Brandom

3/10/2008

Animating Ideas of Idealism: A Semantic Sonata in Kant and Hegel

Lecture One

Norms, Selves, and Concepts

1.

In these lectures I consider some of the ideas that animated the philosophical tradition,

anchored and epitomized by Kant and e!el, "hich they called #idealism.$ %y aim is to reanimate some of those ideas, breathin! ne" life into them by e&hibitin! a ne" perspecti'e from "hich they sho" up as "orthy of our interest and attention today. I do that by retrospecti'ely rationally reconstructin! a coherent, cumulati'e tra(ectory of thou!ht, car'in! it out of the conte&t in "hich it is embedded, ruthlessly i!norin! elements near and dear to Kant and e!el that are not essential to the line of thou!ht on "hich I am focusin!. )his "ill seem to some a per'erse sort of enterprise. *t the end of my third and final lecture I assemble conceptual ra" materials dra"n from all three lectures, in order to address the methodolo!ical issue of ho" to thin+ about the nature, (ustification, and possible 'alue of this sort of underta+in!.

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2.

*t the heart of 0escartes$ inno'ations in epistemolo!y and the philosophy of mind lies a e sa" that the risin! ne" science re1uired !i'in! up the old "ays

re'olutionary semantic idea.

of thin+in! about the relations bet"een appearance and reality. 2ince the 3ree+s, the idea had been that, at least "hen thin!s !o "ell, the "ay thin!s appear to us resembles the "ay they really are. 4esemblance in this sense is a matter of sharin! properties 5or some more !eneral sort of form6, as a realistic picture shares some elements of shape and perhaps color "ith "hat it pictures. But on 7opernicus$s account, the reality behind the appearance of a stationary 8arth and a re'ol'in! 2un is a rotatin! 8arth and stationary 2un. 9o resemblance there. *nd 3alileo$s readin! of "hat he calls the :boo+ of nature, "ritten in the lan!ua!e of mathematics; finds the best "ay of !ettin! a !rip on the reality of motion to be by manipulatin! !eometrical appearances, in "hich a period of time sho"s up as the len!th of a line, and acceleration as the area of trian!le. )he cate!ory of resemblance is of little help in understandin! the connections that are bein! e&ploited. *nd in 0escartes$ o"n al!ebraized !eometry, the e1uations of lines and circles do not at all resemble the !eometrical fi!ures about "hich they let us reason so effecti'ely. 0escartes sees that a more abstract notion of representation is needed. <e$'e been "orryin! about it e'er since.1

=or 0escartes, the "ay discursi'e al!ebraic e1uations represent !eometrical fi!ures ser'es as a paradi!m of representational relations !enerally, and in particular of the relation bet"een appearance and reality>bet"een the concept?manipulatin! mind and the !eometrical 3alilean "orld of e&tended thin!s in motion that mind thin+s about by representin! it. <hat ma+es it possible to use al!ebraic formulae to reason about !eometrical ob(ects>the
1

@ohn au!eland tells this story "ell, in the openin! chapter of his Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea A%I) Bress, 1C8CD. En Kant$s early re(ection of resemblance in fa'or of representation, see his Dissertation AF/, *+. II, 38-?3C3D.
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phenomenon I am claimin! pro'ided 0escartes "ith his semantic paradi!m>is the global isomorphism bet"een the t"o systems. Ene can, if one li+es, still thin+ of a formula and the fi!ure it represents as sharin! somethin! or bein! ali+e in some "ay. But "hat they share must be thou!ht about in terms of the role each plays in the system of "hich it is a partG the structure? preser'in! "ay in "hich a formula$s relations to other formulae can be mapped onto a fi!ure$s relations to other fi!ures. *part from those horizontal relations bet"een representin!s and other representin!s, the 'ertical semantic relations bet"een representin!s and representeds are in'isible and unintelli!ible. )his holistic character of the ne" notion of representation "as not lost on 2pinoza, for "hom thou!ht of the "orld is possible only because :the order and connection of thin!s is the same as the order and connection of ideas,; nor on Heibniz, "ho re1uired each monad to represent its "hole uni'erse in order to represent any of it.2

3.

<here 0escartes$ semantic concerns center on the nature of representational success,

Kant addresses more fundamental 1uestions about the nature of representational purport. <hat is it, he "ants to +no", for our ideas so much as to seem to be about somethin!I <hat is it for us to ta+e or treat them as, for them to sho" up to us as, representin!s, in the sense of somethin! that ans"ers for its correctness to "hat thereby counts as bein! representedI3 )his issue is the core
around "hich cluster the other elements of Kant$s concern "ith "hat he calls :ob(ecti'ity.;

)he line of thou!ht

he de'elops to ans"er these 1uestions be!ins "ith the identification of a critical shortcomin! of the account of (ud!ment he inherited. )hat account finds its place as part of the traditional
2

I discuss some of the details of their holistic accounts of representation in 7hapters =our and =i'e of Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality A ar'ard Jni'ersity Bress, 2002D. 3 *lready in the letter to erz of 1..2, Kant saysG I noticed that I still lac+ed somethin! essential, somethin! that in my lon! metaphysical studies I, as "ell as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact, constitutes the +ey to the "hole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. I as+ed myselfG <hat is the !round of the relation of that in us "hich "e call #representation$ to the ob(ectI
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classificatory theory of consciousness. )his is the idea that to be a"are of somethin! is to ta+e it as somethin!G paradi!matically, to classify somethin! particular as bein! of some !eneral +ind. In its form as a theory of (ud!ment, it becomes the 'ie" that (ud!in! is predicating one concept of anotherG puttin! t"o concepts into a relation, mar+ed by a copula, "hose paradi!m once a!ain is brin!in! a particular concept under a !eneral one, or subordinatin! a less !eneral to a more !eneral one.

In a radical brea+ "ith the "hole of the lo!ical tradition he inherited, Kant re(ects this "ay of thin+in! about (ud!ment. )he reason he !i'es is that it does not apply to lo!ically compound (ud!mentsG I ha'e ne'er been able to accept the interpretation "hich lo!icians !i'e of (ud!ment in !eneral. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation bet"een t"o conceptsK5<6hat is defecti'e in this interpretationK5is6 that it applies only to cate!orical, not to hypothetical and dis(uncti'e (ud!ments 5the t"o latter containin! a relation not of concepts but of (ud!ments6, an o'ersi!ht from "hich many troublesome conse1uences ha'e follo"ed. ACP B1/0?1D It "ill be instructi'e to fill in some of those :troublesome conse1uences.; )he same lo!ical tradition distin!uishes bet"een mental acts and their contents>that is, bet"een the t"o sides of "hat 2ellars calls the :notorious #in!$/#ed$ ambi!uity,; "hich affects concepts such as (ud!ment, representation, e&perience, and perception>bet"een "hat one is doing in (ud!in!, representin!, e&periencin!, or percei'in!, on the one hand, and "hat is (ud!ed, represented, e&perienced, or percei'ed, on the other. 2ensiti'ity to that distinction should prompt the 1uestion "hether understandin! (ud!ment as consistin! in predication or the relation of t"o concepts is intended to

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address the acti'ity of (ud!in! or the propositional contents of such acts. It is in the conte&t of that 1uestion that the in'ocation of the sorts of compound (ud!ment that populate Kant$s )able of @ud!ments>ne!ati'e, hypothetical, dis(uncti'e, and modal (ud!ments>ma+es most 'isible the inade1uacy of the traditional "ay of thin+in! about (ud!ment.

