HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ vs.

DE CASTRO
324 SCRA 591-618, February 3, 2000
G.R. No. 112905


THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE
LEON, ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO
LOPEZ, ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ,
LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON,
PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON,
LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE
LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE LEON,petitioners,

HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO
PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE
CASTRO, and their successors-in- interest,respondents.


FACTS:

In this case, two applications for registration of the same parcel of land were filed in
different branches of the Court of First Instance. The certificates of title were issued in the name
of respondent de Castro, while the other, for the heirs of Pedro Lopez was still pending.

On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi, representing the Municipality of
Silang, Cavite, filed a motion to lift the order of general default and submitted an opposition on
behalf of the municipality. The opposition was later amended on September 16, 1966 alleging
that a portion of the land applied for which the municipality had leased to private persons had
been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier. The municipality further alleged that in a
registration case entitled "Mariano Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang" (CA-G.R. No.
8161-R), the Court of Appeals found that the applicants had never been in possession of the land
sought to be registered.

On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Legaspi, representing the Municipality of Silang
Cavite, submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality. The opposition was amended
alleging that the subject lot had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier.

In their answer, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of land they sought to
register was their inheritance. The municipality filed a motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit on the ground that the oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene
considering that Lot 1 was outside of its territorial limits.

The municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. The court denied it
in its July 23, 1970 order.

The applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court be commissioned to receive
evidence for them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had become final and executor by
virtue of which the municipality of Silang no longer had any personality. The court granted said
motion and directed clerk of court to submit a report.

In his report, dated April 15, 1971, clerk of court Rolando Diaz stated that since time
immemorial, the Delos Reyes owned and possessed parcel of land in question. On November 3,
1870, they sold it to Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the property was passed to Pedro
Lopez de Leon, Sr. And Maxima Trinidad until their death when their children took over
ownership and possession thereof. Upon their death, their respective heirs succeeded over the
property and on February 25, 1971, they partitioned it.

On April 19, 1971, the court rendered a decision approving the report of the clerk of court
and ordering the decree of title be issued in favor of the applicants (Lopez).

In the course of examining the records for the purpose of issuing the decree of
registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration Commission discovered that lot
1 had been decreed in favor of private respondent Honesto de Castro, et al.

Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967, Honesto de castro et al. sought the
registration of the same parcel of land in question and succeeded in declaring it in their names.

On August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an order declaring the court had lost
jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.

Seven (7) years later, on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for
execution of judgement and cancellation of land titles of the defendants and their successors-in-
interest before the RTC of Cavite.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the titles issued to the defendants be cancelled?

HELD:
No.In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their
interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that
whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where more than one
certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the
land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.36 It should be stressed that said
rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for
registration of title. Hence, even though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to
have priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is being processed, an
applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take care that his right or interest is duly
protected.
Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land
registration. In the same way that publication of their application for registration was supposed to
have rendered private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of
notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of
notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have been notified of the land
registration proceedings filed by private respondents in the Tagaytay City branch of the Cavite
CFI thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.

They let seven years to pass from such discovery before they acted to revive what already
was a dormant judgment. In short, they were guilty of laches-negligence/failure to do that which
is ought to be done.

Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration (Presidential Decree 1529) The decree of
registration shall not be reopened by reason of absence, minority or other disability, subject,
however, to the right of any person...deprived of land, to file in the proper Court of CFI a petition
for reopening and review not later than ONE YEAR.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.


Hence, the heirs of Pedro Lopez lost their property in favor of Honesto de Castro.


THE DIRECTOR OF LAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS
276 SCRA 276

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA,
MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents


FACTS:

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529.
[5]
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
[6]
However, during
the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel,
Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who
was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since
1938.
However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23
(1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the
Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view
that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation."
ISSUE:

Whether or not newspaper publication is mandatory in a land registration case?

HELD:

Yes. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from
filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall
not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. --
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the
land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may
concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting,
all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and
the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole
world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered
because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for applicationThere
is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have
been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration
isDISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.















CACHO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
269 SCRA 159, March 3, 1997


TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant,
COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:
The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land situated in
what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of Military
Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly tried and
decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title under
Republic Act 26.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for
re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with prejudice.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error in its decision?

HELD:

Yes. A land registration proceeding is binding upon and conclusive against all persons
including the government and its branches.

A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive upon all
matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceeding.

The lower court and the court of appeals correctly found that decrees of registration had
in fact been issued in the case at bench.

To allow the final decrees to be once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the
1914 case of Cacho vs U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decree which cannot be
reopened after the lapse of one year from the enrty thereof. Such action would definitely run
counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
Requiring the submission of new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree
would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the
fundamental rule regarding res judicata.

In land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the losing party had been
in possession of land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

The issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the land
registration commission.

A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the
statute of limitation nor by laches.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the
City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9,
1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.







DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
308 SCRA 317, June 17, 1999

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, MONICO RIVERA and ESTRELLA NOTA, respondents.
FACTS:
Lot 10704 is one of the uncontested lots. It is a parcel of land party cocal and corn land
situated at Cagmanaba, Oas, Albay containing an area of 68,179 square meters bounded on the
North, South and West by Burias Pass and on the East by Lot 10976. Originally the land was
owned by Eliseo Rivera who began possessing and occupying the same in the concept of owner
openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1926. He planted corn in the
vacant spaces and some coconut seedlings which later bore fruit. Sometime on January 7, 1928,
the Spouses Ignacio Almazar and Gregoria Rivera purchased the land from him. The land now
was declared in the name of Gregoria Rivera under Tax Declaration No.. There was another re-
assessment under Tax Declaration No. 7968 .They continued planting corn.
On May 22, 1971, claimant herein and his wife purchased the land from Gregoria
Rivera. She caused the land to be declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. 10641. There
was another re-assessment under Tax Declaration No. 10403. There was a house which they
constructed as their abode. They continued planting corn and harvested about 10 to 15 sacks of
ears of corn. They shelled the ears of corn and sold the same to the market for their own
livelihood. Meanwhile, on the coconut trees they harvest about 50 to 100 nuts every 45 days for
family consumption.
The land was surveyed in the name of the herein claimant per certification of the CENRO. The
cadastral survey costs in the amount of P101.70 had been paid under .Likewise, all taxes have
been paid up to the current year
Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily
possessed and occupied the land in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely,
notoriously and exclusively since 1926, very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the court ordered
the registration and confirmation of Lot 10704 in the name of the Spouses Monico Rivera and
Estrella Nota.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the finding of the trial
court that claimants-appellees and their predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10704 since
1926 is not sufficiently supported by the evidence. The appellant contended that the earliest tax
declaration presented by appellee took effect only in 1949 and that there is no evidence that
Gregoria Rivera declared the same in her name for tax purposes during her alleged occupancy.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment appealed from

ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Monico Rivero and EStrella Nota have a registrable title to the
lot in question?
HELD:
Yes. Monico Rivera and Estrella Nota were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of ownership under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years prior to
1973 is a question of fact which was resolved affirmatively by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Such factual finding is generally binding upon this court which should limit itself to
questions of law in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. There is a
question of law where there is a doubt raised concerning the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter.

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act provides: Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of the
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively essential to the
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.








REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL
295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998
G.R. No. 132963


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical
School), petitioner,
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent

FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio
Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application
for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of
Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of
Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a
school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970.
Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High
School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National
School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several
demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.

In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint
for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in
the school's favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he
occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the
filing of the complaint in 1991.

Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with
the RTC, the court ruled on schools power.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the court ruling that Doldol was entitled to the
portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years (1959-1991).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?
HELD:
No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in
accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land
since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having
complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to
the land or a right to assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had
reserved the lot for Opol National School.

The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual
or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for
sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the
government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired (Solicitor General)

In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land in dispute.






PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 392, January 21, 1997


SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA.
DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES,
SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES, respondents

FACTS:
On 13 June 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands issued EO NO. 40,
which reserved for provincial park purposes parcels of land situated in Naga,Tiwi, Albay.

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance in Albay, ordered the registration of 15
parcels of land covered by EO No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on 1916-1917. Palomo
donated these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo, two
years before his death in 1937.

Claiming that the aforesaid OCT were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio
Palomo filed a petition for reconstruction. In 1953, the RD issued TCT to said lot.

On July 10,1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47, converting the area
embraced by EO No. 40 into Tiwi Hot Spring National Park, under the control, management,
protection and administration of Commissions of Parks and Wildlife, now a Division of the
Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion
of public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible of disposition under Public Land Law nor
registrable under Land Registration Act.

The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real taxes thereon
and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. They also
mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan from BPI.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and
Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for
Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy
Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of
Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut
down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.

On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in
the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case.


The court dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. On the other hand, the court rule din
favor of the RP.

The petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner certificate of titles are valid?

HELD:
No. Under the Spanish Crown, private ownership of land could only be acquired through
royal concessions, which were documented in various forms, such as:
1. Royal Grant
2. Special Grant
3. Title by Purchase
4. Possessory Information Title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the
Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.

Unfortunately, no proof was presented that petitioners predecessors-in-interest derived
the title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance on the decisions of the Court
of First Instance which were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of
notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court.

There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public
domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the
subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation
prior to 1913 up to the present. Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes,
they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels
of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership in land registration cases. Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to
the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears
emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were
surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered
under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates
of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299
approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and
correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11,
1948 contains the following note, "in conflict with provincial reservation." In any case,
petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the
registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in
introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall
within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area.
Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, were
within the perimeter of the national park, no pronouncement as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling
within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.















JAMES BRACEWELL vs. COURT OF APPEALS & REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
323 SCRA 193, January 25, 2002


JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

FACTS:
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square
meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria
Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and
Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the
name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her
son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.

On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed
petitioners application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the
application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.

The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by
Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Rizal.
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the
Makati Regional Trial Court where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The
Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, this time
alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not
constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner.
The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed
and set aside the lower courts Order


The C.F.I. ruled in favor of petitioner upholding the right of M. Cailles. In 1985, the
Solicitor General re-submitted his opposition. The lower court issued an order granting the
application of petitioner. The Solicitor General appealed to respondent Court in 1992 which
reversed and set aside the lower courts order. It also denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner has vested rights over the parcels of land?
2. Whether or not Sec. 48 of Court of Appeals No. 141 could be invoked in this
particular case?

HELD:
No. Sec. 48 of C.A 141 was amended by PD 1073 in January 1977, which now reads (b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.

Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or
disposable. It was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as
alienable on March 27, 1972. Even the petitioner and his predecessors occupied the same since
1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of possession since the subject parcels of land
were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation.

There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified or disposable
or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains public land until released
therefrom and open to disposition.

Petition DENIED for lack of merit.




















THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. COURT OF APPEALS &
AQUILINO CARINO
324 SCRA 757, February 7, 2002

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an
area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming
part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao,
Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911, and later administered by him in behalf of his five
brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot
No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan, among the heirs of
Teresa Lauchangco.
On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot
No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.
.

Private respondents statements were confirmed by the report of the Land Investigator of
the Bureau of Lands. It further stated that the land was agricultural in nature and improvements
thereon were sugarcane, bamboo clumps, etc.; That the land subject for registration was outside
any civil or military reservation, etc. and that the same land was free from claim and conflict;
That Carino had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the
same thru inheritance from his deceased mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs decision
ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of Respondent Carino was valid?

HELD:
No. The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land Registration Act which
requires that he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present
muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as Titulo Real, or royal grant, a Concession
Especial or special grant, a Composicion Con Al Estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
compra, or title through purchase; informacion possessoria or adjustment title, which would
become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.

Even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land
Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For
insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private
respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the
manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872,
the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975,
provides:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of first Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
x.................x.................x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter."
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless
the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required period to constitute a grant from the State.

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain.

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother
had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and
inadmissible in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept
of owner", by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his
parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The
burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration
required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that
would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.

The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by
the private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property. To reiterate,
under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State. Unless alienated in accordance with
law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his
petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing
and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en
concepto de dueno for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,[37] the
Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms
part of the pubic domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of
Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No.
6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land,
under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands
Management. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.














TURQUESA vs. VALERA
322 SCRA 573
[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000]


MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA
substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO
ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN,
LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO, petitioners,

ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, respondents

FACTS:
More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the registration of two
parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a
total land area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an
area of 210,767 square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters.
In support of her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she
was still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the
heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime
in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she
continued possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in
her name. Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with
copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.

The Director of Lands, together with petitioners and other persons opposed the
application of private respondent. In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the director
of lands) averred that their lands were included in lot 1 which private respondent sought to
register in her name. Oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct
boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, but the same was denied.

On 23 April 1956, the trial court ruled that applicant has a registrable title.
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned,
arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and
their demand for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the
appealed decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered
the conduct of an ocular inspection.

In accordance with the CA directive, three (3) commissioners were appointed by the Trial
Court to conduct ocular inspection. The observations and findings were the following:

(1) the claims of petitioners as shown in the sketch plan are not shown in the original
survey.
(2) the claims of other petitioners appeared in the original survey although three of these
claims bear different identifying names.
(3) the Calle para Collago maintained by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of
the property of the applicant on the south side is existing and still is the existing boundary on the
south and on the southeast side as shown in the sketch plan.
However, the court just reiterated its former decision ordering the registration of the lot in
the name of applicant Rosario Valera.
ISSUE:
Does Rosario Valera have a rightful claim over the lot in question?
HELD:
No. She doesnt have a rightful claim over the land.
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must
show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. On him also
rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain considering that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies
the title. Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that
the default order issued by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or
unknown, except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. In
the case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other
oppositors.

Even if petitioner/s (Partolan) was excluded by the order of general default and (Baltar)
did not appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956. The applicant must still prove
and establish that she has registrable rights over the land, which must be grounded on
incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration of the
applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a
certain period, does not constitute the WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE and
CONCLUSIVE evidence required in land registration. If an applicant does not have any
rightful claim over real property, the Torrens System of registration can confirm or record
nothing.

It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits.

The Damasens were declared to have a rightful claim over the specific portions of Lot. . A
reading of the said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly indicates that the land to be
registered in private respondents name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to
the Commissioners report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors.
Since private respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas,
such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then
the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November
25, 1981 are REINSTATED.

FELIPE SEVILLE, et. al. vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et. al./
CALIXTRA YAP
351 SCRA 112, February 2, 2001
G.R. No. 129401.

FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA
and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TELLDER, MA. ISABEL
SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE,
JOSE MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-
GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-
DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-
interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners,

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION,
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents.

FACTS:
On June 14, 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA (Leyte Sub-Basin Development
Authority) a lot consisting of 464,920 square meters located at Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte. On
June 1, 1982, LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands
covering said lot. Thereafter, an original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of
LSBDA. In 1989, LSBDA assigned all rights over the property to the National Development
Company (NDC), and as a result, a new TCT was issued. The property was leased to Philippine
Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation, Philphos & LEPANTO.

In 1988, the estate of Joaquin Ortega, represented by their administrator Felipe Seville,
filed a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals, & damages against the respondents. After
trial, the Court declared, among others, the following:

1. The Deed of Sale by Calixtra Yap in favor of LSBDA is NULL & VOID ab initio;
2. The intestate estate of Joaquin Ortega is declared owner in fee simple of the 735,333
sq. m. & NDC is ordered to segregate same area & convey the same to the estate of J.
Ortega.;
3. The Register of Deeds is ordered to issue 8 new titles;
4. xxxx
5. xxxx
6. xxxx
7. xxxx
8. xxxx

A motion for reconsideration was filed with the Court of Appeals where the latter
REVERSED & SET ASIDE the RTCs judgment.
Hence, this petition.

In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted the following issues for the reconsideration
of the Court:

1. Whether or not the sale of Calixtra Yap of the estate of the late Joaquin Ortega in
favor of LSBDA was NULL & VOID;
2. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Patent & an Original Certificate of
Title in favor of LSBDA was valid;
3. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches;
4. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance & the damages
awarded by the Trial Court.

HELD:
The petition has no merit. There was no showing that the land had been classified as
alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA, hence, petitioners could not have become owners
thereof through prescription. Petitioners challenge to LSBDA cannot be granted, because it is
based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

Certificate not subject to collateral attack A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.

LSBDAs title was based on Miscellaneous Sales Patent issued by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands. LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of
Lands. Therefore, the same was valid.

Moreover, the title became indefeasible & incontrovertible after the lapse of one year
from the time of its registration and issuance. Sec. 32 of PD 1529 provides that upon expiration
of said period of 1 year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become
incontrovertible.

Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This
cannot be allowed. The proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted only,
pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, which states that, All actions for the reversion to
the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.





SERNA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
308 SCRA 527, June 18, 1999
G.R. No. 124605.

ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA RASING, respondents.
FACTS:

Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza, all
surnamed Fontanilla. Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and
Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca
(married to Enriquito Serna). Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to Rafaela
Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are first cousins.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land, containing
an area of twelve thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay
Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same year,
Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement
that the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands. On
March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands approved the survey plan.
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla
sold the land to his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate
property tax thereon.
On August 21, 1955, Rosa sold the land to her nephew, herein Respondent Santiago
Fontanilla, thru a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The instrument was not registered.
Respondent spouses Fontanilla constructed their house on the lot in question.

On December 16, 1957, Rosas heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two children, Fructoso &
Paciencia, executed another Deed of Absolute Sale over the same land in favor of Respondent
Fontanilla.
In 1978, respondent spouses Fontanilla went to the United States (U.S.) and stayed there
until 1981. While in the U.S., Petitioners Enriqueto & Amparo Serna (Ampara is a grandchild of
Dionisio Fontanilla), applied for the land registration of the same land in Pangasinan. In 1979,
the registration was approved and the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No.
139 to petitioners. Such title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
On May 7, 1981, Respondent spouses Fontanilla filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) an action for reconveyance.
After trial, the CFI ruled in favor of Respondent spouses Santiago Fontanilla & Rafaela
Rasing declaring them absolute and legal owners of the land in question; ordering the defendants
to transfer & recover OCT No. 139 to spouses Santiago Fontanilla & Rafaela Rasing.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

On August 22, 1995, the CA AFFFIRMED the decision of the RTC. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but said motion was denied on February 26, 1996.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appealed decision was supported by evidence?
2. Whether or not the decision was in accordance with law & jurisprudence?
HELD:
1. YES. The appealed decision was supported by evidence.
Respondent spouses Fontanilla & R. Rasing proved that they were enjoying open,
continuous and adverse possession of the property for more than 60 years from 1921. xxxx
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant,
tax declarations & receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by
possession for a period sufficient for prescription.
2. YES. The decision was in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as
amended. Later, PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended & codified laws relative
to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not
become final & incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final
decree. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible & no longer subject
to reopening or review.

An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. This means that
petitioners should have enforced the trust within 10 years from the time of its creation or upon
the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to
have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real
property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and it shall be counted from
the time of such registering, filing or entering.

Respondent spouses Fontanillas action for reconveyance was timely as it was filed
within 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We
AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922.














REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS & ROMEO
DIVINAFLOR
349 SCRA 451

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS & ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondents
FACTS:
Lot 107391, with an area of 10,775 square meters, is a parcel of riceland located at
Maramba, Oas, Albay. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial Listana who was in possession
& occupation of the same in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously & exclusively in
1939.
On May 21, 1973, Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of the land by means of an
Absolute Deed of Sale. He had it declared in his name thru a tax declaration.
Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily
possessed & occupied this land in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously, adversely,
notoriously, & exclusively since 1939, very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the Court ordered
the registration & confirmation of lot 10739 in the name of Spouses Romeo Divinaflor & Nenita
Radan.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the finding of
the Trial Court was not sufficiently supported by evidence. The Director contended that the
earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 & the certificate of real
estate tax payment was dated 1990.

The CA affirmed the judgment appealed from, ruling that, To our mind, it is not
necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations & tax receipts of the land in
question. All that the law mandates is proof of open, continuous, peaceful & adverse
possession which appellee has convincingly established xxxxx.

Thereafter, a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision was likewise
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Divinaflor has acquired registrable title over the subject
property?

HELD: YES. Respondent Divinaflor acquired a registrable title over the subject property.

PD 1073, Sec. 48, provides that, Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession &
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceing the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant &
shall be entitled to a Certificate of Title under the provisions of this Chapter.



DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP) vs. COURT OF APPEALS
331 SCRA 267, April 28, 2000
G.R. No. 129471
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS CAJES, respondents.

