Freedom because of duty: the problem of agency in Mms

Elisa Freschi May 23, 2012

Contents
1 What is Mms? 1 3 . . . . . 4 4 5 7 8 9 2 Is there anything like free will in Indian philosophy? 3 Agents causation 3.1 Epistemological basis of compatibilism in Mms . . . . . . . . 3.2 Vedic-exegetical basis of the concept of agenthood in Mms: consciousness and ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Bha and Prbhkara Mms vs. Nyya . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The role of commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 Causality and determinism 12 4.1 Is there determinism in Mms? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2 Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3 Training desires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5 Source of ethics 15 5.1 Immoral sacrices prescribed by the Veda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6 Conclusions References 17 18

1 What is Mms?
Mms (lit. desire of thinking, hence reection) is one of the six traditionally recognised Indian philosophical systems (darana). It was born out of an ancient tradition of exegesis of Sacred Texts and keeps as its primary focus the Veda (knowledge, Indian sacred texts, not accepted as such by Buddhist and Jaina schools). Thus, like all other philosophical systems generally look at Vaieika for 1

natural philosophy and at Nyya for logic, so they look at Mms as a reservoir for exegetic rules, making it possibly the main source for the Indian approach to hermeneutics in general. This inuence is particularly evident in the case of Vednta schools, where Mms rules, adjusted to the Vednta view of the Veda or other Sacred Texts, have been systematically applied and constitute the background of most theological discussions. The bulk of the system is based (as usual in India) on a collection of stra aphorisms, Jaiminis Mmsstra (hence MS) which would be quite obscure without abara Bhya (commentary, hence Bh). There is no direct evidence about the date of abara, who knows some sort of Mahyna and is aware of a theory of sphoa (which seems more primitive than Bhartharis one1 ), but does not refer to any known author after Patajali (c. 2nd c. b.C.). Some centuries later, perhaps in the 7th or 8th c., Kumrila Bhaa and Prabhkara Mira wrote philosophical engaged commentaries on the Bh. These commentaries have been again commented upon by later Mms authors (Prthasrathi, e.g., wrote a line-to-line commentary on Kumrilas lokavrttika and likantha a similar gloss on Prabhkaras Bhat ). According to the dierent tenets of these two main thinkers, Mms is traditionally distinguished in two schools, the Bha Mms, which follows Kumrila and the Prbhkara Mms, which follows Prabhkara. Mms may also be referred to as Prva Mms, to distinguish it from Uttara Mms (or Vednta). For brevitys sake, I shall restrict the use of Mms to Prva Mms only. A thinker belonging to the Mms school is called Mmsaka follower of the Mms. The main Mms tenets originated out of issues connected with Vedic exegesis. Mms authors departing from abara uphold the a priori validity of cognitions (and, consequently, the general reliability of our cognitions), accept linguistic communication as instrument of knowledge and focus on action and exhortation. The validity a priori of cognitions (called svata prmya by Kumrila) is the basis of an apologetics of the Veda. Kumrila explains at length that our sense faculties only regard what is (directly or indirectly) perceptible, that common human being have no access to morality (dened as krya what has to be done), and that there is no reason to believe that there have ever been exceptional human beings who could have access to it. Thus, the Veda is the only instrument of knowledge regarding what has to be done instead of what there is. To sum up, cognitions are valid until and unless they are falsied by subsequent evidences, the realm of what has to be done can only be known through the Veda, and hence the Veda cannot be falsied. Therefore, given that all cognitions are to be considered true unless and until the opposite is proved, the Veda is a genuine instrument of knowledge. By the same token, the same principle means that the Veda is only an instrument of knowledge in its unique eld, i.e., what has to be done, whereas as for the eld of what there is, sense perception and the other instruments of knowledge based on it (inference, analogy , cogent evidence and absence) are the only valid source of information. Consequently, unless and until contrary evidence arises, the world is the way we perceive it.
1 Bhartharis

date is itself controversial, but scholars tend to agree on the 5th c. AD.

Linguistic communication (abda or stra, chiey equivalent to the Veda) is necessarily an instrument of knowledge out of the same reason, namely, that unless we accept it, we would have no way to access the realm of deontic, i.e., of what has to be done. Last, the Mms habit to investigate the Brhmaa part of the Veda, which mainly consists of exhortations, made them aware of the importance of this topic and led them to investigate the mechanisms, within language, which make one undertake an action. More importantly for the present topic, it also made Mmsakas consider the issue of agency from the viewpoint of how one is made into an agent by a (Vedic) injunction.

2 Is there anything like free will in Indian philosophy?

In the intention of its editors, this volume deals with Free Will, Agency and Selfhood. However, a search for a precise synonym of free will in the South Asian context is most probably going to be vain, insofar as free will is, in Western culture, a concept overload with history, especially Christian history. In fact, although arguments against or in favour of determinism are very ancient, the usage of free will (translating liberum arbitrium) is a relatively recent label (possibly 13th c. AD) and might seem partly redundant, insofar as its opposite (bound will, or servum arbitrium) entails paradoxical elements (how can ones will be bound? Would not it cease to be a will if it were bound?) and only makes sense within certain perspectives, such as Martin Luthers soteriology. The disproportion of Gods omnipotency and ones free will has turned, in contemporary philosophy, into that between the evidences of natural scientists, which seem to weigh in favour of determinism (or at least this is their reception among lay people), and the psychological feeling of freedom. Classical Indian philosophy, it goes without saying, predates these developments. However, although the denition and the semantic of the syntagm free will are historically loaded, one can more easily determine the set of questions or scenarios this is meant to deal with in Western philosophy and theology. In this way, one can nd not a precise synonym, but a functional equivalent2 of this term in India. These sets of questions or scenarios are, roughly: 1. The problem of the agents causation: how does the process of volition lead to an action? 2. Moral responsibility vs. determinism 3. Ones psychological experience of freedom
2 One might suggest, for instance, that the authority of the Veda is for Prbhkaras the functional equivalent of the categorical imperative in Immanuel Kant, since both full the same role, namely, providing a x term of reference for what ought to be done. The concept of a functional equivalent has been developed by Raimon Panikkar in the context of his comparative approach to Christian, Buddhist and Hindu terms.

