Compilation of Cases - Insurance Law

Topic: CONTRACT OF INSURANCE MAYER STEEL PIPE CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
124050, June 19, 1997 FACTS Hongkong Government Supplies Department (Hongkong) contracted petitioner Mayer Steel Pipe Corp. (Mayer) to manufacture and supply various steel pipes and fitting from August to October 1983 which is to be shipped to Hongkong. The parties jointly appointed Industrial Inspection International as a third-party inspector to examine whether the pipes and fittings are manufactured in accordance with the specifications in the contract. Prior to the shipment, Mayer insured the pipes and the fitting AGAINST ALL RISKS with private respondent South Sea Surety and Insurance Co. (South Sea) and Charter Insurance Corp. (Charter). Before the shipment, International examined the steel pipes and the fitting and certified that all are in GOOD ORDER before they were loaded to the vessel. Nonetheless, when the goods when reached Hongkong, it was discovered that a substantial portion thereof was damaged. Mayer filed a claim against South Sea and Charter for indemnity under the insurance contract. Charter paid Hongkong the amount of HK$64,904.75. But South Sea refused payment on the ground that the insurance surveyors report allegedly showed that the damage is a factory defect. Trial Court decided in favour of petitioner and found that the damage to the goods is not due to manufacturing defects. That the insurance contract in controversy is at ALL RISKS policies which insure against all causes of conceivable loss or damage. CA set aside the trial courts findings and dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription; it invoked Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by the Sea Act (COGSA) since it filed on April 17, 1986 or more than two years from the time the goods were unloaded from the vessel.
PECAs Digest Insurance Law
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ISSUE: WON the petitioners cause of action has already been barred by prescription;WON the COGSA is the applicable law. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the negative. According to the Court, the CA erred in applying the COGSA law in this case. Section 3(6) of the COGSA the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless the suit is brought within one year after the delivery f the goods should have been discovered. In the abovecited provision, it is clear that only the carriers liability is extinguished if no suit is brought within one year. But the liability of the insurer is not extinguished because the insurers liability is not based on the contract of carriage but on the contract of insurance. COGSA governs the relationship of the shipper and the carrier. It does not affect the relationship between the shipper and the insurer. The Filipino Merchants Case is not applicable in this case. In the Filipino Merchants Case, it was the insurer who filed a claim against the carrier for reimbursement of the amount it paid to the shipper. In this case, it is the shipper which filed a case against the insurer. It based on the ALL RISKS insurance policies issued by South Sea.
Topic: DOING OR TRANSACTING AN INSURANCE BUSINESS
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, GR. No. 167330 ,SEPT. 18, 2009 Facts Petitioner: Philhealth, a domestic corporation whose main purpose is to establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance organization (HMO) to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization.
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Members paid their annual membership fee and are entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and curative medical services provided by its duly licensed physicians, specialists and other professional technical staff participating in the group practice health delivery system at a hospital or clinic owned, operated or accredited by it. Philhealth was assessed to pay DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX (DST) by the respondent pertaining to its health care agreement pursuant to Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code. Philhealth contested claiming that they are not an insurance company and that they are merely a health maintenance organization. They also claimed that they availed tax amnesty pursuant to RA 9840 or the Tax Amnesty Act of 2007.
Issue: WON Philhealth is engaged in an insurance business; hence they are required under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code to a DST. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the negative and finds that the petitioner is merely a health maintenance organization. Petitioner is admittedly an HMO. Under RA 7875 (or The National Health Insurance Act of 1995), an HMO is an entity that provides, offers or arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid premium. In the long line of cases in the United States, the US Courts adopted the test to determine whether an HMO is engaged in the insurance business, the tests are the following: the assumption of risk and indemnification of loss. These tests are considered to be the principal objectives in doing an insurance business. If these are the principal objectives, the business is that of insurance. But if they are merely incidental and service is the principal purpose, then the business is not insurance. (THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT AND PURPOSE TEST) Further, American courts have pointed out that the main difference between an HMO and an insurance company is that HMOs undertake to provide or arrange for the provision of medical services through participating physicians while insurance companies simply undertake to indemnify the insured for medical expenses incurred up to a pre-agreed limit.
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In this case, petitioner as an HMO, has the obligation to maintain the good health of its members by way of its preventive and diagnostic medical services. Accordingly, its health care programs are designed to prevent or to minimize the possibility of any assumption of risk on its part. Thus, its undertaking under its agreements is not to indemnify its members against any loss or damage arising from a medical condition but, on the contrary, to provide the health and medical services needed to prevent such loss or damage. Overall, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits to its members (with respect to its curative medical services), but these are incidental to the principal activity of providing them medical care. The insurance-like aspect of petitioners business is miniscule compared to its noninsurance activities. Therefore, since it substantially provides health care services rather than insurance services, it cannot be considered as being in the insurance business.
Petitioner, as an HMO, undertakes a business risk when it offers to provide health services: the risk that it might fail to earn a reasonable return on its investment. But it is not the risk of the type peculiar only to insurance companies. Insurance risk, also known as actuarial risk, is the risk that the cost of insurance claims might be higher than the premiums paid. The amount of premium is calculated on the basis of assumptions made relative to the insured
Finally, the petitioners tax liability was extinguished under the Tax Amnesty Law.
Topic: CONTRACT OF ADHESION/FINE PRINT RULE
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ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORP. vs. THE PHILIPPINE AMERERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, G.R. no. 166245, April 9, 2008 FACTS Eternal Gardens (Eternal) and respondent PhilAm Life entered into an agreement known as CREDITOR GROUP LIFE POLICY No. P-1920. Under the policy, the clients of Eternal who purchased burial lots from it on installment basis would be insured by Philamlife. The amount of insurance coverage depended upon the existing balance of the purchased burial lots. The policy was to be effective for a period of one year, renewable on a yearly basis. On the agreement, it was stipulated that no insurance if the application of the Lot Purchaser is not approved by the respondents. Eternal complied with the abovecited stipulation. On December 29, 1982 Eternal sent a letter to PhilAm Life containing a list of insurable balances of its lot buyers for October 1982. One of those included in the list as "new business" was a certain John Chuang. His balance of payments was PhP 100,000. On August 2, 1984, Chuang died. Upon Chuangs death, Eternal wrote a letter to PhilAm Life, attaching thereto pieces of evidence that would warrant the death of Chuang. PhilAm Life replied asking for other documents relative its insurance for Chuangs death in which Eternal transmitted the requested documents on November 14, 1984. After more than a year, Eternal got no reply from PhilAm. Hence, this prompted Eternal to demand response to the respondent. PhilAm Life replied that Chuang has no application for the group insurance submitted before their office prior to his death. PhilAm invoked the pertinent provision on their agreement which speaks that there shall be no insurance if the application is not approved by the Company."
ISSUE: WON inaction of the insurer on the insurance application be considered as approval of the application. SCs DECISION: The Court answered in the affirmative.
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According to the Court, INSURANCE CONTRACT are contracts of adhesion which are wholly prepared by the insurer with vast amounts of experience in the industry purposely used to its advantage. It contains technical terms and conditions which an ordinary layperson cannot understand or could cause confusion. Hence, insurance contracts are imbued with public interest. So, in order to protect the interest of insurance applicants, insurance companies must be obligated to act with haste upon insurance applications, to either deny or approve the same, or otherwise be bound to honor the application as a valid, binding, and effective insurance contract In this case, the Court finds that the letter dated December 29, 1982, which Philamlife stamped as received, states that the insurance forms for the attached list of burial lot buyers were attached to the letter. Such stamp of receipt has the effect of acknowledging receipt of the letter together with the attachments. The burden of evidence shifted to the respondent which must prove that the letter did not contain Chuang's insurance application. However, Philamlife failed to do so; thus, Philamlife is deemed to have received Chuang's insurance application. To conclude, PhilAm Life assumed the risk of loss without approving the application.