FACTS:
The land in dispute, consisting of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol,
was originally owned by Ulpiano Mumar, whose ownership since 1917 was evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 3840.
In 1950, Mumar sold the land to private respondent who was issued Tax Declaration No.
R-1475 that same year. The tax declaration was later superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. R-799
issued in 1961 and D-2247 issued in 1974. Private respondent occupied and cultivated the said
land, planting cassava and camote in certain portions of the land.
In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez succeeded in obtaining the
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468.00 square meters, in his name for which
he was issued OCT No. 546 on June 16, 1969. The parcel of land included the 19.4 hectares
occupied by private respondent. Alvarez never occupied nor introduced improvements on said
land.
In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to whom
TCT No. 10101 was issued. That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained a loan from petitioner
Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and, as security, mortgaged the land
covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank.
In 1978, the SAAD Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented
by Gaudencio Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another mortgage over the
land in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00. The spouses Beduya later failed to
pay their loans, as a result of which, the mortgage on the property was foreclosed. In the
resulting foreclosure sale held on January 31, 1985, petitioner was the highest bidder.
As the spouses Beduya failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its
ownership. It appears that private respondent had also applied for a loan from petitioner in 1978,
offering his 19.4 hectare property under Tax Declaration No. D-2247 as security for the loan. As
part of the processing of the application, a representative of petitioner, Patton R. Olano,
inspected the land and appraised its value.
Private respondent's loan application was later approved by petitioner. However after
releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found that the land mortgaged
by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in the name of the
spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore, cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment of
the amount. Private respondent paid the loan to petitioner for which the former was issued a
Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18, 1981, releasing the property in question from
encumbrance.
It appears that respondent Cajes had also applied for a loan from DBP in 1978, offering
his 19.4 has. as security for the loan which was approved. However, after the release of the loan,
DBP found out that the land mortgaged by Cajes was included in the land mortgaged by the Sps.
Beduya. Petitioner DBP cancelled the loan & demanded payment from Cajes.

Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of
the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by petitioners representatives. It was
then discovered that private respondent Cajes was occupying a portion of said land. Private
respondent Cajes was informed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he was
occupying, & he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondent refused to do so,
petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against him, invoking that it
was an innocent purchaser for value. The Regional Trial Court-Tagbilaran City rendered a
decision declaring petitioner DBP the lawful owner of the entire land on the ground that the
decree of registration was binding upon the land.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith?
2. Whether or not petitioner bank can can be considered an innocent purchaser for
value?
HELD :
No. At the time of the constitution of the mortgagee, the mortgagee-bank failed to
conduct an ocular inspection. While an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an
exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagors title, in the case of banking
institutions, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into said contract. Judicial
notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send
representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral & to investigate who are the legal
owners thereof. Banks, having been impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more
care & prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands.

Petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registered owner was in actual
possession of the land when it bought the same at the foreclosure sale. A person who
deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create a suspicion in an otherwise reasonable
man is not an innocent purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close
his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, & then claim that he acted in
goof faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.

Judgment AFFIRMED in toto.












VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
351 SCRA 12, February 1, 2001
G.R. No. 117971.

ESTRELLITA S. J. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, LAURENCE and JENNIFER, BOTH
SURNAMED VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO MILLAMA and ROLLY DE JESUS, petitioners,

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LINA F. VDA. DE SANTIAGO, EDDIE, ROLANDO, WILLY
and MARILOU, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS:
On December 20, 1962, the land registration court, in a final decision, awarded the
disputed lots, measuring 98,800 sq. m. to Spouses Antonio & Rosario Angeles. They sold the
lots to Victorino Santiago in 1967 who converted some parcels into fishponds. In 1977, Santiago
sold the lots to Anacleto Santiago, husband of respondent Lina Santiago. At the time of the last
sale, no decree of registration had yet been issued for the said lots despite the final judgment in
the land registration case.

On February 28, 1978, Victorino Santiago filed an action for forcible entry against Carlos
Villanueva & his wife, petitioner Estrelita Villanueva, which was dismissed since Victorino had
already sold the property to Spouses Santiago.
However, on Sept. 22, 1978, while Adona was in Alaminos, Pangasinan, some people
entered the property and destroyed the nipa hut. Adona reported the matter to Anacleto who
advised him to stop work until the problem was solved. By then, Adona had completed work on
about six (6) hectares of the entire 9.8-hectare property, including the three (3) hectares which
were fully developed
On December 12, 1978, the decrees of registration covering the subject lots were issued
& OCTs were transcribed in the name of Antonio Angeles on December 27, 1978.
On February 22, 1979, Antonio Angeles, as original owner & vendor, executed a Deed of
Confirmation Sale, Waiver & Quitclaim over the lots in favour of Anacleto Santiago, the vendee,
for which TCTs were subsequenty issued in the name of Anacleto Santiago. The lots were
declared for taxation purposes.
On February 26, 1979, the Santiagos sued the Villanuevas for forcible entry. On February
14, 1980, a criminal case was also filed against the Villanuevas for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law. During the pendency of these cases, Anacleto discovered that the Ministry of
Natural Resources granted to Carlos a Fisheries Lease Agreement over the said lots on February
28, 1980. Anacleto sought the cancellation of the said agreement, but both the Ministry and the
Office of the President dismissed Anacletos petition.
In the meantime, Carlos Villanueva & Anacleto Santiago both died. Hence, the present
case was brought by Anacletos heirs against the heirs of Carlos.
In their complaint dated July 30, 1991, Lina Vda. De Santiago & her children maintained
that as successors-in-interest of Anacleto, they were unlawfully deprived of the possession, use
& enjoyment of the fishponds for the last 12 years by Carlos & now, by the latters widow,
Estrelita Vda. De Villanueva, and their children.

The Santiagos asked the court the Viilanuevas to vacate the lots and restore to them
possession & ownership of the lots registered in their precedessors name.

In a decision dated December 18, 1992, the Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack
of cause of action and res judicata. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents certificate of title constitutes valid and indefeasible proof of
ownership.

HELD :
Yes. The high court ruled that respondents titles constituted indefeasible proof of
ownership which entitles them to possession of the properties.

In land cases, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.

A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and
notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is a notice to the whole world
and as such, all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.

Petition DENIED, judgment AFFIRMED with modifications.

CERVANTES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
354 SCRA 4
G.R. NO. 118982. February 19, 2001


LORETA BRAVO CERVANTES, LOIDA CERVANTES, LEAH CERVANTES, CHRISTY
CERVANTES, CHARME CERVANTES, SPS. ARMANDO ABAD and ADORACION
ORDUNA, petitioners,

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO (GIL) FRANCISCO, VENANCIO FRANCISCO,
APOLONIA FRANCISCO and VIRGINIA FRANCISCO, respondents.

FACTS:
On July 8, 1985, Guillermo Francisco, et.al, filed an amended complaint alleging that
they were the heirs of the late Antonio G. Francisco who was the registered owner of a parcel of
land containing an area of 3,768 located at Bugallon, Pangasinan. Said heirs discovered that
Antonio Cervantes & spouses Armando Abad were illegally occupying & had declared in their
names certain portions of said property.

Despite demands to vacate the subject property, petitioners refused to do so. Hence, an
action for recovery of land was filed by Guillermo Francisco. In his answer, Antonio Cervantes
denied the allegations in the complaint & in defense, claimed legal possession over one of the
parcels of land in question alleging that he and his siblings inherited the land from their late
father Tranquilino Cervantes who purchased the same in 1947 from Juan Abad (deceased), who
in turn earlier purchased the property from Guillermo Franciscos predecessors-in-interest.
Cervantes prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
On the other hand, spouses Armando Abad alleged that their possession was lawful and
in concept of an owner for more than 70 years dating back before 1920. According to them, the
land was purchased by their parent, the late Juan Abad, and Marcelino Nievera from Estefania
Ignacio Vda. De F. Totanez, who purchased the same from Antonio Fernandez, who in turn
purchased the property from Vicente Espino, whose possession & ownership of the property was
public, exclusive, notorious, open & continuous long before the alleged registration of the
subject property in the name of Antonio Francisco, under Act No. 496, the latter being known as
a mere trustee or overseer.
Defendants Abad alleged that the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Torrens
Title do not apply to the case at bar because registration by the applicant-registrant was done in
bad faith and by way of actual fraudulent acts; that Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529
was never intended to shield the fraudulent and unlawful acts of the applicant-registrant in order
to divest the actual owner and possessor thereof before the registration; and that between the
actual owners-possessors before the registration under Act No. 496 and a usurper-trustee who
applied and successfully registered the same land in his name, the former should prevail over the
latter.
On October 28, 1987, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Guillermo Francisco
declaring that they were the owners of the parcels of land. The defendants were ordered to vacate
immediately the parcel of land and pay actual damages.

On August 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in
toto.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated February 13, 1995.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners Cervantes & Abad have a right to the parcels of land they
were occupying?

HELD:
No. Petitioners have no right over the land.
Taking into consideration the documentary evidence presented by the plaintiffs,
particularly that of TCT No. 2200 (Exhibit A.) which the parcel in question is included, among
others, that the sale of the parcel in question was made by Juan Abad to Tranquilino Cervantes
(father of defendant Antonio Cervantes) on January 22, 1947 took place when the said TCT No.
2200 was already existing in the name of Antonio Francisco, the late father of the herein
plaintiffs. Said TCT No. 2200 was issued on November 8, 1924, or more than twenty-two (22.)
years before the aforesaid sale between Juan Abad and Tranquilino Cervantes. This clearly
shows that what Juan Abad sold to Tranquilino Cervantes on January 22, 1947 was a parcel of
land that did not belong to the former. It is because said parcel of land already belonged to
Antonio Francisco for having obtained a title over said parcel of land covered by TCT No. 2200.
Not being the owner of the parcel in question, Juan Abad did not transmit any right whatsoever
with respect to the parcel in question. Well-settled is the rule that one cannot sell what he does
not own and this rule has much force when the subject of the sale is a titled land that belongs to
another person. Simply put, the sale of the parcel in question made by Juan Abad to Tranquilino
Cervantes did not affect the title of Antonio Francisco over said parcel. 24
Likewise, the trial court correctly held that defendants Abad had no right to the parcel of land
they were occupying, thus:
The purchases alleged by the defendants-spouses on the questioned parcel of land
beginning from their alleged primitive predecessor-in-interest Vicente Espino to Estefania
Ignacio Vda. De F. Totaez to Juan Abad and Marcelino Nievera were never proven in court.
The documentary evidence they presented before this Court were not sufficient to establish their
right over the parcel in question. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real and Personal
Property with Sale has no probative value because it is self-serving. Besides, it sought to
partition the parcel of land which is already covered by TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of
Antonio Francisco. Simply stated, there was no property that they could partition among
themselves because said property subject of the partition did not belong to their late father Juan
Abad but to the late Antonio Francisco, the father of the plaintiffs.
The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit 2.) entered between Juan Abad and Tranquilino
Cervantes, has no probative value also for being irrelevant. Besides, this is the same deed
wherein this Court has already passed upon concerning its efficacy and ruled in the early part of
this decision that it has no effect whatsoever to TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of the late
Antonio Francisco.1wphi1.nt
The Tax Declaration issued in the name of the defendants-spouses and the corresponding
Tax Receipts have no probative value also as against the TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of the
late Antonio Francisco. It is because they are not proofs of ownership. TCT No. 2200, on the
other hand, serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears thereinAntonio Francisco. Further, after the expiration of the one year
period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes
incontrovertible (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558). 25
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, the same being in
accordance with law and the evidence. Hence, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
should be as it is hereby affirmed.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein, in this case, Antonio Francisco. A title once registered under the Torrens
System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open & notorious possession, neither can it be
defeated by prescription. Petitioners cannot prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land
through tax declarations & corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.

Petition DENIED.







Sps. ZARAGOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
341 SCRA 309
[G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000]

SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA, petitioners
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents

FACTS:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the
Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed
Zaragoza. He died intestate & was survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint
against Spouses Florentino & Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share,
consisting of Lots 943 & 871, & for payment of damages. She Claimed that she was a natural-
born Filipino citizen & the youngest child of Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his
lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his 4 children. The shares of her brothers &
sisters were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale but without consideration, while her
share was not conveyed by way of deed of sale because she became an American citizen & was
prohibited to acquire land in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no
formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's
lifetime.
Petitioners Florentino & Erlinda, in their answer, admitted their affinity with private
respondent & the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge
of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871
was still registered in the name of their father, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for
valuable considerations. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey
said lots to Alberta & that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the
complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to implead indispensable parties. The
resolution of said Motion was deferred by the lower court until the case was tried on the merits.
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Ilo-ilo promulgated its decision,
adjudicating lot 871 in then name of Flavio Zaragoza Camo to Plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-
Morgan

ISSUE:
Whether or not that question regarding the validity of the Certificate of Title issued in the
name of petitioner is allowed in this petition.

HELD:
No. The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Section 48 of the PD 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree which provides:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack-A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.

In the case of Halili, the court held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document
a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in
the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of the owners.
The title, once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition for
review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587,
entitledAlberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs. Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-
Zaragoza is VACATED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the
Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also DISMISSED without
prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.







TAN vs. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION
353 SCRA 292
[G.R. No. 137739. March 26, 2001]

ROBERTO B. TAN, petitioner
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORP., HELEN LEONTOVICH VDA. DE AGUINALDO and
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

FACTS:
On 29 December 1925, petitioner bought from respondent Helen Aguinaldo a parcel of
land at Valley Golf Subdivision Antipolo, Rizal. The lot was then registered in the name of
respondent Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the said title. After
payment of the agreed purchase price, the title was cancelled and a new one in the name of
petitioner was issued.
On 29 February 1996, two months after he bought the property, petitioner was served a
copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent bank. Said petition stated that said
petitioner was being sued as a nominal party as the new registered owner of the said parcel of
land. It was only then that petitioner learned that the lot he bought from respondent was subject
between her and respondent bank.
It appeared that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband obtained loans from respondent
bank. To secure payment of this obligation, they executed a real estate mortgage over three
parcels of land in favor of the respondent bank-PBC.

Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent demand letter to respondent
Aguinaldo. Despite said demands, the loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank then initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the real estate mortgage. In the public sale, the mortgage
properties were sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder.
On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one year,
respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the aforesaid foreclosure
proceeding. In said proceedings, the parties (respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank) entered
into a Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts stating, among others, that they agree that the decision to
be rendered by this Honorable Court [RTC] shall be final and unappealable, subject only to the
filing within the reglementary period of the usual motion for reconsideration.
On 15 April 1995, the trial court rendered its decision against the respondent.
The respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision had become
final and executor. Upon presentation of the courts decision and certification, the register of
deeds cancelled respondent banks title and issued a new title in the name of respondent
Aguinaldo. She subsequently sold the lot to petitioner.
Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court but
the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by way of certiorari and thereafter
moved for partial reconsideration praying for the reinstatement of the Transfer Certificates of
Title. In its decision the CA reinstate said titles in the name of the respondent PBC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners title over the said parcel of land is valid?


HELD:
Yes. The petitioners title is valid.
It must be noted that petitioners title was irregularly issued after the lot covered by the same was
sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the sellers title, which was then free
from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.
As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct attack/proceeding. It is well
settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified
or cancelled only in direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title over
the subject lot, petitioner is entitled t protection against indirect attacks against his title.
Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against
indirect attacks against his title. The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision,
denying respondent banks prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles without prejudice to
the filing of proper action should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the
adoption of the Torrens system in our country:
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim
of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is
that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts
could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if
not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system,
should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued there under once the conditions laid
down by the law are satisfied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February
1999, of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Decision, dated 27 February
1998, is REINSTATED in toto.















OMANDAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
349 SCRA 483, January 18, 1991
G.R. No. 128750

CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM, petitioners
COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA, respondents
FACTS:
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo
Lasola a Homestead Patent covering one parcel of land. Sometime in 1978, the RD issued an
OCT in his name.
On April 28, 1983, the same lot was bought by (respondent) Blas Trabasas from Dolores
Sayson, who claimed that she was the owner of such land.
Sometime in 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Omandam and Itom had occupied
the land.
In 1987, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent before the Bureau and prayed
for the cancellation of the OCT. In the same year, Trabasas repurchased the same land from
Lasola
In 1989, Trabasas acquired a new certificate of title.
On April 16, 1990, Spouses Trabasas filed a complaint against Omandan for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the subject land with the RTC.

The RTC issued its decision (1993) declaring that neither respondents (Trabasas) nor
their predecessors-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. Trabasas has no equitable
right to the possession of the land under litigation.
Trabasas appealed to the CA. The CA reversed RTC decision. It ordered (petitioners)
Omandam and Itom to vacate the land and surrender it to the respondents (Trabasases) =)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of decree or
registration issued by the Director of Lands?

HELD:
No. Courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of decree or registration issued
by the Director of Lands.
Commonwealth Act no 141 (Public Land Act) gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director
of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary
of DENR) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands. The courts have no
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of
Lands. Only the DENR secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.
It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasolas homestead application on
May 21, 1968. Nineteen years after, in 1987, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of
Lands. Thereafter, Trabasas instituted the present action in the Regional Trial Court for recovery
of possession and/or ownership. The trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a declaration
of equitable possession over the area in question. . Said trial court then ordered the cancellation
of respondents title and the issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts order reversed the award
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for the proper
administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over the patent on the
subject matter, which is the contested homestead area.
DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to
resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not
settled the respective rights of public land claimants But once the DENR has decided,
particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its
decision prevails.
By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, have
been duly confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. By virtue of
the deed of sale executed by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor
of Trabasas, who then secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents
clearly have superior right over the land claimed by petitioners Omandam and Itom. The
appellate court did not err in upholding the right of private respondents, and in ordering the
petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to said respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21, 1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.



DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
171 SCRA 71, 1966

FACTS:
The land in question was situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoined the Kailogan River and
private respondent Valeriano had converted it into a fishpond.
In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they were the co-owners in
fee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it was not
within any forest or military reservation.
The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for was WITHIN THE
UNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area was denominated as
FOREST LANDS-did not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. This
was affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the subject property is entirely devoted to
fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
HELD:
No. Courts cannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and jurisdiction.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department
of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants (Valeriano)
may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of the subject property into a fishpond by Applicants does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from
unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter.















DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ABANILLA
124 SCRA 358
G.R. No. L-26324 August 31, 1983

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
MARIA ABANILLA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, defendants, MARIA
ABANILLA, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee (Director of Lands) in his complaint, alleged that defendant-appellant
(Maria Abanilla) had, through fraudulent means, secured a Free Patent and an Original
Certificate of Title over a public land situated in Roxas, Isabela. Said free patent application
included portions of land occupied by Esteban Esquivel & Wilson Nueasa who bought the land
from Dominador Cullanan who also bought the same from defendant-appellant Abanilla.
Defendant-appellant Abanilla in her answer alleged that her application for a free patent
over a parcel of public land & the subsequent issuance of an Original Certificate of Title, were
lawful, since the occupancy of Esquivel was merely tolerated by her and was never adverse and
Wilson Nuesas occupancy never affected her right over the portion he claims because the sale
made by her to Dominador Cullanan was void ab initio.
The Trial Court entered judgment declaring the Free Patent and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title null and void, ordering the Director of Lands to cancel the said
patent and issue another patent in favor of Abanilla, excluding the respective portions of land
possessed by Esquivel & Nuesa, and ordering Abanilla to surrender to the Register of Deeds of
Isabela the Original Certificate of Title, who was thereby ordered to cancel the same.

Defendant-appellant claimed that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of
both free Patent & Original Certificate of Title issued in her name and in not dismissing the
action considering that a period of six years and six months had already elapsed from February
1953 when the patent was issued to August 11, 1959 when the present action was instituted in
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue of the said
patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six (6) months.

HELD:
Yes. The patent can still be cancelled.

Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, expressly provides that any false
statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title shall ipso facto
produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted.
The Doctrine of Indefeasibility of Torrens Title does not apply to free patent secured
through fraud since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
Defendant-appellant clings to the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. She claimed
that the lower court erred in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six years and
six months had already elapsed when the present action was instituted, in view of the line of
decisions of this Court sustaining the indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued in pursuance of
a public land patent.


The lapse of one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud
would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title had been secured through fraud
or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shielf of
fraud in securing title.
The State is not bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec. 38, Act 496, any may
still file action for cancellation of certificate of title even after six years from its issuance.

WHEREFORE, FINDING THAT THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE FACTS AND THE LAW, THE SAME IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. DOUBLE
COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT APPELLANT.









PADRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
214 SCRA 446, 1992
G.R.No.84902-03

AGRIPINO PADRE, FAUSTA PADRE, SILVINA PADRE, and OCTAVIO PADRE; AND
SABAS PAA and ROSARIO PAA, Petitioners

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO P. DE VERA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch XX, JULIANA PACLEB PAREL and
FRANCISCO PAREL, Respondents.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs Agripino Padre, et. al, sought to quiet title on two (2) parcels of land situated at
Taleb, Bantay, Ilocos Sure, thru two (2) civil cases they filed before the lower court where the
latter made its findings of facts and conclusion, to wit:

1. Civil Case No. 2954 The land was originally owned by Jose Padre who gave it to
Fausta Padre without a Deed of Transfer. Fausta Padre declared the land for taxation
purpose in her name. On December 2, 1966, she sold a portion of the land to Avelina
Paranada, married to Vicente Viernes. The late Jose Padre had been in possession of
the subject land up to the time it was given to Fausta. Fausta was also in possession of
the property until the years 1973-1975 when Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down trees on
the land. Hence, the case was filed.

2. Civil Case No. 2964 The land was originally owned by Calixto Paa who gave the
same to Sabas Paa without a deed of transfer. Calixto declared the land for taxation
purposes in his name. He paid realty taxes to evidence his possession. The complaint
was filed because Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down some trees on the portion of the land
in question.
On the other hand, defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel, et. al. contended that the parcel of land
was formerly owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold it to Blas Pacleb without a deed of
transfer. Some of the adjoining lots were the properties of Bartola Pero, the deceased
grandmother of Juliana Parel, one of the defendants and a portion of it was the land of Roman
Pacleb, the predecessors-in-interest of defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel.
The defendants in both Civil Cases were in actual possession of the land in dispute. Being
in actual possession under claim of ownership, it was presumed that defendants were the owners.
After carefully considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the Court found that the
plaintiffs-Padre, et.al., had not established their cause of preponderance of evidence. The Court
found defendants-Parel, et.al., to have been in possession under claim of ownership,
continuously, and uninterruptedly and long before that, the land was in the possession of their
grandfather, grandmother & father under similar circumstances. The Court however denied the
claims of defendants for damages, attorneys fees & expenses of litigation. The plaintiff had the
right to litigate & it was not sound public policy to punish a party by making him pay damages,
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation for having exercised their right erroneously xxx.

