518 CHAPTER LXXVI. THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE, OCTOBER 23, 1911—AUGUST 22, 1912. Sur H. Baz-Nonside to Sir A. Nicolson, Privaté and most Confidential.(') 7 My dear Nicolson, Sofia, October 28, 1911. A mecting took place between the Bulgarian ‘and Servian Prime Ministers on the 11th instant duzing the return journey of the former from Vichy. They travelled together in a special carriage from Belgrade to Lapovo. M. Milovanovitch was accompanied by the Servian Minister for Public Works and they lett Belgrade together, nominally to open a bridge. In my despatch No. 84 Confidential of August 9th,(*) 1 reported M. Gueshoff's views with regard to Austrian policy and in my despatch No, 86 Confidential of August 28th(*) I informed Sir E. Grey of His Excellency’s wishes in regard to a ‘‘Rapprochement” between Bulgaria & Servia. M. Gueshoff made known his desiro to meet M. Milovanovitch early in September, but it was not found possible to arrange an interview at an earlier date than the one determined. I have reason, however, to believe that as soon as M. Gueshof’s views were known in Belgrade, a quite temporary working arrangement was decided upon between the two Governments to avoid all complications in Albania, with the object of preventing any pretext Jor Austrian intervention and of bringing pressnre on Cettigné to prevent the King of Montenegro repeating his policy of last year. Prior to the meeting of the two Prime Ministers, M. Rizoff, the Bulgarian ‘Minister in Rome, was sent to Belgrade, when on leave, {o discuss matters generally but he was not able to gain the confidence of the Servian Gov{ernmen't. as he is known as a tool of the King of Bulgaria and M. Milovanovitch did not know at that time the views of King Ferdinand as to a “rapprochoment.”” MM. Gueshoff was, however, able to assure the Servian Premier that he had brought much pressure to bear on His Majesty lately in the sense indicated, and that he had been assisted by M. Teodoroff the Minister of Finance. These two both hoped and believed that the King was won over to their way of thinking and that he now saw that a friendly poliev between the Balkan States, favourable to Russia and hence leaning towards the Triple Entente was preferable to the ‘jen de bascule” [is] M[ajesty] was still playing. T have not gathered that this mecting, was in any way inspired hy a hostile focling towards the Ottoman Govfernmen]|, in fact. quite the contrary as far as Servia is concerned, as she has many reusons for remaining on good terms with Turkey. The chief object in view was to limit the action of the Servian and Bulgarian propoganda [ric: propaganda] to certain definite districts, it to be tacitly understood for the future, that, in the event of a break up of European Turkey those districts should fall to the State which had been conducting an active propoganda in them at the time of the catastrophe. The two Prime Ministers decided that all efforts should be used to maintain the ‘status quo'” at the present juncture unless Austria made an advance, especially as Russia had informed both Gov[ernmen]ts that she would not aid any forward movements on the Turkish frontier at the presont time. (2) [Camock MSS., Vol. V of 1911] : ()[v. supra, pp. 407-0, No. 515.] ©) [p. supra, p. 801, No, 517.] [5092] Qu514 This condition, you will notice. the Bulgarian Prime Minister has edhered to in spite of pressure. MM. Milovanoviteh gave ML. Gueshoff to understand that no working arrangement of a permanent character could ever be arrived at between the two Gov[ernmé unless Uskub fell under Servian influence: Servia would also desire the Kitips ‘Monastir line (excluding the latter town), together with Old Servia. The Bulgarian Government have hitherto considered that they have a claim to the Caza of Uskub, together with the town of the same name, the Caza of Velessa, together with the town of Velessa, marked on our maps os Kitipriilii, the Caza of Perlépé, and that portion of the Vilayet of Monastir which includes the Capital of the same name. This portion of European Turkey was understood to be the future lot of Bulgaria at the time of the Treaty of San Stefano. Here lies the bone of contention which has hitherto laggely helped to keep the two countries apart, MM. Gueshoff agreed to cease Bulgarian propoganda in the Cazas of Koumanovo and Uskub—Servia to occupy Uskub when the time for partition came. Bulgaria would have Servia’s consent to occupy Salonica and Monastir. The question of the future of Kitipriilii was left over for further consideration. All to the East of the ‘Uskub-Kitipriili—Monastir line was in the future to be under Bulgarian influence, to a line to be arranged with Greece at a later date. The Prime Minister decided that every effort must be made to exclude both Italy and Austria from all territorial participation when the catastrophe arose, but, and this was made a particular point of by M. Milovanoviteh, no action whatever was to be taken to weaken Turkey :—preferably a weak Turkey to a strong Austria. No advance is to be made by either party without the tacit consent of Russia. ‘M. Gueshoff also spoke in favour of more friendly and closer relations existing between Greece and Servia. He stated that Bulgaria and Greece were originally on very bad terms and no one could have supposed thet their relations could have so rapidly improved. ‘The Balkan States should, he said, work together, in face of Austria, the common enemy. These remarks were ‘sympathetically received. No further negotiations are in progress at the present time, each Prime Minister being satisfied with what has already been done. T consider that the seed of a future entente has been sown. It will not grow on the Bulgarian side unless M. Gueshoft or M. Daneff are in office, or unless serious danger threatens froin the side of Austria. King Ferdinand will remain an unknowr factor until the last minute, ‘Yours sincerely, Il. 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. Sir H. Bas-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey. BO. 44875 /44875/11/7. (Xo. 109.) Sofia, D, November 8, 1911. Sir, R. November 18, 1911. More than a year ago mention was made of the establishment of a Committee for the purpose of bringing about an economic ‘' rapprochement ” between Bulgaria and Servia.(*) The political Press has published from time to time the names of the () [No reference to the establishment of this Committea can he traced in the archives of the Foreign Office.”515 Servian or of the Bulgarian members of the Committeo, presumably with the object of keeping the uames of the initiators of the project before the eyes of the public. But up till now the two halves of the Committee have been unable to arrange -a meeting, some difficulty invariably occurring at the lest moment. A report is now going the round of the Press, and has been confirmed to me by an authoritative source. that a meeting of this almost forgotten Committee is to take place at Sofia on the 7th instant. In giving an assurance that the Servian members of the Committee will be most welcome guests in the Bulgarian capital, the Press here hint that any attempt to bring about the proposed “rapprochement” may not perhaps be received with any great acclamation either in Government circles or at the hands of the publie; though it is admitted that any action tending to promote a friendly feeling between neighbouring peoples is, in itself, a thing mmch to be desired. In principle it would be foolish, if not actually unfriendly, to work against such an understanding: nor indeed does any Bulgarian opposition exist in fact. Nevertheless in Bulgaria there are not a few who point out thet the Servians entered upon the project with all zeal, while in this country on the other hand, a more sober spirit was shown, year-books of statisties were consulted and the action of Servia recalled during the tariff difficulties with Austro-Hungery, and again during the negotiations for a customs union between Servia and Bulgaria. It has been considered well that the truth should be known with regard to the proposed under- standing, end the Bulgarians have come to recognise that Servia might perhaps have deslings with the Committee in which questions of high policy might be involved. ‘he opinion has gained ground that it should be clearly understood at Belgrade that at Sofia there is absolutely no intention of arriving, through the efforts of the Committee, at any but an economic understanding. ‘The chauvinistic aspirations, which are said to fill the heads of so many Servian members of the Committee, would most certainly not be weleomed at Sofia. These views must, it is held here, be fully understood before the meeting of the committee, in order to prevent future disappointment and mutasl recrimination. The general opinion is that the Committee will be more likely to fulfil its task and to attain its objeot if it confines its operations solely and entirely to the foreign trade of the two countries. Copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade. T have, &e. H, 0, BAX-IRONSIDE. Sir H. Baz-lonside to Sir Edward Grey. F.0, 47206/44875/11/7. (No. 118.) Sofia, D. November 14, 1911. Sir, R. November 27, 1911, With reference to my Despatch No. 109 of the 8rd instant,(*) I have tho honour to report that the Serbo-Bulgarian Committee for the establishment of an under- standing between the two countries met at Sofia on the 5th instant.(*) After s statement that matters of high policy would not be discussed, the Committee declared that their object was to study economic questions, to point out their solution, and to foster the relations of the two peoples in order to bring about a more binding “' rapprochement” in economic affairs. @)[n, immediately preceding document.] @) [Thus im original, cp. ummediately preceding document.) [5092] 19 e rc)516 Amongst the objects put forward by the Committee were the following :— To elucidate and facilitate a solution of the questions of Postal, Telegraph, Telephoue, and Railway Tariffs: to facilitate and simplify the Commercial, Customs, and Frontier relations between Bulgaria and Servia: to unify commer- cial legislation, and fiseal law with regard to the enterprise of the two countries, and to arrive at a unity of social legislation and a mutual recognition of the school diplumes of the respective states: further, to atlain a unification of judiciary law, and reciprocal assistance in decisions come to thereunder: and to cultivate a tendency towards a common policy in general, agrarian, and commercial matters. A programme embodying the proposals outlined ahove was adopted by the Committee, who, after declaring that the identic interests of the other Balkan nations imposed similar action on their part, also made a warm appeal to all sincere friends of a Balkan gencral ‘‘ rapprochement” to follow the example set them and to found a similar programme in all the Balkan States. ‘The oficially inspired “* Mir,”” taking the proceedings of the Committes as it's text. sees nothing in the programme which can confliet with the idea revently resuscitated at Constantinople ot a general Balkan Confederation. ‘The point of importance is that both there and here the economic interests of the Balkan peoples must be considered. But from what quarter soever the initiative of such a “rapprochement” may spring, it cannot but be favourably received in Bulgaria, where the belief that the peninsula can eventually beloug to none but Balkan peoples is deeply rooted. On this basis friendship and a good understanding amongst all the minor States in the Near East are both possible and highly desirable. So much for the cryptic comments of the officially inspired Press. Other organs are much more outspoken and less diplomatic in their utterances, The past history of dealings with Servia is quoted as a warning that the present Servian overtures could not be trusted too far. ‘he allusion is, it should perhaps be stated. to the fact that on e past occasion of negotiations for a Customs Agreement between the two countries Servia sought to use the opporlunity to obtain ‘Tariff concessions from Austria, Moreover, it is remembered that when the agreement had been enthusiastically welcomed by Bulgaria, Servia refused at tho last moment to accept Tt is admitted that in itself the idea of an understanding is desirable, but the only condition upon which it seems, in Bulgarian public opinion, possible is that there should he no deep-laid scheme underlying it. Ina word, the Bulgarians are inclined to think that Servia is using the proposed economic "*rajprochement” as a stalking-horse, and that she really harbours ideas of far greater scope. They therefore do not believe that Servia is sincere in her Geclarations and there can be little doubt that Bulgarians on their side are far from sincere in the half-hearted weleome which they have accorded to the , of the Commitee A copy of this despatch will be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade, : have, &e, . H. 0, BAX-IRONSIDE. - . MINUTE. Bulgaria is suspicieus,BIT No. 528. Str F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. F.O. 49411/47882/11/7. (No. 205.) Confidential. Vienna, D. December 3, 1911. Sir, R. December 11, 1911. I have the honour to report that King Ferdinand of Bulgaria has been here and that His Majesty has been received in semi-state by the Emperor. The King has also had a long interview with Count Aehrenthal, which has given rise to much comment, for the antipathy which the latter entertains for the King is well known. ‘There seems to be little doubt that this time King Feidinand has come to Vienna not merely of his own free will, but on @ direct invitation which has been sent to him trom here. What has brought this about and with what object in view Count Aehrenthal should have summoned His Majesty to Vienna, is a question which is much discussed here. A few days ago Count Aehrenthal said to one of the foreign Ambassadors in Vienna that Europe lay exposed to two crises in the immodiate fnture: one was the Near Eastern crisis which might be started at any moment by the Italo-Turkish war, and the second was the antagonism which existed between Great Britain aud Germany which might soon lead to a catastrophe in the West. With regard to the second imminent crisis, Count Aehrenthal evidently intends to do his utmost to prevent the Dual Monarchy from being drawn into it, but as regards the first it is impossible for Austria-Hungary to keep out of il should it arise. Count Achrenthal must therefore prepare his plans for all possible coutingenvies, even though he should prefer—as he does—that it should still be possible to maintain the ‘ status quo’ im the Balkans and Turkish power in an effective condition there. For a long time past Count Aehrenthal has striven to better the relations between Russia and Austria- Tlungary with a view to arriving at an understanding with regard to ther respective interests in the Near East, but although he has rendered these relations normal. he has not succeeded in making them cordial, and the Rassian Government still look upon Count Aehrenthal with a certain amount of mistrust and suspicion. As events in the Near East are not likely 1o wait until Anstro-Russian relations allow of a frank exchange of views with regard to Balkan matters, Count Aehrenthal finds it necessary, I suspect, to take what precautions he can to ensure that whatever happens the interests of the Dual Monarchy shall not be unfavourably affected by it. Ie has therefore summoned King Ferdinand to Vienna to enter into a deal with him as to the immediate future. The moment selected for doing this seems to he a propitious one :—Monsienr Tcharykoif, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. has shown such an exaggerated affection for Turkey that it has created a certain amount of alarm in Bulgaria; moreover, the rumours which are current that he is desirous of negotiating the opening of the Straits o Russian men-of-war, has caused positive alarm in Bulgaria. as it implies in return that Russia is prepared 10 give Turkey a guarentee of the integrity of her dominions. Such a gnarantee would place Russia in direct opposition to the national aspirations of the Bulgarians, and the very rumour that such a guarantee may possibly be given, has cansed Bulgaria fo turn towards Austria as to a welcome friend in adversity. Now this turning of Bulgaria towards Austria suits Count Aehrenthal’s policy very well, and he has received the King with open arms. ‘The policy which Count Aehrenthal has steadily pursued towards Turkey has heen, as is well known, to do nothing which could accelerate @ crisis on the Bosphorus. I think that recent events may have somewhat modified his views. Early in the year, as mentioned in my telegram No. 12, of the 19th February last,(*) ye}f8 emodvond, a the contents ase suficetly indented shove, (F-0. oth /e0e0/518 Count Aehrenthal had expressed himself as thoroughly dissatisfied with the Young ‘Tork régime, and to be looking forward to the prompt suppression of the same by a ‘coup d’étal.” carried ont by Mahmoud Shevket Pasha and the military party. Since that time we have had the Albanian rising and the sharp warning addressed to the Turkish Government by Count Aehrenthal in the “‘Fremdeublait’’ of Tune 8th.(?) T have some reason to believe (hat of late he has been losing confidence in the capacity of the Turkish Commander-in-chief. The war in Tripoli has also helped to make him entertain doubts as to the stability of the Central Government at Constantinople. All this mnst lead him to meditate whether it is not well to be prepared to re-create a state of equilibrium in the Balkans should a crisis arise in which Turkey in Europe would go over board. To bring about such an equilibrim, in the event of a serious crisis arising, it is necessary that Austria and Bulgaria should clearly understand each other and settle definitely what aspirations of the latter Austria can allow to be realized without danger to herself. As is well known the nightmare under which Bulgaria has suffered of late has been the fear that, when she. was engaged in a life and death struggle with Turkey, Austria would push Roumania upon her from behind and so checkmate her. To prevent this King Ferdinand has more than once attempted to negotiate directly with Ronmania to see whether the two countries could not come to an understanding with regard to Macedonia, but every time he has done so he has encouutered the secret opposition of Count Aehrenthal who disliked and distrusted His Majesty. Now that the King has come {o Vienna on an invitation of Count Aehrenthal, it may be taken for certain that this question of the future attitude of Roumania towards Bulgaria will form one of the principal items of their conversations. 1 do not think it probable that Count Aehrenthal is prepared to plan with the King of Bulgaria the downfall of Turkey in Europe. but 1 deem it more than probable that Count Aehrenthal, having lost faith in the stability of the Turkish Empire, and foreseeing a possible crisis in the Near East. may go to the length of saying to the King:—‘ If a crisis should occur in the Near Bast, I will restrain Roumania from attacking you in the rear while you are engaged in your struggle with the Turks. on the understanding that you do not touch Salonika and that you give reasonable territorial compensation to Roumania in the Dobrudja or in the cession of Gilistria. for which I will allow you to compensate yourself at the expense of Servia by seizing the district of Pirot and a portion of Macedonia.” T think it is unfortunate that at this present moment the Russian Government should continue to encourage Servia in her pursnit of an anti-Austrian policy. Tere at the ‘* Ballplatz,’’ I am told, a considerable amount of annoyance has been created by the frankly hostile attitude assumed by the Russian Minister at Belgrade, M. de Hartwig. against Austria, As Russia is not prepared to do anything serious for Servia, it seems a pity that that country, small as she is. should expose herself to the resentment of Austria-ITungary. and that resentment will soon show itself in a very effective way, should o crisis arise in the Near East. by Austria-Hungary opposing any serious increase of Servia’s tervitory at the expense of Turkey, Russia not being prepared to go to war with Austria, and having her attention called to events in China and in Persia. it is not likely that any of the Great Powers will do more than champion the cause of Servia platonically if the division of the Turkish dominions in Europe should become necessary in the near future, In conclusion, I would venture to say that 1 feel sure that Count Aehreuthal has made up his mind how he will act under every probable coutingeney which is likely to arise. Knowing his own mind. being near the field of action. and having the Austro-Iungarian army ready to march, he will occupy a commanding position which will enable him to settle the future destinies of the little Balkan States should Turkish rule in Europe come to an end. Would it not be well for Great Britain, France and Russia to exchange views with regard to these matters, and either come ©) [® supra, pp. 459-60, No. 476.]519 fo terms with Count Achrenthal as to a possible joint action of the Powers in the Balkans in the event of trouble arising there, or to form a plan of action of their own to oppose that which will be pursued by Austria-Hungary in the event of a Near Eastern crisis arising? I have, &e. FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT. MINUTE. Tt would be a mistake for us to take an initiative im opposing Austria in the Dalkens: it is for Russia to make up ber mind as to what she wants and approach us if she wishes to do so. ‘Ti we take an initiative in proposing a Balkan policy to Russia we shall be committed more deeply than it is necessary or wise for us to be committed in Balhan affairs, E.G. No. 529. Sw W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.(*) P.O, 49468/49468/11/37. (No. 66.) Confidential. Sir, Bucharest, December 6, 1911. The recent appointment of General Averesco as Chief of the Staff of the Roumanian Army has caused considerable comment in the press. and in military circles. ‘The General was Minister of War in Monsieur Bratiann's administration; . . . .