Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 33

The

Group Successes and Failures of the United States Special Operations Campaign in Vietnam

Figure 1: The unofficial SOG insignia, designed by men assigned to the unit.

Andrew Mullikin Prepared for Dr. Phillip Karber GOVT 451 Georgetown University 7 December 2012
Contact: amm338@georgetown.edu

Mullikin 1

Youve never lived till youve almost died For those who fight for it, Life has a flavor The protected will never know. SOG motto1

Introduction
An official 1988 study by the Joint Chiefs on the conduct of the war in Vietnam simply notes that the Military Assistance Command-Vietnams Studies and Observations Group2 provided advice and assistance in the areas of research and development, combat development, and clandestine activities in addition to evaluating SPAR reports [Significant Problems Area Report] and recommending courses of action and/or methods while [coordinating] and [monitoring] clandestine activities, such as cross-border reconnaissance and operations3 However, SOG was a far more dynamic and important unit than such a bland description would seem to indicate, conducting some of the most dangerous reconnaissance missions in the Vietnam War. The following paper examines the Groups antecedents, formation, structure, personnel, and tactics in detail; the Groups contributions to the war in Vietnam, and its effectiveness in achieving operational and strategic goals, are analyzed throughout the paper. The war in Vietnam was a complicated affair, and for that reason the SOG operations discussed here are painted in broad strokes. The work of Projects Delta,

As written by Larry Trimble, Jim Lamotte, and Ricardo Davis. Quoted in John L. Plaster, Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG, Simon and Scheuster, New York, NY. 2004, p. xi. 2 When SOG was founded, the acronym stood for Special Operations Group; it was changed to the Studies and Observations Group for purposes of operational security in the summer of 1964. 3 Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam: Part 1. The War in Vietnam, 1954-1973, MACV Historical Office Documentary Collection, ed. Robert E. Lester, (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1988).

Mullikin 2

Sigma, and Omega prior to their merger with SOG,4 for example, is not covered here, despite the similarities between their mission set and that of the SOG recon teams. Its also important to note that the scope of the activities of these units remains largely classified to this daythose government documents that have been declassified are, in general, redacted so heavily that precise numbers and other concrete data for SOGs operations is virtually nonexistent. The Joint Chiefs study referenced above, for example, includes only two additional references to SOG, both of which are publicly unavailable. For that reason, much of the following text relies heavily on personal memoirs of those who served with SOG, and analytical texts on the efforts of American unconventional warfare specialists in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia. The Studies and Observations Group was an important asset in the American prosecution of the Vietnam War, and its personnel clearly rank among the most valorous of all the units that served during that war. Unfortunately the Group was misused both operationally and strategically, and its combat and command experience in Vietnam offer important lessons to modern special operations missions. As Major Danny Kelley notes, Determining a more effective use of military resources to meet the strategic goal of defeating international terrorists and the nations who sponsor them is a difficult problem. In the past, policy makers faced similar problems in trying to determine how to defeat a growing communist insurgency in South Vietnam. The US employed a mixture of DOD clandestine operations, CIA covert action forces, and conventional military units in the prosecution of the conflict.5 Recognizing where SOG and its higher command went wrong is a key task in developing a more comprehensive understanding of modern special operations missions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
4

Programs similar in design to SOG but operating under the authority of the 5 Special Forces Group. For more information, see Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print. 5 MAJ Danny M. Kelley, The Misuse of the Studies and Observations Group as a National Asset in Vietnam, 2005, at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437021>, p. 4.

th

Mullikin 3

Origins
SOG grew from roots in the U.S. Army Special Forces, which in turn owed its

early existence to veterans of the WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and other guerrilla campaigns in both the European and Pacific Theaters of the war. Men like Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, Col. Arthur Bull Simons, Col. Aaron Bank (an OSS veteran who later became the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group), and others who gained hard-won unconventional warfare experience fighting behind enemy lines during WWII and the Korean War were the founders of a whole new type of unconventional warfighting doctrine within the US military. Recognizing the Armys need for a permanent unconventional warfare capability, General Robert McClure (then the head of the Armys Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare) established a Special Operations Division in 1951. That organization was eventually renamed the Special Forces Division and was dedicated to supporting partisan groups in operations similar to those of the OSS in WWII. Five years later, the group had again changed names, becoming the US Army Special Warfare Center, and was deploying units around the world.6 The first Army Special Forces deployments to South Vietnam arrived in June

1956, when advisors from the 14th Special Forces Group were sent to train South Vietnamese troops. With American involvement in Vietnam escalating in 1961, attention turned to Special ForcesPresident Kennedys favorite military organizationas a way to provide more tangible support to South Vietnams largely ineffective army without the political ramifications of large-scale conventional troop deployments.7 While the Special Forces teams trained South Vietnamese troops, notably including the elite 1st Observation Group, the Kennedy administration tasked the CIA with providing the manpower and resources for a covert war 6 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional
Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Print, pp. 54-57. Note: this brief history of the Army Special Forces does not do justice to the innovative men who founded the organization. For more information on the Green Berets, Adams text is an excellent place to start. 7 Ibid, p. 78.

Mullikin 4

against the North, formalizing these orders in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52, signed by President Kennedy on 11 May 1961.8 Operation White Star The model for SOG operations developed out of another Special Forces

deployment to Southeast Asia, in which twelve eleven-man training teams were sent to Laos under the command of the Military Assistance Advisory Group Laos, formally established on 19 April 1961.9 While these SF operators had been quietly training the generally inept Laotian military alongside CIA operative for several years, the program was significantly expanded and made official by the establishment of MAAG-Laos. Initially, the SF soldiers served almost exclusively in a training role while also gathering intelligence for the CIA. Eventually, teams began deploying into the field with their units, serving as full combat advisors and executing the first American combat assignment in Southeast Asia. Stanton notes that this deployment was important because of the Special Forces new role as an instrument of American strategy: By virtue of President Kennedys belief in its individual and collective excellence, the Special Forces became the principle counterinsurgency force of the United States. The wartime Special Forces was forged in the jagged Laotian mountains and forest plateaus in direct contrast to its intended wartime mission as guerrilla cadre. In Laos, as in Vietnam, Special Forces soldiers were employed as elite troops to execute long-range special missions, to lead normal infantry, and to train remote, indigenous minorities. Actual missions against true enemy guerrilla bands were rare, and the Special Forces was never allowed to penetrate denied areas to establish guerrilla units.10 Interestingly, the White Star teams in Laos enjoyed excellent relationships with the CIA operatives working in the country, allowing them to operate effectively without working through the bureaucracy established by the MAAG command.
8

Robert M. Gillespie, Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), pp. 4-5. 9 Shelby L Stanton. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956 1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Print, p. 22. 10 Ibid, pp. 30-21.

