much complementary, with each of us taking up an aspect of the f e d which may be somewhat negIected by the il
0 ther.

the role o shame i general, as*a dynamic element in the el ti on of f n experience. Let me just say here that i a wholefield mode1 o self and n f development such as we are working t articulate, the issue o discono f

This bsings me to the larger point, which i how we are to understand s

nection (unwanted disconnection,as Resnick rightly emphasizes) takes on an entirely different meanin& from what it had in an older self-paradigm. Inan individualist model, anxiety mer@ as the key affect i the o@ n rzation of the self-because it is the signal and the sign that the self (meaning the self&ves, i the Freudian system) is in trouble in some n way, as it moves and seeks to realize its nature ( the discharge o those f drives, again in the classical system). In a similar way, shame emerges as the key signal affect in serfaganitntion under a whole-field model because of the way it serves as information about the ground conditions for contact, the state o the sdjective experiential field and thus about what fipres f of emwtiun, desire, and action can be formed and energized in experience. In this way I am not persuaded that shame is best treated " n much the i same way as any other issue o existential importance," as Fuhr and f Grenunler-Fuhr suggest. How it is best treated is the question w e are all engagd here i exploring. And the promise of this exploration, to me, is n that it leads us straight to the creative potential o the Gestalt model to f deconsfrucf f individualist model of self and community, apening up new h possibilities for experience and action i a world that is starved for n meaningful connection.

A Psychometric Examination of Gestalt

Contact Boundary Disturbances
B R U C E M I L L S , E.D.
uRmrG THE PAST 40YEARS Gestalt emy has received widespread e p implementation as a therapeutic tool d in a number of contexts, ranging from being the primasy focus of the psychotherapeutic s l ofnumerous practitioners to being an adjunct m e t h d ve for many others. The purpose o this study was tn empirically examine f an instrument for measuring the Gestalt therapy constructs of contact boundary disturbances referred t as projection, retrofldon, introjeco tion, deflection and confluence. This research builds on the efforts of Kepner (1982)and Caffam (1991) to develop a similar measure.Although not incorporated into this study, a number of similar research endeavors were conducted at Kent State University under lhe diredion o Professor Emeritus Ansel Woldt. f Research by Bymes (1975) is the "grand parent" o d psychometric f studiw of Gestalt contact and resistance functions. Zn addition to Kepner, other figural research on inshumentation o relevance to this study are f Frew ( 9 2 , Hell18) (1983), Martinek (1985), Miaz (1990),Hoopingarn ( 9 7 ) Fuller (1991), Hartung (19921, and Prosnik (1996) at Kent State 18', University and Kiracofe (1992) at Temple University. This study includes an exploratory factor analysis to examine construct validity and the use o coefficient alpha to determine which f items reflect inter-item reliability. A confirmatory factor analysis examined the structure o the f n l instrument. To analyze the convergent f ia validity o the instrument, the measure o contact born* f f dish* bances were examined i their relationships t the personality attributes n o

described as the "Big 5" personality traits of conscientiousness, emotional stability, openness t experience, extraversion, and agreeableo ness (Goldberg, 1992). The hypotheses examined were:
h c e E Mills, PkD. i an As&tant RPtessor o Management a t the S c k d o Wz9inea, s f f UmMty o Wiscrmsin-Madison. H qxdalks in d f e concemifig the pycholagy ot

the woikplace.

2.78

Q 1997

me~ n a l ~ t i ~ hss

GESTALT CONTACT BOUNDARY DISTURBANCIIS

279

Hypothesis 1 Confluence will be positively correlated with conscien:

tiousness, emotional stability, openness t experience, extroversion, o and agreeableness. Hypothesis 2: Introjmtion, deflection, retrofldon, and projection wiIl be negatively correlatd with conscientiousness, emotional stability, openness to experience, extraversion, and agreeableness.