4. Religious discourse We will see (section 3.1) that the psychological experience of freedom, though not thematised, is often the implicit departure point for Mms authors, who describe the phenomenology of will without taking into account its absolute freedom.3 Thus, in the following, the rst two scenarios will be examined in some more detail. No much space is needed for the fourth one, since Mms authors deny any role to God as a philosophical entity. They may subjectively adore a personal God, but tend to be quite strict in denying to Him/Her the role of ontological foundation. In other words, God has no place as a justication for the system and there is, consequently, no need to discuss ones freedom in respect to his omnipotence. The absence of any comparison with God also entails that Mms authors do not need to specify in which sense one can be said to be free, although one is not as free as God is since, for instance, God can assume all possible forms and we cannot. Pratyabhij authors, in this connection, suggest that the limited subjects only enjoy a fraction of the Gods innite power of freedom.

3 Agents causation
3.1 Epistemological basis of compatibilism in Mms
In addition to the general points brought forward above (1), it is worth remembering that Mms authors in general favour accounts which mirror ones experience. Let us consider, for instance, the cognition one has upon entering in a dark room. At rst, one hardly sees anything at all, but in a few seconds, one starts distinguishing pieces of furniture, etc. Is this later experience still a case of senseperception (pratyaka)? Buddhist epistemologists deny it this status, since it is the result of conceptual thinking, insofar as one only distinguishes, e.g., a table insofar as she expects to see one and, hence, conceptually organises her vague sensory data in order to t her expectations. By contrast, Mms authors contend that, since one experiences it as a case of sense-perception, one could only refute it this status if one had very strong reasons for doing it (see Taber 2005). The Buddhists state that the notion of a table ought to be due to conceptual thinking, since perception has been a priori dened as only grasping the ultimate particular. But this claim seems to prefer the consistency of the Buddhist epistemological system over that
3 This turn has occurred only recently in Western philosophy, where, following P. F . Strawson 1962, Brian Earp welcomed the shift of focus on the question what it is like to feel free? rather than on the older one are we free?:It is worth saluting this shift in emphasis from the millennia-old, seemingly intractable debates about free will to current philosophical and psychological work on the empirical questions surrounding belief in free will, and how it may be inuenced by context, motivation, and other factors.Earp 2011, p. 25. Johannes Bronkhorst, though not explicitly making this poinst, while discussing Indian conceptions of free will favours an experiential approach, which takes into account our decisions within the process of undertaking actions, independently of whether they are absolutely free (i.e., if determinism is wrong) or not (Bronkhorst forthcoming). This favour is probably determined by the similar attitude of Indian author.

of our experience of the world.4 Similarly, since one obviously feels that her will has a role in the process of undertaking an action, Mmsakas do not dispute this. Unlike their Western colleagues, Mms philosophers do not question the degree of freedom of the decisions one experiences as free. They do not, e.g., argue for the fact that our experience of freedom might just be an epiphenomenon accompanying the process of undertaking an action,5 or that our experience of freedom might be in fact a fake, since our decisions are completely determined by who we are, something which is a priori determined by facts we cannot interfere with, such as genes and early education (cf., by contrast, G. Strawson 1998). The fact that decisions are experienced as free is enough for Mms authors to treat them accordingly. Within this framework (which basically takes our intuitions about freedom at facevalue), one could also just speak of will, since from the point of view of the way a single action is caused, nothing changes if the general laws of the universe allow freedom or not one would nonetheless believe he has freely decided to do X. Thus, and given that Mmsakas accept the laws of karman and the ritual causality linked to aprva, Mmsakas adopt what Western authors would label a compatibilist stance.6

3.2 Vedic-exegetical basis of the concept of agenthood in Mms: consciousness and ability
Furthermore, Mms authors dealing with agenthood (karttva) primarily focus on the sacricial agent and that the lack in the Indian context of an ongoing polemics on free will allows for them to discuss technical problems (such as to whom does agenthood pertain in case there are several ritual performers, MS book 3, or several sacricers, MS book 6) without having to question the very concept of agenthood. Of chief importance, in this case, is that the agent is the one who consciously undertakes actions (for an antithetic position, see Cardonas contribution in this volume). Thus, to be an agent, one needs to be aware of what one is
4 This is, e.g., also Kumrilas answer to the Buddhist Pramavdin who contend that it is illogical to claim that a single perceptual act can grasp both the individual and the universal inhering in it. Kumrila maintains that this must be the case, because so runs our experience, see Taber 2005. 5 Conscious will, writes for instance the psychologist Daniel M. Wegner, is not a direct perception of relation [between thought and action] but rather a feeling based on the causal inference one makes about the data that do become available to consciousness the thought and the observed act. (Wegner 2002, p. 67). And, even more clearly: The experience of will [] is the way our minds portray their operations to us, not their actual operation. Because we have thoughts of what we will do, we can develop causal theories relating those thoughts to our actions on the basis of priority, consistency, and exclusivity. We come to think of these prior thoughts as intentions, and we develop the sense that the intentions have causal force even though they are actually just previews of what we may do (Wegner 2002, p. 96). Both passages are quoted in Bronkhorst forthcoming. 6 The theory of karman introduced a loose determinism as a pre-condition for all Indian schools, so that the only option left was some sort of compatibilism and everyone automatically adjusted. Most Indian authors are in fact by default compatibilists. They assume automatically that we are determined by karman, but also that karman is not an inextricable chain. If it were one, no liberation would be possible (or, according to how strict ones interpretation of karman is: no liberation would be possible without a Divine intervention. Predestination is, accordingly, only admitted by the Theistic school of Dvaita Vednta, founded by Madhva (see Dvaita Vednta in this volume. See also, e.g., Zydenbos 1991 and Pandurangis review of Zydenbos article, Pandurangi 2012.

