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1. Genato vs. De Lorenzo If the donation was a joint one to both donees,
one could not accept independently of his co-donee, for there is no accretion
among donees unless expressly so provided or unless the are husband and
wife
Facts:
The Genato Commercial Corporation is a family corporation, founded by the
spouses Vicente Genato and Simona B. de Genato. The spouses had six
children named Francisco, Florentino, Manuel, Carmen, Felisa and Juan.
One day, majority of the members of the Board of Directors composed of
Francisco G. Genato, President, Simona B. Vda. de Genato, Director and
Secretary-Treasurer, and Florentino Genato, Vice-President and Director, held
a meeting at Hidalgo, Manila.
It appears in the minutes of said meeting that Doa Simona Vda. de Genato
explained that due to her advanced age it is more convenient that Florentino
Genato, now Vice-President of the corporation, act as Assistant Secretary-
Treasurer as, as a matter of fact, he has heretofore been acting as such, since
the work is rather strenuous.
Four or five days thereafter, Florentino cancelled share certificates Nos. 7 and
18 belonging to his mother and in lieu thereof issued share certificate No. 118
for 265 shares in favor of Florentino Genato and share certificate No. 119 for
265 shares in favor of Francisco G. Genato.
Simona Genato died. The Philippine Trust Company, judicial administrator of
the intestate estate, and the legal heirs Manuel Genato, Felisa Genato de
Lorenzo and Juan Genato filed the complaint in the case at bar to recover from
the other two legal heirs, Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato, the 530
shares of stock in order that they may be included in the inventory of the
intestate estate of their deceased mother and in due course distributed among
all the surviving children of the decedent. In their answer, the defendant
Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato alleged that they had acquired the
ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from their mother.
The trial court found that defendants Francisco G. Genato and Florentino
Genato had acquired the ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from
their widowed mother.
Finding that there had been neither consideration for the sale of shares nor
valid donation of the same, due to lack of proper acceptance and non-
compliance with statutory requirements, and that the appeal of respondent
Felisa Genato de Lorenzo inured to the benefit of her other co-plaintiffs, the
Court of Appeals, as previously related, invalidated the transfer of the shares
to Florentino and Francisco Genato, and decreed that said stock remained a
part of the estate of the transferor.
Issue: W/N there was a valid donation
Held: No. There was none. There was a lack of proper acceptance because one
of the joint donees was not present
Ratio:
Assuming, ad arguendo, that the late Simona Vda. de Genato gave the
Certificates of Stock Nos. 7 and 18 to Florentino with instructions to transfer
the same to him and his brother, this act did not constitute a valid manual
donation in law for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two
donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that he,
Francisco Genato, had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of
them.
the delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous,
and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized
by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been
claimed to exist in this case.
the donation intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept
independently of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless
expressly so provided (Art. 637) or unless they be husband and wife.
2. CRUZ vs. CA - The donation may not be revoked or reduced if there is no
adequate allegation that the legitime would be impaired and if there has been
no inventory submitted.

Facts:
Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San
Isidro, Taytay Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to
her grandnieces (private respondents, names not mentioned), in a deed of
donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was accordingly
transferred to the names of private respondents.

In 1974, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after
which Eduvigis extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees
resisted, alleging that
(a) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her
brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own
1/2 of the property by inheritance; and
(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an agricultural land of more
than 2ha situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not
impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.

In 1975, Cruz filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation
invoking Article 760, paragraph 3 of CC
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Art. 760, Every donation inter vivos made by a person having no
children or descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or
illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced
(3) If the donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.

TC revoked the donation to the grandnieces. CA reversed and held that:
(a) the trial court took into consideration only Article 760 and ignored
Article 761 which states: "In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the
donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may
be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor
of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the
birth, appearance or adoption of a child.
(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another lot in Dolores Taytay Rizal, although
the subject of a pending litigation valued at P273k in 1977.
(c) The donated lot did not belong entirely to Eduvigis as ! thereof
belonged to her brother Maximo Cruz, grandfather of defendants. 1974 it had a
total market value of P17k. One-half thereof was P8,500. Adding thereto a
P50,000 value of the apartment house constructed thereon, the total value of
the donation would still be within the free portion of donor's estate and
therefore would not impair the legitime of the adopted child.
(d) In an action for revocation of donation, the donor has the burden
to show that the donation has impaired the legitime of the subsequent child;
but in this case, Eduvigis did not even allege it in her complaint.