Two sets of subjects were mp1oyd in h i s research.Sub~ects Sample 1 in were 200 first-level supervisors and mid-level managers who attended management dwelopment programs at a Midwestern university. Sub jects in Sample 2 were students in an introductorj-level, undergraduatet o ~ t i o n abehavior class. Participation was voluntary, and a total o l f 400 students parkiapatd in Sample 2. Data were collectedby self-report, paper-and-pencil questionnaires.

CJoaract BouPtdmy Dtiwi4ancer The initial items used in the study for Prqection, Introjection, Retroflectim, and Confluence inc1uded 66 items taken from Kepner's (1982) dissertation. The items for Deflection were taken from Caffm's (1991) article i the Gestalt J o m l . An exploratory factor analysis was first n utilized with the data from each sample t examine the internal structure o of the constructs. Initially, many o the items failed to reach an acceptable f level of factor loading with those items with which they were hypothesized to be related. For further analysis of the instrument, only those items that indicated w reasonable lwel o factor loading were u t i l d . f

"BigT" Pmonality Va&Ies The Big 5 was measud through use of an ipsative scde with anchors,
including extraversion (social, talkative, assertive), agreeabtenes C g d natured, cooperative, trusting), co&entiousness [responsible, cautiaus, organid), emotional stability (tax,hwcure, nervous), and o p w t experience (imaginative, artistically sensitive, inte1lectual). The wdjeco tive pairs were extracted from the lists prepared by Goldberg (1992).

Analpii and UEB

As stated earlier, the exploratory factor analysis indicated a m b e r o items that failed to have adequate factor loadings with the d a t e d f items. O particular interest was the failure o those items hypotheskd f f

28Q

BRUCE F. MILLS

representing inhojectim t~ discriminate fmm those hypothesized as deflection. Also, those hypoth~ized representing confluence did not as have high common factor loadings. T h t y two items were utilized i the n final instrument. The items that constitute the five Getalt factors are listed in Table 1. Table 1 Gestalt Factor Scds

Items with appropriate factor loadings that were u.tilized i the final n study. (Note: sweral o the items have rev& f scoring and are marked with an *)
Deflection
y get my point clearIy ta ofhers s that they understand it. o People o h lose inter& in what I am sayingbecause I don't stick t the point. o I ramble on much too mu& w h I speak. I like t generalize about things and don't think s p d f ~ m too o are important. T very spedfic and to the point i my conversationwith others. ' m n 1 often play music or watch TV rather than attad to what's making me anxious. I find most people understand my meaningvery quickly when Im ' expressing myself. 1listen to music or turn on the W when I have other work t do at o home. 1 would rather have many t i e going on w h spiking with h n someone even though it may hamper m y communication with them.

Td

Iam clever at making mnvemztion. I find it easy to guide mvemtions where I want them to go. If people really knew me they wodd say I a m an uptight person. I think of myself as a special person. There are a number o tfungs I'd l i b t do but feel too inhibit& t f o o
try. 3 look to others t start: conversations. o I seek out new things rather than lt them come t me. e o 1stop myself from doing quite a few things because o embmmsf
ment.

GESTALT CONTACT BOUNDARY DISTURBANCE5

281

18. Other people have a d me o being lazy. f 1 . It is easier for me t get help on something thanto do it by myself. 9 o 20, 1 a m scattered and u n f d in my attention. *21. 1have lived up t the h o p m y parents had for me. o *22. 1 seldom put things off.