Mullikin 5

Unfortunately this relationship would change in Vietnam, probably in part due to the failure of CIA covert operations there prior to the Groups establishment. Operation Leaping Lena By 1963, the CIA had failed to deliver positive results from its covert warfare

campaign against North Vietnam. Despite President Kennedys initial orders, the CIA had focused most of its efforts in the South, fearing that their intelligence networks would be degraded without constant supervision. While CIA operations in South Vietnam included paramilitary and counterterrorism campaigns, operations in North Vietnam were limited to agent team infiltration for intelligence collection and psychological operations including leaflet drops and radio broadcasts. Such operations were a far cry from Kennedys orders to build an insurgent movement against the Communists. Given the shortcomings of the CIA program, responsibilities for covert and clandestine operations were slowly transitioned away from the Agency and assigned to the newly formed Studies and Observations Group. The transition between these programs took roughly a year, during which time the CIA still took the lead on all black operations in Southeast Asia. It was during this period that the first cross-border reconnaissance missions

were employed in the Vietnam War. Recognizing that whatever was happening in Laosaerial reconnaissance had failed to deliver reliable intelligencerequired the serious attention of American strategists, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara resolved to send teams drawn from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and trained by US Special Forces troops on reconnaissance missions across the Laotian border. Despite warnings from a senior-ranking Special Forces officer that the missions would fail unless Green Berets were assigned to lead the units, McNamara ordered the teams formed and ready to deploy within thirty days. These reconnaissance operations, codenamed Leaping Lena, were administered

by the CIA and trained by Special Forces soldiers from the 5th SF Group. The eight teams were each manned by five Vietnamese commandos, and were inserted into

Mullikin 6

drop zones along Highway 92 in Laos between 24 June and 1 July 1963.11 Unfortunately, all eight teams were intercepted by NVA troops operating inside Laos, with the majority of their members either killed or captured. Only four of the original forty men escaped back to South Vietnam.12 In the aftermath of Leaping Lenas failure, it was clear that the NVA had a substantial presence in Laos, but no one could be sure exactly what the Communist forces were doing in the area. The task of finding out would be handed to SOG and its new commander, WWII unconventional warfare specialist Col. Donald Blackburn.

Formation and Order of Battle


The initial demand for an enhanced special operations capacity in Vietnam

stemmed from high-ranking generals disapproval of the unconventional warfare tactics then employed by Special Forces units in Vietnam. Rather than training the Vietnamese to fightthe hallmark of unconventional warfareMajor General William B. Rosson in particular argued for an expansion of theater-wide U.S. covert operations. This resulted in Operations Plan 34A, which called for: 1. An expansion of the Vietnamese 1st Observation Unit, which tasked indigenous troops with covert and clandestine operations against North Vietnam with support from the CIA and Army Special Forces. 2. CIA and Special Forces training of reconnaissance teams to be infiltrated into southern Laos, where they units would locate and attack NVA bases and lines of communication, all under light civilian cover. 3. Establishment of company-sized (100-150 man) Vietnamese assault units for deployment against targets too large for the reconnaissance teams.
11

The exact number of men assigned to these units is unclear in the literature. The numbers presented here are from Mike Guardia. Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D. Blackburn - Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2011. Print, p. 166. Unfortunately even Guardias text has some discrepancies regarding the Leaping Lena teams; I have reported his most consistent numbers. 12 Ibid.

Mullikin 7

4. The development of the South Vietnamese Armys capability to launch light-infantry (Ranger) raids into North Vietnam. 5. Regular flights over Communist-held areas for the dissemination of propaganda materials to both harass NVA forces and help maintain morale of anti-Communist residents of North Vietnam. President Johnson approved Op Plan 34A in January 1964, and on 24 January SOG was born out of General Order 6 from the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Headquarters. According to Adams, MACV-SOG was to be a joint unconventional warfare task force responsible for special operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam, and border areas of Chinait was to be the joint service, unconventional-war task force for Southeast Asia13 Given the CIAs failure to expand its operational mandate under NASM 52 beyond South Vietnam, the SOG operations were the first truly theater-wide American covert and clandestine during the Vietnam War. Unfortunately the new commands relationship with MACV headquarters was

rocky from the start. Despite SOGs direct subordination to MACV headquarters in Saigon, the commands missions required approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In practice this approval was delegated to the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities at the Pentagon, and resulted in a significant lag between the opening of a window of opportunity for a decisive covert operation and the actual approval and execution of that operation. Several sources also indicate that the MACV command staff was hesitant to place its full confidence in the poorly understood special operations units assigned to SOG. As a result, SOG was never constituted as a formal, independent task force.14 Perhaps even worse than this command relationship, staff officers assigned to SOG did not enjoy the support and cooperation of the CIA, despite the Agencys
13 14

Adams, p. 118. Ibid, p. 119.

Mullikin 8

previous experience running covert operations in the theater. The few CIA officers assigned to SOG were restricted to the Psychological Operations section, where they had little impact on the majority of SOG missions. Even more problematic, the position of SOG deputy, or 01, was reserved for a CIA liaison officer, but Langley never assigned an officer to the post. Some sources even go so far as to suggest that the CIA wanted to keep its distance from SOG.15 The combination of these two factors meant that the new SOG command was forced to begin its operations in Southeast Asia without significant support from its predecessor or its higher headquarters.

Figure 2: SOG Organizational Structure. The Ground Studies Group, SOG 35, was the branch responsible for cross-border reconnaissance operations.

Organization The SOG command was initially assigned six officers and two enlisted men, led by Col. Clyde R. Russell, who had served with the 101st Airborne Division during WWII, but lacked real experience fighting unconventional warfare. Drawing from
15

Adams, p. 119-120.

