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Jerueh L. Labro JD4 Case Digests


RULE 37 48. 49. 50. RULE 39 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. APPEAL 58. 59. Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, et al. , G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013 (Page 8) Figuracion v. Figuracion Derille , G.R. No. 151334, February 13, 2013(Page 8) Dalangin v. Perez, et al., G.R. No. 178758, April 3, 2013 (Page 2) O Ventanilla Corp. v. Tan, et al., G.R. No. 180325, February 20, 2013(Page 3) Pacifico Cruz v. SB, February 19, 2010(Page 4) De Leon v. Public Estates Authority , August 3, 2010(Page 5) Villeza v. German Management & Services, Inc., August 8, 2010(Page 6) Sps. Yap v. Dy, et al. , G.R. No. 171868; Dumaguete Rural Bank v. Sps. Dy, et al. , G.R. No. 171991, July 27, 2011(Page 6) Imani v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010(Page 7) Tejada v. Rep., G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013 (Page 1) Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Page 1) UP v. Hon. Agustin Dizon, et al., G.R. No. 171182, April 22, 2013 (Page 1)

July 27, 2013 Remedial Law Review I

hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. 59 It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water. 49. PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL. G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012 BERSAMIN, J.: Facts: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration. After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC). Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss. Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb its order. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla countered that the RTC order was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law." The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla. Issue: Whether or not the RTCs decision denying of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal a final order and appealable; Held: Yes. First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal

RULE 37: NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION 48. REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKY TADEJA, RICARDO TADEJA and FERDINAND TADEJA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013

SERENO, J.: Facts: An Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed against Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel. Meanwhile, Reynante filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Russell and Robenson. The RTC acquitted Rusell and Robenson for the charge of frustrated homicide. Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed both of the decisions of the RTC.The petitioners appealed before the Supreme Court but the latter only affirmed the decision of the lower courts. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Courts decision several times but to no avail. Petitioners then moved for the reopening of the case allegedly on the ground of newly found evidence which was the admission of Plaridel who was later on arrested that it was him who killed Ruben and that the other petitioners had nothing to do with Rubens death. Issue: Whether or not petitioners motion to reopen the case for reception of further evidence in the trial court should be granted Held: No. Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. 56 Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 the date on which the Decision of The Supreme Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained. Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridels extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridels apprehension. Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence;