23. Other people are seldom the cause of a lot of my difficulties. ' 24. h v e d ones should know what i going on with you without your s having t say. o *25. People often have a hidden meaning behind what they say. 26. If others around me would change their ways, I would be better
27.

off. Most people grab d of the d l

mistakes.

t t h y ean and avoid admitking

98. People usually live up to my expectations o them. f

29. When a situation gets tense, I mmetims find myself laughing30. 1get along with almoat everyone. 31. Some things must be acceptedwithout question 32. Established authorities usually know what they are talking about. 33. I like t go along with what othem like to do. o

Conhmabry Factor Analysis for tfie 32 final items o h e instrument was f d p d utilizing integrated factors with s a m p l ~ ~ 1 and T utilizing the LISREL VDI computer package Ooreskog and Sorbom, 1993). Thls analysis indicated a satisfactory fit to all o the criteria. For Sample 1, the f Goodnew o Fit hdex was -93, the Adjusted G o o h a of Fit Index was f -90, the Comparative Fit Index was .92, and the Root Mean Squate Error o Approximation was .046. For Sample 2, the Goodness of Fit Index was f -93, the Adjusted Goodness o Fit Index was .89, the Comparative Fit f Index was -85, and the Root Mean Square Error o Approximation wes f
.069.

Coefficient alpha was applied t obtain an estimate o the i n k m d reliao f bility o the Gstalt % a h . Using the hig?wt alpha scores from the two f samples, the RetrofledionScale was .72 and h e Deflection W e was -66

282

BRUCE F. M K S

Table 2

ConfIuenee

Deflection Inhjection Retrofl&im Projection Pleasantness

9 -

To experimce
Extraversion Emotional

Stability Conscientiousness

on Sample I. h are acceptable lwels. The &dent dpha scale for the Introjeaion Scale was .59,the Confluence Scale was 55, and the F m jection Scale was .54. The latter three scores are m a p d y acceptable and a e all from Sample 1. However, coefficient alpha's for the originally r hypothesized items were very poor, ranging from - 0 to -48. .3

the cornlation analysis Getween the contact boundary disturbance measure3 and the Big 5 personality constructs indicated a highly significant set of relationships with a high level of convqent validity o the constructs (see Table 2). f

The results of

indicatd a high level o v l d t as the f aiiy t validity Big 5 measures had a factor loading o .87 on one factor, while the contact f boundary disturbance items had a loadmg o .50 on the second factor. f
0 .

Dis&mnr

Volidig

The results o the study indicate several questions that merit further f analysis. The first concam further validation of an instrument with

GETALT CONTACT BOUNDARY D ~ B A N C E S

283

improved p s y ~ c and, at the least, replication of this study. For s example, the results of this study do not consistently replicate the -Its from the earlier Caffaro study, because coefficient alpha was signrficantly lower for the defledion items that he previously utilized. And overall, the psychometrics o t i instrument have yet to be proved camistent. f hs This requires perhap questioning how the constructs are operationalized i the instrument o even perhaps whether the theoretical undern r pinnings require further analysis. For example, does the fad that the deflectionitems did not discriminate from the introjedion items indicate that they are not measuring separate contack disturbances, or that deflection is simply a behavioral response to persans who perceive their relationship to the environment is one of introjection? Also, atkntion needs to be paid to the demographic differawe between the subjects from this study and those from the Caffm study. One sample i this study included working managers and supervisors n whose ages ranged from 34 to 61, all o whom were employed at the time f o the study and were from a wide range of industries and locations f throughout the country. The second sample was students ranging from age 20 to 26, who were taking an organizational behavior class. The Caffaro study included persons familiar with Gestalt therapy and the constntets involved. Whether or not t i provided a significant bias can hs only be tested through further replication. The strong relationships with the Big 5 personality collshcts raises sweral other questions. First, what does the fact that the contact boundary items discriminatedfrom the Big 5 indicate how persodity relaw to contact boundary disturbances? Does personality fiow from how persons perceive they must relate to their environment to get their needs met and achieve homeostasis? Concerning the overall theoretical foundation for contact boundary disturbance, this study does indicate they can be shown empirically to have a relationship to ofher, distinct personality factors. Also, what does the fact that confiuenee indicated positive relationships with three of the Big 5 personality c ~ l s t r u c t sindicate about it, since all o the other contact boundary disturbances had strongly f negative relationships? k this mean that confluence has a distinctly different theoretical basis from the other contact boundary ronstructs? Does there need to be further refinement of the theoretical basis for confluwce or how it was operationalized in this instrument?