Mullikin 9

his conventional background, Russell organized SOG along traditional military lines, with separate divisions for various administrative activities. As the command developed, its force structure eventually included an

assortment of special operations units, including Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy SEALs, Reconnaissance Marines, and CIA agents, in addition to a large complement of indigenous mercenaries including Vietnamese, Chinese Nungs, Montagnards, and Cambodians. Given the clandestine nature of the unit it is hard to tell how many operational personnel were working for SOG at any one time, but in 1970 the command had 383 authorized personnel (down from 394 at the end of 1969). However, total contributions from the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, CIA, and indigenous groups brought up the total to 10,210 personnel reporting to the SOG chief in Saigon.16 According to Adams, the vast majority of these personnel which the author refers to as 2,000 Americans and 8,000 Vietnamesewere from the US Army and Vietnamese Special Forces units. The personnel assigned to SOG from branches other than the Armyaside from small numbers of US Navy SEALs and their Vietnamese counterpartswere primarily support staff, including the air and maritime transportation components of SOG.17, 18


16 17

Gillespie, p. 197. Adams, p. 119. 18 According to Col. Francis J. Kelly, the US Marine Corps contribution to special operations missions in Vietnam came largely before the creation of SOG, running from 1962-1964. (See, Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print, p. 162.)

Mullikin 10

Figure 3: Map of three operational SOG headquarters.

SOG eventually established three operational headquarters: Command and Control North (CCN) in Da Nang, Command and Control Central (CCC) in Kontum, and Command and Control South (CCS) in Ban Me Thuot (see map above). These headquarters were serviced by forward operating bases (FOBs) strategically located within a short helicopter ride of insertion sites close to the Cambodian and Laotian borders.19 All of these sites were closely compartmentalized, with strong cover stories to keep their covert operations secret. The CCC insertion site at Dak To, for example, was home to an American engineer battalion and emergency medical bunker, providing plausible deniability to its secondary role as a base to refuel and rearm helicopters flying in support of SOGs cross-border missions, and as a staging ground for those insertions. The insertion sites also housed Bright Light units: recon teams staged for emergency extractions and personnel recovery missions
19

By the end of the war SOG operated six FOBs throughout South Vietnam (Guardia, p. 170).

Mullikin 11

behind enemy lines.20 Thus SOG teams rotated from major SOG installations directly to these covert insertion sites, executing missions and returning back to their headquarters, sometimes after only a few hours on the ground, but occasionally after weeklong operations in enemy territory.


Figure 4: Aerial view of Command and Control North, Da Nang.

Combat forces at the regional command and control hubs were organized into

reconnaissance teamswhen John Plaster arrived at Kontum, eighteen teams were fully manned with an additional six authorized but without sufficient manpower to go into the field. Each team was composed of three American operatorsin Plasters case, all Green Beretsand nine indigenous soldiers, and named for an American state, for example, RT Texas or RT California. Other SOG regional command centers used different naming systems; recon teams from CCS at Ban Me Thuot were named for tools, while those based at CCN were named for poisonous snakes, like RT Copperhead, led by Ricardo Davis until his death in Cambodia.
20

Plaster, p. 46.

Mullikin 12

Recruitment and Training John Plasters memoir of service with SOG provides a ready example of the

dedication shown by the men who volunteered for service with the unit. After enlisting in the Army at age 18, fresh out of high school, Plaster attended Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia before being selected to attend Special Forces training, following a similar pipeline to modern 18X enlistees.21 After intensive training with the Special Forces Training Detachment at Fort Bragg, Plaster deployed to Vietnam with the 5th Special Forces Group, initially assigned to a Signals Company. At the behest of an old friend, Plaster faked his orders and volunteered to go to Command and Control North, hoping to find his way into SOG. Upon arrival, Plaster and the other new men were briefed by the CCN commander, Lt. Col. Jack Warren, who made the implications of running covert operations in Vietnam crystal clear: You will not keep a diary or journal, [Warren] ordered. Your letters are subject to censorship. You are forbidden to tell anyone outside here what you are doing. We train Vietnamese and Montagnards, thats all. On paper we belong to the 5th Special Forces Group. In reality, we work for SOG.22 Unfortunately, the men who finally made their wayeither by selection or accident, as in Plasters caseto join the ranks of SOG were in general ill-prepared for covert warfare. Pre-mission training, like almost every other aspect of service with SOG, was informal and largely based on the whims and past experiences of the teams One-Zero.23 Recon teams were generally allowed one or two weeks to
21

The U.S. Army 18X programalso referred to as direct entry or Initial Accessionsprovides young men the opportunity to enlist specifically to attend the Special Forces Assessment and Selection program. 22 Plaster, 29-30. 23 One-Zeros were recon team leaders, in charge of two other Americans (referred to as OneOnes and One-Twos, denoting their rank in the team hierarchy) and several indigenous mercenaries, usually Vietnamese, Montagnard, or Cambodians recruited and funded by SOG money. Plaster explains that rank was irrelevant in the choice of a One-Zero: Some One-Zeros were not their teams highest-ranking man Here in SOG, rank did not determine leadership; experience and ability meant far more than the stripes or bars a man wore. (Plaster 37). The author offers several examples of SOG officers, including a lieutenant colonel in charge of

Mullikin 13

prepare for missions, but the training they conductedat least according to Plasterrarely progressed beyond basic immediate action drills. Newly- constituted teams, or teams reformed with only one or two veterans remaining from their previous iterations, were given a brief three weeks to bring their indigenous soldiers up to speed, forming a mission-ready, green team despite significant language and cultural barriers.24 Equipment, Weapons, and Logistics Much like modern American special operations forces, SOG units succeeded in

part due to the tools they carried into combat. In addition to basic small arms (which sometimes performed poorly in the field) SOG commanders leveraged significant external assets to move their units around the units secret battlefields in Laos and Cambodia. Plaster encounters the SOG transportation network early upon his arrival in

South Vietnam, when he is ordered to board a plane to Kontum, then a forward operating base under the command of Command and Control-North, but later home to Command and Control-Central. He describes the C-130, normally a standard transport craft, but specially modified in this case for SOG operations: Nicknamed a Blackbird because of its distinct black and forest green paint scheme, the planes nose bore a folded yoke, part of a special apparatus for extracting secret agents from the ground. Its U.S. insignia were painted on removable metal plates, so they easily could be taken off. Inside the C-130, the cargo compartments forward third was curtained off with a warning: TOP SECRET. Squeezed into the remaining seats was a smorgasbord of passengers


reconnaissance units at Kontum, going into the field under the command of young Staff Sergeants serving as One-Zeros. 24 While almost all indigenous recruits to SOG had previously served with and been extensively trained by other U.S. forcesgenerally Special Forces teams operating throughout South Vietnamtheir ability to serve effectively with SOG recon teams left much to be desired. Plaster recounts using toy soldiers to teach basic infantry tactics to Montagnard mercenaries who were generally illiterate, learning tasks by rote, and lacking basic mathematic skills, which they overcame by counting one, two, three, many (Plaster, 162).

