John Protevi

Department of French Studies

www.protevi.com/john/DG
protevi@lsu.edu
Class notes: not for citation in an pu!lication"
#$d li%e to e&press m 'ratitude to Dan Smith of Purdue (niversit) for
lettin' me see his super! lecture notes on Difference and *epetition)
to which these lectures are 'reatl inde!ted.
Sprin' +,,-: .he /ajor 0or%s of Gilles Deleu1e
Second da lecture / +2 Januar +,,-: #ntro and Ch. 3 of D*
.45 C467758G5 9F DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION
.ruer words were never spo%en than when Deleu1e said of D* in his
32-: ;7etter to a 4arsh Critic;: ;it$s still full of academic elements) it$s
heav 'oin'; <Negotiations -=. #$ll sa" <Part of that academicism
comes from D havin' su!mitted D* to his jur as the primar thesis
for the doctorat d'Etat >the secondar thesis was the !i' Spino1a
!oo%?.=
.he conte&t of these remar%s is useful: Deleu1e has just !een notin'
that ;the histor of philosoph plas a patentl repressive role in
philosoph) it$s philosoph$s own version of the 9edipus comple&;
<Negotiations @=. Deleu1e continues that he tried to su!vert this
repressive force ! various means <Negotiations A=:
<3= ! writin' on authors such as 7ucretius) 4ume) Spino1a and
8iet1sche who contested the rationalist tradition ! the ;critiBue
of ne'ativit) the cultivation of jo) the hatred of interiorit) the
e&ternalit of forces and relations) the denunciation of power
>pouvoir?;
<+= ! enculage / immaculate conception: ma%in' the author
sa somethin' in their own words that would !e monstrous.
.hese are famous lines) and the last is certainl fun in an pater les
bourgeois sort of wa. Cut what$s reall important in m view comes
ne&t) when D e&plains what it means to finall write ;in our own
name); as he claims he first did in D*:
#ndividuals find a real name for themselves D onl throu'h the
harshest e&ercises in depersonali1ation) ! openin'
themselves up to the multiplicities everwhere w/in them) to
the intensities runnin' throu'h them. >.his is? a
depersonali1ation throu'h love rather than throu'h su!jection.
<Negotiations A=
So that$s our challen'e in readin' D*: can we avoid su!jectin'
ourselves to it as a monument in the histor of philosoph) as is the
case with an 9edipal relation to the histor of philosoph in which ou
'ive ourself up to !e a mere rptiteur: an old occupational title in
the French academic sstemE *ather) can we turn our readin' of it
into a ;harsh e&ercise in depersonali1ation); that is) ! openin'
ourselves up to the multiplicities and intensities w/in usE Can our
encounter with it !e a depersonali1ation throu'h loveE Can we learn
from it) rather than 'ain %nowled'e from itE
S.*(C.(*5 9F .45 C99F
#ntroduction: *epetition and Difference
3: Difference in #tself
+: *epetition for #tself
:: .he #ma'e of .hou'ht
G: #deal Snthesis of Difference
@: 6smmetrical Snthesis of Sensi!ilit
Conclusion: Difference and *epetition
6t first 'lance we see that the title / su!ject of the !oo%) difference
and repetition) structures the !oo%. .he conclusion repeats) with a
difference) the #ntroduction) while chapter G repeats chapter 3 and
chapter @ repeats chapter +. Chapter : is the center of the !oo%) the
pivot on which it turns. #n a useful article) .im /urph will claim it is
the ;caesura); the pure and empt form of time) that !rea%s na%ed
repetition and opens the wa to a novel future) repetition with a
difference.