In this appeal, the appellants raised several errors of the lower court.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Director of Lands possesses the competence of the regular courts over
possessory actions?
WON the Regional Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has prior possession of public
lands?

HELD:
1. YES. The Director of Lands possesses the competence of the regular courts over
possessory actions.

Jurisdiction: The authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of
public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory
action, the public character of the land notwithstanding.
2. YES. The Regional Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has prior possession
of public lands.

The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to
the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation of the land
in question or the better right of possession.
Petition DISMISSED.


HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO vs. HEIRS OF JOSE ALIWALAS
168 SCRA 198
G.R. No. 77541 November 29, 1988

HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO, petitioners,
HEIRS OF JOSE and VICTORIA ALIWALAS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an action to quiet title instituted by the late Victorio Vda.
De Aliwalas against the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco, the Director of Lands & the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga.
Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the public domain & it was
so declared on October 12, 1933. Thereafter, Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands
for the issuance of a homestead patent covering this lot. On December 11, 1936, the Director of
Lands granted the application and issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588.
This patent was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937. On the
same day, OCT No. 159 was issued in the name of Jose Aliwalas. From then on, Dr. Aliwalas
paid the corresponding realty taxes thereon having declared the land for taxation purposes in his
name.
In 1962, Jose Aliwalas died and the administration and management of the land was
assumed by Jose Aliwalas Jr., son of Dr. Aliwalas. When the property was partitioned among Dr.
Aliwalas surviving heirs, the lot was allotted in favor of the plaintiff Victoria Vda. De Aliwalas.
Thereafter, an OCT was issued in her name on November 14, 1966.

On the other hand, defendant Ponciano Tengco in representation of the defendants Heirs
of Gregorio Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of Lands, thru its District Land Office
in Pampanga. He alleged that this parcel of land had been occupied and cultivated originally &
continuously thereafter by Gregorio Tengco. After being given due course, this application was
approved by the Director of Lands who issued a Free Patent covering the lot.
The defendant-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco also adduced evidence showing that their late
grandfather Gregorio Tengco had occupied the land exclusively years before he died in 1934, his
children succeeded him in its possession & enjoying the fruits from different trees planted
thereon.
On rebuttal, Plaintiff Aliwalas adduced evidence showing that the pre-war records of the
Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land applications were burned during the war as certified
by the Bureau of Lands. This was the reason why no more record pertaining the Homestead
Patent issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas in 1936 which gave rise to the issuance of an OCT.
On the basis of the evidence, the Trial Court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff
Aliwalas as the true owner of the property, ordering the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel
the TCTS in the name of Cipriano Tengco, et. al.; ordering the defendants-Heirs of Gregorio
Tengco to vacate the land in question xxxxxxx.
Dissatisfied with the trial courts judgment, the Heirs of Tengco interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts findings. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, this petition.



ISSUE:
1. WON an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of promulgation of the order.
2.WON private respondents are guilty of laches or prescription.
HELD:
1. Yes. An original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of
promulgation of the order. It is a well-settled rule that an original certificate of title issued on
the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a
judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the
public domain, and becomes indefeasible & incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year
from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the
patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act becomes as
indefeasible as a Torrens Title.

2. No. They are not guilty of laches or prescription. Title acquired through a homestead patent
registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate
against the registered owner.

Petition DENIED

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, etc. vs. THE HEIRS OF C. CARLE, et. al.
105 Phil. 1227 July 31,1959
G.R. No. L-12485

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ETC., petitioner-appellant
HEIRS OF CIRIACO CARLE, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellees

FACTS:
Ciriaco Carle filed a Homestead Application over a parcel of land located in Pola,
Oriental Mindoro. Applicant Carle having died in 1942. The Homestead Patent corresponding to
said application was issued to his heirs, said patent was duly transmitted to and recorded by the
Register of Deeds of said province and a corresponding Certificate of Title was issued in favor of
the said heirs.
Seven years later, passing upon the opposition of certain Meynardo Ilagan, the Director
of Lands declared the said patent inoperative in so far as it covers a certain porition designated
and adjudged in favor of the oppositor who is a holder of another homestead application for the
reason that the inclusion of the aforementioned area in the patent was erroneous.
On appeal by the heirs, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the
order of the Director of Lands. Thereafter or on December 2, 1955, the Director of Lands filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, which was later amended, praying that
Homestead Patent No. 71852 be declared null and void, and that the respondents, Heirs of
Ciriaco Carle, be ordered to surrender the patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto to the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Mindoro, respectively, for
cancellation (Civil Case No. R-650). Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that as
more than one year from the issuance of the certificate of title had already elapsed, petitioner's
cause of action was already barred by prescription.
Considering the aforesaid motion and the opposition thereto filed by the petitioner, the
Court a quo in its order of March 2, 1957, dismissed the petition on the ground that said action
filed beyond the period of limitation provided for by law. The Director of Lands thereupon
instituted the instant appeal.
The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that said action was filed beyond the
period of limitation provided for by law.

The Director of Lands thereupon instituted the instant appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a Homestead Patent becomes
irrevocable after one year?

HELD:
Yes. Where a land was granted by the government to a private individual as a homestead
under the provisions of Act No. 926 and the corresponding patent was registered and the
certificate of title issued to the grantee, said land is considered registered within th meaning of
the Land Registration Act. The title to the land thus granted and registered may no longer be the
subject of any inquiry, decision, or judgment in a cadastral proceeding.

A Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a Homestead Patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate issued a consequence of a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really
a part of the disposable land of the public domain and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance.
















INGARAN, et. al. vs. RAMELO, et.al.
107 Phil 498, March 30,1960
G.R. No. L-10471

INOCENCIA INGARAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
FEDERICO RAMELO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs first filed their complaint in the court below on February 20, 1953 against the
defendant Federico Ramelo. The complaint was subsequently amended on December 17, 1953 to
include the Director of Lands as party defendant. On July 20, 1954, plaintiffs filed a second
amended complaint, including, this time, Felix Guiang as party defendant. Said complaint alleges
that in 1936 Prudencio Bumanglag, plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, filed a homestead
application for a tract of land in Echague, Isabela, which was given due course by the defendant
Director of Lands who acknowledged receipt thereof; that Bumanglag and his family entered the
land and cultivated "a greater portion" thereof; that having worked the land for sometime, he
intended to submit final proof of his right to a patent, but the war broke out; that after
Bumanglag's death, his heirs, herein plaintiffs, continued possession of the land applied for;
In 1946, defendant Ramelo entered the land through force and deceit, Plaintiff
Ingaran complained to the Local District Land Officer who wrote a letter to said Ramelo
advising him to desist from his occupation of the land because Homestead Application of
Bumanglag was still subsisting, but Ramelo refused to vacate.

On 1947, the Director of Lands rendered a decision rejecting Bumanglags homestead
application and gave due course to defendant-Ramelos application for the same land. The
Director of Lands issued a Homestead Patent and from which an Original Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of Federico Ramelo.
The plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was of no avail because a patent had already been issued to Ramelo. Plaintiffs alleged
that they had acquired a vested right over the land in litigation and that Ramelos title and patent
were secured through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and by mistake, collusion, with grave
abuse of discretion of the land officials.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Plaintiff acquired vested right over the land in question;
2. Whether or not a Certificate of Title issue pursuant to a Homestead Patent becomes
irrevocable after one year.

HELD:
No. Plaintiff did not acquire vested right over the land in question.
An applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right over the homestead only when
his application has been perfected by the presentation of the final proof and its approval by the
Director of Lands.
In the present case, plaintiffs merely alleged in their complaint that an intention to make
final proof was submitted to the proper authorities. No such final proof appears to have actually
been presented to show compliance with the requirements of the law as warrant the issuance of a
patent.

Yes, a Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a Homestead Patent becomes irrevocable
after one year.

A certificate of title issued pursuant to a Homestead Patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate issued as a consequence of a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible &
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance.














LOPEZ vs. PADILLA
45 SCRA 44
G.R. No. 27559, May 18, 1972

BERNABE LOPEZ (M.S.A. VI-1-135), MRS. GLORIA D. RAMA, assisted by her husband
FORTUNATO RAMA (M.S.A. VINEW), MELECIO CABIDO (M.S.A. NO. VI-1-167),
SOTERO UBAL (M.S.A. NO. VI-1-2-10), MRS. FELISA VDA. DE BORJA (M.S.A. VI-1-
NEW), JOSE ARQUIZAL (R.P.A. NEW), LEOPOLDO UBAL (M.S.A. VI-1-NEW),
BIENVENIDO GENSIS (M.S.A. VI-1-NEW ), ANGEL ALEONAR (R.P.A. NEW),
MACARIO DE LOS REYES (R.P.A. NEW), DALMACIO DE LOS REYES (R.P.A. NEW),
JULIAN ABING (R.P.A. NEW), FELIPE BANDE (R.P.A. NEW), ANTONIO SABLE (R.P.A.
NEW), ENRIQUE BASCON (R.P.A. NEW), J. PABALAYA (R.P.A. NEW), ROSARIO
EDAO (R.P.A. NEW), PEDRO PICON (R.P.A. NEW), APOLONIO VILLAMALA (R.P.A.
NEW), JUANITA GASIONG (R.P.A. NEW), GREGORIA DICHOSO (R.P.A. NEW),
RODULFO BACANTI (R.P.A. NEW), TEODORO TABOGON (R.P.A. NEW), CARLOS
BACULI (R.P.A. NEW), CRISANTO BACULI (R.P.A. NEW), BIBIANO CALMA (R.P.A.
NEW), NICASIO PANSACALA, JR., (R.P.A. NEW), PONCIANO YNTONG (R.P.A. NEW),
RESTITUTA CABUCAL (R.P.A. NEW), ANITA MARIQUIT (R.P.A. NEW), LUCIANO
CABARRON (R.P.A. NEW), GREGORIO CANCANO (R.P.A. NEW), BENEDICTO
ALPHABITE (R.P.A. NEW), ESTRELLA PETALCORIN (R.P.A. NEW),plaintiffs-appellants,

EMILIO & ALBERTO both surnamed PADILLA as heirs of the late JUAN PADILLA; the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Bureau of Lands, Manila; and EDGAR WOOLBRIGHT, defendants-
appellees.

FACTS:
The late Juan Padilla, the predecessor-in-interest of defendants Emilio Padilla & Alberto
Padilla, was the applicant of a public land under Homestead Application with the Bureau of
Lands from which the heirs of said Juan Padilla were issued Original Certificate of Title which
was transcribed in the Register Book of the Province of Cebu.
Sometime in 1958, the plaintiffs began reclaiming the area covered by the waters across
the shores of Mabaling Cebu City and as soon as the same became tenantable, they constructed
their dwelliungs and consequently filed with the Bureau of Lands applications for lease on the
areas reclaimed and occupied by them. Some also filed with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous
sales application.
Juan Padilla and his heirs Defendant Padillas succeeded in obtaining the approval of the
Director of Lands of their Homestead Application without excluding therefrom the foreshore and
marshy lands as well as the areas reclaimed and occupied by the plaintiffs and covered by
plaintiffs applications.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendant Padillas pretended to the Bureau of Lands-Manila
that their Homestead Application entirely covered an area of land which alone they occupied and
cultivated, the truth of the matter being more than half of the area applied by them for homestead
was foreshore, marshy and covered by sea and a portion of which was reclaimed and occupied
by plaintiffs long before the issuance of the patent & title in defendants favor. They also alleged
that subsequent to the issuance of patent and title through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation,
defendant sold the land to defendant Edgar Woolbright in violation of Sec. 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456.
Defendant Padillas wrote the plaintiffs demanding the latter to vacate the premises
reclaimed and occupied by the said plaintiffs because said defendants would bulldoze, level and
fill up the same in order to construct improvements.
Plaintiffs prayed for the cancellation of title and issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining the defendants from entering into the lands reclaimed and occupied by the
plaintiffs and from destroying, bulldozing, leveling or filling up of the aforesaid areas.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not defendants title is susceptible to collateral attack.
2. Whether or not Plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring the action.

HELD:

1. No. The Torrens Title issued to defendants in pursuance of the homestead patent is no longer
susceptible of collateral attack through the present action filed by the plaintiff who, as mere
applicants of revocable lease, permits or miscellaneous applications of what is now
concededly title property of private ownership, have no personality or legal interest in the
first place to institute the action, nor to question the sale of homestead allegedly within five-
year prohibitory period of Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
2. No. Plaintiffs are not the proper parties to bring the action. Section 101 of the Public Land
Act vests on the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, the authority to institute
the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of defendants title and for the reversion
of the homestead to the government.





















PAMINTUAN vs. SAN AGUSTIN (Judge)
43 Phil 558, June 22,1982
G.R. No. L-17943


FLORENTINO PAMINTUAN, petitioner,
Honorable PRIMITIVO SAN AGUSTIN, Auxiliary Judge of the Second Judicial District, the
SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA, NICOMEDES ESPINOSA, ROSA ESPINOSA, EUSEBIA
ESPINOSA, and FRANCISCA DAVID, respondents.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, requiring the respondent judge to certify to the Supreme
Court the record in land registration case number 11732 and the record of Cadastral Case No.
132, as pertains to 625.
The record shows that in Land Registration Case No. 11732 & under the date April 19,
1917, the aforesaid lot number 625 was decreed in favor of FLORENTINO PAMINTUAN by
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and that Certificate of Title No. 540 was thereupon
issued to him in 1918.
In the meantime, Cadastral Case No. 132 was instituted. This case embraced the district
in which the lot in question was situated and the lot was given its cadastral number in the
proceedings were pending under Act No. 496. Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot at
the trial of the cadastral case and the Court of First Instance awarded it to the respondents
(Nicomedes, Maria, Mercedes, Arosa & Eusebia ESPINOSA) and ordered the cancellation of
certificate of title number 540. The person to whom the land had been adjudged subsequently
conveyed their interest to the respondent Francisca David, in favor of whom the Court of First
Instance issued a writ of possession, placing her in possession of the land. The possession was
restored to the petitioner by virtue of the preliminary injunction issued by this court on
November 30, 1920. It may be noted that no final decree has as yet been issued in the cadastral
case in regard to the lot.
Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the adjudication of the land in favor of the
Espinosa until the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga required him to surrender his
certificate of title for cancellation. He then presented a motion to the Court of First Instance,
asking that the decision of the court in regard to the lot in the cadastral case be set aside and that
the writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled. This motion was denied by
the court on November 16, 1920.

ISSUE:
Whether or not courts have jurisdiction to decree again a registration of a land already
decreed in an earlier land registration case.

HELD:
No. In a cadastral case, the Court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of a
land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the the court in
cadastral cases over land already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical
errors in the description of the lands.

Cadastral proceedings are authorized and regulated by Act No. 2259xxxxIts subject is
settlement and adjudication of land titles. Sec. 11 of it states xxxx the settlement and
adjudication of land title under the Cadastral Act is exactly that provided for in the Land
Registration Act No. 496.
SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convinient place within the province in
which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and
filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as
ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land Registration, and shall be governed by the
same rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in
ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting interest shall be
adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the person entitle to the lands or the
various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of
title in favor of said persons, which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on
application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act, and except as herein
otherwise provided all of the provisions of said Land Registration Act, as now amended, and as it
hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act, and to the titles and
certificate of title granted or issued hereunder.
As will be seen the "settlement and adjudication" of a land title under the Cadastral Act is
exactly that provided for in the land Registration Act No. 496, i.e., a proceeding culminating in
the issuance of a final decree and a Torrens certificate of title in favor of the owner of the land.
The title to the land is therefore fully as well settled and adjudicated, within the meaning of the
Cadastral Act, by a final decree in an ordinary land registration case as it would be by a similar
decree in cadastral case and, obviously, it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature to
provide a special proceeding for the settlement and adjudication of titles already settled and
adjudicated. It is, indeed, more than doubtful if the Legislature. would have the power to enact
such a provision had it so desired; the landholder who possesses a settled and adjudicated title to
his land cannot be deprived of that title through another settlement and adjudication of a similar
character.
The intention of the Legislature to exclude land already registered form the operation of
the Cadastral Act is further indicated by the provision of section 18 of the Act to the effect that,
no apportionment of any part of the costs and expenses of cadastral proceedings can be made
against such lands.
We hold that in cadastral case the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is
limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided,
such corrections, do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.
The petition is granted, and the proceedings in the court below in regard to lot No. 625 of the
cadaster of Mabalacat are declared null and void, with costs against the respondents Nicomedes
Espinosa, Maria Mercedes Espinosa, Eusebia Espinosa, and Francisca David, jointly and
severally. So ordered.






EL HOGAR FILIPINO vs. OLVIGA
60 Phil 17, April 5, 1934
G.R. No. L-37434

EL HOGAR FILIPINO, Mutual Building and Loan Association, plaintiff-appellant,
SEVERINO OLVIGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
The Plaintiff is a mutual building and loan association who brought this action to recover
from the defendants the title to and possession of a land described in TCT Nos. 5261 & 5617,
both of which were issued by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Tayabas, where the land
was located.
The case was submitted by the parties based on a stipulation of facts; the parties agreed
on the following facts:
- That the land in question formerly had OCT 477 (by virtue of a homestead
patent) and registered in the registry of deeds of Tayabas in 1921 in favor of
TIMOTEO OLVIGA & RAFAEL IGLESIA.
- The certificate of title 447 was cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2505 issued in 1928 in favor of GENARO TABIEN.
- That in 1928, the land was mortgaged by Tabien to EL HOGAR, said
mortgage was registered in the registry of deeds of Tayabas and was noted in
the TCT No. 2505.

- That pursuant to the mortgage contract the land in question was extra-
judicially sold at public auction & adjudicated to plaintiff.
- That in 1931, the court declared EL HOGAR as the absolute owner and
ordered the cancellation of TCT 2505 and the issuance in the name of said El
Hogar another certificate-TCT No. 5261 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas.
- That in 1929, the same land now known as Lot 3912 and covered by OCT 30174
was sold by TIMOTEO OLVIGA to defendant Spouses Bonifacio and Irenia
Olviga.
- That in 1931, a new transfer certificate of title no. 5617 was issued in favor of
the defendants.
The court held that the titles (TCT 2205) obtained by Tabien and the plaintiff
should not prevail over those subsequently obtained by the defendants on the ground that
the former were issued in a cadastral proceeding, and the latter in accordance with
Section 22 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act).

The plaintiff avers that the court erred in not declaring it as owner of the land in question.

ISSUE:
Should Tabiens title and that of plaintiff prevail over that of the defendant spouse, on the
ground that the former title was issued in a cadastral proceeding?



HELD:

Yes. Because the proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions
of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both
take the nature of judicial proceedings and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive
and final. (Aquino vs. Director of Lands)
Where a land was granted by the government to a private individual as homesteader
under the provisions of Act No. 926 and the corresponding patent was registered and issued to
the grantee, said land is considered REGISTERED within the meaning of the Land Registration
Act No. 496. (Manalo vs. Lukban & Liwanag)
Title to land thus granted and registered may no longer be subject of an inquiry xxx
Since the title of Tabien and the plaintiff were issued in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 496, the same shall have all the characteristics of IRREVOCABLE TORRENS TITLE,
and since the title of Tabien is prior to that issued for the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez &
Irinea Olviga.








DURAN vs. OLIVIA
113 Phil 144, September 28,1961
G.R. No. L-16589

JOSE O. DURAN and TERESA DIAZ VDA. DE DURAN, applicants-appellants,
BERNABE OLIVIA, FE ALMAZAN, HEIRS OF VICENTE GODESANO, MANUEL ARCE
and ESPERANZA SALUD,oppositors-appellees.

FACTS:
On December 3, 1952, Jose O. Duran & Teresa Diaz Vda. De Guzman filed an
application for the registration in their names of 16 lots with the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur. On April 20, 1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the
oppositors filed their opposition to the application.
On August 27, 1958, the oppositors (Bernabe Olivia, et. al.) filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots
respectively claimed by Jose Duran, et. al. as said lots were already registered in their names
attaching therewith the original certificates of title.
The applicants filed their objection to the motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion
to dismiss did not appear in the application but were mere assertions of the parties & that the
Trial Court had jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots were already covered
by certificates of title.

The lower court dismissed and rendered successively the 2 orders of dismissal appealed
from.

ISSUE:
May a certificate of title based on public land patent once registered becomes
indefeasible as a Torrenst Title?

HELD:
Yes. Once registered under Act No. 496, a certificate of title becomes indefeasible as a
Torrens Title.
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. . . . After due
registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land
for all purposes under this Act. (Act 496)
The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally
settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of title thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title
may still be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above
purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent once registered under
the Land Registration Act can not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any
title issued thereon is null and void.