doing. For instance, in a rather late compendium of Mms rules, the MNS, it is said that notwithstanding a possible interpretation of a Vedic statement the bones [of a dead sacricer] are not the agents, either on their own or through an arrangement, only living persons, who are (indirectly) indicated by them, are the sacricers. 7 Consequently, automatic movements are not enough to be an agent, whereas the same movements, if performed on purpose are the activity of an agent (on movement as dierent from action, see Freschi 2010). An agent may also not perform any movement at all and yet be called an agent, if she instigates another to undertake a certain action (see V, tmavda 75-87). Accordingly, both the sacricer (yajamna) and the ociating priest are said to be agents. 8 However, being conscious is not enough, insofar as one must also be able to perform the action, even if one does not actually perform it. This requisite has an evident ritual origin, since lame and blind people, or animals cannot perform accurately the sacrice and thus they cannot be ritual agents.9 It is, however, applied also outside the ritual sphere, for instance when Kumrila argues against the possibility of a God by saying that omnipotence (sarva-karttva, literally omniagenthood, i.e. agenthood directed to all possible items) would only be possible for an embodied agent, since without a body, one is not able to undertake all possible actions.10
7 MNS ad MS 10.2.17, Translation in MNS, p. 657. The Sanskrit text runs as follows: asthn svata savidhnena vkarttvt tallakit jvanta eva yara. A parallel passage of Prthasrathi Miras stradpik has It is never possible, either directly or through an arrangement, that a dead person is an agent (na katha cid api mtasya skd v savidhnd v karttva sambhavati, quoted in MNS, p. 239). 8 See MNS 3.7.8, which depicts an objection claiming that the sacricer should perform the sacrice himself and a reply explaining that he might be an agent also if has priests ociate instead of him. In Bensons translation: [Obj.:] Because the agent and the enjoyer (of the result) are in syntactic agreement in the statement, One desirous of heaven should sacrice (yajeta), because the sux of the middle voice (i.e.m in the verb yajeta (let him sacrice)) is taught by smti (i.e., grammar) to be employed when the result of an action accrues to the agent, and because the rite, together with its subsidiaries, produces the result, the actions of sacrice etc., together with their subsidiaries, should (all) be performed by the sacricer. [Reply:] No. In as much as the action of hiring (the priests) would otherwise be inapplicable, the meaning of the text (stra [the Veda]) is only that at a rite which has subsidiaries, the condition of being an agent is common to the direct agent and the instigating agent, (MNS, pp. 446-7, square brackets are mine). The Sanskrit text runs as follows: svargakmo yajeteti kartur bhoktu ca smndhikarayt, kartgmiphala tmanepadasmarat, sgasya phalajanakatvc ca sga ygdi yajamnena kryam. na. parikraynyathnupapatty sge sktprayojakasdhraakarttvasyaiva strrthatvt (the transcription has been slightly changed to t the conventions of the present chapter). See also V, tmavda 74. For the underlying Grammatical conception of agenthood, see Cardonas contribution in this volume. 9 The stra expressing this point is MS 6.1.2. The hint at animals is found in commentaries and Mms textbooks, such as the MNS on 6.1.2. 10 But the notion of an embodied God is inherently contradictory (how could he be revered by dierent people in dierent places simultaneously, if he were linked to a body?). On Kumrilas arguments against the existence of God, see Krasser 1999.

3.3 Bha and Prbhkara Mms vs. Nyya

The philosophical school Mms authors mostly refer to is the Nyya school.11 Thus, a comparison of Mms and Nyya views usually throws additional light on both. Naiyyika authors usually detect a sequence leading from cognition (e.g., of the pleasant avour of an apple) to volition (icch) to the action (see Dastis contribution in this volume). Mms authors of the Bha school usually start with desire (e.g. of eating something fresh and healthy), which leads to the eort (prayatna or pravtti, i.e., the fact that one undertakes the action of eating an apple). Prbhkara Mmskas complicate the picture by adding the role of injunctions, so that one desires something, one consequently identies as the one addressed by a certain injunction (e.g. if you want to live long and healthy, eat apples every day) and the fact that one feels enjoined leads to ones eort. Both schools of Mms tend not to focus on whatever happens after the eort, i.e. on the actual performance of the action. In this sense, just like precontemporary Christian thinkers, they focus on free will and disregard the actual performance of the action. Thus, Mmsakas would dene free-will as just the capacity to do what one wishes, independent of whether one actually does it or not. What one needs in order to be an agent is just the capacity to full the action (see above, p. 6). As for the cognitive element, previous cognition is indeed mentioned in the Bh as preceding desire and, therefore, as an evidence of a self enduring from the moment of cognition to that of desire: Through desire we grasp a self. [Obj.:] How? [Reply:] Because desire regards something coveted which has been known before. For instance, we do not desire those sweet tree-fruits which no human being has ever experienced, since they are [only] found on the left side of the Mount Meru. Nor does one knower desire what has been grasped by another person. [] Therefore we understand that this [desire] has the same agent as that grasping.12 Unlike Nyya authors, however, Mms ones do not always stress the connection of desire with cognition. Furthermore, unlike in Nyya, Prbhkaras deem desire to be important only insofar as the subject identies herself as the addressee of a prescription insofar as her specic desire is mentioned in it: It has been explained that the one who desires heaven, etc., has to be understood as the enjoined one, since duty is connected to himself [in sentences such as The one who desires heaven should sacrice]. And
11 On the parallel and contrastive development of the two schools views on the key issue of Linguistic Communication/Verbal Testimony, see Freschi and Graheli 2005. 12 icchay tmnam upalabhmahe. katham iti. upalabdhaprve hi abhiprete bhavatcch. yath merum uttarea yni asmajjtyai anupalabhaprvu svdni vkaphalni, na tni prati asmkam icch bhavati, [] tenopalambhanena samnakartk s ity avagacchma (Bh ad 1.1.5, pp. 60-72).