(°) Seeing that the last-named statesman is today to all intents and purposes the leading spirit of the Cabinet, it is perhaps not unnatural that onlookers should ask themselves what has ‘caused this sudden change in the Conservatives’ estimation of General Averesco. ‘A somewhat circumstantial, though to all appearances quite improbable rumour having reached me from @ military source to the effect that the appointment had been foreed upon the Government by Germany, and that Roumania is making great military preparations in anticipation of what may ocear in the Spring, I took the occasion, yesterday being the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ reception day, to ask His Excellency if Ronmania had lately recerved any disquieting information concerning the outlook in South Eastern Europe, as it had been reported to me thet military preparations are being carried out ona large scale. Monsieur Maioresco replied without a moment's hesitation that J had been misinformed. as Roumania is making no special war preparations, though, as I was anare, the King snd his Government are extremely anxions as to the tun events may take in the Spring, unless the great Powers ean devise some means by which an end may be put to the war between Turkey and Italy. Pointing to the deop snow outside :—'“That.” he said, “is our safeguard for peace in the Balkans for the present, but as long as hostilities continue,” he added, “ Roumania must remain on her guard.” ‘The King, Government, and people are all, he declared, fundamentally pacifically disposed, and trily anxious to maintain the excellent relations now existing with all the neighbouring states, hut all, he asserted with considerable emphasis, are determined to maintain, with force if need be, Roumania’s claims to consideration, should future events result in a groater Bulgaria, a greater Greece, or a greater Servia. We are well satisfied, Ilis Excellency continued, with our present position, and our prosperous economic situation is sufficient guaranteo (%) [A copy of this despatch was sont to the Director of Military Operations. (2)[A sentence of a personal character is here omitted. ‘The ‘last-named statesman” in the next sentence is M. Margbiloman.]520 of our pacific intentions. but we must have our share if smaller nations around us are to acquire aggrandisement at Turkev’s expense. Inspired apparently by something I said as to the confidence that could be placed in his assurances, Monsieur Maioresco suddenly exclaimed :—'‘ Yes. Carp (the Prime Minister) and I are old men. and we believe in complete frankness in Diplomacy.” Speaking with great earnestness he continued, ‘* You have doubtless heard of the agreement supposed to have been made by my predecessor and Monsieur Bratiann with Tw Such an agreement never did, never could and never can exist. Rourania is precluded by her natural position from tying her hands by any such agreement with any Power, quite apart from historical recollections of Turkey's connection with tho united provinces.”” Since seeing Monsieur Maioresco I have received your despatch No. 18 of tho Qnd instant(*) informing me of a report reccived from Ilis Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna of e conversation betweer the French Ambassador and Count Aehrenthal. I would beg to add that the King of Roumania and the Cabinet fully share the anxiety expressed by King Ferdinand as to what may occur mm the Balkans in the Spring, if the-Turco-Italian war is allowed to drag on, or Turkey is seriously erippled. Relations betweon this country and Bulgaria have certainly improved somewhat of late. but the friendly den.onstrations shewn to Monsieur Miamendi, the late Roumanian Minister at Sofia, on his departure from his post, met with but little response in the Press of Bucharest, and provoked little comment in official circles beyond an expression of satisfaction that a Ronmanian Representative had contrived to make himself such a good position. It was even hinted that the inner motive of the demonstrations was home polities. I have, &e. WALTER TOWNLEY. () [Not reproduced. It repeated to Sir W. ‘Townley the contents of Sr F. Cartwright's telegram No. 129 of December 1, 1911. D, 7-10 Pav. R. 9 pw. (FO. 48182/47892/11/7.) The conversation reterred to nbove contained reference to ihc anviety of the King of the Bulgarians lest a dangerous situation should arise in the Balkans if the war continued until the pring.) No. 580. Mr. Lampson to Sir Edward Grey. -O. 51522/51522/11/44. 129.) Sofia, D. December 12, 1911. Sir, R. December 27, 1911. lis Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople having in recent despatches(+) commented upon the idea raised at that capital for a confederation of all the Balkan States, it may not be amiss to give a brief estimate of the reception accorded to the suggestion in Bulgaria. Almost all Bulgarians of weight with whom I have discussed the question. from the Prime Minister downwards, seem agreed that the proposal is in principle an excellent one, and worthy of every enconragement. It is recognised that a loyal confederation of the Balkan States would place the Balkan Peninsula in a position independent of the good-will of any single Great Power, and would greatly improve the economic and political situation of the Balkan peoples generally. Unfortunately, (*) [Im his despatch No, 772, D, October 81, 1911, R. November 6, 1911 (F.0, 43792/49792, 11/44), “and again in his despatch No. 794, D. November 8, 1011, R. November Ta Ont (F.O, '41812/30601/11/44), Sir G. Lowther had ‘mentioned that the Constantinople press was hostile to an alliance with Russia and favoured tho idea of a Balkan federation as ‘the more natural combination and would it realized involve something more than « good understanding with Russia,"]521 however, in practice, certain hard facts must be faced. and Bulgarian Statesmen of the Opposition, together with the Press in general, have expressed themselves on the whole with more force than diplomacy in alluding to certain phases of the question. Throughout the whole volume of public opinion one predominant note has been sounded :—distrust of Turkey and Turkish sinceri It has been felt that the main reason for this sudden desire on the part of the Turke to live in peace and good-will with their Balkan neighbours lies in the ditcult position in which Turkey at present finds herself placed: given that the storm is safely weathered, it is firmly believed that a complete ‘“‘ volte-face ’ would probably follor ‘The matter has been thrashed out from many points of view and it seems quite clear that Bulgaria is not inclined to take up the idea with any seriousness until Tarkey gives more tangible proof of her good faith. $o long as Bulgaria is threatened with a festering sore on her imiuediate frontier. it is considered here a waste of time to indulge in rhetorical rhapsodies over the blessings of a United Balkan Federation. It is pointed ont that, apart from the greatest and most diffienit of all questions—the present state of affairs in Macedonia—there are many other matters in which Turkey might show her goodwill. lt is urged that in none of these pending questions has the Turkish Government taken the hand of friendship proffered by Monsieur Ghéshoff, and signs of restiveness are not wanting at the lack of suecess of the friendly policy of the present Government towards the hereditery enemy and the oppressor of some five centuries. IL is therefore not surprising thet. after ocenpying the prineipal columns of every newspaper for days on end, the matter has becn allowed to drop as unpracticable and not worth the ink expended upon expounding its advantages and disadvantages. ‘Moreover, recent events in Itchib have. for the moment. completely eclipsed all other topics of discussion: and whatever their ultimate result may be, it can be asserted with some confidence that public opinion in Bulgaria will for some time to come be less inclined than ever to put trust in any Turkish advances. It would be a mistake to attach an exaggerated importance to the effect which the latler regrettable incident may have lad upon Monsievr Guéshofi’s position; but at the same time it should not be forgotten that there are many -influential members of the Opposition who are only too ready to take advaulage of any discontent which mey manifest itself in regard to his Turcophil policy. A copy of this despatch will be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. T have, &e. MILES W. LAMPSON. ‘MINUTE A Balkan Federation is as yet very far distant. They distrust not only Turkey but cach other. R. P.M. LM. No, 581. Sir W. Townley to Sr Bdward Grey. F.0. 51669/51669/11/87. (No. 70.) Confidential. Bucharest, D. December 18, 1911. Sir, R. December 27, 1911. I found the Minister for Foreign Affairs rather disturbed this morning in consequence of questions which would appear to have been addressed either to him or to Roumanian representatives abroad respecting the extraordinary military preparations that this country is said to be making. Monsieur Maioresco atated that522 he could not understand how such a belief had become current, and attributed it to the recent meeting of French and Russian diplomatists at Paris, though he was unable to surmise why such a hare should have been started in such circles. His Excellency denied categorically thet there was any foundation whatever for such a supposition, although he confessed that there had been some extra activity at the Roumanian War Office sinee the present Government took office. He said that the late War Minister was a hit slack, and that Monsieur Filipescu has been somewhat of a new broom, partly because it was required of him in consequence of the condition in which he found the Department, and partly because, as a civilian, he is somewhat ansious to impress the military party with his zeal, and to win the confidence of the officers. ‘Monsieur Maioreseo assured me that nothing more had been or was being undertaken than is absolutely necessary for putting the army in proper trim. The resulis of Monsienr Filipesco’s energy had, he said, made themselves apparent at the Autumn Mancuvres. As I reported in my despatch No. 66, Confidential, of the 6th instant,(*) there is certainly a belief that unusual military preparations are being made, and I know that the Roumanian Government are negotiating an order for 100,000,000 ball cartridges. I have asked for the cahier des charges of this order, and have been promised the same as soon as it can be copied. T took the occasion to ask Monsieur Maioresco if he knew what had been the object of the King of Bulgaria’s recent visit to Vienna, His Excellency laughed and said that he did not, and that he did not believe Ilis Majesty’s own Ministers knew. then said, as it seemed to me that it might be interesting to know the Minister’s views, that a rumour had reached me that King Ferdinand had approached Count Aehrenthal with a view to ascertaining how Austria would look upon an under- standing between this conntry and Bulgaria, and whether euch an arrangement would he likely to receive Austrian support. Monsieur Maioresco replied that it was quite possible that King Ferdinand might have acted in this manner, but that there had been absolutely no exchange of views between the two Governments nor indeed, had the subject been broached to him officially. lis Excellency added that Mr. Bourehier, of the “‘ Times,”’ who is a strong advocate of a Bulgo-Ronmanian understanding. had spoken to him on the subject. and had assured him that the Bulgarians would be ready to make such territorial concessions in the Silistria district as would secure to Roumania an easily defensible frontier on that side as the basis of an understanding. Pressed for his authorities, Mr. Bourchier could only assert that he knew that many Bulgarian statesmen held these views. Iardly sufficient authority, the Minister said, on which to open negotiations of such a serious nature. Reverting to King Ferdinand’s it to Vienna, Monsieur Maioresco said that it was quite possible that that astute politician had purposely let it be surmised there that the idea of a Bulgo-Roumanian understanding was on foot. His Majesty might very likely wish that a rumour to that effect should reach Constantinople. and 0 strengthen his hands in his dealings with the Turkish Government. Roumania, Monsieur Maioresco added. in conclusion, will make no arrangement with Bulgaria or with Turkey. Her position forces her to keep her hands quite unfettered. The King and his Government fear greatly what may happen in the spring, and Roumania must be prepared for all eventualities. It is earnestly hoped hero that the great Powers of Europe may before the end of the winter agree upon some means of bringing the war between Turkey and Italy to an end. Unless all are agreed, His Excellency said, the Turks are sure to have recourse to their classical policy of playing off one group of Powers against the other. Thave, &. WALTER TOWNLEY. (©) [v. supra, pp. 519-20, No. 529.]528 No, 582. Lord Granville to Sir Edwaid Grey. ¥.0. 51557/30691/11/44. (No. 445.) Berlin, D. December 21, 1911. Sir, R. December 27, 1911. The “Tageblatt'” reproduced last night a report printed in the “*Times,"’ to the effect that a train-load of war material from Germany had reached the Turkish frontier at Zibeftehe, and had there been taken over by ‘Turkish officials. An editorial comment on this report stated that the attempt {o arouse feeling in Italy against Germany by means of this report was too obvions {o achieve its purpose. If there was any truth at all in the report, it could only at the most be a question of medical supplies imported from Germany by ‘Turkey or placed at her disposal by the Red Cross Society. The “ Kreuz-Zcitung"’ this morning expresses greet indignation at the publica- tion of the report. which it describes as pure gossip. Sufficient proof of the strict neutrality of Germany was, it says, furnished by the fact that her vorrect attitude had called forth violent abuse both from Italy afl Turkey. The “‘Kélnische Zeitung” says it may be that consignments of war material produced in private factories have been forwarded throngh Servia. This would, however, in no way infringe the provisions of §7 of the Hague Convention, which specifically permits the supply of war material by neutral States to belligerents. But it adds, that it is quite untrue that the Turkish Ambassador had. as alleged by the “Times,”” thanked the Emperor for this proof of Germany's friendship. T have, de. GRANVILLE, MINUTE. Mr. Lampson reported that the story is true() but it is not a violation of neutrality, eo that the German newspapers have cxeited themselves unnecessarily. at () [Mr. Lampson reported in his telegram No. 42 of December 20. D. 9 paat., R. Decomber 21. 8 Ax, that a train contsinmg munitions of war was believed to have ezossed the frontier on December 13, (F.O. 51123/30001/11/44.)] Xo. 588. Mr, Barclay to Sir Edvard Grey.) F.0. 51675/51675/11/89. (No. 81.) Belgrade, D. December 21, 1911. Sir, R. December 27, 1911. ‘The general debate on the Budget and the special debate on the estimates of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs furnished two occasions last week for Monsieur Milovano- vitch (0 make a declaration of the present foreign policy of Servia. On the first occasion on the 1th instant, His Excellency stated that Servia was not bound to Russia and the ‘Triple Entente as had been said in some quarters, still less could Servia bind herself to Austria and the Triple Alliance. Both these groupings of the Great Powers had much more weighty problems to elucidate just now than the Balkan problem, Servia must not imagine that she was the centre point of Europe's interest. That interest had its limits. Servia's duty was, by @)[A copy of this despatch was sent to the Director of Militery Operations ]524 showing herself capable of defending her independence, to prove herself a roliable factor in the balance of power in Eastern Europe. ‘That was the basis of her foreign policy. The most important object now for the Balkan peoples was to draw nearer to one another and to aim at complete solidarity. . If this wero attained and the future destinies of the Balkan Stetes resied in their own handy then would Servia be able, however difficult and critical tho situation might be at present for the Balkan peoples. [to] look at the future with full confidence, Tle was hopeful that the formnla the Balkans to the Balkan peoples would some day be universally recognised. On the 15th instaut Monsieur Milovanovitch, in reply to an attack made upon him by the leader of the Progressists, who blamed the Servian Government for their passive attitude in the face of events in the Turkish Empizo as compared with the activity and energy displeyed by Bulgaria and Greece, made the statement that the general situation was 60 serious that no one could tell what would happen in the Spring. On that account, His Excellency wont on, Servia as well as Bulgaria and Greece must be prudent. As a matter of fact Bulgaria and Greece had shown great reserve as regards revent events in Macedonia and Crote respectively. .An appeal to Europe at the present moment could but entail certain dangers. ‘Tt seemed most desirable for the Balkan States that the Powers should not mix themselves up in Balkau affairs, From the above, it will be seen that the Servian Government realise fully that the future of Servie is linked to that of the other Balkan States, and consequently that she must drew closer to them and nol pursue an independent policy leaning either on Russia or on Austria. ‘As to Monsieur Milovanovitch’s gloomy view of the general situation, I took an opportunity to ask the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether His Excellency had any special reasons for making such a statement. Monsieur Yovanovitch teplied that recent cvents in Macedonia, the reinforcements and redistribution of Turkish troops in the Sendjak. the continuons inflow of arms through Montenegro to arm the Albanians, and the perturbed state of the political atmosphere in general justified Monsieur Milovanovitch’s opinion that anything might happen in the Spring. T have, &. COLVILLE BARCLAY. MINUTE. Penultimate para. Yes, but no one seems particularly anxious to draw nearer to Servia. Ta faut i the Bulkan penit-ule no one secs anaious to draw nearer to anyone—at least in a fnendly manner. RG. V. ‘Tan{uary] 6, [1912]. RPM HN. LM. Sir IL. Bax-Ironside to Sir Eduard Grey.(*) . 580/580/19/7. . 188.) Confidential, Sofia, D. December 28, 1911. 72 R. January 4, 1912. With reference to my despatch No. 88, Very Confidential of August Stst(2) last, I have the honour to enclose herewith a despatch which has been addressed to ir, ©) [A copy of this despatch was sent to the War Offce.] () [v. eupra, pp. 502-3, No, 518.)525 me by Lieut{enant]-Colfonel] Lyon, R.A., Military Attaché to His Majesty’s Legation, respecting the question of the conclusion of a secret miliary convention between the Brigerian and Russian Governments. Colonel Lyon, who has discussed the matter with Major Tabouis, the French Military Attaché, has come to the conclusion that the evidence respecting the negotiations on this subject is not very substantial. I gather however from a confidential souree that during both the late spring and early summer General Fitcheff, the Chief of the General Staff, and Colonel Romanowsky. the Russian Military Agent. worked together to promote a scheme regarding military assistance to be given by Russia in the event of wat between Bulgaria and Turkey. Were hostilities to brewk out, the Bulgarian coast would be at the merey of the Turkish Navy, and the region round Bourgas would be one of the most vulnerable poinis open to Turkish attack. ence the anxiety shown by the Bulgarian Headquarter Staff for some protection in the case of an advance of the Bulgarian Army southwards. On his return from St. Petersburg, on the conclusion of the Russian Mancenvres. General Fitcheff appears to have changed his views respecting the necessity of coming to an arrangement with Tussia. Some say that he was not impressed with existing Russian military conditions; others that he has been won over by Austria, and certain events that have occurred this autumn, such as the arrival in Sofa of Austrian Staff Officers, who were entertained hy the Bulgarian General Staff. give some colour to such a supposition. The real cause in my opinion is, however, the attitude of His Majesty King Ferdinand, as His Majesty prefers to continue his ‘jeu de bascule” under present conditions, and is unwilling to decidedly throw in his lot with either Russia or Austria. T am further strengthened in this conclusion by the fact that His Majesty has endcavonred to sound certain members of the Diplomatic Corps as to Colonel Romanofsky’s character and capacity. and has even gone so far as to pronounce him as somewhat too energetie and ‘‘remuant."’ Colonel Romauofsky is certainly anxious to sign some mililary agreement with Bulgaria which would render Russian action easier in the case of an outhreak of a war between Russia and Turkey, bat hitherto his endeavours have not been successful. T have, &e. H, 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. Enclosure in No. 534. Lreutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir IL, Buz-lonside.(') Sir, Sofia, December _, 1911.(4) 1 have only this week had an opportunity of talking with Major Tabonis, tho French military attaché here, on the subject of the negotiations that you reported to the Foreign Office as having recently taken place between the Bulgarian and Russian Governments, regarding military assistance to be given by Russia in the event of war between Bulgaria and Turkey, 2 The evidonce of these negotiations is uot very substantial. M, Paleologue. the French Minister. heard by chance that the Bulgarian Government was discussing direet with the Russion War Office, through the Russian military agent here, the question of how such assistance might best be given. M. Paleclogue drew the altention of Major Tabouis to what he had heard, and the latter considered that various circumstances pointed to the fact that the Bulgarian military authorities were paying unusual attention to the rather desolate country round Bourgas. One of the ablest of the younger officers of the general staff recently spent some weeks () [The text given above is printed trom the copy in the Confidentiat Print, as the original was sent to the War Office.] (* [Thus in original.]526 in that country, and subsequently a staff ride was held by the chief of the general staff in the same locality. In addition to this. General Fitcheff, who had arranged to attend the French mancuvres, changed his mind four days before he should have left for Paris, and went to the Russian mancuvres instead. 8. 1 am of the opinion that the above facts do not point to an intention to conclude a military convention between the two vountries, but indicate rather that the Bulgarian Government recognises that in certain eventuulilies it might be desirable to seek the aid of a Russian force, and that in such a case, it might be convenient for this force to land at Bourgas. . 