A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as
indefeasible as a Torrens title, and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for
determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new title which the cadastral court may order
to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to
make correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its title, or to
proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two or more co-owners. (Ramoso v. Obligado, et
al., 70 Phil. 86; See also Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga,
60 Phil. 17; Republic v. Carle, et al., G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959; Samonte et al. v.
Descallar, et al., G.R. No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960).

The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land
Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrens
system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible.









PAJOMAYO vs. MANIPON
39 SCRA 676
G.R. 33676, JUNE 1971,

MARIANO PAJOMAYO, PATRICIO PAJOMAYO, EUSEBIO PAJOMAYO, SOLEDAD
PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband FLORIANO CHITONGCO, DEMFTRIO PAJOMAYO,
CRISTITA PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband MANUEL RAMIREZ, PATROCINIO
PAJOMAYO and CRISPO PAJOMAYO, plaintiffs-appellees,
RODRIGO MANIPON and PERFECTA ZULUETA, defendants-appellants

FACTS:
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch
IX, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are owners pro-indiviso of the parcel
of land described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in
the name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that
they had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said
property in the concept of owners for a period of more than 70 years until the early part of the
year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said property, resulting in their having
suffered annual damages amounting to around P1,100.00 representing the value of the crops of
rice; mongo, corn and vegetables that they failed to harvest; and that because they have to file the
present suit they must spend P800.00 for incidental expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.
The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the lawful owners pro-indiviso of the land in question,
and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay them the damages they have
suffered.
In their answer, the defendants, after denying some of the complaint, alleged that:
1. They were the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 14034
issued by the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan;
2. The said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings of
the Malsique Cadastre, and that apparently the plaintiffs were claiming the same
parcel of land;
3. They had acquired the land in their answer by their inheritance from their
deceased father Pioquinto Manipon and;
4.They and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years.
When the case was called for trial on July 6, 1964, the counsels for the parties submitted
to the court a stipulation of facts xxxx that the parties agree that the land in question is covered
by Two Certificates of Title, one in the name of Diego Pajomayo under Original Certificate of
Title No. 1089 issued under Free Patent, and Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 in the name
of Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral Case No. 91 of Malasique Cadastre.
Based on these stipulations of facts, the C.F.I of Pangasinan rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiffs. It ordered the defendants (Manipon) to vacate the land in question & deliver
possession thereof to the former who were entitled thereto as heirs of Diego Pajomayo who were
declared the legal and lawful owner of the said property. The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
was ordered to cancel OCT No. 14034.

The defendants appealed the decision of the lower court and assigned the following error: The
lower court erred in declaring OCT No. 14034 of herein appellants null and void.

ISSUE:
Which of the two original certificates of title should prevail? The OCT 1089 held by
plaintiffs-appellees or OCT 14034 held by defendants-appellants?

HELD:
The appeal has no merit and the OCT No. 1089 of the plaintiffs should be upheld.
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiffs based their claim of title to the land in question
on OCT No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo in 1931 by virtue of a free patent that
was granted to him. The law requires that a homestead patent must be registered in the office of
the register of deeds of the province where the land lies. Sec. 122 of the Land Registration Act
provides that it shall be the duty of the official using the instrument of alienation, grant, or
conveyance in behalf of the government to cause such instrument before its delivery to grantee,
to be filed with the Register of Deeds for the province where the land liesxxxx
Thus, it has been ruled by this court that once a homestead patent granted in accordance
with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Sec. 122 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act),
the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title
under the Land Registration Act.
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier date must prevail as
between the original parties. It appearing that OCT No. 14034 was issued in 1957, while OCT
1089 was issued in 1931, under the law and the authorities, the latter certificate of title-that of the
plaintiffs should prevail, and the former should be cancelled.

Necessarily, when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should
be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled.


















ERNESTO DAVIT, et. al. vs. CRISTITO MALAY, et. al.
318 SCRA 711, November 19, 1999
G.R. No. 132644.

ERNESTO DAVID, RICARDO DAVID, NELIA DAVID, EMILIA DAVID, LOLITA DAVID,
BASILIO LEMQUE, NICANOR LEMQUE, FELIX LEMQUE, NORMA LEMQUE,
WILFREDO LEMQUE, RODOLFO LEMQUE, ROGELIO LEMQUE, VICTORIA LEMQUE,
ESTATE OF MARIA ESPIRITU and ANDRES ADONA, MILAGROS DE UBAGO-UMALI,
FELISA GUBALLA DE UBAGO, VANESSA DE UBAGO-UMALI, ANTONIO DE UBAGO,
JR., JOSEPH GUBALLA DE UBAGO, MARIETTA DE UBAGO-TAN, and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ZAMBALES, petitioners,
CRISTITO MALAY and NORA MALAY, DIONISIO MALAY, FRANCISCA T.
CAPACILLO, PEPITO ALCANTARA, NICOLAS SORIANO and JUAN MORA, respondents.

FACTS:
The spouses Andres Adona & Leoncia Abad, husband and wife for a good number of
years, were blessed with five children, among them was Carmen Adona. Carmen married
Filomeno Malay; three children were begotten by the marriage, namely Cristitito, Nora and
Dionisio (among the herein private respondents). Following the death of Leoncia Abad in 1923,
Andres Adona cohabited with Maria Espiritu, a widow, without the benefit of marriage. Andres
& Maria sired two children-Esperanze, represented herein by her heirs, all surnamed David, and
Vicente Adona. Maria Espiritu likewise had a child by her previous marriage, Fulgencio
Lemque, now herein represented also by his own heirs. During his lifetime, Andres Adona
applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of agricultural land located at Dirita, Iba, Zambales,
containing an area of 22.5776 hectares. After Andres Adona died, Maria Espiritu, predecessor-
in-interest of herein petitioners, succeeded in obtaining Original Certificate of Title No. 398 over
the land in her name. After Maria Espiritu had died in 1945, the children, as well as descendants,
of Andres Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful and quiet
possession of subject land.
Sometime in 1989, petitioners executed a deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
over the subject property in favor of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. Private respondents protested the
sale claiming that they were the true owners of the land. Ultimately, in any event, the sale in
favor of Mrs. Ungson was rescinded in view of the latters failure to pay in full the consideration
agreed upon. Subsequently, petitioners executed another deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Sale. In this new instrument, dated 15 December 1990, petitioners divided the land equally
among themselves and sold their respective shares to their co-petitioners herein, Antonio de
Ubago, Jr., Milagros de Ubago-Umali, Felisa Guballa de Ubago, Vanessa de Ubago-Umali and
Marietta de Ubago-Tan and Joseph Guballa de Ubago. On 27 November 1992, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-42320 was issued in favor of the de Ubagos.
Less than a month later, or on 07 December 1992, private respondents filed a complaint, for
Annulment of Sale with Restraining Order, Injunction and Damages against petitioners before
Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales. In their complaint, private respondents
averred that the disputed land sold by the heirs of Maria Espiritu to the de Ubagos was the
subject of a homestead application by their great grandfather, Andres Adona, but that Original
Certificate of Title No. 398 was instead fraudulently issued to Maria Espiritu, on 04 December
1933, upon her false representation that she was the widow of Andres Adona.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant-buyers were in good faith and for value.

HELD:
No. It is unbelievable that the defendant-buyers would not have noticed the plaintiffs who
were in possession of the land when the defendant buyers inspected the same. Had they made
further investigations, they would have discovered that plaintiffs were in possession of the land
under a claim of ownership. The rule is settled that a buyer of a real property which is in the
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of
those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer
in good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in the
adverse possession of another buyer in bad faith.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED








BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
361 SCRA 711, November 19, 1999
G.R. No. 109559

HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, SHERIFF SILVERIO BERNAS and JEROME
SOLCO, petitioners
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Fifteenth Division), DAE SUGAR MILLING CO., INC.,
AZUCAR MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, EDUARDO R.
LOPINGCO, TEODY LOPINGCO and ROSITA LOPINGCO, respondents

FACTS:
On August 30, 1991, petitioner Jerome Solco filed with the Regional Trial Corut, Quezon
City, an action for damages totaling to P 11,621,913.00 moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs, with preliminary attachment against respondents DAE Sugar Milling
Corp., Azucar Management & Development Corp., Eduardo L. Lopingco, Teody Lopingco and
Rosita Lopingco, claiming that the sugar quedans he had purchased out to be worthless.
On September 12, 1991, petitioner Solco amended the complaint increasing his demand
for actual damages to P 28,520,320.70.
Respondents contended that the quedans were owned by the corporations controlling
stockholder, respondent Eduardo Lopingco, and were merely borrowed by petitioner for use as a
collateral for a loan he had intended to obtain from lending institutions. The parties submitted the
Compromise Agreement to the Trial Court. On May 27, 1992, the trial court rendered a
judgment approving the compromise agreement in accordance with its terms and conditions and
enjoined the parties to comply therewith. All other claims and counterclaims of the parties were
considered waived.
Respondent Eduardo R. Lopingco, however, failed to comply with the terms of the compromise
agreement, so that on June 24, 1992, petitioner Solco filed with the trial court a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against respondent Eduardo R. Lopingco, for the amount of
P68,421,050.00, plus interest at the rate of 30% per annum from today until the date of full
payment.
On July 3, 1992, the trial court issued the writ of execution as prayed for by virtue of
which the courts branch sheriff levied upon and/or garnished certain personal property
belonging to respondent Lopingco as well as respondents AZUCAR and DASUMICO; and
certain real property belonging to respondents Eduardo Lopingco and Rosita Lopingco, and
AZUCAR and DASUMICO, with a total value of P36,111,000.00, which according to the
sheriffs report/return was in partial satisfaction of the courts judgment in the case. On July 9,
1992, the trial court issued a Notice of Levy on Execution including property of Talisay-Silay
and Ma-ao which were not parties to the case.
The notice was annotated as Entry No. 350179 on TCT 115609, the certificate of title
covering the vast tract of land and sugar mill owned and registered in the name of Talisay-Silay,
located in the municipality of Talisay-Silay, Negros Occidental.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents DASUMICO and AZUCAR were bound by the compromise
agreement entered into by petitioner and respondent Eduardo R. Lopingco even without express
resolution of the Board of Dirctors authorizing him to enter into such compromise.

HELD:
No. The Court finds the Memorandum of Agreement dated November 25, 1993, executed
by petitioner Jerome Solco and respondent DAE Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (DAE) void in that
Solco and Dae Sugar have nothing to ratify because the levy and sale on execution of TCT No.
115609 have been nullified by both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court. Thus, the
levy and sale to be implemented or validated are now non-existent.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Joint Motion (RE: Settlement Agreement of the
Parties) and declares the Memorandum of Agreement, attached thereto as contrary to law, and
thus, VOID.













JESUS P. LIAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
323 SCRA 430, January 27, 2000
G.R. Nos. 102961-62

JESUS P. LIAO, petitioner,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS I. C. CRUZ CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARLE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
On March 5, 1986, Estrella Mapa filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 99 a petition for reconstitution of documents and issuance of certificates of title over
certain parcels of land covered by OCT 614, Decree No. 6667, GLRO Rec. No. 5975. Estrella
Maps claimed that on Jun 16, 1913, the Director of Lands issued certificates of sales to Vicente
Salgado over the parcels of land covered by OCT 614, Decree No. 6667, GLRO Rec. No. 5975
in accordance with Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. The sale involves
four (4) parcels of land (Lot Nos. 755, 777, 778 and 783) located at Brgy. Payatas, Quezon City.
Lot No. 755 has an area of 3,691 hectares, Lot No. 777 has 25.0155 hectares, Lot No. 778 has
24.5091 hectares, and Lot No. 783 has 25.0363 hectares. The four lots formed part of the Piedad
Estate.



ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the annulment of the order of the
Trial Court in LRC Case No. 3369 (86) authorizing issuance of titles on the basis of sales
certificates and technical descriptions as reconstituted by the Land Registration Commission.

HELD:
No. The court ruled the petitioner not owner of the land. Petitioner Liao claims that his
predecessor in interest acquired the property through sale certificate Nos. 780, 781, 783, issued
by the Director of Lands is 1913. It is shown, however, that the sale certificates were signed by
the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. These sales were void. This
is because the sales were not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In
Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court also said that approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands.
In the absence of such approval, the sales were void. In view of the invalidity of the sales, there
can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sales.

Petition DISMISSED






AGASEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
325 SCRA 504, February 15, 2000

ALEJANDRO AGASEN and FORTUNATA CALONGE-AGASEN, petitioners,
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PETRA BILOG, assisted by her husband FELIPE
BILOG, respondents.

FACTS:
On April 7, 1980, private respondent Petra Bilog, assisted by her husband Felipe Bilog,
filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with the Regional Trial Court of
Agoo, La Union, involving an Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four (8,474) square meter
parcel of land registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16109 of the
Registry of Deeds of La Union. She alleged that sometime in 1964 or 1965, petitioners took
possession and assumed ownership of the said property, appropriating the fruits therefrom. She
alleged that despite demands on them to vacate the land, petitioners refused to do so and even
filed a case for Annulment of TCT and/or Reconveyance with Damages before the same court,
which case was, however, dismissed on February 12, 1980. Thus, in her complaint, private
respondent prayed that she be declared the true and absolute owner of the subject land and
petitioners be ordered to turn over possession thereof to her.
On November 19, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 3, rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners, dismissing the complaint and declaring Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 16109 in the name of private respondent null and void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and private
respondent was declared the true and absolute owner of the subject land. Accordingly, petitioners
were ordered to turn over the subject land to private respondent.
With the denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on May 20, 1994, [5] the
instant Petition was filed, anchored upon the following grounds:
(1) The decision (annex a) erred in declaring the deed of partition with sale (exh. 1) and
the deed of absolute sale (exh. 2) not authentic and valid;
(2) The decision erred in holding that defendants failed to substantiate their claim of
ownership and in giving more credence to plaintiffs testimonial evidence and tax declaration no.
21460 (exh. B) and certification of tax payments (exh. C);
(3) The decision erred in finding/holding that the non-registration of the deed of partition
with sale and the deed of absolute sale with the register of deeds made the purchases thereunder
"dented" and did not automatically vest title or ownership over the subject property to the
buyers;
(4) The decision erred in holding that the daily notebook (exh. 3) containing the
memorandum of installment sale by leonora calonge to defendant-appellee fortunata agasen (exh.
3-a to 3-c) over the parcel of land described in exh. 2 was not a valid or credible document of
transfer;
(5) The decision gravely erred in holding that tct no. 16109 (exh. A) cannot be
collaterally attacked on the ground that it is barred by the rule on indefeasibility of a torrens title
after the lapse of one year from the decree of registration.
Issue:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two (2) documents, relied upon by petitioners as basis for their claim
of ownership, are valid.

HELD:
To begin with, it is not denied that the two subject documents are notarized documents
and, as such, are considered public documents which enjoy the presumption of validity as to
authenticity and due execution. [8] One of the documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, was
identified by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maximo Quero, the administering officer who had
notarized it. The legal presumption of validity of petitioners duly notarized public documents
has not been overcome by preponderant evidence by private respondent, upon whom the burden
of proof rests, having alleged the contrary.
The subject documents were also attached by petitioners to their Answer where they were
alleged as part of the counterclaim. As such, private respondent should have specifically denied
under oath their genuineness and due execution. [10] After all, a counterclaim is considered a
complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the
same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. [11]
Having failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the said
documents, private respondent is deemed to have admitted the same.
The following circumstances all indicate the genuineness and due execution of the
subject documents: (1) The subject documents were duly notarized public documents; (2) The
documents enjoy the legal presumption of validity; (3) Their genuineness and due execution
were not specifically denied under oath by private respondent; (4) Private respondents signature
thereon were found genuine by the lower court upon a comparison of her signature thereon with
that in her own documentary evidence; (5) The actual identification and positive testimony of
petitioner; and (6) The testimony of the lawyer who had notarized one of the subject documents.
Private respondents bare denial of the same cannot, by any measure, overcome the above-
mentioned evidence and legal presumptions in petitioners favor.
The memorandum of sale appearing in Exhibit "3" is sufficient to prove the sale between
petitioner Fortunata Calonge Agasen and her late sister, the previous vendee of the land subject
of the Deed of Absolute Sale from private respondent. After all, contracts are obligatory in
whatever form they may have been entered into provided all essential requisites are present. [14]
The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not
for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a
parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. [15]
Petitioners have adequately explained why they have not pursued their action for
annulment of title against private respondent, which the Court of Appeals viewed as having
"further darkened the cloud of suspicion which hovered over the questioned documents." Private
respondent herself admits that petitioners were the first to assert their right, by filing an action
for annulment of title and/or for reconveyance with damages against private respondent [18]
which complaint was, however, dismissed without prejudice. [19] On the other hand, the
complaint of private respondent was filed two months after the dismissal of their complaint,
prompting them to merely interpose their cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the
lower court.
Finally, the Court of Appeals is likewise in error in holding that private respondents title
was "vested with the garment of indefeasibility." The rule on indefeasibility of torrens title ---
i.e., that torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance
of the decree of registration --- applies only to original titles and not to subsequent registration.
An action for annulment of title and/or reconveyance which was previously filed by petitioners
and interposed in their counterclaim is an action open to them to attack private respondents
fraudulently acquired title. Neither may the compulsory counterclaim of petitioners challenging
the title of private respondent be brushed aside as merely a collateral attack which would bar a
ruling on the validity of the said title.

















REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRIQUE P. DE GUZMAN
326 SCRA 267, February 23, 2000
G.R. No. 105630


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
ENRIQUE P. DE GUZMAN, Spouses RIO RIVERA and CAROLINA R. DE GUZMAN, THE
CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY and HOECHST PHILS.,
INC., respondents.RIO RIVERA and CAROLINA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

FACTS:
After a public bidding held on March 18, 1950, the Board of Liquidators awarded 5249
Ts-217 a 450-square meter land situated in Dadiangas, General Santos City, to Eusebio Diones
of Takurong, Bubon, Cotabato. On March 11, 1955, Eusebio Diones transferred his rights over
the lot to Enrique P. De Guzman (de Guzman, for brevity) for P 700.00 as evidenced by an
Agreement of Transfer of Right. On November 12, 1956, the Board of Liquidators cancelled the
award previously given to Eusebio Diones.
From the time he purchased the lot, de Guzman did not occupy it. In 1963, Lucena Ong
Ante, another claimant of Lot 5249 Ts-217, authorized Carmen Ty to occupy the land. Ong Ante
paid the corresponding real estate taxes from 1963 until 1980. Carmen Ty remained the occupant
of the land until this time. De Guzman filed with the Board of Liquidators, Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. 00222-E, and submitted supporting documents. In 1973, de Guzman sold the lot
to his married daughter and her husband, Carolina R. De Guzman and Rio Rivera for P 5,000.00.
The covering deed of sale could not be located and Rio Rivera admitted that his father-in-law
Enrique P. De Guzman was not in occupation of the lot in question. On September 4, 1973, the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7203 to
spouses Rio Rivera and Carolina R. De Guzman. On March 21, 1974, Lucena Ong-Antes
adverse claim was annotated on the title of the lot.
Meanwhile, on February 13, 1974, spouses Rivera and Hoeschst, Phils., Inc., as
mortgagor and mortgagee, respectively, executed a deed of real estate mortgage involving the
lot. For failure to settle their obligation, on October 29, 1977, mortgagee Hoechst Phils., Inc.,
foreclosed on the mortgage and acquired the lot at the foreclosure sale. A certificate of sale was
issued in favor of Hoechst Phils., Inc. However, for unknown reasons, the real estate mortgage
and certificate of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds. Thus, the transfer
certificate of title remained in the name of spouses Rivera.
On January 14, 1981, petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed with the Court of First
Instance, 16th Judicial District, General Santos City re-amended complaintfor reversion of Lot
5249 Ts-217 and cancellation of titles against Enrique P. de Guzman, spouses Rio Rivera and
Carolina R. de Guzman, the City Registrar of Deeds, General Santos City and Hoechst Phils.,
Inc.
In its re-amended complaint,petitioner Republic of the Philippines averred that Enrique P.
de Guzman obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712 through fraudulent means.
Petitioner contended since Lot 5249 Ts-217 was awarded to Eusebio Diones, hence, Eusebio
Diono had no right to execute a deed of transfer in favor of Enrique de Guzman. Petitioner
maintained that the documents presented by de Guzman to support his miscellaneous sales
application were either issued by fictitious persons who were not employees of the Board of
Liquidators, or contained inconsistencies that cast doubt on their authenticity.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Enrique P. De Guzman validly obtained the sales patent and the
original certificate of title.
2. Whether or not the validity of the patent and the original certificate of title can still be
assailed after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the disputed title.
3. Whether or not the spouses Rivera were innocent purchasers for value.

HELD:
1. No. The court ruled negatively. There is no question that de Guzman was not in
possession of the property. Hence, de Guzman misrepresented facts in his application for
sales patent. Even the Court of Appeals sustained the factual finding of the trial court on
this point. However, the Court of Appeals held that an action for cancellation of patent or
title could not be maintained after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance thereof.
As heretofore stated, the ruling is erroneous.
2. Yes. The court ruled that the State can assail a patent fraudulently issued by the
Director of Lands. Where public land acquired by an applicant through fraud and
misrepresentation, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of
one year. The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.