Issue: Whether donation may be revoked? - NO

Held: Private respondents won.

Ratio:
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously
donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the
annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the date of
adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into
account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child.
(Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). The burden of proof is on the donor,
who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the
basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

In the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the
subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. It contains no
indication at all of the total assets of the donor.

Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is
unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land P273k 1977,
although then subject to litigation.

The legal situation of the donor is made worse by the factual finding of the
Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso
of one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of
the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the
estate within the free disposal of donor

3. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
-- There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is
stipulation for automatic reversion. Nonetheless, the stipulation is against
public policy and thus, is void.

FACTS
Respondent spouses filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation,
rescission of contract, and reconveyance of real property against the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila (RCA). The complainants alleged that spouses Eusebio de Castro and
Martina Rieta (both dead) executyed a deed of donation in favour of RCA
Manila covering a parcel of land. The deed of donation allegedly provides that
the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred
(100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation
of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation
and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.

However, while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property,
petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila
was allegedly transferred, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property
subject of the donation in favor of Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in
consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. As a consequence of the sale, a TCT
was issued in the name of the Ignao Spouses.

The Ignao spouses said that the donors had no cause of action and the Church
said that the action to recover the property has already prescribed. The trial
court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action has prescribed. Upon appeal, the CA held that the action had not yet
prescribed and ordered to remand the case to the lower courts.

ISSUE/HELD
Whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation
and deed of sale) has prescribed NO.
! But the decision of the CA is set aside and the decision of the RTC is
also dismissed. The 100 year prohibition is an illegal condition.
! Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action
for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same
is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved
herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property
donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not necessary
! It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts
involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not
apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code
provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general
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provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in
Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an
explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory
condition and which is subject to an express provision that the same
shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said
resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of
the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the
foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently
justified.
! When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules
on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and
not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code
authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at
the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic
revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for
that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of
the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision
of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not
in itself the revocatory act.
! Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions
in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The condition
imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a
patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee
to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable
attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order
to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of
time.
! In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of
donation against the alienation of the property for an entire
century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an
integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an
illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of
Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically
stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be
considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be
placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation.
The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale
supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the
nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of
the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
private respondents must fail.
! It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation
against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the
very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the same
time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion to
dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court
and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue of prescription.
That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was
assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of the
validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably
related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues
are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.

4. De Luna vs. Abrigo Art 764 does not apply to onerous donations in view
of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are
governed by the rules on contracts.
Facts:
Prudencio de Luna donated a parcel of land to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc.,
(now Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the
foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was
subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic
reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-
compliance The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the
foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" (Annex "B"
of Petition) subject to terms and conditions which among others, required:
3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a Chapel, a
Nursery and Kindergarten School, to be named after St. Veronica.
As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of Donation Intenrivos" also
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in case
of violation of the conditions.
The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same
document, subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation.
Prudencio de Luna and the foundation executed a 'Deed of Segregation
whereby the area donated was adjudicated to the foundation.
herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and
Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and only heirs of
the late Prudencio de Luna filed a complaint with the RTC alleging that the
terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the
foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and
the reversion of the donated land to the heirs.
respondent foundation claimed that it had partially and substantially complied
with the conditions of the donation and that the donor has granted the
foundation an indefinite extension of time to complete the construction of the
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chapel. It also invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of action and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code was
adopted to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions
when revocation of the donation has not been agreed upon by the parties. By
way of contrast, when there is a stipulation agreed upon by the parties
providing for revocation in case of non-compliance, no judicial action is
necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the action filed before the Court of
First Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the donation under Article
764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4) years, but one to
enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.
Issue: W/N the stipulation for automatic revocation of donation was valid
W/N the action to revoke had prescribed
Held: Yes. The stipulation is VALID
No. The action has NOT prescribed
Ratio:
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the
donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made
subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and
a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution
of the deed of donation. It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our
opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the
specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed
by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on
prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the
right "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of
Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation of any of the conditions
(herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor,
his heirs, . . ., without the need of executing any other document for that
purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not
being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is
valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
Judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in
order to determine whether or not the recession was proper.
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the
case at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code
because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, complaince with the
terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5)
years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23,
1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a
written contract