=or it then becomes clear that in the traditional theory, the notion of predication is bein! as+ed to do t"o incompatible (obs. En the one hand, it ser'es as a structural "ay of buildin! up ne" (ud!eable contents. En the other hand, it is thou!ht of as a +ind of doin! that has the si!nificance of endorsin! such contents. )he collision bet"een these t"o senses in "hich predication is an #operation$ is clearest "hen one thin+s about (ud!eable contents appearin! as unasserted 5unendorsed6 components of more comple& sentences 5(ud!ments6. )he conditional is a paradi!m. <hen I assert :If Pa then Pb,; I ha'e not asserted Pa. a'e I predicated P of aI

If so, then predication does not amount to endorsementG predicatin! is not (ud!in!. If not, then it loo+s as thou!h there is an e1ui'ocation "hen I detach from the conditional, reasonin!G If Pa then Pb Pa 2oG Pb =or the second premise is a predication, and the antecedent of the first premise is not a predication.

3each pic+s up this Kant?=re!e point, usin! it in his masterful, !em?li+e essay :*scripti'ism,; to ar!ue a!ainst emoti'ist semantic analyses of terms of moral e'aluation./ is

tar!et is theories that understand the normati'e si!nificance of terms such as #!ood$ not as part of
/

)he Bhilosophical 4e'ie", Lol. ,C, 9o. 2, 221?22-. *pr., 1C,0.

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the content of "hat is said about an act, not as specifyin! a characteristic that is bein! attributed, but rather as mar+in! the force of the speech act. 7allin! somethin! !ood is thou!ht of as doing somethin! distincti'eG commendin!. 3each first as+s "hat the limits of this ploy are. e points

to the lo'ely archaic 8n!lish 'erb :to macarize;, "hich means to characterize someone as happy. 0oes the possibility of understandin! callin! someone happy as macarizin! her mean that happiness is not a property bein! in'o+ed in specifyin! the content of the claim that someone is happy, because in sayin! that "e are really doing somethin! else, namely performin! the special speech act of macarizin!I If "e can do that "ith #happy$, "hy not "ith #mass$ or #red$I <hat are the rules of this !ameI e then su!!ests the embeddin! testG loo+ to see if an e&pression can

be used to construct a (ud!eable content that is not directly used to perform a speech act, paradi!matically in the antecedent of a conditional. Because imperati'al force is !rammatically mar+ed, "e cannot sayG M:If shut the door, thenK.; But "e can say thin!s li+e :If he is happy, then I am !lad,; and :If that is a !ood thin! to do, then you ha'e reason to do it.; In the first of these, I ha'e not macarized anyone, and in the second, I ha'e not commended any action. 2o the terms #!ood$ and #happy$ contribute to the specification of content, and are not to be understood as mere force indicators. 5I called this essay
:masterful; and :!em?li+e.; 3each e&hibits a deep fault?line in an entire philosophical approach, nails do"n his point, and lea'es it at that. )he essay is fi'e pa!es lon!.-6

<orryin! about compound forms of (ud!ment containin! unendorsed (ud!eable contents as components re1uired Kant to distin!uish the operations by "hich such contents are
-

Ef course this ar!ument does not ma+e it fore'er impossible to pursue emoti'ist?e&pressi'ist theories. It (ust obli!es those "ho do to ha'e somethin! to say about embedded uses as "ell as free?standin! ones. *ddressin! (ust this issue is "hat mar+s the di'ide bet"een classical e&pressi'ists such as 7.H. 2te'enson, and the more sophisticated !eneration of neo?e&pressi'ists epitomized by *llen 3ibbard and 2imon Blac+burn.
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constructed from the acti'ity of endorsin! the results of those operations. =urther, once "e see that the doctrine of (ud!ment as predication is tryin! to ha'e thin!s both "ays, and that no sin!le #operation$ can be ta+en both to form contents and to be the adoption of an attitude to"ards those contents, the need to deal "ith compound (ud!ements sho"s that predication is inade1uate for both purposes. 8ndorsin! hypothetical 5conditional6 (ud!eable contents is not happily thou!ht of as predicatin!, and those contents are not happily thou!ht of as formed by predication.,

/.

=or this reason, Kant could not ta+e o'er the traditional classificatory theory of

consciousness, "hich depends on understandin! (ud!in! as predicatin!. But "hat can !o in its placeI ere is perhaps Kant$s deepest and most ori!inal idea, the a&is around "hich I see all of

his thou!ht as re'ol'in!. <hat distin!uishes (ud!in! and intentional doin! from the acti'ities of non?sapient creatures is not that they in'ol'e some special sort of mental processes, but that they are thin!s +no"ers and a!ents are in a distincti'e "ay responsible for. @ud!in! and actin! in'ol'e commitments. )hey are endorsements, e&ercises of authority. 4esponsibility, commitment, endorsement, authority>these are all normati!e notions. @ud!ments and actions ma+e +no"ers and a!ents liable to characteristic +inds of normati!e assessment. Kant$s most basic idea is that minded creatures are to be distin!uished from un?minded ones not by a matter? of?fact ontolo!ical distinction 5the presence of mind?stuff6, but by a normati'e deontolo!ical one. )his is his normati!e characteri"ation of the mental.

0ra"in! on a (urisprudential tradition that includes 3rotius, Bufendorf, and 7rusius, Kant tal+s about norms in the form of rules. @ud!in! and actin!>endorsin! claims and ma&ims,
,

*t this point some 5e'en =re!e himself, briefly6 ha'e been tempted to thin+ of (ud!in! as predicatin! truth of a sentence>at the cost of seein! the same predicate as in'ol'ed in all (ud!in!s. But sentences formed by applyin! :Kis true; to a sentence can also appear as the antecedents of conditionals, and the same 1uestion arisesG In assertin! such a conditional, has one :predicated; truth of the sentence that appears in the antecedentI
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committin! oursel'es as to "hat is or shall be true>is bindin! oursel'es by norms. It is ma+in! oursel'es sub(ect to assessment accordin! to rules that articulate the contents of those commitments. )hose norms, those rules, he calls #concepts$. In a strict sense, all a Kantian sub(ect can do is apply concepts, either theoretically, in (ud!in!, or practically, in actin!. 0iscursi'e, that is to say, concept?mon!erin! creatures, are normati'e creatures>creatures "ho li'e, and mo'e, and ha'e their bein! in a normati'e space.