0e should note that in an interview from 32HH Deleu1e sas that
;noolo'; or the stud of the ima'e of thou'ht is the ;prole'omena to
philosoph; <Negotiations 3G2=. So) rou'hl spea%in') we can sa
that the first part of the !oo% <#ntro and Chapters 3 and += is
Deleu1e$s voa'e of depersonali1ation throu'h the histor of
philosoph <repeatin' it with a difference) his enculage of the
philosophers he writes on=. Chapter :) the stud of the ima'e of
thou'ht) is the prole'omena to philosoph) while the second part of
the !oo% <Chapters G) @) and Conclusion= is Deleu1e ;doin'
philosoph; in his ;own name); after his ;harsh e&ercise; of
depersonali1ation. #t dou!les the repetition of the histor of
philosoph we find in the first half of the !oo% ! doing philosoph in
a novel wa. D* is itself a livin' repetition) differin' from the !are
repetition that would have !een a standard readin' of Plato) 6ristotle)
7ei!ni1) Fant) 4e'el) et al.
D575(I5JS 58C9(8.5*S 0#.4 9.45*S #8 D*
Kou could replace the title Difference and Repetition with tructure
and !enesis: structures are differential) and 'enesis produces
repetition: different incarnations of the same structure. .he %e is to
identif the conditions for livin' repetition) that which introduces
difference into what tends toward dead repetition) repeated elements
that are different onl within a hori1on of identit: different cases of
the same concept) and so on) the four shac%les of representation.
So there is somethin' to the clichLd la!el of Deleu1e as ;postM
structuralist.; James 0illiams has a ver nice readin' of the ;4ow
does one reco'ni1e structuralismE; essa as a draft of D*.
Structures <what Deleu1e will call #deas= are conditions of 'enesis)
conditions for the creative transformation of thin's. So in a twist
tpical of Deleu1e) a twist in which the form of his thou'ht maps its
content) we$re not trin' to ;reco'ni1e; structuralism) that is) produce
a finite set of necessar and sufficient conditions so that we can
jud'e somethin' as fallin' within the cate'or of ;structuralism); !ut
we are trin' to esta!lish the conditions for the creative
transformation of structuralism: we$re trin' to find the sensitive
points of structuralism so that if we nud'e it a little) it and we will !e
transformed. 0e$re trin' to ;conju'ate our sin'ularities; with that of
structuralism to produce somethin' new: what DG will call a
;!ecomin'); or ;mutual de/reMterritoriali1ation.; 0e$re trin' to form a
;war machine); in which we reMterritoriali1e on our powers of deM
territoriali1ation: we$re trin' to form a ha!it of creative transformation
of ha!its) we$re trin' to feel at home while we$re on the move N even
when that !ein' on the move entails no chan'e of spatial location.
Cut D* is just as much a rewritin' of Fant as it is a wor% of ;postM
structuralism.;
D* includes en'a'ements with Plato) 6ristotle) Scotus) Spino1a)
7ei!ni1) 4ume) Fant) 4e'el) 8iet1sche) Freud) and Cer'son.
0ith 6ristotle and 4e'el) the en'a'ements are uniforml critical) and
with Spino1a) 8iet1sche) and Cer'son the are lar'el positive.
Plato) Fant) 7ei!ni1 and Freud are the interestin' cases. Deleu1e
treats them as what the earl Derrida would call ;mar'inal); inscri!in'
openin's or 'estures toward differential thou'ht in their writin') !ut
not followin' up on them.
0ith Plato we 'et the simulacrum) with 7ei!ni1 the notion of ;viceM
diction; and the 'limpse into the world of diver'ent series <followed
up on ! Cor'es in the notion of the 'arden of !ifurcatin' paths=) and
with Freud the rethin%in' of death. .here$s also the ver important
thou'h lar'el unmar%ed influence of Simondon) from whom the
notion of individuation is ta%en.
Cut perhaps the encounter with FantJs transcendental philosoph is
most important.
.*68SC58D58.67 P4#79S9P4K
.ranscendental philosoph in its technical modern form was
inau'urated ! Fant with the distinction !etween transcendent and
transcendental.