Mullikin 14

Chinese, Vietnamese, Americans in civilian clothes, armed and unarmed Green Berets, and nondescript Asians whose nationality I could not even guess.25 With concerns over deniability relaxed by around 1970, SOG also had a hand in developing close air support tactics, specifically for the AC-130 gunship, a heavily armed ground attack aircraft that has been deployed by USSOCOM for close air support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and as part of the NATO intervention in Libya in March 2011. In terms of personal field kit, SOG units were initially highly restricted in terms of the weapons and gear they could carry into the field. In order to maintain the United States plausible deniability of sending troops into technically neutral Laos and Cambodia, recon teams deploying across the border were sterilethey carried untraceable gear, wore Asian-made uniforms without nametapes or rank insignia, and carried no identification cards or dog tags. SOG teams often deployed with foreign weapons, including AK-47s and British and Swedish silenced submachine guns. If the units came into heavy contact on the ground, they were essentially on their own; early SOG missions were
Figure 5: RT Maine, 1970. Dressed in NVA fatigues and carrying mostly foreign weapons, this recon team is ready to depart from CCC.

not allowed access to tactical air support, a critical feature of modern small-unit, especially special operations, tactics. These restrictions were later relaxed, allowing more and more SOG operators to carry American-made weaponsthe CAR-15, a
25

Plaster, 28.

Mullikin 15

forerunner to the modern M4 carbine, was a recon favoriteand to rely on helicopter gunship and fighter support in extreme emergencies, provided the limited assets dedicated to cross-border support were available, and not occupied with other teams emergencies.

Tactics
Between 1967 and April 1972, OPS-35 [the reconnaissance group responsible

for cross-border missions] conducted 1,398 reconnaissance missions, 38 platoon- sized patrols, and 12 multi-platoon operations in Cambodia. During the same period, it captured 24 prisoners of war.26 Given the size of the unit, and the combat attrition that constantly kept manpower at sub-optimal levels, the sheer number of missions run by SOG is extremely impressive. SOG teams in the field also displayed uncommon valor; Jerry Mad Dog Shriver, for example, once famously replied to an officer concerned that he was about to be overrun by calmly stating, No sweat. Ive got em right where I want emsurrounded from the inside.27 Despite these extreme cases of bravado, SOG operations were among the deadliest in the waraccording to Meyer, The unit experienced an incredible casualty rate of exceeding 100 percent - meaning that at one time or another, every man serving in that unit was wounded at least once28 The danger associated with service in SOG came largely from the units high operational tempo and widespread area of operations, which was, for the most part, restricted to austere, denied access areas behind enemy lines. SOG teams conducted land, sea, and air operations in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodiaareas forbidden to most other American units. Furthermore, SOG teams had a role in every major event of the conflict, including
26

Capturing an NVA soldier was the ultimate coup for a SOG recon team, providing higher command with a rare opportunity to interrogate a prisoner, and earning the returning team a weeklong R&R in Taiwan. Unfortunately the act of securing a prisoner was incredibly difficult; prisoners were often killed in the inevitable run and gun firefight that erupted after a recon team secured its prize. 27 Plaster, p. 21. 28 John Stryker Meyer, Across the Fence [Kindle Edition], SOG Publishing, 2011.

Mullikin 16

the Gulf of Tonkin air operations over North Vietnam the Tet Offensive the secret bombing and ground incursion into Cambodia, the Phoenix Program, and the Son Tay Raid.29 While individual units were given a week of stand down time30 after a mission, the limited number of teams available to SOG commanders meant that, at any one time, multiple teams from each regional headquarters were deployed behind enemy lines. At an operational level, sheer weight of numbers made SOG operations extremely dangerous. The situation was more complex at the tactical level. Due to demands from higher headquarters in Saigon, officially mission-ready teamsteams that were sometimes poorly prepared and lacking in sufficient unit cohesionwere often sent into the field with dire consequences. According to Plaster, You could say they died from bad luck or bad field craft, but I thought they died from too little time, not enough chance to learn from mistakesin SOG, just one mistake and you could be dead.31 While this statement is likely true for any combat operation in any war, the isolation of SOG teams operating outside South Vietnam raised the stakes of the game. For SOG operators, especially recon men, death was not a distant afterthought, but a statistical inevitability. On average, a recon team leadera One- Zerohad been on roughly eight missions prior to taking command of a team. Given the high casualty rate of SOG reconnaissance units, five more missions and the young sergeant was a senior team leader and almost a statistical anomaly. According to Plaster, by the time he had twenty missions behind him, it was a wonder that he was still alive.32 The best available statistics for SOG casualties note
29 30

Gillespie, 258. Post-mission stand down times were good for both informal discussions of effective recon tactics and blowing off steam from the stress of recon missions. SOG operators had access to seemingly endless beer and hard liquor at their base NCO clubs, which were funded by selling alcohol illegally to underage American troops. While these rowdy weeks off perpetuated the stereotype of SOG men, and Special Forces soldiers as a whole, as undisciplined and unreliable, the process of hot washing missions immediately after their conclusion has been formalized among modern American special operations units, especially Delta Force and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (SEAL Team Six). 31 Plaster, p. 48. 32 Plaster, p. 51.