4, An agreement with Russia that she should eend an army to assist Bulgaria in the event of the latter being at war with Turkey would be estremely unpopular here. The most that is desired is that, by threatening the frontier of Moldavia, Russia will keep Roumania in check. ‘ Tam, é&c. F. LYON. No. 338 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.(*) F.O, 285, 19/12/44. (No. 1.) Sir. Foreign Office, January 8, 1912, ‘The Servian Chergé a’Affaires called on the 29th ultimo, and spoke at length about Austrian intrigues in Albania, &e, Tle stated that the troops on the frontier of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar had been drilled in the Jast three months; that the Servian Gfovernmen]t knew that Austrian agents were persuading Albanians to petition the Austrian Gfovernmen]t to protect them: that the King of Montenegro had told the Russian Minister at Cettinjé that he knew that Austria had decided to annex the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar in January, and had obtained the consent of Itely, Germany, and Turkey to this course. [I am, &c. E. GREY.] (2) {This despatch was repeated to St, Petersburgh (No. 4). A copy was sent to the Ditector of Military Operations. } (2) (As atafted originally, this despatch forwed part of a minute addteseed to Sir Edward Grey by Mr, Mallet. After the two paragraplis given above the minute continued as tollows This ceoms improbable but evidenes is accumulating that Ausiria is doing something. Mr. Lampson at Sofia is quite convinced on the subject. Wo might ask ovr consul at Serajevo whether it is true that the Austrian forces in Bosnia have been inrgely augmented lately [v. infra, Ed. note] und copies of the despatch recording this Gntersew should be set to St Beteeburg and Constantinople, ome and Bein, Sir G. Duchanan instructed to enquire whether the story of the King of Montenegro's conversation is accurate. [v. immediately succeeding document.] a Your telegram of to-day will open this subject. ‘The only way of avoiding repetition of the Bosnian crisis is an understanding between Austria and Huagis, ”' * repetition of L. M. Dec. 29. E.G] [ED, NOTE—Sir Edward Grey's telecram to Consul Freeman of January 3 asked if there was "any information to the effect that Austrian troops in Bosnia have been largely increased lately.” “(F.O. 285/10'12/44.) A eopy was sent to Vieuna, and Mr. Russell telegiaphed in reply on the Jth that Consul Freeman was on leave, but that on the point raised the military attaché ‘st Vienna Lad no reason to alter the opinion ‘proviously expressed. ‘This was to the effect that hs had no information to suggest an incento of ‘oops in Bosnia, and, an ofa denial trom the fnister of War. (Enclosure in despatch from Mr. 'T. Russell, 'No. 218 of F.0, 61616/48015/11/8.)] esB27 No. 586. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.) P.O. 285/19/12/44. Foreign Office, January 8, 1912. I transmit to you a copy of a despatch to H[is] Mfajesty’s) Minister at Belgrade,(*) recording a statement made by the Servian Cargé d’Afinires respecting the alleged intention of Austria-Hungary to annex the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar at an early date. I request Y[our] E[scellency] to enquire from the Russian M{inister for] Fforeign] A[fiairs] if the King of Montenegro actually did use to the Russian Minister at Cettinjé the language stated. [I am, &. E. GREY.] (*) [This despatch was repeated to Rome (No. 6); to Vienna (No. 2); to Berlin (No. 7); tv Constantinople (No. 6). A copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations.) @)[v. ianmediately preceding doeument.] No. 587 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. Private.(*) My dear Bertie, Foreign Office, January 9, 1912. I understand the sensitiveness of de Selves about an understanding between Italy, Russia and Austria respecting the Balkans, reterred to in the last paragraph of your despatch number : 8, of the 8rd instant -(?) but I am not sure that de Selves is right. Tp to the time of Iswolsky’s quarrel with Aehrenthal, there was @ working agreement between Russia and Austria about the Balkans. It did not produce a * rapprochement "” between Germany and Russia, and it did not impair the relations between France and Russia. I do not see why an agrcement should do so in the future, T can understand a dislike on the part of Germany to an understanding between Russia and Austria; for, if Austria was sure of being able to avoid a quarrel with Russia, she would be more independent of Germany than she now is. What makes me wish for a working understanding between Russia and Austria is that a war between them would be very inconvenient. I do not think that we could take part in it, and intervene on the Russian side in a Balkan war; and yet our abstention would prove a danger to the maintenance of the present grouping of the Enropean Powers. I do not think that France would like to see a war between Russia and Austria. On the whole, it seems to me that, unless France and we were prepared to go to war on behalf of Russia, the danger of upsetting the present grouping of the Powers would be far greater if Russia became invoived in a war with Austria than if she came to a working agreement with that country. Of course, I cannot actively promote an agreement between Russia and Austria against the wishes of France; and I do not know that any active attempt by me to promote such an agreement would have the result intended. An agreement is more likely to come about if we do not mix ourselves in the matter. This makes () [Grey MSS., Vol. 14.] €) [2. supra, pp. 356-7, No. 855.]528 the question rather academic as far as I am conecined; but I think it worth while to tell you why I doubt whether de Selves 1s right in bis view. ‘Y[ou]rs sincerely, E. G[REY]. Since I wrote this de Selves has resigned, but I seud it as his resignation doesn’t affect the merits of the question. I am very sorry he has gone for I had a very favourable impression of his personelity and character. E.G. No. 538. Sir @. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.(?) F.0. 1898/19/12/14. (No. 10.) St. Petersburgh, D. January 10. 1912. Sir, R. January 15. W912. In reply to the enquiries which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Aflairs to-day, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your despatch No. 4 (285/12) of the 8rd instant.(?) His Fxcellency informed me that it was quite true that the King of Montenegro had told the Russian Minister at Cettinjé that he knew that Austria had decided to annex the Sanjak in Jannary and had obtained the consent of Germany. Italy and Turkey to this course. Ie did not, however. himself believe that this was the case, as it would mean that Austria was prepared to raise general conflagration in the Balkans. Reports had. [is Excellency continued, reached him of large reinforcements having been sent to the troops stationed near the frontier and of the ordinary railway trafic having been suspended in order to facilitate the passage of military trains. The Austrian Ambassador, to whom he had spoken on the subject, had given both those reports a categorical denial. Count Thurn bad explained that it was true that the ordinary railway traffic had been temporarily dislocated, but that this was due to the fact that the IWungarians had insisted on having special railway facilities granted them for the transport oi their grain after the last harvest. As regarded the strengthening of the trontier troops, Count Thnrn had stated that all that had been done was to bring the regiments up to their proper strength, and that this measure had not heen contined to the frontier districts but had been equally taken in the interior in the cases of regiments which were below that strength. Monsieur Sazonow said that he was inclined to believe that Count Aehrenthal was not contemplating any aggressivo action, but that he wished to be ready to mect all possible cventualities. I said that this view was shared by Ilis Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. and enquired whether his Excellency had heard anything of what took place at the reveut interview which Count Aelirenthal had had with the King of Bulgaria. fis Excellency replied that according to the acecunt which hed reached him Count Aehrenthal had assured the King that Austria had no intention of ombarking on a policy of adventure, and had impressed on Ilis Majesty the necessity of Tis abstaining from porsuing such a poliey. ‘This adviee, Monsiour Sazonow remarked, was quite superfluous as he did not believe that King Ferdinand would ever have the couruge fo adopt an aggressive policy. {Te had also heard a report, which had been subsequently contradicted. that Count Achrenthal hed recommended King Ferdinand to cultivate friendly relations with Roumania. This also was rather curious advice for an Austrian Minister to give His Majesty: and His Excellency then asked whether ()[This document is marked ‘Seen at Berlin.""] @)[v. supra, p. 527, No. 586.)829 1 thought that Roumania had contracted any cugagemeut with Austria-Hungary with regard to Bulgaria, I replied that when I was at Sofia King Ferdinand had himself told me that the King of Roumania had once warned him that, shonld the Bulgarian army cross the BRhodopes, the Roumanian army would be mobilised at Silistria. Roumenia was apparently determined to obtain some territorial commponsation on the side of the Pobrudja, should Bulgaria aequiro an accession of territory in Macedonia: and in the ovent of a Tureo-Bulgarian war Ronmania would. uo doubt. threaten the rear of the Bulgarian army unless she was held in check by Russia. Whether she had ever given Austria an engagement to the above effect I could not say; but it was gencrally believed in Bulgaria that @ military convention existed between her and that Empire. ‘Monsieur Sazonow observed that he also believed in the existence of such convention ; and it would he interesting to know whether it honnd Austria to intervene in the event of Russia taking military measures to restrain Ronmania from an attack on Bulgaria. 1 replied that I thought it most probable that Russian intervention would lead to Austrian intervention, I have. &e. GEORGE W. BUCHANAN, MINUTE We have en occasion beon ontogorically a-cured by tho Roumanians that thoro is no ecnvention between Austiia and Rournania—and personally T do hot believe that one exists—though Roumania hitherto has let it be clearly understocd what her attitude would be if Bulgaria mobilized. ‘The interesting pomt to accertain is whether this attitude 1 under provess of being modified. for considarations—most probably to my mind sue is the caso.(4) ALN. re @) Rumania signed four treatios with Austsia-Hungary. The first was on October 30, 1883, to which Germany acceded on the same date and Italy on ax 15, 1868. The texts of all these are in Pribram, Vol. I. pp. 78-89, 104-83. ‘Tho fourth teaty was signed on February 6, 1019, Gennany acceding on February 26 and Italy on March 5.] . No. 589. Sir H. Bar-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey. F.0. 2825/2081/12/44. 0. 8.) Confidential. Sofie, D. January 15, 1912. Sir, R. January 22. 1912. I have read with interest Sir F. Cartwright’s despatch to you No, 205, Confidential, of the 5th ultimo.) in the Print Sections. This despatch opens up questions which so vitally affect the Balkan States, and Ilis Majesty’s Ambassador touches on so many matters involving the future destiny of the Near ast, that I venture to make the following observations upon it. ‘As you are aware, I have myself hoard from Monsieur Gueshoff, thus confirming sir F. Cartwright’s information, that the King of Bulgaria was direetly invited by the Emperor of Austria, af tho instigation of Count Achrenthel, to visit Vienna. On receiving this invitation, His Majesty telegraphed direct from Ebenthal, where he was then staying, to the President of the Council. asking him whether ho saw any objection. in view of the existing circumstances, to the visil, Monsieur Gueshoft replied that he saw no objection. but it is certain that he was much preoccupied and anxious until King Ferdinand informed him of the result, when the effect was tranquillizing. : His Majesty, on his return to this Capital, discussed his interview with Count Aebrenthal at length, both with Monsiour Gueshoff and Monsieur Danoff; he informed these two statesmen that Count Achrenthal was much preoccupied with the political situation of the Dual Monarchy in view of the immediate difficulties of the Near () [p. eupra, pp. 517-9, No. 528.] [5092] 2m: 580 Eastern problem, and that he personally had arrived at the conclusion that Count Aebrenthal was very anxious for a “rapprochement” with Russia. Tlis Majesty added that. while Count Achronthal had shown a yery friendly disposition towards Bulgaria,, le had put forvard no definite proposition which could be regarded as likely to satisfy Bulgarian aspirations? Tt is clear that, were the policy above alluded to successful, it would be a great blow both to King Ferdinand personally, and the Buigarian hopes in general; the favourite ‘jon de hascule ” of Tlis Majesty would of necessity cease, as the limitations of a greater Bulgaria would donbiless be fixed by Russia and Austria. Count Achrenthal’s programme of a large autonomous Albania. which has become known in the conrse of the last few months, has tended to make Austria’s position a lonely one. A large Albania, comprising the major portion of the three vilayets, would not be agreeable either to Bulgaria. Servia, or Greece: this ia apparent by Count Aebrenthal’s failure to gain over partisens for his programme both in Sofia and Athens, to which capitals he sent agents last year. As tar as one can judge, it seoms' that Austria-Hungary cannot directly hope tor any effective support from Russia or Germany, either for the creation of an autonomous Albania or for assistance in carrying out an active Balkan policy. It was reported hy Ilis Majesty's Ambassador in Vienna to you in the course of the late Albanian troubles that the Austro-Hungarian Government Were not satisfied with utterances from Germany to the effect that that Empire limited itself solely to an approval of an amelioration of economic and financial conditions in the European portion of the Ottoman Empire. It has also been alleged—and, I believe, with truth—that the German Chancellor gave Monsieur Sazonoff to understand at Potsdam(*) that his Goverament would not approve of an active Anstro-Iwngarian policy in the Balkans. Count Aehrenthal. doubtless taking all these circumstances into consideration, was anxious to gain over King Ferdinand in favonr of Austria. promising him his reward as reported by Sir F. Cartwright, but he was not successful. ‘The King, whilst constitutionally unwilling to arrive at important decisions, is undoubtedly drawn tovards Russia. ‘The Orthodox religion, the atiinities of race and Tanguage, together with gratitude for aid in attaining their independence, have mado the nation very favourably disposed towards that Empire, and His Majesty with his great astateness. wel) knows that, whatever his personal predilections may be, he would risk both his own position and that of the dynasty by coming to an arrangement with Austria for the future partition of Macedonia without first obtaining Russia's consent. ‘As regards the rewards said to have been offered to the King, Tis Majesty would prefer that the guarantees against Ronmania should come from the Russian rather than from the Austrian side: further Ilis Majesty’s views. together with those of his Government, are at the present time favourably disposed towards Servia, and tho oecupation of a Servian province. said to have been proposed as a sop to Bulgarian aspirations elsewhere. would not accord with the views which exist here, at the present time, towards that country. Future events in the Balkans may. and in my humble opinion are likely to eanse the relations between these two states {o become more cordial. The greatest obstacle to an arrangement, viz :—{he limitation of the respective spheres of influence of the two countries in Macedonia. has. as you, Sir. are anare. been already largely overcome. The attitnde of Roumania mnst, it wonld appeor, eventually change when she finds herself face to face with Serho-Bulgarian solidarity. whereas at the present time the relations between these two states are merely correct. One reason for such a change on the part of Roumania will be the action of Russia, who will use all her influence at Bucharest to force Roumania to adopt a neutral policy, which should be the more easy as the latter country would not then have to fear an aggrandisement (7) (Lhe meeting at Potsdam will be referred to in a later volume.]581 of Bulgaria alone, but she would find in the future aggrandisement of Servia a guarantee of the equilibrium of the Balkan States. As far as can be gathered bere, the Ambassador’s remarks respecting the relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary are eutively aceurate. {t does not appear that an entente could be arrived at except under conditions which Austria would be unlikely to agree to. She would have to cease from her constant anti- Bussian agitation in Galicia, (proots of which can daily be gathered from the columns of the entire Slav Press). She would have to cease from intriguing in Balkan affairs, both in Albania, Servia, Macedonia, and, to a smaller extent, in this country. It is evident (hat at the present time Germany is exercising consi‘lerable influence in the direction of an Austro-Russian understanding. Her efforts in this direction can be perceived both in Petersburg and Belgrade, but hitherto sho has met with no suecess. This policy is most probably not due to fondness either for Russia or Austria, but because if successful it would be of great help in maintaining the present *‘ status quo” in the Ottoman Empire. The rapid weakening of the Young Turk Party must be viewed with deep concern by all who are interested in the Near Eastern question. How much more therefore by Count Aehrenthal, whose political position would be seriously imperilled by any change? Whilst agreeing thus in the main with the views expressed by Sir F. Cartwright, I would respectfully submit a doubt as to the views he has expressed as to the policy of Russi: In the latter portion of the penultimate paragraph of his despatch, the Ambassador states that ‘ Russia not being prepared to go to war with Austria, and having her attention called to events in Persia and China, it is not likely that any of the Great Powers will do more than champion the cause of Servia platonically, if the division of the provinces of Turkey in Europe should become necessary in the near future.’” Russia's differences with Persia can be settled with the consent of Great Britain only, and if force has unfortunately to be used by her in Northern Persia, the employment of a very few thousand men is all that will be found necessary. Russia’s troubles in China, although more extensive, are, if she is only successful in adopting a conciliatory policy towards Japan, of a comparatively slight nature. In the case of the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, she can, and doubtless would, console herself either by the annexation of Upper Mongolia, or by the employment of that province as a buffer state, and should she confine herself to such a policy, no other Power is likely to say her nay. But I would most respectfully submit that Russia's Interests in the Balkans are to her of a more serious and urgent nature than her interests in more distant portions of the world. Should she fall from her present position as the protector and defender of the Slav race, and allow Austria to usurp the functions which she herself is now exercising, she would have to submit to a total absorption of Servia in the Austrian Empire, to an oceupation of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, to tho incorporation of an autonomous Albania, and to the eventual descent of Austria to Salonica, with all the yesulting consequences. ‘he Dual Monarchy would evolve into a Triple Monarchy, in which the Serb element would play a conspicuons part, and Austria's position would be supreme in the Near East, to the eutire detriment of the Muscovite Empire. In support of my contention thal Russia will not stand by with folded hands were a catastrophe to arise, I have become aware that the Russian Minister in this Capital has quite recently entered into a correspondence with his Government as to the necessity of preparing immediate plans in view of future trouble. ‘When the Russian policy is evolved, it will presumably be made known to the other members of the Triple Entente from headquarters. No doubt Monsieur de Hartwig’s hostile attitude at Belgrade causes annoyance at the Ballplatz, but it appears to me a sign that Russia will uot leave Servia in the lureh. but will be prepared, when the necessity arises. to give her material aid to maintain her threatened independence. [5092] 22582 L have heard from a certain source that Servia has received the assurances of the Emperor of Russia that she need be under no anxiety as to her future, as Russia would protect her both materially and effectively agaiust Austrian aggression. Such promises were given to Servia first in March 1910,(*) during the visit of the King of Servia to Petersburg, and secondly last year on the oveasion of the marriage of Prineoss Helena. It’ seeins highly probable that similar assnrances were given to Sorvia hy France, namely that she would use her influence in support of Busgin’s policy, if became necessary, on the late visit of the Servian Monarch to Paris. ‘The recent annexation of Bosnia and Ierzegovina, placing as it docs so many members of the Slav xace undex the dominion of the Dual Monarchy, was a blow to Russia’s pride and prestige. and it is one amongst other and stronger reasons for rendering an Enteute between these Powers extremely difficult. It is searcely probable that Russia would view a further advance without taking up arins in response to the appeal of her corcligionists. ‘A copy of this despatch will be sent to lis Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and Constantinople. T have, &e. 1. 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. MINUTE. Sir I. Bax-Ironside touches on a very large number of questions rome of the more important conclusions of Siv F. Cartwright in a very Ufis] Elxccllency | wrote last December (No. 40441 annexed).(‘) ‘The illness o: Count Aebrenthal has altered tho situation, introducing a further element of uncertainty, since theso despatches were written. Tt scems to me that where Sir H. Bax-Ironside differs from Sir F. Cartwright for the most part the opinions expressed by the Iatler aro mote likely to prove correct. Very much of what Sir H. Bux-Ironside writes is the purest speculation: “Thus, what have we to show that the political position of Count Achrenthal would be seriously imperilled by any change such as the weakening of the Young Tuk party? Hud Count Aclrenthal lived end continued in good health.