O.ranscendentP o!jects refer to those which are thou'ht !ut cannot
!e e&perienced <the are !eond e&perience) that is) the OtranscendP
e&perience=) that is) there is either no sensor data correspondin' to
them <the soul) God= or there is no wa of snthesi1in' the totalit of
the o!ject <the world=.
O.ranscendental)P on the other hand) refers to the method of loo%in'
for the universal and necessar conditions of possi!ilit of an
rational e&perience. .hat is) it wor%s !ac%ward from e&perience to
what must !e if that sort of e&perience is to !e possi!le.
Deleu1e will critici1e Fant for copin' the transcendental field in the
ima'e of the empirical field. .hat is) empirical e&perience is personal)
identitarian and centrifu'al: there is a central focus) the su!ject. <Fant
has a Cartesian herita'e then: the vital importance 'iven to su!jective
consciousness) that is) the O# thin%P or cogito.= 6ll our e&periences are
ta''ed as !elon'in' to us. Fant sas this is onl possi!le if we can
posit the .(6) the .ranscendental (nit of 6pperception) that is) the
possi!ilit to add O# thin%P to all our jud'ments: O># thin%? the cat is on
the mat.P
Deleu1e will instead want to have the transcendental field !e
differential: the virtual is the condition for real e&perience) !ut it has
no identit. #dentities of the su!ject and the o!ject are products of
differential processes. Deleu1e still wants to wor% !ac% from
e&perience) !ut his rule is that the condition should not resem!le the
conditioned. 6s the empirical is personal and individuated) the
transcendental is impersonal and preMindividual. .he Deleu1ean
virtual is not the condition of possi!ilit of an rational e&perience) !ut
the conditions of 'enesis of real e&perience.
6 nice online reference:
Levi Bryant, Immanence and the Fractured Cogito: Deleuzes
Grounding of the Transcendental Field!
http://www.levi!rant.com/copernicus:.pdf
Dan Smith: Deleu1eJs Ocate'oriesP <which are precisel not cate'ories
as identitarian forms of thou'ht=
a. >Su!stantive? /ultiplicit: a'ainst the 985) the identit of the
Platonic Form. 5ver thin' is a multiplicit) an manifold.
!. >/odalit? Qirtualit: a'ainst possi!ilit as a modalit.
c. Pro!lematic: Cein' alwas presents itself under a
proble"atic form.
d. #ntensit: the tpe of difference ! which #deas are
actuali1ed.
P*5F6C5 .9 .45 58G7#S4 5D#.#98
French version in Deu# Rgi"es de Fous) p. +H,M+H:
3= Difference !etween histor of philosoph and writin' philosoph.
+= D* is first !oo% in which D tries to ;do philosoph.; 5verthin' that
follows is connected to D*.
:= FourMfold representation prevents us from thin%in' difference in
itself.
G= .hin%in' repetition as difference w/o concept also prevents us from
a concept of repetition. 0e need to thin% variation. #s there a sin'le
power >une seule et "$"e puissance? of difference / repetitionE
@= D has tried to constitute a philosophical concept from the
mathematical function of differentiation and the !iolo'ical function of
differenciation: a stata!le relation !etween the two that does not
appear at the level of their respective o!jects.
A= Puttin' into Buestion the traditional ima'e of thou'ht. Ch : now
appears to D to !e ;the most necessar and the most concrete.; Cf
the contrast of the rhi1ome and the tree.
P*5F6C5
6 ;'enerali1ed antiM4e'elianism; is ;in the air.; #dentit is primar in
the world of representation) !ut ;the modern world is !orn of the
failure of representation.; <Cf. FoucaultJs 9rder of .hin's) and) after
D*) his #nau'ural 6ddress at the CollR'e de France <French: 7J9rdre
du discoursS stran'e 5n'lish title as O.he Discourse on 7an'ua'eP for
the wiles of 4e'el) for whom !ein' OantiP is perhaps alread
su!sumed in his sstemE=
0e see difference and repetition rather than identit and
contradiction. 4e'el confines difference to a hori1on of identitS in this
wa difference is ne'ation leadin' to contradiction. See the
;Determinations of *eflection; section of Coo% ## of the Science of
7o'ic) ;5ssence.; 6lso ver important for Derrida.