Mullikin 17

that over the course of nine years of covert operations, 163 men were killed in action with an additional 80 listed as missing.33, 34 The danger of SOG missions lay not only in the jobs they were expected to do, but also in the logistics of inserting and extracting men by helicopter deep behind enemy lines. Teams were frequently inserted only to immediately come under heavy fire, as was the case with Jerry Mad Dog Shrivers final mission, in which his recon team was inserted to a landing zone only to meet immediate overwhelming fire, leading to the deaths of three American soldiers.35 Hoping to minimize the casualties incurred when recon teams were in Prairie Fire emergency situationsin danger of being overrun by NVA forcesSergeant Major Charles T. McGuire, an instructor at the MACV Recondo School, developed the McGuire Harness to rapidly extract men from landing zones without needing to actually pull them up into a hovering extraction helicopter. Essentially Swiss-style rappelling seats, McGuire Harnesses were used effectively in the field in emergency scenarios. Unfortunately, the time spent dangling beneath helicopters while still subject to NVA ground fire exacted its toll
33 34

Figure 6: SOG soldiers practice another extraction method - climbing out on rope ladders.

Gillespie, p. 258. If these statistics seem grim, consider them from the NVA perspectiveby 1969 SOG had achieved a kill to loss ratio of 150:1 (Guardia, p. 177). 35 Plaster, p. 127; Jack Murphy, The Legend and Truth of Jerry Mad Dog Shriver, SOFREP (1 October 2012) <http://sofrep.com/11209/the-legend-and-truth-of-jerry-mad-dog-shriver/> [Accessed 2012.11.20].

Mullikin 18

on SOG recon men; Plaster tells the story of RT Vermonts attempted rescue of a missing SOG operator on the ground in Laos, when First Lieutenant Jim Birchim was lost after flying in a McGuire rig for an hour and a half.36 The extreme valor shown by SOG operators in the field ensured that Purple

Hearts were not the only medals won by men assigned to the recon teams. Sergeant (later Colonel) Bob Howardaccording to Plaster the most decorated U.S. soldier since WWIIwas nominated for the Medal of Honor twice before finally winning the award on his third nomination; he also won two Distinguished Service Crosses, a Silver Star, four Legion of Merit awards, four Bronze Stars, and eight Purple Hearts.

Figure 7: Bob Howard carries an NVA prisoner of war captured by RT Texas away from the helicopter landing pad.

Operations
SOG operations under the first Chief, Col. Russell, were limited in scope and

failed to generate any new intelligence on NVA operations outside South Vietnam. Col. Donald Blackburn immediately expanded Russells operations upon taking command of SOG in May 1965, two months after the first American combat troops
36

Plaster, p. 57.

Mullikin 19

were sent to South Vietnam, and almost a year after the failure of the first US- sponsored reconnaissance missions into Laos. Operation Shining Brass37 Blackburn immediately ordered a study for cross-border operations designed

to focus on a more immediate problemthe infiltration coming down from the North.38 Blackburns plan called for small training teams to be inserted across the Laotian border to reconnoiter the Ho Chi Minh trailat the time understood to be little more than a mountain path. Eventually Blackburns plan became known as Operation Shining Brass, and it was to be executed in three phases: first, reconnaissance teams would locate NVA logistical corridors in Laos and report back with that intelligence; a company-sized exploitation force would then be deployed into the area to eliminate the critical targets identified in Phase 1; in the third phase, American and indigenous personnel assigned to SOG would infiltrate Laos and organize units of Laotian natives to fight against the NVA.39 While the Joint Chiefs were hesitant to approve of the plan, Shining Brass was eventually given a green light on 21 September 1965. After establishing the parameters of the operation, Blackburns first reconnaissance team inserted into Laos on 18 October 1965.40 By the end of the year, eight missions had been launched into Laos, six of which had returned with significant intelligence on NVA movements in the area. While Blackburn was forced to relinquish command of SOG on 1 July 1966SOG

commanders were only allowed to serve one-year tourshe later stated I dont think theres any question as to the effectiveness of the Shining Brass Operation It
37 38

Later renamed Operation Prairie Fire. Col. Donald Blackburn, quoted in Guardia, p. 167. 39 Guardia, pp. 168-169. 40 The US Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, was wary of the political ramifications of American soldiers operating inside Laos. Sullivan initially restricted the movements of SOG teams to boxes of roughly ten to fifteen square kilometers, and tried to prevent SOG teams from utilizing round-trip helicopter insertions. By sheer force of personality, Blackburn convinced Sullivan of the necessity of helicopters, but it wasnt until the intelligence value of the recon missions had been substantiated that Sullivan allowed an expansion of their area of operations inside Laos. Guardia, pp. 169-170.

Mullikin 20

identified and located the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail network along which, in October 1965, the NVA had deployed roughly 30,000 logistical and support troops, not including the roughly 4,500 NVA combat troops infiltrating South Vietnam along the trail each month.41 Gen. Westmoreland, the MACV commander, was equally impressed, and SOG operations were significantly expanded in 1966 and afterward. Operation Daniel Boone42 By 1967 the Groups successes in Shining Brass had been so well received that

the program was expanded to include Cambodia in missions initially known as Operation Daniel Boone. For roughly a year, Projects Sigma and Omega had been running missions into Cambodia, resulting in significant disputes between the 5th Special Forces Group and SOG. In pitches to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the State Department, both organizations claimed they should take the lead in running reconnaissance missions in Cambodia. SOG won out, claiming that the 5th Group, operating under the authority of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, lacked authorization for operations outside South Vietnam. SOG took over Sigma and Omega on 3 September 1967.43 Several new SOG bases were established to manage the missions in Cambodia, including Command and Control South at Ban Me Thuot. According to Turkoly- Joczik, From 1967 through April 1972, OPS-35 conducted 1,398 reconnaissance missions, 38 platoon-sized patrols, and 12 multi-platoon operations in Cambodia. During the same period, it captured 24 prisoners of war.44 Stand-Down and Operation Commando Hunt The 1968 Tet Offensive left NVA and Viet Cong forces operating in South

Vietnam decimated, and the operation was an undeniable military victory for the US
41 42

Guardia, pp. 171-177. Later renamed Operation Salem House. 43 Gillespie, pp. 122-123. 44 LTC Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik, "SOG: An Overview." Special Operations.Com. N.p., n.d. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.specialoperations.com/MACVSOG/Overview.htm>.

