Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Group
Successes
and
Failures
of
the
United
States
Special
Operations
Campaign
in
Vietnam
Figure
1:
The
unofficial
SOG
insignia,
designed
by
men
assigned
to
the
unit.
Andrew
Mullikin
Prepared
for
Dr.
Phillip
Karber
GOVT
451
Georgetown
University
7
December
2012
Contact:
amm338@georgetown.edu
Mullikin 1
Youve never lived till youve almost died For those who fight for it, Life has a flavor The protected will never know. SOG motto1
Introduction
An
official
1988
study
by
the
Joint
Chiefs
on
the
conduct
of
the
war
in
Vietnam
simply
notes
that
the
Military
Assistance
Command-Vietnams
Studies
and
Observations
Group2
provided
advice
and
assistance
in
the
areas
of
research
and
development,
combat
development,
and
clandestine
activities
in
addition
to
evaluating
SPAR
reports
[Significant
Problems
Area
Report]
and
recommending
courses
of
action
and/or
methods
while
[coordinating]
and
[monitoring]
clandestine
activities,
such
as
cross-border
reconnaissance
and
operations3
However,
SOG
was
a
far
more
dynamic
and
important
unit
than
such
a
bland
description
would
seem
to
indicate,
conducting
some
of
the
most
dangerous
reconnaissance
missions
in
the
Vietnam
War.
The
following
paper
examines
the
Groups
antecedents,
formation,
structure,
personnel,
and
tactics
in
detail;
the
Groups
contributions
to
the
war
in
Vietnam,
and
its
effectiveness
in
achieving
operational
and
strategic
goals,
are
analyzed
throughout
the
paper.
The
war
in
Vietnam
was
a
complicated
affair,
and
for
that
reason
the
SOG
operations
discussed
here
are
painted
in
broad
strokes.
The
work
of
Projects
Delta,
As written by Larry Trimble, Jim Lamotte, and Ricardo Davis. Quoted in John L. Plaster, Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG, Simon and Scheuster, New York, NY. 2004, p. xi. 2 When SOG was founded, the acronym stood for Special Operations Group; it was changed to the Studies and Observations Group for purposes of operational security in the summer of 1964. 3 Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam: Part 1. The War in Vietnam, 1954-1973, MACV Historical Office Documentary Collection, ed. Robert E. Lester, (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1988).
Mullikin 2
Sigma,
and
Omega
prior
to
their
merger
with
SOG,4
for
example,
is
not
covered
here,
despite
the
similarities
between
their
mission
set
and
that
of
the
SOG
recon
teams.
Its
also
important
to
note
that
the
scope
of
the
activities
of
these
units
remains
largely
classified
to
this
daythose
government
documents
that
have
been
declassified
are,
in
general,
redacted
so
heavily
that
precise
numbers
and
other
concrete
data
for
SOGs
operations
is
virtually
nonexistent.
The
Joint
Chiefs
study
referenced
above,
for
example,
includes
only
two
additional
references
to
SOG,
both
of
which
are
publicly
unavailable.
For
that
reason,
much
of
the
following
text
relies
heavily
on
personal
memoirs
of
those
who
served
with
SOG,
and
analytical
texts
on
the
efforts
of
American
unconventional
warfare
specialists
in
Vietnam
and
other
parts
of
Southeast
Asia.
The
Studies
and
Observations
Group
was
an
important
asset
in
the
American
prosecution
of
the
Vietnam
War,
and
its
personnel
clearly
rank
among
the
most
valorous
of
all
the
units
that
served
during
that
war.
Unfortunately
the
Group
was
misused
both
operationally
and
strategically,
and
its
combat
and
command
experience
in
Vietnam
offer
important
lessons
to
modern
special
operations
missions.
As
Major
Danny
Kelley
notes,
Determining
a
more
effective
use
of
military
resources
to
meet
the
strategic
goal
of
defeating
international
terrorists
and
the
nations
who
sponsor
them
is
a
difficult
problem.
In
the
past,
policy
makers
faced
similar
problems
in
trying
to
determine
how
to
defeat
a
growing
communist
insurgency
in
South
Vietnam.
The
US
employed
a
mixture
of
DOD
clandestine
operations,
CIA
covert
action
forces,
and
conventional
military
units
in
the
prosecution
of
the
conflict.5
Recognizing
where
SOG
and
its
higher
command
went
wrong
is
a
key
task
in
developing
a
more
comprehensive
understanding
of
modern
special
operations
missions
at
the
tactical,
operational,
and
strategic
levels.
4
Programs similar in design to SOG but operating under the authority of the 5 Special Forces Group. For more information, see Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print. 5 MAJ Danny M. Kelley, The Misuse of the Studies and Observations Group as a National Asset in Vietnam, 2005, at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437021>, p. 4.
th
Mullikin 3
Origins
SOG
grew
from
roots
in
the
U.S.
Army
Special
Forces,
which
in
turn
owed
its
early existence to veterans of the WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and other guerrilla campaigns in both the European and Pacific Theaters of the war. Men like Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, Col. Arthur Bull Simons, Col. Aaron Bank (an OSS veteran who later became the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group), and others who gained hard-won unconventional warfare experience fighting behind enemy lines during WWII and the Korean War were the founders of a whole new type of unconventional warfighting doctrine within the US military. Recognizing the Armys need for a permanent unconventional warfare capability, General Robert McClure (then the head of the Armys Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare) established a Special Operations Division in 1951. That organization was eventually renamed the Special Forces Division and was dedicated to supporting partisan groups in operations similar to those of the OSS in WWII. Five years later, the group had again changed names, becoming the US Army Special Warfare Center, and was deploying units around the world.6 The first Army Special Forces deployments to South Vietnam arrived in June
1956,
when
advisors
from
the
14th
Special
Forces
Group
were
sent
to
train
South
Vietnamese
troops.
With
American
involvement
in
Vietnam
escalating
in
1961,
attention
turned
to
Special
ForcesPresident
Kennedys
favorite
military
organizationas
a
way
to
provide
more
tangible
support
to
South
Vietnams
largely
ineffective
army
without
the
political
ramifications
of
large-scale
conventional
troop
deployments.7
While
the
Special
Forces
teams
trained
South
Vietnamese
troops,
notably
including
the
elite
1st
Observation
Group,
the
Kennedy
administration
tasked
the
CIA
with
providing
the
manpower
and
resources
for
a
covert
war
6
Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional
Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Print, pp. 54-57. Note: this brief history of the Army Special Forces does not do justice to the innovative men who founded the organization. For more information on the Green Berets, Adams text is an excellent place to start.
