The best phrase to describe the role of the character Thrasymachus in The Republic, is Plato's

straw man. This is not necessarily the fault of Plato (though I think we can safely say that it is), but

rather the fault of the dialectic as a form of philosophic inquiry. It's not that there is an inherent problem

with contrasting opposing views to try to derive truth (though there is), but rather, that the way in

which dialectics were written, especially by Plato, was such that they served to hide the writer's bias,

while strengthening his position by destroying imaginary ones. Plato had clearly already decided what

he wanted justice to be when he started writing the Republic, and every conversation in that story was

carefully written by him to strengthen that view of justice. Even though he may present interesting

arguments through his ancillary characters like Thrasymachus and Polemarchus, they are only

presented to elucidate Socrates' own opinions (and thus Plato's), and because Plato has already thought

of arguments that he thinks will counter them. In this way, I think, Thrasymachus specifically was

given both the fairest and unfairest of treatments in The Republic, because he is the presenter of the

best view of justice contrary to Plato's, but is unable to defend it against Socrates, though many such

opportunities exist for him to challenge Socrates' framing of the argument. Which is why, in this essay,

I will seek to defend Thrasymachus' position “that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the

stronger” (Plato 338c).

In defending Thrasymachus however, I will need to explain why Plato/Socrates believes his

idea of the craft of justice to lead to a happy life, since it is the main thrust of Thrasymachus' argument

that Socrates' view of justice does not make one happy. To begin, then, Thrasymachus, when

challenged by Socrates to explain his initial assertion (Plato 338d), frames his argument in a poltiical

one, by discussing the various types of governance that existed in the Greek city states. He argues that

each different kind of government promotes laws that are to the benefit of that government,

“Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others” (Plato

338e). The rulers in these cities are the strongest and they are pushing on the populace what is virtous

by proscribing the laws of that society, “and they punish anyone who goes against [these laws] as
lawless and unjust” (ibid). Socrates attacks this position by separating intention from the definition of

justice. He proposes that since sometimes the rulers will make mistakes and order things which are not

to their advantage, and since it is considered virtuous for the people to uphold any law made by the

rulers, then it must be virtuous to do both what is to the benefit of the ruler and well as what's not in

their benefit (since sometimes they will be wrong), and therefore justice or virtue cannot be the

advantage of the stronger, since sometimes it will not be to their benefit (Plato 339e – 340b).

It is said then that Thrasymachus changes his argument to be what is believed to be better for

the rulers, which is an important consideration, though one that should, in all fairness to the argument,

be assumed given the framework of his argument. However, it is important to note here that the reason

Socrates' does not immediately assume Thrasymachus is speaking of intention is because of his

teleological framework. He has approached the definition of justice, or virtue, as a craft (Plato 332d). It

is something people strive to achieve their end, a good life. It is in this framework that intention does

not really hold a place, because it is a definition that exists outside of human interpretation. Though

justice is a human craft, it is something inherent, not defined by humanity but discovered by humanity,

much like how Plato believes knowledge to not be sought but rediscovered (Plato Meno). In this sense

then, what rulers believe to be beneficial to themselves, and what is actually beneficial are clear

distinctions, since Socrates'/Plato cannot accept a definition of justice that is contingent on the

considerations of the person engaging in that craft.

Thrasymachus, however, is able to define his view of justice without consideration to intention

necessarily, by discussing how one views crafts. That is, that a doctor is not considered a doctor when

he is in error, but when he is successfully practicing his craft (Plato 340d). He explains that the vagaries

of language force us to say that a doctor has erred, when really, it is the doctors' lack of knowledge of

doctoring that has caused the error, and thus, in that regard, he is no craftsmen of medicine (Plato 341).

And therefore “A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best

for himself, and this his subjects must do” (ibid).

 The second point to which an important and clear distinction between Thrasymachus and Plato's

respective view on justice is made is whether or not a craft seeks out its own advantage. Socrates

argues that “no other craft seeks its own advantage – for it has no further needs – but the advantage of

that of which it is the craft” (Plato 342c). This argument is strengthened, and explained, by his

assertion that crafts, in their precise sense, are not practiced by their craftsmen for the advantage of that

craftsmen. In the precise sense, a doctor does not practice medicine for his own financial benefit, but

for the benefit of his patient (Plato 342d). “In the precise sense” is more of the teleological framework

being established. That is, that crafts can be explained with reference only to themselves, and that they

represent purpose action combinations in and of themselves, and a human's purpose can be defined

outside of the craft, and has no effect on the true purpose of the craft. Socrates' argues, within this

framework, that rulers, in the precise sense, must not seek their own benefit, but the benefit of those

who they practice ruling over, their subjects (ibid). Thrasymachus responds with an example that

destroys Socrates' inference from the precise sense of crafts to rulers not benefiting themselves. He

states “that shepherds and cowherds [do not] seek the good of their sheep and cattle, and fatten them

and take care of them . . . [for] their master's good and their own . . . rulers in cities – true rulers, that is