Mullikin 21

and South Vietnam. Unfortunately the political fallout in the United States was considerable, leading to a major turning point in the war. While officers assigned to MACV universally agreed that the communists should be pushed to the wall by intensified bombing campaigns, assaults into NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, and possibly even threatening the North with a ground invasion, the Joint Chiefs and President Johnson disagreed. In return for an agreement from Hanoi to seriously negotiate Washington terminated the bombing campaign; all of SOGs northern operations were terminated as well.45 With the bombing campaign suspended, NVA forces were sending more troops

and materiel down the Ho Chi Minh trail than ever before. With an increasing number of aircraft available for bombing missions, Air Force units were given permission to launch more sorties against the NVA targets traveling along the trail as part of Operation Commando Hunt. SOG units were tasked with assessing the results of these missions, resulting in a significant increase in the units operational tempo. The men assigned to these bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions eventually came to despise and even fear them; often, the aerial view of the effects of this massive bombing was deceiving, and recon teams were frequently greeted with well-organized, functional fighting units upon their insertion. The results of these contacts often resulted in heavy casualties, as was the case with a 24 April 1969 raid on the headquarters of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which American strategists understood to be the main command of communist forces operating in the South. In this raid, SOG lost at least three men and suffered dozens of wounded.46 Operation Lam Son 719 The intelligence gathered by SOG reconnaissance missions conclusively proved

that the logistical support of NVA units operating in Laos and Cambodia was a key
45 46

Gillespie, pp. 132-133. Those killed on this raid included SOG legend Jerry Mad Dog Shriver. Gillespie, pp. 181-182.

Mullikin 22

reason behind the communists success in South Vietnam. Both American and South Vietnamese strategists agreed that an attempt to interdict the NVA supply lines across the border had to be made. The initial plans for an attack across the border to disrupt the communist safe havens were developed at MACV headquarters in Saigon in early December 1970. SOG teams were barred from participating in the attack, however, for two

reasons: the US Senates Cooper-Church Amendment to the 1970 Foreign Military Sales Act,47 which prohibited US ground forces from participating in the mission at all; and the fact that all available helicopter assets in the theater were tied up in support of the conventional South Vietnamese attack. Unfortunately, Lam Son 719 was too little, too late. Without the support of

American ground troops, the South Vietnamese offensive (launched on 8 February 1971) stalled and was eventually repelled, forced to withdraw on 25 March. Despite SOGs exhaustive efforts to reconnoiter the Trail, and Col. Blackburns initial plan to send SOG troops into the area to cut the Trail with the help of indigenous guerrillas, the Group never got the chance to execute that mission.48 Transition to Strategic Technical Directorate and Withdrawal In anticipation of the US disengagement from the war, both the MACV staff and

senior South Vietnamese military leaders began transitioning the burden of combat operations to South Vietnamese forces. SOG operations in particular were slowly drawn down in 1970-1971, with operators continuing to perform BDAs, gather intelligence, and direct air strikes until the final SOG recon mission was launched into the Ashau Valley (one of the Ho Chi Minh Trails key entry points into South Vietnam, and the primary target of the Operation Lam Son 719) in December 1971.


47

The original amendment passed in the Senate, but was defeated in the House. A revised version was passed by both houses and enacted on 5 January 1971. 48 Gillespie, pp. 227-228.

Mullikin 23

In an attempt to keep up intelligence-gathering operations based on the SOG model, the Group was replaced by the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), a unit manned by Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers and supported by a group of 155 Special Forces soldiers. Unfortunately several members of the minority ethnic groups that served alongside the Americans in SOG refused to work with the Vietnamese, resulting in a significant loss of institutional knowledge of running cross-border reconnaissance missions. While many former SOG operators remained in Vietnam working with the STD, the majority of those who had run reconnaissance missions with the Group transitioned elsewhere. Unfortunately the STD generally struggled to execute operations on the SOG model, and collapsed when the last SF soldiers withdrew in March 1973.49 Presidential Unit Citation The Studies and Observations Group was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation

(Army) on 4 April 2001. The ceremony hosted all the former commanders of SOG still alive, and all former members of SOG remaining on active duty. Portions of the citation are reproduced below: The Studies and Observations Group is cited for extraordinary heroism, great combat achievement and unwavering fidelity while executing unheralded top secret missions deep behind enemy lines across Southeast Asia. Incorporating volunteers from all branches of the Armed Forces, and especially, US Army Special Forces, SOGs ground, air, and sea units fought officially denied actions, which contributed immeasurably to the American war effort in Vietnam. [] Despite casualties that sometimes became universal, SOGs operators never wavered, but fought throughout the war with the same flair, fidelity, and intrepidity that distinguished SOG from its beginning. The Studies and Observations Groups combat prowess, martial skills and unacknowledged sacrifices saved many American lives, and provided a paragon for Americas future special operations forces.50 49 Adams, p. 127.
50

Qtd. in Gillespie, p. 264.

Mullikin 24

Strategy: the Groups Overall Impact on the War


SOG reconnaissance missions were essentially tasked with developing intelligence and disrupting the NVA safe havens in Laos and Cambodia, where communist forces had evicted local inhabitants and set up massive rear-area logistical systems, which were used to resupply and reinforce NVA combat units fighting in South Vietnam. According to a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, Department of Defense analysis claims that: SOG operations provided a considerable amount of intelligence data to Washington and Saigon on North Vietnamese troop movements along those portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that were patrolled by the OPS-35 forces. Because of these reconnaissance efforts, U.S. planners had a fairly clear picture of enemy forces in the sanctuaries and along the trail by early 1969.51 Unfortunately higher command often misinterpreted the intelligence supplied by SOG recon teams, using the information to justify the expansion of operations that had little positive effect on the ground. A perfect example of this phenomenon were the initial bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions following the Nixon Administrations commencement of strategic bombing missions along segments of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia. After inserting with RT Illinois to perform a BDA of the third site targeted by Operation Menu, Plaster tells of being overwhelmed by enemy fire despite the obvious signs of a massive aerial bombardment. In the teams debrief: All we could say was that these hard-core NVA were right there where the bombs had hit, which apparently pleased the Air Force and the Nixon administration. As a result, the secret bombing would be expanded, so that by years end nearly 1,000 B-52 sorties would have dropped almost 27,000 tons of bombs in northeast Cambodia alone.52 Instead of questioning the effectiveness of the bombing given the fact that NVA troops managed to not only survive, but also retain their fighting capabilities despite heavy aerial bombardment, the Pentagon and members of the Nixon Administration
51 52

Turkoly-Joczik. Plaster, p. 130.