7 Ibid, p. 78.
Mullikin 4
against the North, formalizing these orders in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52, signed by President Kennedy on 11 May 1961.8 Operation White Star The model for SOG operations developed out of another Special Forces
deployment
to
Southeast
Asia,
in
which
twelve
eleven-man
training
teams
were
sent
to
Laos
under
the
command
of
the
Military
Assistance
Advisory
Group
Laos,
formally
established
on
19
April
1961.9
While
these
SF
operators
had
been
quietly
training
the
generally
inept
Laotian
military
alongside
CIA
operative
for
several
years,
the
program
was
significantly
expanded
and
made
official
by
the
establishment
of
MAAG-Laos.
Initially,
the
SF
soldiers
served
almost
exclusively
in
a
training
role
while
also
gathering
intelligence
for
the
CIA.
Eventually,
teams
began
deploying
into
the
field
with
their
units,
serving
as
full
combat
advisors
and
executing
the
first
American
combat
assignment
in
Southeast
Asia.
Stanton
notes
that
this
deployment
was
important
because
of
the
Special
Forces
new
role
as
an
instrument
of
American
strategy:
By
virtue
of
President
Kennedys
belief
in
its
individual
and
collective
excellence,
the
Special
Forces
became
the
principle
counterinsurgency
force
of
the
United
States.
The
wartime
Special
Forces
was
forged
in
the
jagged
Laotian
mountains
and
forest
plateaus
in
direct
contrast
to
its
intended
wartime
mission
as
guerrilla
cadre.
In
Laos,
as
in
Vietnam,
Special
Forces
soldiers
were
employed
as
elite
troops
to
execute
long-range
special
missions,
to
lead
normal
infantry,
and
to
train
remote,
indigenous
minorities.
Actual
missions
against
true
enemy
guerrilla
bands
were
rare,
and
the
Special
Forces
was
never
allowed
to
penetrate
denied
areas
to
establish
guerrilla
units.10
Interestingly,
the
White
Star
teams
in
Laos
enjoyed
excellent
relationships
with
the
CIA
operatives
working
in
the
country,
allowing
them
to
operate
effectively
without
working
through
the
bureaucracy
established
by
the
MAAG
command.
8
Robert M. Gillespie, Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), pp. 4-5. 9 Shelby L Stanton. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956 1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Print, p. 22. 10 Ibid, pp. 30-21.
Mullikin 5
Unfortunately this relationship would change in Vietnam, probably in part due to the failure of CIA covert operations there prior to the Groups establishment. Operation Leaping Lena By 1963, the CIA had failed to deliver positive results from its covert warfare
campaign against North Vietnam. Despite President Kennedys initial orders, the CIA had focused most of its efforts in the South, fearing that their intelligence networks would be degraded without constant supervision. While CIA operations in South Vietnam included paramilitary and counterterrorism campaigns, operations in North Vietnam were limited to agent team infiltration for intelligence collection and psychological operations including leaflet drops and radio broadcasts. Such operations were a far cry from Kennedys orders to build an insurgent movement against the Communists. Given the shortcomings of the CIA program, responsibilities for covert and clandestine operations were slowly transitioned away from the Agency and assigned to the newly formed Studies and Observations Group. The transition between these programs took roughly a year, during which time the CIA still took the lead on all black operations in Southeast Asia. It was during this period that the first cross-border reconnaissance missions
were employed in the Vietnam War. Recognizing that whatever was happening in Laosaerial reconnaissance had failed to deliver reliable intelligencerequired the serious attention of American strategists, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara resolved to send teams drawn from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and trained by US Special Forces troops on reconnaissance missions across the Laotian border. Despite warnings from a senior-ranking Special Forces officer that the missions would fail unless Green Berets were assigned to lead the units, McNamara ordered the teams formed and ready to deploy within thirty days. These reconnaissance operations, codenamed Leaping Lena, were administered
by the CIA and trained by Special Forces soldiers from the 5th SF Group. The eight teams were each manned by five Vietnamese commandos, and were inserted into
Mullikin 6
drop zones along Highway 92 in Laos between 24 June and 1 July 1963.11 Unfortunately, all eight teams were intercepted by NVA troops operating inside Laos, with the majority of their members either killed or captured. Only four of the original forty men escaped back to South Vietnam.12 In the aftermath of Leaping Lenas failure, it was clear that the NVA had a substantial presence in Laos, but no one could be sure exactly what the Communist forces were doing in the area. The task of finding out would be handed to SOG and its new commander, WWII unconventional warfare specialist Col. Donald Blackburn.
stemmed
from
high-ranking
generals
disapproval
of
the
unconventional
warfare
tactics
then
employed
by
Special
Forces
units
in
Vietnam.
Rather
than
training
the
Vietnamese
to
fightthe
hallmark
of
unconventional
warfareMajor
General
William
B.
Rosson
in
particular
argued
for
an
expansion
of
theater-wide
U.S.
covert
operations.
This
resulted
in
Operations
Plan
34A,
which
called
for:
1. An
expansion
of
the
Vietnamese
1st
Observation
Unit,
which
tasked
indigenous
troops
with
covert
and
clandestine
operations
against
North
Vietnam
with
support
from
the
CIA
and
Army
Special
Forces.
2. CIA
and
Special
Forces
training
of
reconnaissance
teams
to
be
infiltrated
into
southern
Laos,
where
they
units
would
locate
and
attack
NVA
bases
and
lines
of
communication,
all
under
light
civilian
cover.
3. Establishment
of
company-sized
(100-150
man)
Vietnamese
assault
units
for
deployment
against
targets
too
large
for
the
reconnaissance
teams.
11
The exact number of men assigned to these units is unclear in the literature. The numbers presented here are from Mike Guardia. Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D. Blackburn - Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2011. Print, p. 166. Unfortunately even Guardias text has some discrepancies regarding the Leaping Lena teams; I have reported his most consistent numbers. 12 Ibid.
Mullikin 7
4. The development of the South Vietnamese Armys capability to launch light-infantry (Ranger) raids into North Vietnam. 5. Regular flights over Communist-held areas for the dissemination of propaganda materials to both harass NVA forces and help maintain morale of anti-Communist residents of North Vietnam. President Johnson approved Op Plan 34A in January 1964, and on 24 January SOG was born out of General Order 6 from the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Headquarters. According to Adams, MACV-SOG was to be a joint unconventional warfare task force responsible for special operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam, and border areas of Chinait was to be the joint service, unconventional-war task force for Southeast Asia13 Given the CIAs failure to expand its operational mandate under NASM 52 beyond South Vietnam, the SOG operations were the first truly theater-wide American covert and clandestine during the Vietnam War. Unfortunately the new commands relationship with MACV headquarters was
rocky
from
the
start.
Despite
SOGs
direct
subordination
to
MACV
headquarters
in
Saigon,
the
commands
missions
required
approval
from
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff.