Difference and repetition: the simulacrum. #dentities are produced !
difference and repetition.
.wo conver'in' lines of research: ;concept of difference w/o
ne'ation; and ;concept of repetition; in which mechanical repetition
finds its raison d'$tre in a ;hidden repetition in which a $differential$ is
dis'uised and displaced.;
.he a''ression of thou'ht in 'rapplin' with pro!lems vs the !eautiful
soul who shir%s from !attle.
Philosoph !oo%s as detective novel and science fiction.
Detective novel: empiricism. (ndoin' classic oppositions of temporal
/ nonMtemporal) historical / eternal) particular / universal.
Science fiction: #mpersonal individuations and preMindividual
sin'ularities. 0ritin' at frontier of i'norance.
(se of the histor of philosoph: reproduction with a monstrous
difference.
#8.*9D(C.#98
G main areas
3. .hree contrasts of repetition and 'eneralit
a. conduct: instead of 'eneralit as esta!lishin' a 'enus of
particulars) we have repetition as universalit of the sin'ular:
everthin' is uniBue) and can onl !e stolen or 'iven rather than
e&chan'ed </auss / Derrida on 'iftS polemic contra 7LviMStrauss and
e&chan'ist anthropolo' in 69=
!. laws: repetition has to !e a ;trans'ression); has to !e
;a'ainst the law; <sin'ularit versus eBualit of le'al su!jects= !oth in
terms of natural laws and moral law
c. concepts: repetition as difference w/o concept
+. Fier%e'aard) 8iet1sche) PL'u: concludes with distinction !tw F
and 8 on ;theatre of faith; and ;theatre of cruelt;:
:. .he ne'ative and G. Care and clothed repetitions
#n the discussion of the ne'ative) we see a movement tpical of D*: a
historical fi'ure <Freud in this case) !ut this will also !e how Deleu1e
reads Plato) 7ei!ni1) and Fant= does not 'rasp) or !ac%s awa from)
the radical implications of what he has written in a ;furtive and
e&plosive moment; <said of Fant in Chapter 3) p. @H=.
#n this case) in %e&ond t'e Pleasure Principle) we see the death
instinct !oth as !are or na%ed or !rute repetition) a mechanical or
material model) as the tendenc of life to return to inanimate matter.
Cut there is another readin' of the death instinct in CPP <as D ar'ues
at len'th in Chapter +=) as ;positive and dis'uised.; .hat is) dis'uises
that do not simpl dis'uise a !rute fact that is first there) full present)
and then is repeated a'ain and a'ain. *ather) dis'uises are
themselves what is first there: the are the ;internal 'enetic elements
of repetition itself) its inte'ral and constituent parts; <3-=. #n Derridean
terms) difference is primar: ;there is no first term which is repeated;
<3-=.
4ere Deleu1e introduces a term) ;simulacra); which we will find a'ain
and a'ain in D* <especiall the end of Chapter 3 and of Chapter +=)
and in one of the appendices to (ogic of ense) ;.he Simulacrum
and 6ncient Philosoph.;
8e&t) a lon' discussion of !are vs clothed repetitions. See chart in
D* outline. *epetition of ordinar points is the ;envelope; of
repetition of sin'ularities) its series of dis'uises) !ut these do not preM
e&ist dnamic repetition.
.he #ntroduction has tau'ht us that we have not et 'rasped the
essence of repetition !ecause we thin% ;difference w/o concept; onl
in terms of !rute spatioMtemporal difference and not as difference
internal to the #deas <which 'ets actuali1ed in diver'ent lines >what is
repeated) that is) another instance of this #dea) is alwas different?=.