– think about their subjects [no] differently than one does about sheep” (Plato 343b). The craft of being

a shepherd would be herding sheep, and he takes care of the sheep, but not to the sheep's benefit, but to

his own. At face value this would seem the same distinction as earlier, that Thrasymachus is

abandoning the teleological framework by placing a human purpose as integral to the crafts purpose,

but there is an interesting distinction there. It is possible for a doctor to approach medicine in a manner

that does not benefit himself, and the reason that most doctors do benefit from the practice of medicine

is the nature of our human market, and how we approach scarcity. With a shepherd, however, it is a

specific craft whose purpose is to keep sheep safe specifically for the benefit of their wool and meat.

There is an inherent purpose in being a shepherd that one is working to the benefit of the owner of the

sheep. If we are to extend the medical analogy, the sheep in this case are not the patients, the owner of
the sheep is, and so it is the same way that Thrasymachus views rulers, that their subjects are not their

patients. This is a view completely in opposite with what will later be discussed in the Republic by

Socrates as to the nature of rulers in his perfect city.

On the heels of this argument, Thrasymachus states what will become the main contention for

the rest of his debate with Socrates', that “justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the

stronger and the ruler, harmful to the one who obeys and serves” (Plato 343c) and that “ injustice is to

one's own profit and advantage” (Plato 344c). Socrates' once again attacks this by arguing that crafts

have no intrinsic benefit to the practitioner, which is why wage-earning exists as a craft used in tandem

with other crafts to earn, for the craftsmen, a recompense for practicing his craft (Plato 346e). But he

decides to put this point away, conveniently after he has had the last word on it, and wishes to address

the secondary line of Thrasymachus' argument, that unjust people will live better lives than just ones.

He decides, once again very conveniently, that the Socratic method (as we know it today, of one

person asking questions about another's point of view, rather than a competition of opposing views that

would need a judge to determine the winner) is the best to approach this issue (Plato 348d). This line of

questioning eventually leads to the the very important consideration: “Does [an unjust] person claim

that he deserves to outdo outdo a just person . . . [and] also outdo an unjust person or someone who

does an unjust action . . .?” (Plato 349c). When Thrasymachus admits as much, Socrates' begins to

make the arguments that will force Thrasymachus to concede the debate, the first of which is,

ironically, one of his weakest arguments. He argues that because an unjust person seeks to outdo not

only people who are not like him, but also people who are like him, that whatever positive qualities he

must possess (Thrasymachus having previously stated that because an unjust man seeks his own benefit

he is “clever and good” (Plato 348d)) would lead him to not want to outdo people who are like him, “a

good and clever person doesn't want to outdo those like himself but those who are unlike him and his

opposite” (Plato 350b). His argument for this being the case, relies, once again on crafts in their precise

sense, and the main examples he brings up to fulfill this regard whether or not a craftsmen seeks to
outdo craftsmen of the same type as himself. Whether or not, say, a musician, in practicing his craft,

seeks to outdo non musicians or musicians. For, regarding music, a musician is cleverer at it than a non

musician, and if a musician does not want to outdo others of the same type as him (musicians) than

clearly, clever people do not want to outdo the people who practice the same craft as them, so a person

who practices the craft of injustice, if he is clever, would not seek to outdo another unjust person, but,

by Thrasymachus definition he would have to, therefore he could not be clever as Thrasymachus had

already proposed (Plato 349d – 350d). There is one large problem with this argument, which is that it is

never actually demonstrated (most likely because it was accepted fact at the time, and Plato saw no

reason to justify a wildly held belief, even if, as I will point out, it is irrational) that a craftsmen does

not seek to outdo members of the same craft as himself, in the precise sense. Now, if we accept

Socrates' view on crafts as they have been demonstrated, we need to ask ourselves, how does one

decided who is better at practicing their craft? In the precise sense, who is a better doctor? When does

someone practice medicine better than another? How do we measure that? The answer is that we

measure the goodness of a doctor relative to other doctors, that his skill at the craft of medicine is

measured in comparison to how well other doctors practice their craft. Therefore, it stands that when a

doctor engages in a craft, he is, by necessity outdoing other doctors who are worse at the craft than him,

and obviously, since crafts seek perfection (if not necessarily of themselves, than of the thing they

affect) craftsmen would seek perfection in their craft, by having a greater effect with their craft. And so,

craftsmen seek to outdo members of the same type.