In
practice
this
approval
was
delegated
to
the
Special
Assistant
for
Counterinsurgency
and
Special
Activities
at
the
Pentagon,
and
resulted
in
a
significant
lag
between
the
opening
of
a
window
of
opportunity
for
a
decisive
covert
operation
and
the
actual
approval
and
execution
of
that
operation.
Several
sources
also
indicate
that
the
MACV
command
staff
was
hesitant
to
place
its
full
confidence
in
the
poorly
understood
special
operations
units
assigned
to
SOG.
As
a
result,
SOG
was
never
constituted
as
a
formal,
independent
task
force.14
Perhaps
even
worse
than
this
command
relationship,
staff
officers
assigned
to
SOG
did
not
enjoy
the
support
and
cooperation
of
the
CIA,
despite
the
Agencys
13 14
Mullikin 8
previous experience running covert operations in the theater. The few CIA officers assigned to SOG were restricted to the Psychological Operations section, where they had little impact on the majority of SOG missions. Even more problematic, the position of SOG deputy, or 01, was reserved for a CIA liaison officer, but Langley never assigned an officer to the post. Some sources even go so far as to suggest that the CIA wanted to keep its distance from SOG.15 The combination of these two factors meant that the new SOG command was forced to begin its operations in Southeast Asia without significant support from its predecessor or its higher headquarters.
Figure 2: SOG Organizational Structure. The Ground Studies Group, SOG 35, was the branch responsible for cross-border reconnaissance operations.
Organization
The
SOG
command
was
initially
assigned
six
officers
and
two
enlisted
men,
led
by
Col.
Clyde
R.
Russell,
who
had
served
with
the
101st
Airborne
Division
during
WWII,
but
lacked
real
experience
fighting
unconventional
warfare.
Drawing
from
15
Adams, p. 119-120.
Mullikin 9
his conventional background, Russell organized SOG along traditional military lines, with separate divisions for various administrative activities. As the command developed, its force structure eventually included an
assortment of special operations units, including Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy SEALs, Reconnaissance Marines, and CIA agents, in addition to a large complement of indigenous mercenaries including Vietnamese, Chinese Nungs, Montagnards, and Cambodians. Given the clandestine nature of the unit it is hard to tell how many operational personnel were working for SOG at any one time, but in 1970 the command had 383 authorized personnel (down from 394 at the end of 1969). However, total contributions from the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, CIA, and indigenous groups brought up the total to 10,210 personnel reporting to the SOG chief in Saigon.16 According to Adams, the vast majority of these personnel which the author refers to as 2,000 Americans and 8,000 Vietnamesewere from the US Army and Vietnamese Special Forces units. The personnel assigned to SOG from branches other than the Armyaside from small numbers of US Navy SEALs and their Vietnamese counterpartswere primarily support staff, including the air and maritime transportation components of SOG.17, 18
16 17
Gillespie, p. 197. Adams, p. 119. 18 According to Col. Francis J. Kelly, the US Marine Corps contribution to special operations missions in Vietnam came largely before the creation of SOG, running from 1962-1964. (See, Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print, p. 162.)
Mullikin 10
SOG
eventually
established
three
operational
headquarters:
Command
and
Control
North
(CCN)
in
Da
Nang,
Command
and
Control
Central
(CCC)
in
Kontum,
and
Command
and
Control
South
(CCS)
in
Ban
Me
Thuot
(see
map
above).
These
headquarters
were
serviced
by
forward
operating
bases
(FOBs)
strategically
located
within
a
short
helicopter
ride
of
insertion
sites
close
to
the
Cambodian
and
Laotian
borders.19
All
of
these
sites
were
closely
compartmentalized,
with
strong
cover
stories
to
keep
their
covert
operations
secret.
The
CCC
insertion
site
at
Dak
To,
for
example,
was
home
to
an
American
engineer
battalion
and
emergency
medical
bunker,
providing
plausible
deniability
to
its
secondary
role
as
a
base
to
refuel
and
rearm
helicopters
flying
in
support
of
SOGs
cross-border
missions,
and
as
a
staging
ground
for
those
insertions.
The
insertion
sites
also
housed
Bright
Light
units:
recon
teams
staged
for
emergency
extractions
and
personnel
recovery
missions
19
By the end of the war SOG operated six FOBs throughout South Vietnam (Guardia, p. 170).
Mullikin 11
behind enemy lines.20 Thus SOG teams rotated from major SOG installations directly to these covert insertion sites, executing missions and returning back to their headquarters, sometimes after only a few hours on the ground, but occasionally after weeklong operations in enemy territory.
Figure
4:
Aerial
view
of
Command
and
Control
North,
Da
Nang.
Combat forces at the regional command and control hubs were organized into
reconnaissance
teamswhen
John
Plaster
arrived
at
Kontum,
eighteen
teams
were
fully
manned
with
an
additional
six
authorized
but
without
sufficient
manpower
to
go
into
the
field.
Each
team
was
composed
of
three
American
operatorsin
Plasters
case,
all
Green
Beretsand
nine
indigenous
soldiers,
and
named
for
an
American
state,
for
example,
RT
Texas
or
RT
California.
Other
SOG
regional
command
centers
used
different
naming
systems;
recon
teams
from
CCS
at
Ban
Me
Thuot
were
named
for
tools,
while
those
based
at
CCN
were
named
for
poisonous
snakes,
like
RT
Copperhead,
led
by
Ricardo
Davis
until
his
death
in
Cambodia.
20
Plaster, p. 46.
Mullikin 12
Recruitment and Training John Plasters memoir of service with SOG provides a ready example of the
dedication
shown
by
the
men
who
volunteered
for
service
with
the
unit.
After
enlisting
in
the
Army
at
age
18,
fresh
out
of
high
school,
Plaster
attended
Airborne
School
at
Fort
Benning,
Georgia
before
being
selected
to
attend
Special
Forces
training,
following
a
similar
pipeline
to
modern
18X
enlistees.21
After
intensive
training
with
the
Special
Forces
Training
Detachment
at
Fort
Bragg,
Plaster
deployed
to
Vietnam
with
the
5th
Special
Forces
Group,
initially
assigned
to
a
Signals
Company.
At
the
behest
of
an
old
friend,
Plaster
faked
his
orders
and
volunteered
to
go
to
Command
and
Control
North,
hoping
to
find
his
way
into
SOG.
Upon
arrival,
Plaster
and
the
other
new
men
were
briefed
by
the
CCN
commander,
Lt.
Col.
Jack
Warren,
who
made
the
implications
of
running
covert
operations
in
Vietnam
crystal
clear:
You
will
not
keep
a
diary
or
journal,
[Warren]
ordered.