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may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. 50. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANA vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ BERSAMIN, J.: Facts: The UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos (UPLB). When the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its corespondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Stern Builders. Following the RTCs denial of its motion for reconsideration, the UP filed a notice of appeal. Stern Builders and dela Cruz opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being belated, and moved for the execution of the decision. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period because the UPs Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. Both the CA and the RTC found the filing on June 3, 2002 by the UP of the notice of appeal to be tardy. They based their finding on the fact that only six days remained of the UPs reglementary 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal because the UP had filed a motion for reconsideration on January 16, 2002 vis--vis the RTCs decision the UP received on January 7, 2002; and that because the denial of the motion for reconsideration had been served upon Atty. Felimon D. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002, the UP had only until May 23, 2002 within which to file the notice of appeal. Issue: Whether or not the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco was defective considering that its counsel of record was not Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City Held: Yes. Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be made. That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial only on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002, rendering the filing of the UPs notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UPs period to appeal. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. The fact that Atty. Nolasco was in the employ of the UP at the UPLB Legal Office did not render the service upon him effective. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel.95 Service on the party or the partys employee is not effective because such notice is not notice in law. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side." As such, the period to appeal resumed only on June 1, 2002, the date following the service on May 31, 2002 upon the OLS in Diliman of the copy of the decision of the RTC, not from the date when the UP was notified. Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing. However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the freshperiod rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals. Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day." RULE 39: EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS 51. MARCELINO and VITALIANA DALANGIN, vs.CLEMENTE PEREZ, CECILIA GONZALES, SPOUSES JOSE BASIT and FELICIDAD PEREZ, SPOUSES MELECIO MANALO and LETICIA DE GUZMAN, AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BATANGAS G.R. No. 178758 April 3, 2013 DEL CASTILLO, J.: Facts: Respondents Clemente Perez and Cecilia Gonzales (Perez spouses) sold to petitioners Marcelino and Vitaliana Dalangin (Dalangin spouses) hectare parcel of land. The latter, however, failed to pay in full despite demand, leaving an unpaid balance of. Thus, the Perez spouses filed a Complaint against the petitioners for recovery of a sum of money. Petitioners failed to file their Answer hence, they were declared in default and the Perez spouses were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. The City Court of Batangas City ordered petitioners to pay jointly and severally the Perez spouses with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint until fully paid. No appeal having been taken, the Decision became final and executory. Pursuant to this, a Writ of Execution was issued. In the May 15, 1972 sale, respondents emerged as the highest bidder. For failure to redeem, the sheriff executed a Final Deed of Conveyance over said properties, and a Writ of Possession was issued by the City Court. The Writ of Possession was received by Emmanuel Dalangin, petitioners son. The Perez spouses thus came into possession of the subject property. Twelve years after the City Courts issuance of the Writ of Possessionpetitioners filed a case for annulment of the sheriffs, petitioners prayed that the sheriffs sale, Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of Conveyance be nullified and voided for lack of publication and notice of the sheriffs sale, and for inadequacy of the purchase price of the subject properties. The RTC rendered its Decision upholding the validity of the sheriffs sale. It ruled that while it appears that there was no notice of sheriffs sale, petitioners nevertheless received copies of the Writ of Execution and the subsequent Writ of Possession, which should serve as adequate warning of the continued action on the case and the impending loss of their properties. This was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not the 1997 Revised Rules of Court applied in the execution sale conducted on March 15, 1972 Held: No. The applicable rule at the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972 is Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. This rule does not require personal written notice to the judgment debtor. At the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, the applicable rule is Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. It states:
Sec. 18. Notice of sale of property on execution. Before the sale of property on execution, notice thereof must be given as follows: (a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of the time and place of the sale in three public places in the municipality or city where the sale is to take place, for such time as may be reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property;

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(b) In case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in three public places in the municipality or city where the sale is to take place, for not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) days; (c) In case of real property, by posting a similar notice particularly describing the property for twenty (20) days in three public places in the municipality or city where the property is situated, and also where the property is to be sold, and, if the assessed value of the property exceeds four hundred pesos (P400), by publishing a copy of the notice once a week, for the same period, in a newspaper published or having general circulation in the province, if there be one. If there are newspapers published in the Province in both the English and Spanish languages, then a like publication for a like period shall be made in one newspaper published in the English language, and in one published in the Spanish language.

Private respondent Adelina Tan then filed with the trial court a Motion for Execution praying that the excess of the amounts she previously paid as exemplary damages, attorney's fees and liquidated damages be refunded to her, in accordance with the judgment of the CA. To counter such move, petitioner filed with the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, an Omnibus Motion (with entry of appearance), praying that the entry of judgment be recalled, lifted and set aside; that the CA Decision dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 be recalled, reconsidered, and/or vacated and, thereafter, the appeal of Adelina Tan be dismissed or the appeal be reopened to allow petitioner to file an appeal brief. Petitioner argued that its counsel, Atty. Liberato Bauto died on March 29, 2001, hence, any notice sent to him must be deemed ineffective; that the parties have arrived at a settlement of the case, as shown by the fact that private respondent already paidP9,073,694.76 as complete and full satisfaction of the adjudged obligations of the defendants to petitioner, and thus, the appeal should have been deemed mooted. Meanwhile, the RTC granted the motion for execution, and ordered to be refunded to defendants the amount of Php1,968,801.616 against the herein plaintiff. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion (for recall and reconsideration of order and quashal of alias writ of execution, levy, and notice of sheriff's sale, etc.), but this motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA (docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 82608) to assail the trial court's denial of the Very Urgent Motion, but as admitted by petitioner in the present petition, said action for certiorari was denied due course and dismissed by the CA. As to petitioner's Omnibus Motion (with entry of appearance) filed with the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, the appellate court issued a Resolution merely noting petitioner's motion because its Decision dated October 21, 2002 has long become final and executory. Undaunted, petitioner again filed on October 2, 2006, a Manifestation and Motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, praying that its Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Motion be resolved on the merits instead of merely being noted as the CA did in its Resolution dated March 19, 2004; that the petition for certiorari be resolved and granted; and that the proceedings in the trial court with regard to the execution of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817, be annulled and set aside.The CA promulgated the Resolution denying the above-mentioned Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner on October 2, 2006. Issues: I.