(®) probably few statesmen would havo been mete capable to deal adroitly and to the adventage of Austria with on altered situation in Turkey. ‘Then again Sir H. Bne-Tronside assumes that Itusian attention cannot be to auy great extent diverted from the Balkans to Northern Persia, beause, ‘if she has to use force there, ‘the employment of a very fow thousaud men 1s all that will be found necessary.” ‘This is a bold assumption: if Russia cconpies Nforth} Persia more than temporarily she will not impiobably como into conflict with Turkey, who will consider her eactern provinees menaced. Iv is not unlikely that Turkey has moved forward on the frontier to improve her strategic position in the event of Russia coming further south. ‘The third paragraph fiom tho end is interesting but it scems hardly probable that the Emperor of Russia can have given such ascuranees, which, from a military pot of view, would be hard to fulfil. Tow could Russia defend Sortin, so eldse to Austria and so far from Russia, agulast Suutrien aggresdon? ; Jur information is that Austria has beon drawing closer of late to Montenegro and Bulgaria, but there has been little improvement in Austro-Servian relations. a : and he disagrees with teresting despatch which ALP. Tonfuae}y 29, 1912. a enh RPM. Eo. () (Tor the visit of Peter to St. Petersburgh in March 1910. r. supra, pp. 141-62, Sos, 183-49, passim. \ semiotic! communiqué made to the Ttussian press at the’ ond of the visit promised the active mor! support of Russia to Seria in maintaining pence vith Turkev Fulgaria and other naghbomme States. (ep. Sit T. Whitchead’s despatch No. 24, D. March 29° 1010, R. April “i 1910. F.0, 971/982." 11363/9204/11/39.) ep. also infra, p. #43. No. 850, and p. 353, No. 558, ° (fo. supra, pp. avr, No, 598.] () [The phraseology here is curious. Count von Achrenthal died on February 17, 101 (, infra, p. 543, No. 551). A possible explanation is thet the minute is wrongly dated.’ Tt i. typed on the jacket of the paper, even the signature and date being in typescript. ‘The initials ce a4 ‘Nicolson, Mr. Maxwell, and Sir Edward Grey are, however, written below in their oun ml583 No. 540. Mr. Barclay to Sir Eduard Grey.(+) F.0, 2914/19/12/44. No. 2.) Confidential. Belgiade, D. January 16, 1912. Sir, TR. January 22, 1912. I took an opportunity to-day of questioning the Minister of Fureign Affairs on the subject of the alleged Austrian intrigues in Albania, and on the general political outlook in these parts. M. Milovanovitch declared that there was no doubt whatever but that a regular campaign was being pursued by Austria-Hungary in Albania. where they were omploying agents to endeavour io persuade the people to petition Austria-Hungary for protection against the Trwks. ‘The policy of the Dual Monarchy, Ilis- Excellency went on, in encoureging an Albanian movement was simply fo create another element of discord in the Balkans, so as to give herself yet another excnse for intervention in the peninsula. There had never been an Albanian Nation, like a Servian, a Bulgarian or a Civeek Nation. ‘The Albanians, divided up as they were by their different religious creeds and without any past history or traditions, except brigandage, did not possess the elements essential for the life of a nation. Were by chance autonomy granted to them, discord would at once reign and the reeult would be an appeal to Austria, their maker. Any encouragement, therefore, given from ovtside to Albanianism was merely playing into the hands of Austria, Large quantities of arms and ammunition had of late been smuggled into Albania through Montenegro and the population was far better armed now than before their disarmament. In reply to my enquiry as (o whether he thought that Austria meant business in the spring, lis Excellency replied that of course it was impossible to foretell; it would dopend on a‘variety of cirenmstances, chiefly on the condition of Turkey's internal policy, and her attitude in Macedonia and in Albania. One of the circumstances which aight tempt Austria was the fact that Russia was occupied elsewhere. in Persia and China. ‘The visit of King Ferdinand to Vienna, whateyer may have been its outcome, was also an ominous sign which could not be ignored. One thing was certain and that was that the Servian Government knew for a fact that the Austrian divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina had Leen brought up to their full complement and that all arrangements preparatory to mobilisation had been made so thet, when the order should be given, the troops could be ready for campaign within a week. As an instance of the preparations made, M. Milovanovi(ch told me that he had had in his own hands one of the originals of a circular addressed to all the medical nen in Agram, ordering them to report themselves to the Military Authorities and stating the terms upon which their services would be required in the event of war, the amonnt of their pay, (20 Kronen a day). the amount of pension for their family in case of death. &. T then asked M. Milovanovitch what Servia’s altitude would be in case Anshia reoceupied the Sandjak. Ie replicd that Servia could not possibly look on with her arms folded, she would also have to move forward into the Sandjak; there were points where the Austrian troops would arrive first, but there were others also where the Yervien troops could be first. Tt was a matter of life end death to them: if the Austrians once got down into the valley of Kossovo, Servia might just as well throw up the sponge and go over bag and baggage into the Anstrian camp. It would be useless to go on strugeling aficr that and Sevia might as well be incorporated into the Dual Monarchy where, added to the Slav element already existing, they would form a block of some 8 or 9 millions. In reply to my question as to whether they hed not come to some arrangement with Bulgaria and Montenegro to face eventualities. he shrugged his shonlders, and said that Buigeria seemed to be in Austria's pocket as well as Montenegro, and (*) [A copy of this despatch was sent to the Director of Miltary Operatic ns.]534 besides it was impossible to attempt dealings with that “royal pignou/,” King Nicholas. ATis Excelleney went on to say that as the Triple Hntente had been able to keep Germany out of Morocco by their firm attitude, so they ought to do the same to keep Austria out of the Sandjak: they could moreover count upon Italy's support. It was perfectly clear that once more established in the Sandjak Austria would never again retreat, and indeed never rest until she got to Salonika. ‘That would mean the ultimate occupation of Constantinople by Russia and the consequent absorption of all the Balkan States. including Roumania. by Austria and Russia. Ifow would you like that in England? he asked. To my remarking that that seemed a distant eventuality M. Milovanovitch said that no one could ever tell how fast events might go; tho horizon was black. far blacker than he had ever known it. Although it must not be forgotten that the Servian Government are prone to find the hand of Austria at every turn, yet under the present circumstances— Mr. Bourehier. the ‘‘ Times” correspondent, has confirmed to me on independent and reliable authority the existence of an active Austrian propaganda in Alhauia— it would seem that there are more grounds than usual for Servian alarm. T havo, &e, COLYILLE BARCLAY. MINUTE. Seo especially last paragraph, The whole situation m the Near Last is more than usually disquicting, and there are so many uncertain factors, such as Count Aehrenthal's health, and who may take his place if he quits office. AM. Milovanovitch, wo heard a few days ago, is also likely to be defeated very short! influenco on the whole bas bern steadying and pacific. His successor is likely to be A. Pasiteh, who is much disliked by the King of Montenogro, According to an extremely interesting enaual report from Count de Salis there has been a distinct rapprochement between Sofia and Cettings of Into, and the influence of Austria has been consolidated in both capitals of late (according to Sir F. Cartwright). Such indications as there are seem to point to Austria squaring Bulgaria and Montenegro in the event of making a forward move, and to Servia being isolated, Sir F. Cartwright considers that Russia will not go beyond plator eae Jnn[uary] 26, 1612. R. P.M. cs E, No. 541. Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. Vienna, J ° 5 FO. 2467/2467/12/8. my ene Tel. (No. 7.) R. 9-15 pa, Count von Achrenthal’s position is daily becoming more difficult owing to enmity of military party headed by the heir apparent. It is not considered here that he will be able to retain office much longer.535 No. 542. Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey. 0, 2880/2467/12/3. (No. 8.) Very Confidential. Vienna, D. January 18, 1912. Sir, RB. January 22, 1912. With reference to my telegram No. 7 of yesterday's date() I have the honour to report that Count Achrenthal’s numerous enemies are closing in around him and that his resignatioa of office now only depends on the already much-enfeebled determination of the Emperor to retain his serviees. I is heing reported that His Tmpetial Majesty will be unable much ionger to resist the importunilies of the Heir Apparent who declared at the time of the dismissal of General Conrad von Hétzen- dorf that he would give his aged uncle no rest as long as Count Achrenthal controlled the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy. The Fmperor who, up to a short time ago, resented any sort of snggestions on the part of his nephew, has now—I learn privately—reluctantly admitted that as his own end could not be far distant, it was perhaps right that the future oceupant of the Throne should be permitted to assume @ larger share in the administration of the State. My informant told me that at tho time of the dismissal of General Schénaich, the Minister of War. last summer the venerable Monareb, in reply to a protest from one of his advisers, remarked somewhat plaintively that it was easier to get rid of a War Minister than it was of an Heir Apparent. The crimes of Count Achrenthal in the eyes of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand are twofold: firstly, a lack of cordiality towards Germany, and, secondly, an excess of cordialily towards Italy, With regard to the first I hear very confidentially that the Emperor William wrote to Ilis Imperial Highness in December to say (bat though Germany had not always had reason to be thoroughly satisfied with the attitude of Count Aehrenthal. he telt hound to admit that His Excellency was at the present moment the only possible Austro-ITungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. On my remarking that the Arehduke’s well-known admiration for the German Emperor would have led one to suppose that this letter would have acted in a favourable manner for Count Aehrenthal, I was assured that his character was not one to brook the slightest interference even on the part of his exalted and much admired friend—nay more, that this interference had only tended to intensify his desire to see a prompt change at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With regard to Count Achrenthal’s second delinquency, namely a correct attitude towards Italy in conformity with the letter and spirit of the alliance existing between the two countries, there is now but little doubt that this attitude has thwarted an ardent desire on the part of the military party, led by the Archduke to push matters to a head with Italy while a large portion of her army was shut up in Tripoli ‘Though you, Sir, are aware and it has often been reported from this Embassy— that very unfriendly feclings exist between Austrians and Italians, it is only since the Italian seiznre of Tripoli thal a belief has been gencrally and openly expressed that actual hostilities are inevitable sooner or later. and that Albania will provide a fitting scene for the struggle. Why the Archduke should he identifying himself to such a degree in this anti-Italian movement which is now in progress. it is diffienlt to say if the almost incredible suggestion is dismissed that he is aiming at the re-establishment of the temporal Power of the Pope. The other thoory which is being put forward, seems easier of acceptance, namely thal the Archduke sees a possibility in the event of ‘a snecessinl campaign in which he would lead the Austro-Ilungarian troops to victory, of acquiring a prestige and importance which in other cireumstances would certainly be denied him. Count Aehrenthal, whose policy it has been to improve relations with the junior member in the hope of thus diminishing Austria-Hungary’s dependence on the ()[v, immediately preceding document.]586 predominant meniber of the Triple Alliance, can uaturally not co-operate with War Ministers and other leading military men who sharo the views of the Heir Apparent. Te may moreover be reluctant to see the worries of the aged Emperor increased on his account. For these reasons, he will probably in the near future place his resignation in the hands of his Imperial Master, pleading the state of his health as an excuse for laying down the burdens of office. Should this prove to be the case. the history of the future will. I think, decide that the Heix-Apparent has rendered his country a great disservice in ridding her ot a Minister who, with all the mistakes he has committed, was the one strong man capable of raising the Mouse of Hapsburg from a state of thraldom to a position cf comparative independence. T have, &e. THEO RUSSELL. MINUTES. Extremely interesting. We may assume from this that Count Achrenthal’s early resignation is not merely @ probability, but n certainty: and that lis successor will be strongly anu-ttalian and pro-German. From the British point of view this iy deplusble: but in any case, om the Emperor's death, which cannot be long deferred. the violent wnt-ftaliau, anti-Dritish and pro- German sentiments of the Archduke would have found expicsien. Tt would be interesting to sce what Italy, and especially the old Papal States, would say it the restoration of the temporal power of the Papacy ever became a practical question, I imagine it would require the whole Austrian army and more to suppress the revolution and anarchy which would ensue if a serious effort to that end were made. In view of the objection of the Archduke to any miterferenee with his plans, iv is not by any moans certain that Austria on his succession will become quite submissive to German policy. In tact the Archduke’s character and the methods of German diplomacy ar not unlikely to Glas and to Jeed to ieton. “I do not believe in the story for the restoration ct Temporal ower. E, D. 22/1/12, E, No. 548. Sir II. Baz-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson. Private and Most Confidential.(') My dear Nicolson. Sofia, January 18. 1912. In a letter which I addressed to you on October 28 last,() T informed you of the secret negotiations which had been commenced between the Bulgarian and Servian Primo Ministers on the 1th of that month. I now am able to state that very severe pressure is heing brought to bear on King Ferdinand to give his consent to a secret alliance with Servia. Both Messrs. Gueshoft and Daneff are strongly urging the King in this direction : the Busian Minister and presumably therefore the Russian Government,—although of this I have as yet no positive proof,—are privy to their policy. The King has been given to understand that in view of the present disquieting state of affairs Bulgaria must decide once for all cither to cast in her lot with Russia, or with Austria. M. Daneff is the spokesman in the negotiations which are now proceeding. Ie has (2) [Carmock MSS., Vol. 1 of 1012,] (@) [o. supra, pp. 613-4, No, 526.)387 told his Majesty that in any case Russia will not throw over Servia in the event of a forvard move on the part of Austria, and should Bulgaria show unwillingness to cooperate with Servia, slie must expect the opposition of Russia. King Ferdinand now finds himself “an pied du mur," and is not in @ very happy stale of mind. I write you this in order to make the views expressed in my despatch No. 8 Conf[idontia]! of the 15th inst[ant] clearer.(’) Nekludow considers that the King will have to make up his mind within the next three wecks. ‘The whole matter is heing kept very secret, and is not even known at the French Legation. Yours sincerely, IL. 0. BAX-IROD ©) [e. supra, pp. 520-82, No, 539.] SIDE. No. 544. Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Str A. Nicolson. Private.(*) My dear Nicolson, Sofia, January 81, 112. You have my thanks for your letter of the 28rd_instant.(°) Both Gueshoff and Daneff consider that King Ferdinand was indisereet, (aud perhaps knowingly so,) during his visit to Anstria in November last. .\t any rate, they are of opinion that Count Aehrenthal. although he knows, they imagine. nothing - definite, has some vague inkling of a Servo-Bulgarian “rapprochement.” It this has got out at Vienna, il is through Prinee Philip of Coburg. who is in Ilis Majesty’s confidence. JTence their action, mentioned in my last letter, of bringing pressure to bear on the King to give his consent to a sccret alliance with Servia. This will mean that ho muct definitely throw in his lot with Russia, and explains his recent visit to Austria, where he conferred at length with Princo Philip. In view of the state of Count Achrenthal’s health, and the inseenrity of his position, the King decided not to see him. but to continue to wait on events. Meanwhile breathing space is afforded by the “high jinks’” in conncetion with Prince Boris’ coming of age. Tiussia, Austria, Germany. Roumania, Greece. Montenegro, and Servia are scnding Royal Missions; Eyance. Italy, Belgium, and Turkey Special Missions, and we shall have three fatiguing ceremonial ‘* pleasure” days, commencing on ‘Thursday. ‘This gives Kiug Ferdinand time to come (o a decision on the Servo-Bulgarian qnestion, No one will know Letler than he how to utilize the preseneo here ot so many highly placed personages. T will koep you fully informed, of course, of what gocs on, As regards your remarks respecting the ** squaring ”” of Roumania. the necessity of such a policy is fully recognized here. Ii would be extremely badly received in Germany, however, for the reasons given in my despatch No. 119 of November 14 last.(°) Setting aside this difficulty. it must he borne in mind that Rowmania will desire some compensation :—she cannot obtain it from the side of Austria. however much she may desire to get a grip on Trensylvania, and it does not scem as if she conld get any compensation from Bnigaria without a war. She requires the so-called Quadrilateral (Roustehouk, Silistria, Shumla, Varna). and this Bulgaria would never cedo except under compulsion. T scarccly think that Bulgaria will work on Roumania ©) [Garnock MSS.. Vol. 1 of 1012.] (@) [Not reproduced, os it cannot be tracud. | (*) [In Sir H. Baxchonside'’s despatch to Sir E. Grey, No. 119 of November 14, 1911, he says, "80 long ax King Carol remams under German inffuence and keeps cn fhicndly terms with Turkes, "30 long con Germany view the present state of affairs with tranquillity.” (P.O. 47207/44875/11/7.)}Bas. through Vienna, though one must not neglect the possibility of such action; but i in my opinion, either dircetly here or ab St. Petersburg. Prince Ghika has not yet been approached in the matter, he has as you know, ouly recently arrived. I am keeping my eyes open as to this, MI. Panas, the Greek Minister, thinks that they may endeavour to work an arrangement through Petersburg, in order to obtain Russian influence; if they try this method, of which you would doubtless be kept informed from St. Petersburg, they will not, I anticipate, be successful, for reasons too long to state here. The Bulgarian Minister in Bucharest is incompetent, and useless, and they will not enter into negotiations through him. . T quite agree as to no really serious troubles arising in the Balkans this spring. Tt seems practically certain that there will be an Albanian revolt, and that it will be more universal than previous ones: also we may expect the usual Macedonian ‘programme of assassination and outrages, but Bulgaria certainly will not bell the cat, and is quite unlikely to resort to extreme measures unless Austria takes the lead. The King would much prefer to wait and see the fruit drop into his mouth, than have to shake the tree. The relinquishing of office by Count Aerenthal or even his prolonged departure, will remove an element of stability, and although tho influence of the Emperor will always remain on the side of peace, old age, and, I fear, in his case, a gradual decline of mental capacity, tend to put power into less cautious hands. ‘As regards my own position, with King Ferdinand, it is excellent so far. He haa shown his friendliness by sending me gifts of books,—the life of Queen Caroline of Naples, his grandmother. (before I went home.) and on the New Year an Edition de Luxe of J. Funckau’s Life of Emma, Lady Mamilton.—a truly royal gift, containing 70 coloured and other engravings. King Frangois’ well-known phrase as regards women ean well be applied to him. ‘Yours sincerely, H. 0, BAX-IRONSIDE. No. 545. Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.(*) .0. 5027 /5027/12/89. . 6) Belgrade, D. February 1, 1912. R. February 5, 1912. In his despatch No. 61 of September 27 last(*) Sir R. Paget reported upon the violent attacks of the press against the Crown and the Government, and the feeling of unrest attributed to conspirator intrigues. It would appear that the younger officers who took part in the murder of King Alesander and Queen Draga have for some time past been discontented with their treatment at the hands of the Court and also with the weak policy of the Radical Government. They realise that the Karageorgevitchs are no better than the Obrenovitchs, that neither the King nor the Crown Prince take any interest in military affairs, that the army does not progress like that for instance of Bulgeria in spite of the millions spent on it, that the country is ruled by men whose only object is to enrich themselves at the country’s expense. They reproach the King and the Government with weakness and their object is to turn the Radicals out of power and to replace them by a strong Government, which would pursue a policy more in accordance with Pan-Servian aspirations. With that object in view, they have formed @ secret society under the name of “‘ Union or Death,” better known already as the (©) [A copy of this despatch was sent to the Director of Military Operations. angi E* Reproduced, as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.0. 