it has been explained at the beginning of the eleventh [book of the MS] that the desire for heaven is a specication of the enjoined person.13 Thus, desire is only an indirect cause of action (the direct cause being the prescription). To sum up, an agent is identied as one who undertakes an action, who could be able to perform it in full and who does it consciously. At least in ordinary experience (outside it, see 5), she also needs to have a goal in view while undertaking the action, as expressed in a well-known verse by Kumrila: Without a goal, even the fool does not undertake any action.14 In short, according to Nyya: cognition desire undertaking of the action action According to the Bha Mms: desire undertaking of the action According to the Prbhkara Mms: desire recognition of oneself as the addressee by the prescription prescription undertaking of the action

3.4 The role of commands

A border line problem, crossing over the boundaries described in section2 is that of the role of commands in Mms, which can be seen as regarding ones psychological experience of freedom and at the same time the agents causation. Commands are usually neglected in all elds of Western philosophy,15 just like exhortative language is usually neglected in Western linguistics (see Freschi 2008, Freschi forthcoming a). By contrast, they play a fundamental role in Mms (see Freschi 2007, Freschi 2012a, Freschi 2012b). A command, Mms authors maintain, only provides for one to feel enjoined (niyujya). It does not make one necessarily perform what the command enjoined them. For an action to be undertaken and then performed, one still needs the whole process described above, section 3.1, to take place. However, people who have been trained (see below, section 4.3) to hold in high esteem a certain authority (notably,
svasambandhitay bodhya svargakmdir niyojya iti vyutpditam. svargakman ca niyojyavieaam ity ekdadye vyutpditam (VM II ad 23, PrP , p. 440, Sarma 1990, p. 44). I could not nd any passage at the beginning of Bh ad MS 11 which could be the one likantha has in mind. Thus, he probably refers to Prabhkaras lost commentary thereon. See also TR IV, sections 10.210.3.2 in Freschi 2012b. 14 prayojanam anuddiya na mando pi pravartate | (V, sambandhkepaparihra 55ab). 15 A notable exception is Bocheski 1974.
13 kryasya

the one of the Veda), will rejoice at undertaking the actions enjoined (see TR 10.11 and cf. the notion of tmatui, see fn. 32) and are thus very likely to undertake them. (People for whom a certain text or person is not authoritative just do not feel enjoined by it or her and thus are irrelevant.) Can one still speak of free will if one undertakes an action due to a prescription? Is there room left for free will, after having heard a Vedic command? Before answering, it is worth remembering that prescriptions only regard specic people, i.e., the ones identied by the desire mentioned in the prescriptive sentence. Hence, a specic prescription applies to one according to what she desires. Does it mean that it applies according to who she is, in a deterministic way? The case of the yena, where people who desire to harm their enemies are blamed hints at the opposite. Such people are blamed because one can train oneself to desire something better than harming ones enemy.16 Once one has been enjoined to do something, one is thus free not to perform the action enjoined, but one is not free not to feel enjoined. Furthermore, one is free to not to desire a certain goal, so that the prescription will not apply to them. This applies to optional goals, such as sons, rain, cattle, villages. In exceptional cases (see below, 5), it seems to apply also to the general goal of happiness.17

3.5 Agent
Naiyyikas tend to speculate on how agenthood can refer to an underlying self (called tman). By contrast, Mmsakas generally discuss empirical agents and refrain from discussions on the tman, unless they need to polemically address their Buddhist opponents (like in the Bh passage quoted in the preceding section). Even when this is the case, most notably in Kumrilas works, Mmsakas are keen to prove the existence of something closer to the Western common-sense notion of subject or person than to that of an underlying tman. This means that what they envision is a subject which is intrinsically an agent, rather than a changeless tman to which agenthood is later attached as an adventitious quality. Kumrila opposes the two aspects with the terms purua person and tman self in V, tmavda 29.18 Kumrila is even ready to go as far as to risk denying the xedness (nitya) of the self, in order to make room for the possibility of changes: It is not prohibited to say that the self is not xed (nitya) |
16 One might suggest that these people are blamed although they cannot help, because of their nature, desiring to harm. However, this paradoxical interpretation (one can be blamed although one could not have done otherwise) would not suit the legalistic attitude of Mmm (about which, see for instance Lingat 1973). Similar claims have been made only within a strong theistic context (e.g. in some branches of Lutheranism emphasising responsibility even over things one cannot control). 17 It is probably worth remembering that this degree of freedom only regards male Brahmins. dras, women, etc. undergo many more constraints due to their own nature, so that it is possible that they cannot freely train their desires in whatever direction. I am not overstressing this point here because it seems to be rather a socio-political issue, inherently linked with the history of classical India, rather than a specic feature of Mms philosophy. 18 For a similar terminological opposition in Prbhkara Mms, see Freschi 2012a.