It follo"s that the most ur!ent philosophical tas+ is to understand the nature of this normati'ity, the bindin!ness or 'alidity 5Lerbindlich+eit, 3Nlti!+eit6 of conceptual norms. =or 0escartes, the 1uestion "as ho" to thin+ about our !rip on our concepts, thou!hts, or ideas 5Is it clearI Is it distinctI6. =or Kant the 1uestion is rather ho" to understand their !rip on usG the conditions of the intelli!ibility of our bein! bound by conceptual norms.

-.

)his master idea has some of Kant$s most characteristic inno'ations as relati'ely

immediate conse1uences. )he lo!ical tradition that understood (ud!in! as predicatin! did so as part of an order of semantic e&planation that starts "ith concepts or terms, particular and !eneral, ad'ances on that basis to an understandin! of (ud!ments 5(ud!eables6 as applications of !eneral to particular terms, and builds on that basis an account of inferences or conse1uences, construed syllo!istically in terms of the sort of predication or classification e&hibited by the (ud!ments that appear as premises and conclusions. In a radical brea+ "ith this tradition, Kant ta+es the "hole (ud!ment to be the conceptually and e&planatorily basic unit at once of meanin!, co!nition, a"areness, and e&perience.. 7oncepts and their contents are to be understood only in terms of the contribution they ma+e to (ud!mentsG concepts are functions of (ud!ment. <hyI Kant
.

*s "e mi!ht say, (ud!ment is for Kant the Jr?teil of discourse.

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adopts this order of semantic e&planation because (ud!ments are the minimal units of responsibility>the smallest semantic items that can e&press commitments. )he semantic primacy of the propositional is a conse1uence of the central role he accords to the normati!e si!nificance of our conceptually articulated doin!s. In =re!e this thou!ht sho"s up as the claim that (ud!eable contents are the smallest units to "hich pra!matic force can attachG paradi!matically, assertional force. In the later <itt!enstein, it sho"s up as the claim that sentences are the smallest lin!uistic units "ith "hich one can ma+e a mo'e in the lan!ua!e !ame.

Jnderstandin! (ud!in! in normati'e terms, as underta+in! a distincti'e +ind of responsibility, is also responsible for the most !eneral features of Kant$s account of the form of (ud!ment. )he sub(ecti'e form of (ud!ment is the #I thin+;, "hich, "e are told, can accompany all our (ud!in!s, and so, in its pure formality, is the emptiest of all representations. )hou!ht of in terms of the normati'e pra!matics of (ud!ment, it is the mar+ of #ho is responsible for the (ud!ment. 5* correspondin! point applies to the endorsement of practical ma&ims.6 It indicates the relation of a (ud!in! to the :ori!inal synthetic unity of apperception; to "hich it belon!s. I "ill say somethin! more soon about the use Kant ma+es of this central concept. But the idea behind it is that the sortin! of endorsements into co?responsibility classes is a basic condition of the normati'e si!nificance of commitments. 7ommittin! myself to the animal bein! a fo&, or to dri'in! you to the airport tomorro" mornin! normati'ely preclude me from committin! myself to its bein! a rabbit, or to my sleepin! in tomorro", but they do not in the same "ay constrain the commitments others mi!ht underta+e.

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)he ob(ecti'e form of (ud!ment, Kant says, is :the ob(ectOP; to "hich (ud!ments al"ays, by their 'ery form as (ud!ments, ma+e implicit reference. )hou!ht of in terms of the normati'e pra!matics of (ud!ment, it is the mar+ of "hat one has made oneself responsible to by ma+in! a (ud!ment. It e&presses the ob(ecti'ity of (ud!ments, in the sense of their ha'in! intentional ob(ectsG "hat they purport to represent. )he understandin! of the intentional directedness of (ud!ments>the fact that they represent or are about somethin!>is throu!h?and? throu!h a normati!e one. <hat the (ud!ment is about is the ob(ect that determines the correctness of the commitment one has underta+en by endorsin! it. 5En the practical side, it is
normati'e assessments of the success of an action for "hich the ob(ect to "hich one has made oneself responsible by endorsin! a ma&im must be addressed.6

In endorsin! a (ud!ment one has made oneself liable to

distincti'e +inds of normati'e assessment. <hat one is thin+in! and tal+in! about is "hat plays a special role, e&ercises a special sort of authority in such assessments. 4epresentin! somethin!, tal+in! about or thin+in! of it, is ac+no"led!in! its semantic authority o'er the correctness of the commitments one is ma+in! in (ud!in!. 4epresentational purport is a normati'e phenomenon. *s "e shall see, representational content is to be understood in terms of it.

,.

Besides #ho is responsible for a (ud!in!, and "hat that (ud!in! is responsible to, there

are t"o other elements a normati'e pra!matics of (ud!ment should addressG <hat is it that one ma+es oneself responsible for by (ud!in!I and <hat is it that one is doing in ma+in! oneself responsible, committin! oneself, endorsin!I

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)he first is a 1uestion of ho" to understand (ud!eable contents. )he second is the challen!e to fill in the bare?bones picture of (ud!in! as a normati'e doin!, the alteration of one$s normati'e status, the underta+in! of some sort of responsibility. )his is the +ey issue, for it is in terms of the ans"er to this 1uestion that "e "ill ha'e to understand both dimensions of content>"hat one ma+es oneself responsible for in (ud!in!, and "hat one ma+es oneself responsible to>as "ell as the nature of the sub(ect of those responsibilities. idea. ere, I thin+, "e !et Kant$s ne&t bi!

)hat is that the responsibility one underta+es in (ud!in! 5and there is a parallel story about endorsin! a practical ma&im6 is !enerically a +ind of tas$ responsibilityG the responsibility to do somethin!. 2pecifically, it is the responsibility to integrate the (ud!ment into a unity of apperception. 2ynthesizin! a unity of apperception is the acti'ity that pro'ides the bac+!round and the conte&t in "hich episodes can ha'e the si!nificance of (ud!in!s. 8n!a!in! in that acti'ity produces, sustains, and de'elops a synthetic unity of apperceptionG a self or sub%ect. <hat must one do to be doin! thatI Ene must integrate ne" endorsements into the "hole that comprises one$s pre'ious endorsements. 2ynthesis by successi'e inte!ration can be thou!ht of as in'ol'in! three sorts of acti'ityG critical, ampliati'e, and (ustificatory. Ene$s critical responsibility is to "eed out materially incompatible commitments.8 )his means re(ectin! candidate (ud!ments that are incompatible "ith "hat one is already committed to and responsible for, or relin1uishin! the offendin! prior commitments. @ud!ers as such are obli!ed to renounce commitment to contents that are incompatible "ith their other commitments, or "hich
8

%y tal+ here and in "hat follo"s of :material; relations of incompatibility and inferential conse1uence is adapted from 2ellars$s usa!e. It refers to inferential and incompatibility relations that hold in 'irtue of "hat is e&pressed by non&logical 'ocabulary. )hus claimin! that Bittsbur!h is <est of 9e" Qor+ 7ity has as a material inferential conse1uence that 9e" Qor+ 7ity is 8ast of Bittsbur!h, and is materially incompatible "ith the claim that Bittsbur!h is a prime number. I discuss this idea further in 7hapter Ene of Articulating easons A ar'ard Jni'ersity Bress, 2000D.
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ha'e such commitments as their conse1uences. =or if t"o commitments are incompatible, each ser'es as a reason to !i'e up the other.