The foregoing rule does not require written notice to the judgment obligor. Respondents are thus correct in their argument that at the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, personal notice to the petitioners was not required under Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Indeed, notice to the judgment obligor under the 1964 Rules of Court was not required, or was merely optional; publication and posting sufficed. It was only in 1987 that the Court required that written notice of the execution sale be given to the judgment debtor, via Circular No. 8 amending Rule 39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court on notice of sale of property on execution. Thus, the alleged failure on the part of the respondents to furnish petitioners with a written notice of the execution sale did not nullify the execution sale because it was not then a requirement for its validity. Petitioners may no longer question the conduct of the execution proceedings below. As correctly held by the CA, the presumption of regularity of the execution sale and the sheriffs performance of his official functions prevail in the absence of evidence to the contrary and in light of the self-serving allegations and bare denials of petitioners to the effect that they were not served with notice of the sheriffs sale, and given that the entire record covering the sale could no longer be located. After 12 years and after being dispossessed of their properties and title thereto for such a long time, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 2700 in an attempt to reverse the effects of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 1386. This is a clear case of afterthought, a risk petitioners took knowing that they stood to lose nothing more, but gain back their properties in the event of a victory that is farfetched.

Whether or not the CA Decision in CA-G. R. CV No. 58817 attained finality because petitioner's counsel, who died while the case was pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof; and Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the issuance of a writ of execution against petitioner, ordering it to refund the amount of P1,968,801.616 to herein private

52. O. VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. ADELINA S. TAN and SHERIFF REYNANTE G. VELASQUEZ, Presiding Judge. G.R. No. 180325 February 20, 2013 PERALTA, J.: Facts: Petitioner leased out two of its properties in Cabanatuan City to Alfredo S. Tan and herein private respondent Adelina S. Tan (the Tans). Due to the failure of the Tans to comply with the terms of the lease, petitioner filed a complaint against the Tans for cancellation and termination of contract of lease with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City (RTC). The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation and against the defendants Alfredo S. Tan, Sr. and Adelina S. Tan. Both Alfredo S. Tan and private respondent Adelina S. Tan appealed from said Decision. However, herein petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal and the same was granted by the trial court. Several properties and bank accounts of private respondent and Alfredo S. Tan were levied upon. The Tans decided to pay the amounts as ordered in the RTC Decision.The trial court issued Orders lifting and cancelling the Notice of Levy on private respondent Adelina Tan's properties and also on several bank accounts in the name of the Tans. Both orders stated that after the court allowed the writ of execution pending appeal, defendant tendered payment in the amount of P9,073,694.76 in favor of herein petitioner, who through Mr. Moises C. Ventanilla, acknowledged receipt of said amount as complete and full satisfaction of the adjudged obligations of the Tans to petitioner in this case. The appeal filed by Alfredo S. Tan was dismissed by the CA, but the appeal filed by herein private respondent Adelina S. Tan (docketed as CAG. R. CV No. 58817), proceeded in due course. On October 21, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision partially granting the appeal. None of the parties filed any motion for reconsideration or appeal from the CA Decision, thus, the same became final and executory on November 21, 2002, per the Entry of Judgment issued by the CA.

II.

Held: I. Yes. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration. It is the party's duty to inform the court of its counsel's demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm. Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the death of its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the place or law office designated by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary period therefor.