if what one means is just that it can evolve (vikriy), [since] there is no cessation of it by that || If there were an absolute destruction of it, there would be destruction of the actions performed and accrual of actions non-performed [hence, random connection of actions and results] | but not in the case it reaches a dierent stage, like in the ordinary experience of childhood, youth, [adulthood and old age] (when the same person is said to be a child, then a young person, then an adult and then an elder person) ||19 His commentator Prthasrathi explains further: If only because it evolves [you want to say that it is] not xed, then let it be so (as you prefer)! In fact, there is no cessation of ones own nature, since one recognises [one as the same person]. 20 Thus, writes Kumrila, if one were to deny the continuity of the self, one would be forced to conclude that the actions performed by a certain self would lead to a result enjoined by a dierent one, and this is paradoxical and runs against common sense. By contrast, the self can evolve, just like a person changes from being a child to an adult. A Buddhist Pramavdin might reply that it is exactly the case that the enjoyer is dierent than the doer. Against this view Kumrila replies that the self is both constant and non-constant: According to me, even when the person (nara) reaches a stage of pleasure or pain | it never relinquishes its nature of being consciousness, a substance and something which exists || [] Therefore, since both options (i.e., total xedness and total destruction) have been eliminated, a person must be accepted as consisting of something which disappears and something which recurs, like gold in an ear-ring, etc. || 21 He further adds (possibly against Skhya and what came to be known as Advaita Vednta) that there is no intermediate entity that changes instead of the subject:
19 (nnityaabdavcyatvam tmano vinivryate | vikriymtravcitve na hy ucchedo sya tvat || sytm atyantane sya ktanktgamau | na tv avasthntaraprptau loke blayuvdivat || V, tmavda 22cd-23cd) 20 yadi vikramtram anitya tad astu, na hi vikramtrea svarpocchedo bhavati pratyabhijnt. (Nyyaratnkara ad loc.) 21 sukhadukhdyavasth ca gacchann api naro mama | caitanyadravyasattdirpa naiva vimucati || [] tasmd ubhayahnena vyvttyanugamtmaka | puruo bhyupagantavya kualdiu svaravat || (V, tmavda, 26 and 28)

10

Nor is it the case that the condition of being an agent and that of being an experiencer have as substrate the stages of a person [rather, they have as substrate the person himself/herself] | therefore, the agent himself reaches his fruit, since he is the real possessor of all stages ||22 Thus, Kumrilas treatment suggests that he presupposes a notion of subject as a knower and an agent, who is able to change through time. Then, one might argue, what enables one to recognise her as a single subject? To this general problem, the Nyya answers by delineating an underlying character which does not change, namely the tman. This would remain stable, allowing accidental qualities to change without altering it. By contrast, Kumrila seems to imply that no such distinction makes sense, and that, on the contrary, there is no need to postulate a subtle, changeless tman. The subject itself guarantees continuity, though in ux, and one can recognise the continuity as constituted by the changes, just in the case of the subsequent stages of a river. The agent is, in other words, constant through his changes.23 Furthermore, Kumrila states that the subject is knowable through ahampratyaya notion of an I, that is, the notion one has of oneself when one refers to oneself in sentences like I am going, or I am doing an eort. This stance has been adversed exactly by the schools who consider the tman to be an underlying entity, not to be confused with the empirical I. The fact that Kumrila and his commentators stick nonetheless at this evidence for its existence most probably means that they implicitly deny any sharp distinction between the empirical I and an underlying tman. Prbhkaras dispute this view out of a dierent standpoint, namely because they deem it impossible for the subject to be at the same time the knower and the known entity. They maintain instead that the subject is knowable in each act of cognition since all cognitive acts throw simultaneously light on themselves, on their content and on their knower qua knower, i.e., as a subject and not as an object (see TR, chapter 1, partly translated in Freschi forthcoming b). Thus, Prbhkaras are even stricter in underlying the active nature of the subject and in both sub-schools, one grasps the subject while it is doing something. For this reason, other psychic organs (such as buddhi or antakaraa) are hardly mentioned at all (see Freschi forthcoming b). Although I am not aware of any explicit discussions about this in Mms texts, the general attitude of Mms authors is to deal with a complex subject, which acts (knowledge is included in action), desires and experiences. Its possible subdivisions are irrelevant because the only entity one actually encounters is such a subject (and because, once again, Mmsakas are more interested in accounting for our experience than in creating an alternative explanation of it).
22 na ca karttvabhokttve puso vasthsam rite | tenvasthvatas tattvt karttaivpnoti tatphalam || (V, tmavda 29) 23 One is reminded of the Mms concept of kuastha- and pravhanityatva. The rst one is immutable xedness, the second one is xedness through change. A typical example is that of wordreferents, which remain the same though their individual tokens change.