Bymes, 9. (1975), An examinntionofGestalt therapy #ity themy using Qmethodology.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Kent State University, Kent,

Ohio.

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BRUCE F. M I L E

Caffam, J. (1991), A factor analytic study o deflection. W a l t J., 143-4. f Frew, J'. (1982), A study of inteqm=-mal contact in Gestalt therrtpy and its relationship to marital adjustment.Unpublished doctold dissertation, Kent State University,Kent, Ohio. Fuller, D. (1991), A comparison of the Gestdt Contact Styles Qwstionnah by African heticans ta-the normed sample. ~npublishd master's thesis, ~ & t State University, Kent, Ohio. Goldbq, L. R. (19921, Standard markers of the big-five factor s t ~ d u m . Psycholog. Assess., 4:2b-42. Hartung, P. ( 9 2 , Construction and initial validation o a Gestalt earem 19) f d e c i h process inventoy. Unpublished doctoral diserhtion, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. Hellgm, R. (1983), Construct validation o the Gestalt Q-so* An R-method f approach. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Kent State Univ-ity, Kent, Ohio. Hoopingarner, R. ( 9 7 , A reliability study o the Gestalt Contact Styles 18) f Q u e s t i d R e v i s e d , Unpublished mastefs thesis, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. Joreskog, K G, & Sorbom, D,(1993),L l S E L VM. Chicago:National Educational Resoure. Kepner, J. ( 9 2 , Questionnaire measurement o v n a l i t y styles from the 18) f theory o Gestalt therapy. Unpublished doctoral disswhkion, Kent State f Ynivetgity, Kent, Ohio. Kiracofe, N.(1992), A process analysie of Gestalt resistances in psyehofherapy. Unpublished doctoraldissertation,Temple University, Philadelphia, FA Martinek, S. (19851,Gestalt therapy hommstasis theory:Instrument construction and validation of the Gestalt Pe~sonalHomeostasis Inventory. Unpublished d o d d d i d t i o n , Kart State Univemity, Kent,Ohio. Mmz, T.(199U), A study o the validity o the Gestalt p m d i t y theory o f f f homeostasis and the Gestalt Persona1 H~meostask Inventory-Revid. Unpublisheddoctoral dissertation, Kent State University,Kent, Ohio. Prosnik, K. (19961,Fnl contact and beyond in Gestalt therapy theory and ia m h : A factor analytic study of egotism and transfluenc&.- n ~ u b l i s h e d ~ doctoral dissertation,Kent State University, Kent, Ohio.

Schd o B u s i m f Gmngtr Hail LFnim-ty o W i d n f Madison, W153706 bfm~i.hs.wisc.edu

f Rcaim, 1(3):2&52&6,19W

Reviews and Notes

C t a q Hupe and Mite i%p&e: F i m l Essays o P a l Gwdmn, dited by f Taylor Staehr. A Gestalt Institute of Clwetand publication. Distributed by The Analytic Press, Hillsdale, NJ, 1994, ISBN: 088163-266-X, 156 pp.,
$29.95.

Here is a group of essays from the final years of one of the seminal f i w in Gestalt therapy-venerated still in Gestalt circles, mostly forgottm outside them since his death. The essays sum up Goodman's views on life in society, on writing on his homosexuality; another playing of his familiar tunes, pared down but no less eloquent, the fight mostly gone out of him but not the lyric lilt. Gestalt therap&&are on home ground with his continual circling around experience,impulse, the individual in society, and the singdar, particular occasion o the present f moment. SFis prose style is simpler here than in Gestalt 7?wtrpybut still curiously abstract for all its collquiality, Goodman admits that he "'cannot really write fiction," and the reader's view o him fails i t a f no new place: brilliant in so many ways, melancholy, and never swept off by imagination's soar. Taylor Stoehr's introduction i a marvel o intellis f gence, affection, and clear sight; a person could want nothing mare from his biographer. Praise t Gordon Wheeler and Edwin Nevis, alsa, for o their part in making some o the fruits o Stoehr's mtinuing work on f f Goodman available to Gestalt therapists.