Your
letters
are
subject
to
censorship.
You
are
forbidden
to
tell
anyone
outside
here
what
you
are
doing.
We
train
Vietnamese
and
Montagnards,
thats
all.
On
paper
we
belong
to
the
5th
Special
Forces
Group.
In
reality,
we
work
for
SOG.22
Unfortunately,
the
men
who
finally
made
their
wayeither
by
selection
or
accident,
as
in
Plasters
caseto
join
the
ranks
of
SOG
were
in
general
ill-prepared
for
covert
warfare.
Pre-mission
training,
like
almost
every
other
aspect
of
service
with
SOG,
was
informal
and
largely
based
on
the
whims
and
past
experiences
of
the
teams
One-Zero.23
Recon
teams
were
generally
allowed
one
or
two
weeks
to
21
The U.S. Army 18X programalso referred to as direct entry or Initial Accessionsprovides young men the opportunity to enlist specifically to attend the Special Forces Assessment and Selection program. 22 Plaster, 29-30. 23 One-Zeros were recon team leaders, in charge of two other Americans (referred to as OneOnes and One-Twos, denoting their rank in the team hierarchy) and several indigenous mercenaries, usually Vietnamese, Montagnard, or Cambodians recruited and funded by SOG money. Plaster explains that rank was irrelevant in the choice of a One-Zero: Some One-Zeros were not their teams highest-ranking man Here in SOG, rank did not determine leadership; experience and ability meant far more than the stripes or bars a man wore. (Plaster 37). The author offers several examples of SOG officers, including a lieutenant colonel in charge of
Mullikin 13
prepare for missions, but the training they conductedat least according to Plasterrarely progressed beyond basic immediate action drills. Newly- constituted teams, or teams reformed with only one or two veterans remaining from their previous iterations, were given a brief three weeks to bring their indigenous soldiers up to speed, forming a mission-ready, green team despite significant language and cultural barriers.24 Equipment, Weapons, and Logistics Much like modern American special operations forces, SOG units succeeded in
part due to the tools they carried into combat. In addition to basic small arms (which sometimes performed poorly in the field) SOG commanders leveraged significant external assets to move their units around the units secret battlefields in Laos and Cambodia. Plaster encounters the SOG transportation network early upon his arrival in
South Vietnam, when he is ordered to board a plane to Kontum, then a forward operating base under the command of Command and Control-North, but later home to Command and Control-Central. He describes the C-130, normally a standard transport craft, but specially modified in this case for SOG operations: Nicknamed a Blackbird because of its distinct black and forest green paint scheme, the planes nose bore a folded yoke, part of a special apparatus for extracting secret agents from the ground. Its U.S. insignia were painted on removable metal plates, so they easily could be taken off. Inside the C-130, the cargo compartments forward third was curtained off with a warning: TOP SECRET. Squeezed into the remaining seats was a smorgasbord of passengers
reconnaissance units at Kontum, going into the field under the command of young Staff Sergeants serving as One-Zeros. 24 While almost all indigenous recruits to SOG had previously served with and been extensively trained by other U.S. forcesgenerally Special Forces teams operating throughout South Vietnamtheir ability to serve effectively with SOG recon teams left much to be desired. Plaster recounts using toy soldiers to teach basic infantry tactics to Montagnard mercenaries who were generally illiterate, learning tasks by rote, and lacking basic mathematic skills, which they overcame by counting one, two, three, many (Plaster, 162).
Mullikin 14
Chinese,
Vietnamese,
Americans
in
civilian
clothes,
armed
and
unarmed
Green
Berets,
and
nondescript
Asians
whose
nationality
I
could
not
even
guess.25
With
concerns
over
deniability
relaxed
by
around
1970,
SOG
also
had
a
hand
in
developing
close
air
support
tactics,
specifically
for
the
AC-130
gunship,
a
heavily
armed
ground
attack
aircraft
that
has
been
deployed
by
USSOCOM
for
close
air
support
missions
in
Afghanistan
and
Iraq,
and
as
part
of
the
NATO
intervention
in
Libya
in
March
2011.
In
terms
of
personal
field
kit,
SOG
units
were
initially
highly
restricted
in
terms
of
the
weapons
and
gear
they
could
carry
into
the
field.
In
order
to
maintain
the
United
States
plausible
deniability
of
sending
troops
into
technically
neutral
Laos
and
Cambodia,
recon
teams
deploying
across
the
border
were
sterilethey
carried
untraceable
gear,
wore
Asian-made
uniforms
without
nametapes
or
rank
insignia,
and
carried
no
identification
cards
or
dog
tags.
SOG
teams
often
deployed
with
foreign
weapons,
including
AK-47s
and
British
and
Swedish
silenced
submachine
guns.
If
the
units
came
into
heavy
contact
on
the
ground,
they
were
essentially
on
their
own;
early
SOG
missions
were
Figure
5:
RT
Maine,
1970.
Dressed
in
NVA
fatigues
and
carrying
mostly
foreign
weapons,
this
recon
team
is
ready
to
depart
from
CCC.
not
allowed
access
to
tactical
air
support,
a
critical
feature
of
modern
small-unit,
especially
special
operations,
tactics.
These
restrictions
were
later
relaxed,
allowing
more
and
more
SOG
operators
to
carry
American-made
weaponsthe
CAR-15,
a
25
Plaster, 28.
Mullikin 15
forerunner to the modern M4 carbine, was a recon favoriteand to rely on helicopter gunship and fighter support in extreme emergencies, provided the limited assets dedicated to cross-border support were available, and not occupied with other teams emergencies.
Tactics
Between
1967
and
April
1972,
OPS-35
[the
reconnaissance
group
responsible
for
cross-border
missions]
conducted
1,398
reconnaissance
missions,
38
platoon- sized
patrols,
and
12
multi-platoon
operations
in
Cambodia.
During
the
same
period,
it
captured
24
prisoners
of
war.26
Given
the
size
of
the
unit,
and
the
combat
attrition
that
constantly
kept
manpower
at
sub-optimal
levels,
the
sheer
number
of
missions
run
by
SOG
is
extremely
impressive.
SOG
teams
in
the
field
also
displayed
uncommon
valor;
Jerry
Mad
Dog
Shriver,
for
example,
once
famously
replied
to
an
officer
concerned
that
he
was
about
to
be
overrun
by
calmly
stating,
No
sweat.
Ive
got
em
right
where
I
want
emsurrounded
from
the
inside.27
Despite
these
extreme
cases
of
bravado,
SOG
operations
were
among
the
deadliest
in
the
waraccording
to
Meyer,
The
unit
experienced
an
incredible
casualty
rate
of
exceeding
100
percent
-
meaning
that
at
one
time
or
another,
every
man
serving
in
that
unit
was
wounded
at
least
once28
The
danger
associated
with
service
in
SOG
came
largely
from
the
units
high
operational
tempo
and
widespread
area
of
operations,
which
was,
for
the
most
part,
restricted
to
austere,
denied
access
areas
behind
enemy
lines.