11

Accordingly, discussions about the self in itself (i.e., independent of any action it might be performing) are strikingly rare in Mms. So rare that a reader might suspect that Mms authors were not interested in investigating about an hypothetical tman underlying all experiences, given that their focus was much more on the active subject of all these experiences. In general, Mms arguments about the tman as a substance derive much from their Nyya antecedents and are hardly original (see Freschi 2012a).24 A case in which the notion of tman is discussed in Mms texts is the context of dharma and adharma (merit and demerit) of each individual. Mms authors are absolutely strict in refuting the Advaita position of a single tman, also because this would lead to a confusion of dharma and adharma (see PrP , Tattvloka, p.345). In one of the few extensive ontological descriptions of the self I am aware of, i.e., the one found in likantha Miras Tattvloka (PrP , p. 343), the tman is said to be inseparably linked to its attributes (gua). These arise only when the tman is in contact with the inner organ (manas). This, in turn, is only present in a body. Thus, although an tman is theoretically conceivable also without a body, its attributes, the ones through which one grasps it, are only possible within a body. Mmsakas are quite clear in distinguishing the subject from its external body,25 nonetheless the body understood as an organism is said to be the only possible substrate of activities which are typical of the subject, such as being an agent (see above, section 3.2) and enjoying (see PrP Tattvloka p. 331). In TR 2 it is said that plants do not have bodies (arra) because they are not able to experience, and bodies are exactly dened as the instrument for realising experience (bhogasdhana).26 Thus, the subject and the body are most probably mutually dependent: although a bodiless subject might be theoretically conceivable, in ordinary experience subjects can only be such insofar as they are embodied. Conversely, bodies are dened insofar as they enable one to experience reality. Corpses are not bodies and dead subjects will probably need some new form of (subtle?) body.

4 Causality and determinism

4.1 Is there determinism in Mms?
From the literal point of view, ones will can only be dened as free if there is the chance for it to be bound. Is this possibility ever mentioned by Indian authors? A similar hint may be detected in some theistic schools, where it is said that God alone is free (he is, e.g., vara and svatantra), whereas we are all bound (i.e., paratantra
24 For instance, a later Bha author, Ggbhaa (16th c.), mentions the tman in connection with his argument that pleasure (sukha), cognition (jna) and desire (icch) do not reside in the body, nor in the sense organ, nor in the inner organ (mana). Therefore, they must reside in the tman, which is thus established (tasmt tadrayatay tmasiddhi) (Bhacintmai, Ggbhaa 1933 (repr.) Pp. 5354.) Further psychic entities are not mentioned at all and the whole argumentation repeats a Naiyyika scheme (see the Naiyyika commentaries on NS 1.1.10). 25 See the discussion in Bh ad 1.1.5, Frauwallner 1968, p. 34 and then PrP Tattvloka, p. 320 and 327-329. 26 This passage is discussed and partly translated in Freschi 2012a.

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eteronomous or like cattle pau). Furthermore, one might suggest that the karman might be thought to obstruct ones will (this view can be found in dramas, cf. the attitude of minor characters in the kuntal, see Nuckolls 1987). However, in philosophical schools one does not encounter a deterministic view of karman being explicitly endorsed.27 Does this non-determinism interact with the Mms account of causality? Or does the non-determinism only refer to the moral level, whereas accounts of causality regard the ontological realm?

4.2 Causality
Within Mms, dierent accounts of causation intersect. One is the (almost) panIndian one based on karman. Another is the ritual paradigm, linked to the aprva one accumulates during rituals. This is a force which was not there before [the ritual], generated by the ritual and reaching until its result, thus explaining how the ritual one performs today can be the cause of the village one will conquer in some weeks, etc. It is not clear whether the two paradigms might clash, for instance, if a person whose karman does not allow to have sons may perform a putrakmei (a sacrice meant for people who want to have sons) and eventually get a son. The topic is not explicitly dealt with, as far as I know, in Mms.28 The general idea seems to be that both paradigms express rules about the world and that the karmanparadigm rules the natural world whereas the aprva-one rules the human world. In case of conict, the aprva one might be thought to overcome the other just like human causation overrides natural forces. But it could also be suggested that if one can be the adhikrin responsible agent for a certain sacrice (i.e., if one has enough wealth to perform it, is not disabled in any limb, etc.), this must mean that ones karman has lead him or her to this goal.29 The question as to whether deterministic causation (be it through karman or through aprva or both) could ever hinder ones free will seems to be resolved in Mms through a compatibilistic approach. Compatibilism in a non-technical sense is in fact one of the distinctive marks of Mms authors, who seem to prefer to adhere to our complex experience rather than to reduce it to some basic and consistent principles (see above, section 3.1). Mms thinkers describe the process of the agents causation as a complex process, in which a role is played by the agents initial desires and one by the exhortations they receive and accept because of these desires. That the latter role does not rule out the former is assumed as if it were self-understood and is not the object of a separate treatment. The key point which does not make the laws of karman end up in a rigid determinism probably lies in
27 I am very much inclined to think that also the Buddhist Pramavda (notwithstanding what seems a mechanicistic account of causality) is not deterministic, as shown by the fact that Dharmakrti refutes the possibility of inferring a result from its causes, so that even a karmic cause cannot be said to invariably lead to a certain result. 28 On causality within and outside Mms, see Halbfass 1980. 29 Furthermore, it might be argued that the theory of karman derives from some form of ritual causation or has been inuenced by it (Ghler 2011, p. 135), and this historical connection could partly explain why the two paradigms seem to be seen as compatible by Mms authors.