Topic: PARTIES IN INSURED;BENEFICIARY
INSURANCE
CONTRACT-INSURER
AND
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP. vs. CA and MEDARDA V. LEUTERIO, G.R No. 113899, OCTOBER 13, 1999 FACTS Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) executed a contract of group life insurance with Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) wherein Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP. One such loan mortgagor is Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio. In an application form, Dr. Leuterio answered questions concerning his test, attesting
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among others that he does not have any heart conditions and that he is in good health to the best of his knowledge. However, after about a year, Dr. Leuterio died due to massive cerebral hemorrhage. When DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife, the latter denied the claim, alleging that Dr. Leuterio did not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death. Allegedly, such non-disclosure constituted concealment that justified the denial of the claim. Hence, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio filed a complaint against Grepalife for Specific Performance with Damages. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found in favor of the widow and ordered Grepalife to pay DBP.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding Grepalife liable to DBP as beneficiary in a group life insurance contract from a complaint filed by the widow of the decedent/mortgagor. SCs RULING: The rationale of a group of insurance policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as the mortgage redemption insurance, is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying the obligation. In a similar vein, ample protection is given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of death, the mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund. Such losspayable clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the contract. The insured, being the person with whom the contract was made, is primarily the proper person to bring suit thereon. Subject to some exceptions, insured may thus sue, although the policy is taken wholly or in part for the benefit of another person, such as a mortgagee.
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And since a policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or succession to any person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such person may recover it whatever the insured might have recovered, the widow of the decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer, Grepalife.
Topic: CONTRACT OF ADHESION/FINE PRINT RULE WESTERN GUARANTY CORP. vs. CA et. al, G.R no. 91666, July 20, 1990 FACTS A certain Priscilla Rodriguez was struck by a De Dios passenger bus owned by De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. As a result, she was thrown to the ground hitting her forehead. Prescilla was hospitalized as her face was permanently disfigured causing her serious anxiety and moral distress. She claimed damages against De Dios. De Dios is insured with the Western Guaranty. It has been stipulated by the parties, among other things, the PROTECTION AGAINST THIRD PARTY LIABILITY. (Western will pay ALL SUMS NECESSARY TO DISCHARGE LIABILITY OF THE SINSURED IN RESPECT OF xxx death or bodily injury or damage to property of any THIRD PARTY x x x. The trial court decided in favour of Priscilla. It ordered that De Dios and Western to pay jointly and severally the relief sought plus compensation for loss of earning during plaintiffs incapacity to work; moral damages, attorneys fee and cost of suit. Western contested the decision. It claimed that they cant be held liable for loss of earnings, moral damages and attorney's fees because these items are not among those included in the Schedule of Indemnities set forth in the insurance policy.
ISSUE: WON Western is obligated to pay the actual damages, moral damages, attorneys fee and cost of suit even if these are not included in the insurance policy. SCs RULING: The Court held in the affirmative. According to the Court, insurance contract is a contract of adhesion. The rule is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that the terms of such
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contract are to be construed strictly against the party which prepared the contract, which in this case happens to be petitioner Western. An examination of Section 1 of the Liability of the Public of the Master Policy issued by Western to De Dios, it seems that it marked out in comprehensive terms, all sums necessary to discharge liability of the insured in respect of [the precipitating events]" It must be stressed, however, that the Schedule of Indemnities does not purport to limit, or to enumerate exhaustively, the species of bodily injury occurrence of which generate liability for petitioner Western. A car accident may, for instance, result in injury to internal organs of a passenger or third party, without any accompanying amputation or loss of an external member (e.g., a foot or an arm or an eye). But such internal injuries are surely covered by Section I of the Master Policy, since they certainly constitute bodily injuries. Further, the Schedule of Indemnities was merely meant to set limits to the amounts the movant would be liable for in cases of claims for death, bodily injuries of, professional services and hospital charges, for services rendered to traffic accident victims,' and not necessarily exclude claims against the insurance policy for other kinds of damages, such as those in question.
Topic: INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS RIZAL SURETY & INSURANCE CO. vs. CA, G.R. No. 112360, June 18, 2000 FACTS Rizal Surety & Insurance Company (Rizal Insurance) issued Fire Insurance Policy 45727 in favor of Transworld Knitting Mills, Inc. (Transworld), initially for P1,000,000.00 and eventually increased to P1,500,000.00, covering the period from 14 August 1980 to 13 March 1981. The same pieces of property insured with Rizal Insurance were also insured with New India Assurance Company, Ltd., (New India). On 12 January 1981, fire broke out in the compound of Transworld, razing the middle portion of its four-span building and partly gutting
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the left and right sections thereof. A two-storey building (behind said four-span building) where fun and amusement machines and spare parts were stored, was also destroyed by the fire. Transworld filed its insurance claims with Rizal Insurance and New India but to no avail. Transworld now brought against Rizal and New India a action for collection of sum of money. It anchored its contention that the so called ANNEX (where the amusement machines and spare parts were stored) was NOT an ANNEX but was actually an integral part of the four-span building, hence, the goods and the items stored therein were covered by the same fire policy. Trial Court decided in favour of Transworld; ordered the Rizal Surety to pay to the former the insured amount as well as the other costs while dismissing the case agsunts New India. CA modified the decision; it ruled that New India should likewise pay the insured amount in favour to Transworld; it affirmed that Rizal Surety should also pay.
ISSUE: WON the annex building where the amusement machines and other effects were stored is part of the fire insurance policy. SCs DECISION: The Court answered in the affirmative. After scrutinizing the fire insurance agreement, the Court finds that the said fire insurance policy in question did not limit its coverage to what were stored in the four-span building. ("xxx contained and/or stored during the currency of this Policy in the premises occupied by them forming part of the buildings situate (sic) within own Compound xxx") Two requirements must concur in order that the said fun and amusement machines and spare part would be deemed protected by the fire insurance policy, to wit: said properties must contain and/or stored in the areas occupied by Transworld and said areas must form part of the building described in the policy. Both the trial court and the CA found that the so-called ANNEX was not an annex building but an integral and inseparable part of the four-span building described in the policy and consequently, the machines and the spare parts stored therein were covered by the fire insurance policy. Insurance Contracts are contracts of adhesion. Hence, the 'terms in an insurance policy, which are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain x x x are to be construed strictly and most strongly against the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the dominant purpose of
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indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where forfeiture is involve. The reason for this is that the 'insured usually has no voice in the selection or arrangement of the words employed and that the language of the contract is selected with great care and deliberation by experts and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclusively in the interest of, the insurance company.
Topic: INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. vs. TANTUCO ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. No. 138941, October 8, 2001 Facts Tantuco Enterprises is engaged in the coconut milling and refining industry. It owns two oil mills both are located in the companys factory in Iyam, Lucena. It started with one oil mill and in 1988 a new oil mill was installed. The two oil mills were SEPARATELY covered by fire insurance policies issued by Petitioner American Home Assurance Co. The first oil mill was insured for 3million pesos while the new oil mill was for 6million pesos. A fire broke which consumed the new oil mill. Tantuco immediately informed American Home about the incident. American Home then sent an appraiser to check the burned premises. On a letter, American Home rejected Tantucos claim for the insurance proceeds. They argued that burned oil mill was not covered in the insurance policy since the description of the insured premise is not the one that had been burned. Tantuco filed a complaint for specific performance and damages. RTC- decided in favour of Tantuco; CA affirmed the same.
ISSUE: WON the burned oil mill is not covered in the insurance policy.
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SCs Ruling: The Court finds that the burned oil mill is covered in the fire insurance policy. According to the Court, the objective of the Court in construing a contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties to the contract and to enforce the agreement which the parties have entered into. In determining the intent, the court will read and construe the policy as a whole to determine its purpose and object. In this case, it is clear that the parties really intended to protect the new oil mill (the one that had been burned). Notwithstanding the misdescription in the policy, it is beyond dispute that what has been insured is the new oil mill. Indeed, it would be absurd to assume that Tantuco would protect the first oil mill for different amounts and leas the uncovered its second one. In view of the custom of insurance agents to examine buildings before writing policies upon them, and since a mistake as to the identity and character of the building is extremely UNLIKELY. It is also clear that it was petitioners agent who made an error of copying the boundaries of the first oil mill when typing the policy to be issued to the new one. Hence, the source of the discrepancy happened during the preparation of the written contract. Noteworthy also to point out that Mr. Tantuco notified Mr. Borja (Americans agent) about the discrepancy of the description in the insurance policy. However, instead of correcting the same Mr. Borja assured Mr. Tantuco that the use of the adjective NEW will distinguished the properties insured.
Topic: INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ERLINDA FABIE and HER UNKNOWN DRIVER, G.R. No. 81026, April 3, 1990 FACTS Pan Malayan is the insurer of Canlubang Automotive Resource Corporation for a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer car with plate number DDZ431. Sometime on May 26, 1985, due to the carelessness, recklessness and imprudence of the unknown driver of Fabie the insured car was hit by a pick-up truck owned by the latter. PanMalay defrayed the cost of the repair; it became the subrogee of Canlubang. Despite repeated demands for reimbursement from Fabie,
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the latter refused to pay. Fabie contended that PanMalay has no cause of action and that payment under the "own damage" clause of the insurance policy precluded subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, since indemnification thereunder was made on the assumption that there was no wrongdoer or no third party at fault. Both RTC and CA ruled that PanMalay has no cause of action.