Homge to Rob& host by JosephBrcdsky, S e a m Heaney, and Derek Walcott. Farrm, Straw and Giroux, New York, 19%.

Three Nobel poets plying a trade with resemblances to our own: the
careful attention to words' r e s o d i g s in the soul and in the wodd, and the faith, which impells their actions, that devotion to the truthful exchanges betwen humans i an essential activity. Though ours i also s s an ancient art, it i the bard's mind which has the prior claim to this s

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activity. 'Brodsky's, H&s, and Wa1coWs pred-rs sang first against the younger hills ofearth. Toseph Bmdsky's contributionis the lo-t and the most remarkable, the kind of hprovisation-h essay i editled from remark given to a s class at the Sorbornethat makes you know that here is the full, free flow o life being lived, t~nthwmted, say, "Go, mm--Ydhhhh!" H e f and reads through two Frost poems, turning them this way and that, showing here a textuse and there a color, illuminating this "terrifpg" American poet with his penetrating, affectionate gaze. And he makes us think about what we do. Listen to this:

Because of its absorbiig story line, there i a strong temptation to s bill "Home Burial" as a t t a g d y o incommuni&ility, a poem f about the failure o language. ...I fact, it i just the reverse: it i a f n s s tragedy of communication, for communication's logical end i the s violation of your interlocutor's mental imperative. This is a poem about language's knifyuig success, for language, i the final ana1yn sis, i alien t the sentiments it articulates. No one is more aware o s o f that than a poet; and if "Home Burial"'is autobiographical,it is so in the first place by revealing Frost's grasp o the collision between f his metier and his emotions. To drive this point home, may I suggest that you compare the achral sentiment you may feel toward an individual i your company and the word "love."A poet n i doomed to resort to words [p.39-40]. s

Books Rc#ived
Adolexmw: P s y d m t h e t ~and the Emergent SeIf by Mark McCmvilIe. Jossey-Bass P u b l i i s h ~ ~ Francisco, 1995, a Gestalt Institute o CleveSan f land publication.

Intentional Remlutions: A Seven-Boint Strafegyfor Trm$mning Organizations by Edwin C. Nwis, Joan h c o u r t , and Helen G.Vassalfo. bas^ Publishers, San Francisco, 1996, a Gestalt Institute o Cleveland f publieation.

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Gestalt Reseatch Reports

W e are excited about the initiation o this new and s p d d section o f f Gestalt Rm'ew, which will regularly contain reports of ernpirid studies concerning aspects of Gestalt therapy. As asc&te editors, we are pl& ta be coediting this d o n . It i our vision that Research Reports will enhance the a w m of s practicing psychotherapists and theureticians regarding meaningful research on Gestalt therapy. One o the complaints ever the years has f been that Gestalt therapists are remiss i conducting m r c h and that n even when such research is accomplished, results are not reporled. There are, for example, over 300 doctoral dissertations containing research on Gestalt therapy, With few exceptions, however, most have never been published i professional journals. It is our hope that R n d Reports will stimulate additional empirical research and provide a venue for the exchange o ideas among our readers. f We also envision including d ideas, espe&lly.ones fucused an collecting data from within the Gestalt community or the larger body of psychotherapists. W e welcome brief reports summarizing completed research as well as works in progress. R d Reports should be four to six pages i length, including n references. Manuscripts must be formatted according to our instructions fur contributors, as well as t The Analytic Press style sheet. Both are o available from Gestalt Rmim, 1 South Street, Portland, ME 04101. 7 ~ ~ p should be submitted t the same address. l s o
Pa~lline Rose C l a m , Ph.D. Professor, Gewgia State Unimsity
A d L. Woldt,E d D ,

Professor E m ' t u s , Kent State Unimity

Q 1997The Analytic PESS