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ISSUE: - W/N the judge is given the discretion to impose a penalty other than what is prescribed by law
HELD/RATIO: - No. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of law and ought to protect and enforce without fear or favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty in spite of his personal contrary beliefs. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
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Garcia v. Recio
FACTS: - Rederick Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian citizen) in Malabon, Rizal in 1987 and lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, their marriage was dissolved by decree of divorce issued by the Australian Family Court. - In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" from the Australian government. - In 1994, Recio married petitioner Grace Garcia (a Filipina) in Cabanatuan City where the respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino" - In 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior dissolution of marriage and their conjugal properties were divided in 1996 in Australia. - In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of "bigamy" because Recio was alleged to have a subsisting marriage at the time of his marriage with Garcia in 1994. Garcia claimed that she only knew about the previous marriage in 1997. ISSUE(S): (a) Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven (b) Whether or not Recio has legal capacity to remarry HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. Samson and Recio's divorce appeared to be authentic as issued by an Australian family court. Compliance with the Family Code is not necessary since Recio, having acquired Australian citizenship in 1992, was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with a political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. By becoming an Australian, Recio severed his allegiance to the Philippine and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. (b) No. The court held that respondents presentation of a decree or an interlocutory decree, a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce, showed that the divorce obtained may have been restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to national law. Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the application for a marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been admitted as a prima facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence that proves that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
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ISSUE: - W/N the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent even after their divorce obtained in USA
HELD/RATIO: - No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his county, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him. He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a wife's obligation. The private respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
Barreto v. Gonzales
FACTS: - Plaintiff and defendant are Filipino citizens and residents of Manila. They were married in 1919 in Manila and lived together as husband and wife until 1926. - It was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, P500 monthly (to be increased in case of illness or necessity), and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. - Husband went to Reno, Nevada and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion in 1927 and on the same date married another Filipina (with whom he had 3 children). He then lived in California and returned to the Philippines in 1928 where he has since remained. When the defendant left he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and 4 minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. - After his return, the wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that the court confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued in Nevada: The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until 1 year thereafter.
ISSUE:
W/N the divorce obtained in Nevada, USA be recognized and approved by the Philippine courts.
HELD/RATIO: - No. Art. 11 provides that ... The prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or agreements entered into a foreign country. The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which both parties prayed for the ratification and confirmation of the Reno divorce, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippines regarding divorce and to secure themselves a change
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Government v. Frank
FACTS: - On April 17, 1903, in Chicago, the defendant through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippines, entered into contract for a period of two (2) years with the plaintiff by which the defendant was to receive a salary of $1,200 per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and 1/2 salary during said period of travel. - Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and 1/2 salary paid during such period - The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon April 30, 1903, and was paid his salary from the date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippines. - On February 11, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract - On December 3, 1904, the plaintiff filed an action in the Court of First Instance in Manila to recover from the defendant a certain sum. - It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and 224 should constitute a part of said contract. - Lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant who shall pay the plaintiff a certain amount. - Defendant claims that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult when he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later ISSUE: - W/N the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was valid under Philippine laws HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. The law of the country wherein the said contract was executed shall govern as was provided by Art. 17 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Barnuevo v. Fuster
FACTS: - On 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo, both citizens of Spain, got married in a Catholic ceremony in Malaga, Spain. - On 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippines and acquired real and personal property. Towards the middle of 1896, Contanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899. - On April 4, 1899, they made an agreement in a public document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases" - Fuster undertook in the same document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid from June 1899, but he only complied until August 1899.
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W/N the validity of the testamentary dispositions of the deceased is to be governed by the law of the State of California wherein the deceased was a citizen
HELD/RATIO: - YES, the law of the State of California governs, as it is the national law of the deceased. But the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. There is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children.
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ISSUE: - W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the filing of the criminal action. HELD/RATIO: Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence an adultery case on the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Thus, it follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this it meant that he is still married to the accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of the complaint.
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SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS (2007) GR No. 133743 and GR No. 134029
Petitioners: Edgar San Luis and Rodolfo San Luis Respondent: Felicidad Sagalongos (alias Felicidad San Luis) FACTS: - Felicisimo T. San Luis, the settlement of whose estate is involved in the present case has contracted three marriages during his lifetime. First Marriage.On March 17, 1942, he married Virginia Sulit and they had six children. Virginia died on August 11, 1963. Second Marriage. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American Citizen, with whom he had a son. However, the latter filed a divorce in Hawaii, USA and a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody was subsequently issued. Third Marriage. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis in California, USA. He had no children with her but he lived with her for 18 years up to his death on December 1992. - Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. Consequentl y, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City praying that said letters of administration be issued to her. - Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis who was later joined by Linda, children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed motions to dismiss which the trial court denied. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis separately filed motions for reconsideration. The petitioners have the following arguments: The petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence, the latter being the Governor of the said province. The respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Paragraph 2, article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. Respondent on the other hand, has the following oppositions: She submitted documentary evidence that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang, Metro Manila. She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued in Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
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ISSUES: (a) W/N the venue was properly laid (b) W/N respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
HELD/RATIO: (a) The Court found that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court. It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile. Fo r purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. (b) The Court held that the provisions of the Family Code need not retroactively apply, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudence allowing to rule in the affirmative. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage if respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA, it is found that the respondent has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved and therefore, this case must be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree and the subsequent marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. The respondent would qualify as an interested person who has direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo. Her legal capacity to file the letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Art. 144 of the Civil Code or Art. 148 of the Family Code.