So we now turn to Buestion of difference in itself. .he past
philosophies of difference <6ristotle) 7ei!ni1) 4e'el= missed the
concept of difference !cs the contented themselves with ;a merel
conceptual difference D difference in the concept in 'eneral.; <8C
that D$s ;#dea; is not a concept >as selfMidentical form of thou'ht? !ut
an internallMdifferentiatin' structure that throws out diver'ent lines in
actuali1in' itself.=
C46P.5* 3: D#FF5*58C5 #8 #.S57F
4ow has difference !een chained in representation) su!ordinated to
identitE 4ow have we !een led to mista%e the chainin' of difference
in concepts for what we should have wanted) a concept of difference
in itselfE
Difference is not intermediate !tw two states of indifference) the !lac%
a!ss of total dissolution <no forms) just 'round= and the white
surface of disparate unconnected determinations <all forms) no
'round=. *ather) difference is when we can ;spea% of determination
as such.;
D$s formula is ;unilateral distinction; in which ;somethin'
distin'uishes itself) et that from which it distin'uishes itself remains
aloof.; 4e 'ives the e&ample of li'htnin') !ut we could also 'ive the
e&ample of crstalli1ation: the crstal forms from the superMsaturated
solution without the solution distin'uishin' itself from the crstal. .he
solution remains there as ;'round risen to the surface); that is) as
retainin' its unformed potential to produce more crstals. Deleu1e$s
difference is ;ma%in' a difference); it is not mutual reco'nition of
su!jects on the 4e'elian masterMslave model in which !oth sides ta%e
and preserve form in distin'uishin' themselves from themselves.
*ather) forms are ;dissolved); !ecomin' onl an ;a!stract line;
reflected in the 'round.
#n 6.P the Oa!stract lineP of dissolved form will !e called a Otrait)P or a
potential to 'enerate forms ! an artisanJs nud'in' of a sstem to
one of its thresholds of selfMor'ani1ation. 4ere we see that the
pro!lem of individuation <how to produce an individual N ou move a
sstem to a threshold in which its potential for selfMor'ani1ation clic%
in= is prior to that of specification in which we arran'e thin's !
similarit of form.
Project of a philosoph of difference: rescue difference from its
monstrous / cursed state.
#n representation difference is confined in the four shac%les of
mediation.
3. #dentit in form of undetermined concept: thou'ht
+. 6nalo' in relation of determina!le concepts: jud'ment
:. 9pposition in relation of determinations w/in concepts: predication
G. *esem!lance in determined o!ject of concept: perception <of form=
*econcilin' difference and concept: Gree% propitious moment <Plato /
6ristotle=S reali1ed in 7ar'e <4e'el= and Small <7ei!ni1=
6*#S.9.75: 9*G68#C *5P*5S58.6.#98. See lectures of 3G Jan
32-G <3G/,3/32-G= on we!deleu1e.
For 6ristotle) difference can onl !e seen or dealt with on a hori1on of
identit <Oou canJt compare apples and oran'esP=. Cut thatJs not all:
some differences are O!etterP than others. For instance) contraries or
opposites <!lac% and white= are a ;!etter; %ind of difference than
otherness <red and 'reen=. Cut there are several %inds of difference
for 6ristotle that we need to ta%e into account to understand DJs
critiBue: 'eneric difference) specific difference) and material
difference.
Dan Smith refers us to PorphrJs tree) a wa of representin' the
%inds of difference we find in 6ristotle.
3: G585*#C 9* 68679G#C67 D#FF5*58C5 T difference !etween
'enera: alterit or diversit is heteroM'eneit: animal is a 'enus and
so is ve'eta!le) !ut the are onl other or diverse visMUMvis the other.