3. No. We agree with the trial court that spouses Rivera are not innocent purchasers for
value. Spouses Rivera is related by consanguinity and affinity to Enrique P. De Guzman
knew that de Guzman was not in possession of the land. In fact, Rio Rivera testified that
his father in law was not in possession of the lot in question. Carmen Ty was in
possession of the land since 1963 and paid the real estate taxes thereon. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals that the presumption of a buyer in good faith must prevail. The
burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who
asserts that status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary
presumption of good faith. The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights
of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded
as buyer in good faith.
"A purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to
believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in the vendors or mortgagor's title, will not make him an innocent
purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact
defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required of a
prudent man in a like situation."

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court
of Appeals.






















HEIRS OF MANUEL ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
220 SCRA 309

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in
substitution of original petitioner), petitioners
COURT OF APPEALS andMAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun
Corp.) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Brgy.
Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 & 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of
3,641 and 10,674 square meters, respectively. The original registration case was docketed as
Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge
Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corp. presented a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Meliza as vendor and indicating the
purchase price to be P 170,000. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original
petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas for P 200,000.00 two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority (the National Land Titles & Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA)
to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporations application for
registration. Since Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner,
occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was
made in the Official Gazette & the Record Newsweekly. After an Order of General Default was
issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case.

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an
intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud of its detrimental effect upon public interests and
public or private confidence; even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design
to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining
the decree of registration?

HELD:
Yes. Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that the Roxas family, as
having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. Although there is no proof of
respondent Maguesun Corporations direct participation in the execution and preparation of the
forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not
the innocent purchaser for value who merits the protection of the law. Magueson Corp. is thus
not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably,
petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive
and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular
transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper in the concept of an owner over
the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper
and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to
Section 14 of Property Registration Decree No. 1529.

Petition GRANTED.
















VICENTE G. DIVINA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
352 SCRA 527, February 22, 2001
G.R. No. 117734

VICENTE G. DIVINA, petitioner
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VILMA GAJO-SY, respondents.

FACTS:
Lot no. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa, July
22, 1960. He sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion was particularly described as: A parcel of
land unirrigated, situated at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of
TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the north by Lot # 1464-Fausto
Ayson and Lot # 1888-Gloria Fajardo: on the east, by Lot # 1446-Silverio Garcia: on the south,
by Lot # 1891-Antonio Escobedo and on the west, by Lot # 1880-Federico Faronas and Lot #
1890-Eugenia Espedido. Cadastral concrete posts were the visible signs of boundary. It had no
permanent improvement thereon, designated as Lot 1893 of Antonio Berosa, declared under Tax
No. 13038, valued at Php 760.00 for the current year in the name of Antonio Berosa.
Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893, a
20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March
28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and declared it
had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration
No. 9032 in Gamos name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals was valid.

HELD:
No. Section 15 of P.D. 1529 is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration
of land titles, the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the
land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the
search made to find them, the court emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of knowledge
of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not sufficient, but the search that had been
made to find them is necessary.

Petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio
San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos which in turn sold it to respondent
in 1970. Clearly, going by the records, petitioners name would not be found on the said survey
plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the portion of Lot
1893. Petitioners claim was clearly meritorious.

Petition GRANTED.




CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
95 SCRA 22, April 11,1980
G.R. No.35787

FAUSTA FRANCISCO, Petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA FRANCISCO (Substituted
by: JOSE SAN DIEGO; CELSO GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS, EDILBERTO
GARROVILLAS, AMALIA GARROVILLAS; VIRGINIA GARROVILAS, PACITA
GARROVILLAS and LOPE GARROVILLAS), Respondents
FACTS:
On October 2, 1991, respondent Regiono G. Relova filed a petition with the trial court for
the registration of two parcels of land described as Lot Nos. 1834 & 1832, Cad-688-D of the
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, situated in Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal. He alleged that he had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said parcels of land since 1958 and,
therefore, had acquired the same by prescription. The Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, registered its written opposition to the petition.
At the initial hearing of the petition on February 28, 1992, nobody appeared to oppose the
petition. After respondent Relova presented evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts, the trial
court ordered that a general default be entered against the whole world except the Republic of the
Philippines. The trial court designated a hearing commissioner to receive evidence ex-parte in
support of the petition.

During the course of the proceedings, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) submitted
its report stating that discrepancies were found after plotting the plans pertaining to the land
applied for. Thus, the LRA recommended that the appropriate government agencies be ordered
to submit their reports to determine whether the land or any portion thereof are covered by land
patents were within the forest zone.
ISSUE:
Weather or not there was fraud committed by the applicant in this case.
HELD:
No. There was no fraud committed. It should be noted that the report of the LRA that was
submitted to the court states that there are some corrections in the technical descriptions of the
property but the area of the property has remained the same as applied for. That is why this court,
in its order dated October 28, 1993, granted the motion of counsel for the applicant to approve
the technical corrections for the reason that the correction without need for the re-publication
amendment does not appear to be substantial. It should be noted also that the order of the Land
Registration Authority recommended the corrected technical description of Lot 1832 Cad-688-D
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre be approved and the applicant be ordered to publish in the official
gazette the corrected technical description of Lot 1834 Cad-688 Cainta-Taytay Cadastre. An
order issued approving the said technical description to be utilized in the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration. So it is clear that with respect to Lot 1832, which is the
subject opposition in this case, the LRA merely stated that the corrected technical description of
Lot 1832.

Petition GRANTED

ESQUIVAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
272 SCRA 803
[G.R. No. 119714. May 29, 1997]

SALVADOR S. ESQUIVIAS and ALICIA DOMALAON-ESQUIVIAS, petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE G. DOMALAON, ELENA G. DOMALAON and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF SORSOGON, respondents.

FACTS:
A 6,270-SQUARE METER PARCEL OF LAND in the poblacion of Gubat, Sorsogon, is
the subject of this action for reconveyance and damages.
Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece of land with an area of 1,260 square meters
and the two-storey house standing thereon. In 1950 she extrajudicially constituted this property
into a family home. Alicia Domalaon-Esquivias, Elena G. Domalaon and Jose G. Domalaon,
among other children, were named beneficiaries thereof.
On 11 March 1974 a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Julia Galpo de Domalaon in
favor of her son-in-law, Atty. Salvador Esquivias, husband of Alicia Domalaon. Subject matter
of the deed was the property constituting the family home the two-storey house and the
residential lot on which it stood, more particularly described in the deed
On 30 March 1977 the family home was dissolved by Julia Galpo de Domalaon with the
conformity of all her children. Afterwards, another deed of sale was executed by her dated 12
April 1977 transferring to Jose G. Domalaon the house and lot which once constituted the family
home. The deed indicated that the property being sold was the entire 1,260 square meters.
However, in the Affidavit of Confirmatory Waiver of Rights, the area was increased to 2,456
square meters.
Prior to the sale of the property to him, or on 21 October 1976, Jose already filed two (2)
applications for Free Patent in his name covering the entire property. When his first application
was approved, a certificate of title was issued on 11 February 1981. His rights over the other
application covering the rest of the property were relinquished by him in favor of his sister
Elena. It turned out later that Elena G. Domalaon also succeeded in her application for Free
Patent and a certificate of title was issued in her name on 18 March 1985. Alleging that it was
only in 1981 that she came to know that the document she signed in favor of Atty. Salvador S.
Esquivias in 1974 was actually a deed of sale, Julia Galpo de Domalaon filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Esquivias. According to her, being a son-in-law and lawyer of the Domalaons,
Atty. Esquivias took advantage of her trust and confidence and poor eyesight by representing
that the document was a sale of her land in favor of all her children. But the Solicitor General,
who investigated the case, recommended its dismissal for lack of merit
A 6,270 square-meter parcel of land in the poblacion of Gubat, Sorsogon was the subject
of this action for reconveyance and damages. Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece
of land with an area of 1,260 sq. m. and the two-storey house standing thereon. In 1950, she
extrajudicially constituted this property into a family home. Alicia Domalaon-Esquivias, Elena
G. Domalaon & Jose G. Domalaon, among other children, were named beneficiaries. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed by Julia Galpo de Domalaon in favor of her son-in-law, Atty.
Salvador Esquivias, husband of Alicia Domalaon. The subject matter of the deed was the
property constituting the family home.

ISSUE:
Who has a better right over the subject property, the Esquiviases or the Domalaons?

HELD:
While the certificates of title in the names of Jose G. Domalaon and Elena G. Domalaon
were indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world, they do not create or vest
title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot use the same
to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.
Although a review of the decree of registration is no longer available on account of the
expiration of the one-year period from entry thereof, an equitable remedy is still available to the
Esquiviases who were wrongfully deprived of their property, i.e., to compel Jose G. Domalaon in
whose name the house and lot in question had been wrongfully registered, to reconvey the
property to the Esquiviases, provided that the same has not yet been transferred to innocent
persons for value. The registered property is deemed to be held in trust for the real owners by the
person in whose name it has been registered. In this action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, in this case, the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person's name, to its rightful and legal owners.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals reversing that of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Gubat, Sorsogon, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision of the latter court in favor of petitioners as quoted in pages four (4) and five (5) hereof
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.




















VDA. DE CABRERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
267 SCRA 339
[G.R. No. 108547. February 3, 1997]

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, MARYJANE CABRERA and FELICIDAD
TEOKEMIAN, plaintiff
COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGILIA ORAIS DE FELICIO, represented by her Attorney-in-
Fact, ERNESTO M. ORAIS, defendants.

FACTS:
On January 16, 1950, a Deed of Sale was executed by Daniel Teokemian and Albertana
Teokemian in favor of Andres Orais over a parcel of unregistered land situated at Abejod, Davao
Oriental with an area of 7.3720 hectares. The property was owned in common by Daniel and
Albertana and their sister Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the same from their late father,
Domingo Teokemian. However, the Deed of Sale was not signed by Felicidad, although her
name was printed therein as one of the vendors. On January 26, 1950, the parcel of land was
surveyed in the name of Virgilia Orais, daughter of vendee Andres Orais, and denominated as
Lot No. 2239, Cateel Cadastre. As surveyed, the property had an area of 11.1000 hectares.
Virgilia Orais was issued a free patent therefor. An Original Certificate of Title was issued in her
name.
On July 27, 1972, Alberto (sic. Albertana) Teokemian executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying to Elano Cabrera, husband of Felicidad Cabrera, ONE HALF PORTION OF LOT
NO. 2239, Cad-287, eastern portion, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TEN (55,510) SQUARE METERS, more or less (Exh. 3), which portion
supposedly corresponded to the one-third share in Lot 2239 of Felicidad Teokemian who was not
a party to the Deed of Sale earlier executed by her brother and sister in favor of Andres Orais,
Virgilia Orais predecessor-in-interest. It was explained by Felicidad Cabrera that the Deed
of Sale was signed by Albertana Teokemian, not by Felicidad Teokemian, because the whole of
Lot 2239 was adjudicated to Albertana in a decision of a cadastral court dated June 8, 1965 as
evidenced by a Certification of an officer-in-charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Br.
7, Baganga, Davao Oriental (Exh. 4). Felicidad Cabrera and her husband immediately took
possession of the western portion of Lot 2239.
In 1974 and 1978, Virgilia Orais brothers, Rodolfo and Jimmy Orais went to Cateel,
Davao Oriental and confronted the Cabreras of the latters alleged encroachment and illegal
occupation of their sisters land, but no concrete action on the matter was pursued by Virgilia
Orais until February 11, 1988 when she filed Civil Case No. 379 against Felicidad Cabrera, now
a widow, and her daughter Marykane Cabrera for Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages
with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
The complaint, which was amended on June 22, 1988 by including Felicidad Teokemian
as party defendant (pp. 42-47, Records), alleged that sometime in 1972 and 1973 the late Elano
Cabrera and defendant Felicidad Cabrera, knowing that Lot 2239 was already registered in the
name of the plaintiff, prepared a document of sale and had Felicidad Teokemian sign it
conveying a portion of said lot to them as described in the Sketch Map (Annex D of the
Complaint), after which they entered and possessed said portion and enjoyed the fruits
thereon. Plaintiff further averred that by reason of the document of sale and the declaration of
the property involved in the name of defendant Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera, there created a cloud
of doubt on the formers title on said property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court erred in holding laches in this case.

HELD:
No. The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was
a definite portion of the community property, and, therefore, void, is likewise untenable.

Art. 493 of the Civil Code provides that Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and even he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

Petition GRANTED.






IGNACIO GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
358 SCRA 598, June 18, 2001
G.R. No. 110335

IGNACIO GONZALES, LILIA R. GONZALES, GUSTAVO R. GONZALES, WIGBERTO R.
GONZALES, GILDA GONZALES-SALUTA, FERNANDO RAMIREZ, OCTAVIO
RAMIREZ, JR., IGNACIO RAMIREZ, ESMIRNA RAMIREZ, MERCEDES GONZALES-
FAVIZ, JAIME GONZALES, FEDERICO GONZALES, ROSARIO GONZALES, PATRICIA
GONZALES, DANIEL GONZALES, ALDO GONZALES, CLAUDIA GONZALES and
AMANDA GONZALES, petitioners

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ESTANISLAO SALVADOR, MATEO SALVADOR,
ALBERTO SARMIENTO, MAXIMO ESGUERRA, MAMERTO ANTONIO, VIRGILIO DE
GUZMAN, ANGEL FAJARDO, ABAD DELA CRUZ, PEDRO FAJARDO, JUANITO DE
LARA, ELIGIO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR MARTINEZ, EDUARDO DELA CRUZ, JOSE
MATIAS, SOLEDAD ESTRELLA, ROMAN GUINGON, CIRILO SALVADOR, CATALINA
DELA CRUZ, BERNARDO ESGUERRA, JR., GLORIA CABANA, PAQUITO CHAVEZ,
RENATO GARCIA, FRANCISCO PASCUAL, WALDO SALVADOR, MARIO SALVADOR,
PEDRO GARCIA, ALBINO SALVADOR, ANTONIO DE GUZMAN, AMBROCIO
SALVADOR, TERESITA CAPATE, EDUARDO TALENS, BENIGNO CARAIG, ERNESTO
BERNABE, SERGIO CARLOS, SIMEON BALINGAY, ANTONIO NANGEL, TEOFILO
BINUYA and WILFREDO DELA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:
The now deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered
owners of two parcels of agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2742 and denominated as Lot 551-C and Lot 552-A.
Lot 551-C contains an area of 46.97 hectares while Lot 552-A contains an area of 37.5735
hectares. Herein petitioners are the successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of
said Gonzales spouses. On the other hand, private respondents are the farmers and tenants of
said spouses who have been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either
personally or through their predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her
estate was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales
executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property, specifically
Lot No. 551-C, in favor of his 14 grandchildren. The said donation was not registered. Thus,
when Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect on October 21, 1972, the
landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of
said decree, and private respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of
Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974, the administratrix Lilia Gonzales
filed an application for retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, requesting that their
property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. After initial investigation,
Hearing Officer Melchor Pagsolingan recommended the denial of said application for retention
and this action was affirmed by Assistant Secretary of Agrarian Reform Benjamin Labayen, in
an order dated September 12, 1977. Apparently, however, a reinvestigation was conducted,
resulting in the present Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) resolution dated February 23,
1983 recommending that the land subject of the deed of donation, or Lot No. 551-C, be exempt
from Operation Land Transfer. On September 3, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong issued
an order declaring that the subject landholdings covered by the deed of donation are exempt from
Operation Land Transfer, and cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of
private respondents.
DAR Secretary reasoned:
As the donation had been duly accepted by the donees who were already of legal age on the
date of the donation and by the legal guardians of the donees who were still minors at that
time, and the donor having known of said acceptance, the donation had therefore been
perfected in accordance with the law, and the donees had acquired a valid title to the portion
donated on the date the instrument was executed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered
when P.D. No. 27 took effect should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.

HELD:
No. The land subject of the donation is covered by Operation Land Transfer. The findings
of fact made by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court even if
contrary to these of the trial court or the administrative agency, so long as such findings are
supported by the records or based on substantial evidence (Tabaco vs. Court of Appeals, 239
SCRA 485, 1994). While the foregoing doctrine is not absolute, petitioners have not sufficiently
proved that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.

Agrarian laws have never really been effectively implemented. Certain individuals have
continued to prey on the disadvantage, and as a result, the farmers who are intended to be
protected and uplifted by the said laws find themselves back in their previous plight or even in a
more distressing situation. This Court ought to be an instrument in achieving a dignified
existence for these farmers free from pernicious restraints and practices, and there is no better
time to do it than now.

Petition DENIED.












OLIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
236 SCRA 145
G.R. No. 107075 September 1, 1994
ARMANDO S. OLIZON and ILUMINADA C. OLIZON, petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL BANK, respondents.

FACTS:
The factual alpha of the present dispute was sometime in 1967 when the spouses
Armando and Iluminada Olizon obtained a loan from respondent Prudential Bank in the amount
of P25, 000.00 and, as security therefor, they executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters located at Barrio Calaanan,
Kalookan City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 of the
Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City. Unfortunately, that transaction spawned the succeeding
events hereunder chronologically narrated, eventuating in this appeal wherein we are now
expected to pen the judicial omega.
It appears from the records that the Olizon spouses failed to pay their aforestated
obligation upon its maturity, so private respondent extra judicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage. At a public auction thereafter held on March 11, 1975, the subject property was sold
to respondent bank as the highest bidder, pursuant to which it was issued a certificate of sale as
of the same date. On March 12, 1974, the said certificate of sale was duly annotated at the back
of petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604.

On June 5, 1978, again due to the failure of petitioner spouses to redeem the foreclosed
property within the period of redemption, title to the property was consolidated in favor of
respondent bank.
On January 14, 1986, respondent bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City a petition to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604, which was lost in the
Office of the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City, the said proceeding being docketed as Case
No. C-2746.
On June 11, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City ordered the reconstitution
prayed for. As a consequence, Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 24604 in the name of the
Olizon spouses was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 149858 was
issued on June 5, 1987 in the name of respondent bank.
On November 27, 1989, respondent bank this time filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession against petitioner spouses,
docketed as LRC Case No. C-3094,
4
and which petition was granted by the trial court on
February 8, 1990.
On March 8, 1990, a petition, by way of opposition, was filed by petitioner spouses
wherein they sought the cancellation of the writ of possession, the nullification of the certificate
of sale dated March 11, 1974, and/or the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. In support
thereof, they alleged lack of notice of the auction sale and lack of posting of the notice of sale as
required by Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
After trial, the court a quo issued an order dated July 16, 1990.

Private respondent appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered its
questioned decision in CAG.R. CV No. 29482, dated September 9, 1992.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the lack of personal notice to the mortgagors, herein petitioners, is a
ground to set aside the foreclosure sale and the failure of the mortgagee bank to comply with the
posting requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended, be considered a sufficient
ground for annulling the sale.

HELD:
No. It is now a well-settled rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is not necessary. 10 Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of
the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of
general circulation. Hence, the lack of personal notices to the mortgagors, herein petitioners, is
not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.
Neither can the supposed failure of respondent bank to comply with the posting
requirement as provided under the aforesaid Section 3, under the factual ambiance nor
circumstances which obtained in this case be considered a sufficient ground for annulling the
aforementioned sale. We are not unaware of the rulings in some cases that, under normal
situations, the statutory provisions governing publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure
sales must be strictly complied with and that failure to publish the notice of auction sale as
required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. However, the
unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of the confluent circumstances involved
in this case require that we rule otherwise.
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviation therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.
Furthermore, notice of sale was duly published in accordance with law and furnished the
Olizons. The evidence presented during the trial of the case show that the then Clerk of Court,
Emma Ona, sent a printed letter dated February 18, 1974 informing the Olizons that appellant
bank had filed an application to foreclosure their real estate mortgage and the public auction of
the mortgaged parcel of land was sent on March 11, 1974, together with a copy of the Notice of
Sale. The document is more than ten (10) years old and the absence of a registry receipt in the
case folder of the foreclosure records of the Sheriff of the City of Caloocan, does not indicate
that the Olizons did not receive a copy of the aforesaid notice of sale, it being presumed that the
sheriff performed her duties and that foreclosure proceedings are regular.
In the case at bar, petitioners are already considered estopped through laches from
questioning the regularity of the sale as well as the ownership of the land in question. It is
evident from the records that the petition to annul the foreclosure sale was filed by herein
petitioners only after 16 long years from the date of sale and only after a transfer certificate of
title over the subject property had long been issued to respondent bank. Herein petitioners failed
to advance any justification for their prolonged inaction. It would be inequitable to allow
petitioners, after the lapse of an almost interminable period of time, to defeat an otherwise
indefeasible title by the simple and dubious expedient of invoking a purported irregularity in the
foreclosure proceedings.

Finally, the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants not only a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either had abandoned it or declined to assert it, but
also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice
to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. In the present case, at no time after
the debt became due and demandable and the mortgage property had been foreclosed, or even
thereafter, did petitioners offer to pay their mortgage obligation to redeem their property.
Petitioners' collective acts are, therefore, indicative of their acquiescence to and acknowledgment
of the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the sale, as well as a recognition of respondent
bank's just and legal title over the property acquired thereby.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed judgment of
respondent









SALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
211 SCRA 858
G.R. No. L-40145 July 29, 1992

SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioners
COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO GONZALES, respondents

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Branch III which upheld the validity of the deed of sale of a parcel of land executed by petitioner
Severo Sales in favor of respondent Leonilo Gonzales
Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan. Covered by
Tax Declaration No. 5861, the property had an area of 5,733 square meters more or less.
On July 4, 1955, Sales mortgaged said property, together with two other parcels of land,
to Faustina P. Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P2,
240.00 payable on or about July 4, 1956. 2 On August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an
order declaring the court had lost jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.
On October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No. 5861 was canceled and in lieu hereof, Tax
Declaration No. 13647 was issued to Sales but the area of the property was stated therein as
5,229 square meters more or less.