88380/32862/589 “Black Mand."(') This society has of late been rapidly gaining ground until it now numbers among its memhers not only officers of all ranks, but also civilians of every stations of life. Ligh officials are stated to be members and the Minister of War, General Stepanovitch, is supposed to be at the head of the movement, with practically the whole of the Belgrade garrison as well as the Police at his back. Such is the influence of the society that some of those most directly aimed at, such as the King. the Crown Prince and the Trime Minister, Monsieur Milovanovitch, have, it is rumoured, thought it expedient to join the ‘* Black Mand,’ whose overt intentions, as mentioned before, are the pursuit of an active policy to unite the scattered members of the Serb race under one Flag. The present attilude of the King in regard to the position of the Ministry. which has scarcely a working inejority in the Skupshtina, would seem to confirm this rumour. M. Milovanovitch’s intentions for some time past had been to force a dissolution and hold elections, which would have ensued the Radicals coming in again with a greater majority. But King Peter seeing the danger for himself of the return of the Radicals to poner. made it, so it is stated, quite clear to M. Milovanoviteh that he would not dissolve the Skuptehina before the expiration of its mandate in the autumn, M. Milovanovitch being himself inuch impressed by the growing power of the ‘’ Black ITand,’” also saw that it would be more politic on bis part to take sides with the Society, end hence the carious anomaly of those against whom the society was originally directed joining the movement. To complicate matters, another society has been formed, named the ** Servian Union.” Tis promoter. General Sreckovitch, a popular officer on the retired list, issued last week a manifesto to the Servian people, calling their attention to the rotten state of the army and urging all Reserve officers to become members of the Union, with the object of opposing the process of disorganisation now ruling in the army, end of furthering the Pan-Serb nioyement. Although I have tried several well-informed sources, it is impossible to obtain satisfactory information as to the actual scope of the movements. But one thing is certain and that is that at least one powerful organisation headed by the Military does exist, and that its influence will have to be reckoned with as an important factor in the attitude of Servia in case of complications arising in the Balkans. The Government will not be allowed to remain passive. M. Milovanovitch’s statements to me, as reported in my despatch No. 2 Confidential of the 16th ultimo,(*) as to the aggressive policy of Servia in case of an Austrian advance into the Sendjak, would seem to corroborate thal view. All the Foreign Representatives, with whom I have spoken on the subject, are of opinion that the movement is, or will be, serious. T have. &. COLVILLE BARCLAY. vitios of this society at this time ave desenbed mm 0.-U.1., TIE, p. 530, No. 2911; p 1; p. 549, No, 2028; p. 627, No. BOL: p. 808, No. and ib., IV, p. 232, No. 3500. For other relevant hterature v. references in B. E. Schmitt: The Cominy of the War 7911 (1930), Vol. I, pp. 184-5. end. B. Tay The Onyine of the World War (2nd edition, 1930), Vol. IT, pp. U1. ¢4 () fo. supa, pp. 338-4, No, 540.] No, 546. Sir Eduard Grey to Sir P. Bertie. FO. 5857/4468 /12/44. (No. 54.) Sir, Foreign Office, February 5. 1912. MM, Cambon told me to-day that, in speaking to M. Poincaré the other day, you had zeferred to the anxieties of the international situation, and said that we ought to be prepared against developments.540 AM. Cambon expressed the opimon that the apprehensions which were felt, and so freely expressed. were exaggerated. So far as he could see, no one desived a conflict. He thought that Germany did not wish to have ono; Austria would not do anything without Germany ; and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria would not move without the consent of Austria, because otherwise Anstria would let Roumania loose on the back of Bulgaria. . I said that a good deal of the anxiety seemed to me to arise from the wide spread belief in Germany that, if Germany increased her naval expenditure, we would attack her. In the course of the conversations,(*) which had been suspended some time ago, but would now be resumed, we should discover what the disposition of the German Government was. [I am, &e.] E. G|REY.] () [For this subject, v. Gooch ¢ Tempeiley, Vol. VI. passim. The question of the resumption of conversations in 1912 is dealt with in that volume, especially pp. 652-65.) Sir Edward Grey to Sir I’. Bertie. P.O. 5108/4468/12/44. (No. 51.) Confidentiel, Si Foreign Office, February 7, 1912. M. Cambon read to Sir A. Nicolson on the Ist instant] a telegram which M. Louis had sent from Sl. Petersburg, reporting a conversation with the Russian Minister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] on Sfouth]-K[astern] Europo Affairs, M. Louis uad said that M. Poincaré haying been told by the Russion Amb[assado]r al Paris that there was an “ardent desire’ on ihe part of the Russian Gov[ernmen]t to exchange views with the French Cabinet, he would be glad o hear whet M. Sazonof had to say: but that the French Gov[ernmen]t would be glad, if the situation in S[outh]-H[astern] Europe were to be discussed, that II[is] M[ajesty’s] Govfern- men]t should also take part in the conversations. M. Sazonof said that H[is] Mfajesty’s] Govferumen]t might be invited to joi later. but he wished to impress on the French Gov[ernnien]t how disquieting the aspect of affairs was in S[outh]- Efastern} Europe, and that the activity of the bands in Maccdonia had never been so marked as at present. I[is] h{xcellency] thought that Russia. France and England should put pressure at Sofia to suppress tho activity of the bands, and should also press the Turks to introduce reforms in Macedonia which would remove the grievances which caused the formation of these bands. ‘Sir A. Nicolson told M, Cambon that, giving his personal opinion only, he much donhted if II[is] M[ajesty’s] Govfenmen]t would Le disposed to take part in a conversation & trois which was to lead to exercising pressure at Sofia and to presenting a programme of reforms at Constantinople. It seemed to him that an exchange of views would he conducted with much greater advantage, and with more raison d’étre between Vienna and St. Petersburg than between London, Paris and St. Petersburg. The two most directly interested Powers were Austria and Russia,(*) and it appeared futile that Russia, France and England should endeavour to exercise independently of Germany and Austria pressure at Sofia and Constantinople. Any such endeavours were doomed to failure from the outset, and if any steps were to be taken they should be taken hy all 5 Powers, and initiated by Austria and Russia in conjunction. ‘M. Cambon said that personally he quite agreed. [Tam, &.] B. G[REY]. (1) [ep. supra, pp. 520-92, No. 589.]541 No, 548, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir 4 . Nieoleon. Private. (2) My dear Nicolson, St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1912. Many thanks for your last letter. (?) The Rnglish visif(* hes heen a wonderful success and has, I think, served to create a friendly feeling towards England such as has never beforo existed in this country. Weardale and his colleagues doserve the greatest credit for the manner in which they acquitted themselves of a by uo means easy task. and for having delivered so many speeches without committing a single indiscretion. The German papers tried very unfaitly to make capital out of a speech made by General Bethune at the Parliamentary dinner, and in some cases even pretended that he had expressed the hope that in the next war the British and Russian armies would fight side by side against Germany, His remarks, on the contrary, were of quite a general haracter. He had to reply to a toast proposed by a Russian General who had taken in the Crimean war to the British vetcrans who still survived, and said, as any one would under such circumstances, that if war ever broke out be trusted that the British and Russian armies would not again find themselves ince to face, bul would fight shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy. T cannot help hoping that the friendly feeling that has been generated by this visit will react favourably on the relations between the two Goveruments and will help to smooth over the difficulties and differences that so often arise between them. It would. I think, as I have already suggested, he a graceful aet. which would be much appreciated here, were the King to write to the Emperor to thank Tim not only for the very cordial reception which His Majesty accorded to the British representatives, but also for the wniversal kindness and hospitality which they received during their stay in Tussia. Were His Majesty to command me {o deliver His letter in person to the Emperor, it would fnrnish me with x good opportunity of laying before the latter Sir Edward's views with rogerd to Persia, The Empress told me that She was returning shortly to the Crimea, as te great cold affects Her heart and breathing so that if I am to ask for an audience I ought to do 6o soon. Ay Yours ever, GEORGE W. BUCIIANAN. (1) [Garnock MSS. Vol. I of 1912.] () [Sir A. Nicol-on's letier of January 30, 1912. is not reproduced, es it is chiefly concerned with affairs in Persia, (Garnock MSS., Vol. I of 1912.)] (2) [Tho party included members of both Houses of Perliament, the Church, the Army and the Navy. The Speaker, Mr. James Lowther, who had been stlected ns the delegation, was compelled by ‘the death of his’ father to return home. vr. Sir G. ‘My Mission to Tussia (1923), Vol. T, pp. 107-9, snd Sir Bernard Pares: My Russian Memories (1931), pp. 220-42.] (}} [The remainder of the letter relates to M. Sazonov's views on the Persien question and other subjects.) No. 549. Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. Vienna, February 12, 1912. F.0, 6816/6816/12/7. D. 1-50 pam. Tel. (No. 18.) Most Confidential. R. 2:45 Pam. Bulgaria and Servia. Owing to Count Aehrenthal’s illness and the consequent difficulty of obtaining any official information from the Ministry I have had to have recourse to a private542 source of information to obtain the views of the Austro-[Tungarian Government with regard to rumonrs of rapprochement between Scrvia and Bulgaria mentioned in Sir A, Nicolson’s private letter to me of Feblruary] 5.(’) ; | T learn from this confidential source that the Austrian Ministry for F[oreign] Affairs) are perfectly well aware that negotiations of a kind are going on between Belgrade and Sofia, but so far they do not appear to altach any great importance to them nor do they look with alarm on the King of Bulgaria’s proposed visit to ‘Athens. I suspect that the King of Bulgaria has given here what are considered to be sufficient guarantees that he is doing nothing antagonistic to Austro-Ilungarian interests in the Balkans. JT have sounded Count Berchtold with regard to rumours of rapprochement between Servia and Bulgaria. He had also heard them. but did not attach very great importance to them, (Sent to Sofia.) 1) (This letter (Carmoek MSS., Vol. [ of 1912) quoted on extract from Sir H, Bav-Ironside's jeter of January 31, 1912. v. supra, pp. 37-8, No. 5i4.] No. 550. Mr. Barelay to Sir Edward Grey.(+) F.O. 7118/7118/12/39. (No. 10.) Confidential. Belgrade, D. February 15, 1912. Sir R. February 19, 1912. I have the honour to report that I had a conversation two days ago with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the presvnt political situation. M. "Yovanovitch chiefly went over old ground, and repeated the statemeuts made to me by M. Milovanovitch as to Austrian activity in Albania, as reported in my despatch No. 2, Confidential, of the 16th ultimo.(*} But he added that besides Austrian there were Italian agents as well working in that Province, and that the Servian Government had heard that arms and ammunition from Italian sources had heen landed on the coast for the Albanians, The reports they were receiving from Northern Albania were not reassuriug. The Albanians were already more active than ut this time last year and the number of assuults committed by them on Serbs in Old Servia were daily inereasing.—lle said the reverse to the Italian Minister two days previonsly.—M. Yovanovitch also stated that the Servian Government knew for a positive fact that the Austrians, although they denied it, were daily sending ion and guns all along the Serbo-Bosnian frontier on the Drina. The difference in the railway gauge in the annexed provinces made the transport comparatively slow but men conld be sent on later with much less difficulty. ‘The Turkish Goverument were tully alive to the danger and they had within the last week been sending masisn guns into the Sand} As to the relations between Servia and Bulgaria, M. Yovanovitch said that of late there seemed to be indications from Sofia that Bulgaria was beginning to realize that her future must ultimately he closely associated with that of Scrvia, for if Servia were absorbed hy Austria and the way to Selonica were once open. this would mean the end of Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia, Ilere I interrupted M. Yovanoviteh and asked him whether he thought Russia would ever allow Austria to absorb Servia; surely, I said laughing. M. de Ilartwig would not permit it. He smiled and, without giving a direct reply, went on where he head left off that the descent of Austria towards Salonica would mean a corresponding claim on the part of Russia and the (%) [This despateh_was sent to Constantinople (es No. 84) on March 4, No. 49), in print, on March 8. ()[v. supra, pp. 538-4, to 888 on Maree A and to Tebran (as copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations, ae ry Operations.543 a consequent henmning in of Bulgaria, The latter would, therefore, do well to identify her interests with those of Servia and come to an understanding with her. The only chance of safety for the Balkan States was that they should act together. M. Yovanovitch then spoke of the grave condition of Count d'Aebrenthal’s health, and that his death would mean the disappearance of the greatest Peace factor in the Dual Monarchy. Ie algo spoke of the Grand Duke Andrew's visit to Vienna as a sign of a rapprochement between Russia and Austria. which in his opinion bode no good for Servia. M. Yovanovilch. whose tone was pessimistic throughout concluded by saying that he thought that this year would at last see the real beginning of the end of the Sick Man. As to M. de Hartwig’s Austrophobe attitude, which as o often been mentioned at Vienna, T have the honour, if I may venture a humble opinion, to state that it appears to me to have somewhat diminished sinco the departure of Count Forgach. Auy way I am not sure that it actually represents the attitude of his Government and it is probably only another instance of a Russian diplomatist following a line of his own. It may be of interest to add that a Foreign Representative here, who does snot wish to be mentioned. has confided to me that M. Sazonow had told their Ambassador at St. Petersburg that they were beginning to have enongh of MI. de Hartwig. I also hear that the latter has boasted to another of his colleagues that it was he who was directing all Rnssia’s Persian poliey from here during M. Sazonow's illness and that he had strongly urged that the only way of settling the question was by Russian troops marching into Tehran. As to Russia having promised effective aid to Servia in case of Austrian aggression, this is quite possible. But Servia, in spite of her ever looking to her big Slay Brother for protection. has a strong latent mistrust of him founded on previous experience, henee her constant dread of an Austro-Russian understanding and her fear of being left in the lurch and bargained away by Russia. T have. &e. COLVILLE BARCLAY. No. 551. Sir P. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. F.0. 7821/8700/12/8. Vienna, D. February 18, 1912. R. February 21. 1912. I have already communicated to you by telegram the melancholy intelligence of the death yesterday evening of Count Achrenthal. lis Excellency had been suffering for some two years from a malady of the blood known as leucwmia, which assumed an aggravated form at the end of last year and forced him to abandon his work. In the course of last month it became clear that Count Aelenthal's condition was hopeless, and that it would be impossible to prolong his life for more than a short period. ‘The Emperor, thongh aware of this cirewnstance, refused to consider the question of Count Aehrenthel’s successor until the latter (who did uot at the time realize the gravity of his condition) should himself tender his resignation. His Imperial Majesty's appreciation of and respect for Count Aebrenthal was such that he wished to avoid taking any step which might cause pain or excitement to his Foreign Minister. Finally, on February 16th, Connt Aehventhal, realizing that he would never again be able {o take into his hands the guidance of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Degged the Emperor to accept his resignation and to appoint a successor.544 His Tmperial Majesty thereupon yesterday addressed the folloning gracious letter to Connt Aehrenthal :— “ Dear Count Achrenthal. “«Tn appreciation of the circumstances under which the state of your health has obliged yon—to my deep regrcl—to beg to be relieved of the oflice of Minister of My House and of Foreign Affairs, I accede to your request and have accepted your resignation. “On this occasion I desire to assure you of My undiminished confidence not only in yourself but also in the polizy which you have, in difficult conditions. pursued with cireumspection and initiative and which ensires an abiding honour to your memory. “ At the same time, I express to you my full recognition of and my warmest thanks for the loyal and excellent services which you have rendered with so much self-sacrifice to Me, to My Honse, and to the Monarchy. “As a mark of my continued affection I confer upon you the Grand Cross in brilliants of my Order of St. Stephen.” FRANZ JOSEPIL. “Vienna, February With, 1912.” ‘This letter must be considered, in the very remarkable circumstances under which it was written, as a strong proof of the Emperor's approval ot the policy of which Count Aehrenthal was the embodiment and as a clear indication that that policy vill be continued in the fatnre.?) Count Achrenthal was already unconscious when this letter reached him, on the day of his death. ‘At midday Count ‘Achrenthal’s condition became worse. The last sacraments were administered to him, and shortly afterwards Monsignor Rossi, the Uditore of the Papal Nunciature, came to bring the dying Minister the blessing of the Pope. At 7 o'clock the agony began: and at a quarter to ten Count Aehrenthal breathed his last, in the presence of Countess Achrenthal and the members of his family. have, &e. FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT. () [Count Berchtold was nominated the successor of Count Achrenthal on February 17.] ‘No. 552. Su G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gren.c) 8285 /4468/12/41. 