ISSUE: WON PanMalay may institute an action to recover the amount it had paid its assured in settlement of an insurance claim against Fabie as the parties allegedly responsible for the damage caused to the insured vehicle. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the affirmative and ruled that PanMalay has cause of action. Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to the rights of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all remedies which the latter may have against the third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim by the insurer. Exceptions to the abovecited rule: 1. if the assured by his own act releases the wrongdoer or third party liable for the loss or damage, from liability, the insurer's right of subrogation is defeated, 2. where the insurer pays the assured the value of the lost goods without notifying the carrier who has in good faith settled the assured's claim for loss, the settlement is binding on both the assured and the insurer, and the latter cannot bring an action against the carrier on his right of subrogation and 3. where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which is not a risk covered by the policy, thereby effecting "voluntary payment", the former has no right of subrogation against the third party liable for the loss
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It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that the terms of a contract are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties thereto have used. In the case of property insurance policies, the evident intention of the contracting parties, i.e., the insurer and the assured, determine the import of the various terms and provisions embodied in the policy. It is only when the terms of the policy are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain, such that the parties themselves disagree about the meaning of particular provisions, that the courts will intervene. In such an event, the policy will be construed by the courts liberally in favor of the assured and strictly against the insurer. Both the PanMalay and Canlubang has the same understanding the coverage insurance risks under Section III-1 (a) where it is comprehensive enough to include damage to the insured vehicle arising from collision or overturning due to the fault or negligence of a third party. CANLUBANG filed its claim with PANMALAY for indemnification of the damage caused to its car. It then accepted payment from PANMALAY, and executed a Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt in favor of latter.
Topic: Aleatory Insurance MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. vs. ARNALDO , G.R. No. L-67835, October 12, 1987 Facts Petitioner issued a Fire Insurance Policy to the private respondent, Coronacion Pinca on her property for the amount of P14,000 effective July 22, 1981 to July 22, 1982. Sometime on October 15, 1981, petitioner allegedly CANCELLED the policy for non-payment of the premium and sent the corresponding notice to Pinca. On December 24, 1981, payment of the premium for Pinca was received by Domingo Adora, agent of MICO. It was only on January 15, 1982 that Adora remitted the payment to MICO. Three day later, on January 18, 1982, the property of Pinca was completely burned. But on February 5, 1982 MICO returned Pincas payment on the ground that her policy was already cancelled earlier. The latter refused to accept it. Pinca, made demands for the payment, which MICO rejected. Hence, she seek recourse to the Insurance Commision.
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ISSUE: WON the denial of payment by the petitioner is valid on the ground that the fire insurance policy of Pinca is already cancelled for non-payment. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the negative. Section 77 of the Insurance Code (which petitioner relies their argument) is not applicable in this case since the payment of premium was made by the private respondent. SEC. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies.
Notably, the premium invoice issued to Pinca at the time of the delivery of the policy on June 7, 1981 was stamped "Payment Received" of the amoung of P930.60 on "12-24-81" by Domingo Adora. This is important because it suggests an understanding between MICO and the insured that such payment could be made later, as agent Adora had assured Pinca. In any event, it is not denied that this payment was actually made by Pinca to Adora, who remitted the same to MICO. It would seem from MICO's own theory, that the policy would have become effective only upon payment, if accepted and so would have been valid only from December 24, 1981m but only up to July 22, 1981, according to the original terms. In others words, the policy would have run for only eight months although the premium paid was for one whole year. Further, A valid cancellation must, therefore, require concurrence of the following conditions: (1) There must be prior notice of cancellation to the insured; (2) The notice must be based on the occurrence, after the effective date of the policy, of one or more of the grounds mentioned; (3) The notice must be (a) in writing, (b) mailed, or delivered to the named insured, (c) at the address shown in the policy; (4) It must state (a) which of the grounds mentioned in Section 64 is relied upon and (b) that upon written request of the insured, the insurer will furnish the facts on which the cancellation is based
MICO's claims it cancelled the policy in question on October 15, 1981, for non-payment of premium. To support this assertion, it presented one of its employees, who testified that "the original of the endorsement and credit memo" presumably meaning the alleged cancellation "were sent the
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assured by mail through our mailing section" However, there is no proof that the notice, assuming it complied with the other requisites mentioned above, was actually mailed to and received by Pinca. A close study of the above transcript will show that Pinca meant to renew the policy if it had really been already cancelled but not if it was stffl effective. It was all conditional. As it has not been shown that there was a valid cancellation of the policy, there was consequently no need to renew it but to pay the premium thereon. Payment was thus legally made on the original transaction and it could be, and was, validly received on behalf of the insurer by its agent Adora. Adora. incidentally, had not been informed of the cancellation either and saw no reason not to accept the said payment.
Topic: Contract is considered to be RISK-DISTRIBUTING DEVICE SPS. TIBAY vs. CA and FORTUNE LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. No. 119655, May 24, 1996 Facts Private respondent Fortune Life issued a FIRE INSURANCE POLICY in favor of the Petitioner Tibay on their two-storey residential building together with all their personal effects therein. The insurance was for P600,000 covering the period from January 23, 1987 to January 23, 1988. Petitioner Sps. Tibay paid only P600 from the total premium of P2,938.5 on January 23, 1987 leaving a considerable balance unpaid. On 8 March 1987 the insured building was completely destroyed by fire. Two days later or on 10 March 1987 Violeta Tibay paid the balance of the premium. On the same day, she filed with FORTUNE a claim on the fire insurance policy. Fortune denied the claim of petitioners for violation of the Policy Condition, specifically No. 2 thereof, and of Section 77 of the Insurance Code. Efforts to settle the case before the Insurance Commission proved futile. Hence, petitioners sued Fortune for damages in the amount of P600,000.00 representing the total coverage of the fire insurance policy plus 12% interest per annum, P100,000.00 moral damages, and attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total claim. Trial Court ruled for the petitioners; it ordered Fortune to pay the total value of the insured building CA reversed the decision of the trial court and declared that Fortune is not liable.
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Issue: WON fire insurance policy be valid, binding and enforceable upon mere partial payment of premium. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the negative. According to the Court, Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. 4 The consideration is the premium, which must be paid at the time and in the way and manner specified in the policy, and if not so paid, the policy will lapse and be forfeited by its own terms. On the Policy it clearly provides that the payment of the premium should be in full. Accordingly, where the premium has only been partially paid and the balance paid only after the peril insured against has occurred, the insurance contract did not take effect and the insured cannot collect at all on the policy. This is fully supported by Sec. 77 of the Insurance Code which provides, Sec. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid , except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies (emphasis supplied). The 1967 case of Philippine Phoenix and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Woodworks, Inc. is not applicable in this case since, it was the insurance company that sued for the balance of the premium, i.e., it recognized and admitted the existence of an insurance contract with the insured. . In the case before us, there is, quite unlike in Phoenix, a specific stipulation that (t)his policy . . . is not in force until the premium has been fully paid and duly receipted by the Company . . . Resultantly, it is correct to say that in Phoenix a contract was perfected upon partial payment of the premium since the parties had not otherwise stipulated that prepayment of the premium in full was a condition precedent to the existence of a contract. Lastly, , it must not be ignored that the contract of insurance is primarily a risk distributing device, a mechanism by which all members of a group exposed to a particular risk contribute premiums to an insurer. From these contributory funds are paid whatever losses occur due to exposure to the peril insured against. Each party therefore takes a risk: the insurer, that of being compelled upon the happening of the contingency to pay the entire sum agreed upon, and the insured, that of parting with the amount required as premium, without receiving anything therefor in case the contingency does not happen. To ensure payment for these losses, the law mandates all insurance companies to maintain a legal reserve fund in favor of those claiming under their policies.