SOG
teams
conducted
land,
sea,
and
air
operations
in
North
Vietnam,
Laos,
and
Cambodiaareas
forbidden
to
most
other
American
units.
Furthermore,
SOG
teams
had
a
role
in
every
major
event
of
the
conflict,
including
26
Capturing an NVA soldier was the ultimate coup for a SOG recon team, providing higher command with a rare opportunity to interrogate a prisoner, and earning the returning team a weeklong R&R in Taiwan. Unfortunately the act of securing a prisoner was incredibly difficult; prisoners were often killed in the inevitable run and gun firefight that erupted after a recon team secured its prize. 27 Plaster, p. 21. 28 John Stryker Meyer, Across the Fence [Kindle Edition], SOG Publishing, 2011.
Mullikin 16
the
Gulf
of
Tonkin
air
operations
over
North
Vietnam
the
Tet
Offensive
the
secret
bombing
and
ground
incursion
into
Cambodia,
the
Phoenix
Program,
and
the
Son
Tay
Raid.29
While
individual
units
were
given
a
week
of
stand
down
time30
after
a
mission,
the
limited
number
of
teams
available
to
SOG
commanders
meant
that,
at
any
one
time,
multiple
teams
from
each
regional
headquarters
were
deployed
behind
enemy
lines.
At
an
operational
level,
sheer
weight
of
numbers
made
SOG
operations
extremely
dangerous.
The
situation
was
more
complex
at
the
tactical
level.
Due
to
demands
from
higher
headquarters
in
Saigon,
officially
mission-ready
teamsteams
that
were
sometimes
poorly
prepared
and
lacking
in
sufficient
unit
cohesionwere
often
sent
into
the
field
with
dire
consequences.
According
to
Plaster,
You
could
say
they
died
from
bad
luck
or
bad
field
craft,
but
I
thought
they
died
from
too
little
time,
not
enough
chance
to
learn
from
mistakesin
SOG,
just
one
mistake
and
you
could
be
dead.31
While
this
statement
is
likely
true
for
any
combat
operation
in
any
war,
the
isolation
of
SOG
teams
operating
outside
South
Vietnam
raised
the
stakes
of
the
game.
For
SOG
operators,
especially
recon
men,
death
was
not
a
distant
afterthought,
but
a
statistical
inevitability.
On
average,
a
recon
team
leadera
One- Zerohad
been
on
roughly
eight
missions
prior
to
taking
command
of
a
team.
Given
the
high
casualty
rate
of
SOG
reconnaissance
units,
five
more
missions
and
the
young
sergeant
was
a
senior
team
leader
and
almost
a
statistical
anomaly.
According
to
Plaster,
by
the
time
he
had
twenty
missions
behind
him,
it
was
a
wonder
that
he
was
still
alive.32
The
best
available
statistics
for
SOG
casualties
note
29 30
Gillespie, 258. Post-mission stand down times were good for both informal discussions of effective recon tactics and blowing off steam from the stress of recon missions. SOG operators had access to seemingly endless beer and hard liquor at their base NCO clubs, which were funded by selling alcohol illegally to underage American troops. While these rowdy weeks off perpetuated the stereotype of SOG men, and Special Forces soldiers as a whole, as undisciplined and unreliable, the process of hot washing missions immediately after their conclusion has been formalized among modern American special operations units, especially Delta Force and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (SEAL Team Six). 31 Plaster, p. 48. 32 Plaster, p. 51.
Mullikin 17
that
over
the
course
of
nine
years
of
covert
operations,
163
men
were
killed
in
action
with
an
additional
80
listed
as
missing.33,
34
The
danger
of
SOG
missions
lay
not
only
in
the
jobs
they
were
expected
to
do,
but
also
in
the
logistics
of
inserting
and
extracting
men
by
helicopter
deep
behind
enemy
lines.
Teams
were
frequently
inserted
only
to
immediately
come
under
heavy
fire,
as
was
the
case
with
Jerry
Mad
Dog
Shrivers
final
mission,
in
which
his
recon
team
was
inserted
to
a
landing
zone
only
to
meet
immediate
overwhelming
fire,
leading
to
the
deaths
of
three
American
soldiers.35
Hoping
to
minimize
the
casualties
incurred
when
recon
teams
were
in
Prairie
Fire
emergency
situationsin
danger
of
being
overrun
by
NVA
forcesSergeant
Major
Charles
T.
McGuire,
an
instructor
at
the
MACV
Recondo
School,
developed
the
McGuire
Harness
to
rapidly
extract
men
from
landing
zones
without
needing
to
actually
pull
them
up
into
a
hovering
extraction
helicopter.
Essentially
Swiss-style
rappelling
seats,
McGuire
Harnesses
were
used
effectively
in
the
field
in
emergency
scenarios.
Unfortunately,
the
time
spent
dangling
beneath
helicopters
while
still
subject
to
NVA
ground
fire
exacted
its
toll
33 34
Figure 6: SOG soldiers practice another extraction method - climbing out on rope ladders.
Gillespie, p. 258. If these statistics seem grim, consider them from the NVA perspectiveby 1969 SOG had achieved a kill to loss ratio of 150:1 (Guardia, p. 177). 35 Plaster, p. 127; Jack Murphy, The Legend and Truth of Jerry Mad Dog Shriver, SOFREP (1 October 2012) <http://sofrep.com/11209/the-legend-and-truth-of-jerry-mad-dog-shriver/> [Accessed 2012.11.20].
Mullikin 18
on SOG recon men; Plaster tells the story of RT Vermonts attempted rescue of a missing SOG operator on the ground in Laos, when First Lieutenant Jim Birchim was lost after flying in a McGuire rig for an hour and a half.36 The extreme valor shown by SOG operators in the field ensured that Purple
Hearts were not the only medals won by men assigned to the recon teams. Sergeant (later Colonel) Bob Howardaccording to Plaster the most decorated U.S. soldier since WWIIwas nominated for the Medal of Honor twice before finally winning the award on his third nomination; he also won two Distinguished Service Crosses, a Silver Star, four Legion of Merit awards, four Bronze Stars, and eight Purple Hearts.
Figure 7: Bob Howard carries an NVA prisoner of war captured by RT Texas away from the helicopter landing pad.
Operations
SOG
operations
under
the
first
Chief,
Col.
Russell,
were
limited
in
scope
and
failed
to
generate
any
new
intelligence
on
NVA
operations
outside
South
Vietnam.