58.) St. Petersburgh, D. February 21, 1912. R. February 26, 1912, Inthe couse of the conversation reported in my immediately preceding despatch (*1 I explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the views of His Majesty’s Government, as recorded in your despatch No. 51 of the 7th instant(”) to Sir F. Bertie, with regard to the suggestion which Monsieur Sazonow is reported to have made to the French Ambassador at this Court that France. Russia and England should bring pressure to bear at Sofia for the purpose of securing the suppression of the bands, and should at the same time urge the Porte to introduce reforms into Macedonia. ‘Monsieur Sazonow at once said that there must have been a misunderstanding, as he had never put forward a concrete proposal of this nature in the conversations () [A copy of this despatch wee sent to the Director of Military Operation: @)[ep. supra, p. 867, No. 880, and note (3).] an ©) [v. aupra, p. 840,"No, 547.)BAS which he had had with Monsieur Louis. What had happened was this. He had received from Monsieur Iswolsky a report of his conversation with Monsieur Poincaré and had been more than ever impressed with the seriousness of the situation in south-eastern Europe. He had felt that the time had come when the Powers ought to reflect as to the attitude which they would have to take in the event of their being confronted with a conflagration in the Balkans. He had therefore suggested that there might be a preliminary exchange of views between the Cabinets of London, Paris and St. Petersburg; but he had never contemplated taking any immediate or separate action either at Sofia or Constantinople, nor had he the slightest wish to see Europe split up into two opposing groups with regard to the Balkan question. Ife had, on the contrary, thought that if the three Powers of the triple entente could agree as to the best means of localising any conflict that might possibly break out in the Balkans, they might then consult with Austria and Germany with a view to bringing all the Powers into line. It had, His Excellency said, occurred to him that the object which he had in view might best be secured by inviting an exchange of views between Paris, London and St. Petersburg as to what ought to be done in certain eventualities, such as a rising in Albania: an incursion into Macedonia on the part of one of the Balkan States; a Turco-Bulgarian war; and possibly an Austrian occupation of the Sanjak. ‘My French colleague, to whom T have also spoken on the subject. tells me that his conversation with Monsieur Sazonow was of a purely academic character; that His Excellency had spoken of the increasing activity of the bands and of the failure of the Porte to carry out any reforms in Macedonia; that he had suggested that it might be useful for the Powers to reflect a little on the situation, so as not to be taken unprepared, should it become acute; bnt that he had put forward no definite proposal whatsoever and had confined himself to indicating certain points which might be wade the subject of conversation later on. ‘Monsiour Sazonow said nothing to we with regard to the possibility of arriving at an understanding with Austria on the Balkan question. He told me however that not only had there been an exchange of very friendly telegrams between himself and Count Berchtold, but that the latter had assured the Russian Ambassador at Vienna of his earnest desire to establish really good relations between the two Empires. His Excellency added that Monsieur de Giers was to come to St. Petersburg in a few days; and though Monsienr Sazonow said nothing as to the object of his visit, it seems more than likely that Ttis Excellency will brig with him further friendly messages from Count Berchtold which will probably lead to an exchange of views between the two Cabinets. There can, I think, be no doubt but that Count Berchtold, who had passed so many years of his diplomatic career at this Court, will do all in his power to bring about a rapprochement, if he does not even attempt to revive the old policy of a close understanding between the three Emperors. The appointment of Count Berchtold as Count Aehrenthal’s successor has been received with much pleasure here; and the only criticsm which Monsieur Sazonow made on it was that His Excellency was not likely to show the same independent spirit as his predecessor, and would be consequently far more under German influence. While His Majesty's Government would no doubt view with satisfaction an improvement in the relations of Austria and Russia as tending to promote the cause of peace in the Near East, I do not think that it would be to our interest to encourage an Austro-Russian understanding on the Balkan question, except on the condition that all the other Powers were to be parties to it. It will be in your recollection that Count Aehrenthal declined to associate the other Powers in his declaration of policy which resulted from the views exchanged between himself and Monsieur Iswolsky in the spring of 1910: and I think that it is highly probable that Count Berchtold will adopt » similar attitude under similar circumstances. By the visit of the Grand Duke André to Vienna not only has the estrangement between the two Courts been removed, but relations between them have again been placed on a cordial [5092] ax546 footing. The Grand Dake’s visit was, I believe, arranged at an Audience which the ‘Austrian Ambassador had with the Emperor a short time before: and ITis Tmperiel Highness’s visit will probably shortly be returned by one of the Archdukes. At the same time Count Rerchtold’s appointment may very likely lead to an attempt being made to draw the Russian Government more within the Austro-German orbit than would be to the interests of either England or France. I do not, however think that such an attempt would be crowned with success. as there still exists in this country a profound distrust of Austria-Hungary. It is rether, I think, in the influence which Connt Berehtold may bring to bear on the Emperor through the Austrian Court, supported as he would no doubt be by the Emperor William, that there seems to me fo be any danger of our position at St. Petersburg being under- mined by Austria and Germany. I have, &e. GEORGE W. BUCHANAN. MINUTE, I agree with the last paragraph and do not think that we should encourage w rapprochement between Austria and Hussia exeept on the conditions ‘meationed by Sir @. Buchanan, ‘The Archduke is, it is known, in favour of a revival of the Drei Keiser Bund, ‘The present action of M, Sszonow in intriguing with Italy about mediation is not however calculated to make a good impression at Vienna and therc are indications that Gcrmany and ‘Austria realize what is happening. LM E.G. No. 558. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.(*) P.O. 8186/8486/12/38. (No. 66.) Secret. St. Petersburgh, D. February 24, 1912. Sir, R, February 27, 1912. I had the honour of being received in Audience yesterday by the Kmperor and of handing to His Majesty the Letter which the King had commanded me to deliver in person, After assuring His Majesty how highly the King and His Majesty's Government had appreciated the gracious reception accorded by Him to the members of the British Depulation, as well as the warm welcome extended to them by all classes of His Majesty's subjects, I proceeded to speak of Lord Ialdano’s reeent visit to Berlin in the terms authorised by Sir A. Nicolson’s private telegram of the 18th of this month.(*) ‘The Emperor at once said that Ile had received the news of this visit with much pleasure. Russia had coucluded an arrangement with Germany which had placed tho relations with that Empire on e perfectly friendly footing; and it was not only natural but neressary in the cause of the world’s peace {hai relations of a similar friendly character should be established hetween Germagy and England. I Yentured to express my satisfaction at hearing Ilis Majesty say this, The characler of Englond’s relations to Germany and Rnssia respectively had, I observed, deen very happily deserihed in a speech delivered hy Lord iugh Cecil at the Parliamentary dinner offered to the British Visitors. Lord [ugh had on that occasion remarked that nations were like individuals. ‘They had feelings of friendship for @ considerable number of other nations, but their feelings of affection were (2) [A copy of this despatch was sent to the Director of Military Opcrations.] Gh ERet wprtuced, as the tenour is suficietly indicated above, Camock MBS., Vol. T547 restricted to a select few, among whom Russia, in our case, ocoupied a chief place. I trusted that the relations which now so happily existed betwean the two countries would long be maintained; as I ventured to think that our experience of last year showed that the ‘Triple Entente was a powerful factor for peace and for the main- tenance of the balance of power in Europe. lis Majesty expressed a cordial assent, adding that it was a curious fact that 2 national feeling of sympathy seemed to attract one more towards one nation {hen towards another, He went on to say, however, that he did not entertain any particular distrust of Germany except on one point: and that was her present attitude towards Turkey. Ile had more than once told the German Emperor. without receiving any satisfactory explanation, that he entirely failed to understand the reagons that had prompted His Majesty to supply the Ottoman atmy with German Instructors. That Army had, thanks to Germany, acquired a high degree of efficiency; but, if ever called on to take the field, it would march either egainst Russia or against one of the Balkan States. who were allied to Russia by close ties of kinship and religion. Such a proceeding could not, therefore, be regarded by Him as a very friendly act. On my asking whether His Majesty suspected Germany of encouraging the ‘Turks to push forward their frontier in the direction of Urumiab, the Emperor said that this was very difficult to prove; but that, whether with or without German encouragement, Turkey was continually occupying fresh strategical points, of which Russia and not Persia was the objective. Tn proof of this statement the Emperor prodiced a map on which were marked the various points actually in occupation of Turkish and Russian troops. Tn reply to my further enquiry as to what His Majesty thought was likely to be the outcome of the meeting of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, the Emperor remarked that, should it fail to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of this long ontstanding question, we ought to insist on Turkey submitting it to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal. ‘As the conversation then turned to Persia. I explained to the Emperor at some length the very serious position with which we were confronted in the south, as well as the reasons which rendered it inadvisable for us to dispatch a large force from India to restore order and protect the caravan toutes. I at the same time expressed the satisfaction felt by Ilis Majesty's Government at the cordial vo-operation which they were receiving from the Russian Government in affording both moral aud material support to the Persian Government and more especially at the manner in which they had met our wishes with regard to the ex-Shah. I enumerated the causes which rendered it impossible for His Majesty’s Government ever to recognise Mohammed Ali again and dwelt on the necessity of removing him and all other disturbing elements with the least possible delay. The Emperor observed that it was quite true that Mohammed Ali had heen guilty of a breach of faith in xetuening to Persia, but that Ie trusted thet after the warning addressed to him through the Russian Consul at Astrabad the ex-Shah would not long delay his departure. I replied that Mohammed Ali was still making difficulties ahout his pension and that according to the latest reports from Meshed the situation in that district was not altogether reassuring. I had also heard from Teheran that Mohammed Ali had declared that he would only bow before a direet order from the Emperor. I would, therefore, appeal to lis Majesty to say the necessary word. should Mohammed Ali pay no attention to the communication addressed to him throngh the Russian Consul. The Emperor eventually said that if other means failed he would do as I had asked him to. As regarded the general situation His Majesty expressed the hope that the united efforis now being made hy the two Governments to strengthen the hands of the Persian Government would be crowned with success. When once the large loan had been arranged the first task which that Government ought to take in hand was the restoration of order throughout the country. The fiscal gendarmerie ought to be developed: a small army ought to be organised for garrisoning the more important towns: and the Cossack Brigade ought to be strengthened. so that it might act as the cavalry branch of that army. When once the maintenance of order was [5092] a2548 guaranteed, all the Russian troops would be at once recalled. All would, however, depend on whether the Persian Government succeeded in finding capable officers to organise these forces. His Majesty said nothing with regard to the proposed constitutional changes which Monsieur Sazonow is anxious to introduce at Teheran. In the course of our conversation the Emperor expressed much satisfaction at Count Berchtold’s appointment as Count Aebrenthal’s successor. It would, he thought, undoubtedly lead to the establishment of better telations between the two Empires. Count Berchtold had been placed in a very difficult position as Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh during the Balkan crisis of 1908 :(°) and His Majesty had, He said. felt very sorry for him, as he was in no way responsible Jor what Count Aehrenthal had done. He was not however likely to show the samo independent spirit as Count Aehrenthal with regard to Germany, and Austria would probably revert to her former réle of a brilliant second. | . T then ventured to ask whether His Majesty was sufficiently well acquainted with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to be able to form an opinion of his qualifications as the future ruler of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. ‘The Emperor replied that I ‘had put a question which it was very difficult to answer. The last time that He bad met the Archduke was at Mirzsteg in the autumn of 1908: and His Tmperial Highness hed then astonished and even shocked Him by his outspoken language about his futte Hungarian subjects. His Majesty had. in fact, been obliged to point out that it was hardly becoming on the part of an Heir Apparent to hold such language toa foreign Sovereign. His Imperial Highness had, however, impressed His Majesty as a man of strong character with decided views of his own. At that particular moment the Archduke was much concerned with the subordinate position which Austria-Hungary occupied in the ‘Triple Alliance, and had openly complained of the heavy hand with which Berlin kept Vienna in subjection to her. His idea then was to create a Slav kingdom within the Austro-Hungarian dominions and to substitute trialism for dualism. Such a policy, the Emperor remarked, would not, had it been realised, have tended to improve Austro-Russian relations. Since the Bosnian crisis, His Majesty continued. the Archduke's views had apparently undergone a complete change: and he was now the devoted friend and admirer of the Emperor William. Ve was also credited with entertaining anything but friendly sentiments for Italy and of favouring forward policy in the Balkans. So long as the Emperor Franz Joseph lived there was no likelihood of any step being taken by Austria-Hungary that would endanger the maintenance of peace: but when once the aged Emperor had passed away, it was impossible to say what might bappen. The Emperor then proceeded to speak of the general situation in the Balkans. and to say that it did not cause Him quite so mugh preoccupation as it had at the heginning of the winter. The recent visit of the King of Montenegro had given him the opportunity of speaking very seriously to that Sovereign: and the assurances which he had Teceived had been’ quite satisfactory. He had also charged the Grand Duke André. who had represented His Majesty at the celebration of the coming of age of the Crown Prince at Sofia. with messages to King Ferdinand and King Petor. Both these Sovereigns hed sent Him, in reply, the most positive assurances of their pacific intentions. They had both, however, as well as the King of Montenegro, made one rather important reserv[ation], namely that if the Turks pursued an irritating and repressive policy with regard to their Christian subjects and if the ferment that existed in the frontier districts assumed serious proportions. it would be very difficult for them not to intervene. His Majesty admitted that the Turks had reason to complain of the activity of the bands. but said that they had themselves chiefly to thank for what was going on, as they had never attempted to carry out the promised reforms either in Macedonia or Albania, Russia, His Majesty added, desired to maintain good relations with Turkey and to live at peace with her: but if war broke out between Turkey and any of the Balkan States, there would be such an ebullition (* [ep. Gooch and Tempertey, Vol. V. ©. Index of Persons, eu Benoutoxp, Covvr yov.]549 of sympathetic feeling among the Slavs of Russia for the Balkan Slavs that even He would not be able to keep quiet or to look on at what was passing with folded arms. It was therefore in His Majesty’s opinion advisable that the Powers of the triple entente should look ahead and consult together as to what they should do in certain eventualities. such as a war between Turkey and one of the Balkan States or a forward movement on the part of Austria. such as the occupation of the Sanjak. T repeated to His Majesty what I had already told Monsieur Sazonow. that you wished to avoid any action that could possibly split up Europe into two hostile groups, and that on the contrary you would like if possible to secure the co-operation of all the Powers. It might perhaps be possible for Austria and Russia. as the Powers most directly interested, to come to some agreement. not confined to themselves alone, but of a character that would enable all the other Powers to be parties to it. This would, however, naturally be impossible were we to be confronted with the question of an Austrian oceupation of the Sanjak. This, the Emperor replied, was esactly the question which preoccupied Him most, and constituted one of the reasons for His advocating an exchange of views between Paris, London and St. Petersburg. An occupation of the Sanjak would be but the first step in an Austrian advance towards the Aigean: and it was therefore very necessary that it should not find us unprepared. The Emperor also spoke of the grave ansiety which the Cretan question was causing Him. He could not, He said. hide from Himself the fact that the Protecting Powers were not altogether blameless in this matter and that at the time of the crisis of 1908 they had kept the Cretans quiet by giving them assurances that had raised expectations which had proved to be irrealisable. War between Turkey and Greece must, however. be avoided at all costs; and therefore if, as seemed to be the case. the reoceupation of the island was the only course left open to the Powers He would consent to join in it, much as He disliked the idea. ‘With regard to China the Emperor said that He much doubted whether a Republican régime could take firm root in a country with such secular traditions of Imperial rule. There was. however, nothing for the Powers to do but to wait and hope for the best. as intervention of any kind was at the present moment out of the question. T have, &e. GEORGE W. BUCHANAN. MINUTES, The Emperor's declarations could hardly be more friendly and satisfactory. Hs distrust of Germany is perhaps 2 little uncalled for id so far as it concems the instruction of the Turkish Army by German officers. He might find the same fault with us for allowing our officers to reorgenise the Turkish Navy. Surely the object of Germany is primarily to make the Turkish Army pro-German and so secure the services of a valuable sccond, Lut nob necessarily to make it anti-Russian, ‘As for the Turco-Persian frontier, it is doubtful whether a reference of the dispute to The Hague would be of advantage either to us or to Russia, ‘Hfis] I[mperial] M{ejesty]'s attitude about Persia could not be better, especially as regards the Ex-Sheh and the same applies to the Cretan question. The subject of the Balkans is the most important one dealt with and thcre the action of Austria must be the determining factor in the situation. 2 Approve Sir G. Buchanan's language. HN. Feb{runry} 27, 1012 RP. 1 Ghink the Emperors fears re quite matual for the reasons which Eis] M[ojsty] gives » Me A very satisfactory audience. I quite understand the Emperor's remarks ss to German officers orgonising the Turkish army and rendering it a weapon of great strength and efficiency—550 i at , 5 , a to be used either against Balkan states (e1go indirectly against Russia) or against Russia directly in Asia. Tndecd a shong military Turkey with a possible Pan Ielomie programme has always been regerded by Russia as a danger, ALN. FDA. KG. No. 554. Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey. F.0, 9848/9848/12/7. (No. 22.1 Confidential. Sofia, D. February 24, 1912. Sir, R. March 4, 1912. Some time haying now elapsed since the departure of the Royal and Special Missions which visited this Capital on the occasion of the ceremonies in connection with the coming of age of His Royal Highness the Prince of Tirnovo, the present may perhaps be @ favourable occasion for discussing the possible political results of so important a gathering. The fuct that the five Crown Princes representing the Balkan States met at Sofia is @ significant factor. The visit which has attracted the most attention, and was certainly of the highest importance. was that of the Crown Prince of Greece. For several years, diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Greece had either been entitely interrupied, or had been of an extremely cold and formal description. The Greek Government were fortunate cnough, however, to send an able repre- sentative here in 1909. in the person of Mf. Panas, at that time Secretary General at Athors: he has been successful in considerably ameliorating the relations between the two Governments. and the visit of the Crown Prinee is largely due to his influence. Kirg Ferdinand’s ambitions and abilities are well known to yon; He has for many years dreamed of the creation of a Ryzantine Empire. of which he would be the Emperor. with its capital at Constantinopie. This dream has, however, gradually faded. and Tlis Majesty's views are now turned towards the Confederation of the Balkan States, to be followed by the ereation of a Balkon Empire, of which His Majesty. or his successor. would be the chief. At the first blush, this would also appear to be an irrealizable dream. but taking into consideration the finesse, astuteness, and industry ot His Majesty, it would be rash to prophesy as to its non-fulfilmont. T am of opinion that after the demise of the Austrian Hmperor His Majesty will opeuly throw in his lot with Russia, and will endeavour to marry the Grown Prince to one of the Emperor's daughters. Ie will. with Russia's consent, arrange a defensive alliance with Servia, to be followed by an arrangement with Greece, into which Moutenegro will eventually be drawn. Tis Majesty fully realizes that during the lifetime of the King of Roumania it will be extremely difficult to come to any arrangement with that country, as Bulgaria would never corsent to the cession of the Quadrilateral, or mdeed to the cession of any Bulgarian territory to Roumania, and these appear to be the only terms upon which Roumanian friendship can. at present, be obtuined. The personality of the Roumanian Crown Princo appears, however, in King Ferdinand’s estimation, to create a favourable ground on which to work. If the Russian marriage were to fail, the King, ‘‘ faute de mieux,” would marry his son to » Roumanian Princess, and in any case his second son, Prince Cyril, is likely to find wife at the Roumanian Court. The visit of Prince Frederick-Leopold was a mere act of courtesy; Tis Royal Highness returned to Berlin through Bucharest, travelling with the Crown Prince of Roumania, and thus emphasising, in a manner which was not particularly agreeablebal to the Bulgarian Court, the fact that the Hohenzollern influence is paramount at Bucharest. The visit of the Grand Duke André Viadimirovitch was particularly gratifying to the Bulgarian Court, in view of the personal friendship which formerly existed between the Grand Duke André’s father and the King, and the eminent services rendered by the former to the cause of Bulgarian independence. The Grand Duke was given precedence over all other Royalties and he was flattered and treated with much respect. The Archduke Charles Albert created a favourable impression. but no intimate political conversations were held with him. To sam up, the meeting of the Grand Duke and the Archbishop at Sofa, followe by the visit of the former to Vienna, was a prelude to the establishment of the coming “rapprochement” between these two great Powers; the germ of a friendly political feeling between the Balkan States was sown during the recent visits, and, with care and fostering, it is likely to grow and fractify. It should always be borne in mind that, for reasons which I have bad the honour to explain in previous despatches, King Ferdinand will endeavour to attain his political ambitions by peaceful means. have, de. H. 