.his difference !etween 'enera !ecomes crucial when we have to
discuss the relation amon' the man senses of O!ein'.P Cein' is not a
'enus in which the cate'ories are species. *ather) the cate'ories are
'enera. 0hat then unites the senses of Cein'E 6re the just diverseE
Sense in this conte&t relates to logos) which is neither su!jective nor
o!jective) !ut is Ospeech cut to the measure of the world.P <0e see
here DJs Odo'matic ima'e of thou'htP: thou'ht has a natural affinit
for the truth of the world.=
#n technical terms) this is called Opros 'en eBuivocationP of !ein'.
Pros hen T Owith reference to one.P .his is also %nown as the
;analo'ical; senses of !ein': !ein' is said in man was) !ut alwas
with a prime meanin') a ;focal meanin'; of su!stance. .he other
cate'ories <concepts said of all !ein's T the senses of the term
;!ein';= all refer to su!stance: Bualit of a su!stance) Buantit)
where) when) etc.
.his is a distri!utive and hierachical jud'ment: it distri!utes the sense
of !ein' amon' all the cate'ories <all the cate'ories are senses of
!ein'= and et there is a prime sense of !ein' <su!stance is OmoreP
!ein' than the others) which modif su!stance=. .he medievals called
this an Oanalo' of proportionP <more or less= rather than an Oanalo'
of proportionalitP <a:!::c:d=.
+. SP5C#F#C D#FF5*58C5 is difference w/in a 'enus: it is the
;'reatest difference;: this is opposition or contraries) presupposin'
the hori1on of identit of the 'enus. /an is rational <as opposed to
nonMrational= animal <the 'enus to which man as species !elon's=.
4ere we see the Omiddle ran'eP of PorphrJs tree) identit of the
concept <the 'enus= and opposition of the predicates that determine
the species. Deleu1e comments that Ounivocit of species within
'enera refers to eBuivocit of !ein' in the 'enera.P
:. material difference is difference w/in the OlowestP species: it$s the
matter that separates those !ein's with the same form. 4ere we see
resem!lance in perception: in 6ristotelian perception) the form is
a!stracted from matter: in seein' two men) we see the form of
rational animal <throu'h the form of their actions as matchin' means
to end=) even as we see the material differences <their desires as
what proposes to them their ends= that separate them. 6'ain we see
the hori1on of identit within which difference appears.
(8#Q9C67 98.979GK is the %e to developin' a philosoph of
difference) in which difference would no lon'er !e su!ordinated to
identit.
.he medievals were concerned with what 4eide''er calls OontoM
theolo'P: the Buestion of Cein' for them alwas revolved around the
difference !etween God and creatures. .he answers here were
alwas politicall wei'hted for there is alwas an implicit politics in
ontolo') an Oanalo' of proportionalitP if ou will: God is to the world
and the Fin' is to the %in'dom and as the Pope is to the Church.
.here were three options: eBuivocit) analo' and univocit.
5Buivocit: God and creatures are said to !e in different senses. .he
ris% here is ontolo'ical anarch: if God cannot !e said to !e in the
wa creatures are) then itJs hard to see what GodJs relation to the
world can !e) or alternativel) how we can e&press that relation in our
lan'ua'e which is formed ! our e&perience of worldl creatures. .he
ris% is ne'ative theolo') which can come close to atheism: God Ois
not)P he cannot !e said Oto !e.P <0e canJt even tal% a!out the Fin') let
alone define his ri'hts and privile'esS there can !e no thou'ht of
duties of the Fin'.=
6nalo': this is how the medievals read the Opros hen eBuivocationP
of 6ristotle. God is the primar sense of Cein') he e&ists in an
e&cellent or superior wa) !ut there is a relation to the wa creatures
e&ist: the e&ist in a lesser wa) !ut there is not the sheer ontolo'ical
'ulf ou 'et with pure eBuivocit. <.he Fin' is a man) !ut he is a
special %ind of man.=
(nivocit: there is onl one sense of Cein'. God and creatures are in
e&actl the same wa. (nivocit collapses the ontoMtheolo'ical
difference. .he ris% here is pantheism / atheism: either all thin's are
God <or God is all thin's or God is OinP all thin's= or there is no God)
there is just the totalit and sstematicit of thin's. Spino1a captures
this am!i'uit in his formula Deus sive Natura <OGod or 8atureP:
8ature) that is to sa) God 9* God is nothin' !ut 8ature=. <.he Fin'
is just another man li%e ou or me.=
*ather than the analo' of !ein' in 6ristotle) in univocal ontolo'
!ein' is said in a sin'le sense of all of which it is said) !ut it is said of
difference itself. 0hat is that differenceE .he difference in de'rees of
puissance. Puissance is not pouvoir. #t is immanent power) power to
act rather than power to dominate another. Puissance is pra#is rather
than poi)sis <others are matter to !e formed ! m command=. D will
read puissance in terms of intensit: selfMdividin' or selfMdifferentiatin'
difference: Bualitative chan'e at thresholds.