5. CENTRAL PHIL UNIVERSITY vs. CA - If there has been no compliance
with the resolutory condition, the donation may now be revoked and all rights
which have been acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.

Facts:
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a member of
the Board of Trustees of the Central Philippine College (now Central Philippine
University [CPU]), executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU of a parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 3174-B-1, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for which
a TCT was issued in the name of the donee CPU with the following annotations
copied from the deed of donation:
1. The land shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the
establishment and use of a medical college
2. The said college shall not sell to any third party nor in any way
encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said
college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any
net income from the land shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON
LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus

In 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed
an action for annulment of donation against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to
present, CPU had not complied with the conditions of the donation. And that
CPU had negotiated with NHA to exchange the property donated to the land
owned by NHA

CPU avers that the Heirs of Ramon are barred by prescription

TC ruled that CPU failed to comply with the conditions of the donation and
declared it null and void ordered CPU to execute a deed of reconveyance of the
property in favor of the heirs of Don Ramon

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CA ruled that the annotations at the back of CPUs certificate of title were
resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee
thus making the donation revocable.
However, CA found that that while the first condition mandated CPU
to utilize the donated property for the establishment of a medical
school, the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must
be fulfilled, hence, until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the
condition, CPU could not be considered as having failed to comply with
its part of the bargain.
CA then remanded the case back to TC to fix a period

Issue:
1. Whether there is a resolutory condition? YES
2. Whether there is a need to fix the period? - NO

Held: TC ruling reinstated revoking the deed of donation and ordering CPU to
reconvey the property to Heirs of Ramon. Heirs of Ramon won

Ratio:
The donation is onerous when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the
value of the donation
Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to CPU but
imposed an obligation upon the latter to establish a medical college,
thus it is onerous

1. Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition
of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall
depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that
the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is
a resolutory one
If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition,
such as the case at bar, the donation may be revoked and all
rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed
lost and extinguished.

Prescription NOT applicable.
Since the time within which the condition to build the medical college
should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will of CPU, it has
been held that its absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its
obligation provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to prevent
the prescription from running

2. The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the
necessary buildings and improvements on the property be quantified in a
specific number of years because of the presence of several factors and
circumstances involved in the erection of an educational institution, such as
government laws and regulations pertaining to education, building
requirements and property restrictions which are beyond the control of the
donee.
The general rule that a court can fix the period when the obligation
provides for none is NOT applicable. Why?
o More than 50 yrs has lapsed since the execution of the Deed
of Donation and for CPU to comply with the condition, yet it
failed to do so
o To allow the court to fix a period would just delay the
fulfillment of CPU of its obligation

Dissenting opinion (Davide)
There is no conditional obligation to speak of in this case. Conditions in
obligations is different from conditions in donations.
Conditions in donations does not refer to uncertain events on
which the birth or extinguishment of a juridical relation depends, but
is used as charges imposed by the donor on the donee, which
would characterize the donation as onerous

In the present case, the donation is onerous, but it is more properly called a
"modal donation."
A modal donation - one in which the donor imposes a prestation
upon the donee. The establishment of the medical college as the
condition of the donation is such prestation

The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez determines neither
the existence nor the extinguishment of the obligations of the donor and the
donee with respect to the donation.
The conditions imposed by Don Ramon Lopez upon the donee
are the very obligations of the donation to build the medical
college and use the property for the purposes specified in the deed of
donation.
These obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment, performance,
existence or extinguishment of which is NOT dependent on any
future or uncertain event or past and unknown event