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the fact that Mms authors seem to presuppose that one can inuence her likes and dislikes. Since one can decide, for instance, not to want more cattle, or at least train himself to want just a little bit more, he will not be liable to the authority of the prescriptions concerning the Citr sacrice. Similarly, one might infer that the same applies in ordinary experience. Karman, most probably, inclines one towards doing something, but does not completely determine her to do it. Compatibilism would then mean, within Mms, that the authority of the Veda over a ritual agent (and, similarly, of an adult over a child, a landlord over his servants, etc.) together with the ritual agents past karman are not incompatible with her freedom to adhere to the Veda (etc.), with adherence being the preferred option, the one one should long for, since the Vedas tell us it is the best one. This precinct of freedom is stressed by Prabhkara in sentences such as The [Vedic] injunction tells one what to do, it does not tell one that he has to do it.30

4.3 Training desires

This again leads to a wider question, i.e., Are we free only when we act independently of desire? Or can one speak of free will also in the case of acts determined by desire? In other words, is eating while hungry an instance of free will? Or is only the whimsical movement of ones arm with no exact reason a free act? Indian schools such as Mms have naturally acknowledged the role of desire. Accordingly, the implicit answer seems to be a stoic one, i.e., that one can train oneself to desire the right things, since desire is part of ones rational behaviour and not outside it.More in detail, for Mms authors, desire is part of the natural world which is controlled by the laws of karman and restricted by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. An evidence of this attitude is found in discussions concerning the parisakhyvidhi paca pacankh bhaktavy the ve ve-nailed ones must be eaten. The parisakhyvidhi is a prescription restricting something else. In this case, Mms authors explain, it restricts ones natural appetite which would be directed to everything to these ve animals only: Here it is not the eating which is prescribed, since it is already obtained through ones longing (rga) for it, and an activity which has been initiated prior [to the injunction] because it has been obtained due to desire (rga) cannot be prescribed (since prescription only cause to know something previously unknown).31 Thus, if we try to get a coherent picture out of these elements, karman lies at the origin of the natural desires one experiences. Vedic prescriptions and prohibitions
30 kartavyatviayo niyoga. na puna kartavyatm ha (B, B, I/38,8f. For an insightful discussion of this topic, see Yoshimizu 1994.) 31 atra ca na bhakaa vidheyam; rgata prptatvt. npi rgaprpte prvapravtty vidheyatvam (ambhubhaas Prabhval on Khaadevas Bhadpik 1.2.4., Khaadeva 1987, p. 33). The text has been written in mid-17th c.

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rule them and if one is addressed by a Vedic prescription or prohibition, she cannot but feel enjoined by them. Consequently, she will restrict her natural desire to only the things which are permitted by the Veda. Here lies the precinct of application of her free will, which is, however, lead by the Vedic word. Once again, free will in this view is not tantamount to ones whims, but rather to ones faculty to consent or dissent to a Vedic word.

5 Source of ethics
Mms authors uphold the externality of moral authority. There is no inner source for morality, they maintain, because all human instruments of knowledge ultimately rest on sense perception and sense perception cannot ll in the gap between the is and the ought (in Sanskrit terms, between what is siddha already established and what is sdhya to be brought about). The only source for morality is, hence, the Veda as instrument of knowledge. The Veda is the only way to know about what one ought to do. Other sources, such as smti (traditional texts, such as the Mnavadharmastra and the other Dharmastras) and sadcra (behaviour of good people) are valid insofar as they are based on the Veda. People who are versed in the Veda and who have studied the Mms rules to interpret it may end up developing an inner feeling for what ought to be done, as suggested in the Dharmastras32 and in Kumrilas TV,33 but this is nothing other than an analogical extension of the hermeneutic rules they learnt and hence no independent source. The Veda is an instrument of knowledge about what one ought to do, because it prescribes something to be done instead of describing a state of aairs. It is thus a collection of commands. The Vedic commands are of two sorts. On the one hand there are commands which regard compulsory sacrices, to be performed regularly throughout ones life (nitya) or on certain occasions (naimittika), such as the birth of a son. On the other, there are optional sacrices (kmya), dependent on ones wishes. One needs to perform an Agnihotra every day, whereas a Citr is only performed if one wants cattle. In the Mms classication, however, all sorts of sacrices refer to ones desires. The rst group applies throughout ones life because such sacrices identify as the person who has to perform them the one who desires happiness, and the desire for happiness accompanies one throughout ones life.34 So far with the pure (i.e., Vedic-exegetical) Mms core. However, Kumrila35 and most later Mmsakas seem to admit that it is theoretically possible to annihi32 See, e.g., Mnavadharmastra, 2.6: vedo khilo dharmamla smtile ca tadvidm | cra caiva sdhnm tmanas tuir eva ca || 6 || Olivelle translates as follows: The root of the Law is the entire Veda; the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda; the conduct of good people; and what is pleasing to oneself (Olivelle 2004), but the context and the position of sdhn suggests that also what is pleasing to oneself only regards good people who know the Veda. 33 TV ad 1.3.7, passim. On the topic of tmatui, the whole Davis 2007 is insightful and intriguing. See also Francavilla 2006, pp. 165176, which dissents with Davis as for the importance of tmatui, but agrees as for its being dependent on the authority of the Veda. 34 On the equivalence of svarga and happiness, see Bh ad 6.1.2. The goal of happiness identies the one who has to perform the sacrice, and the MS and the Bh explain that happiness is everyones goal, see MS 4.3.15. 35 See Mesquita 1994 and the discussion in Taber 2007.

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late ones desires. At that point, one would no longer be under the inuence of Vedic and non-Vedic commands, since commands depend on the identication of a desire of the person who should full them (see Freschi 2007). One would be left with the possibility to act focusing only on the actions, since one would no longer long for their results. This could be labelled freedom, although it is a very abstract degree of freedom, in which no room for acting whimsically is left. Later Mmsakas tend to interpret this stage as that in which one dedicates to God all actions, so that one no longer performs them for the sake of their results, but rather for the supreme purpose of pleasing God (see the closing verses of padevas Mmsnyyapraka, MNP). This would be a relative freedom (freedom from the common desires, but dependence on a higher-order one).36 It is dicult to establish whether the acceptance of a desire-free action is a move of Kumrila, inuenced by Vednta (as maintained in Mesquita 1994), or whether this possibility has always been held in account by Mms authors. This issue has to do with the relation between Mms and Vednta and with the problem of their historical connection. It might in fact be suggested (see Parpola 1981 and Parpola 1994) that the fact that these two schools were known as Prva- and Uttara-Mms (see above, 1) points to a remote time, in which their basic texts formed a single stra, initially commented upon as a whole and only later parted into two. If this were the case, then one could easily imagine that the Vednta development was in fact already part of the background of Mms authors, who however left its discussion to commentators on the Brahmastra (against the view of a single Mmsstra, later split into Prva-Mmsstra and Uttara-Mmsstra, see Bronkhorst 2007).