More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the consent of his wife,
Margarita Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900) square meters of the same property in favor of
their daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermude The duly notarized deed of donation was
presented to the Assessor's Office on the day of its execution. Hence, Tax Declaration No. 13647
was replaced by two tax declarations: Tax Declaration No. 13875 in the name of Esperanza Sales
Bermudez for the 900-square-meter lot donated to her and Tax Declaration No. 13874 in the
name of Sales covering the remaining portion or 4,339 square meters.
As a consequence of a case filed by Faustina P. Agpoon against Sales in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, sometime in January 1959, the mortgaged property of Sales was set
for foreclosure. To prevent such foreclosure, Sales requested his friend, Ernesto Gonzales, to pay
his total indebtedness of P2, 700 to the Agpoon spouses.
Ernesto Gonzales acceded to the request and asked Sales and his wife to sign a document
transferring the mortgage to him. According to the Sales spouses, they were not given a copy of
said document. 8 Around a month later, Sales had the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861
surveyed by a private surveyor.
On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between Severo Sales and
Leonilo Gonzales was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
In October 1968, Sales received a photostat copy of the deed of sale appearing to have
been signed by him and his wife on January 29, 1959 before ex-officio Notary Public Arturo
Malazo in San Manuel, Tarlac. The document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the land
described under Tax Declaration No. 5861 in consideration of the amount of P4, 000 to Leonilo
Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales.

In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto Gonzales, (SP 42692) in the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, the land in question was claimed by respondent Leonilo Gonzales.
Subsequently, upon submission of the Deed of Sale between Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales,
the questioned land was excluded there from. Said parcel of land was declared by Leonilo
Gonzales under Tax Declaration No. 12483.
On November 7, 1968, Leonilo Gonzales filed an action for illegal detainer against Sales
before the Municipal Court of Bugallon. Before the case could be tried, Sales and his daughter,
Esperanza Sales Bermudez filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III a complaint
for annulment of the deed of sale between Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud.
Consequently, the municipal court suspended the illegal detainer proceedings before it pending
the outcome of the annulment case.
On October 27, 1969, the Court of First Instance 14 rendered a decision finding that the
allegation of fraud was not supported by convincing evidence.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Sales and his daughter elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court erred in upholding the validity of
the deed of sale and in not considering the unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the earlier deed of donation should "prevail" over the deed of sale or be
"recognized".
HELD:

The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has not been registered
neither under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The parties hereto have agreed to
register this document under Act 3344." Such agreement had to be expressly stipulated in the
deed of donation because under Act 3344, the Register of Deeds is not authorized to effect any
registration unless the parties have expressly agreed to register their transaction thereunder. A
perusal of the records shows, however, that the deed of donation was not registered at all.
Besides, at the hearing, petitioners failed to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners'
counsel even failed to secure a certification from the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan of its due
registration as directed by the trial judge.z. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between
the donor and the donee thereby effectively transmitting the rights to said property from Sales to
his daughter, such deed, however, did not bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party to the donation.
This is because non-registration of a deed of donation under Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does not
bind other parties ignorant of a previous transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein which
petitioners invoke that "any registration made under this section shall be understood to be
without prejudice to a third party with a better right" Petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez may
not be a considered a third party being the daughter of the vendor himself and the "better right"
possessed by a third party refers to other titles which a party might have acquired independently
of the unregistered deed such as title by prescription.
The court take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not registered, the
Deed of Sale was registered as evidenced by the notation made by Cipriano Abenojar, Register
of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan 35 and the official receipt issued by the Registry of Deeds.

Finally, the court cannot be convinced that it is useless to register deeds or instruments
affecting unregistered lands because the books of registration provided under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code as Amended by Act 3344 continue to remain in force even to this
day. In fact, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instruments dealing with
unregistered lands can still be registered.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioners.















PEOPLE vs. PACIFICADOR
354 SCRA 310, March 13, 2001
G.R. No. 139405

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondent

FACTS:
On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile co-
accused, Jose T. Marcelo, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the
Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and
therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters
Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other
individuals, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith
promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land
in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located
including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters
Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair
market value thereof at that time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters
Corporation unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and
prejudice to the government in the amount of P777,005.50.
After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in
Criminal Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998.
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to
Dismiss the Information.
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan
on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription of the
offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA
538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office also interrupts the period
of prescription of the offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6,
1976.
The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the
proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense.
On December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10,
1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the
ground of prescription.
In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows
that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the
Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326.
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan
on July 23, 1999.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the government officials involved in the transaction connived and
conspired with respondent and the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 a

HELD:
No. It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of
prescription of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v.
Sandiganbayan, [11] this Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the
anti-graft court in determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime
of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto , they categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period
shall commence to run on the day it was committed.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. [16] The
said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an
act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how
the respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the
transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the
government officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent
Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On
the other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte and that the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee,
Philippine Smelters Corporation.

In view of the foregoing, the Court does not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by
the respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition against
the respondent on the ground of prescription is dismissible.





























CHU Sr. vs. Benelda Estate Development Corporation
353 SCRA 424, March 1, 2001
G.R. No. 142313

SPOUSES MANUEL CHU, SR. and CATALINA B. CHU, the former substituted by
THEANLYN B. CHU, THEAN CHING LEE B. CHU, THEAN LEEWN B. CHU and MARTIN
LAWRENCE B. CHU, the latter represented by his mother and guardian ad litem, petitioner
CATALINA B. CHU, petitioners
BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioners spouses Manuel Chu, Sr. and Catalina Chu (the former substituted by
Theanlyn Chu, Thean Ching Lee Chu, Thean Leewn Chu, and Martin Lawrence Chu) were the
registered owners of five (5) parcels of land situated in Barrio Saguin, San Fernando, Pampanga,
covered and described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 198470-R, 198471-R, 198472-
R, 198473-R and 199556-R of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Pampanga.
On September 30, 1986, the petitioners executed a deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan in consideration of P5,161,090.00. Although Cunanan
has actually an unpaid balance of P2,561,090.00, it was made to appear in the deed of sale that
the total consideration had been fully paid to enable Cunanan to have the parcels of land
registered in her name so that she could mortgage the same to secure a loan and thereupon pay
from the proceeds of the loan the said balance of P2,561,090.00. Their agreement, however, was

that the ownership of the properties shall remain with the petitioners until full payment of the
balance of the total purchase price. Trinidad N. Cunanan was thus able to cause the cancellation
of the said titles registered in the name of the petitioners spouses Manuel Chu, Sr. and Catalina
Chu and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCTs No. 239278-R, No. 239376-R, No. 239279-R, No.
239277-R, and No. 239280-R which are all registered in her name.
Cunanan failed to pay the balance of the total purchase price to the petitioners. Without
the knowledge of the petitioners, Cunanan sold the three (3) parcels of land to Cool Town Realty
and Development Corporation, and the two (2) other parcels of land subject of the instant
case and covered by TCT Nos. 239276-R and 239277-R to the spouses Amado and Gloria
Carlos. The spouses Carlos, in turn, sold these two (2) properties to the respondent Benelda
Estate Development Corporation.
Petitioners commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 before the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga
against Trinidad N. Cunanan, Cool Town Realty and Development Corporation and the Register
of Deeds of Pampanga. The petitioners amended their complaint to include respondent Benelda
Estate Development Corporation as a defendant, alleging, insofar as the latter is concerned The
respondent filed its answer with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint
states no cause of action against respondent. It alleged that respondent corporation, through its
officers, acted in good faith in buying the properties inasmuch as it exerted all efforts to verify
the authenticity of the titles and that no defect was found. After the petitioner filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the trial court rendered a decision denying the motion to
dismiss.
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

its motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial
court and dismissed the case as against the respondent on the ground of lack of cause of action
and for failure of the petitioners to include the spouses Carlos as indispensable parties in the
complaint.
ISSUES:
a) Whether the spouses Amado E. Carlos and Gloria A. Carlos (sellers of the subject titled
parcels of land to respondent) are real and indispensable parties in the case at bar.
b) Whether or not the respondent corporation is an innocent purchaser for value.

HELD:
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. In land title cases, the court held that a person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of
the propert
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value who is defined as one
who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in
such property and pays a full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. In this connection, Section
53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that:

The production of the owners duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument
is presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in
accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon
the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for
value and in good faith.
Thus, a title procured through fraud and misrepresentation can still be the source of a
completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
In a case for annulment of title, therefore, the complaint must allege that the purchaser
was aware of the defect in the title so that the cause of action against him will be sufficient.
Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court cannot render a valid
judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in good faith in acquiring the said
property. Failure to prove, much less impute, bad faith on said purchaser who has acquired a title
in his favor would make it impossible for the court to render a valid judgment thereon due to the
indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his title.
What is important is that when respondent bought the subject properties, it was not
aware of any defect in the covering certificates of title thereto at the time of such purchase. There
is no allegation to the contrary in the amended complaint. Therefore, the title of respondent,
being that of an innocent purchaser for value, remains valid.
By allowing the cancellation of their certificates of title and the issuance of new ones in
lieu thereof in the name of Trinidad N. Cunanan despite alleged non-payment of the full
purchase price for their subject two (2) parcels of land, the petitioners took the risk of losing their
titles on the said properties inasmuch as the subject deed of sale with assumption of mortgage

constitutes their consent and announcement to the whole world that Cunanan was indeed the
legal owner of the properties by virtue of the said deed which is a public document.
The appellate court therefore was correct in entertaining the petition for the reason that
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it refused to dismiss the case against
the respondent, despite the obvious insufficiency of the amended complaint against the
corporation respondent.
To implead the respondent in the case at bar, absent an allegation of bad faith on its part,
is to undermine a well-settled rule protecting innocent purchasers for value and the
indefeasibility and conclusiveness of certificates of title issued under the Torrens System.

The petition is DENIED for lack of cause of action.









AFP Mutual Benefit Association Inc. vs. CA
327 SCRA -203
[G.R. No. 104769. March 3, 2000]

AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

FACTS:
Prior to September 7, 1976, Investco, Inc. was the owner of six (6) parcels of raw land,
located in Quezon City and Marikina (Metro Manila, now a City), registered under titles in the
names of its predecessors-in-interests, Angela Perez-Staley and Antonio Perez, Jr.
On September 7, 1976, Investco, Inc. agreed to sell the six (6) parcels of land to Solid
Homes for P10, 211,075.00, payable in installments from July 22, 1977 to January 22, 1983.
Among other terms, the parties agreed that Solid Homes would pay the amount of P100, 000.00
as down payment upon execution of the contract; that Solid Homes would pay P1, 942,215.00 as
additional down payment on July 22, 1977, October 22, 1977, and January 22, 1978; and that
Solid Homes would pay the balance of P8, 188.860.00 in ten (10) semi-annual installments for a
period of five (5) years, with interest at twelve (12%) percent per annum. The first installment
was due on July 22, 1978.
However, after paying the amount of P2,042,215.00 corresponding to the down payment,
and the amount of P4,084,430.00 representing the first four (4) semi-annual installments and a

portion of the fifth installment, Solid Homes made no further payment to Investco, Inc. after
February 19, 1981. The post dated checks issued by Solid homes to Investco, Inc. intended for
the remaining installments were dishonored, leaving a balance of P4, 300,282.91 due under the
contract in Investco, Inc.s favor.
On March 13, 1981, Investco, Inc. and its predecessors-in-interests Angela Perez-Staley
and Antonio Perez, Jr. filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch 26 an action
for specific performance and damages against Solid Homes, Inc.
In the complaint, Investco, Inc. and co-plaintiffs sought to collect from Solid Homes, Inc.
the sum of P4, 800,282.91 representing the balance on the purchase price due under the contract,
reimbursement of P350,000.00 representing Investco, Inc.s contribution to the expenses for
eviction of squatters and the further sum of P99,559.00 for science and transfer taxes, and actual
and moral damages, including attorneys fees.
On April 20, 1981, Solid Homes filed with the trial court an answer to Investco, Inc.s
complaint alleging that the purchase price under the contract was "not yet due" and that the
former, in fact, exceeded the installment payments due thereon. Solid Homes prayed for
dismissal of Investco, Inc.s complaint, and interposed a counterclaim for the refund of its excess
payments, moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 "or in
the sum equivalent to 10% of whatever amount is awarded in favor of defendant."



On September 20, 1984, Solid Homes filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina a
notice of lis pendens with reference to Civil Case No. 40615 requesting that the same be
annotated on the titles in Investco, Inc.s name. On the same date, the notice of lis pendens was
recorded as Entry No. 117191 of the primary Entry Book, Volume 14 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
However, the notice of lis pendens was not actually annotated on the titles in the name of
Investco, Inc.
On February 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Investco, Inc.
ordering solid Homes to pay plaintiffs P4,800,282.91, representing the balance of the purchase
price due under the contract, with interest thereon from February 23, 1981 until paid; P99,559.00
representing science and transfer taxes advanced by Investco to Solid Homes and P250,000.00 as
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
On May 27, 1985, the trial court ordered the original record transmitted to the appellate
court in view of Solid Homes filing of a notice of appeal.
In the meantime, on April 23, 1984, Investco, Inc. offered to sell the property to AFP
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. for P27,079,767.00, subsequently reduced to P24,000,000.00,
payable in installments. Investco, Inc. furnished AFP MBAI with certified true copies of the
titles covering the Marikina property.
In June, 1984, AFP MBAI verified the titles with the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
Metro Manila and found that copies of the titles that Investco, Inc. gave were genuine and

faithful reproductions of the original titles on file with the Register of Deeds. AFP MBAI noted
that there were no liens or encumbrances annotated on the titles.
Moreover, AFP MBAI, through its Real Estate Committee, made an ocular inspection of
the property sometime in June and July, 1984 "to determine the nature of the property and its
(metes) and bounds." During the inspection, AFP MBAI found that the Investco, Inc. property
was underdeveloped raw land "which is mostly cogonal, (with) few trees and shrubs and
bounded on one side by the Marikina River."AFP MBAI confirmed the presence of squatter
shanties numbering about twenty (20) to thirty (30). Except for a foot path used by the squatters,
there was no development on the property.
After determining that the Investco property was suitable for the housing project of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and that the titles covering the same were "clean" and
"genuine," AFP MBAI agreed to purchase the same from Investco, Inc. for the price of
P24,000,000.00, payable in installments for a period of one (1) year.
On October 10, 1984, Investco, Inc. executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" conveying the
property to AFP MBAI for the price of P24,000,000.00, payable in installments until October 10,
1985.
Among other terms, Investco, Inc. warranted to AFP MBAI that "it has good and valid
title over the properties subject of (the) sale and (that it ) shall hold (AFP MBAI) free from any
adverse claim of whatever nature and from liens an encumbrances of third parties."

In November, 1984, AFP MBAI again verified the records of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila and confirmed "(t)he absence of any lis pendens, adverse claims or any
liens or encumbrance (on) the originals of the title(s) x x x." AFP MBAI also inquired from the
Malacaang Legal Office, the Land Registration Commission, and the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Marikina if there were cases and other problems concerning the property, but found no case
involving either Investco, Inc. or the property pending with said court and offices.
AFP MBAI also obtained a certification from the Clerk of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Marikina that Investco, Inc. "has no pending case before (that) court."
In April, 1985, AFP MBAI completed its payments of the purchase price.
On April 26, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Marikina issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. N-104941, N-104942, N-104943, N-104944, N-104945 and N-104946 in the name of AFP
MBAI. The titles issued were "clean" and contained no annotation of any lien, encumbrance, or
adverse claim by a third party.
On November 28, 1985, Solid Homes commenced action before the Regional Trial
Court, Marikina, against the Register of Deeds, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. for "annotation of
lis pendens and damages" with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In its
verified complaint, Solid Homes prayed that (a) the Register of Deeds be ordered to annotate on
the titles registered in the name of Investco, Inc. the notice of lis pendens dated September 19,
1984 in relation to civil Case No. 40615, and to carry over the same to the titles in the name of
AFP MBAI; (b) alternatively, to declare AFP MBAI as a buyer in bad faith, bound by the
judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 40615; and (c) AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. be

ordered to pay Solid Homes jointly and severally, unspecified amount of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney fees of P100,000.00 plus "ten (10%) percent of the total
amount to be awarded to plaintiff."
Solid Homes also prayed for an order to enjoin provisionally the Register of Deeds from
registering any deed affecting the titles in derogation of solid Homes rights under the contract
executed between itself and Investco, Inc.
In due time, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. filed with the trial court an answer to the
complaint. After pre-trial and trial, on April 25, 1990, the trial court rendered decision.
Aggrieved thereby, AFP MBAI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
November 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered decision.
On December 24, 1991, AFP MBAI filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which Solid Homes opposed.
On March 17, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis pendens on
the titles of Investco, Inc. and AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., in relation to Civil Case
No. 40615 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig and thereby be bound by the final judgment
therein.


HELD:
No. Basically, Solid Homes complaint was one for "annotation of lis pendens and other
matters with prayer for restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction" against Investco,
Inc. AFP MBAI and the Register of Deeds of Marikina, to cause the annotation of lis pendens in
the titles of Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI. Actually, therefore, the suit is to compel the Register
of Deeds of Marikina to annotate the notice of lis pendens on the titles of AFP MBAI with a
claim for damages against Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI for depriving Solid Homes of its rights
to the property as provided under the contract to buy and sell. In its verified complaint, Solid
Homes alleged that "the act of defendant Register of Deeds in not causing the annotation of the
lis pendens on the titles then registered in the name of defendant Investco, Inc. and in issuing
titles in the name of defendant AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., without carrying over the
proper annotation of lis pendens are contrary to law".
Obviously, the Register of Deeds obligation to annotate the notice of lis pendens is one
that arises from law. Hence, the action is actually one for mandamus to compel the performance
of a clear legal duty.
There is no such action as one for "annotation of lis pendens," as Solid Homes sought in
its complaint.
"Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation
while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real
property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said
property. It is but a signal to the intending buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to

investigate the prospect or non-prospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his
money."
Consequently, the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable to this case. The Register of
Deeds of Marikina correctly denied the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles of
Investco, Inc. and the AFP MBAI.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1529, known as the "Property Registration Decree of
1978", the Register of Deeds may deny registration of the notice of lis pendens, which denial
may be appealed by the applicant en consulta (Section 10, paragraph 2) to the Commissioner of
Land Registration.
The rule that "all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate of title are
not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title" applies herein with full vigor. In
the absence of anything to excite suspicion, the buyer is not obligated to look beyond the
certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. "Good
faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof." Here, Solid Homes alleged that Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI "confederated
with each other in entering into the aforementioned sale in order to deprive herein plaintiff (Solid
Homes) of its rights over subject properties under the Contract to Sell and to Buy..." However,
Solid Homes adduced no evidence to prove such allegation of bad faith.
The conclusion is inevitable that contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, AFP
MBAI was a purchaser in good faith and for value, and, consequently, acquired valid and
indefeasible titles to the Investco, Inc. property.

Resultantly, we find the appeal via certiorari of solid Homes without merit. Its objective was to
compel AFP MBAI to execute a deed of transfer of the titles to parcels of land originally covered
by the agreement to buy and sell between Solid Homes, Inc. and Investco, Inc. and for Solid
Homes to pay AFP MBAI, in substitution of Investco, Inc. the amount of P4,800,282.91 with
interest thereon at one per cent per month from March 22, 1982, until paid. Thus, if Solid Homes
would succeed in its scheme in the case, it would unjustly enrich itself enormously, acquiring
subject property now worth billions for the measly sum of P4,800,282.91 with interest at one per
cent a month from March 22, 1982, which it was unable to pay Investco, Inc. in the first place.
Solid Homes claim is predicated on the assumption that AFP MBAI is a transferee pendente lite
of Investco, Inc. of the subject parcels of land and bound by the result of the suit. Such claim is
not factually or legally correct. In the absence of a valid notice of lis pendens annotated in the
titles, AFP MBAI is a buyer in good faith and for value, and thus, acquired clean and valid titles
to the property in question.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
(1) In G. R. No. 104769, GRANTS the petition, and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27398 and, in lieu thereof, renders judgment:
(a) Dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 52999 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig
Branch 165;

(b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Marikina to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-104941, N-104942, N-104943, N-104944, N-
104945 and N-104946 of the Register of Deeds for Marikina, Metro Manila;
(c) Ordering respondent Solid Homes, Inc. to pay AFPMBAI P300,000.00 as attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation; and costs.
(2) In G.R. No. 135016, DENIES the petition, for lack of merit.