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Topic: Uberrima Fides ( Perfect Good Faith) FIELDMANS INSURANCE CO., INC., vs. CA, G.R No. L-24833, September 23, 1968 Facts Federico Songco (husband of private respondent, Mercedes Songco), a man of scant education being only a first grader, owned a private jeepney. He was induced by Petitioners agent, Benjamin Sambat, to apply for a COMMON CARRIERS LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY covering his private motor vehicle. He was convinced, hence, he paid the annual premium of P16.50 and he was issued by the petitioner a Common Carriers Accident Insurance Policy. Sometime on October 1961, the insured motor vehicle collided with a car somewhere in Calumpit, Bulacan. As result of the mishap, Federico and his son Rodolfo died while the rest of his family members (who were passengers) sustained physical injuries. The heirs of Federico demanded payment from petitioner based on the common carriers accident insurance policy. The petitioner denied any payment.
Issue: WON the petitioner is allowed to escape liability under a common carrier insurance policy on the pretext that what was insured, not once but twice, was a private vehicle and not a common carrier. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the negative. The basis for the favorable judgment is the doctrine announced in Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., with Justice J. B. L. Reyes speaking for the Court. It is now beyond question that where inequitable conduct is shown by an insurance firm, it is "estopped from enforcing forfeitures in its favor, in order to forestall fraud or imposition on the insured." As estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall the innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the failure to apply it in this case would result in a gross travesty of justice. As much, if not much more so than the Qua Chee Gan decision, this is a case where the doctrine of estoppel undeniably calls for application. After petitioner Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. had led the insured Federico Songco to believe that he could qualify under the common carrier liability insurance policy, and to enter into contract of insurance paying the premiums due, it
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could not, thereafter, in any litigation arising out of such representation, be permitted to change its stand to the detriment of the heirs of the insured. Moreover, the contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uberima fides) not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility." We have no choice but to recognize the monetary responsibility of petitioner Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. It did not succeed in its persistent effort to avoid complying with its obligation in the lower court and the Court of Appeals. Much less should it find any receptivity from us for its unwarranted and unjustified plea to escape from its liability.
Topic: Contract of Indemnity WHITE GOLD MARINE SERVICES INC., vs. PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION and THE STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA), G.R. No. 154514, July 28, 2005 Facts Petitioner White Gold procured a PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY for its vessel respondent Steamship Mutual through co-respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. A CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY AND ACCEPTANCE was issued in favor to the petitioner by the respondent. However, when it failed to pay its account, Steamship Mutual refused the renewal of the coverage. Hence, it filed a complaint before the Insurance Commission claiming that respondent Steamship Mutual violated Sections 186 and 187 of the Insurance Code for enagaging in the insurance business without a certificate from the Insurance Commission, while respondent Pioneer violated Sections 299, 300 and 301 of the same code. On the other hand, respondent Steamship contended that it filed a case against White Gold for collection of sum of money to recover the latter's unpaid balance. It further averred that, although they are an P&I CLUB (PROTECTION and INDEMNITY CLUB), they are NOT ENGAGED IN THE INSURANCE BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES, rather, it is merely an association of vessel owners who have come together to provide mutual protection against liabilities incidental to shipowning. Further, Pioneer was already licensed, hence, a separate license solely as agent/broker of Steamship Mutual was already superfluous. Insurance Commissioner DISMISSED the complaint; it ruled that respondent Steamship need not obtain a license since it was not enagaged in the insurance business.
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CA affirmed the decision of the Insurance Commissioner; it ruled that Pioneer was merely a collection agent of Steamship, hence, no need for a license.
Issue: WON Steamship Mutual, as a P & I Club, is engaged in the insurance business. WON Pioneer need a license as an insurance agent/broker for Steamship Mutual. SCs Ruling 1st Issue NO. Steamship Mutual is not engaged in the Insurance business. According to the Court, an insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. In it, one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. The test to determine if a contract is an insurance contract or not, depends on the nature of the promise, the act required to be performed, and the exact nature of the agreement in the light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the performance becomes requisite. It is not by what it is called. In particular, a marine insurance undertakes to indemnify the assured against marine losses, such as the losses incident to a marine adventure. Section 99 of the Insurance Code enumerates the coverage of marine insurance. Further, a mutual insurance company is a cooperative enterprise where the members are both the insurer and insured. In it, the members all contribute, by a system of premiums or assessments, to the creation of a fund from which all losses and liabilities are paid, and where the profits are divided among themselves, in proportion to their interest. Additionally, mutual insurance associations, or clubs, provide three types of coverage, namely, protection and indemnity, war risks, and defense costs. In this case, Steamship Mutual as a P & I Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the marine insurance business. As such, since they are doing business here in the Philippines as it maintains a resident therefrom, to continue doing business here, Steamship Mutual or through its agent Pioneer, must secure a license from the Insurance Commission. Since a contract of insurance involves public interest, regulation by the State is necessary. Thus, no insurer or insurance company is allowed to engage in the insurance business without a license or a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission.
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2nd Issue YES. Pioneer needs to have special license being an agent or broker of Steamship Mutual. Although Pioneer is already licensed as an insurance company, it needs a separate license to act as insurance agent for Steamship Mutual. Basis: Section 299 of the Insurance Code - No person shall act as an insurance agent or as an insurance broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippines or any agent thereof, without first procuring a license so to act from the Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. .
Topic: Personal Contract INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY vs. CARPONIA T. EBRADO and PASCUALA VDA. DE EBRADO, G.R. No. L-44059, October 28, 1977 Facts Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado was issued by the petitioner a life insurance with a rider for accidental death. On the policy, it designated Carponia T. Ebrado, a common-law wife of the insured, as the revocable beneficiary. Pascuala Vda. De Ebrado, on the other hand, was the legal wife of the Buenaventura. Sometime on October 21, 1969, Buenaventura died in an accident. So, Carponia filed a claim with the petitioner for the proceeds of the Policy. This was contested by the legal wife. Pascuala claimed that she is the widow of the deceased, hence, she is the one entitled to the proceeds. Petitioner commenced an action for an Interpleader. On the pre-trial conference, parties admitted that Pascuala was the legal wife of Buenaventura to whom they have six legitimate children, that during the lifetime of the deceased he was living with his common-law wife and their two children, although he was not legally separated from his legal wife. It was also admitted that on the policy it was the common-law wife that was designated as the beneficiary, though there was a reservation, the same was not revoked during the lifetime of the deceased up to his death. RTC ruled that Carponia is disqualified to claim the proceeds being contrary to law.