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. No. 555. Str I, Baz-Ironside lo Sir A. Nicolson. Private and Most Confidential. (’) ‘My dear Nicolson :— Sojia, February 26, 1912. ‘There has been much buzzing in the Austrian bee-hive lately, and the Legation must have received a hint from the Baliplatz, to endeavour to find out whether negotiations are proceeding between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments. Two days aiter the despatch of Carturight’s telegram No. 18 to Sir E. Grey of February 12th,(*) marked ‘‘ Most confidential", the Austrian Military Atiaché here bearded the Chief of the Staff, and endeavoured to extract information from him. General Fitcheff, who is kept in entire ignorance of these negotiations, denied their existence ‘* in toto.’ Larnowski sounded most of his collcagucs, and two minor officials at the Ministry, who are said to be in Austrian pay, but without success. Meanwhile, the negotiations had been proceeding very actively up to yesterday, when a deadlock arose. The Prime Minister drew up a rough draft of a defensive alliance, and sketched out @ line for a future extension of Bulgarian influence in Macedonia. ‘This contained a clause to the effect that in the case of the eventual break up of the Turkish Empire in Europe, Bulgaria should consider all territory to the East of a line which I will define later, as an integral portion of her own kingdom, whilst that to the West of such a line should come under Servian influence. A frontier was evolved both at Belgrade and Sofia, and it was naturally unacceptable to either party. A second attempt was then made. Gueshoff offered to concede Uskub and Kiipriilii to Servia, if Milovanovitch would consent to include the Struga valley, together with the village of the same name, in Bulgarian territory. This place lies to the N.N.W. of Lake Ochrida, and it appears that Servi attaches much importance to its future possession. Before his departure for Vienna and Beaulieu, King Ferdinand had given way to the great pressure brought to bear on him by Gueshoff and Daneff, and hed instructed the former, in the event of Sorvia agreeing to the Bulgarian proposals, to draw up the necessary papers for () [Cernock MSS., Vol. IT of 1912.] ©) Le. aupra, pp. 643-2, No. 549.)552 his signature. A conference was held at Belgrade, and I gather that Milovanovitch was won over to give his consent to the Bulgerian proposals. However, M. Pasitsch, who, as you are aware, is very powerful in Servia, supported by Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade, refused his assent, and thet is how matters stand at present. Nekludow here is supporting the Bulgarian line, and Hartwig the Servian, I will continue to keep you fully informed as to the state of these negotiations. If a defensive alliance between these two Powers is arranged, it would. in my opinion, tend to the preservation of peace in the Balkans. The only chance of success is that these negotiations should be kept entirely secret until concluded, and that no inkling whatever of them should reach the Austrian Government. The work is entirely carried on in M. Gueshoff’s private house. Meanwhile, I heard last night that King Ferdinand had instructed the Bulgarian Minister in Vienna to endeavour to make atrangemente for his official reception by the Austrian Emperor at an early date. ‘Yours sincerely, H. 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. No. 556. Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. F.0. 9875/9875 /12/89. (No. 11.) Belgrade, D. February 29, 1912. Sir, R. March 4, 1912, ‘The death of Count d’Achrenthal naturally elicited considerable comment in the Belgrade Press: but considering its low level it behaved with surprising correctness, only two of the numerous rags inveighing against the late statesman in abusive langnage. ‘The general view adopted of the political consequences of the death of His Excellency is that it will change nothing in Austria's attitude towards Servia. Occasion is also taken to comment on Austrian and Russian policy as affecting this eountry, and in view of the almost coincident improvement in the relations between the two Empires, it may be of interest to quote some of the remarks made in this connection, ‘The “ Pravda,’ organ of the Progressists. says: Most of the years spent abroad by Count @’Aehrenthal were spent in Russia and it was the thorough knowledge which he there aequired of Russia's worth that enabled him to proclaim the anuexa- tion of Bosnia. We Serbs, during the crisis that followed, consoled ourselves for the loss of Bosnia with the idea that Russia, owing to the damages caused by the Japanese war, was not ready to take action against Austria, otherwise that she would not have allowed the annexation to take place. However this is not true, for it becomes more and more evident every day that Russia would never have drawn the sword for Bosnia even had she been prepared. Russia had already ceded by special seoret treaties those two Serb provinces to Austiia, To-day again Russia is too much engaged in Asia and she will take good care not to come up against any Power in Europe. On the contrary, she is endeavouring to come to terms with Austria to have her hands free. The only reason why Russia was dissatisfied with the annexa- tion of the provinces was simply that she herself obtained nothing in return. Commenting on Count Berchtold’s appointment, the same paper remarks: It is not mere chance that makes the Emperor choose a man whose knowledge of Russia and popularity in St. Petersburg are greater even than those of his predecessor, it is because Austria in all her endeavours to advance in the Balkans finds herself confronted by Russia, and it is therefore essential that the man responsible for her policy should have a thorough knowledge of Russian methods. It is easier to beat an adversary when you Imow him, For us Serbs, Count Berchtold is asdangerous as Count d’Aehrenthal. He is even more dangerous. for he is younger and abler, and has a larger circle of influential friends. Berehtold is a rejuvenated Aehrenthal and the consequence will be a more active policy on the part of Austria iu the Balkans. . The * Srpscka Zastava.” organ of the Liberal party says: Count Berchtold will endeavour to bring about an improvement in Austrian and Russian relations, a ueressity which Count d’Achrenthel had already seen. But this desire will uol change the foreign policy of Austria which will remain imbued with imperialistic tendencies. What Count Berchtold will do will be to give more scope to that policy by coming to terms with Russia and thus having his hands freer. Serbs cannot therefore hope for any good to come out of an Austro-Russian rapprochement. Russia is ever ready to come to terms with Anstria, In Vienna they know that full well and that is the reason they always laugh at us. The “ Moniteur Commercial.”” au independent paper of standing, after reviewing at length Count d’Achrenthal’s antagonistic policy to Russia in the Balkans. states: In spite of all he did Count d'Aehrenthal was able to re-establish normal relations with Russia. We shall now see whether Russia will allow herself to be cajoled by Count Berchtold into arrangements detrimental to herself and to all Slavs. The “ Samouprava.”’ organ of the Government, merely published a long obituary notice but refrained from any commentary. The ** Politika “* endeavours to console Servian public opinion with the remark that not much harm will come to Serb races out of an Anstro-Russian rapprochement. According to its usual practice. that paper says. the Vienna press have suddenly changed their attitude towards Russia, they think they will beguile Russia, but in this they are mistaken for Russia cannot forget everything. The first thing that she can never forget is that Anstria can never he trusted. That is a sufficient reason why events will not be altogether as Austria wishes in the Balkans. These remarks ofthe "Politika" are worth noting. for that paper. besides being the semi-official organ is also in the pay of the Russian Legation. They are evidently intended to convey that Russia will not throw over Servia. Confidential.—tI have endeavoured to ascertain the feeling in official circles on an Austro-Russian rapprochement and I find that both M. Pashitch and M. Milovanovitch are optimistic about it, being confident that Russia will not abandon Servia. They even seem to hint that ther have assurances on the point. But what the scope of these assurances may be. or whether they come merely from M. de Hartwig or from St. Petersburg itself. and in this there is a considerable difference. no one seems able to tell. As to the relations hetween Servia and Bulgaria, concerning which M. Yovano- vitch showed himself more hopeful a fortnight ago, as reported in my despatch No. 10 Confidential of the 15th instant.:'; it seems from a number of conversations I have had in well informed circles. that there may be something in the air tending to a rayprochement, but everyone is very vague about it. On fhe other hand. the Bulgarian Minister told me confidentially that it was absurd to think that Bulgaria would ever tie her hands by coming to any definite arrangement with Servia: her Government could never be trusted, and her army did not count, He said that the relations between the two countries were certainly improving. but that there was a great gap between that and any precise arrangement, in the practicability of which he did not himself helieve. It should be remembered that M. Spalaikovitch, the Servian Minister in Sofia was at the beck and call of M. de Hartwig when he was here as Secretary General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is etill in constant touch with him. He has been going backward and forward frequently during the past few months between Sofia and Belgrade and every time he has had long conferences at the Russian () Le. supra, pp. 52-3, - 650,]554 Legation, when ML. de Iartwig no doubt pressed his views, which he has for a long time been advocating, as to the desirability of a rapprochement. Tho facts are probably that the Bulgarian Government do not discourage the advances of the Servian Government, although they have no intention of coming to any arrangement, and on the other hand thal M. Spalaikoviteb, who though an able man is an enthusiast rather apt to be carried away by his convictions, may be inclined to adopt too sanguine a view and to take wishes for facts. T have, &c. COLVILLE BARCLAY. MINUTE. It is @ curious estimate which makes Count Berchtold abler than his predecessor. WX. RP. M. L. M. No. 557. Sir,P. Cartwright to Sir A. Nicolson. Private.(*) My dear Nicolson, Vienna, February 29, 1912. Since 1 last wrote to you Aehrenthal has breathed his last, and he has been succeeded by Count Berchtold. The death of Count Aehrenthal is certainly a great loss, both to Austria-Hungary and to Europe, and ihe news of it has only been greeted with indifference in Germany. It is said that King Wdward once observed that what was necessary in Europe was a ‘‘chef d’orchestre.’’ Count Aehrenthal had little by little succeeded in a way in occupying that difficult position in the “Concert of Europe,’ and now that he is gone, every Power will begin to play its ‘own tuno in that ‘Concert,”’ for there is no statesman, except perhaps Sir Edward Grey, who enjoys the authority to make the band play together. {t is satisfactory, however, to know that the Emperor has expressed @ wish that the Aehreuthal policy shall be continued, but I foresee many difficulties in the way of this, for without a man of strong character at tho helm to carry it through, the policy will become flabby, nerveless and uncertain. Let us hope that Count Berch- told. who has the hest intentions in the world, may prove to be not merely a pupil but an emulator of Count Achrenthal. Le certainly knows the latter's views with rogard to the great lines of Austro-ITungarian policy, and T have no doubt that he will do his level best to follow them, but 1 am somewhat afraid that if Germany brings strong pressure to bear upon him and starts a campaign against him, his nerve will give way and he will either yield to the pressure or, what is moro likely, throw up the post in disgust. Baron Tucher, the Bavarian Minister here, who reflects the views of the German Embassy, spoke to me the other day’ most disparagingly of Count Berchtold. According to the Baron he was quite unfitted for the post he now holds, hecause he has never been in Berlin during his diplomatic career, and because he is soaked in Russian ideas and sympathies, Tschirschky, Tam told, has spoken in the same sense to people here, so I am afraid that trouble is brewing for Count Berchtold in Berlin. Count Berchtold has told me that he very reluctantly accepted the succession to Achreuthal, and that he only did so at the express desire of the Emperor, who told him that the reason which had led [is Majesty to select him was his knowledge of Russia which marked him out us the man who was most likely to facilitate a ‘‘ rapprochement ”” with that country. Count Aehrenthal’s policy may be said in a few words to have been as follows :— ‘he was in favour of the continuance of the Triple Alliance as one created for the (*) [Carnock MSS., Vol. II of 1912.)555 maintenance of peace and not for the purposes of aguression—an Alliance devised for the protection of Central Europe from any attack from without. Shortly before his death Achrenthal told Dr. Szeps, whom he frequently saw and with whom he was very intimate, that an alliance could only be lasting and real if made between equals, for if one of the parties to an alliance was much weaker than the other, the weaker was bound to be over-shadowed by the stronger. and that was sure to give rise 10 friction and trouble between them. Ie added that he had no intention of letting Austria-Hungary play a subordinate part in the alliance with Germany. As regards Italy, Aehrenthal was determined (o do his utmost to maintain good relations with her, and he considered that her remaining in the Triple Alliance was essential to Austria-ITungary, for if she separated from it, Austria would have a permanent enemy on her southern frontier which would drive her back hopelessly into the arms of Germany. With Russia Aehrenthal desired to be on the best footing, and it was one of his great regrets that the annexation crisis and his personal dispute with M. Isvolsky, should have dug a gulf between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Since that crisis he had laboured unremittingly to bridge over that gulf. and as he died he had the satisfaction of knowing that a ‘‘détente”’ between St. Petersburgh and Vienna was on the eve of being realized. With England and with France Aehrenthal desired 10 cultivate the best relations, in the first place because a quarrel with either of these countries made his task of keeping on good terms with Russia more difficult, and secondly, because if Austria was on good terms with England, France and Russia, she could offer more resistance to the exigencies and selfish demands of Germany. With regard to the Balkans, that part of Furope where Austian interests are paramount, Aehrenthal. I believe, sincerely desired the maintenance of the ‘* status quo.” and he was determined to do nothing which would bring about a change in that part of Europe. If the Turkish Government should collapse and the political geography of the Balkan States have to be re-written, he was resolved to see that essential Anstrian interests should not be injured by auything which might happen. With regard to this matter there are, I think, two points which must not be lost sight of: Austria will never allow Bulgaria to go to Salonika, nor will she admit that Servia shall ever penetrate to the Adriatic. I think that all other alterations which may oceur in the Balkaus are merely questions of detail for the Dual Monareby. When he was a dying man. Dr. Szep» tells me that Aehrenthal confessed that he might have made many errors of detail in carrying out his poliey—what man has not made errors?—but that he sincerely believed that the main lincs he had followed were the right ones, and he earnestly expressed the hope that his suceessor would keep close to them. It was not, however. Achrenthal’s abstract policy which Thave tried to explain to yon above which drew thonsands into the streets of Vienna on the day of his funeral, but it was the feeling in the crowd that Count Aehrenthal had iaised high the banner of the Hapsburg Monarchy which he had found almost ignoved by the other European Powers when he como to office. ‘The great demonstation of sympathy for the dead man on the day of his funeral was pei haps more a patriotic manifestation than one for the man himself who had always lived so retired a life that his personality was practically unknown to the people of Vienna for whoin he was merely a name... . « @ Yours truly. FAIRFAX 1. CARTWRIGHT. (2) [The rest of this letter deals with the war in ‘Tipolt and with \nstio-Lunganan ec urt pons.556 Xo. 558. Sir H. Baz-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson. Tel. (Private and Secret.)(*) Sofia, March 14, 1912. ‘A secret treaty of friendship and alliance between Bulgaria and Servia on lines foreshadowed in my series of private letters to you has been signed by Kings and Foreign Min[iste]rs of the 2 kingdoms.(*) K[ing] of Bulgaria signed this morning after considerable pressure and King of Servis on March 11. The Emp{ero}r of Russia and Russian Govfernmen]t are aware of the contents of the Treaty and former has taken a personal interest in its successful conclusion, Bulgaria has now definitely thrown in her lot with Russia. I understand Russian Gov[ernmen]t will communicate conclusion of treaty to other Powers of Triple Entente and I suggest that any knowledge of its existence should be kept secret until information reaches H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnmen]t either from Russia or other sources. +0) [Camock MSS., Vol. I of 1912.] (?)[0. immediately succeeding document, encl.] No, 559. Sir H. Baz-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson. Private & Most Confidential.(") My dear Nicolson, Sofia, March 14, 1919. ‘The secret negotiations which have been proceeding between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments, concerning which I have written you a series of private letters, commencing on October 28rd of last your,(®) and concluding with that of the 26th ultimo,(*) have now reached @ successful termination. This information I am telegraphing to you to-day.(*) ‘The last difficulty, namely that of the inclusion of the Struga valley in Servian territory, has now been got over, by the Bulgarian Government ceding the point, and I send you, herewith, a rough translation of the Treaty of Alliance. It was signed at Belgrade by King Peter and M. Milovanovitch on the 11th instant, and it is to be signed to-day by King Ferdinand und M. Gueshoff. The King of Bulgaria refused to sign yesterday, as it was the 18th of the month. I have myself seen the original draft of this Treaty: the Bulgarian version was in M, Gueshof’s own handwriting, and the Servian in that of M. Spalaikovitch, the Servian Minister in this capital. “T made my translation, with assistance, from this ‘aft. King Ferdinand was most loath to sign the third Article during tho lifetime of the Emperor Francis Joseph, as its provisions are directed against a forward movement on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government in European Turkey. I consider the Treaty to be very favourable to Turkey, and this is largely due to Servian pressure. Russia has made it a condition that the Treaty shell not be made known to any other Power without her consent. Thus it is of the highest importance that we should remain officially ignorant of its existence until it is communicated from St. Petersburg. e) one ‘MSS., Vol. II of 1912.) () [v, supra, pp. 518-4, No. 525.] @)[v. supra, pp. 851-2, No. 555.] () [v. linmediately preceding document, ]537 ‘The Russian Representatives in Bolgrade and Sofia, and through them the Russian Foreign Office, have been kept ‘au courant” with the course of the negotiations which have been proceeding regularly since the interview between MM. Gueshoff and M. Milovanoviteh, concerning which I reported to you in my letter of October 23rd last.(*) ‘Many difficulties have had to be surmounted in the course of the six months negotiations, and some of these arose in a quite unexpected quarter. ‘The general goodwill of M. Daneff had to be obtained, the spheres of propaganda, together with a delimitation of the future frontier of the respective Kingdoms, in the case of the break up of European Turkey, had to be definitely decided upon. These have not been mentioned in the Treaty, as the Powers interested consider that the fact that Russia is awaro of the arrangement come to is sufficient for the purpose. All this has been successfully arranged, and I will send you a map at a later date. As Russia has been cognizant of the “ pourparlers”, and has played a con- siderable réle in the successful negotiation of the Treaty, she is considered in the light both of a witness and a guarantee of its execution by the Servian and Bulgerian Governments. ‘This is especially important from the Servian point of view, because of King Ferdinand’s character ‘and lack of stability. M. Sazonoff exercised much influence on the Russian Representatives both in Belgrade and Sofia, and the matter was finally clinched by the Russian Emperor sending for the Bulgarian Military Attaché in Petersburg. and-requesting him to inform the Bulgarian Minister of Wat, General Nikyphoroff, that he would view with favour a successful termination of these negotiations, and this personal pressure, added to that brought to bear by Gueshoff and Daneff, has at last decided King Ferdinand to cease his favourite “‘ jeu de bascule”’. and to throw in his lot with Rnssia. By giving his consent to a defensive alliance with Servia, he shows his determination to oppose, by force of arms any advance Southward by the Austrians. Russia will doubtless shortly inform the other Powers of the Triple Entente of what has been done. and from the reference made to this subject by the Emperor, as reported to Sir E. Grey by Sir G. Buchanan in his despatch No. 66 Secret,(*) it would seem to be His Majesty's wish that the Powers of the Triple Entente should consult as to the line of policy to be adopted in certain eventualities in the Balkans. We may expect that negotiations will soon be entered into between Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, and, if successful, with “Montenegro, and later perhaps also with Roumania. The foundation has now been laid of a Federation of the Balkan States, backed by Russia, to oppose forward movement on the part of Austria in the Sandjak. ‘At the moment of writing this King Ferdinand has not signed. but the Messenger is just leaving. I hope to hear that he has signed this morning. Yours sincerely. TE. 