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FACTS:
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ISSUE: - W/N respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
HELD/RATIO: - The Court held that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. Article 26 (2) should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The basis is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American cit izen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
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ISSUES: (a) W/N plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her especially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead (b) W/N the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. Petitioners have a cause of action. Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage because such provision pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Furthermore, the Court cited that a void marriage, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife , and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. (b) The cohabitation between respondent and Pepito Nial was not the cohabitation contemplatedby law thus it cannot be covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license and is void ab initio lacking such element. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
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FACTS: - On April 13, 1988, Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage. - Petitioner alleges the following: That threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988 That respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not granting the annulment of marriage, the consent of petitioner having been vitiated by fraud and intimidation and that there was no cohabitation The there were harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threat ening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her and that he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. - Private respondent on the other hand refutes petitioners allegations arguing that the latter freely and voluntarily married her thus praying for the dismissal of the petition and for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. ISSUES: (a) W/N the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent (b) W/N petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and c osts HELD/RATIO: (a) No. Petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife since lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. The Court is disturbed by the circumstance that it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. The prolonged inactio n evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando in the hope that the annulment may bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy against him. As to the appellants allegation on the lack of cohabitati on, the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds that may vitiate consent, hence the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
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ISSUE: - W/N the state of facts as presented by the petitioner satisfies the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code HELD/RATIO: - YES. The petitioner, in an action for declaration of nullity under Art. 36, was able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence, which was further corroborated by the witnesses he presented. In addition, the root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, as proven by experts. Such incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. The gravity of respondents incapacity is sufficient to prove her inability to perform the essential marital obligations.
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ISSUE(S): (a) W/N judicial declaration of nullity of marriage must be obtained first before a person can remarry. (b) W/N Mercado was guilty of bigamy. HELD/RATIO: (a) Yes. It is expressly provided in Art. 40 of the Family Code that, The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be inv oked for the purpose of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In this case, wh ile the previous marriage was judicially declared null and void, such was made only after the subsequent marriage was contracted, thus the subsequent marriage shall be deemed to be null and void. (b) Yes. Mercado was guilty of bigamy since all the elements of the crime under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code were present, namely: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In this case, the petitioner contracted the second marriage prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, which at that time was still valid and subsisting. The court ruled that bigamy is committed if a subsequent marriage is contracted by a person without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity. In addition, bigamy is determined not by the fact that the first marriage is void but by virtue of contracting a subsequent marriage absent a judicial declaration of nullity of such previous marriage.
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ISSUE(S): (a) W/N there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Parker was already dead (b) W/N the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts declaration of presumptive death of Parker. HELD/RATIO: (a) No. Art. 41 of the Family Code prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death may be granted. Based on the facts, the court held that the respondent failed to conduct a search for his wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead. The investigation he had done to ascertain his wifes whereabouts was too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. Moreover, the court did not give much credence to his assertion that he had inquired from their friends her whereabouts since he did not identify those friends in his testimony. Also, respondent failed to explain his failure to ask for help from the authorities of London and Liverpool. The court found it difficult to regard the claim of a well -founded belief of death under the circumstances of Parkers departure and respondents subsequent behaviour. (b) Yes. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts declaration of presumptive death of Parker was reve rsed and hereby nullified by the Supreme Court by virtue of the respondents failure to establish that he had a well -founded belief required by law that his wife was already dead.