Ene$s ampliati!e responsibility is to e&tract the material inferential conse1uences of each commitment, includin! ne" ones, in the conte&t of the au&iliary hypotheses and collateral premises pro'ided by the rest of one$s commitments. 8ach commitment !i'es one reason to accept others, "hich one ou!ht to accept in the sense that one has already implicitly committed oneself to them by ac+no"led!in! the commitment from "hich they follo". Ene$s %ustificatory responsibility is to be prepared to offer reasons for the commitments 5both theoretical and practical6 that one ac+no"led!es, by citin! prior commitments 5or underta+in! further commitments6 that inferentially entitle one to those ne" commitments. 2ee+in! to fulfill the first sort of responsibility is aimin! at a "hole constellation of commitments that is consistent. 2ee+in! to fulfill the second is aimin! at one that is complete. *nd see+in! to fulfill the third is aimin! at a constellation of commitments that is #arranted. 5Berhaps it "ill be clear at this point ho" it is that Kant can ta+e it that the systematic obli!ations of philosophers are merely the e&plicit form of the 'ery same obli!ations that are implicitly incumbent on rational +no"er and a!ents as such.6

<hat is produced, sustained, and de'eloped by practically ac+no"led!in! these critical, ampliati'e, and (ustificatory inte!rati'e tas+ responsibilities is a unity precisely in the sense of bein! !o'erned by, sub(ect to assessment accordin! to, those norms of inte!ration. It is a synthetic unity in that it is produced by the acti'ity of synthesis that is inte!ratin! disparate

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commitments into such a unity. C It is an original synthetic unity of apperception because "hat ma+es an act or episode a %udging in the first place is (ust its bein! sub(ect to the normati'e demand that it be inte!rated into such a systematically unified "hole10, and a"areness in the sense of apperception 5a matter of sapience, rather than mere sentience6 is (ud!ment 5appercei'in! is (ud!in!6.11 Kant also, tellin!ly, calls the product of this synthetic acti'ity a transcendental unity of apperception. It is transcendental in that it is that in terms of "hich "e must understand the relation to ob(ects>representation>"hich is an essential dimension of the content of (ud!ments. )he +ey to Kant$s account of representation is to be found in the story about ho" representational purport is to be understood in terms of the acti'ity of synthesizin! an ori!inal unity of apperception, as I ha'e described it so far. It "ill help to approach that story in sta!es.

..

2o far I ha'e attributed to Kant t"o positi'e mo'es in response to his principled re(ection

of traditional accounts of (ud!ment as predicationG

)his is not the only sort of :combination; that Kant calls :synthesis; 5cf. B130?16. But the claim that this is the basic species is an important element of the readin! I am offerin!. 7f. the claim at *.C/B10/G )he same function "hich !i'es unity to the 'arious representations in a (ud!ment also !i'es unity to the mere synthesis of 'arious representations in an intuitionR and this unity, in its most !eneral e&pression, "e entitle the pure concept of the understandin!. )he same understandin!, throu!h the same operations by "hich in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the lo!ical form of a (ud!ment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in !eneral. 5I ha'e said>and "ill here say>nothin! about the mo'e from unifyin! (ud!ments into an ori!inal synthetic unity of apperception to the unification of concepts and intuitions in (ud!ments.6 10 )his is "hat I ta+e to be the idea behind Kant$s apparently a"+"ard claim that representations must both already :stand under; a synthetic unity and :be brou!ht under; it by the acti'ity of synthesisG I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations>to be entitled the ori!inal synthetic unity of apperception>under "hich all representations that are !i'en to me must stand, but under "hich they ha'e also first to be brou!ht by means of a synthesis. A7B4 B13-D 11 A)Dhat act of understandin! by "hich the manifold of !i'en representationsK is brou!ht under one apperception, is the lo!ical function of (ud!ment. A7B4 B1/3D
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understandin! the acti'ity of (ud!in! in normati!e terms, as the underta+in! of a +ind of responsibility or commitmentR and

understandin! that +ind of responsibility as a tas$?responsibility, a commitment to do somethin!, namely to inte!rate the (ud!eable content one endorses into a synthetic unity of apperception.

In li!ht of the (ustificatory, ampliati'e, and critical dimensions of that practical synthetic? inte!rati'e responsibility, another "ay of puttin! this last point is that "hat one is responsible for is ha'in! reasons for one$s endorsements, usin! the contents one endorses as reasons for and a!ainst the endorsement of other contents, and ta+in! into account possible counter!ailing reasons. *nd that is to say that as normati!e creatures, "e are rational creatures>not in the sense that "e al"ays or e'en !enerally thin+ or act as "e ha'e reason to, or that "e usually ha'e !ood reasons for thin+in! and doin! "hat "e do, but in the sense that "hether "e do or not, "e are al"ays liable to normati'e assessment concernin! our reasons for thin+in! as "e do or doin! "hat "e do. o"e'er sensiti!e "e are in fact on any particular occasion to the normati'e force

of reasons 5that peculiar force, at once compulsory and yet not al"ays compellin!, that so fascinated and puzzled the ancient 3ree+ philosophers6, "e are the +ind of creatures "e are> +no"ers and a!ents, creatures "hose "orld is structured by the commitments and responsibilities "e underta+e>only because "e are al"ays liable to normati'e assessments of our reasons.

)he norms that articulate the contents of (ud!ments are concepts. )he conceptual faculty, the understandin!, is the faculty of (ud!ment. 7oncepts articulate the contents of (ud!ments by determinin! "hat one "ould ma+e oneself responsible for, "hat one "ould be committin! oneself to, "ere one to endorse those contents. Kant thin+s of concepts as a +ind of rule. <hat

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are they rules for doin!I )hey are rules for synthesizin! a unity of apperception. *nd that is to say that they are rules articulatin! "hat is a reason for "hat. )he concepts bein! applied determine "hat follo#s from a !i'en claim5able6, hence "hat 5else6 one "ould ha'e committed oneself to or made oneself responsible for by endorsin! it. )hey determine "hat counts as rational e!idence for or a!ainst, or %ustification of a (ud!eable content, hence "ould count as a reason for or a!ainst endorsin! it.

)he tas+ of inte!ratin! a (ud!ment 5or practical ma&im6 into a synthetic unity of apperception has determinate conditions of success and failure only insofar as the (ud!ments ha'e contents that stand in relations of material inferential conse1uence and incompatibility to one another. * +no"er can ha'e a determinate critical inte!rati'e tas+?responsibility only if it is settled "hich (ud!eable contents are materially incompatible "ith "hich others, so that endorsin! some pro'ides !ood reasons to re(ect others. *nd a +no"er can ha'e a determinate ampliati!e or %ustificatory inte!rati'e tas+?responsibility only if it is settled "hich (ud!ments inferentially commit or entitle one to "hich others, and so pro'ide !ood reasons for acceptin! those further (ud!ments. )he concepts applied in (ud!in! articulate the content of the (ud!ment 5the (ud!eable content one becomes responsible for6 by specifyin! the material inferential and incompatibility relations that content stands in to other such contents. =or that is "hat settles "hat one is responsible for doing in ma+in! the (ud!ment. 7onceptual content in that sense pro'ides the details of the synthetic?inte!rati'e responsibility one is underta+in! thereby. ere

the paired notions of a (ud!eable content and of bein! responsible for such a content in the sense of endorsin! or committin! oneself to it, are bein! made sense of in terms of a basic +ind of tas+?