II. No. First of all, as held in Legaspi v. Ong, "[e]xecution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal."
Secondly, contrary to petitioner's claim, private respondent merely paid the amount of P9,073,694.76 in compliance with the writ of execution pending appeal, and not by reason of a compromise agreement. No such agreement or contract appears on record. Furthermore, petitioner's claim is belied by the fact that private respondent actively pursued the appeal of the case, which resulted in the CA Decision decreasing the amounts awarded by the RTC. Petitioner then contends that there is a substantial variance between the writ of execution and the CA Decision, as the latter did not make mention of petitioner having to make a refund. However, note Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. - Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, the action of the RTC in ordering the issuance of the writ of execution against herein petitioner for it to return the excess amount private respondent has paid in compliance with the execution pending appeal, is in accordance with the Rules. ln sum, there is nothing amiss in ordering petitioner to refund the amount of Pl , 968,801.616 to herein private respondent, as the appellate court has ruled with finality that petitioner is not entitled to such amount. 53. PACIFICO R. CRUZ vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156 G.R. Nos. 174599-609 February 12, 2010

Issue: Whether or not the findings of the Court in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value of the TCCs in question bar the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases subject of this petition Held: Yes. The Court held in its ruling in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that Pilipinas Shell, of which petitioner Cruz was the responsible officer, was a transferee in good faith and for value of the same TCCs subject of the criminal casesraises the issue of whether or not such ruling bars the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases subject of this petition. The res judicata rule bars the re-litigation of facts or issues that have once been settled by a court of law upon a final judgment on the merits. Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court establishes two rules:
(a) a judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars the parties and their privies from bringing a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before either the same or any other tribunal; and (b) any right, fact or matter directly adjudged or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court that renders judgment on the merits is conclusively settled and cannot be litigated again between the parties and their privies, regardless of whether the claims, purposes or subject matters of the two suits are the same.

The first is commonly referred to as "bar by former judgment"; the second as "conclusiveness of judgment." It is the second that is relevant to this case. Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised anew in any future case involving the same parties although for a different cause of action. Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues but not necessarily identity in causes of action. In the present case, the OMB charged petitioner Cruz, acting in conspiracy with others, of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 in connection with the transfer of fraudulently issued TCCs to Pilipinas Shell.27 The main issue in this case is whether or not Cruz, Pilipinas Shells Treasury head, connived with the officials of the One-Stop Center and others in unlawfully giving, through manifest partiality and bad faith, unwarranted benefits to DKC by processing and approving such transfers to Pilipinas Shell, knowing that DKC, the transferee, had been a dormant company. The Supreme Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. There, the Court categorically found that Pilipinas Shell, represented in its acquisition of the TCCs in question by petitioner Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for value of those TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a party to the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs. Indeed, there existed, said the Court, no evidence that Pilipinas Shell was involved in the processing of the One-Stop Centers approval of the transfer of those TCCs to Pilipinas Shell. The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are substantially the same. Although it was respondent Task Force that investigated the irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the TCCs, the ultimate complainant in the criminal casethe party that suffered the injurywas the government, represented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The latter also represented the government in the tax case against Pilipinas Shell. Petitioner Cruz, on the other hand, represented Pilipinas Shell in all the transactions in question. In short, the parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases represent substantially identical interests. The principle of res judicata through conclusiveness of judgment applies to bar the criminal actions against Cruz.

ABAD, J.: Facts: Acting on reports of irregularities, respondent Special Presidential Task Force 156 (Task Force) investigated the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (the One-Stop Center) of the Department of Finance (DOF). The Task Force found that certain officials of the One-Stop Center had been issuing tax credit certificates (TCCs) to entities that did not earn them through tax overpayments. According to respondent Task Force, the Diamond Knitting Corporation (DKC), a Board of Investments-registered textile manufacturer, completely shut down its operations in 1993 yet the DOFs One-Stop Center issued to it TCCs totaling P131,205,391.00 from 1994 to 1997. DKC in turn sold a number of these TCCs to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) with the approval of the One-Stop Center. Pilipinas Shell then used these TCCs to pay off its excise tax obligations to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Believing that petitioner Pacifico R. Cruz, the General Manager of Pilipinas Shells Treasury and Taxation Department, was a party to the fraud, respondent Task Force included him in its complaint for plunder .. Respondent OMB dismissed the plunder charge but caused the filing of separate informations for multiple violations of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against petitioner Cruz and the others with him. Before being arraigned, however, Cruz sought the reinvestigation of the cases, claiming that he had been unable to seek reconsideration because of the hasty filing of the informations. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion and ordered the OMB to submit a report of its reinvestigation within 60 days. Pending the case before the Sandiganbayan, on December 21, 2007, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.22 The BIR assessed deficiency income taxes against Pilipinas Shell, given that it used for payment the fraudulently issued TCCs subject of this case. The Supreme Court nullified the assessment, finding that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value and may thus not be unjustly prejudiced by the transferors fraud committed in procuring the transfer of those TCCs.Petitioner Cruz filed a manifestation invoking the Courts ruling in the above tax case as res judicata with respect to his alleged criminal liabilities relating to the subject TCCs.