.wo important points here:
First) 8omadic distri!ution and crowned anarch. *emem!er that
jud'ment re'ardin' cate'ories) that is) ontolo'ical jud'ment) is
distri!utive and hierarchical.
.pes of distri!ution: .erritorial: divides that which is distri!uted in a
closed >striated? spaceS 8omad: a division of that which distri!utes
itself in an open >smooth? space.
.pes of hierarch: /easurement ! limit) i.e.) ! distance from a
principleS ;/easurement; ! power >puissance?: 'oin' to limit of what
a thin' can do.
Vuote from 3/3G/-G lecture: ;6t this level) there are no lon'er an
cate'ories) no lon'er an forms) no lon'er an speciesD. >C?etween
two mem!ers of the same species there can !e more differences)
more differences in the de'ree of power than !etween two !ein's of
different species. Cetween a racehorse and a draft horse) which
!elon' to the same species) the difference can perhaps !e thou'ht
as 'reater than the difference !etween a draft horse and an o&D.
>.he? thou'ht of de'rees of power is lin%ed D to a conception of
assem!la'es into which each !ein' is capa!le of enterin'. ;
Cf. 6.P and the notion of ;affects.; D will distin'uish moralit and
ethics. /oralit is the Ojud'ment of God)P that is) comparison of the
action of a !ein' with what is e&pected of a !ein' with that essence)
that is) the Onatural lawP of what that !ein' is supposed to do
<OrationalP animal=. 5thics is instead action accordin' to puissance)
that is) immanent action ta%in' a !od to the limits of its capacit to
act. 6s we are social) capacit to act means pra&is) actin' with
others. .he criterion then !ecomes production of Ojoful) active
affect.P /ore later) !ut !riefl this means hori1ontal networ%s of
mutual empowerment. # %now this sounds Californian) !ut there it is.
Second) #ndividuation precedes matter and form / species and parts.
<individuation: Simondon: field of difference prior to identit=.
#deas T virtual T difference T structureS
spatioMtemporal dnamisms T intensive individuation T repetition T
'enesis.
.hree moments in histor of univocal ontolo': Scotus) Spino1a)
8iet1sche. *epetition in 5* is reali1ation of univocal !ein'. Practical
selection and no!ilit: that which returns is that which is capa!le of
selfMtransformation) of !ecomin'. .he !ein' of !ecomin'.
8iet1sche and 5* let us see that !ein' is said in the same wa of all
ontoMheteroM'enesis: differential conditions for !ecomin' or
individuatin' factors. 6ll thin's have #deas / spatioMtemporal
dnamisms as their 'enetic conditions.
.hen !ac% to 4e'el and 7ei!ni1 and ;9*G#6S.#C;
*5P*5S58.6.#98. Despite some provocative formulations) 7ei!ni1
remains !ound to identit ! his theor of God$s choosin' amon'
compossi!le worlds.
0e have to turn to 8iet1sche to see that difference is the condition for
identit) not the other wa around.
.hen a famous sain': ;the tas% of modern philosoph is reversin'
Platonism.; Plato and selection.