Sps. JAYME and EVELYN UY vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. NICANOR and ESTER DE
GUZMAN,
G.R. No. 109197, June 21, 2001

SPOUSES JAYME C. UY and EVELYN UY, petitioners,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NICANOR G. DE GUZMAN and
ESTER DE GUZMAN,respondents

FACTS:
The spouses DE GUZMAN were the registered owners of certain parcels of land,
evidenced by certificates of title. The spouses erected a residential house therein worth around
Php10Million, while the value of the lots was around Php4k to Php5k per square meter. Later,
due to financial constraints, the said spouses obtained a loan from Mario Siochi, secured by a
mortgage over the said properties. However, the spouses were required to sign a document
dubbed as Deed of Sale. Later, unknown to the said spouses, Mario Siochi was able to transfer
the registration of the said parcels of land in his name, using the Deed of Sale. Accordingly,
new transfer certificates of title over the said lots were issued in the name of Mario Siochi. In
turn, Mario Siochi sold the said lots to the spouses UY, both engaged in buy-and-sell of real
estates, in the measly amount of Php2.7Million. For this, the spouses UY were able to obtain
new transfer certificates of title over the said parcels of land in their name. In turn, the spouses
UY leased the said properties to Roberto Salapandan. However, since the spouses DE GUZMAN
remained in possession of the said properties, Roberto Salapandan was not able to occupy it.
Roberto Salapandan then filed an ejectment case against the spouses DE GUZMAN. It was at

this juncture when the spouses DE GUZMAN learned, for the first time, that the said parcels of
land are already registered in the name of the Sps. UY.

The spouses DE GUZMAN filed a case for quieting of title against the spouses UY, Mario
Siochi and Roberto Salapandan. On the part of the spouses UY, they argued that they are
innocent purchasers for value, thus, the properties should remain registered in their name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses UY are innocent purchasers for value.

HELD:
The spouses UY are NOT innocent purchasers for value.
Firstly, it was proved that the transaction between Mario Siochi and the spouses DE GUZMAN
was an equitable mortgage, and not sale. Thus, Mario Siochi cannot sell the subject properties to
the spouses UY. The fact that the spouses UY merely relied in the certificates of title over the
subject lots registered in the name of Mario Siochi is not material. For while it is true that a
person dealing with registered lands need not go beyond the certificate of title, it is likewise a
well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to face up to the fact
that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in the vendors or mortgagors title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if
it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of

the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which
may be required of a prudent man in a like situation.

In this case, IF the spouses UY only conducted the required diligence, they should have
discovered the defect in the title of Mario Siochi over the subject parcels of land. The fact that
the properties remained in the possession of the spouses DE GUZMAN and the cheap purchase
price (Php2.7Million) they have paid to Mario Siochi should have incited their awareness to
conduct further inquiry, especially so that they are businessmen dealing with real estates for
which a higher degree of diligence is required of them by law.















ARTEMIO BALTAZAR and AURORA GALVEZ vs. Court of Appeals and GOOD
EARTH ENTERPRISES, INC., 78728, December 8, 1988

ARTEMIO BALTAZAR and AURORA GALVEZ, petitioners,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GOOD EARTH ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:
GOOD EARTH ENTERPRISES, INC. is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land
as evidenced by a certificate of title. Later, ARTEMIO BALTAZAR filed an action for recovery
of ownership of the said lot against GOOD EARTH. However, the summons for GOOD EARTH
to appear and answer the complaint was returned UNSERVED by the sheriff alleging that the
address of such corporation is UNKNOWN. The sheriff, however, did not attempt to serve the
summons to the corporation through its officers. Forthwith, in accordance with the rules of court,
substituted service was resorted to, thus, the summons was published. Thereafter, an Order of
Default was issued for failure of GOOD EARTH to answer the complaint. After presentation of
complainants evidence, a Judgment of Default was issued in favor of ARTEMIO BALTAZAR
and against GOOD EARTH, for which, the latters certificate of title was cancelled. Such
decision has become final and executory. Accordingly, ARTEMIO BALTAZAR was able to
obtain a new certificate of title over the said parcel of land. Thereafter, ARTEMIO BALTAZAR
subdivided the lot, and sold a portion thereof to AURORA GALVEZ. Accordingly, AURORA
GALVEZ was able to obtain a certificate of title to such portion of the lot sold to her by
ARTEMIO BALTAZAR. When GOOD EARTH discovered the cancellation of its certificate of

title, it filed a case for annulment of judgment against ARTEMIO BALTAZAR and AURORA
GALVEZ. AURORA GALVEZ argued that she is an innocent purchaser for value, thus, such
portion sold to her should remain in her ownership.

ISSUE:
Whether or not AURORA GALVEZ is an innocent purchaser for value.

HELD:
AURORA GALVEZ is NOT an innocent purchaser for value. Firstly, the court where the
complaint of ARTEMIO BALTAZAR was filed DID NOT acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the corporation for improper service of summons. The sheriff DID NOT conduct the proper
service thereof as required by the rules (i.e. service upon the President, secretary, cashier, etc).
Neither did the publication cure the defect, since summons by publication is done only in cases
where: 1) the defendant or his address is UNKNOWN; 2) service upon defendants who are
residing abroad; and 3) service upon residents temporarily out of the country. GOOD EARTHs
address is NOT UNKNOWN (The address of GOOD EARTH is correct, yet, the sheriff DID NOT
inquire at the given address whether GOOD EARTH has office therein); GOOD EARTH is NOT
residing abroad; GOOD EARTH is NOT temporarily out of the country. Thus, summons by
publication should have NOT been resorted to. As regards the claim of AURORA GALVEZ, she
has NOT proved her status as a purchaser in good faith and for value of the land. The burden of
proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that
status. In discharging that burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good
faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is here essential is

integral with the very status which must be proved. Also, whatever rights AURORA GALVEZ
might have had cannot be superior to the rights of GOOD EARTH which was, at all relevant
times, the lawful registered owner of the subject parcel of land, and which had not been negligent
in any manner and indeed had not performed any act which gave rise to or any occasion for any
claim of right by third persons. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that AURORA GALVEZ
had successfully proven that she was a purchaser in good faith and for value. Even so, as
between two persons, both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the
law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor
bereft of any transmissible rights. Under the foregoing principle derived from the above case
law, AURORA GALVEZ has no rights as against GOOD EARTH. Her recourse is against
ARTEMIO BALTAZAR.













BENIGNA SECUYA, et. al. vs. GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA,
136021, February 22, 2000

BENIGNA SECUYA, MIGUEL SECUYA, MARCELINO SECUYA, CORAZON SECUYA,
RUFINA SECUYA, BERNARDINO SECUYA, NATIVIDAD SECUYA, GLICERIA
SECUYA and PURITA SECUYA, petitioners,
GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA, respondent

FACTS:
GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA is the registered owner of Lot 5679-C-120 consisting
of 9,302 square meters as evidenced by TCT No. T-35678, having bought the same sometime in
February 1975 from Cesaria Caballero as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale and have been
in possession of the same since then. Cesaria Caballero was the widow of Silvestre Aro,
registered owner of the mother lot, Lot. No. 5679 with an area of 12,750 square meters of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4752. Upon
Silvestre Aros demise, his heirs executed an "Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale"
wherein one-half plus one-fifth of Lot No. 5679 was adjudicated to the widow, Cesaria
Caballero, from whom GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA derives her title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA is a purchaser in good faith and for
value.


HELD:
GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA is a purchaser in good faith and for value.
Indeed, a party who has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would move a
reasonably cautious man to make an inquiry will not be protected by the Torrens system.

However, in this case, granting arguendo that GERARDA knew that BENIGNA SECUYA, et.
al., through Superales and his family, were actually occupying the disputed lot, it must be
stressed that the vendor, Cesaria Caballero, assured GERARDA that BENIGNA SECUYA, et.
al. were just tenants on the said lot. GERARDA cannot be faulted for believing this
representation, considering that BENIGNA SECUYA, et. al's claim was not noted in the
certificate of the title covering Lot No. 5679. Moreover, the lot, including the disputed portion,
had been the subject of several sales transactions. The title thereto had been transferred several
times, without any protestation or complaint from BENIGNA SECUYA, et. al. In any case,
GERARDA's title is amply supported by clear evidence, while BENIGNA SECUYA, et. als
claim is barren of proof.









AZNAR BROTHERS vs. Court of Appeals,
128102, March 7, 2000

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS AYING, DEMETRIO SIDA, FELOMINO AUGUSTO,
FEDERICO ABING, and ROMEO AUGUSTO, respondents

FACTS:
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (hereafter
AZNAR), it appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square meters located at
Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City, was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on
by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March
1964. This deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964
as shown on the face thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property under its
name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon. Herein private respondents were
allegedly allowed to occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave
the land in the event that the company would use the property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR
entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development
of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its
demands for the private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and damages


On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the successors and
descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the
registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and
occupying the subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their parents
and grandparents, except for Teodorica Andales who was not a resident in said premises. Private
respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is
void ab initio for being simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when
AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation. They then
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint seeking to declare the
subject document null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid as to transfer ownership of
the subject property to the AZNAR BROTHERS notwithstanding non-registration thereof in
OCT RO-2856.

HELD:
The Deed is valid notwithstanding lack of registration thereof.
It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary to give the
conveyance legal effect as between the parties and the vendors heirs. As between the parties to a
sale, registration is not indispensable to make it valid and effective. The peculiar force of a title
is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the
conveyance. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers

to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed
evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.
Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the subject lot is involved;
thus, the conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private respondents and their predecessors
is valid and binding upon them, and is equally binding and effective against their heirs.

The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and those
of innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of the properties." This principle has no
bearing on the present case, as no subsequent transfer of the subject lot to other persons has been
made either by private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest.













Spouses ALEXANDER AND ADELAIDA CRUZ vs. ELEUTERIO LEIS, et. al.,
G.R.No.125233, March 9, 2000

Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners,
ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L.
CAYONDA and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

FACTS:
GERTRUDES acquired a parcel of land for which TCT No. 43100 was issued in the
name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was referred therein as a "widow." Later, GERTRUDES
obtained a loan from spouses ALEXANDER and ADELAIDA CRUZ, secured by a mortgage
over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. GERTRUDES, however, failed to pay the loan.
Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and payable,
GERTRUDES executed two contracts in favor of ALEXANDER CRUZ. The first is
denominated as "Kasunduan," which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting
Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng
Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of
P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan." For failure of GERTRUDES to
repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of ALEXANDER
CRUZ in whose name TCT No. 130584 was issued, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the name of
GERTRUDES ISIDRO. Later, when GERTRUDES died, her heirs assail the validity of the
transfer of title from GERTRUDES to ALEXANDER, claiming that the subject property

covered by the then TCT No. 43100 is a conjugal property, thus, GERTRUDES cannot transfer
the entirety of the lot to ALEXANDER.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ALEXANDER acquired the entirety of the subject lot.

HELD:
ALEXANDER acquired the entirety of the subject lot.

It must be noted that the property was registered as TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of
"Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties
of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely
relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the
purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The
rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind
the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the
burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To
require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system.
As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals finding and
conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed to repurchase the property within
the period stipulated and has lost all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming
the Regional Trial Court's decision on the premise that there was no compliance with Article

1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing before registration of the property in the name
of petitioners. This provision states:
ART. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by
virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly
heard.
The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has
caused in the hands of usurers. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature
of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination
is being made.
It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of
Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the
transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes
nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan."
The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are
immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the
vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said
resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over
the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his
title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method
prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title.


WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that the petitioners
are deemed owners of the property by reason of the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to
repurchase the same within the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
130584, in the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order, is hereby
ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes
Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.














REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CEFERINO
PAREDES,
112115, March 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
COURT OF APPEALS and CEFERINO PAREDES, JR., respondents.

FACTS:
By way of a Deed of Sale dated August 30, 1974, private respondent Ceferino S. Paredes
appears to have purchased a 1,200 square meter parcel of land (the subject land) located in San
Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, from one Almario Garay. On January 21, 1976, he filed an
application for free patent over essentially the same subject land, although of a bigger area. The
application was approved on May 1, 1976 by the District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands
and private respondent was issued Free Patent No. (X-8) 1253. On the strength of such Free
Patent, Original Certificate of Title No. P-8379 was subsequently issued in private respondent's
name by the Register of Deeds of Agusan Del Sur on May 28, 1976. Private respondent then
constructed his house on the subject land.
On June 27,1984, however, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur
adopted Resolution No.403, whereby it undertook to assist the Municipality of San Francisco in
recovering possession of the subject lot, which it averred had been designated by the Bureau of
Lands as a school site for the San Francisco Town Site Reservation, long before title to it was
issued in private respondent's name. In the same Resolution, the Sangguniang Bayan also

questioned the veracity of private respondent's assertion that his application for free patent was
posted on the door of the San Francisco Municipal Hall, reasoning that if it was true that the
application was posted, then it would have filed a protest thereto.
On August 6, 1984, the Sangguniang Bayan, in its Resolution No. 11 requested the Director
of the Bureau of Lands and the Solicitor General to file the necessary action for the cancellation
of title in the name of private respondent and for the recovery of the subject land from him.
On April 25, 1985, pursuant to the request, petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of
Free Patent issued to private respondent and for reversion of the subject land to the public
domain. The complaint was later amended to include as party-defendant the Development Bank
of the Philippines, to which private respondent had mortgaged the subject land.
On May 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
The said decision was, however, reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals

ISSUE:
Whether or not CEFERINO PAREDES has a valid title over the subject parcel of land.

RESOLUTION:
CEFERINO PAREDES has NO valid title over the subject property.
In the case at bar, the deliberately false application and suppression of the known fact that
the subject land was reserved for a school site misled the Bureau of Lands to waive opposition to
private respondent's application and effectively deprived the petitioner Republic of its day in
court.

Moreover, there are indications that private respondent failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements on posting of notices of his application. The law requires that notices
shall be posted in conspicuous places in the capital of the province, the municipality and the
barrio where the land applied for is situated for a period of two consecutive weeks, and that said
notices shall require everyone who has any interest in the matter to present his objection or
adverse claim, if any, before the application is granted.
Here, petitioner specifically assails as false private respondent's statement in his affidavit
that a copy of his application was posted "at the door of the municipal building from January 21,
1976 up to February 21, 1976." Based on this, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a Resolution
requesting the provincial prosecutor to file a complaint for perjury against private respondent for
making the said false statement. In rejecting petitioner's charge, respondent Court of Appeals
found that petitioner failed to present any member of the Sanggunian or official of the
Municipality to prove that the notice was not, in fact, posted on the door of the Municipal
building of San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur. However, this fact was sufficiently established by
the submission of the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution which stated: "it is not true that Atty.
Paredes Jr. posted a copy of the notice of his free patent application at the door of the Municipal
Building on January 21, 1976, up to February 21, 1976, nor at any other date," and that if such
were true, "the members of the Sangguniang Bayan as well as the other municipal officials and
employees would have known or noted the existence of his free patent application and a protest
against his application would have been presented or filed, for the land covered hereby is a
portion of Lot No.3097, which has been designated as a school site of the San Francisco
Residential Site." The genuineness and authenticity of this Resolution was affirmed during trial

by petitioner's witness, Teofilo E. Gelacio, who signed the same as Acting Mayor, being the then
duly elected Vice Mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
Neither can private respondent successfully invoke the doctrine of estoppel against
petitioner. While it is true that private respondent obtained title to the subject land without
government opposition, the government is not now estopped from questioning the validity of his
certificate of title. It is, after all, hornbook law that the principle of estoppel does not operate
against the Government for the act of its agents.
As held in Republic v. Lozada: x x x. It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the
State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to
inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the
Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file
the corresponding action for reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject
thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is
to determine whether or not fraud has been committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforementioned, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27990 is SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 512, is
REINSTATED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDER

HEIRS OF EULALIO RAGUA, et. al. versus THE COURT OF APPEALS,
89366-67, JANUARY 31, 2000

HEIRS OF EULALIO RAGUA, namely, DOMINGO, MARCIANA, MIGUEL, FRANCISCO,
VALERIANA, JUANA, and REMEDIOS, all surnamed RAGUA; DANILO and CARLOS, both
surnamed LARA, petitioners
COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., INC., J. M. TUASON &
CO., INC. and HEIRS OF D. TUASON, INC., respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 89366-67. January 31, 2000]
MARINO T. REGALADO and ELISA C. DUFOURT petitioners
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, QUEZON CITY, (Branch 88)
presided by Hon. Tirso D. C. Velasco (formerly Court of First Instance, Quezon City, Branch 18,
then presided by Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao), and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special
Ninth Division composed of the HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LUIS A.
JAVELLANA REGINA G. ORDONEZ-BENITEZ, AND LUIS L. VICTOR), respondents.

FACTS:
This case involves a prime lot consisting of 4,399,322 square meters, known as the
Diliman Estate, situated in Quezon City. On this, 439 hectares of prime land now stand the
following: the Quezon City Hall, Philippine Science High School, Quezon Memorial Circle,
Visayas Avenue, Ninoy Aquino Parks and Wildlife, portions of UP Village and East Triangle,
the entire Project 6 and Vasha Village, Veterans Memorial Hospital and golf course, Department

of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Sugar Regulatory
Administration, Philippine Tobacco Administration, Land Registration Authority, Philcoa
Building, Bureau of Telecommunications, Agricultural Training Institute building, Pagasa
Village, San Francisco School, Quezon City Hospital, portions of Project 7, Mindanao Avenue
subdivision, part of Bago Bantay resettlement project, SM City North EDSA, part of Phil-Am
Life Homes compound and four-fifths of North Triangle. This large estate was the subject of a
petition for judicial reconstitution originally filed by Eulalio Ragua in 1964. However, this
petition failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and posting of
notices provided under Republic Act No. 26, Sections 12 and 13. Notwithstanding this failure,
the trial court granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
HELD:
With respect to the first issue, R. A. No. 26, Sections 12 and 13, provide for jurisdictional
requirements of petitions for reconstitution of titles filed on the basis of documents other than the
owners or co-owners duplicate certificates of title. The provisions are quoted
hereunder:
"SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c),
2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person
having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other

things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had
been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners mortgagees or lessees duplicate
had been issued, or if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed;
(c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and
description of the buildings or improvements, if any which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such building or
improvements; (e) the name and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all
persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of
the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds
or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or
if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the
documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in
support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with
the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from
sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of
the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
"SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the

municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of
the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The Court
shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
address is among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and
all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and
the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their
claim or objections to the petition. The petition shall, at the hearing, submit proof
of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the
court."
Petitioners admittedly did not comply with the requirements of Section 12 (d), (e) and (g),
namely, the petition did not state (1) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements,
if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners
of such buildings or improvements, (2) the names and addresses of the occupants of the
adjoining property and of all persons who may have any interest in the property and (3) that no
deeds or other instrument affecting the property have been presented for registration. Neither do
these data appear in the notice of hearing. Besides, petitioners also did not comply with the
notice and publication requirement under Section 13 because the order directed that the notice be
posted at the Caloocan City Hall, not in Quezon City, where the land is situated.

We have ruled that the failure to comply with the requirements of publication and posting of
notices prescribed in Republic Act No. 26, Sections 12 and 13 is fatal to the jurisdiction of the
court. Hence, non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements renders its decision
approving the reconstitution of OCT No. 632 and all proceedings therein utterly null and void.



















JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS VS. THE CITY OF LEGASPI
G.R. No.133913, October 12, 1999

JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS, petitioner
THE CITY OF LEGASPI, respondent

FACTS:
On September 26, 1962, the City of Legaspi filed a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of
its title

to twenty parcels of land, the certificates of which had allegedly been lost or destroyed
during World War II. On September 16, 1964, the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to
reconstitute the Original Certificates of Title over these lots in favor of the applicant.
On August 4, 1970, the City filed a Complaint for quieting of title against Carlos V.
Stilianopulos alias Chas V. Stilianopulos, Ana Estela Stilianopulos, and the American Oxygen
and Acetylene Company. While this case was pending, Carlos V. Stilianopulos died
On February 29, 1984, the trial court rendered its Decision, which upheld the validity of
TCT No. 13448 and its superiority to OCT No. 665. Thus, petitioner was declared the lawful
owner of the disputed property.
On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appealsin its Decision of October 16, 1987, reversed
the trial court and ruled in favor of the City of Legaspi. Petitioners recourse to this Court was
dismissed in a Minute Resolution promulgated on August 17, 1988, on the ground that the issue
raised was factual in nature. Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution of October 26, 1988.

Undaunted, petitioner filed an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 665, which the trial
court subsequently dismissed on August 15, 1989 on the ground of res judicata,.
On appeal the CA affirmed the trial court, reasoning that petitioners action was an action
for annulment of the order of the reconstitution of OCT No. 665 and was therefore not
cognizable by the trial court. Refusing to accept defeat, on June 13, 1994, petitioner again filed
before the Court of Appeals a new action for annulment of the September 16, 1964 Order based
on three grounds: (1) that the Respondent City of Legaspi procured OCT No. 665 fraudulently;
(2) that the original certificate of title which was judicially reconstituted was non-existent: and
(3) that the court which ordered the reconstitution lack[ed] jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.

RESOLUTION:
It appears that the trial court had NO jurisdiction.
First, under Section 13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to the occupant of the land covered by the
title sought to be reconstituted is mandatory and jurisdictional. If no notice of the date of hearing
of a reconstitution case is served on the possessor or anyone else having interest in the property
involved, the order of reconstitution is null and void.
Second, reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of
title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or
destruction of the owners copy of the certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot 1 was not lost

or destroyed. It remained in the possession of the petitioners father and was eventually passed
on to him. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another
person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the Decision had no
jurisdiction.

However, laches has set in against STILIANOPULOS. More than 20 years have lapse from the
time the trial court rendered the decision in the reconstitution case without any protest from
STILIANOPULOS.















EVANGELINE L. PUZON VS. STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
G.R. No. 139518, March 06, 2001

EVANGELINE L. PUZON, petitioner
STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, Inc., respondent.