However, since this line of reasoning is not addressed in the book, Socrates goes on to make a

further point, to prove that unjust people can not work to their own benefit in the same way that just

people can. He asks whether or not a city can achieve power “without justice, or will it need the help of

justice?” (Plato 351b). He argues that they would need justice, because a city, before it can become

powerful, must rule itself, and getting along with other people in such an organized fashion would be

justice for unjust people “would never have been able to keep their hands off each other were they
completely unjust . . . there must have been some sort of justice in them that at least prevented them

from doing injustice among themselves” (Plato 352c). This is an interesting argument, and I will defend

noble Thrasymachus from it (since, at this point in the story, he refuses to defend himself, even though

he is correct) by use of a concrete example, a person that Socrates and Thrasymachus would both agree

is unjust, a Mafia don.

Now, a Mafia don is a member of an organized crime syndicate, namely, the Mafia. He is a ruler

to, in the precise sense, so it benefits us in his relationship to the topic to discuss him. He exists outside

the laws of society, and seeks to use the mafia, and his subordinates to his own benefit. Therefore

Thrasymachus would argue that he is not bowing down to the laws that benefit the rulers of that

society, and in his own rulership, is placing his needs first. Socrates' would say that he is acting against

his innate sense of good and is harming his subjects, causing them to create more injustice. The crux of

the argument here though, is about whether or not the man is completely unjust. Socrates' would argue

that he is not, because he exists within a stable hierarchy that is ordered precisely because people have

agreed to get along and follow orders, and if they were all completely unjust they would not have

agreed to this society. But, I think were Thrasymachus not ham-stringed for this dialectic would argue

that Socrates' definition of justice is unfair. He is stating that every time people cooperate, they must be

engaging in the craft of justice, and therefore, no one is completely unjust, and it would be impossible

to engage in full on injustice, because it would require a person to stop being a social animal. But, and I

think this is where intention becomes a critical point when dealing with justice and injustice, an unjust

person seeks to benefit himself, if working with other people benefits him more than not working with

other people, he's going to work with other people, and that really shouldn't be considered justice,

because, really, it's just a cost benefit analysis. And though it may seem to be on the surface the act of a

just man to help others, if he himself benefits more from the helping, and he is only willing to help

others in so much as he benefits, than he is an unjust man and not a just one.
 Now, since this is really a debate about whose definition is correct, about whether or not we can

say that Justice is, in fact, the ability for people to get along, and that injustice, even though it seeks to

benefit oneself, it must not be viable since it would not benefit the person if he can't work with others,

there is really no answer. I would contend that Socrates, in trying to outdo Thrasymachus, has made his

definition of justice too broad to be of any real significance. He has argued that any time a human

interacts with another human to either of their benefit, that is justice. If he would refute that he has

argued that the case (as I imagine both he and Plato would) and would instead say that he has argued

that any time people try to outdo each other, it is injustice and that does not benefit them, because they

can't get along, then he is just plain wrong. Outdoing someone, as simply as Socrates' and Plato would

like to put it, is not always engaging in hostile competition with everyone. In fact, it is merely striving

to do better than someone else, and if, to do better than another person, it requires you to help them for

a time, agree to certain rules, like how the Mafia has set up its organization, then you are still outdoing

the person, you are just engaging in a method different than what is commonly seen. In fact, in a

teleological framework, it should be argued that the craft of outdoing someone is not dependent upon

the method of how one actually manages to overcome someone else, since a sailor can use sailing to

outdo a soldier (perhaps running away from him in a boat, being the first to get to a treasure), and a

soldier could in turn use killing to outdo the sailer (killing him before he can escape with the treasure)

then the craft of outdoing someone, in the precise sense, is not dependent on method, but on

motivation, or intention. Therefore Thrasymachus' idea still stands. An unjust person is more clever

because he seeks to benefit himself and not his rulers, and justice is, since Socrates' refutation of

craftsmen benefiting themselves was wrong, just the tyranny of the stronger over the weaker.

Works Cited

Plato. “Republic,” (G.M.A. Grube & C.D.C. Reeve, trans.) (Indianopolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1992)
Plato. “Meno,” in The Internet Classics Archive | Meno by Plato (Benjamin Jowett trans.)
(url: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html)