54. BERNARDO DE LEON vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted by the CITY OF PARAAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDO ORPILLA G.R. No. 181970 August 3, 2010 PERALTA, J.: Facts: Petitioner Bernardo De Leon filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City against respondent

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Public Estates Authority ("PEA"), a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers, herein private respondents Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo Pena and Reymundo Orpilla. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leons fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square meters, situated in San Dionisio, Paraaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises. The court a quo found merit in De Leons application for writ of preliminary injunction. PEA sought recourse before the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a quo for issuing injunctive relief. The Supreme Court therein affirmed the decision of the trial court. Unfazed, PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982. The Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so that De Leons occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer ownership or possessory rights and that no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leons nebulous right of possession. De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of execution. He adamantly insisted that the court a quos Order for the issuance of the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive portion of the Supreme Courts previous decision as it did not categorically direct him to surrender possession of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA. However, both motions were denied by the trial court. Dissatisfied, De Leon filed another Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the orders of the RTC of Makati City. In the same proceeding, De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction but the same holding that an earlier decision promulgated by the Supreme Court, finding the subject property to be public and that De Leon has no title and no clear legal right over the disputed lot, has already attained finality. De Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same. De Leon questions the Decision of the CA on the following grounds: (a) he can only be removed from the subject land through ejectment proceedings; (b) the Decision of The Supreme Court in G.R. No. 112172 merely ordered the dismissal of De Leons complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 93-143; and (c) even though petitioner is not the owner and has no title to the subject land, mere prior possession is only required for the establishment of his right. Issues: I. II. ownership which was rejected. The Supreme Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership. In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. 26 If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 30 In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leons claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of The Supreme Courts decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of The Supreme Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits. It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.33 The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather than the rule. As held by The Supreme Court in Go v. Abrogar, 34 the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a new paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as follows:
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

Whether PEA is really entitled to possess the subject property; and Whether the RTC should proceed to hear PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition

While the above quoted amendment may not be applied in the instant case, as A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was made effective only on December 27, 2007, the provisions of the amendatory rule clearly underscores the urgency of proceeding with the principal case in the absence of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. This urgency is even more pronounced in the present case, considering that The Supreme Courts judgment in PEA v. CA, finding that De Leon does not own the subject property and is not entitled to its possession, had long become final and executory. As a consequence, the writ of execution, as well as the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the writ of demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry out the Order previously made by the RTC for the execution of The Supreme Courts decision in PEA v. CA. It is a logical consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued. Neither can De Leon argue that he stands to sustain irreparable damage. The Court had already determined with finality that he is not the owner of the disputed property and that he has no right to possess the same independent of his claim of ownership.

Held: I. Yes. The question of ownership and rightful possession of the subject property had already been settled and laid to rest in The Supreme Courts Decision dated November 20, 2000 in G.R. No. 112172 entitled, Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals (PEA v. CA). In this case, the land in question is admittedly public. The respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all. His claim of ownership is based on mere possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of at least fifty (50) years. However, the survey plan for the land was approved only in 1992, and respondent paid the realty taxes thereon on October 30, 1992, shortly before the filing of the suit below for damages with injunction. Hence, respondent must be deemed to begin asserting his adverse claim to Lot 5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 was certified as alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, per certificate of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is obvious that respondents possession has not ripened into ownership. As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.

II.

55. ERNESTO VILLEZ vs. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES, INC., DOMINGO RENE JOSE, PIO DIOKNO, SESINANDO FAJARDO, BAYANI OLIPINO, ROLANDO ROMILO and JOHN DOES G.R. No. 182937 August 8, 2010 MENDOZA, J.:

However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.24 Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of

Facts: This petition sprouted from an earlier Supreme Court ruling in German Management v. Court of Appeals which has already become final and executory. The decision, however, remains unenforced due to the prevailing partys own inaction. This petition, therefore, is the struggle of a victor trying to retrieve the prize once won.