Col.
Donald
Blackburn
immediately
expanded
Russells
operations
upon
taking
command
of
SOG
in
May
1965,
two
months
after
the
first
American
combat
troops
36
Plaster, p. 57.
Mullikin 19
were sent to South Vietnam, and almost a year after the failure of the first US- sponsored reconnaissance missions into Laos. Operation Shining Brass37 Blackburn immediately ordered a study for cross-border operations designed
to focus on a more immediate problemthe infiltration coming down from the North.38 Blackburns plan called for small training teams to be inserted across the Laotian border to reconnoiter the Ho Chi Minh trailat the time understood to be little more than a mountain path. Eventually Blackburns plan became known as Operation Shining Brass, and it was to be executed in three phases: first, reconnaissance teams would locate NVA logistical corridors in Laos and report back with that intelligence; a company-sized exploitation force would then be deployed into the area to eliminate the critical targets identified in Phase 1; in the third phase, American and indigenous personnel assigned to SOG would infiltrate Laos and organize units of Laotian natives to fight against the NVA.39 While the Joint Chiefs were hesitant to approve of the plan, Shining Brass was eventually given a green light on 21 September 1965. After establishing the parameters of the operation, Blackburns first reconnaissance team inserted into Laos on 18 October 1965.40 By the end of the year, eight missions had been launched into Laos, six of which had returned with significant intelligence on NVA movements in the area. While Blackburn was forced to relinquish command of SOG on 1 July 1966SOG
commanders
were
only
allowed
to
serve
one-year
tourshe
later
stated
I
dont
think
theres
any
question
as
to
the
effectiveness
of
the
Shining
Brass
Operation
It
37 38
Later renamed Operation Prairie Fire. Col. Donald Blackburn, quoted in Guardia, p. 167. 39 Guardia, pp. 168-169. 40 The US Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, was wary of the political ramifications of American soldiers operating inside Laos. Sullivan initially restricted the movements of SOG teams to boxes of roughly ten to fifteen square kilometers, and tried to prevent SOG teams from utilizing round-trip helicopter insertions. By sheer force of personality, Blackburn convinced Sullivan of the necessity of helicopters, but it wasnt until the intelligence value of the recon missions had been substantiated that Sullivan allowed an expansion of their area of operations inside Laos. Guardia, pp. 169-170.
Mullikin 20
identified and located the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail network along which, in October 1965, the NVA had deployed roughly 30,000 logistical and support troops, not including the roughly 4,500 NVA combat troops infiltrating South Vietnam along the trail each month.41 Gen. Westmoreland, the MACV commander, was equally impressed, and SOG operations were significantly expanded in 1966 and afterward. Operation Daniel Boone42 By 1967 the Groups successes in Shining Brass had been so well received that
the program was expanded to include Cambodia in missions initially known as Operation Daniel Boone. For roughly a year, Projects Sigma and Omega had been running missions into Cambodia, resulting in significant disputes between the 5th Special Forces Group and SOG. In pitches to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the State Department, both organizations claimed they should take the lead in running reconnaissance missions in Cambodia. SOG won out, claiming that the 5th Group, operating under the authority of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, lacked authorization for operations outside South Vietnam. SOG took over Sigma and Omega on 3 September 1967.43 Several new SOG bases were established to manage the missions in Cambodia, including Command and Control South at Ban Me Thuot. According to Turkoly- Joczik, From 1967 through April 1972, OPS-35 conducted 1,398 reconnaissance missions, 38 platoon-sized patrols, and 12 multi-platoon operations in Cambodia. During the same period, it captured 24 prisoners of war.44 Stand-Down and Operation Commando Hunt The 1968 Tet Offensive left NVA and Viet Cong forces operating in South
Vietnam
decimated,
and
the
operation
was
an
undeniable
military
victory
for
the
US
41 42
Guardia, pp. 171-177. Later renamed Operation Salem House. 43 Gillespie, pp. 122-123. 44 LTC Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik, "SOG: An Overview." Special Operations.Com. N.p., n.d. Web. 2012.11.20. <http://www.specialoperations.com/MACVSOG/Overview.htm>.
Mullikin 21
and South Vietnam. Unfortunately the political fallout in the United States was considerable, leading to a major turning point in the war. While officers assigned to MACV universally agreed that the communists should be pushed to the wall by intensified bombing campaigns, assaults into NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, and possibly even threatening the North with a ground invasion, the Joint Chiefs and President Johnson disagreed. In return for an agreement from Hanoi to seriously negotiate Washington terminated the bombing campaign; all of SOGs northern operations were terminated as well.45 With the bombing campaign suspended, NVA forces were sending more troops
and materiel down the Ho Chi Minh trail than ever before. With an increasing number of aircraft available for bombing missions, Air Force units were given permission to launch more sorties against the NVA targets traveling along the trail as part of Operation Commando Hunt. SOG units were tasked with assessing the results of these missions, resulting in a significant increase in the units operational tempo. The men assigned to these bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions eventually came to despise and even fear them; often, the aerial view of the effects of this massive bombing was deceiving, and recon teams were frequently greeted with well-organized, functional fighting units upon their insertion. The results of these contacts often resulted in heavy casualties, as was the case with a 24 April 1969 raid on the headquarters of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which American strategists understood to be the main command of communist forces operating in the South. In this raid, SOG lost at least three men and suffered dozens of wounded.46 Operation Lam Son 719 The intelligence gathered by SOG reconnaissance missions conclusively proved
that
the
logistical
support
of
NVA
units
operating
in
Laos
and
Cambodia
was
a
key
45 46
Gillespie, pp. 132-133. Those killed on this raid included SOG legend Jerry Mad Dog Shriver. Gillespie, pp. 181-182.
Mullikin 22
reason behind the communists success in South Vietnam. Both American and South Vietnamese strategists agreed that an attempt to interdict the NVA supply lines across the border had to be made. The initial plans for an attack across the border to disrupt the communist safe havens were developed at MACV headquarters in Saigon in early December 1970. SOG teams were barred from participating in the attack, however, for two
reasons: the US Senates Cooper-Church Amendment to the 1970 Foreign Military Sales Act,47 which prohibited US ground forces from participating in the mission at all; and the fact that all available helicopter assets in the theater were tied up in support of the conventional South Vietnamese attack. Unfortunately, Lam Son 719 was too little, too late. Without the support of
American ground troops, the South Vietnamese offensive (launched on 8 February 1971) stalled and was eventually repelled, forced to withdraw on 25 March. Despite SOGs exhaustive efforts to reconnoiter the Trail, and Col. Blackburns initial plan to send SOG troops into the area to cut the Trail with the help of indigenous guerrillas, the Group never got the chance to execute that mission.48 Transition to Strategic Technical Directorate and Withdrawal In anticipation of the US disengagement from the war, both the MACV staff and
senior South Vietnamese military leaders began transitioning the burden of combat operations to South Vietnamese forces. SOG operations in particular were slowly drawn down in 1970-1971, with operators continuing to perform BDAs, gather intelligence, and direct air strikes until the final SOG recon mission was launched into the Ashau Valley (one of the Ho Chi Minh Trails key entry points into South Vietnam, and the primary target of the Operation Lam Son 719) in December 1971.