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. P.S. 12.45 p.w. I have just received the news that King Ferdinand has signed. A. BI Enclosure in No. 559. Rough Translation into French from Bulgarian and Servian Original.(") Traité d’Amitié et d’Alliance entre les Royaumes de Boulgarie et de Serbie. Art. I. Préamble. Art. II. Les deux Etats se garantissent réciproquement et d’une maniére absolue l'indépendance et I’intégrité de leurs territoires. (°) [v. supra, pp. 518-4, No. 525.) (©) [v. supra, pp. 546-9, No. ©) [Zhe text of this treaty is printed infra, pp. 781-2, App. V.]558 Art. TIL, Les deux Etats s'obligent d’employer toutes leurs forces contre toute Grande Puissance qui essaicrait d’annexer ou d’occuper, ne fiit-ce que provisoirement, n'importe quelle partie de territoire Balkanique qui se trouve aujourd'hui sous Vautorité de la Turquie. Aprés une guerre, les deux Puissances feront la paix d’un commun accord. ; Art. IV. Les deux pays conelueront une Convention Militaire aprés la signature du traité, dans laquelle on déterminera les obligations militaires des deux pays en temps de guerre. le nombre de troupes, et les rapports entre les deux commandements. Art. V. La durée du Traité sera jusqu’d la fin de 1920. (Note). Certain details then follow as to the drawing up of the Treaty. Art. VI. Ce Traité pourra étre publié ou communiqué anx autres Etats seulement aprés entente préalable entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, assemblées dans ce but. Un autre pays peut ére regu dans alliance aprés entente préalable entre les deux Etats. Signatures. King of Bulgaria. King of Servi M. Gueshoff. M. Milovanoviteh No. 560. Sir A, Nicolson to Str F. Cartwright, Private.) My dear Cartwright, Foreiyn Office, March 18, 1912. 1 am much obliged to you tor your letter of the 14th instant.(:) I am afraid L have not much time to write you fully to-day, for I happen to be more occupied than nsual and have very little leisure time. There is one point, however. which T wish to mention to you, but only for your own private and confidential information, as it is at present a matter of profound secrecy and which 1 should not at all like to be disclosed by us. I therefore beg you to keep it entirely to yourself. I tell you it as 1 should like to have your opinion. Bulgaria and Servia quite recently signed a Treaty of Friendship and of Alliance, and ihe main point of this Consention is that the two States ongage to employ all their forces against any third Power who might attack, annex or occupy. even provisionally, any portion of Balkan territory, which is at present under the authority of Turkey. I am told that this Treaty has been negotiated under the inspwation of Russia and with the entire approval of the Russian Government. It is sigued by the two Sovereigns and also by the respective Ministers. I am surprised that King Ferdinand was induced to take such a step of this nature. However, it will probably sooner or later leak out, and 1 should think that the view which will be held by Austria in regard to Servia’s action will be a pretty serious one. It is most unfortunate that such a Convention has been concluded, especially under Russian auspices, as it shows that the Russian Government have no intention to work hand in hand with the Austrian Government in Balkan affairs, and this, personally, I much regret. 1 should not be surprised betore long that King Ferdinand will repent of the step which he has taken and will endeavour to reinsure himself by some ineans or another. To me it seems almost childish that Bulgaria and Servia cau imagine that they can resist the advance of any great Power, unless they were assured of Russian support. I again beg you to keep this information entirely to ()|Camock MSS., Vol. IL of 1912.] () [This Ietior 1’ not reptoduced. a it 13 chiefly concerned with at micdiatio betwen Ltiy and Tuber. (Cannock VSS.. Vol, IT of 1012), a559 yourself and not to mention it to your French colleague or anyone at all. We have received it in a private form and have not even allowed it to go into the department. I only tell it to you and no one else as I think you may be able to give mo some interesting views on the subject. I trust that you will embody them in a private and personal letter,(‘) apart from the one which you nsually write to me. [Yours, &e. A. NICOLSON.] (1 [The text of the letter written by Sir F, Cartwught in reply to this request is ven infra, pp. 783—t, App. V.] No. 561. Sw G, Louther to Sir A. Nicolson. . Privute.(4) My dear Nicolson. Pera, March 20, 1912. So far from ‘Teharykow's departure being taken with indifference, it has called forth almost universal expressions of regret, except of course socially. ‘The Turks are sorry, for Teharykow always smoothed down the disugreeable messages he had to give and the Balkan representatives lament likewise. The German and Austrian ‘Ambassadors can hardly conceal their delight, for the change is said to portend a return to the more bullying methods of Russia and it is expected that the Young Burks when no longer flattered by the representative of the Czar, will submit more readily to the blandishments of Germany, and disregard the kind expressions of the two friends of the snake in the grass. I hope Russia does not mean to adopt a disagreeable policy here. It will make our position and that of the French very difficult. Assim says that the only reason he knows of for the recall of ‘'charykow is the Straits question, in which Tcharykow declared when Sazonow practically disowned him, that he had been acting on the instructions of the Foreign Office. but that Sazonow being away knew nothing of it. +) ‘Yours ever, GERARD LOWTHER. (2 [Onrnock, MISS. Vl 11 ob 3022.) 2) [he rest of this letter is of a general nature and deals with changes in the Diplomatic stall af difercat Powers} No. 562. Su G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. P.O, 12852,'12852/12/38. (No. 97.) St, Petersburgh, D. March 21, 1912. Sir, R, March 26, 1912. T have the honour to repori that the ‘‘ Novoe Vremya”’ of March 18, published an interview with “a recent arrival from tho shores of the Bosphorus” on the recall of Monsieur Tcharykow. Tn to-day’s issue of the same paper ‘all oficial responsibility for the contents ‘of the article is repudiated, and it is denied that the person interviewed is in any way connected with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time the substance of560 the article argues at least a fairly intimate acquaintance with the affairs of the ‘Ministry. , ‘The unknown individual from Constantinople began by saying that Monsieur ‘Teharykow's friends represented him as the victim of an intrigue and his recall as deing due to the fact that he was proving a dangerous rival. Ilis enemies on the other hand maintain that he ought to have been recalled long ago. An Ambassador shonld not he a puppet in the hands of a foreign Government, but should pay due heed to instructions and to the policy of the head of his Department, Monsieur Tcharykow, however, in spite of private warnings of the danger of his aetion, had persistently ignored the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had continnally taken an entirely independent line, totally disregarding the instructions and policy of Monsieur Sazonow and of Monsieur Nératow while the latter was in charge of the Ministry. An impossible situation had thns been created. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been reduced to impotence. As concrete examples in sapport of these statements the person interviewed cited the question of th . which he declared thut Monsieur Teharykow had raised on his own initiative and had continued to negotiate notwithstanding that he had been instructed not to do so and had been informed that the moment was in- opportune for raising this question. Even when the Turkish Government had given an unfavourable reply he had continued his pourpurlers. Correspondence between the Ministry and Monsieur ‘Tcharykow only drew a reply from the latter in which he insisted ‘on his own point of view and declared his independence in this and in other matters of poliey. ‘The final result has been to create an atmosphere unfavour- able to Russia in Constantinople. , Further tension between Monsieur Sezonow and Monsieur Teharskow was pro- duced by the latter's démarche in regard to Turkish action in the province of Urumia. Some time ago information was received in St. Petersburg which proved beyond all donbt Turkey's intention to take undue advantage of the unrest in Persia in order to establish herself in that province. Monsieur Teharykow however protested that the action of the Turks was misunderstood, that the Ottoman Government had frankly confided to him their real ideas and motives, and that Turkey was only desirous of being on good terms with Russia, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on receiving yet further confirmation of their previous views on this eubject, repeated their instructions to Constantinople : but the only reply was an indignant denial of the trath of the information received. Another unfortunate step was taken by Monsieur Teharykow on his own initiative in regard to a federation of the Balkan States, the result being a fresh defeat for Russian diplomacy. Such a question is at present outside the realm of practical Politics, and is fit ouly for sensational newspaper articles. All these rebuffs to Russia are bound to impair Tnreo-Russian relations, and Russia’s foes naturally take full advantage of them. The correspondent of the paper asked if it was not true, nevertheless, that Monsieur Teherykow enjoys considerable influence in Turkish Government: circles, but the gentleman interviewed replied that this was formerly the case but is so no longer. ~The Turks were quick to see that Monsieur Tcharykow was a convinced optimist. and a perusal of his despatches wonld show that he had consistently adopted the Turkish view in all matters under discussion. Previous to his appoint- ment the Russian Government had three times saved Turkey from war, and yet ‘Turkey's only respone was to take advantage of the unrest in Persia to pursue an unfriendly policy towards Russia, The Ministry pointed this ont to Monsieur Tcharykow in vain: he still insisted that the Turks were really friendly, and that patience and time alone were needed. ‘As an instance of how the Turkisli Government imposed on the Russian Ambassador, the Armstrong contract for the construction of the Turkish fleet might be cited. Monsieur Teharykow wrote a despatch to the effect that owing to his advice tho Porte had deferred constructing cruisers and signing a contract for four years, and3561 of the ships would take three years, The nest day the Porte signed the ventract with Urmstiong. ty whieh all work was to be completed vithin two and a-ha . as regards mediation between Turkey and Trals. led that any Russian efforts in this direction were de med wed great disinclination ta co-operate with hi: mizht be imagined. all this ‘M. Teharvkow had to admit was impes: or udmit his mistukes. Nevertheless the Ministry had not treated him harsh! He will receive a salary of 15.000 roubles a year. and will remain in the Ministry cf Fereim Affairs. Yet one move instance: Monsieur Tcharykow declared emphatically that as a result of the measures taken by the Turks a fresh rising in Albania was absolutely impossible. But on March 17 a telegram announced that the rising had already begun and the situation was “* very serious."* “Monsienr Teharrkow is a man ef strong independent views and a strong Nationalist: he also considers that an Ambassador is a representative of the Emperor alone. and that it is incumbent on him to act on his own initiative and not merely to be the mouthpiece of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 have. ke, GEORGE W. BUCHANAN. Mensieur Teharykow failure art therefore Gavernment in the matter. As ther hed cre ted a siteation which even le. He refused bemever 19 mend his ways ‘The paragraph respecting Russian opposition to the Armstreng contract is i No. 568. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir 4. Nicolson. Private.‘ My dear Nicolson, St. Petersburgh, March 21. 1912. Many thanks for yoar letter.(*) The chief event of the last fortnight has been the sudden recall of Teharykow. His transfer from Constantinople to another post would not have created any surprise. as it was known that he did not see exe to eye with his Government with regard to Turkish affairs. hut nothing has so far transpired that explains the reason for his having been dismissed the service in such a peremptory fashion and for his having been relegated to the Senate instead of, like other ex-Ambassadors. being appointed to the Council of Empire. Sazonow told me in confidence that Tcharskow had been making a mess of things for some time past and had persisted in dis- regarding what he knew to be the views of his own Government. During the con- versations which took place between him and Said Pasha last Qvtober with regard to the question of the Straits, he had received the most categorical instructions to keep within certain clearly-defined limits. He had, however. as Sazonow put it, “jumped over all the barriers ’’: on one occasion he had telegraphed saying that it The] liad understood his instructions aright he would have to do something which Sazonow did not specify: and he had been told in reply that he was on no account to do it. He nevertheless did it. () [Carnock MSS., Vol, If of 1912.) . 12)[Net reproduced. The identification is uncertain. but it is probsbly Sir A, Nicolzon's letter of March 12. which mentioned M. Sazonov's mediation propossls and a letter from Sir G. Lowther on the ‘ubjet. It did not add substantially to information obtained elsewhere. (Carncck MSS., Vol. II of 1912.)] [5092] Qo2 Then came the mediation proposals. Nazonow had told him that he did not wish the Ambassadors to move in the matter, as he preferred discussing the question directly with the other Governments. Teharykow had therenpon begun intriguing and had worked directly against his own Government. Sasonow remarked that he had no objection to Ambassadors holding views of their own—and those of Tcharykow were ultra Tureophil—but it was impossible to allow un Ambasrador to give effect to such views when they were in uppositiun to the policy prescribed hy his Government. All this, however. does not explain what was the last drop that enused the enp to overflow. On Tuesday in last week Sazonow sew the Emperor, and. according to all accounts, nothing was then said about Tchaxykow's immediate recall. On tho following Friday an order was signed by the Emperor to the effect that Tcharykow was to be recalled at once and appointed to the Senate. As Kokovisoff had had an Andience of His Majesty on that day, some people imagine that it was he who on his own initiative had induced the Emperor to issue this order. I do not myself believe that Kokovtsoft had anything to do with the business. What I think really happened was that between Tuesday and Friday Tcharykow wrote or telegraphed something which displeased the Emperor so much that His Majesty ordered his immediate recall. What the particular something was it is difficult to say: but I expect that it had reference to the Turkish encroachments in the Trumia district... . . ) Ever yours, GEORGE W. BUCHANAN. (®) [The omitted paragraphs refer to the Turco-Porsian frontier question, Russian military preparations, and internal affairs.) No. 564. Minutes by Sir Lyre Crowe, Sir A. Nicolson and Sir Edward Grey. FO. 14058/14058/12/38. March 27, 1912. Sir Francis Oppenheimer, with whom I discussed yesterday the position now held in German public opinion by Herr von Kiderlen, fold me, although he could not vouch for the absolute truth of the statement, that it was commonly understood in well-informed quarters, that Herr von Kiderlen had scored a great triumph in the Polsdam arrangement with Russia.(!) under which Russia had agreed to move the bulk of the enormous Russian forces hitherto stationed on Prussia’s eastern frontier, far into the interior of Russia, thereby materially relieving the strain and diminishing the necessity of immediate counterpreparations in those localities. E. A. G. I think a misapprehension exists—Russia, with the full concurrence of the French General Staff, is reorganising her mobilization scheme—and would now mobilize belund the Vistula—not “far into the interior of Russia""—This T know for a fact. Morevver the comm(unicatioJns between the Russian and French General Staffs are very frequent and intricate, and we may be quite assured that the ramoured agree- ment ut Potsdam in yegard to these military matters is a legend, AN, ‘The ** well informed quarters” are no doubt informed by Herr von Kiderlen. E. G. (7) [She arrangements made at Potsdam will be referred to in a later volume.)Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. F.O, 18727/18727, 12/39. (No. 18.) Secret. Belgrade, D. March 28, 1912. Sir, R. April 1, 1912. I have the hononr to report that one of the foreign Mepresentatives here, who is always particularly well-informed and generally reliable, told me this morning in the comrse of conversation that he understood that the relations between Servia, and Bulgaria were so far improved that an understanding had been arrived at between tho two countries to move together in case of any third party advancing into the Balkan Peninsula. Ie did not believe there was any formal agreement, but only an understanding. It would seem that Servia and Bulgaria are longing for Ttalian action against Tarkey in Enrope and I was told and begged to keep the information secret, that the Italian Minister here has on more than one occasion been unofficially approached with offers of assistance in Macedonia in case Italy should desire combined action. To these offers the Italian Minister is said to have invariably replied that his Govern- ment’s policy is the maintenance of the Status Quo in the Balkans, and to have given the advice to Servia to keep quiet. Whether it is true that Italy has refused these advances of Servia, or whether negotiations are actually going on between Servia and Bulgaria on the one hand and Italy on the other for simultaneous action it is impossible to tell, It hardly seems likely however that Italy would gratuitously stir such a hornet’s nest. T have also heard that Monsieur Sasonow had recently proposed to the Austro- Hungarian Government a formula of agreement by which Russia and Austria would undertake not to make any forward movement in the Balkans. The Austrian reply had been merely that the policy of Austria was that of the maintenance of the Status Quo, and that a formal agreement on the lines suggested seemed therefore unnecessary. T have, &e. COLVILLE BARCLAY. MINUTES. Tt would been of more interest if Mr. Barclay hed told us tho namo of the foreign Repfzesenjt{ative]. I sh[ouJld doubt the accuracy of the inform[atiojn as to M. Sazonow approsching Vienna. ALN. Mr. Barclay tells me it was the Italian Minfiste}r. — EG No. 566. Sir H. Baz-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson. Private and Sveret.(") My dear Nicolson, Sofia, March 28, 1912. Soon after writing my letter to you of the 14th inst[ant].(*) M. Gueshoff asked me to call on him at his private house. He told me that it was only after long and serious consideration that he had adopted his new policy of concluding a secret (1) [Garnock MSS. Vol. IT of 1912.] ) (0. supra, pp. 556-7, No. 550.] [5092] 20 ©564 treaty of friendship and alliance with Servia, and that it required considerable persuasion to win over the King and M. Daneff to his views. ‘He was most anxious that no one in London should be cognizant of this treaty, except Sir E. Grey and yourself, until the Russian Government made their arrange- ments as to disclosing its contents. He further expressed the hope that his policy would mect with Sir E. Grey's approval: it was in his opinion, the most likely one to secure peace in the Balkans. . ‘Any Power advancing into European Turkey would now be faced with solid hostility on the pert of Bulgaria and Servia. becked up by Russia, and, he hoped, by the Triple Entente if necessary. He personally confirmed to me the information which I conveyed to you.(*) to the effect that the Russian Emperor himself sent for the Bulgarian Military Attaché in St. Petersburg, just prior to the latter’s going on leave, and expressed to him his wish for a successful termination to the negotiations which were then proceeding, ‘M. Gneshoff believes that the policy of a loose Federation of the Balkan States, or, to be more accurate, the conclusion of treaties of Friendship and Alliance between Bulgaria. Servia, Greece and Montenegro, for the maintenance of the ‘‘ status quo,” under the aegis of Russia and with the goodwill of Turkey, is the best policy for the maintenance of peace. He is of opinion that if Austria is faced by such a combina- tion she will not occupy the Sandjak, but will content herself with economic benefits. I gather that after Easter M. Daneff, on the part of the Bulgarian, and M. Pasitch, on the part of the Servian Government, will proceed to Petersburg to communicate the Treaty officially to the Russian Government, who will then acquaint the other members of the Entente with its existence, and explain Russia’s views: meanwhile, it seems probable that they will, after this, approach Greece to join the Federation. on the understanding, however, that the Cretan question be ‘entirely exclnded from the programme. . . . «| ) Yours sincerely, H, 0. BAX-IRONSIDE. ©) [e. supra, p. 387, No. 859. () [The succeeding paragraphs are entirely personal-] No. 567. Sir H. Baz-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson. Private and Most Confidential. (*) My dear Nicolson, Sofia, April 8, 1912. I am venturing to send you, with apologies for its length, this letter containing my views with regard to pending developments in Balkan politics. In your letter of March 18th(?) you write, “I should have liked to have seen all the Balkan States confederate for the maintenance of the ‘status quo’ under the aegis of Russia and Austria.”” Such an arrangement would be an ideal one, but we have, alas! to put up with ‘a less satisfactory standard in this world. ‘The solution of the Balkan problem will, I think, be found in the expression quoted in your letter with the omission of the words ‘and Austria.” In my despatch No. 8 Confidential of the 15th January(*) I gave what IT considered to be cogent reasons for Russia's not standing by with folded arms, were a catastrophe to arise. To those reasons, which still hold good, I would wish () [Garnock MS8., Vol. IV of 1912.] (©) [Not reproduced, as the letter cannot be traced.] ©) [v. supra, pp. 839-82, No. 580.]