A wholly empirical theory of vision explains certain visual illusions in terms o f the agent's accumulated past experiences in an environment

where statistical r egularities exist. What is the nature of these regularities and...? Let us tak e one example, as Purves explains the why question (purves and howe, 33, 41, 52. .) which can or must be explained in terms of 'the structure of the world'.

"larger planes will always encompass smaller ones" (41,52) straight lines Let us think of association as "an a priori essential lawful regularity of genet ic, "passive" consitution of sense, irreducible to habit, custom, or mental proc esses;...[bringing] associative syntheses into an intentional and motivational ( and not causal) nexus concerning affectively significant primordial phenomena an d their role in the awakening of affective tendencies toward attentiveness..." ( ACPAS p. lv) or not questions: linking luminance to reproductive advantage? questions about affection/motivation., and action/behavioural consequences (audi tory experiments & affect) The experiment with the aperture illusion and SoA, changing what we see during ' illusion' the questions of what 'empirical' means here, the controversial urge/motive of P urves (keeps returning to so-called 'controversial' claim..?); the role of space , time, and causality; the rationalist objection? ontogeny vs phylogeny Relation of trophic theory to empirical ranking theory? sensory substitution carry-over? visual percepts are generated by "the 'empirical significance' of light stimuli" rather than their physical characteristics. Kantian perspective on space? (point, line, plane/ surface, body?) merleau-ponty's flesh, Husserl's allure, Will?