Re fixing of the period by the court:
Since the donation is an onerous one, it is governed by the law on
contracts (oblicon) and as such it has to comply with Art 1197 where
courts have to fix a period

Prescription is APPLICABLE
the mere fact that there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of
the donation are to be fulfilled does NOT ipso facto mean that the
statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to revoke
the donation becomes imprescriptible
Artt 764 provides that actions for the revocation of a donation must
be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation
o However, Art 764 does NOT apply to onerous donations
in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the
rules on contracts.
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" In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and
the general rules on prescription and not the rules
on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
The prescriptive period is ten years from the time the cause of action
accrues, and that is, from the expiration of the time within which
the donee must comply with the conditions/obligations of the
donation. As to when this exactly is remains to be determined, and
that is for the courts to do as reposed upon them by Article 1197.


6. PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC -- The characteristic of a condition
precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition
is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile nothing is
acquired and there is only an expectancy of right. Consequently, when a
condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when
the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent.

FACTS
Cirer and Hill owned a parcel of land. They donated this to the municipality of
Tarlac, under certain conditions specified in a public document evidencing the
donation. The donation was accepted by the municipal president on behalf of
the municipal of Tarlac. The parcel thus donated was later registered in the
name of the donee, the municipality of Tarlac.

Later, sellers sold this parcel to the herein plaintiff George L. Parks. Then, the
municipality of Tarlac transferred the parcel to the Province of Tarlac which, by
reason of this transfer, applied for and obtained the registration thereof in its
name, the corresponding certificate of title having been issued to it.

The plaintiff, George L. Parks, alleging that the conditions of the donation had
not been complied with and invoking the sale of this parcel of land made in his
favor, brought this action against the Province of Tarlac, the municipality of
Tarlac, sellers and prayed that he be declared the absolute owner entitled to
the possession of this parcel, that the transfer of the same by the municipality
of Tarlac to the Province of Tarlac be annulled, and the transfer certificate
issued to the Province of Tarlac cancelled. The lower court dismissed the
complaint.

ISSUE/HELD
Whether Parks has a right of action in this case
! NONE
! Even supposing that causes existed for the revocation of this
donation, still, it was necessary, in order to consider it revoked, either
that the revocation had been consented to by the donee, the
municipality of Tarlac, or that it had been judicially decreed. None of
these circumstances existed when Concepcion Cirer and James Hill
sold this parcel to the plaintiff. Consequently, when the sale was
made Concepcion Cirer and James Hill were no longer the owners of
this parcel and could not have sold it to the plaintiff, nor could the
latter have acquired it from them.
! But the appellant contends that a condition precedent having
been imposed in the donation and the same not having been
complied with, the donation never became effective. We find
no merit in this contention. The appellant refers to the
condition imposed that one of the parcels donated was to be
used absolutely and exclusively for the erection of a central
school and the other for a public park, the work to commence
in both cases within the period of six months from the date of
the ratification by the partes of the document evidencing the
donation. It is true that this condition has not been complied
with. The allegation, however, that it is a condition precedent
is erroneous. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that
the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition
is not complied with or is not deemed complied with.
Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy
of right. Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the
compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right
is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition
precedent. In the present case the condition that a public
school be erected and a public park made of the donated land,
work on the same to commence within six months from the
date of the ratification of the donation by the parties, could not
be complied with except after giving effect to the donation.
The donee could not do any work on the donated land if the
donation had not really been effected, because it would be an
invasion of another's title, for the land would have continued
to belong to the donor so long as the condition imposed was
not complied with.
! The appellant also contends that, in any event, the condition not
having been complied with, even supposing that it was not a condition
precedent but subsequent, the non-compliance thereof is sufficient
cause for the revocation of the donation. This is correct. But the
period for bringing an action for the revocation of the donation has
prescribed. That this action is prescriptible, there is no doubt. There is
no legal provision which excludes this class of action from the statute
of limitations. And not only this, the law itself recognizes the
prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a donation, providing
a special period of five years for the revocation by the subsequent
birth of children (art. 646, Civil Code), and one year for the revocation
by reason of ingratitude. If no special period is provided for the
prescription of the action for revocation for noncompliance of the
conditions of the donation (art. 647, Civil Code), it is because in this
respect the donation is considered onerous and is governed by the law
of contracts and the general rules of prescription. Under the law in
force (sec. 43, Code of Civ. Proc.) the period of prescription of this
class of action is ten years. The action for the revocation of the
donation for this cause arose on April 19, 1911, that is six months
after the ratification of the instrument of donation of October 18,
1910. The complaint in this action was presented July 5, 1924, more
than ten years after this cause accrued.
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7. Austria-Magat vs. CA - The act of selling the subject property to petitioner
herein CANNOT be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of
donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke must be filed in court.