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responsibilityG bein! responsible for doing somethin! 5namely inte!ratin! the (ud!ment into a normati'e unity of apperception6.

Kant$s ideas about the act or acti'ity of (ud!ing settle ho" he must understand the content (ud!ed. In conditionin! the semantic account of content on the pra!matic account of force 5in =re!e$s sense6>the "ay the story about "hat is endorsed is shaped by the story about "hat endorsing is>Kant e&hibits a +ind of methodolo!ical pragmatism. In this sense, that pra!matism consists not in the e&planatory pri'ile!in! of practical discursi'e acti'ity o'er theoretical discursi'e acti'ity, but in the e&planatory pri'ile!in! of act o'er content, "ithin both the theoretical and the practical domains. Kant$s e&planatory pri'ile!in! of the acti!ity of synthesizin! a unity of apperception "ould re'erberate throu!h subse1uent 3erman Idealism, and be embraced and e&ploited in particular by =ichte and e!el.

8.

)he ar!umentati'e and e&planatory structure I ha'e been indicatin! as !uidin! and

"or+in! out 5in a pra!matist spirit6 Kant$s master idea of the fundamentally normati!e character of (ud!in! is a "ay of thin+in! about the relations bet"een four thin!sG
16

<hat one must do in order in the rele'ant sense to be ta+in! responsibility

for or committin! oneself to a (ud!eable content 5or practical ma&im6. )his is en!a!in! in the acti'ity of synthesi"ing an ori!inal unity of apperception, by integrating the content in 1uestion into the "hole that comprises all of one$s commitments in the li!ht of the relations of material inferential conse1uence and incompatibility they stand in to one another.

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26

<hat one creates, sustains, and de'elops by doin! thatG the constellation

of commitments that is an ori!inal synthetic unity of apperception 5E2J*6. 36 )he elements of that synthetic unity, "hat one ta+es responsibility for or

commits oneself to. )hese are the (ud!eable contents that are inte!rated into the E2J*. /6 <hat one thereby ma+es oneself responsible to. )hese are the ob%ects that

one comes to represent, in the sense of ma+in! oneself ans"erable 5for the correctness of the endorsed (ud!eable contents that ma+e up the E2J*6 to ob(ects, "hich one in that normati'e sense thereby counts as thin+in! 5tal+in!, (ud!in!6 about. It is because of this dimension of conceptual contentfulness that the synthetic unity of apperception deser'es to count as a transcendental unity of apperception. =or in Kant$s usa!e, transcendental lo!ic differs from general lo!ic in addressin! the content, and not (ust the form of (ud!ments, in the sense of their representation of, or reference 5in the sense of normati'e ans"erability6 to, ob%ects.

)his list amounts to an order of e&planation. )he strate!y is to ma+e sense of each of these elements in terms of those that precede it. Because the +ind of normati'e unity distincti'e of the synthetic unity of apperception must be understood in terms of the synthetic?inte!rati'e acti!ity that produces it, the co!niti'e?practical sub(ect or self that is identified "ith a synthetic unity of apperception is not happily thou!ht of usin! the traditional cate!ory of substance. It is the mo'in!, li'in! constellation of its :affections;, that is, of the concomitant commitments that compose and articulate it. )he si!nificance of each of the component commitments that

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contin!ently and temporarily are included in a particular synthetic unity of apperception depends holistically on its rational conse1uential and incompatibility relations to its fello"s. )his reciprocal dependence of the "hole and its parts, to!ether "ith the dynamic character of such relational structures as sustained by rational synthetic?inte!rati'e acti'ity made it irresistible for subse1uent idealists 5follo"in! Kant himself, in his Criti'ue of (udgment6 to appeal to and apply organic metaphors.

)he t"o?sided notion of conceptual content ad'erted to in the last t"o items on the list> "hat one ma+es oneself responsible for and "hat one ma+es oneself responsible to, by (ud!in!> is also to be e&plained in terms of the ori!inal synthetic acti'ity of inte!ratin! one$s commitments accordin! to their rational relations to one another. I ha'e claimed that "e can thin+ of this as a pragmatist e&planatory strate!y, in the sense that "e find in contemporary philosophers of lan!ua!e "ho "ant to understand the meanings e&pressed by 'arious locutions in terms of the use of those e&pressions>that is, in suitably broad senses of the terms, to !i'e e&planatory priority to pragmatics o'er semantics. But I ha'e so far said nothin! about the relations bet"een the t"o dimensions of conceptual content that sho" up as the third and fourth items on the list. I ha'e su!!ested that the tar!et notion of representational purport should itself be understood as a normati'e 5meta6conceptG as a matter of ta+in! or treatin! one$s commitments as sub(ect to a distincti'e +ind of authority, as bein! responsible 5for its correctness, in a characteristic sense6 to thin!s that in that normati'e sense count as represented by those representing states, "hich are "hat must be inte!rated into an ori!inal synthetic unity. <hat remains to be seen is ho" that rational synthetic inte!rati'e acti'ity can be understood as institutin! a specifically representational normati'e dimension of authority and responsibility.

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)hat is "hat is re1uired to (ustify the claim that the ori!inal rational synthetic unity of apperception as so far described also deser'es to be thou!ht of as a transcendental unity of apperception, the sub(ect studied by transcendental lo!ic, "hich !oes beyond general lo!ic precisely in its concern not "ith the form of (ud!ments, but of their content, in particular, their representational content.

Intentionality>semantic contentfulness>comes in t"o fla'orsG #of$?intentionality and #that$?intentionality. )he first, or representational dimension, is semantic directedness at ob(ectsG "hat one is thin+in! of or tal+in! about. )he second, or e)pressi!e dimension, concerns the content of our thou!ht and tal+G #hat one is thin+in! or sayin! 5about "hat one is thin+in! or tal+in! about6. 2o one can thin+ of or about fo&es, that they are nocturnal omni'ores. <hat falls "ithin the scope of the #of$ in such a specification is a term, "hile "hat follo"s the #that$ in such phrases as :I thin+ 5or @ohn thin+s6 that fo&es are nocturnal omni'ores,; is a declarati'e sentence. )he pre?Kantian early modern philosophical tradition too+ it for !ranted that one ou!ht first to offer an independent account of representational, #of$?intentionality, of "hat it is to represent somethin!, and only then, on that basis to e&plain e&pressi'e, #that$?intentionality, "hat it is to (ud!e or claim that thin!s are thus?and?so.