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Issue: WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married man claim the proceeds thereof in case the death of the latter. SCs Ruling: NO. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court ruled that it is quite unfortunate that our Insurance Laws does not contain any specific provision grossly resolutory of the prime question at hand. Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "(t)he insurance shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name it is made" cannot be validly seized upon to hold that the mm includes the beneficiary. The word " interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the "insured" and not to the beneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in character. Further, the general rules of civil law should be applied to resolve this void in the Insurance Law. Article 2011 of the New Civil Code states: " The contract of insurance is governed by special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be regulated by this Code." When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same Code, "any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him. Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other. In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of the new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. Policy considerations and dictates of morality rightly justify the institution of a barrier between common law spouses in record to Property relations since such hip ultimately encroaches upon the nuptial and filial rights of the legitimate family There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on similar consideration A beneficiary in a life insurance policy is no different from a donee. Both are recipients of pure beneficence. So long as manage remains the threshold of
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family laws, reason and morality dictate that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-marital relationship. If legitimate relationship is circumscribed by these legal disabilities, with more reason should an illicit relationship be restricted by these disabilities. Topic: Insurable Interest Defined Gaisano Cagayan Inc., vs. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006 Facts Intercapitol Marketing Corp. is the maker of Wrangler Blue Jeans while Levi Strauss Phils. Inc., (LSPI)is the local distributor of products bearing TM owned by Levi Strauss. IMC and LSPI separately obtained from respondent a Fire Insurance Policies with book debt endorsements. The insurance policies provide for coverage on " book debts in connection with ready-made clothing materials which have been sold or delivered to various customers and dealers of the Insured anywhere in the Philippines . (Book Debt - unpaid account still appearing in the Book of Account of the Insured 45 days after the time of the loss covered under this Policy). Petitioner is a customer and dealer of the products of IMC and LSPI. Sometime in February 1991, the Gaisano Superstore Complex was consumed by fire. Included in the items lost or destroyed in the fire were stocks of ready-made clothing materials sold and delivered by IMC and LSPI. Respondent then filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. It alleges that IMC and LSPI filed with respondent their claims under their respective fire insurance policies with book debt endorsement. Respondent paid the claims of IMC and LSPI and by virtue thereof the former was subrogated to their rights against petitioner. Several demands were made but these went unheeded. Petitioner, on the other hand, countered that they cannot be held liable since the fire the broke out was due to a fortuitous event or force majeure and that respondent's right of subrogation has no basis inasmuch as there was no breach of contract committed by it since the loss was due to fire which it could not prevent or foresee. RTC- it dismissed the respondents complaint and held that the fire was purely accidental. CA set aside the decision of the RTC and held that petitioner should pay to the respondent
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ISSUE: WON the insurance in the instant case was one over credit. SCs Ruling: The Court disagrees with petitioner's stand. In this case, the questioned insurance policies provide coverage for "book debts in connection with ready-made clothing materials which have been sold or delivered to various customers and dealers of the Insured anywhere in the Philippines.; and defined book debts as the "unpaid account still appearing in the Book of Account of the Insured 45 days after the time of the loss covered under this Policy. "Nowhere is it provided in the questioned insurance policies that the subject of the insurance is the goods sold and delivered to the customers and dealers of the insured. Indeed, when the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to read into it any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as they appear on the face of the contract. Thus, what were insured against were the accounts of IMC and LSPI with petitioner which remained unpaid 45 days after the loss through fire, and not the loss or destruction of the goods delivered. The present case clearly falls under paragraph (1), Article 1504 of the Civil Code:
ART. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk whether actual delivery has been made or not, except that: Thus, when the seller retains ownership only to insure that the buyer will pay its debt, the risk of loss is borne by the buyer. Accordingly, petitioner bears the risk of loss of the goods delivered. IMC and LSPI did not lose complete interest over the goods. They have an insurable interest until full payment of the value of the delivered goods. Unlike the civil law concept of res perit domino, where ownership is the basis for consideration of who bears the risk of loss, in property insurance, one's interest is not determined by concept of title, but whether insured has substantial economic interest in the property. Therefore, an insurable interest in property does not necessarily imply a property interest in, or a lien upon, or possession of, the subject matter of the insurance, and neither the title nor a beneficial interest is requisite to the existence of such an interest, it is sufficient that the insured is so situated with reference to the property that he would be liable to loss should it be injured or destroyed by the peril against which it is insured. Page 24
Anyone has an insurable interest in property who derives a benefit from its existence or would suffer loss from its destruction. 30Indeed, a vendor or seller retains an insurable interest in the property sold so long as he has any interest therein, in other words, so long as he would suffer by its destruction, as where he has a vendor's lien. 31 In this case, the insurable interest of IMC and LSPI pertain to the unpaid accounts appearing in their Books of Account 45 days after the time of the loss covered by the policies.
Topic: Insurable Interest in Life/Health Gercio vs. Sun Life Assurance of Canada, G.R. No. 23703, September 28, 1925 Facts Petitioner Hilario Gercio was married to Andrea Zialcita. He obtained a life insurance from the respondent designating her wife as the beneficiary. Towards the end of the year 1919, Zialcita was convicted of the crime of adultery. Subsequently a decree of divorce was issued which completely dissolving the bonds of matrimony contracted by Hilario and Zialcita. Hilario notified respondent that he had revoked his donation in favor of his former wife, he designated instead her present wife, Adela Garcio de Gercio, as the new beneficiary. Respondent refused to change the beneficiary designated in the life insurance policy of the petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus to compel the respondent to change the beneficiary in his life insurance policy.
ISSUE: WON the insured can revoke and change the beneficiary in a life insurance policy considering that his designated beneficiary who is his former wife committed adultery and their matrimonial bond was already dissolved by virtue of a divorce. SCs RULING: Held in the negative.
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The wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband. The beneficiary has an absolute vested interest in the policy from the date of its issuance and delivery. So when a policy of life insurance is taken out by the husband in which the wife is named as beneficiary, she has a subsisting interest in the policy
But if the policy contains no provision authorizing a change of beneficiary without the beneficiary's consent, the insured cannot make such change. Accordingly, it is held that a life insurance policy of a husband made payable to the wife as beneficiary, is the separate property of the beneficiary and beyond the control of the husband.
As to the effect produced by the divorce, the Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, merely provides in section 9 that the decree of divorce shall dissolve the community property as soon as such decree becomes final. Unlike the statutes of a few jurisdictions, there is no provision in the Philippine Law permitting the beneficiary in a policy for the benefit of the wife of the husband to be changed after a divorce. It must follow, therefore, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, that if a policy is taken out upon a husband's life the wife is named as beneficiary therein, a subsequent divorce does not destroy her rights under the policy.
x x x We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the latter, while they are living, can exercise no power of disposition over the same without their consent, nor has he any interest therein of which he can avail himself; nor upon his death have his personal representatives or his creditors any interest in the proceeds of such contracts, which belong to the beneficiaries to whom they are payable. x x x
Topic: Insurable Interest in Property Filipino Merchants Insurance Co., Inc., vs. CA and Choa Tiek Seng, G.R. No. 85141, November 28, 1989 Facts
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Choa Tiek Seng was the consignee of the shipment of fishmeal loaded on board the vessel SS Bougainville. The shipment was insured with the petitioner under Cargo Policy No. M-2678 for the sum of P267,653.59 for the goods described as 600metric tons of fishmean in new gunny bags of 90kilos each from Bangkok, Thailand to Manila AGAINST ALL RISKS. The goods arrived at the Manila port and which were unloaded by arrastre contractor E. Razon Inc. The surveyor ascertained and certified that 105 bags were in bad order condition as jointly surveyed by the ships agent and the arrastre contractor. A formal claim was made by Choa against the petitioner as well as the vessel. Petitioner refused to pat the claim. Consequently, petitioner brought a third-party complaint against the vessel and the arrastre contractor. Trial Court rendered judgment against the petitioner; it ordered to pay Choa; while third-party defendants were ordered to pay petitioner jointly and severally. CA affirmed the trial courts decision
Issue: WON the CA erred in not holding that Choa had no insurable interest in the subject cargo, hence the marine insurance policy taken out was null and void. SCs Ruling: Choa had insurable interest. The very purpose of an "all risks" insurance to give protection to the insured in those cases where difficulties of logical explanation or some mystery surround the loss or damage to property. An "all asks" policy has been evolved to grant greater protection than that afforded by the "perils clause," in order to assure that no loss can happen through the incidence of a cause neither insured against nor creating liability in the ship; it is written against all losses, that is, attributable to external causes. Generally, the burden of proof is upon the insured to show that a loss arose from a covered peril, but under an "all risks" policy the burden is not on the insured to prove the precise cause of loss or damage for which it seeks compensation. Coverage under an "all risks" provision of a marine insurance policy creates a special type of insurance which extends coverage to risks not usually contemplated and avoids putting upon the insured the burden of establishing that the loss was due to the peril falling within the policy's coverage; the insurer can avoid coverage upon demonstrating that a specific provision expressly excludes the loss from coverage. In the present case, there being no showing that the loss was caused by any of the excepted perils, the insurer is liable under the policy.