Facts:
Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario
Austria, Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat,
Leonardo, and one of herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died
in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II.
In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together which she
donated to her children, Rosario, Consolacion, Apolinaria and Florentino.
Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot
in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that sale, (TCT for brevity) in
the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof BWQ TCT was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-
Magat.
Herein respondents Teodora Carampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto Apolo
(representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto
and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother
Rosario Austria) and Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite an action, to annul the TCT in favor of Petitioner.
Petitioner claims that in interpreting a document, the other relevant provisions
therein must be read in conjunction with the rest. While the document indeed
stated that the donation was irrevocable, that must be interpreted in the light
of the provisions providing that the donation cannot be encumbered, alienated
or sold by anyone, that the property donated shall remain in the possession of
the donor while she is alive, and that the donation shall take effect only when
she dies. Also, the petitioner claims that the donation is mortis causa for the
reason that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the donor, Basilisa
Comerciante, showed such intention. Petitioner cites the testimony of Atty.
Viniegra, who notarized the deed of donation, that it was the intent of the
donor to maintain control over the property while she was alive
According to the trial court, the donation is a donation mortis causa
pursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly
provides that it would take effect upon the death of the donor; that the
provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a
feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a
will; and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining
to wills, the same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale
by the donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be the
absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals
Issue: W/N donation was inter vivos or mortis causa
(pertinent!) W/ the donation was validly revoked
Held: The donation was INTER VIVOS
The revocation was NO VALIDLY done.
Ratio:
Issue 1:
The donation was inter vivos because
1. The deed of donation provided that the donor will not dispose or
take away the property donated.
2. An acceptance clause is found in the donation. An acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos

Issue 2: (pertinent)
The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot be
considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason
that a formal case to revoke the donation must be filed pursuant to Article 764
of the Civil Code[19] which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period
of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of
donation. The rule that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a
court action does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that the subject
deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic revocation
in event of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein.
Thus, a court action is necessary to be filed within four (4) years from the non-
compliance of the condition violated. As regards the ground of estoppel, the
donor, Basilisa, cannot invoke the violation of the provision on the prohibition
to encumber the subject property as a basis to revoke the donation thereof
inasmuch as she acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by the
donee, Consolacion Austria, when the said donor asked respondent Domingo
Comia to redeem the same. Thereafter, the donor, Basilisa likewise asked
respondent Florentino Lumubos and the petitioner herein to redeem the
same.[20] Those acts implied that the donees have the right of control and
naked title of ownership over the property considering that the donor, Basilisa
condoned and acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by one of
the donees, Consolacion Austria.
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8. EDUARTE vs. CA - All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and
are causes for revocation.

Facts:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San
Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of 12k sqm. On April 1984, he executed
a deed entitled "Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion InterVivos)" ceding one-half
portion to his niece Helen S. Doria

On July 1984, another deed identically entitled was purportedly executed by
Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land, on
the basis of which said original certificate was cancelled and a TCT was issued
in favor of Helen

In1986, Helen S. Doria donated a portion of 157sqm the parcel of land to the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. A TCT was issued to the church and
another to Helen covering the remaining portion of original 12ksqm lot.

In 1988, Helen S. Doria sold unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the
remaining parcel of land after the donation to the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church except for about 700sqm where Helen built her house.

Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery and that she
was unworthy of his liberality, Pedro Calapine seeks to revoke the donation to
Helen and declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale executed by
Helen to the Calauan Church and Spouses Eduarte.

Spouses Eduared denied knowledge of the first deed of donation and alleged
that after a part of the property was donated to Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc., the remaining portion thereof was sold to them by Helen S.
Doria.

Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. manifested its willingness to reconvey
to Pedro Calapine that part of the property donated to it by Helen S. Doria.
And having executed the corresponding deed of reconveyance, the case as
against it was dismissed

During the pendency of the case, Pedro died and was substituted by his
nephews Alexander and Artemis Calapine.

TC held that the second deed of donation of Pedro to Helen was void and the
subsequent sale to Spouses Eduarte also void. CA upheld and ruled that the
signature of Pedro in the 2
nd
deed was void. It also held that Spouses Eduarte
are buyers in bad faith because they should have ascertained the ownership of
the property in question because of a house w strong materials built on the
land and fruit bearing trees found therein.

Issue: Whether Pedro can revoke the donation in favor of Helen? YES
Whether Pedro/his nephew can get back the property? -NO

Held: 1. Yes, Helen Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid
ground for revocation of the donation
2. No. Spouses Eduarte are innocent purchases for value who got their title
from a forged deed. Rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be
respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller in
securing his title

Ratio:
1. Pedro Calapine's signature in the second deed of donation to be a forgery
after examination by NBI handwriting expert. By falsifying Pedro Calapine's
signature, Helen Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid
ground for revocation of the donation made in her favor in accordance
with Article 765.

Spouses Eduarte allege that Art 765 is not applicable to the case because it
only mentions offenses against the property or person of the donor as the
cause of revocation; and that forgery is a crime against public interest and not
property or person, and thus is not a ground for revocaion

In Tolentino's Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, the book
states that: All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are
causes for revocation.
Spouses Eduartes attempt to categorize the offenses according to
their classification under the RPC is unwarranted considering that
threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of
the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the RPC

2. Spouses Eduarte are buyers in good faith based on the doctrine that a
forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title
One such instance is where the certificate of title was already
transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while
it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what
appeared in the certificate.
When Spouses Eduarte purchased the subject property from Helen
Doria, the same was already covered by by a new TCT under Helens
name. And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, such
fact cannot prejudice the rights of Spouses Eduarte absent any
showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such
irregularity. # they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate
of title which appeared to be valid on its face
the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and
protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller in
securing his title

Proper recourse of the true owner of the property (Calapine) who was
prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for
damages against Helen who caused or employed the fraud

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9. NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS & DIRECTO The act of usurpation by
the donee of the donors land is an act of ingratitude. The law does NOT
require conviction in order to revoke the donation; only preponderance of
evidence is needed in action to revoke.

An action for revocation based on ingratitude must be filed within 1 yr from the
time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee.

Facts
Directo (daughter), Noceda (grandson), and Arbizo (widow) of the late
Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land.

Directo donated a portion of his share to Noceda who is her nephew being the
son of her deceased sister. However, another extrajudicial partition was made
on the same subject land by Directo, Noceda and Arbiso. 3/5 of the land went
to the widow, and 1/5 each went to Directo and Noceda.

Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo.
Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial
settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three
huts. But 4 years after building this house, defendant Noceda removed the
fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and
fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo
demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.
Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against
defendant Noceda before the lower court. A relocation survey was conducted
and it was shown that the area of the land in the later partition was smaller
than the actual area of the subject property.

The RTC ruled that the deed of donation as revoked and upheld the validity of
the later extrajudicial settlement partition. CA affirmed

