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In October 1977, the promoters (Ambanis) made an offer for sale of 2820000
equity shares of Rs. 10/- each at par and consequently the company was listed
on the Bombay Stock Exchange in January 1978. In June 1985 the name of the
company was again changed to Reliance Industries Limited (RIL).
Till 1988, RIL mainly followed the organic growth strategy by setting up
plants in its Patalganga Complex. Polyester filament yarn (PFY) phase I was
commissioned in 1982, followed by phase II in 1985. In 1986 it commissioned
polyester staple fibre (PSF) and purified terephthalic acid (PTA) plants in the
same complex. This was followed by commissioning of linear alkyl benzene
(LAB) plant in 1987 and paraxylene (PX) plant in 1988 in the same complex.
In 1992, Reliance Group had come out with a simultaneous issue of equity
shares at par (face value Rs. 10/-) and optionally convertible debentures
(OCD) convertible at the price of Rs. 50/- per share for each of its twins i.e.
Reliance Polyethylene Limited (RPEL) and Reliance Polypropylene Limited
(RPPL). These companies, which were popularly known as ‘Illu’ and ‘Pillu’,
respectively, in the stock market those days, had been promoted to develop
second phase of Hazira Complex by setting up plants to manufacture
polyethylene and polypropylene respectively. These issues had received huge
response from the public. Prior to these issues, the promoters had allotted
hefty chunk of equity at par to themselves. Though the promoters participated
in the OCD issue, it was to much lesser extent than public. Thus the cost of
one equity share of RPEL worked out to Rs. 14.31 to promoters whereas the
same was Rs. 34.13 to the public. In case of RPPL, these numbers were
respectively Rs. 16.61 and Rs. 33.61. In financial year 1994-95, these
companies were merged with RIL with a swap ratio of 1:4 in case of RPEL
and 3:10 in case of RPPL. As a consequence, the equity capital of RIL went
up only by approx. Rs. 99 crore but with a whopping addition of approx. Rs.
700 crore to its reserves. Public shareholders of RPEL and RPPL got RIL
shares at Rs. 136.52 and Rs. 112.03 respectively, whereas the promoters got
them at Rs. 57.24 and Rs. 55.40 respectively. (The share price of RIL was in
the range of Rs. 350-400 at that time).
RIL played the same rope trick again in 2006-07. In 2002-03, it had acquired
46% stake in IPCL through its investment company Reliance Petro
Investments Limited at the cost of approx. Rs. 2638 crore. In March 2007, RIL
announced IPCL’s merger with itself retrospectively from 1st April 2006 and
with the swap ratio of 1:5. This merger led to RIL equity capital going up by
just Rs. 60 crores while its reserves shooting up by approx. Rs. 5460 crores. It
also added approx. Rs. 12000 to 13000 crore to the turnover of RIL in 2006-
07.
And lo and behold! While this book was going to press, on 2nd March, 2009,
RIL and RPL (Reliance Petroleum Limited) boards announced the merger of
RPL into RIL with a swap ratio of 16:1 i.e. 1 share of RIL for every 16 shares
of RPL. This is the third “RPL” of Reliance Group, that like the first two
mentioned above, is being merged with RIL. As we know, this RPL has set up
the second refinery of Reliance Group close to its first refinery at Jamnagar.
This new refinery went on stream in Dec 2008 and is being merged with RIL
with retrospective effect from 1st April 2008.
At the time of merger announcement RIL held 70.3 percent stake in RPL’s
equity, while the western oil major Chevron held 5 percent, rest being with the
public. Chevron had an option to increase its stake to 29 percent subject to
Chevron signing crude supply and product off-take agreements. While it is
believed by some that the failure of RPL and Chevron to sign crude supply
and product off-take agreements, as a consequence of which it was decided
that RIL will buy Chevron’s 5 percent stake, was the trigger for merger
(Economic Times dated 3rd March, 2009). Some others believe that RPL was
expected to incur substantial losses in the first quarter of 2009 (the first quarter
of its operations also) and the merger was being done to avoid declaring
standalone results of RPL for the year ending 31st March, 2009 (Economic
Times dated 28th Feb 2009). However, in reality neither the merger nor its
timing is any surprise. As can be seen from the earlier paragraphs, it is a part
of the in organic growth strategy followed by Reliance Group. Let us see how
RIL would look post this merger.
Post merger RIL’s turnover for 2009-10 is estimated to be Rs. 2.60 lac crores
as against 2008-09 standalone estimate of Rs. 1.60 lac crores; its net profit for
2009-10 is estimated to be over Rs. 29000 crores against 2008-09 standalone
estimate of over Rs. 20700 crores. While its equity capital will go up by only
Rs. 69 crores (4.4%) from Rs. 1574 crores to Rs. 1643 crores, immediately
post merger, its networth is estimated to shoot up to Rs. 1.05 lac crores as of
31st March 2010 from the estimated standalone networth of Rs. 84000 crores
as of 31st March 2009 (Economic Times dated 3rd March 2009).
Thus we can see how ‘merger’ has been used very effectively as a growth
strategy by the largest private sector company in India.
One must, however, understand that barring merger of IPCL, all other mergers
into RIL mentioned above were of the group companies. Thus, while at RIL
level the growth happened by inorganic route through mergers, at Reliance
Group level it was still an organic growth.
Sources: 1. www.ril.com, 2. Past annual reports of RIL, 3. Economic Times
dated 28th Feb 2009, and 3rd March, 2009.
© 2009, Prasad Godbole.