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Contracts of insurance are contracts of indemnity upon the terms and conditions specified in the policy. The agreement has the force of law between the parties. The terms of the policy constitute the measure of the insurer's liability. If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Anent the issue of insurable interest, we uphold the ruling of the respondent court that private respondent, as consignee of the goods in transit under an invoice containing the terms under "C & F Manila," has insurable interest in said goods. In principle, anyone has an insurable interest in property who derives a benefit from its existence or would suffer loss from its destruction whether he has or has not any title in, or lien upon or possession of the property y. Insurable interest in property may consist in ( a) an existing interest; (b) an inchoate interest founded on an existing interest; or (c) an expectancy, coupled with an existing interest in that out of which the expectancy arises. Herein private respondent, as vendee/consignee of the goods in transit has such existing interest therein as may be the subject of a valid contract of insurance. His interest over the goods is based on the perfected contract of sale. The perfected contract of sale between him and the shipper of the goods operates to vest in him an equitable title even before delivery or before be performed the conditions of the sale
Topic: Concealment Case Sunlife Assurance Company of Cananda vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Sps. Rolando Bacani, G.R. No. 105135, June 22, 1995 Facts Robert John Bacani procured a life insurance for himself from petitioner valued at P100,000 with double indemnity in case of accidental death. He designated his mother, Bernarda Bacani, as her beneficiary. Robert John died on June 26, 1987 in a plane crash. Therafter, Bernarda filed a claim to the petitioner seeking the benefits of the insurance policy of her son. Petitioner denied any claim. Petitioner claimed that after the investigation, Robert John did not disclose MATERIAL FACTS relevant to the issuance of the policy; hence, the policy is voidable. Petitioner discoverd that two weeks prior to formers application for insurance, the insured was examined and confined at the Lung Center of the Philippines, where he was diagnosed for renal failure. During his
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confinement, the deceased was subjected to urinalysis, ultra-sonography and hematology tests. This was not disclosed in his policy. Sps. Bacani alleged that the same was done in good faith. RTC- in favour of Sps. Bacani; it concluded that the facts concealed by the insured were made in good faith and under a belief that they need not be disclosed. Moreover, it held that the health history of the insured was immaterial since the insurance policy was "non-medical. CA- affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: WON there was concealment on the part of the insured regarding his state of health. SCs RULING: YES. The rule that factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court are binding on this Court is not absolute and admits of exceptions, such as when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of the facts. Section 26 of The Insurance Code is explicit in requiring a party to a contract of insurance to communicate to the other, in good faith, all facts within his knowledge which are material to the contract and as to which he makes no warranty, and which the other has no means of ascertaining. A neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate, is called concealment. The terms of the contract are clear. The insured is specifically required to disclose to the insurer matters relating to his health. The information which the insured failed to disclose were material and relevant to the approval and issuance of the insurance policy. The matters concealed would have definitely affected petitioner's action on his application, either by approving it with the corresponding adjustment for a higher premium or rejecting the same. Moreover, a disclosure may have warranted a medical examination of the insured by petitioner in order for it to reasonably assess the risk involved in accepting the application. Thus, "goad faith" is no defense in concealment. The insured's failure to disclose the fact that he was hospitalized for two weeks prior to filing his application for insurance, raises grave doubts about his bonafides. It appears that such concealment was deliberate on his part. Anent the finding that the facts concealed had no bearing to the cause of death of the insured, it is well settled that the insured need not die of the disease he had failed to disclose to the insurer. It is sufficient that his non-
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disclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risks of the proposed insurance policy or in making inquiries.
Topic: Concealment Case PhilAmCare Health System vs. CA and Julita Trinos, G.R. No. 125678, March 18, 2002 Facts Ernani Trinos, husband of Julita Trinos, applied for a health care coverage with the petitioner. In the application form he denied any treatment for high blood pressure, heart trouble, diabetes, cancer, liver disease, asthma or peptic ulcer. Said application was approved for a period of 1 year which was extended for another year. During the period of the coverage, Ernani suffered heart attack and was confined at teh Manila Medical Center for a month. Julita then claim the benefits under the health care agreement. For some reason, petitioner denied her claim saying that the same is void as there was concealment regarding Ernanis medical history. Therafter, Ernani died. Julita filed an action for damages against petitioner. She alleged that she has paid P76,000 for her husbands hospitalization and her claim against the petitioner was denied without valid grounds. Petitioner claimed that agreement grants " living benefits," such as medical check-ups and hospitalization which a member may immediately enjoy so long as he is alive upon effectivity of the agreement until its expiration oneyear thereafter. That that only medical and hospitalization benefits are given under the agreement without any indemnification, unlike in an insurance contract where the insured is indemnified for his loss. Petitioner further argues that it is not an insurance company, which is governed by the Insurance Commission, but a Health Maintenance Organization under the authority of the Department of Health. RTC ruled in favor of Julita; it ordered the petitioner to reimburse the medical and hospital coverage of Ernani, plus moral damages for P10,000, exemplary damages also for P10,000 and attorneys fee of 20,000. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but deleted all awards for damages.
ISSUE: WON the insured concealed a material fact in his application.
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SCs RULING: NO. Under Section 27 of the Insurance Code, "a concealment entitles the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance." The right to rescind should be exercised previous to the commencement of an action on the contract. In this case, no rescission was made. Besides, the cancellation of health care agreements as in insurance policies require the concurrence of the following conditions: 1. Prior notice of cancellation to insured; 2. Notice must be based on the occurrence after effective date of the policy of one or more of the grounds mentioned; 3. Must be in writing, mailed or delivered to the insured at the address shown in the policy; 4. Must state the grounds relied upon provided in Section 64 of the Insurance Code and upon request of insured, to furnish facts on which cancellation is based. None of the above pre-conditions was fulfilled in this case. When the terms of insurance contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation. Being a contract of adhesion, the terms of an insurance contract are to be construed strictly against the party which prepared the contract the insurer.20 By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the insurance contract, ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, especially to avoid forfeiture. This is equally applicable to Health Care Agreements. The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to warrant rescission of the insurance contract. Concealment as a defense for the health care provider or insurer to avoid liability is an affirmative defense and the duty to establish such defense by satisfactory and convincing evidence rests upon the provider or insurer. In any case, with or without the authority to investigate, petitioner is liable for claims made under the contract. Having assumed a responsibility under the agreement, petitioner is bound to answer the same to the extent agreed upon. In the end, the liability of the health care provider attaches once the member is hospitalized for the disease or injury covered by the agreement or whenever he avails of the covered benefits which he has prepaid.
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Topic: Warranties- Effect of Breach of Warranty Perla Compania de Seguros vs. CA and Sps. Herminio Lim, G.R. No. 96452, May 7, 1992 Facts Perla Compania- insurer Sps. Lim insured their Ford vehicle which they mortagage to Supercars FCP Credit Corporation assignee of Supercars Sps. Lim executed a promissory note in favor of Supercars in the sum of P77,940.00, payable in monthly instalment, they also secured by a chattel mortgage over a brand new Ford Laser with Perla Compania. Supercars assigned to FCP Credit its rights, title and interest on the said promissory note and chattel mortgage. On November 9, 1982 (around 2:30 PM), the said vehicle was carnapped. It was Evelyn Lim, wife, who was driving he said car before it was carnapped. The incident was reported to the Philippine Constabulary-Anti- Carnapping Unit. Thereafter, Sps. Lim filed a claim for loss with the Perla Compania but said claim was denied. Perla alleged that when the subject vehicle was carnapped, it was in possession of Evelyn who, at that moment, had an EXPIRED DRIVERs LICENSE, which in violation of the AUTHORIZED DRIVER CLAUSE OF THE INSURANCE POLICY. On the other hand, FCP denied the request of Sps. Lim for a suspension of payment on the monthly amortization agreed upon due to the loss of the vehicle, since the carnapped vehicle insured with petitioner Perla, said insurance company should be made to pay the remaining balance of the promissory note and the chattel mortgage contract. Trial Court ordered Sps. Lim to pay FCP; it also ruled that there was no violation of the insurance contract because the AUTHORIZED DRIVER CLAUSE is not applicable but the THEFT CLAUSE of the said contract.
ISSUE: WON the authorized driver clause in the insurance policy is applicable.
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SCs RULING: No. It is the THEFT CLAUSE in the insurance policy which is applicable. The comprehensive motor car insurance policy issued by petitioner Perla undertook to indemnify the private respondents against loss or damage to the car (a) by accidental collision or overturning, or collision or overturning consequent upon mechanical breakdown or consequent upon wear and tear; (b) by fire, external explosion, self-ignition or lightning or burglary, housebreaking or theft; and (c) by malicious act. Where a car is admittedly, as in this case, unlawfully and wrongfully taken without the owner's consent or knowledge, such taking constitutes theft, and, therefore, it is the "THEFT"' clause, and not the "AUTHORIZED DRIVER" clause that should apply. The risk against accident is distinct from the risk against theft. The "authorized driver clause" in a typical insurance policy is in contemplation or anticipation of accident in the legal sense in which it should be understood, and not in contemplation or anticipation of an event such as theft. The distinction - often seized upon by insurance companies in resisting claims from their assureds - between death occurring as a result of accident and death occurring as a result of intent may, by analogy, apply to the case at bar. Thus, if the insured vehicle had figured in an accident at the time she drove it with an expired license, then, appellee Perla Compania could properly resist appellants' claim for indemnification for the loss or destruction of the vehicle resulting from the accident. But in the present case. The loss of the insured vehicle did not result from an accident where intent was involved; the loss in the present case was caused by theft, the commission of which was attended by intent. It is worthy to note that there is no causal connection between the possession of a valid driver's license and the loss of a vehicle. To rule otherwise would render car insurance practically a sham since an insurance company can easily escape liability by citing restrictions which are not applicable or germane to the claim, thereby reducing indemnity to a shadow. The chattel mortgage constituted over the automobile is merely an accessory contract to the promissory note. Being the principal contract, the promissory note is unaffected by whatever befalls the subject matter of the accessory contract. Therefore, the unpaid balance on the promissory note should be paid, and not just the installments due and payable before the automobile was carnapped. Page 33
The insurance policy was therefore meant to be an additional security to the principal contract, that is, to insure that the promissory note will still be paid in case the automobile is lost through accident or theft. It is clear from the abovementioned provision that upon the loss of the insured vehicle, the insurance company Perla undertakes to pay directly to the mortgagor or to their assignee, FCP, the outstanding balance of the mortgage at the time of said loss under the mortgage contract.