)hat commitment is not strictly entailed by the traditional bottom?up order of lo!ical?semantic e&planation that be!ins "ith an account of concepts, builds on that an account of (ud!ments, and on that in turn an account of inferences. =or one mi!ht pursue such a three?sta!e account first for "hat e&pressions of the 'arious orders of comple&ity e)press, and only then turn to consideration of "hat they represent 5for instanceG ob(ects?and?properties, facts, and la"s6. 2o Kant$s re(ection of the traditional lo!ic, in li!ht of the normati'e?pra!matic priority of (ud!ment 5"hich "e ha'e seen, in his hands already has a substantial inferential component6>his treatin! concepts as :functions of (ud!ment;>is not tantamount to a prioritizin! of the e&pressi'e o'er the representational dimensions
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of semantic content.12

But in fact, once a!ain, Kant turns the traditional order of e&planation on its

head. )he fact that Kant$s approach to (ud!in! appeals to inte!ration of (ud!ments by synthesizin! them into a "hole accordin! to their rational relations to one another brin!s into 'ie" in the first instance a notion of the content a declarati'e sentence e&presses, "hat one has become responsible for, that is understood in terms of the broadly inferential relations of inclusion and e)clusion it stands in to other contents 5both those included in the current synthetic unity of apperception and candidates not currently endorsed6. But for "hat thereby becomes 'isible to be intelli!ible as a notion of conceptual content, it must e&hibit also a representational dimension. )hin+in! about somethin! is not a special +ind of thin+in!. It is an aspect of all thin+in!.

2o the 1uestion is ho" reference to or representation of ob(ects 5representational #of$? intentionality6 can be made intelli!ible or sho"n to be a necessary sub?structure of inferential #that$?intentionality, "hen the latter is understood in terms of the rational synthetic inte!rati'e acti'ity that is (ud!in!. ere is ho" I thin+ that story !oes 5and this is really the punchline of my

story in this lecture, the :one far?off, di'ine e'ent; to"ard "hich this "hole creation has been mo'in!6G )he relations of material incompatibility and inferential conse1uence amon! (ud!eable contents that "e ha'e seen are a necessary condition of synthesizin! a rational unity of apperception 5"hich is to say (ud!in!6 already implicitly in'ol'e commitments concernin! the identity and indi'iduation of ob%ects they can accordin!ly be understood as representin! or bein! about. <hyI )he (ud!ment that A is a do! is not incompatible "ith the (ud!ment that * is a fo&.
12

In terms of later de'elopments, "e can see it as a 1uestion of the relati'e e&planatory priority of the notions of the sense e&pressed by a sentence and the ob(ect represented by a sin!ular term. <ith the "isdom of hindsi!ht 'ouchsafed us by =re!e$s analysis 5still opa1ue to 4ussell6, "e can see that the t"o issues that need to be disentan!led are the distinction bet"een the content associated "ith declarati'e sentences and that associated "ith sin!ular terms, and the distinction bet"een sense and reference.
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)he (ud!ment that A is a do! is incompatible "ith the (ud!ment that A is a fo&. )hat means that ta+in! a do!?(ud!ment to be materially incompatible "ith a fo&?(ud!ment is ta+in! them to refer to or represent an ob(ectG the same ob(ect. *nd the same thin! holds for relations of material inferential conse1uence. )a+in! it that A is a do! does not entail that * is a mammal. But ta+in! it that A is a do! does entail that A is a mammal. 2o dra"in! the inference is ta+in! it that the t"o (ud!ments refer to one and the same ob(ect.13

)his triangulation by ac+no"led!in! material incompatibilities and inferences is, in a nutshell, ho" the normati!e demand for a rational unity of apperception 5(ud!ments6 ma+es intelli!ible representational purportG "hat it is to ta+e or treat (ud!ments as representing or bein! about ob%ects. It sho"s ho" the representational dimension of conceptual content can be understood as already implicit in its articulation by relations of inference and incompatibility, "hich is ho" "e understood the e)pressi!e dimension. It pro'ides as sense in "hich ma+in! oneself rationally responsible for an inferentially articulated (ud!eable content, in the sense of
13

It doesn$t matter that these e&amples appeal only to sentences formed by applyin! monadic predicates. Inferential and incompatibility relations amon! sentences formed usin! relational predicates e&hibit correspondin! phenomena. =or instance, the identities of the terms are essential to the !oodness of the inference from :Kant admired amann,; and : amann "as a teacher of erder,; to :Kant admired a teacher of erder.; Ene mi!ht also "orry about lo!ically compound premises and conclusions 5especially in li!ht of the emphasis placed on these in moti'atin! the "hole line of thou!ht bein! considered6. I$ll say more about those in the ne&t section, in the conte&t of the cate!ories. But once a!ain, the !oodness of material inferences in'ol'in! the paradi!matic ne!ati'e, hypothetical, and dis(uncti'e (ud!ments, for instance, depends on the identity of the ob(ects addressed by the premises and conclusions. :If my do! 7oda bro+e any home furnishin!s, I "ill be an!ry "ith 7oda,; entails :If my do! 7oda bro+e my fa'orite lamp, I "ill be an!ry "ith 7oda,; but not :If my do! 7oda bro+e my fa'orite lamp, I "ill be an!ry "ith @ohn,; or e'en :If @ohn bro+e my fa'orite lamp, I "ill be an!ry "ith @ohn.; Ene mi!ht thin+ that if I belie'e that * is the mother of B, then :* is a do!; is incompatible "ith :B is a fo&.; But "e should rather say that :* is the mother of B,; :* is a do!,; and :B is a fo&,; form an incompatible triad. ere there is still trian!ulation, pointin! to common ob(ectsG :* is the mother of B,; in'o+es ob(ects common to each of the other t"o elements. If there are not :enou!h; other claims in play, "e may not be able to tell "hether an incompatible triad has the structure of this e&ample, in'ol'in! a relational predicate, rather than that e&hibited by :* is a blac+berry,; :* is red,; and :* is ripe,; "hich also are irreducibly triadically incompatible. )his sort of possible underdetermination "ould be a problem if the aim "ere to produce a theory of reference that "ould say "hat ob(ects any !i'en claim referred to, !i'en only the rational relations it stands in to other claims. But the aim is only somethin! much "ea+erG to say "hat it is to ta+e or treat a claim as so much as purportin! to refer to some ob(ect or other. =or that purpose, it is enou!h that all the patterns of multiadic incompatibility in'ol'e some sort of trian!ulation?by? coreference.
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bein! committed to inte!ratin! it into a rational unity of apperception, in'ol'es ta+in! or treatin! those (ud!ments as about ob(ects, and so as ma+in! oneself responsible to them. It puts us in a position to understand Kant$s other"ise dar+ claim that :it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an ob(ect, and therefore their ob(ecti'e 'alidityK.;1/ 4epresented ob(ects sho" up as somethin! li+e units of account for the inferential and incompatibility relations (ud!eable contents stand in to one another. If t"o properties are incompatible, then it is impossible for one and the same ob(ect to e&hibit both, but not impossible for t#o different ob(ects to do so. *nd if possession of one property entails possession of another, then any ob(ect that e&hibits the first "ill necessarily e&hibit the second. But it is not necessary that some other ob(ect do so.

ere, then, is an ans"er to the 1uestion "ith "hich "e be!anG "hat is it for somethin! so much as to seem to be a representation 5a representin! of somethin! represented6I <hat does one ha'e to do to count as ta+in! or treatin! it as a representin! of somethin!I )he ans"er is that treatin! it as standin! in relations of material incompatibility and inferential conse1uence to other such thin!s is ta+in! or treatin! it as a representation, as bein! about somethin!. )his decidedly non?atomistic "ay of thin+in! about representational purport is reco!nizably a "ay of pic+in! up 0escartes$ idea 5endorsed and de'eloped by 2pinoza and Heibniz6 that horizontal relations amon! representin!s are "hat is needed to ma+e intelli!ible the 'ertical relations bet"een them and representeds. )he account of "hat one must do in order to synthesize a unity of apperception pro'ides the conte&t in "hich it is possible to understand both dimensions of conceptual contentG the inferential?e&pressi'e and the referential?representational.