Mullikin 25

chose to use RT Illinois assessment as proof that their targeting was correct, and thus the bombing was achieving its goal of destroying NVA logistical infrastructure. Furthermore, SOG commanders hands were tied when it came to using their

unit to its full potential. Beginning with Col. Blackburn in 1965, SOG commanders petitioned the Pentagon to give SOG permission to create and sponsor a front organization within South Vietnam that would mirror that of the communist- dominated National Liberation Front such an organization could be used as a springboard for a real resistance [guerrilla] movement in the North.53 Despite the incredible potential such a movement might have offered American strategists, Washington repeatedly refused the requests. Apparently, senior American defense officials could never seem to comprehend that [they] could carry out covert operations on one hand while denying them on the other.54 This is just one example of the way conventional military strategists and civilian national security officials failed to recognize the full potential of SOG as an asset for unconventional warfare. The episodes recounted above are case studies in the strategic effectiveness of the Studies and Observations Group; when their missions were effective in gathering intelligence, that information was subject to misuse and misinterpretation. Despite the strengths of the men assigned to the unit, especially in terms of foreign internal defense, conventional commanders were unwilling to consider the potential benefits of unconventional warfare. This blatant misuse of the men and the results they produced speaks to a significant problem with the Vietnam-era U.S. military at the staff level. Thus, despite the extreme bravery shown by the men assigned to SOG, the units overall impact on U.S. behavior during the war was negligible. According to Gillespie: MACSOG and its operations failed to achieve the goals that its masters set for it. This occurred not because of a lack of effort or initiative on the part of the unit
53 54

Gillespie, p. 42. Ibid.

Mullikin 26

or its personnel, but because of the inherent flaws in U.S. political/military strategy during the conflict. Other problemswere exemplified by MACVs and SACSAs inability to adapt MACSOG to fit their strategy. SOG could have served as both pathfinder and spearhead for an attack on the Trail system by larger conventional forces. Thanks to unchanging political restrictions, however, that was never going to happen. In the end, despite the significant intelligence SOG delivered to strategic planners in Saigon and Washington, and the effectiveness commando raids had in instilling fear in NVA rear-echelon troops, SOG failed to fully exploit its successes in the field. There is no evidence that any decisive actions were taken by SOG itself, or by conventional forces based on intelligence gathered by SOG reconnaissance missions, to destroy the NVA supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Given that disrupting and dismantling that logistical infrastructure was a key objective for the Group, we must chalk up SOGs efforts as admirable, but ultimately a failure.

The Groups Impact on Modern Special Operations Units


SOG was the first American joint command with a special operations mission set, making it in some ways a theater-specific forerunner to the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) established 16 April 1987 after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. The Studies and Observations Group pursued theater-wide operations by deploying various special operations units, in addition to coordinating the cooperation of those unitssuch as Special Forces recon teams and the special Air Force task units that inserted them behind enemy linesin the execution of thousands of small-unit missions. At the command level, then, SOG began writing the blueprint for the kind of operations

Figure 8: Billy Waugh (left) and an unnamed pilot prior to a HALO jump into enemy territory.

Mullikin 27

run with such high success rates by SOCOM and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fortunately, many stalwart SOG veterans were still serving when American special operations were formalized under SOCOM and JSOC, helping to guide those organizations in their efforts to formalize American special operations. At the unit level, the establishment of Delta Force in 1977 and SEAL Team 6 in 1980 relied on the advice of many men who made their bones in SOG, especially the famous American covert warrior Billy Waugh.55, 56 Others, including Col. Charlie Beckwith (the founder of Delta), Col. Jerry King (founder of the Intelligence Support Activity),57 and Commander Richard Marcinko (founder of SEAL Team 6) also cut their teeth on special operations work in Southeast Asia, making the warriors serving with modern SOF units something like the military grandchildren of those that fought with SOG. SOG also began the initial development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that have come to dominate American special operations deployments. In his conclusion, Gillespie notes, The methods and techniques developed and utilized by SOG in Southeast Asiawere adopted by Delta [Force] and have become standard operational practices. For example, SOG commander in chief Col. John Sadler authorized the first combat HALO jump on 28 November 1970, ordering Spike Team58 Virginia, composed of three American non-commissioned officers and three Montagnard fighters, to insert behind enemy lines by jumping from 14,000 feet. While the team members were scattered six miles from their planned drop zone,
55 56

Gillespie, p. 260. Billy Waugh retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Sergeant Major in 1972, and later went on to serve in the CIAs Special Activities Division. He served in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). With SOG, Waugh had a role in the first and last combat HALO insertions in Vietnam. Waugh was one of the first CIA paramilitary officers to deploy to Afghanistan where, at age 71, he worked with Northern Alliance leaders to topple the Taliban and appeared at the Battle of Tora Bora. Between his Special Forces and CIA careers, he has spent more than 50 years running covert operations on behalf of the United States. He is the recipient of a Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, four Bronze Stars, eight Purple Hearts, and four Army Commendation Medals. 57 For more information on this important human intelligence-gathering special mission unit, see Michael Smith. Killer Elite. New York, NY: St. Martin's, 2007. Print. 58 Another term for a recon team.

Mullikin 28

they survived five days on the ground without alerting NVA units to their presence, and were successfully extracted from four locations on 2 December.59 Additionally, SOG teams virtually wrote the book on small-unit search and rescue operations and strategic reconnaissance. With these historic developments in mind, we can clearly say that despite the Groups failure to strategically impact the war in Vietnam, its role in the formation of modern special operations units is unparalleled and critically important for todays unconventional warfighters.