47
The original amendment passed in the Senate, but was defeated in the House. A revised version was passed by both houses and enacted on 5 January 1971. 48 Gillespie, pp. 227-228.
Mullikin 23
In an attempt to keep up intelligence-gathering operations based on the SOG model, the Group was replaced by the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), a unit manned by Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers and supported by a group of 155 Special Forces soldiers. Unfortunately several members of the minority ethnic groups that served alongside the Americans in SOG refused to work with the Vietnamese, resulting in a significant loss of institutional knowledge of running cross-border reconnaissance missions. While many former SOG operators remained in Vietnam working with the STD, the majority of those who had run reconnaissance missions with the Group transitioned elsewhere. Unfortunately the STD generally struggled to execute operations on the SOG model, and collapsed when the last SF soldiers withdrew in March 1973.49 Presidential Unit Citation The Studies and Observations Group was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation
(Army)
on
4
April
2001.
The
ceremony
hosted
all
the
former
commanders
of
SOG
still
alive,
and
all
former
members
of
SOG
remaining
on
active
duty.
Portions
of
the
citation
are
reproduced
below:
The
Studies
and
Observations
Group
is
cited
for
extraordinary
heroism,
great
combat
achievement
and
unwavering
fidelity
while
executing
unheralded
top
secret
missions
deep
behind
enemy
lines
across
Southeast
Asia.
Incorporating
volunteers
from
all
branches
of
the
Armed
Forces,
and
especially,
US
Army
Special
Forces,
SOGs
ground,
air,
and
sea
units
fought
officially
denied
actions,
which
contributed
immeasurably
to
the
American
war
effort
in
Vietnam.
[]
Despite
casualties
that
sometimes
became
universal,
SOGs
operators
never
wavered,
but
fought
throughout
the
war
with
the
same
flair,
fidelity,
and
intrepidity
that
distinguished
SOG
from
its
beginning.
The
Studies
and
Observations
Groups
combat
prowess,
martial
skills
and
unacknowledged
sacrifices
saved
many
American
lives,
and
provided
a
paragon
for
Americas
future
special
operations
forces.50
49 Adams, p. 127.
50
Mullikin 24
Mullikin 25
chose to use RT Illinois assessment as proof that their targeting was correct, and thus the bombing was achieving its goal of destroying NVA logistical infrastructure. Furthermore, SOG commanders hands were tied when it came to using their
unit
to
its
full
potential.
Beginning
with
Col.
Blackburn
in
1965,
SOG
commanders
petitioned
the
Pentagon
to
give
SOG
permission
to
create
and
sponsor
a
front
organization
within
South
Vietnam
that
would
mirror
that
of
the
communist- dominated
National
Liberation
Front
such
an
organization
could
be
used
as
a
springboard
for
a
real
resistance
[guerrilla]
movement
in
the
North.53
Despite
the
incredible
potential
such
a
movement
might
have
offered
American
strategists,
Washington
repeatedly
refused
the
requests.
Apparently,
senior
American
defense
officials
could
never
seem
to
comprehend
that
[they]
could
carry
out
covert
operations
on
one
hand
while
denying
them
on
the
other.54
This
is
just
one
example
of
the
way
conventional
military
strategists
and
civilian
national
security
officials
failed
to
recognize
the
full
potential
of
SOG
as
an
asset
for
unconventional
warfare.
The
episodes
recounted
above
are
case
studies
in
the
strategic
effectiveness
of
the
Studies
and
Observations
Group;
when
their
missions
were
effective
in
gathering
intelligence,
that
information
was
subject
to
misuse
and
misinterpretation.
Despite
the
strengths
of
the
men
assigned
to
the
unit,
especially
in
terms
of
foreign
internal
defense,
conventional
commanders
were
unwilling
to
consider
the
potential
benefits
of
unconventional
warfare.
This
blatant
misuse
of
the
men
and
the
results
they
produced
speaks
to
a
significant
problem
with
the
Vietnam-era
U.S.
military
at
the
staff
level.
Thus,
despite
the
extreme
bravery
shown
by
the
men
assigned
to
SOG,
the
units
overall
impact
on
U.S.
behavior
during
the
war
was
negligible.
According
to
Gillespie:
MACSOG
and
its
operations
failed
to
achieve
the
goals
that
its
masters
set
for
it.
This
occurred
not
because
of
a
lack
of
effort
or
initiative
on
the
part
of
the
unit
53 54
Mullikin 26
or its personnel, but because of the inherent flaws in U.S. political/military strategy during the conflict. Other problemswere exemplified by MACVs and SACSAs inability to adapt MACSOG to fit their strategy. SOG could have served as both pathfinder and spearhead for an attack on the Trail system by larger conventional forces. Thanks to unchanging political restrictions, however, that was never going to happen. In the end, despite the significant intelligence SOG delivered to strategic planners in Saigon and Washington, and the effectiveness commando raids had in instilling fear in NVA rear-echelon troops, SOG failed to fully exploit its successes in the field. There is no evidence that any decisive actions were taken by SOG itself, or by conventional forces based on intelligence gathered by SOG reconnaissance missions, to destroy the NVA supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Given that disrupting and dismantling that logistical infrastructure was a key objective for the Group, we must chalk up SOGs efforts as admirable, but ultimately a failure.
Figure 8: Billy Waugh (left) and an unnamed pilot prior to a HALO jump into enemy territory.
Mullikin 27
run
with
such
high
success
rates
by
SOCOM
and
the
Joint
Special
Operations
Command
(JSOC)
in
Afghanistan
and
Iraq.
Fortunately,
many
stalwart
SOG
veterans
were
still
serving
when
American
special
operations
were
formalized
under
SOCOM
and
JSOC,
helping
to
guide
those
organizations
in
their
efforts
to
formalize
American
special
operations.
At
the
unit
level,
the
establishment
of
Delta
Force
in
1977
and
SEAL
Team
6
in
1980
relied
on
the
advice
of
many
men
who
made
their
bones
in
SOG,
especially
the
famous
American
covert
warrior
Billy
Waugh.55,
56
Others,
including
Col.
Charlie
Beckwith
(the
founder
of
Delta),
Col.