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It appears that German Management v. Court of Appeals stemmed from a forcible entry case instituted by petitioner Ernesto Villeza against respondent German Management, the authorized developer of the landowners, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Antipolo City (MeTC). The Decision of The Supreme Court favoring the petitioner became final and executor. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC. Petitioner later filed a Motion to Defer Resolution [4] thereon because he was permanently assigned in Iloilo and it would take quite sometime before he could come back. The MeTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of his motion to issue writ of execution until his return. Three years later, as there was no further movement, the said court issued an order denying petitioners pending Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for lack of interest. More than three (3) years had passed before petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that he had retired from his job in Iloilo City and was still interested in the issuance of the writ. The MeTC issued a writ of execution. As the sheriff was implementing the writ, an Opposition with Motion to Quash Writ of Execution was filed by German Management and Services, Inc. On June 3, 1999, an order was handed down granting the motion to quash the writ of execution issued. Villeza filed with the MeTC a Complaint for Revival of Judgment of the Decision of the Supreme Court. Respondent German Management moved to dismiss the complaint. Petitioner Villeza appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the MeTC order of dismissal. Issue: Whether or not the interruption or suspension granted by the MeTC must be considered in computing the period because it has the effect of tolling or stopping the counting of the period for execution Held: No. An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: xxxx (3) Upon a judgment

time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is precisely to prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights. The Supreme Court cannot just set aside the statute of limitations into oblivion every time someone cries for equity and justice. Indeed, if eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right for more than a 10 th of a century and expect it to be preserved in pristine purity. 56. SPOUSES FRANCISCO D. YAP and WHELMA S. YAP vs. SPOUSES ZOSIMO DY, SR. and NATIVIDAD CHIU DY, SPOUSES MARCELINO MAXINO and REMEDIOS L. MAXINO, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS ORIENTAL and DUMAGUETE RURAL BANK, INC. G.R. No. 171868 July 27, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Facts: The spouses Tomas Tirambulo and Salvacion Estorco (Tirambulos) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the Rural Bank of Dumaguete, Inc., predecessor of Dumaguete Rural Bank, Inc. (DRBI), to secure a loan extended by the latter to them. Later, the Tirambulos obtained a second loan and also executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the same bank. Subsequently, the Tirambulos sold all seven mortgaged lots to the spouses Zosimo Dy, Sr. and Natividad Chiu (the Dys) and the spouses Marcelino C. Maxino and Remedios Lasola (the Maxinos) without the consent and knowledge of DRBI. This sale, which was embodied in a Deed of Absolute Sale was followed by a default on the part of the Tirambulos to pay their loans to DRBI. Thus, DRBI extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages and sold at public auction where DRBI was proclaimed the highest bidder and bought said lots. The sheriffs certificate of sale, however, was not registered until almost a year later. Twelve (12) days after the sale was registered, DRBI sold to the spouses Francisco D. Yap and Whelma D. Yap (the Yaps) under a Deed of Sale with Agreement to Mortgage. Within the redemption period, the Yaps filed a Motion for Writ of Possession alleging that they have acquired all the rights and interests of DRBI over the foreclosed properties and are entitled to immediate possession of the same because the oneyear redemption period has lapsed without any redemption being made. Said motion, however, was ordered withdrawn upon motion of the Yaps, who gave no reason therefor. Three days later, the Yaps again filed a Motion for Writ of Possession. This time the motion was granted, and a Writ of Possession over subject lots was issued in favor of the Yaps. They were placed in possession of the lots. Roughly a month before the one-year redemption period was set to expire, the Dys and the Maxinos attempted to redeem the property. They tendered the amount of P40,000.00 to DRBI and the Yaps, but both refused, contending that the redemption should be for the full amount of the winning bidplus interest for all the foreclosed properties. The Dys and the Maxinos went to the Office of the Sheriff of Negros Oriental and paidP50,625.29 (P40,000.00 for the principal plus P10,625.29 for interests and Sheriffs Commission) to effect the redemption. Noticing that a lot was not included in the foreclosure proceedings, Benjamin V. Diputado, Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff, issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of the Dys and the Maxinos only 2 lots. Atty. Diputado also duly notified the Yaps of the redemption of the 2 lots by the Dys and the Maxinos, as well as the noninclusion of Lot 3 among the foreclosed properties. He advised the Yaps to personally claim the redemption money or send a representative to do so. In a letter to the Provincial Sheriff, the Yaps refused to take delivery of the redemption price arguing that one of the characteristics of a mortgage is its indivisibility and that one cannot redeem only some of the lots foreclosed because all the parcels were sold for a single price at the auction sale. The Provincial Sheriff wrote the Dys and the Maxinos informing them of the Yaps refusal to take delivery of the redemption money and that in view of said development, the tender of the redemption money was being considered as a consignation. The Dys and the Maxinos filed a civil case for accounting, injunction, declaration of nullity (with regard to the lot not included in their certificate of redemption) of the Deed of Sale with Agreement to Mortgage, and damages against the Yaps and DRBI. On the other hand, the Yaps filed a civil case for consolidation of ownership, annulment of certificate of redemption, and damages against the Dys, the Maxinos, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental and DRBI. The 2 civil cases were tried jointly. The Yaps, then, by counsel, filed a motion to withdraw from the provincial sheriff the redemption money which was granted. The trial court ruled in favour of the Yaps. This was reversed by the CA.

Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:


Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

Apropos, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads:


Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment becomes final. When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of judgment on October 3, 2000, it had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the judgment he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in. The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience to allow someone to further avert the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality; that although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. The purpose of the law in prescribing

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The CA noted that the Yaps also failed to rebut their contention regarding the formers acceptance of the redemption money and their delivery of the possession of the three parcels of land to the Dys and the Maxinos. The CA also noted that not only did the Yaps deliver possession of the lot not included in the certificate of redemption to the Dys and the Maxinos, they also filed a Motion to Withdraw the Redemption Money from the Provincial Sheriff and withdrew the redemption money. Issue: Whether or not the Yaps withdrawal of the payment of redemption money has the effect of redemption by the judgment debtor although the same was made to the provincial sheriff Held: Yes. As to the issue regarding the question as to whom payment of the redemption money should be made, Section 31, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then applicable provides:
SEC. 31. Effect of redemption by judgment debtor, and a certificate to be delivered and recorded thereupon. To whom payments on redemption made.If the judgment debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate, and the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption acknowledged or approved before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the margin of the record of the certificate of sale. The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale. (Emphasis supplied.)

Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title covering the subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation and Motion, praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be directed to surrender the owners copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for cancellation. Petitioner opposed the motion arguing that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. The RTC denied Metrobanks motion. Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the RTC. But on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC reinstated its previous order declaring the property levied upon as conjugal, which cannot be held answerable for petitioners personal liability.The CA reversed the RTC ruling. Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale instead of the remedy under Rule 39. The issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim. Issue: Whether or not the remedy provided under Section 16, Rule 39 is the proper remedy Held: No. When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor holds no right or interest, and so incurs in error, the supervisory power of the Court which has authorized execution may be invoked by the third person. Upon due application by the third person, and after summary hearing, the Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The Court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only in so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or not. The sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit. The filing of the motion by petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale was, therefore, a proper remedy. The remedy of terceria or a separate action under Section 16, Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because he is not deemed a stranger to the case filed against petitioner: [T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. Thus, it would have been inappropriate for him to institute a separate case for annulment of writ of execution.

Here, the Dys and the Maxinos complied with the above-quoted provision. Well within the redemption period, they initially attempted to pay the redemption money not only to the purchaser, DRBI, but also to the Yaps. Both DRBI and the Yaps however refused, insisting that the Dys and Maxinos should pay the whole purchase price at which all the foreclosed properties were sold during the foreclosure sale. Because of said refusal, the Dys and Maxinos correctly availed of the alternative remedy by going to the sheriff who made the sale. As held in Natino v. Intermediate Appellate Court , the tender of the redemption money may be made to the purchaser of the land or to the sheriff. If made to the sheriff, it is his duty to accept the tender and execute the certificate of redemption. The Dys and Maxinos have legal personality to redeem the subject properties despite the fact that the sale to the Dys and Maxinos was without DRBIs consent. The Dys and the Maxinos validly redeemed the lots subject of the controversy. 57. EVANGELINE D. IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010 NACHURA, J.: Facts: Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision 4 in favor of Metrobank. This was affirmed by the CA. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was granted A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.