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C.

In order to be able to inte!rate a (ud!eable content into a unity of apperception, "e ha'e

seen, one must be able to distin!uish in practice "hat follo"s from it and "ould be e'idence for it, and "hat is incompatible "ith it.1- But no" "e can introduce a ne" +ind of claimG if p then ', for instance accordin! to the rulesG Ene is committed to if p then ' if and only if one ta+es it that the material inference from p to ' is a !ood one. )he inference from if p then ' and r to ' is !ood (ust in case the material inference from r to p is !ood. if p then ' is incompatible "ith r (ust in case the material inference from r to p is !ood, and there is some s incompatible "ith ' such that the material inference from r to s is !ood.
5%any different "ays of introducin! conditionals present themsel'es at this point. I offer these rules (ust for definiteness.1,6

)hese amount to rules for formin! hypothetical (ud!ments. )hey specify the

conceptual content of such (ud!ments, for they associate a definite set of material inferential and incompatibility relations "ith each such (ud!ment. *nd those relations are "hat settle "hat counts as successfully inte!ratin! such hypothetical (ud!ments into a synthetic unity of apperception. But that means that anyone "ho can inte!rate any non?hypothetical (ud!ments into a synthetic unity of apperception already +no"s ho" to do e'erythin! in principle needed to

1-

)hat is, one must ma+e such distinctions. It is not to say that for any (ud!eable "hatsoe'er one must be disposed to put it into one of these classes. *nd it is not to say that one must al"ays !et it right>thou!h if one !ets enough of it "ron!, one "ill thro" into doubt the attribution of commitment to that content, in e&treme cases, perhaps to any content. 1, *nother "ay to !o starts "ith material incompatibilities. 2ay that p entails ' 5p+,'6 iff e'erythin! incompatible "ith ' is incompatible "ith p. 52o 7oda$s bein! a do! entails 7oda$s bein! a mammal, in the sense that e'erythin! incompatible "ith his bein! a mammal is incompatible "ith his bein! a do!.6 )hen "hat is incompatible "ith p' is (ust "hate'er is incompatible "ith ' and not incompatible "ith p. )hose incompatibilities "ill in turn settle the entailments of p'. )he possibility of doin! e'erythin! "ith material incompatibilities is si!nificant in understandin! the metaphysical and lo!ical primacy e!el assi!ns to determinate negation, "hich is (ust his 'ersion of that concept.
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inte!rate hypothetical (ud!ments in'ol'in! those same (ud!eable contents into such a synthetic unity. In a similar "ay, it is possible to use the practical mastery of the notion of material incompatibility e&hibited by anyone capable of en!a!in! in basic synthetic?inte!rati'e acti'ity to introduce e&plicit notions of ne!ation and necessity>the idea bein! that one counts as committed to S5pT16 "hene'er one treats p and ' as materially incompatible.1.

9o" a concept, on Kant$s usa!e, is a rule for formin! a (ud!ment. In this sense, :formin!; a (ud!ment 5that is, a (ud!eable6 is settlin! "hat counts as successfully inte!ratin! it into a synthetic unity of apperception. )he concepts accordin! to "hich hypothetical, modal, and ne!ati'e (ud!ments are formed, then, are a priori, not in the first instance in an epistemological sense, but in the semantic sense that any sub(ect of apperception, "hich is to say any sub(ect that can en!a!e in (ud!in! 5and hence be a"are of anythin! in the sense of sapient or appercepti'e a"areness6, at least implicitly al"ays already possesses 5can deploy6 those concepts. )hey are in this sense :pure; conceptsG "hat Kant calls :cate!ories.; *nd each is associated "ith a form of (ud!ment. In these cases, they are associated "ith forms of compound (ud!mentG the 'ery +ind of (ud!ment consideration of "hich turned out to re1uire a ne" theory both of the acti'ity of (ud!in! and of the contents (ud!ed. In this case of the hypothetical, Kant thin+s the cate!ory is that of causation in the sense of one thin! necessitating another. )hereon han!s a tale. )he only conclusion I "ant to dra" from this line of thou!ht at this point is that here "e ha'e an e&ample of at least some of Kant$s central cate!ories that "e can understand entirely in terms of the process of synthesizin! a rational unity of apperception. *nd notice that

1.

I sho" in detail ho" one mi!ht do somethin! li+e this in the *ppendices to the fifth of my 200, @ohn Hoc+e lectures *et#een -aying and DoingG To#ard an Analytic Pragmatism Aforthcomin! from E&ford Jni'ersity BressD.
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in this "ay of tellin! the story, "e did not ha'e to presuppose the possibility of somethin! called :synthetic +no"led!e a priori,; and then search for the conditions of its possibility.

<hat "e ha!e had to presuppose, in tellin! this story about the acti'ity of synthesizin! a transcendental unity of apperception, is the a'ailability, as ra" materials, of (ud!eable 5or practically endorsable6 items possessin! determinate conceptual contents. )hat is, it must already be settled, at each sta!e of the process of rational critical and ampliati'e inte!ration, "hat relations of material incompatibility and inferential conse1uence the conceptual contents that are to be inte!rated stand in to one another. In order to assess the status of that presupposition concernin! conceptual contents, "e need to loo+ more closely at the +ind of normati'e force that is in'ol'ed in ta+in! responsibility for the use of concepts in (ud!ment and intentional action. )hat is the topic of my ne&t lecture.

10.