FACTS:
On June 11, 1988, a fire in the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City destroyed,
among others, the original copies of petitioners Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 240131
and 213611 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering two lots with areas of
109,038 and 66,836 square meters respectively, both located in the District of Capitol, Quezon
City.
In October 1993, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 80, a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of the two destroyed titles. The Petition was
based on the owners duplicate copies of the TCTs, which were in petitioners possession.
The October 26, 1993 RTC Order, which served as the notice for the hearing of the Petition
for reconstitution, was published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette. Thirty days
before the date of hearing, the Order was also posted at the entrance of the Quezon City Hall
Building and on the bulletin board of the trial court. Together with a copy of the Petition, it was
served on the Office of the Solicitor General, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), the Land Management Bureau, and the Office of the City
Prosecutor for Quezon City.

During the trial which commenced on January 17, 1994, no opposition was registered. A
representative from the Office of the Solicitor General, however, appeared and cross-examined
petitioner, who was the sole witness. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February
11, 1994. Granting the petition.
After discovering in 1996 that Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., herein respondent,
was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. RT-78673 (240131), petitioner filed
against it and Garsons Co. Inc. a Complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages and
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Injunction.
On March 25, 1998, while the accion reinvindicatoria was still pending before the RTC of
Quezon City (Branch 104), respondent filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment, seeking to annul and set aside the earlier Decision of the RTC of Quezon City
(Branch 80) in the reconstitution case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition.
RESOLUTION:
The source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was EVANGELINE's duplicate
copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition is governed, not by
Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. Nothing in this provision requires that notices
be sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that requirement is found in Section 13, which does
not apply to petitions based on an existing owner's duplicate TCT.


Put differently, Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 require that 30 days before the date of hearing, (1) a
notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the
petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of
the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the
number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the
property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear
and file such claims as they may have.

For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and
3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement: that the notice be mailed to occupants, owners of
adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in the property. To repeat, mailing
the notice is not required for a petition based on Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a), as in the
present case.









JOSELITO VILLEGAS AND DOMINGA VILLEGAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 129977, February 01, 2001

JOSELITO VILLEGAS and DOMINGA VILLEGAS, petitioners
COURT OF APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Before September 6, 1973, Lot B-3-A, with an area of four (4) hectares situated at Dapdap,
now San Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela was registered under TCT No. 68641 in the names of Ciriaco
D. Andres and Henson Caigas. This land was also declared for real estate taxation under Tax
Declaration No. C2-4442.
On September 6, 1973, Andres and Caigas, with the consent of their respective spouses,
Anita Barrientos and Consolacion Tobias, sold the land to Fortune Tobacco Corporation
(Fortune) for P60,000.00. Simultaneously, they executed a joint affidavit declaring that they had
no tenants on said lot. An affidavit to the effect was a prerequisite for the registration of the sale
under the LRC Circular No. 232. On the same date, the sale was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Isabela. TCT No. 68641 was cancelled and TCT No. T-68737 was issued in
Fortunes name.
On August 6, 1976, Andres and Caigas executed a Deed of Reconveyance of the same lot in
favor of Filomena Domingo, the mother of Joselito Villegas, defendant in the case before the
trial court. Although no title was mentioned in this deed, Domingo succeeded in registering this

document in the Office of the Register of Deeds on August 6, 1976. It appears in this title that
the same was a transfer from TCT No. T-68641. On April 13, 1981, Domingo declared the lot
for real estate taxation under Tax Declaration No. 10-5633.
On December 4, 1976, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela was burned together
with all titles in the office. On December 17, 1976, the original of TCT No. T-91864 was
administratively reconstituted by the Register of Deeds. On June 2, 1979, a Deed of Absolute
Sale of a portion of 20,000 square meters of Lot B-3-A was executed by Filomena Domingo in
favor of Villegas for a consideration of P1,000.00. This document was registered on June 3, 1981
and as a result TCT No. T-131807 was issued by the Register of Deeds to Villegas. On the same
date, the technical description of Lot B-3-A-2 was registered and TCT No. T-131808 was issued
in the name of Domingo. On January 22, 1991, this document was registered and TCT No.
154962 was issued to the defendant, Joselito Villegas.
[4]

On April 10, 1991, the trial court upon a petition filed by Fortune ordered the reconstitution
of the original of TCT No. T-68737.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its assailed decision in favor of Fortune
Tobacco, declaring it to be entitled to the property. Petitioners thus appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.



HELD:

Although the order of reconstitution reveals that there was publication of the notice of the
petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette as required by law, there was, however, no
mention of compliance with the requirement of posting of the notice of the petition in the
provincial or municipal building of the city or municipality where the subject property is located.
While proof of publication of the notice of the petition was submitted by Fortune, there was no
proof of posting of the notice, presumably because no such posting was accomplished. The lack
of compliance with these requirements for the judicial reconstitution of certificates of title
deprived the court of jurisdiction over the petition. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to
hear and decide a petition for reconstitution of title is conferred by R.A. 26. The Act prescribes a
special procedure that must be followed in order that the court may act on the petition and grant
the remedy sought. The specific requirements and procedure are as laid down in Sections 9 and
10 of R.A. 26. The proceedings therein being in rem, the court acquires jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owner's title upon compliance with the required
posting of notices and publication in the Official Gazette. These requirements and procedure are
mandatory and must strictly be complied with, otherwise, the proceedings are utterly void, which
is why the petitioner is required to submit proof of the publication and posting of the notice.
Non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of posting of the notice renders the order of
reconstitution null and void. Consequently, the reconstituted title of Fortune is likewise void.
Fortune cannot now invoke the prior title rule, as it in effect has no valid title to speak of.



DORDAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
270 SCRA 329
[G.R. No. 118836. March 21, 1997]

FEDERICO DORDAS, Substituted by his widow, EXCELSA DELA FUENTE and
CHILDREN, REMIGIO, EVELIO, WILLIAM, NONITO, ELDA, FEDERICO, ELMA,
RICARDO and REYNALDO all surnamed DORDAS; and VILMA, LEONORA,
FLORENTINA, PRAXIDES, POTENCIANA, PURIFICACION and TEOTIMO, all surnamed
DIZON, petitioners
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BORRES AND DIOSDADO
BORRES, respondents.

FACTS:
Petition for review of the decision on appeal rendered by respondent Court of Appeals

in
an action for reconveyance

filed by private respondents Francisco and Diosdado Borres against
petitioner, Federico Dordas, now deceased and substituted herein by his heirs.
The object of the action for reconveyance is a parcel of land situated in the Poblacion,
Municipality of Maayon, Province of Capiz, containing an area of 6,097 square meters.
Aforesaid parcel of land was originally owned by one Rafael Dizon. On February 8,
1927, Dizon sold the lot to one Francisco Contreras. Contreras, in turn, sold the lot to private
respondents Diosdado and Federico Borres on December 27, 1957. Respondents have had actual
possession of the lot since 1957 up to the present.


Since 1957 also, after declaring the lot for taxation purposes, respondents have been
paying the realty taxes on the lot.
In 1961, the heirs of Rafael Dizon and petitioner Federico Dordas filed a petition for
judicial reconstitution of the title of the lot. The court ordered the reconstitution of the title upon
the ground that the title was lost or destroyed during the last world war. This, notwithstanding
the fact that the only documents submitted by petitioner was a tracing cloth and blueprint plan
which are not among the documents recognized by Republic Act No. 26 that warrant judicial
reconstitution of title. Furthermore, petitioner Dordas failed to serve notice of the reconstitution
proceedings on private respondents who were the actual occupants of the subject lot. This is
clearly violative of the notice requirement mandated by R.A. No. 26.
Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance against petitioner in the Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 15, Roxas City. The trial court ruled that
since private respondents filed the case on March 27, 1962, prescription has set in and on this
ground, the trial court dismissed the action.
This present action for reconveyance was filed on March 27, 1962, or more than twenty
(20) years from February 9, 1931 is surely barred by the statutes of limitation.
Private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. The respondent court
reversed the trial court and declared null and void the reconstituted title obtained by petitioner.
In the same petition, Federico Dordas claimed that the lot has actually been in this
possession and that all improvements thereon belong to him with no one having any adverse
interests whatsoever. This fact is re-echoed in the order granting the reconstitution saying that
Dordas is the sole occupant of the lot. Notably, these allegations were overpowered and belied
by the unrebutted testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses and Exhs. C, D, E, F & G, which are the

pictures of the houses of Filomeno, Celoria, Remedios Tinsay, Rosalina Banilla, the Liberal
Party Headquarters and Diosdado Borres all standing within the lot, all establishing [that] the
appellants are, in fact, in possession of the lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the better right to reconstitute the title of lot in question

HELD:

No. Art. 1139 of the New Civil Code provides that actions prescribe by mere lapse of
time fixed by law. In the case of Talle v. CA, 208 SCRA 266, it was ruled that actions for
reconveyance based on fraud or on implied or constructive trusts prescribe in ten (10) years. But
it is unsafe to assume that plaintiff's cause of action in this case accrued on February 9, 1931 or
after the expiration of the four (4) year repurchase period in the Deed of Sale between Rafael
Dizon and Francisco Contreras The pacto de retro period is a personal prerogative of Rafael
Dizon to exercise and is not applicable to herein plaintiff's who acquired the lot from Rafael
Dizon's vendee (Francisco Contreras) only in December 27, 1957. In other words, the
computation as to when herein plaintiff's cause of action accrued should not be counted from
February 9, 1931.

Nonetheless, what seems to be the crucial point in this case is the Reconstituted Title No.
RT-2063 (Exh.. B) issued in the name of the heirs of Rafael Dizon. In the Amended Complaint,
appellants question the validity of this title as having been issued out of an illegal reconstitution

proceedings thus making said title null and void. Conversely, appellees maintain that the
reconstitution of RT-2063 was done all in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

Republic Act No. 26, is "THE ACT PROVIDING FOR A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR
THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS TITLE WHICH WERE LOST OR DESTROYED."
As the title of the law suggests, it covers reconstitution of previously issued but lost or destroyed
title over any parcel of land. In other words it presupposes that the lot had already been brought
under the provisions of the Torrens System or Act 496. In obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost
or destroyed one, the same Republic Act. No. 26 laid down procedures which must strictly be
followed because it could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an
easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.

As the law mandates using the phrase "in the following order", the enumerated items
become the only sources whereby a title may be reconstituted. When none of these itemized
sources was submitted by Dordas in the reconstitution proceedings and instead relied heavily on
tracing cloth and blueprint plan of Lot 1474 and its technical description which are not among
those mentioned under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 the reconstitution suffers fatally. The
two (2) pieces of documents plan and technical description, are mere additional requirements of
the law in case reconstitution is to be made from sources in Section 2F or 3F of the act, that is,
any other document, which in the judgment of the court is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title (Sec. 12. RA 26). But, in themselves, such
plan and technical description of the lot are not recognized sources for reconstitution of title
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26.


The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court
of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the authority to
proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same
must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.
.


The foregoing principle applies in the instant case not only because of the non-
compliance by petitioners with the documentary prerequisites in judicial reconstitution of title
but also because petitioners failed to satisfy the publication requirement under R.A. No. 26.
Private respondents who are in actual possession of the properties were not properly notified.

Notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served on the actual
possessors of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the
effect settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the land
involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.

In view of all the foregoing, the SC uphold the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals as
regards the fact that private respondents have a better right to the ownership of the real property
in question, respondent Court of Appeals having correctly nullified and set aside petitioners'
reconstituted TCT No. RT-2063.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY DENIED for utter lack of merit.


Costs against petitioners.







Talusan vs. Tayag
356 SCRA 263, April 4, 2001
G.R. No. 13369

ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, petitioners,
HERMINIGILDO* TAYAG and JUAN HERNANDEZ, respondents.


FACTS:

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
November 20, 1997 Decisioni[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41586.

On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter alia,
that:


They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651,
from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:

On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial
informing him that the above described property would be sold at public auction on December 9,
1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded
payment of the sum of P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;

Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial never
authorized a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for and on his
behalf;

[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag for
P4,400.00 without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without
compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;

A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag.
The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same
is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these;


The bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience, thus,
the sale for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties is null and
void ab initio;

[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the
same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the
concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never been in possession of the
said property;
[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents] the sum of
P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but said offer was
rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.

They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of not
less than P20,000.00; attorneys fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every
appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute the case.

On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with
[C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the allegations in
the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative defenses, among others:

(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has
[become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8,
1987;

[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a buyer in good faith in a
regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.

The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the [petitioners]
pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was
affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September
16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the
Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;

The public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 464
hence, the same is lawful and valid:

[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the
[petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the Registry of
Deeds of Baguio City.

[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at least
P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and, expenses of
litigation.


[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he denied
the material averments in the complaint and stated that no irregularity or illegality was
committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the delinquent real property of Elias
Imperial and the actuations of the defendant herein were all within the limits of his authority and
in accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly,
P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be
imputed against him. He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses, that:

The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the case
cannot prosper;

Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because of]
the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including defendant herein.

In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the
condominium from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was
purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never been
registered with the Register of Deeds.

Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan
Hernandez sold the property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate

taxes thereon. The property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which
represented the unpaid taxes.

Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited
irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.

Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16,
1987 judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R.

This earlier Branch 6 Decision had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in
favor of Respondent Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of
Branch 5 of the same court which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the Register of Deeds to
issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of Respondent Tayag.

According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already
upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue would
amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court, contrary to the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.


ISSUE:


Whether or not the RTC Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to proceeding
and whether the auction sale of subject condominium unit should be annulled.



HELD:

No. Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits
and to promote the expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases, therefore, the Court
declared that this Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdictions vested in
the regional trial court and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial
and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.

It is equally important to consider that a land registration courts decision ordering the
confirmation and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole
world. Thus, the trial courts ruling consolidating the ownership and the title of the property in
the name of herein respondent is valid and binding not only on petitioners, but also on everyone
else who may have any claim thereon.

Yes. For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed
the taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultant
proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property through

an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the registered
owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers must register their purchases as soon as possible
and, equally important, they must pay their taxes on time.

As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find
application, if the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards
by which the matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent purchasers of
the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who has
registered the sale in ones favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not been
registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject property.

Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune
upon themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the
consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the
real property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981, they
did not take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.

Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches. The law helps the vigilant, but not those
who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against
the slothful and the contemners of their own rights.


WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.


LIM vs. VERA CRUZ
356 SCRA 386, April 4, 2001
G.R. No. 143646


SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM and ROSARIO T. LIM, petitioners,
PEPITO M. VERA CRUZ, respondent.

FACTS:

A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by petitioner against
private respondents i[5] before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed
as Civil Case No. 195-M-94, alleging that he has been in possession since 1960 of a 200 square
meter portion of Lot 4204 situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan covered by TCT No.
191498 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan in the names of Turandut, Traviata, Marcelita,
Pacita, Marlene, Mathews, Victoria and Rosary, all surnamed Aldaba.

That on January 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to him said 200 square meter portion,
which is included in the formers one-eight share in Lot 4204, consisting of 1,732 square meters;


That a complaint for ejectment was filed against him in 1993 by private respondent
Henry Lim, who claims to be the owner of the property occupied by him, being a portion of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-16375 registered in his name;

That judgment was rendered against him in the ejectment case, which he elevated to the
appellate court, and that upon investigation, he discovered that TCT No. T-16375 in the name of
private respondents was obtained in bad faith, by fraud and/or clever machination.

Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT T-16375.

On July 22, 1998, respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-16375 upon the posting by private respondents of an
indemnity bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October 7, 1998.

Petitioners contend that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens by the trial court is
justified because respondent had it registered for the sole purpose of molesting them and that it is
not necessary to protect his rights.


ISSUE:


Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
HELD:

No. Sec. 14 Notice of lis pendens In an action affecting the title or the right of possession
of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer,
may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated
a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing of such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of
the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party,
or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

Sec. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused registration thereof.


Based on this principle as well as the express provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular property subject of litigation is covered
by the notice of lis pendens.

In justifying the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the trial court held that
respondents unregistered deed of sale can not be accorded more weight than petitioners
certificate of title.

For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which
requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him. In fact, there is no
requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice must prove his right or
interest over the property sought to be annotated.

Hence, even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be
annotated on the title. And such annotation can not be considered as a collateral attack against
the certificate of title.

This is based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not
produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does not create a right or lien. It only means that a
person purchases or contracts on the property in dispute subject to the result of the pending
litigation.


The Court observed that the trial judge was convinced that the cancellation of the lis
pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should not have required petitioners to post a bond of
P2,000,000.00
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if petitioners are allowed to file a bond,
regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice.

The Court held that the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens
pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient bond by the party on whose title said notice
is annotated.

Petitioners likewise insist that since respondent lost in the ejectment suit they filed
against him, it follows that he also lost whatever right he has in the 200 square meter portion and
that, therefore, he has no more right to be protected by the notice of lis pendens. It bears
emphasis that respondent caused the registration of the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case No.
195-M-94 for quieting of title to his, 200 square meter lot, not in the ejectment case.

Consequently, the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-16375 must stay.


Indeed, there is nothing in the records indicating that the notice of lis pendens is for the
purpose of molesting herein petitioners or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of
respondent.

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.



















PO LAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
316 SCRA 721, October 13, 1999
G.R. No. 116220


SPOUSES ROY PO LAM and JOSEFA ONG PO LAM, petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS and FELIX LIM now JOSE LEE, respondents.

FACTS:

On November 12, 1981, Lim filed in the same Civil Case No. 2953 a motion to annotate
the said Resolution of the Court of Appeals of March 11, 1989 in G.R. No. 44770-R on the
certificate of title of the spouses Po Lam.

He likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the said Resolution
and for the execution in his favor of a deed of conveyance of the lots litigated upon. However,
the said motions were all denied by the trial court in its Order dated February 4, 1982.

On September 19, 1985, Lim again filed with the trial court in Civil Case 2953, a motion
to include spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam as party defendants in the case, as well
as a motion to execute the March 11, 1981 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in AC G.R. No.
44770-R.


On October 16, 1985, both motions were denied by the trial court and on appeal, in CA
G. R. No. 08533-CV, the Court of Appeals upheld the Order of Denial.

On October 29, 1990, Felix Lim assigned all his rights to and interest in subject
properties to Jose Lee, (a lessee of a commercial building standing on Lot No. 1557), who since
then, has substituted Felix Lim as party plaintiff, now the private respondent.

June 1970, after the herein petitioners bought subject lots from LACHO, the former
leased the commercial building on Lot 1557 to the herein private respondent, Jose Lee.

On December 19, 1993, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Legaspi City handed down its
decision in the said unlawful detainer case, declaring the herein petitioners as the lawful owners
of Lot 1557.

On February 18, 1988, in G. R. No. 84145-55 (Lim vs. Court of Appeals),this Court ruled
on Felix Lims appeal from CA-G.R. No. 12316-SP (unlawful detainer case) and from CA G. R.
No. 08533-CV (which affirmed the October 16, 1985 Order of the trial court in Civil Case no.
2953).

On January 14, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City decided Civil Case No
6767 affirmed the decisions rendered in AC-G. R. No. 44770-R promulgated on March 11, 1981.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners then be treated purchasers in good faith of Lot 1557
covered by TCT No. 2580 considering that the notice of lis pendens thereon had been already
cancelled at the time of the sale.


HELD:
Yes. It is a firmly settled jurisprudence that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man on guard and claim that he acted in good faith in the belief
that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.

His mere refusal to believe that such a defect exist, or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title, will not make him innocent purchaser
for value, if it develops afterwards that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had
notice of such defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.

In the case under consideration, there exist circumstances which should have placed the
herein petitioners on guard.

As aptly stressed upon by the respondent court, while it is true that when the petitioners
purchased Lot 1557, the notice of lis pendens affecting said lot had been cancelled, it could not
be denied that such inscription appears on the Transfer Certificate of Title of the said lot together
with the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.

This fact coupled with the non-cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2581 covering Lot 1558, should have sufficiently alerted the petitioners
vis-a-vis a possible defect in the title of LACHO, especially so that Lots 1557 and 1558 were
simultaneously sold to the petitioners in a single deed of sale executed on May 28, 1969.

Then too, considering that Lots 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial lots at the heart of
the commercial district of Legaspi City, it is unbelievable that the petitioners who were assisted
in purchasing the lots by Atty. Rodolfo Madrid (who during his time was a well-known lawyer
of competence in the Province of Albay) would have released the purchase price of 700,000.00
without inquiring into the status of the subject lots.

Verily, spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam willfully closed their eyes to the
possibility of a defect in the vendors (LACHO) title.

The petitioners, very much aware of the pending litigation affecting the lots under
controversy, gambled on the outcome of the litigation. Consequently, they cannot now be
permitted to evade the outcome of the risk they assumed.


Premises studiedly considered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, and so holds,
that the petitioners, Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam, are transferees pendente lite and
therefore, not purchasers in good faith and are thus bound by the Resolution dated March 11,
1981 of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. No. 44770-R.


WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 37452 AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.





















UNIVERSITY OF LA SALETTE
COLLEGE OF LAW
S.Y.2013-2014


DIGESTED CASES
IN LAND TITLES AND DEEDS


SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. ARNEL MANUEL


SUBMITTED BY:
SHAILA CAPINPIN VILLABERT