ISSUE/HELD
Whether the donation in this case is valid
! NO. The decision of the RTC and the CA is affirmed. The case is
dismissed.
! The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by
plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981
and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to
supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the
extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity
to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion
allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated
portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of
the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him.
Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17,
1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square
meters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the
relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein
occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to possess per
the extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981.
! Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the
heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to
conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the
heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of
which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by
Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court
where he stated among other things:
o 7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed
(sic) that the area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-
partition in the name of Celestino Arbizo was smaller than
the computed lots of their actual occupancy as per survey on
the ground;
o 8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan
for ready reference was subdivided, base (sic) on stated
sharing as per EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION
base (sic) on actual occupancy.
! The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the
actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the
percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their
August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement.
! Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of
a third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property
notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an
heir of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never
impleaded as a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was
not established.
! Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling
basis to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as
follows:
o In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff
that Maria Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and
Agripina is her half sister with a common father. On this
point, the Court believes the version of the plaintiff. The
Court observes that in the Extra-Judicial Settlement-
Partition(Exhibit C), Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-
heirs of the defendant, being the widow of his grandfather,
Celestino Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do not
also appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition
because according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares
to Maria Arbizo. And the defendant is one of the signatories
to the said Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition
acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio Maranon. Under
the circumstances, the Court is convinced that the defendant
knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo
and he knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his
share, as well as that of Agripina. When the defendant
signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was already an adult
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since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years
old. So that in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did
not know all of these, the defendant would have not agreed
to the sharing and signed this document and acknowledged it
before the Notary Public. And who could have a better
knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and Maria Arbizo to
Celestino Arbizo than the latters daughter? Besides, at the
time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-
Partition by the plaintiff and defendant, they were still in
good terms. There was no reason for the plaintiff to favor
Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over the defendant.
Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support his
allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and
child.
! We likewise find unmeritorious petitioners claim that there exist no
factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to
private respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation
survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on the
extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual
possession by the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It
was established by the survey plan that based on the actual
possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among the
heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan
was being occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was
also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area
donated by private respondent Directo to petitioner is located. There
is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful
share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
! In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate
succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, in general,
is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to
put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual
interest of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific
property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other. And one way of effecting a
partition of the decedents estate is by the heirs themselves
extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria
Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda
(petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on
August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the
property left by their predecessor-in-interest in the following manner:
o To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion
containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters;
o To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion;
o and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5)
portion.
! We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was
no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis
for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for
finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner
Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private
respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of
Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners
act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo
without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered
as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does
not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be
proved in the action for revocation.
! Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the
right to enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted by
private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first week
of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on
September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed from
the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in
Lot 1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court rejected
such argument in this wise:
o Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action
granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be
renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year
to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the
fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As
expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his
donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of
the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it
was possible for the donor to institute the said action within
the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites
must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the
present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He
reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the
occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff
Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from
the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time
plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was
possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for
revocation of her donation.
o The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes
within one (1) year to be counted from the time
(a) the donor had knowledge of the fact;
(b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one
(1) year period for bringing the action be considered to
have already prescribed.
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o No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his
allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence.
He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence.

10. Imperial vs. CA The 10 year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations required under Art 771, to the extent
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs which shall be reckoned from
the death of the donor-decedent.
Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 45.
Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner
herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into
several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the
contract's designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a
donation.
arely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of
the said Deed of Absolute Sale, on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was
resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First
Instance of Albay under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and
validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner
agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land,
and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of
Leoncio. In case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the
deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
ending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs
the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted
son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of
Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution
of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by
his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the
disputed land. Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Petitioner moved to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
esar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, Civil Case No.
7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on
grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was
alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue
advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of
Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient
property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of
agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata,
and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of
Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no
property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had
donated to petitioner.
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years
under Article 1141 of the Civil Code
7
, reckoned from when the writ of
execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that
the original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet
prescribed.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC

Issue: W/N action to declare donation inofficous had prescribed
W/N there was res judicata No

Held: Yes. The action had prescribed

Ratio:
Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation,
we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the
Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real action over an
immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents' description of their
complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery
of Possession of Property", which suggests the action to be, in part, a real
action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.1wphi1.nt
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of
reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent
birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child;
16
(2) four years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation;
17
and (3) at any time during the
lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the
donor to reserve property for his or their support.
18
Interestingly, donations as
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in the instant case,
19
the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period,
for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law
must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce
inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs.
Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a
legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is
only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this
case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.

11. RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ - Object and cause are two separate elements of
a donation and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application of
the doctrine of pari delicto. Object is the subject matter of the donation, while
cause is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the
transaction.

Facts:
**petitioner and respondent are father and daughter!

Potenciano Ramirez filed a complaint against respondent Ma. Cecilia Ramirez
for annulment of:
1) a Deed of Donation;
2) Waiver of Possessory Rights;
3) 2 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)

Potenciano claimed that Cecilia caused the execution of the Deed of Donation
and Waiver of Possessory Rights to acquire ownership over the land and
improvements then covered the 2 TCTs. Using the Deed of Donation, Cecilia
allegedly succeeded in having the 2 TCTs cancelled and replace a new one in
her name. Furthermore, Potenciano alleged that with the Waiver of Possessory
Rights, Cecilia was able to cause the Office of the City Assessor to transfer to
her name the tax declarations on the improvements in the land.

The Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights were allegedly executed
by Potenciano and his wife, Dolores Ramirez, in 1993 and 1995, respectively.
However, the death certificate presented showed that Dolores died in 1991
and, consequently, could not have executed the assailed documents.
Potenciano repudiated the other signatures appearing on the two documents
that were purportedly his and insisted that he did not intend to transfer the
properties to Cecilia

In her Answer, Cecilia alleged that her father, Potenciano, would not have filed
the case were it not for the fact that he remarried despite his age of 84 years.
She further claimed that it was her fathers idea to cause the preparation of
the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to save on expenses for
publication and inheritance taxes.

TC ruled that the signature of Dolores on the Deed of Donation was a forgery
while her signature on the Waiver of Possessory Rights was genuine. It also
found Potencianos signatures on both documents to be genuine. It then held
Potenciano (petitioner) and Cecilia (respondent) are in pari delicto, as
participants to the forgery, and ruled that they must bear the consequences of
their acts without cause of action against each other in accordance with Article
1412 of the Civil Code. RTC then dismissed the complaint. CA upheld ruling

Issue: Whether Potenciano and Cecilia are in pari delicto? - YES

Held: Petition denied

Ratio:
As one of the modes of acquiring ownership, donations are governed by Title 3,
Book III, of the Civil Code. Donations inter vivos are additionally governed by
the general provisions on obligations and contracts in all that is not determined
by the title governing donations.

Hence, the rule on pari delicto under the
general provisions of contracts is applicable to the present case.

Potenciano alleged that the signatures of Dolores on the Deed of Donation and
on the Waiver of Possessory Rights are a forgery. Cecilia does not deny this
allegation. Forging a persons signature corresponds to the felony of
falsification under Section 4, Title IV of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the act
of forging Doloress signature constitutes a criminal offense under the
terms of Article 1411 of the Civil Code.

ARTICLE 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause
or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each
other, and both shall be prosecuted.

Under this article, it must be shown that the nullity of the contract proceeds
from:
1. an illegal cause or object
2. the act of executing said contract constitutes a criminal offense. #
The second requirement has already been discussed and is found to
be present.

Potencianos claims that the "object or cause" of the Deed of Donation and of
the Waiver of Possessory Rights is the transferred real properties and that the
Property Digests WEEK 16
Dela Torre, Manliclic, Pasquil| AMPIL
Aika G. Manliclic 2D 13
illegality stems from the act of forgery which pertains to consent, which is not
material to the application of Article 1411. # WRONG!
Object and cause are two separate elements of a donation and the
illegality of either element gives rise to the application of the doctrine
of pari delicto.
Object is the subject matter of the donation, while cause is the
essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the
transaction.
Potenciano wrongly asserts that the donated real properties are both
the object and cause of the donation.
In fact, the donated properties pertain only to the object.
Therefore, while he is correct in stating that the object of the
donation is legal, his argument misses the point insofar as the cause
is concerned.
o The cause which moved the parties to execute the Deed of
Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights, the motive
behind the forgery, is the desire to evade the payment of
publication expenses and inheritance taxes, which
became due upon the death of Dolores.

Undeniably, the Deed of Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights were
executed for an illegal cause, thus completing all the requisites for the
application of Article 1411.