I pointed out abo'e that "hen "e understand represented ob%ects>"hat one ma+es

oneself responsible to in becomin! responsible for a (ud!eable content by (ud!in! 5inte!ratin! it into a synthetic unity of apperception6>in terms of trian!ulation of the material incompatibility and inferential conse1uence relations that articulate the contents of those (ud!eable contents, those ob(ects sho" up as somethin! li+e units of account for properties, "hich stand in those relations of e&clusion and inclusion 5or conse1uence6 A e!el$s #ausschlieUen$ and #schlieUen$D to one another. epresenting sub%ects, understood as ori!inal synthetic unities of apperception, can

also be understood as somethin! li+e units of account, for commitments 5(ud!in!s, and, in the e&tended system, also endorsements of practical ma&ims6, "hich stand in relations of e&clusion and conse1uence to one another. 2ub(ects and ob(ects are ali+e in :repellin!; material

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incompatibilities, and encompassin! material conse1uences. )hey are different in that "hile it is impossible for one and the same ob(ect at the same time to e&hibit t"o incompatible properties
5or stand in incompatible relations6

and necessary that it ha'e all the properties entailed by any

properties it does ha'e, it is merely inappropriate for one and the same sub(ect at the same time to underta+e incompatible commitments, and obligatory that it ac+no"led!e all the commitments entailed by any commitments it does ac+no"led!e. In the case of ob%ects, the relations of e&clusion and inclusion are alethic modal onesG a matter of "hat is and is not possible and "hat is and is not necessary. In the case of sub%ects, the relations of e&clusion and inclusion are deontic or normati!e onesG a matter of "hat one is and is not entitled and committed to or responsible for, hence of liability to normati'e assessment and criticism.

Eb(ects play the conceptual functional role of units of account for alethic modal incompatibilities. * sin!le ob(ect (ust is "hat cannot ha'e incompatible properties 5at the same time6. )hat is, it is an essential indi'iduatin! feature of the metaphysical cate!orical sortal metaconcept ob(ect that ob(ects ha'e the metaproperty of modally repellin! incompatibilities. *nd in a parallel fashion, sub(ects too are indi'iduated by the "ay they normati'ely #repel$ incompatible commitments. It is not impermissible for t"o different sub(ects to ha'e incompatible commitments>say, for me to ta+e the coin to be copper and you to ta+e it be an electrical insulator. <hat is impermissible is for one and the same sub(ect to do so. 2ub(ects play the conceptual functional role of units of account for deontic normati!e incompatibilities. )hat is, it is an essential indi'iduatin! feature of the metaphysical cate!orical sortal metaconcept sub(ect that sub(ects ha'e the metaproperty of normati!ely repellin! incompatibilities. * sin!le sub(ect (ust is "hat ought not to ha'e incompatible commitments 5at the same time6.

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<hen e!el loo+s bac+ at Kant$s account of the nature of the sub(ect, construed as an ori!inal unity of apperception and mar+ed by the sub(ecti'e form of all (ud!ments, the :I thin+,; and of the ob(ects to "hich sub(ects ma+e themsel'es responsible in (ud!in!, mar+ed by the ob(ecti'e form of all (ud!ments, the :ob(ectOP,; it stri+es him that both are to be understood in terms of the synthetic acti!ity of inte!ratin! (ud!ments "ith one another, by critical e&clusion and ampliati'e inclusion or e&tension. )hat sort of doing is "hat ma+es the concepts both of sub(ect and of ob(ect intelli!ibleG as "hat is responsible for (ud!ments, and "hat (ud!ments are responsible to, respecti'ely. )his is one of the core ideas around "hich e!el elaborates his idealism. 7onsciousness, in the sense of apperception, a relation bet"een sub(ects and ob(ects, presupposes and is to be e&plained in terms of the process of synthesizin! a self>the process that is self?consciousness. <hat no" sho" up as symmetric sub(ecti'e and ob(ecti'e poles of consciousness 5the intentional ne&us6 are to be understood as correspondin! to t"o aspects of the acti'ity of synthesizin! a unity of apperception that can, in the "ay "e ha'e rehearsed, be seen to be necessarily a transcendental, that is, ob(ect?representin!, unity. *lethic and deontic modalities, "hat is e&pressed by modal and normati'e 'ocabulary, sho" up as t"o sides of one coin, intimately bound to!ether by the synthetic?inte!rati'e systematizin! acti'ity that is the ultimate source of the senses of both +inds of locution. I$ll ha'e more to say about this idea, and the demarcation of the normati'e, in my ne&t lectureG :*utonomy, 7ommunity, and =reedom.;

11.

I ha'e no" finished tellin! the substanti'e part of the story to "hich this lecture is

dedicated. I "ant to close by briefly addressin! a methodolo!ical 1uestion that "ill ha'e occurred to (ust about e'eryone "ho has come this far "ith meG :<hat in the "orld do you thin+

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you are doin!I;

o" could I thin+ that I ha'e been tal+in! about anythin! that .ant thou!ht,

!i'en all the concepts absolutely central to his pro(ect that do not appear at all in my tale. *mon! the topics I did not find it necessary so much as to mention areG intuition, sensibility, recepti'ity, the fact that concepts "ithout intuitions are empty, space and time, conditions of the possibility of e&perience, synthetic truths +no"n a priori, the distinction bet"een phenomena and noumena, transcendental idealism, the 7opernican re'olutionKand a lot more. Ene mi!ht "ell thin+ that these topics are some"hat important to KantR certainly they loom lar!e in his o"n tellin! of his story.

Ef course they are important. )here is a lot more !oin! on, e'en (ust in his theoretical philosophy, than I ha'e ad'erted to. =or instance, Kant is the first philosopher to try to thin+ throu!h the conse1uences of mo'in! from *ristotelian principles of identity and indi'iduation of empirical ob(ects, in terms of substance and accident, to 9e"tonian ones, "hich appeal instead to spatiotemporal location. 5)his is a naturalist idea, but not one the British empiricists>e'en the :celebrated
%r. Hoc+e;>had contemplated, ne'er mind endorsed.6

e thin+s that this metaconceptual transformation

has profound conse1uences for "hat it is to be semantically in touch "ith>to be able to represent>ob(ects so concei'ed. )hose considerations are inter"o'en "ith a line of thou!ht about sensibility and recepti'ity and neither are in any ob'ious "ay necessarily connected to the story about representational purport that I ha'e told here. )hat there is nonetheless a deep connection, indeed a necessary harmony, bet"een them is "hat the transcendental deduction aims to e&plain.

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But the fact that one of Kant$s central preoccupations is synthesizin! these t"o thou!hts about content>one, as Kant seems to ha'e thou!ht of it, ha'in! to do "ith the form of the metaconcept conceptual content, and the other ha'in! to do "ith its content>does not at all mean that it is not possible to dissect from the results of his synthesis one of the constellations of commitments he is concerned to inte!rate into a lar!er "hole. )here is an internal coherence to the line of thou!ht about concepts, (ud!in!, hence apperception and understandin! that I ha'e been layin! out. *nd "e can consider it in abstraction from the other elements "ith "hich Kant combines it. Indeed, "e must distin!uish it if "e are to as+ the potentially interestin! philosophical 1uestion of "hether you !et a better story about intentionality, semantics, and representation "ith or "ithout the considerations concernin! sensibility that he is concerned to inte!rate "ith those I ha'e indicated. *nd I thin+ "e must discern the train of thou!ht I ha'e pic+ed out here in order to address the historically interestin! 1uestion of ho" to understand the paths that lead from Kant$s to e!el$s most interestin! ideas.

Ef course, there are many such paths. In my ne&t lecture, I "ill lay out another one, centerin! on practical, rather than theoretical philosophy.

890

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