APPEAL: 58. BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. vs.ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased) substituted by Reynaldo P. Villareal, Jr.-spouse, Shekinah Marie Villareal-Azuguedaughter, Reynaldo A. Villareal ill-son, Shahani A. Villareal-daughter, and Billy Ray A. Villareal-son G.R. No. 181182 April 10, 2013 . DEL CASTILLO, J.: Facts:

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Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on the other hand, is one of Boardwalks distributors of RTW merchandise. Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint for replevin against Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latters alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the former. The MeTC rendered its Decision favoring Boardwalk. Villareal moved for reconsideration, but failed. The RTC on appeal reversed the MeTC Decision. Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. in a December 14, 2006 Order, which Boardwalk received on January 19, 2007. On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk through counsel filed with the Manila RTC a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying that it be granted 30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review. It paid the docket and other legal fees therefor at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC. On even date, Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC which the said court denied for being a wrong mode of appeal. On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail its Petition for Review with the CA which the latter dismissed outright holding that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees therefor with the RTC. It should have done so with the CA as required by Section 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalks erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42. The CA added that Boardwalks prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension was irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, invoking a liberal construction of the Rules in its favor. It further informed the CA that it had paid the docket fees with the CA Cashier, and submitted the required secretarys certificate and additional pleadings in support of its Petition. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration and its supplement. Issue: Whether or not there is compelling reason to accord it the privilege of appeal to the petitioner Held: No. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. Petitioner must comply with the following requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Sec. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be x x x accompanied by x x x copies x x x of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.

tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. True it is that in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed the governing periods of appeal in order to serve substantial justice. But this we have done only in exceptional cases. Sadly, the instant case is definitely not one of them. At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioners right of appeal is a mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a strict observance of the periods of appeal, which requirements are not merely mandatory, but jurisdictional. Nor may the negligence of Boardwalks former counsel be invoked to excuse it from the adverse effects of the appellate courts pronouncement. His negligence or mistake proceeded from carelessness and ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. This does not constitute excusable negligence that would extricate and excuse Boardwalk from compliance with the Rules. 59. CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACIONANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACIONGINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. FIGURACION, vs. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013

REYES, J.: Facts: The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse. The other petitioners Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez and respondent Emilia were Carolina and Leandros children. When Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of , the latter was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Respondent Emilia instituted the herein Complaint for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages and declared the affidavit of self-adjudication, deed of sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 null and void. Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and Hilaria. The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed premature considering that there is a pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the income from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for which the lots appear to have been intended. Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Supreme Court which denied the appeal, concurring with the CAs ruling that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate of Leandro. The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no acceptance and thus, void. They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that evoke questions of law, because: (a) it has not been registered with the Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as 1961; (b) a certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows that it does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Office of the National Archives which is the depository of old and new notarized documents has no record of the Deed of Quitclaim as evidenced by a certification dated May 19, 2003;23 and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who supposedly notarized the Deed of Quitclaim was not commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the certification dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Previously before the RTC, the defenses raised by the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the respondents cause of action had long

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other

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prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the suit; (2) TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership. Issue: Whether or not the issues raised before the courts a quo may be raised for the first time in a petition filed under Rule 45 Held: No. Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners before the RTC and the CA. In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit the issue with regard to Lot No. 707 as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No. 707. The petitioners supporting theory for this issue was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28, 1961 was rendered ineffective by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa and Hilaria." 27 On appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed ofQuitclaim. They claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the manner required by law. The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, 31 this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand. Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the evidence already adduced by the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners themselves have acknowledged when they attached in the petition several certifications32 in support of their new argument. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts. Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the petitioners involving the nature and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their failure to advance these questions during trial, the petitioners are now barred by estoppel from imploring an examination of the same.