T

he war between Russia and Georgia photo by Dmitry Lovetsky: AP

has some nationalist elements and ev-
idence of old grudges, but it is mostly
about Russia’s newly found power as
an energy imperialist. Georgia has refused to
play along like other former Soviet states. If
anything, its independent attitude has been a
giant irritant to Russia ever since Vladimir Pu-
tin used oil and gas to project hegemony over
the region and, by extension, into all Europe.
At the same time, the tiny country of just 4
million people has been trying to ward off the
giant to its north by seeking membership in
NATO or the E.U. In the post-Cold War era,
the U.S. and Russia-dependent Europe have
been reduced to pleading for calm.
A look at the map makes the conflict’s is-
sues quite transparent. Oil and gas can come
from Russia into Europe by tanker through
the Black Sea from its massive terminal in
Novorossiysk, or by pipelines through Belar- kilometer line connects the oil-rich Caspian A Russian armored
us and Ukraine. (There are also plans for a with southern Europe in what was to be an vehicle enters a
subsea pipeline in the Baltic.) These routes energy corridor for European oil and gas sup- tunnel, moving
toward the border
give Russia huge leverage – almost an ener- plies. The pipeline is designed to carry 1 mil- with Russia's North
gy monopoly – over both the transit and the lion barrels per day from Azerbaijan’s Caspian Ossetia, 70 km
destination countries. Over 25 European coun- oil fields to the export terminal Ceyhan via (43 miles) north
tries now depend on Russia for as much as Tbilisi, with Georgia acting as a very impor- of Tskhinvali, the
Georgian breakaway
75 percent of their oil and gas. tant transit country. This did not sit well with province of South
Georgia was eager to act as a spoiler, and Russia, cutting it out from oil exports to Eu- Ossetia's capital.
European countries were even more eager rope. The pipeline, funded by Western oil com-
to comply while trying to avoid incurring the panies and banks to the tune of $3.2 billion,
wrath of the hand that feeds them. was commissioned in 2006.
First, it was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil What gave Russia fits, and still does, is
pipeline that started construction in 2002 other possibilities that could affect its control
when Russia was much weaker. The 1,776 – for example, underwater pipelines that could
be built across
the Caspian link-
ing Kazakhstan or
Turkmenistan.
But Russia was
really irked over
talk of a gas pipe-
line, similar to the
oil pipeline, again
linking Azerbai-
jan and Turkey
and points beyond
(Baku-Tbilisi-Er-
zerum) through
Georgia. This would
give Georgia energy
independence and
create an alterna-
tive route to – the
holy grail of Rus-
sian geopolitics
– Gazprom’s transit
monopoly.

October 2008