Topic: Cover Notes PACFIC TIMBER EXPORT CORP. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WORKMENS INSURANCE COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-38613, February 25, 1982 FACTS Plaintiff secured temporary insurance from private defendant for its exportation of 1,250,00 board feet of Philippine Lauan and Apitong logs from Diapitan Bar, Quezon Province to Okinawa and Tokyo, Japan. Defendant issued COVER NOTE No. 1010 insuring the cargo of the plaintiff subject to the terms and condition of the Workmens Insurance Company. The same was approved by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner. The regular marine cargo policies were issued only on April 2 1963 in favour of the plaintiff. After the issuance of the cover note but before the issuance of the two marine policies, some of the logs intended to be exported were lost during loading operations in the Diapitan Bay. Defendant denied any claim from the plaintiff on the ground that upon investigation it revealed that the entire shipment of the logs covered by the marine policies were received in good faith at their point of destination. That the said loss, as claimed by the plaintiff, was covered by the Cover Note, said note had become null and void by virtue of the issuance of the marine policy. Insurance Commissioner- observed that 'it is only fair and equitable to indemnify the insured under Cover Note No. 1010', and advised early settlement of the said marine loss and salvage claim. However, defendant alleged that the claim of the plaintiff is being denied on the ground that the cover note is null and void for lack of valuable consideration.
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Issue: WON the cover note is null and void for having been issued without valuable consideration. SCs Ruling: No, subject cover note is valid. Cover Note it is a receipt whereby the company agrees to insure you but good only for 60 days pending the issuance of a regular policy, the same must be in WRITING (see Section 49, Insurance Code) The fact that no separate premium was paid on the Cover Note before the loss insured against occurred, does not militate against the validity of petitioner's contention, for no such premium could have been paid, since by the nature of the Cover Note, it did not contain, as all Cover Notes do not contain particulars of the shipment that would serve as basis for the computation of the premiums. If the Note is to be treated as a separate policy instead of integrating it to the regular policies subsequently issued, the purpose and function of the Cover Note would be set at naught or rendered meaningless, for it is in a real sense a contract, not a mere application for insurance which is a mere offer. Take note that the plaintiff has already paid the full amount due on the two regular marine insurance policies, thereby leaving no account unpaid. For obvious reasons, it was not necessary to ask petitioner to pay premium on the Cover Note, for the loss insured against having already occurred, the more practical procedure is simply to deduct the premium from the amount due the petitioner on the Cover Note. The non-payment of premium on the Cover Note is, therefore, no cause for the petitioner to lose what is due it as if there had been payment of premium, for non-payment by it was not chargeable against its fault. Had all the logs been lost during the loading operations, but after the issuance of the Cover Note, liability on the note would have already arisen even before payment of premium. This is how the cover note as a "binder" should legally operate otherwise, it would serve no practical purpose in the realm of commerce, and is supported by the doctrine that where a policy is delivered without requiring payment of the premium, the presumption is that a credit was intended and policy is valid.
Topic: Unilateral Cancellation of the Policy by the Insurer MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. vs. ARNALDO , G.R. No. L-67835, October 12, 1987
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Facts Petitioner issued a Fire Insurance Policy to the private respondent, Coronacion Pinca on her property for the amount of P14,000 effective July 22, 1981 to July 22, 1982. Sometime on October 15, 1981, petitioner allegedly CANCELLED the policy for non-payment of the premium and sent the corresponding notice to Pinca. On December 24, 1981, payment of the premium for Pinca was received by Domingo Adora, agent of MICO. It was only on January 15, 1982 that Adora remitted the payment to MICO. Three day later, on January 18, 1982, the property of Pinca was completely burned. But on February 5, 1982 MICO returned Pincas payment on the ground that her policy was already cancelled earlier. The latter refused to accept it. Pinca, made demands for the payment, which MICO rejected. Hence, she seek recourse to the Insurance Commision.
ISSUE: WON the denial of payment by the petitioner is valid on the ground that the fire insurance policy of Pinca is already cancelled for non-payment. SCs Ruling: The Court answered in the negative. Section 77 of the Insurance Code (which petitioner relies their argument) is not applicable in this case since the payment of premium was made by the private respondent. SEC. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies.
Notably, the premium invoice issued to Pinca at the time of the delivery of the policy on June 7, 1981 was stamped "Payment Received" of the amoung of P930.60 on "12-24-81" by Domingo Adora. This is important because it suggests an understanding between MICO and the insured that such payment could be made later, as agent Adora had assured Pinca. In any event, it is not denied that this payment was actually made by Pinca to Adora, who remitted the same to MICO. It would seem from MICO's own theory, that the policy would have become effective only upon payment, if accepted and so would have been valid only from December 24, 1981m but only up to July 22, 1981, according to the
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original terms. In others words, the policy would have run for only eight months although the premium paid was for one whole year. Further, A valid cancellation must, therefore, require concurrence of the following conditions: (1) There must be prior notice of cancellation to the insured; (2) The notice must be based on the occurrence, after the effective date of the policy, of one or more of the grounds mentioned; (3) The notice must be (a) in writing, (b) mailed, or delivered to the named insured, (c) at the address shown in the policy; (4) It must state (a) which of the grounds mentioned in Section 64 is relied upon and (b) that upon written request of the insured, the insurer will furnish the facts on which the cancellation is based MICO's claims it cancelled the policy in question on October 15, 1981, for non-payment of premium. To support this assertion, it presented one of its employees, who testified that "the original of the endorsement and credit memo" presumably meaning the alleged cancellation "were sent the assured by mail through our mailing section" However, there is no proof that the notice, assuming it complied with the other requisites mentioned above, was actually mailed to and received by Pinca. A close study of the above transcript will show that Pinca meant to renew the policy if it had really been already cancelled but not if it was stffl effective. It was all conditional. As it has not been shown that there was a valid cancellation of the policy, there was consequently no need to renew it but to pay the premium thereon. Payment was thus legally made on the original transaction and it could be, and was, validly received on behalf of the insurer by its agent Adora. Adora. incidentally, had not been informed of the cancellation either and saw no reason not to accept the said payment.
Topic: Double Insurance Armando Geagonia vs. CA and Country Bankers Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 114427, 6 February 1995 Facts Petitioner is the owner of Normans Mart located in the public market of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. On 22 Dec 1989, he obtained from private respondent fire insurance policy for P100,000. The period is from 22 Dec 1989 to 22 Dec 1990 and covered the stock-in-trade consisting principally of
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dry goods such as RTWs for men and women wear and other usual to assureds business. The policy contained the condition: 3. The insured shall give notice to the Company of any insurance or insurances already affected, or which may subsequently be effected, covering any of the property or properties consisting of stocks in trade, goods in process and/or inventories only hereby insured, and unless such notice be given and the particulars of such insurance or insurances be stated therein or endorsed in this policy pursuant to Section 50 of the Insurance Code, by or on behalf of the Company before the occurrence of any loss or damage, all benefits under this policy shall be deemed forfeited, provided however, that this condition shall not apply when the total insurance or insurances in force at the time of the loss or damage is not more than P200,000.00. On 27 May 1990, the petitioners stocks-in-trade were completely destroyed by fire that broke out in the public market. Hence, petitioner sought recovery from the insurer, however, the latter denied on the ground that at the time of the loss, the same property was insured by Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., Cebu Branch. The basis of the insurers denial was based on Condition No. 3 of the policy. Petitioner filed a complaint against Country Bankers before the Insurance Commissioner. He admitted that at the time he obtained the policy with the Country Bankers, he knew that there was an existing insurance policy issued by PFIC for the same property; however, he had no knowledge of the provision in the Country Bankers policy requiring him to inform the latter of any other prior policies. Insurance Commissioner- ruled that petitioner did not violate Condition No. 3 as he had no knowledge of the existence of the two fire insurance policies issued by PFIC and that it was Cebu Tesing Textile, as his creditor, has insurable interest on the stocks. CA- reversed the decision of the Insurance Commissioner and found that petitioner had knowledge of the existence of the other two policies issued by PFIC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had prior knowledge of the two insurance policies issued by PFIC when he obtained the fire insurance policy from Country Bankers thereby, by not disclosing such fact he violated Condition No. 3 of the policy. SCs Ruling: The Court agrees with the findings of the CA that the petitioner knew of the prior policies issued by the PFIC. His letter of 18 January 1991 to the Page 38
private respondent conclusively proves this knowledge. His testimony to the contrary before the Insurance Commissioner and which the latter relied upon cannot prevail over a written admission madeante litem motam. It was, indeed, incredible that he did not know about the prior policies since these policies were not new or original. Condition 3 of the private respondent's is a condition which is not proscribed by law. Its incorporation in the policy is allowed by Section 75 of the Insurance Code which provides that "[a] policy may declare that a violation of specified provisions thereof shall avoid it, otherwise the breach of an immaterial provision does not avoid the policy." Such a condition is a provision which invariably appears in fire insurance policies and is intended to prevent an increase in the moral hazard . It is commonly known as the additional or "other insurance" clause and has been upheld as valid and as a warranty that no other insurance exists. Its
However, in order to constitute a violation, the other insurance must be upon same subject matter, the same interest therein, and the same risk.