5.1 Immoral sacrices prescribed by the Veda

Given that the Veda is the only source of morality, one might expect the Veda to prescribe only rituals having legitimate outputs, such as sons or cattle, and to avoid prescribing rituals whose results run against the very Vedic rules. In fact, since the Veda (see above, section 5) is the only source of ethical norms, how can it prescribe to do something which it prohibits to do elsewhere? How can one decide that what is prescribed by the Veda should not be performed, unless because a Vedic prescription tells us not to perform it? And would not this second Vedic prescription invalidate the rst? And if so, would not this mean that the Veda on its whole is no longer absolutely valid? Furthermore, the fact that undertaking a ritual actually prescribed entails a punishment leads one to question the origin of morality. If the Veda is the only source of morality, how could it be that something it prescribed is immoral? The problem is dealt with in regard to the yena sacrice, which is performed in order to annihilate ones enemy (and about which, see Kataoka 2012). Now, if one performs it, one will obtain the annihilation of their enemy, while at the same time being guilty of violence, since one would have transgressed another Vedic command, namely one should not perform violence on any living being (na hisyt
36 The issue of theism in later Mms is quite complicated. Suce it here to say that after the 13th c. and especially in South India, Mms moves very close to r Vaiavism (for further references, see Freschi 2012b, chapter 1.1.2.

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sarv bhtni). Thus, they will end up in hell. So far, the aprva-causality seems to work in a rather mechanical way. If for one the slaughter of her enemy is so important that she is ready to endure the consequences, she might perform it (and literally go to hell as a consequence). Basically, the Veda tells one how to obtain the slaughter of her enemy, it is up to her whether to perform it or not. In each case, she will endure the corresponding consequence. Thus, the Veda does not enjoin one to perform the yena (see Prabhkaras quote in section 4.2). It only tells one how to perform it, in case he had freely chosen to perform an illicit (qua violent) act. In fact, only one who is desirous to harm [ones enemy] (hiskma) is a suitable candidate for the performance of the sacrice. She alone would be the addressee of the prescription and have the status (adhikra) required to perform the sacrice. However, the condition of being desirous to harm ones enemy is itself forbidden by the prohibition to perform any sort of violence. Consequently, and in accordance with the principle expressed in section 4.3, one might speculate that ones general appetite (i.e., unspecied desire) to harm his enemies falls within the restrictive power of the prohibition to perform any violence, so that one ought never get to the stage of becoming one who desires to harm her enemy. This also means that if one becomes one who desires to harm ones enemy, one has already violated a Vedic prohibition and is therefore to be ethically blamed.

6 Conclusions
The basic Mms approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of ones freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences ones actions as free and since the karman- or aprvabased causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bha authors, by their desires, and, according to Prbhkara authors, by injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in ones faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prbhkaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it. Agency does not accrue to an underlying tman, but rather seems to constitute one of the subjects essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time.

Abbreviations
B Prabhkara (1934-1967). Bhat ad barabhya. Ed. by S.K. Rmantha str and S. Subrahmanya Sastri. Madras: University of Madras.

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MNP

MNS

MS, Bh, TV

PrP

TR

TS

Franklin Edgerton (1929). Mmsnyyapraka of padeva. Introduction, Sanskrit Text, English Translation and Notes. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mahdeva Vedntin (2010). Mmsnyyasagraha. A Compendium on the Principles of Mms, edited and translated by James Benson. Ed. by James Benson. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar and Ganesasastri Ambadasa Jo, eds. (19711980). rmajjaiminipraite Mmsdarane: Mmsakakahrava-KumrilabhaapraitaTantravrtikasahita-barabhsyopeta. 2nd (1st ed. 1929-1934). nandramasasktagranthvali 97. Poona: Anandasrama. likantha Mira (1961). Prakaraa Pacik of likantha Mira with the Nyya-Siddhi of Jaipuri Nryaa Bhaa. Ed. by A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Darana Series 4. Benares: Benares Hindu University. Rmnujcrya (1956). Tantrarahasya. A Primer of Prbhkara Mms, critically ed. with Introduction and Appendices. Ed. by K.S. Rmaswami stri iromai. Baroda: Oriental Institute. Annambhaa (1979). Tarkasagraha Annambhaaviracita blapriysahita [Blapriy commentary on Annambhaa s Tarkasagrahadpik]. Ed. by N.S. Ramanuja Tatachariar. Hydearabad: Prptisthna. Kumrila and Prthasrathi (1978). lokavrttika of r Kumrila Bhaa with the Commentary Nyyaratnkara of r Prthasrathi Mira. Ed. by Dvrikdsa str. Prchyabhrati Series 10. Varanasi. Uveka Bhaa (1971). lokavrttikavykhyattparyak. Ed. by S.K. Rmantha str, rev. by K.Kunjunni Raja, and R. Thangaswamy. 2nd revised. Madras University Sanskrit Series 13. Madras.

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