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ISSUE(S): (a) W/N the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was valid despite the absence of judicial declaration of presumptive death. (b) W/N Marietta is the rightful heir of the estate as the surviving spouse. HELD/RATIO: (a) The marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on May 8, 1958 in which the law in effect at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on Aug. 3, 1988. Art. 256 of the Family Code limited its retrospective governance only to cases not prejudicial to acquired/vested rights in accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The Court ruled that the applicable provision in this case is Art. 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) XXX (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Art. 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by competent court. Accordingly, the Court held that a judicial declaration of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met, and that the present spouse contracted the second marriage in good faith to render the subsequent marriage as valid. Thus, the second marriage having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
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HELD/RATIO: In this case, the Court ruled in favor of the prosecution which proved that Eduardo was married to Rubylus in 1975, and that such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. It was also proven that Eduardo married Tina in 1996, when the Family Code was already in effect. As provided in Art. 41 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art. 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
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ISSUE(S): W/N Morigo committed bigamy, and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
HELD/RATIO: The elements of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
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ISSUE(S): (a) W/N there exists a first marriage with Villareyes. (b) WON the judicial declaration of nullity of subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity will not make the petitioner liable for bigamy. HELD/RATIO: (a) The petitioner presented certification from NSO and City Civil Registry of Manila that such offices have no record of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. However, the prosecution was able to present sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the first marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. A copy of marriage contract as certified by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila, and a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas confirming that Tenebro was legally married to Villareyes were presented as evidences. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer, or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Hence, the certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the public officer in custody thereof was admissible as the best evidence. As such, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence presented to prove the
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HELD/RATIO:
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Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon met on March 1938 and were engaged on September 19 of the same year. On November 26 of the same year, they got married in the Catholic Cathedral of Baguio City. Eighty-nine (89) days after the marriage, Luida gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939. Petitioner left the respondent and filed a Complaint for annulment in the lower court on the grounds of fraud against respondent for concealing to her husband-to-be that she was not a virgin and that she was pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage.
ISSUE(S): - W/N Luida is guilty of fraud for concealing her pregnancy, and thus should be a ground for annulment HELD/RATIO: - No. Annulment requires clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner, however, failed to present reasonable evidence on account of fraud that he was indeed unaware of the pregnancy of respondent. At the time of their marriage, respondent was already more or less six months pregnant and it would be uncommon, lest ridiculous, that petitioner was unaware of the said pregnancy.
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ISSUE: - W/N can validly invoke concealment of the pregnancy of the respondent as constituting fraud, and thus a ground for annulment HELD/RATIO: - No. Wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. However, it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own.
FACTS: - Maria Victoria Tuason and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3, 1972 and had two children. - Maria Victoria Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition for annulment of her marriage to petitioner. - Private respondent, in her complaint, alleged that at the time of her marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations for the following reasons: violent fights between husband and wife petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent petitioner used prohibited drugs and has not been rehabilitated petitioner was a womanizer left the conjugal dwelling, cohabited with three women in succession, and gave minimal support to the family petitioner became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership
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Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. His defense: it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband 1984, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip During the trial, private respondent presented four witnesses and submitted documentary evidence proving her allegations against petitioner. Petitioner failed to appear on the hearing. Court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding the custody of the children to private respondent. No appeal was taken from the decision by the counsel for petitioner. Private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties Petitioner opposed to the motion. Through new counsel, he filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the decision. Trial court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment, but such was also dismissed and the order of trial court affirmed.
ISSUE: - W/N Order of Makati RTC has become final and executory, thus, a petition for relief from judgment is not valid. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Trial court did not err in granting the declaration of annulment of marriage on the grounds that there was no collusion between parties or that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed. The decision of the trial court was not in violation of his right to due process, thus it is not null and void. After failing to appear on two scheduled hearing, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of petitioner's confinement for rehabilitation. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. Petitioner failed to give any reason why his former counsel did not inform the court of the scheduled hearings. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence.
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W/N respondent judge acted with bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in civil case
HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court found the respondent judge to have acted with bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in civil case. Respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Marcias right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution. Respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Rules on Civil Procedure: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial. Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias motion to set the case fo r pre-trial. Rail-roading
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ISSUE: -
W/N the custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes should be granted to the petitioners.
HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes and ruled that the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus be granted. In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to care and custody of the adopted child (Art. 189(2) of Family Code) and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him (Art 17, PD 603).
Espiritu v. CA (1995)
Petitioner: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug Respondent: Court of Appeals and Teresita Masauding FACTS: - In 1984, Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding entered a common law relationship in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. - Rosalind Therese, their daughter, was born on October 7, 1987. - While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, Reginald was born on January 12, 1988. - The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. - Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California where she used to work as a nurse. - Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh and had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. - Teresita returned to the Philippines and on 1992 she filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. - On 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over the two children and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with visitation rights to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
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ISSUE: - W/N the Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to respondent Teresita. HELD/RATIO: - Yes. The Court held that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to respondent. The findings and conclusions of the regional trial court is sustained because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. Court of Appeals resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code and of Article 213 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by compelling reasons. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Mangonon v. CA (2006)
Petitioners: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon, for and in behalf of her minor children Rebeccas Angela Delgado and Regina Isabel Delgado Respondents: Court of Appeals, Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Federico C. Delgado and Francisco C. Delgado
FACTS: - Petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married. - At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent Civil Code provides, it was later on annulled.