violation would thus avoid the policy. As to a mortgaged property, the mortgagor and the mortgagee have each an independent insurable interest therein and both interests may be one policy, or each may take out a separate policy covering his interest, either at the same or at separate times. We are of the opinion that Condition 3 of the subject policy is not totally free from ambiguity and must, perforce, be meticulously analyzed. Such analysis leads us to conclude that (a) the prohibition applies only to double insurance, and (b) the nullity of the policy shall only be to the extent exceeding P200,000.00 of the total policies obtained. Furthermore, by stating within Condition 3 itself that such condition shall not apply if the total insurance in force at the time of loss does not exceed P200,000.00, the private respondent was amenable to assume a co-insurer's liability up to a loss not exceeding P200,000.00. What it had in mind was to discourage over-insurance. Indeed, the rationale behind the incorporation of "other insurance" clause in fire policies is to prevent over-insurance and thus avert the perpetration of fraud. When a property owner obtains insurance policies from two or more insurers in a total amount that exceeds the property's value, the insured may have an inducement to destroy the property for the purpose of collecting the insurance. The public as well as the insurer is interested in preventing a situation in which a fire would be profitable to the insured. Page 39
Topic: Period of Prescription Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Hon. CA and Vicente Mendoza, G.R. No. 82036, 22 May 1997 Facts At about 5:30 o'clock in the morning of July 20, 1980, a 78-year old woman by the name of Feliza Vineza de Mendoza was on her way to hear mass at the Tayuman Cathedral. While walking along Tayuman corner Gregorio Perfecto Streets, she was bumped by a taxi that was running fast. She was brought to the hospital, but later that day, she died. The name of the taxi was Lady Love Taxi owned by Armando Abellon. At that time it was driven by Rodrigo Dumlao, while the alleged insurer of the vehicle is the petitioner in this case. The heirs of Feliza filed a complaint against Abellon and Dumlao. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include petitioner as party to the case being the compolsury insurer of the taxi cab. Trial Court- in favour of the heirs; it ordered that Dumalo, Abellon and Travellers insurance to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Feliza for indemnity, moral and exemplary damage. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court Travellers Insurance, went to the SC and argued that it did not issue an insurance policy as compulsory insurer of the Lady Love Taxi and that, assuming arguendo that it had indeed covered said taxicab for thirdparty liability insurance, private respondent failed to file a written notice of claim with petitioner as required by Section 384 of P.D. No. 612, otherwise known as the Insurance Code.
Issue: WON petitioner is a compulsory insurer of the Lady Love Taxi; WON the heirs of the deceaseds action to file a claim has already been prescribed.
SCs Ruling 1st Issue: NO The heirs of the deceased made a fatal mistake when they amended the complaint to implead petitioner, but they did not attach a copy of the insurance contract to the amended complaint.
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It is significant to point out that the right of a third person to sue the insurer depends on whether the contract of insurance is intended to benefit third persons also or only the insured. A POLICY whereby the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured "against all sums . . . which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of: a. death of or bodily injury to any person . . . is one for indemnity against liability; from the fact then that the insured is liable to the third person, such third person is entitled to sue the insurer. Since private respondent failed to attach a copy of the insurance contract to his complaint, the trial court could not have been able to apprise itself of the real nature and pecuniary limits of petitioner's liability. More importantly, the trial court could not have possibly ascertained the right of private respondent as third person to sue petitioner as insurer of the Lady Love taxicab because the trial court never saw nor read the insurance contract and learned of its terms and conditions.
2nd Issue: YES The Court ruled that it has certainly ruled with consistency that the prescriptive period to bring suit in court under an insurance policy, begins to run from the date of the insurer's rejection of the claim filed by the insured, the beneficiary or any person claiming under an insurance contract. This ruling is premised upon the compliance by the persons suing under an insurance contract, with the indispensable requirement of having filed the written claim mandated by Section 384 of the insurance Code before and after its amendment. Absent such written claim filed by the person suing under an insurance contract, no cause of action accrues under such insurance contract, considering that it is the rejection of that claim that triggers the running of the one-year prescriptive period to bring suit in court, and there can be no opportunity for the insurer to even reject a claim if none has been filed in the first place, as in the instant case. When petitioner asseverates, thus, that no written claim was filed by private respondent and rejected by petitioner, and private respondent does not dispute such asseveration through a denial in his pleadings, we are constrained to rule that respondent appellate court committed reversible error in finding petitioner liable under an insurance contract the existence of which had not at all been proven in court. Even if there were such a contract, private respondent's cause of action can not prevail because he failed to file the written claim mandated by Section 384
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of the Insurance Code. He is deemed, under this legal provision, to have waived his rights as against petitioner-insurer.
Topic: Period of Prescription Vda. De Gabriel vs. Hon. CA and Fortune Insurance and Surety Co. Inc., G.R. No. 1038883, 14 Nov. 1996 Facts Marcelino Gabriel, the insured, was employed by Emerald Construction & Development Corporation (ECDC) at its construction project in Iraq. He was covered by a personal accident insurance in the amount of P100,000 under a group policy procured from Fortune Insurance & Surety Co. Inc., by ECDC for its overseas workers. The insured risk was for bodily injury caused by violent accidental external and visible means which injury would solely and independently of any other cause result in death or disability. Notice of claim is required to be filed within 6 months from the time of accident. On 22 May 1982, within the life of the policy, Marcelino died in Iraq. A year later, or on 12 July 1983, ECDC reported to Marcelinos death to the insurer by telephone. Among the documents thereafter submitted was a copy of the death certificate issued by the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Iraq which stated that the reason of death was not yet known. Following the series of communications between the wife of Marcelino and Fortune Insurance, the latter, on 22 September 1983 ultimately denied the claim of ECDC on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE: WON the action has already prescribed. SCs Ruling: Yes. The notice of death was given to Fortune Insurance, concededly, more than a year following the death of the insured. Sec. 384. Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the
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insurance company concerned a written notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought, in proper cases, with the Commissioner or the Courts within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action shall prescribe. ( Insurance Code) Fortune Insurance, in invoking prescription, was not referring to the one-year period from the denial of the claim within which to file an action against an insurer but obviously to the written notice of claim that had to be submitted within six months from the time of the accident. Evidence, in fine, is utterly wanting to establish that the insured suffered from an accidental death, the risk covered by the policy. In an accident insurance, the insured's beneficiary has the burden of proof in demonstrating that the cause of death is due to the covered peril. Once that fact is established, the burden then shifts to the insurer to show any excepted peril that may have been stipulated by the parties. An "accident insurance" is not thus to be likened to an ordinary life insurance where the insured's death, regardless of the cause thereof, would normally be compensable. While petitioner did fail in substantiating her allegation that the death of her husband was due to an accident, considering, however, the uncertainty on the real cause of death, private respondent might find its way clear into still taking a second look on the matter and perhaps help ease the load of petitioner's loss.
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Compilation of Cases - Insurance Law

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Compilation of Cases - Insurance Law

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Topic: CONTRACT OF INSURANCE MAYER STEEL PIPE CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

PECAs Digest Insurance Law

Topic: DOING OR TRANSACTING AN INSURANCE BUSINESS

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Topic: CONTRACT OF ADHESION/FINE PRINT RULE

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Topic: PARTIES IN INSURED;BENEFICIARY

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ISSUE: WON the insured concealed a material fact in his application.

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