Pri mary Source Document

wi th Questi ons ( DBQs)

T H E P O T S D A M D E C L A R A T I O N ( J U L Y 2 6 , 1 9 4 5 )



I ntroducti on

The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains among the most controversial events in
modern history. Historians have actively debated whether the bombings were necessary, what effect they had on
bringing the war in the Pacific to an expeditious end, and what other options were available to the United States.
These very same questions were also contentious at the time, as American policymakers struggled with how to use a
phenomenally powerful new technology and what the long-term impact of atomic weaponry might be, not just on
the Japanese, but on domestic politics, Americas international relations, and the budding Cold War with the Soviet
Union. In retrospect, it is clear that the reasons for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan, just like the later impact of
nuclear technology on world politics, were complex and intertwined with a variety of issues that went far beyond the
simple goal of bringing World War II to a rapid close.
The Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, 1945 by U.S. President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, who were meeting in Potsdam, Germany
to consider war strategy and post-war policy. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin also attended the Potsdam Conference but
did not sign the Declaration, since the Soviet Union did not enter the war against Japan until August 8, 1945.



Document Excerpts wi th Questi ons
From Japans Decision to Surrender, by Robert J.C. Butow (Stanford University Press, 1954). 1954 Stanford University Press.


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IrocIamalion Defining lhe Terms for lhe }aanese Surrender, }uIy 26, 1945
(1) WI THI IRISIDINT of lhe Uniled Slales, lhe Iresidenl of lhe NalionaI Governmenl
of lhe ReubIic of China, and lhe Irime Minisler of Greal rilain, reresenling lhe
hundreds of miIIions of our counlrymen, have conferred and agree lhal }aan shaII be
given an oorlunily lo end lhis var.
(2) The rodigious Iand, sea and air forces of lhe Uniled Slales, lhe rilish Imire and of
China, many limes reinforced by lheir armies and air fIeels from lhe vesl, are oised lo
slrike lhe finaI bIovs uon }aan. This miIilary over is suslained and insired by lhe
delerminalion of aII lhe AIIied Nalions lo rosecule lhe var againsl }aan unliI she
ceases lo resisl.
(3) The resuIl of lhe fuliIe and senseIess German resislance lo lhe mighl of lhe aroused free
eoIes of lhe vorId slands forlh in avfuI cIarily as an examIe lo lhe eoIe of }aan.
The mighl lhal nov converges on }aan is immeasurabIy grealer lhan lhal vhich, vhen
aIied lo lhe resisling Nazis, necessariIy Iaid vasle lo lhe Iands, lhe induslry, and lhe
Pri mary Source Document wi th Questi ons ( DBQs) on
THE POTSDAM DECLARATI ON ( JULY 26, 1945)


Asi a f or Educators l Col umbi a Uni versi t y l http: //af e. easi a. col umbi a. edu Page 2 of 2
melhod of Iife of lhe vhoIe German eoIe. The fuII aIicalion of our miIilary over
backed by our resoIve, viII mean lhe inevilabIe and comIele deslruclion of lhe
}aanese armed forces and |usl as inevilabIy lhe uller devaslalion of lhe }aanese
homeIand.
(5) IoIIoving are our lerms. We viII nol deviale from lhem. There are no aIlernalives. We
shaII brook no deIay.
(6) There musl be eIiminaled for aII lime lhe aulhorily and infIuence of lhose vho have
deceived and misIed lhe eoIe of }aan inlo embarking on vorId conquesl, for ve
insisl lhal a nev order of eace, securily and |uslice viII be imossibIe unliI
irresonsibIe miIilarism is driven from lhe vorId.
(7) UnliI such a nev order is eslabIished and unliI lhere is convincing roof lhal }aan's
var-making over is deslroyed, oinls in }aanese lerrilory lo be designaled by lhe
AIIies shaII be occuied lo secure lhe achievemenl of lhe basic ob|eclives ve are here
selling forlh.
(10) We do nol inlend lhal lhe }aanese shaII be ensIaved as a race or deslroyed as a nalion,
bul slern |uslice shaII be meled oul lo aII var criminaIs, incIuding lhose vho have
visiled crueIlies uon our risoners. The }aanese Governmenl shaII remove aII
obslacIes lo lhe revivaI and slrenglhening of democralic lendencies among lhe }aanese
eoIe. Ireedom of seech, of reIigion, and of lhoughl, as veII as resecl for lhe
fundamenlaI human righls shaII be eslabIished.
(12) The occuying forces of lhe AIIies shaII be vilhdravn from }aan as soon as lhese
ob|eclives have been accomIished and lhere has been eslabIished in accordance vilh
lhe freeIy exressed viII of lhe }aanese eoIe a eacefuIIy incIined and resonsibIe
governmenl.
(13) We caII uon lhe governmenl of }aan lo rocIaim nov lhe uncondilionaI surrender of
aII }aanese armed forces, and lo rovide roer and adequale assurances of lheir good
failh in such aclion. The aIlernalive for }aan is roml and uller deslruclion.

Questi ons:

1. Why did the United States and its allies issue this declaration? Do you think
they expected Japan to comply?
2. Why do you think the declaration called for unconditional surrender? Do
you think the war might have ended sooner, and without the use of the
atomic bombs, if the United States had been willing to negotiate a peace
with Japan? Why did America not pursue that course?
3. Does this declaration suggest that the occupation of Japan will be punitive
or constructive? According to the declaration, who bears responsibility for
leading Japan down the path to war?
4. How would you have responded to this document as a leader in the
Japanese government? As an average Japanese person at the time?