Jerry
King
(founder
of
the
Intelligence
Support
Activity),57
and
Commander
Richard
Marcinko
(founder
of
SEAL
Team
6)
also
cut
their
teeth
on
special
operations
work
in
Southeast
Asia,
making
the
warriors
serving
with
modern
SOF
units
something
like
the
military
grandchildren
of
those
that
fought
with
SOG.
SOG
also
began
the
initial
development
of
tactics,
techniques,
and
procedures
that
have
come
to
dominate
American
special
operations
deployments.
In
his
conclusion,
Gillespie
notes,
The
methods
and
techniques
developed
and
utilized
by
SOG
in
Southeast
Asiawere
adopted
by
Delta
[Force]
and
have
become
standard
operational
practices.
For
example,
SOG
commander
in
chief
Col.
John
Sadler
authorized
the
first
combat
HALO
jump
on
28
November
1970,
ordering
Spike
Team58
Virginia,
composed
of
three
American
non-commissioned
officers
and
three
Montagnard
fighters,
to
insert
behind
enemy
lines
by
jumping
from
14,000
feet.
While
the
team
members
were
scattered
six
miles
from
their
planned
drop
zone,
55 56
Gillespie, p. 260. Billy Waugh retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Sergeant Major in 1972, and later went on to serve in the CIAs Special Activities Division. He served in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). With SOG, Waugh had a role in the first and last combat HALO insertions in Vietnam. Waugh was one of the first CIA paramilitary officers to deploy to Afghanistan where, at age 71, he worked with Northern Alliance leaders to topple the Taliban and appeared at the Battle of Tora Bora. Between his Special Forces and CIA careers, he has spent more than 50 years running covert operations on behalf of the United States. He is the recipient of a Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, four Bronze Stars, eight Purple Hearts, and four Army Commendation Medals. 57 For more information on this important human intelligence-gathering special mission unit, see Michael Smith. Killer Elite. New York, NY: St. Martin's, 2007. Print. 58 Another term for a recon team.
Mullikin 28
they survived five days on the ground without alerting NVA units to their presence, and were successfully extracted from four locations on 2 December.59 Additionally, SOG teams virtually wrote the book on small-unit search and rescue operations and strategic reconnaissance. With these historic developments in mind, we can clearly say that despite the Groups failure to strategically impact the war in Vietnam, its role in the formation of modern special operations units is unparalleled and critically important for todays unconventional warfighters.
Conclusion
The
men
assigned
to
the
Studies
and
Observations
Group
in
Vietnam
fought
courageously,
but
their
hands
were
tied,
tactically
and
operationally.
In
the
field,
the
stringent
requirements
set
out
by
Washington
to
keep
SOG
missions
deniable
and
covert
left
the
operators
themselves
alone,
with
little
outside
aid.
Operating
in
small
units,
SOG
recon
teams
were
consistently
outnumbered
and
outgunnedfor
the
men
on
the
ground,
simply
surviving
the
mission
unscathed
counted
as
a
victory.
Unfortunately,
statistically
speaking
every
SOG
operator
suffered
serious
injuries,
calling
into
question
the
strategic
necessity
of
such
costly
missions.
At
the
operational
level,
MACV
strategists
failed
to
take
advantage
of
the
potential
force
multiplier
offered
by
SOG.
By
relying
on
indigenous
forces
to
conduct
the
more
diplomatically
untenable
operations
of
the
war,
SOG
troops
were
never
allowed
to
deliver
a
decisive
blow
to
the
NVA
logistics
infrastructure
theyd
surveyed
over
hundreds
of
reconnaissance
missionsessentially
the
exact
mission
they
were
initially
meant
to
execute
under
Col.
Blackburns
vision
for
the
third
phase
of
Operation
Shining
Brass.
Furthermore,
MACV
officers
failed
to
recognize
the
potential
benefits
of
unconventional
warfare,
remaining
distrustful
of
important
tactics
that
could
have
drastically
changed
the
outcome
of
the
war.
59 Gillespie, p. 210.
Mullikin 29
In strategic terms, the Groups failure lay more with those outside its command
than with those serving as senior leaders of SOG. The organization was an unconventional force operating within a highly bureaucratized, conventional military that was distrustful of special operations units in general. Despite the efforts of the Groups admirable enlisted men and officers, it failed to have a major impact on the outcome of the war. As Kelley notes in his conclusion, The ability to maneuver and conduct battles by the North Vietnamese was not impacted to any great degree by SOGs activities The unconventional war effort was more or less a nuisance to the North Vietnamese. History shows that they continued to maintain control of their rear area and move supplies and personnel to fight the war in South Vietnam. They were still strong enough to mount a major offensive in 1972 and again successfully in 1975. Had SOG operations been linked to the conventional fight and restrictions lessened or dropped, the unconventional war effort might have been more effective.60 Unfortunately the Group never got the chance to prove its full capabilities. It is important to note that the scope of this study does not allow for a full investigation of all aspects of the Studies and Observations Group. Primarily due to a lack of information on the other units manned by SOGincluding, for example, the larger Hatchet and Mike Forces61this paper has focused on the contributions made by SOG reconnaissance teams in their cross-border missions into Laos and Cambodia. More research must be done to paint a complete picture of the impact SOG had on the American war in Southeast Asia. With that said the information presented here is sufficient to unequivocally say that SOG failed to have a decisive impact on the war. However, as any SOG memoir will indicate, that was not in any way the fault of the operators themselves.
60 61
Kelley, p. 66. Company-sized units deployed on relatively infrequent cross-border missions, often to strike targets identified by small-unit reconnaissance missions. These units also sometimes served as quick-reaction forces, similar to modern Ranger units support of other SOF missions. For example, in the five years that SOG units operated in Cambodia, full Mike/Hatchet Force companies deployed across the border only twelve times, compared to 1,398 recon team deployments in the same period.
Mullikin 30
Finally, given the similarities between modern American special operations forces and their grandfathers in SOG, it is important that modern strategic planners take care in their reliance on special operations troops and the capabilities they offer. While the men who fill the ranks of modern SOCOM units are just as remarkable as those who fought with SOG in the Sixties and Seventies, the example of MACVs misuse of SOG proves that the tactical expertise of SOF units is no substitute for sound strategy, operational planning, and a well-grounded understanding of the enemy one hopes to defeat.
Mullikin 31
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Accessed
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From
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Figure
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Digital
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Figure
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70
@
CCC,
taken
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image.
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Figure
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Figure
6:
Nowak,
Richard.
Prisoner
Caught
by
RT
Texas.
Note:
Howard
came
to
the
helicopter
pad
when
the
recon
team
retuned,
he
picked
up
and
carried
the
prisoner
from
the
Huey.
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the
mission
that
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