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ISSUE: - W/N Francisco is obliged to give support to their children HELD/RATIO: - Yes. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children's college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Art. 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters' education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite. Moreover, Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling.
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-Francisco (plaintiff) and Tayao (defendant) contracted marriage in Manila in 1912 - They got separated in 1917. - The husband then moved to Zamboanga,and thereafter had an affair with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano who was the wife of Ambrosio Torres. - Torres filed a criminal case against Tayao and his wife. They were then sentenced to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days imprisonment (prision correccional), and to pay costs. - Relying on this criminal case, Francisco filed to sever the bonds of their marriage in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and was later denied by its judge basing on the fact that Francisco was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of Sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law.
ISSUE(S): - W/N Francisco can secure a divorce from Tayao, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which he was convicted of adultery may also constitute concubinage HELD/RATIO: - No. Francisco could not secure a divorce because she was not the innocent spouse who filed the criminal case against Tayao. Tayao was convicted of the crime of adultery, not concubinage, which is the only cause of action for filing a divorce against a husband. The institution of a criminal case by the injured wife is essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage, and subsequently, for the proper filing of legal separation. What Francisco was asking from the Court was to convict the defendant of the crime of concubinage, although she had not established a prosecution for the same.
GANDIONCO vs PEARANDA (1987) Petitioner: Froilan Gandionco Respondents: Hon. Senen Pearanda (Presiding Judge of the RTC of Misamis Oriental) and Teresita Gandionco
FACTS: - On May 29, 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, presided over by judge respondent, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. - On October 13, 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage as criminal case. - Respondent Judge ordered the payment of support pendente lite. - Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto (support and damages) should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. To support his argument, petitioner cites Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states: Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense the following should be
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- Mariano Arroyo (husband) and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo (wife) were married for 10 years. - The wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separately from her husband Mariano. - The husband made efforts inducing the wife to resume marital relations but to no avail. - The husband initiated an action to compel his wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. - The wife admitted the fact of marriage and that she left home without his consent but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of cruel treatment imposed by her husband. Thus, she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of: (1) decree of separation; (2) liquidation of conjugal property; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. RIVERA 2013 Page 57
Silvino (husband) and May (wife) were married and blessed with four children. The husband caught his wife for several times having extra-marital affairs with other men. But the husband, for the sake of their children, wanted to reconcile with her wife and to start a new life. The couple started a new life but few months later, the wife continued a promiscuous behaviour. The wife confessed that she does not love him anymore. The husband realized that their marriage was hopeless. They then lived separately. The husband filed a complaint. RTC declared their marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity based on the Psychological Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision on the ground that Mays alleged sexual infidelity and emotional immatu rity do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be acquitted from conviction of Bigamy after the subsequent marriage was declared void ab initio. HELD: No. RATIO: 1. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. 2. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 3. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 4. The declaration of nullity of marriage shall first be secured before another marriage be contracted.
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SPOUSES REX and CONCEPCION AGGABAO v. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN
Petitioner: Rex and Concepcion Aggabao Defendant: Dionisio Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena Parulan Facts: -
The case involves two parcels of land located in No. 49 Miguel Cuaderno Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Paraaque City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. Respondent spouses have been estranged from one another. Real estate broker Atanacio offered the property to petitioners. The petitioners already met with Ma. Elena and made payment arrangements. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the possessi on of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a week. The petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376, b ecause Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined. Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena. Dioniso, through Atty. Parulan, commenced the action.
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PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
Petitioner: Joselito R. Pimentel Defendant: Maria Chrysantine L. Pimentel and People of the Philippines Facts: -
Private respondent filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner was summoned in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in RTC QC on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
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Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. Held/Ratio: 1. Annulment of Marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case of parricide. a. The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. b. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. 2. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals cannot be applied to this case. a. The issue in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. b. Also, the Court declared in that case that a declarati on of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
Petitioner Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo under Art. 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent. Respondent Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied it due to failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of appeal, which was likewise denied. The RTC declared the decision to be final. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC. 1. Cynthia sought for motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration. The CA denied this.
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BACCAY v. BACCAY Petitioner: Noel Baccay Defendant: Maribel Baccay and the Republic of the Philippines Facts: -
The petitioner and private respondent were schoolmates at Mapua Institute of Technology. The two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type. Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring her to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordin ately shy when around his family. During special occasions, he would invite her to come with his family but he would always try to avoid his invitations. Noel talked to her about her attitude towards his family and she said she would change, but she never did. Noel decided to break up with Maribel. Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with another woman only if they would not sever their ties. They remained friends. Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, they had several romantic moments together. Noel took their sexual relations casually since Maribel never demanded anything aside from his company. Maribel told Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon the advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. They got married. After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal, Pag -asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them.
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Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Held/Ratio: The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have se xual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marita l obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
AGRAVIADOR v. AGRAVIADOR
Petitioner: Enrique Agraviador y Alunan Defendant: Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador Facts: -
Petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress when they first met at a beerhouse where the respondent worked. They got married and had four children. The petitioners family was apprehensive about thi s marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and because she came from a broken family. The petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible,
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Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to com ply with the essential marital obligations. Held/Ratio: The petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condit ion is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. o Petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage o Petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady w as incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. o Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper.
ANTONE v. BERONILLA
Petitioner: Myrna P. Antone Defendant: Leo R. Beronilla
Facts: -
Petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He argued that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran.
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Issue: Whether or not the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained resp ondents motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information. Held/Ratio: The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition. It would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the information on the basis o nly of the petitioners evidence. The Court sees no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar. The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
DOLINA v. VALLECERA
Petitioner: Cherryl B. Dolina Defendant: Glenn D. Vallecera Facts: -
Petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. Dolina also prayed for financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child, which she based on the childs Certificate of Live Birth which listed defendant as t he father. Petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. Vallecera argued that the petition was just for financial support and not for protection against abuses, that the signature on the Certificate of Live Birth is not his, and that he has never lived with Dolina. The RTC dismissed the petition.
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Title: Marable v. Marable (GR no. 178741, Jan 17, 2011) New Civil Code: Article 36
Petitioner: ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Respondent: MYRNA F. MARABLE Facts: Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children. As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
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Issues:
e. f.
g. h.
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Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. After no response from the espondent, petitioner learned that she had alrady filed for a divorce/dissolution of their marriage which was granted by theSuperior Court of California, and that on Oct. 5, 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years, long-lasting, hence incurable The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents psychological incap acity, however, declaring that: A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. i. Petitioner partially appealed to this order which ten led the court to modify it as: 1. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code b. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issues: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code Held/Ratio:
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b. c. d. e.
Title: Yambao v. RP and Yambao (GR No. 184063, Jan. 24, 2011) New Civil Code: Article 36
A. Petitioner: CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO B. Defendant: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children. Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is the duty of the household help
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Issues: Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations based on evidence presented by the petitioner
Held/Ratio: a. b. c. d. e. The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. The Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition On the contrary to petitioners allegations, respondents efforts , though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners exacting standards. Yet t his Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than others; that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems
f.
g.
h.
C.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED
Title: Aguete v. PNB (GR No. 170166, Apr. 6, 2011) RIVERA 2013 Page 72
b.
c. d. e.
f.
g.
h. i. j. k. l.
Issues: Whether or not Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, which debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership
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C.
Ruling+ Ratio: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court a. b. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguetes marr iage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros mortgage to PNB of the subject property The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife The same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.18 The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the courts with unclean hands. In their memorandum before the trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguetes signat ure The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively for additional working *capital+ of buy & sell of gar lic & virginia tobacco. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
c. d. e.
f.
g. h. i. j. k. l.
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Issues: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits
Held/Ratio: The petition has merit a. The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The mortgagecreditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
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c. d. e.
f.
g. h.
i.
j. k.
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Issues: Whether or not the issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by law
Held/Ratio: We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit a. Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions . The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration b. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding c. On the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his petition for restitution of marital rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. d. Aside from complainants bare allegation, there was no substantial evidence presented to prove the charge. e. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail (Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-5-43, 8 July 2005.
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Issues:
1. Whether or not Court of Appeals violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity of the marriage between Vida and Danilo; 2. Whether or not the a Court of Appeals violated the applicable and jurisprudence when it denied petitioners action for cer tiorari despite the fact that the denial of his motion to dismiss by the trial court is patiently and utterly tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Held/Ratio: 1. No. The Court of Appeals did not violate the applicable law and jurisprudence. Contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged i n the complaint. The manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. An expect psychologist clinically identified the same root causes. The illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
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No. The Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The CA properly dismissed the petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not reviewable for certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiter ate the grounds in his motion to dismiss as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.
1.
2. 3. 4.
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Held/Ratio: YES. Thus,during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Herrara v. Alba -applied by RTC and CA -four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case -procedural aspects are only applicable during trial when parties have presented their evidence and not during the initial stage of proceedings, such in this case that the petition to establish filiation has only been filed. -CA erred in observing that that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity case prima facie case -built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence Rule on DNA Evidence -enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system -prescribed parameters on the requisite
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Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the January 21, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos City which found petitioner Cenon R. Tevez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On November 26, 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Tevez and Thelma Jaime-Tevez at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. After the marriage, Thelma worked abroad. In 2002, she came home to the Philippines for vacation and she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Based on the copy of Certificate of Marriage from the National Statistics Office, Cenon and Edita married on December 10, 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
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1.
2. 3. 4.
Held/Ratio Yes. Petitioner has committed bigamy Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and th us, there is no bigamy to speak of.He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined. Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tanis inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioners case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court. The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. A marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void. The remarrying spouse must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
Cabreza Jr., et al. v Cabreza (2012) G.R. No. 181962 RIVERA 2013 Page 82
Ruling + Ratio: No. Litis pendentia was not properly invoked in dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale.
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Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., et al. v Servacio and Go (2011) G.R. No. 157537
Petitioners:Heirs Of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola, namely: Leonor, Simplicio, Protacio, Jr., Antonio, Beverly Ann Lorrainne, Tita, Consolacion, Leonora and Asuncion, all Surnamed Go Respondents: Ester L. Servacio and Rito B. Go
Facts:
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4. 5. 6.
7.
Issue: 1. 2.
Whether or not Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This provision gives reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Such declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale. 2. No.
In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
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Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa, et al. v Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr., et al. (2012) G.R. No. 185064
Petitioner:Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa Respondent: Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr. and Ma. Rufina D. Acero,Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte and Registrar Alfredo Santos Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa. The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor. Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify the MTC ruling in favor of Spouses Aceroon the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan.
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Held/Ratio: Petition DENIED. Family Home -sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime -from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment -a right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment andcannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases -right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter Article 153 of the Family Code -exception stated is a personal right -incumbent upon Spouses De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home
ANTONIA R. DELA PEA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEA v. GEMMA REMILYN AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO. (FEBTC-BPI) (2012) GR No. 197490
FACTS: Antonia R. Dela Pea (married to Antegono A. Dela Pea) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the 277 square meter parcel of land located in Marikina City in favor of Aguila for the purpose of securing a loan. Parcel of land: mortgaged for the purpose of securing the payment of the loan obligation. Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolut Sale over the property in controversy in favor of Gemma Avila (respondent) for the consideration of 600,000 php. Thus, Avila is now the owner of the subject in question. Avila, as the new owner of the property, constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel of land located in Marikina in favor of Far East Bank & Trust Co. (now BPI) for purposes of securing a loan.
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FEBTC-BPI caused the Extra Judicial Foreclosure of the said property due to Avilas failure to pay the secured loan. Being the high est bidder, the property in controversy now belongs to FEBTC-BPI when the latter caused the property to be entitled to its name. Antonia filed an Adverse Claim to that effect, amongst others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property in question. Antonia with the son (Alvin) filed a petition for the annulment of the deed of sale against Gemma Avila. Contention: 1. The questioned property is CONJUGAL. o The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Antonia in favor of Aguila was NOT CONSENTED by Antegono, who by then was already dead, thus, the REM is not valid. o The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Antonia because she was misled by Avila into believing that the transfer to the latter was necessary to secure a loan (which Avila promised to secure on Antonias behalf). Deed of Absolute Sale: SIMULATED DEROGATORY OF ALVINS SUCCESIONAL RIGHTS.
ISSUE: W/NOT THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA AND ANTEGONO DELA PEA. HELD: The said property was NOT A CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA AND ANTEGONO DELA PEA. It was the PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila is VALID. RATIO: According to Art. 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In this case, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired duringthe marriage. Proof of acquisition during marriage: a condition necessary for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugality (conjugal partnership) (Francisco v. CA) Dela Peas failure to establish that the questioned property was acquired during the marriage of Antonia and Antegono caused the no n-applicability of the presumption of conjugality in the case at bar. Their failure constituted that such property was the paraphernal property of Antonia.
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MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE (2012) GR No. 183622 FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a subsequent marriage with Merope De Catalan, the petitioner. (2004) Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. (2005 February 25) Merope De Catalan filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando at RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan. (Special Proceeding No. 228) (2005 March 3) While Spec. Proc No. 228 was pending, Louella Catalan-Lee, respondent, one of the children of Orlando in his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. (Spec. Proc. No. 232) These two special proceedings were consolidated. o Louella Catalan-Lees contention: Merope De Catalan is not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support thereof, she alleged that a criminal case for BIGAMY was filed against De Catalan before RTC-Alaminos, Pangasinan. Felicitas Amor, first wife of Orlando, filed a complaint for BIGAMY, alleging that De Catalan contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite being married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959. (Crim. Case No. 2699-A) o On 6 August 1998, RTC had acquitted De Catalan of BIGAMY. Orlando and De Catalans marriage was NOT VALID since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since DIVORCE WAS NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION. De Catalan, in the first place, had never been married to Eusebio Bristol. (2006) RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan: dismissedthe petition of De Catalan for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando and granted such to Catalan-Lee. o (contrary to the findings of Crim. Case No. 2699-A) RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan held that the marriage between De Catalan and Eusebio Bristol was valid andand subsisting when she married Orlando. o De Catalan was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. De Catalan filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. But CA dismissed the petition for lack of married and subsequently denied her motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition for review filed at the Supreme Court.
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2.
3.
THE MARRIAGE OF MEROPE DE CATALAN AND ORLANDO B. CATALAN MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS VALID. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. (Doctrine in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr) i. It is true that the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens my obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their nation law. Once proven that one is no longer a Filipino Citizen when he validly obtained a divorce from the other spouse, such other spouse could very well lose her right to inherit from him. (Quita v. CA) Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized Citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, Orlando had severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to the Philippine personal laws. YES, THE BURDEN OF PROOF DOES NOT FALL UPON DE CATALAN BUT INSTEAD TO CATALAN-LEE HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE SUCH. THE BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS UPON THE PARTY WHO ALLEGES THE EXISTENCE OR A FACT OR THING NECESSARY IN THE PROSECUTION OR DEFENSE OF AN ACTION. i. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. ii. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. THE COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. Fact of divorce must first be proven. i. A foreign judgement is given presumptive evidentiary value; the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgement is the judgement itself. (Garcia v. Recio) ii. According to Sec. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 on Presentation of Evidence: Section 24.Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
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PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA (2012) GR No. 175303 FACTS: Eiji Yanagisawa, a Japanese national, is the husband of Evelyn Castaeda, a Filipina. Their marriage was contracted on July 12, 1989. Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of BIGAMY. o Yanagisawa, during the pendency of the case, filed a motion for the issuance of a TRO against Castaeda and an application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction asking that Castaeda be enjoined from disposing or encumber all of the properties registered in her name (including the property in controversy: 152 square meter townhouse unit in Paraaque). However, Castaeda, with her counsel, voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the property in her name during the pendency of the trial. THUS, THE ABOVECITED PETITION OF YANAGISAWA WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE IT BECAME MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON THE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF CASTANEDA.
An order was then issued with regard to the aforementioned: ORDER In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva, counsel for the defendant [Evelyn], together with his client, the defendant in this case, that the properties registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered in any manner during the pendency of this petition , the Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction scheduled today is hereby considered moot and academic.
During the pendency of the trial, Castaeda obtained a loan from PAFIN and in order to secure payment of the loan, she executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Paraaque Town House Unit (property in question).
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ISSUES: W/NOT RTC-PARAAQUE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERHIP. W/NOT IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM. HELD: 1. 2.
NO, RTC-PARAAQUE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE THE SAME ISSUE WAS ALREADY RULED UPON BY THE RTC-MAKATI AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE CA. NO, IT WAS NOT IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.
RATIO: 1. NO, RTC-PARAAQUE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE THE SAME ISSUE WAS ALREADY RULED UPON BY THE RTC-MAKATI AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE CA. Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Yanagisawa and Castaeda owns the Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC. RTC-PARAAQUEVIOLATED THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE o The assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the RTC Paraaque. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. o It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. (Cojuanco v. Villegas) 2. NO, IT WAS NOT IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (RP) VS. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA (2012) GR No. 187512 FACTS: Yolanda Granada was married to Cyrus Granada on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Granada. Cyrus Granada went to Taiwan to seek employment sometime in May 1994. From that time, Yolanda had not received any communication from him, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. o Yolandas brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a petition to have Cyrus declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD. RTC-Lipa rendered a decision declaring Cyrus as PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD, RP represented by OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of such decision under the same court but RTC-Lipa DENIED the motion and soon after, CA also DENIED the Motion for Recon. o RP Contention: Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus thus failed to prove her w ell-founded belief that he was already dead. Hence, a rule 45 petition seeking the reversal of the Resolution of the CA (which affirmed the decision of RTC-Lipa) ISSUES: W/NOT A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THUS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL. W/NOT THERE IS A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF ON THE PART OF YOLANDA TO DECLARE CYRUS AS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD. HELD: 1. A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THUS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL. According to Articles 41, 238, 247, and 253 of the Family Code, since the petition for the declaration of presumptive death for the purposes of remarrying is a summary proceeding, the judgment of RTC-LIPA shall be IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
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2.
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FACTS: Valerio Kalaw and Ma. Elena Fernandez were married in November 4, 1976 at Hong Kong and they had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay). Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejao who gave birth to their son in March 1983. Malyn left their conjugal home and their four (4) children on May 1985. Soon after, Kalaw started living with Jocelyn who bore him three more children. 9 years after the de facto separation from his wife, Fernandez, Kalaw filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. o Kalaws contention: Fernandez was suffering from a psychological incapacity rendering her incapable of performing and complying with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. As manifested in the following acts of respondent: she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto. o Kalaw also presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a canon law expert, Fr. Healy to testify on Fernandezs physcological incapacity. Dr. Gates explanation: (diagnosis: based on the facts revealed by her interviews with Kalaw) Fernandezs sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). o NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others. Fernandezs NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother. Her personality disorder may have been evident even prior to their marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing. Fr. Healys testimony: (opinion: based on the facts revealed by his interviews with Kalaw) He corroborated with Dr. Gates assessment.
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ISSUE: W/NOT FERNANDEZ IS SUFFERING IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM AND COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. HELD: NO, Fernandez was not psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential obligations of marriage. RATIO: Kalaw failed to prove that his wife, Fernandez, was suffering from psychological incapacity. o Burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff (Kalaw) he who alleges must prove the same. Kalaw must prove that the incapacitated party, based on her actions, suffers from a serious psychological incapacity that completely disables her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state . Psychological Incapacity must be: o Grave o Existed at the time of the marriage; and o Incurable o The testimonies of the two supposed expert (Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy) were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of Fernandez which had not been sufficiently proven. o There was no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated . The totality of the evidence presented proved that Fernandez was not psychologically incapacitated. Fernandez did not neglect her duties as a mother and a wife. o She admitted playing majong but only 2 to 3 times a week between 1-6 pm with Kalaws permission to do such and that she would often bring their children and their respective yayas with her which where later corroborated by their children through their testimonies. o At the testimonies of their children, not once did they cite that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick and cooked food that they like. o Fernandez made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. o While Kalaw cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Fernandezs actions.
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MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO (2010) G.R. No. 178902 FACTS: The case is about a husbands sale of conjugal property, employing an alleged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity of the sale, and prescription. Tarciano Roca was married to Rosario Gabriel Roca. Tarciano offer to sell the 358 square meter lot in Zamboanga City to Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. o Agreement: Fuentes spouses were required to pay Tarciano a downpayment of 60, 000 php for the transfer of lots title to him. Within 6 months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca. o In line with the agreement of the parties, Atty. Plagata went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. 1989, Tarciano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. Tarciano and Rosario both died sometime in 1990. Eight years later (1997), the children of Tarciano and Rosario et al (respondent) filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC-Zamboanga City. They also prayed that the property in controversy be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. o Rocas contentions: Sale to the Fuentes spouses was VOID since Rosario did not give her consent to it. Signature of Rosario: forged ISSUES: W/NOT ROSARIOS SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT OF CONSENT TO HER HUSBAND TARCIANOS SALE OF THEIR CONJUGAL LAND TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES WAS FORGED. W/NOT ROCAS ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THAT SALE TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES ALREADY PRESCRIBED. W/NOT ROSARIO, THE WIFE WHOSE CONSENT WAS NOT HAD, COULD BRING ACTION TO ANNUL THE SALE. HELD: 1. ROSARIOS SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT OF CONSENT WAS FORGED.
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FACTS: The case involves a 13,552-square meter portion of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-118801[2] in the name of the Heirs of Victor Flores, namely: Julio, Benito, Dolores, and Virginia, herein petitioners. OCT No. P-11880 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 138892, given on November 12, 1973. This property is located in the Municipality of Piddig, Ilocos Norte. Flores et al, together with their mother Luisa Viernes, executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Vicento Lazo. o Through this document, petitioners agreed to sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM the subject property to Lazo. The property in controversy was then bought by Marciano Bagaoisan as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated Feb 20, 1977. Viernes and petitioner Virginia Flores-Dalere executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact that they conveyed to Lazo the subject property through the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim. Bagaoisan filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the true owner of the subject property and that the entire property covered by OCT No. P-11880 be partitioned among them. o Bagaoisans contention: He was a tenant of Lazo and that he had been working on the subject property since time immemorial. Since he bought the property in 1977, he possessed the land as owner and paid real property tax thereon. Petitioners had denied his ownership of the land and asserted their ownership thereof by working and harvesting the crops thereon. o Flores et als reply: They did not relinquish ownership or possession of the land to lazo. Petitioners admitted that they executed a deed of confirmation and quitclaim in favor of Lazo. They contend that they were misled into signing the same. (Lazo taking advantage of their lack of education. ISSUE: W/not the deed of confirmation and quitclaim is void and violative of sec 118 of the public land act. HELD: THE DEED OF CONFIRMATION AND QUITCLAIM IS VOID AND VIOLATIVE OF SEC 118 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT. The deed of confirmation and quitclaim is void for violating the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through homestead patent under Sec 118 of the Public land Act. The use of words confirmation and quitclaim in the title of the document was an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibi tion imposed by law. Labeling the deed as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim of rights would actually make no difference, as the effect would still be the alienation or conveyance of the property. Public Land Act was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that
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