Conclusion
The men assigned to the Studies and Observations Group in Vietnam fought courageously, but their hands were tied, tactically and operationally. In the field, the stringent requirements set out by Washington to keep SOG missions deniable and covert left the operators themselves alone, with little outside aid. Operating in small units, SOG recon teams were consistently outnumbered and outgunnedfor the men on the ground, simply surviving the mission unscathed counted as a victory. Unfortunately, statistically speaking every SOG operator suffered serious injuries, calling into question the strategic necessity of such costly missions. At the operational level, MACV strategists failed to take advantage of the potential force multiplier offered by SOG. By relying on indigenous forces to conduct the more diplomatically untenable operations of the war, SOG troops were never allowed to deliver a decisive blow to the NVA logistics infrastructure theyd surveyed over hundreds of reconnaissance missionsessentially the exact mission they were initially meant to execute under Col. Blackburns vision for the third phase of Operation Shining Brass. Furthermore, MACV officers failed to recognize the potential benefits of unconventional warfare, remaining distrustful of important tactics that could have drastically changed the outcome of the war.

59 Gillespie, p. 210.

Mullikin 29

In strategic terms, the Groups failure lay more with those outside its command

than with those serving as senior leaders of SOG. The organization was an unconventional force operating within a highly bureaucratized, conventional military that was distrustful of special operations units in general. Despite the efforts of the Groups admirable enlisted men and officers, it failed to have a major impact on the outcome of the war. As Kelley notes in his conclusion, The ability to maneuver and conduct battles by the North Vietnamese was not impacted to any great degree by SOGs activities The unconventional war effort was more or less a nuisance to the North Vietnamese. History shows that they continued to maintain control of their rear area and move supplies and personnel to fight the war in South Vietnam. They were still strong enough to mount a major offensive in 1972 and again successfully in 1975. Had SOG operations been linked to the conventional fight and restrictions lessened or dropped, the unconventional war effort might have been more effective.60 Unfortunately the Group never got the chance to prove its full capabilities. It is important to note that the scope of this study does not allow for a full investigation of all aspects of the Studies and Observations Group. Primarily due to a lack of information on the other units manned by SOGincluding, for example, the larger Hatchet and Mike Forces61this paper has focused on the contributions made by SOG reconnaissance teams in their cross-border missions into Laos and Cambodia. More research must be done to paint a complete picture of the impact SOG had on the American war in Southeast Asia. With that said the information presented here is sufficient to unequivocally say that SOG failed to have a decisive impact on the war. However, as any SOG memoir will indicate, that was not in any way the fault of the operators themselves.


60 61

Kelley, p. 66. Company-sized units deployed on relatively infrequent cross-border missions, often to strike targets identified by small-unit reconnaissance missions. These units also sometimes served as quick-reaction forces, similar to modern Ranger units support of other SOF missions. For example, in the five years that SOG units operated in Cambodia, full Mike/Hatchet Force companies deployed across the border only twelve times, compared to 1,398 recon team deployments in the same period.

Mullikin 30

Finally, given the similarities between modern American special operations forces and their grandfathers in SOG, it is important that modern strategic planners take care in their reliance on special operations troops and the capabilities they offer. While the men who fill the ranks of modern SOCOM units are just as remarkable as those who fought with SOG in the Sixties and Seventies, the example of MACVs misuse of SOG proves that the tactical expertise of SOF units is no substitute for sound strategy, operational planning, and a well-grounded understanding of the enemy one hopes to defeat.

Mullikin 31

Bibilography
Adams, Thomas K. US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Print. Delf, Brian and Gordon Rottman, US MACV-SOG Reconnaisance Team in Vietnam, (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2011). Gillespie, Robert M., Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011). Guardia, Mike. Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D. Blackburn - Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2011. Print. Kelley, MAJ Danny M., The Misuse of the Studies and Observations Group as a National Asset in Vietnam, 2005, at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437021>. Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print. MACV Command History (Report from the DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff), [Formerly TOP SECRET]. Meyer, John Stryker, Across the Fence [Kindle Edition], SOG Publishing, 2011. Moyar, Mark, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIAs Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997). Murphy, Jack, MACV-SOG: RT Marylands Final Mission, SOFREP (29 August 2012) <http://sofrep.com/10802/macv-sog-rt-marylands-final-mission/> [Accessed 2 October 2012]. Murphy, Jack, The Legend and Truth of Jerry Mad Dog Shriver, SOFREP (1 October 2012) <http://sofrep.com/11209/the-legend-and-truth-of-jerry-mad- dog-shriver/> [Accessed 2012.11.20]. Nolan, Keith William, Into Laos: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971, (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986). Plaster, John L. Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam: Part 1. The War in Vietnam, 1954-1973, MACV Historical Office Documentary Collection, ed. Robert E. Lester, (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1988). Saal, Harve, SOG, MACV Studies and Observations Group: Behind Enemy Lines, (Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards Brothers, 1990). Smith, Michael. Killer Elite. New York, NY: St. Martin's, 2007. Print.

Mullikin 32

Stanton, Shelby L. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Print. Taubman, Philip, The Secret War of a Green Beret, New York Times, (article; 1982.07.04); p. 18. Turkoly-Joczik, LTC Robert L. "SOG: An Overview." Special Operations.Com. N.p., n.d. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.specialoperations.com/MACVSOG/Overview.htm>.

Images
Figure 1: Wikipedia Commons, 2009.09.04. Available at <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0b/STEMMA_DEL_MACV SOG.jpg>. Accessed 2012.11.20. Figure 2: From Gillespie, Black Ops Vietnam, 2011. Figure 3: Greene, Larry. CCN Compound 2. Digital image. MACVSOG. N.p., n.d. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.macvsog.cc/images/CCN3.jpg>. Figure 4: Newton, John. RT Maine, 70 @ CCC, taken at FOB, NVA Dressed. Digital image. MACVSOG. N. p., 1970. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.macvsog.cc/images/J%20Newman%202.jpg>. Figure 5: Carrell, Tom. Rope Ladder, FOB 2. Digital image. MACVSOG. N. p., 1967- 1968. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.macvsog.cc/images/Rope%20Ladder%20training%20FOB%20ll.j pg>. Figure 6: Nowak, Richard. Prisoner Caught by RT Texas. Note: Howard came to the helicopter pad when the recon team retuned, he picked up and carried the prisoner from the Huey. Howard was not on the mission that captured this prisoner. Digital image. MACVSOG. N. p., 1969. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.macvsog.cc/images/PrisonerCaughtbyRT-Texas.jpg>. Figure 7: Waugh, Billy. Pre-Combat HALO Insert. Digital image. MACVSOG. N. p., 1971.06.22. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.macvsog.cc/images/pILOT.jpg>.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi