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Hunter Geosystems Presents:
Niagara Transportation
Corridor Hazard and
Vulnerability Analysis
Prepared for Darby Pierson: Niagara Region Emergency
Planning Coordinator
Final Report
Hunter Geosystems 349 Queenston St. St. Catharines, ON L2P2Y1 konrad-hunter@hotmail.com
June 12, 2014
Project ID: 201213-01
Darby Pierson
Emergency Planning Coordinator, Regional Emergency Planning
Niagara Region
2201 St. Davids Rd. West
Thorold, ON
L2V 4T7
Dear Ms. Pierson,
RE: Final Report Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability
Analysis
Please accept this letter as a formal submission of the final report for Niagara Transpiration Corridor
Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis prepared by Hunter Geosystems for the Niagara Region Emergency
Planning department.
This document examines an analysis of community vulnerability to the transportation of dangerous goods
throughout the Niagara Region. We have provided a list of the most commonly transported hazardous
materials as well as the associated evacuation distances. Land Parcel data was utilized to categorize
vulnerable communities that fall within the determined impact buffer zones. Tables indicating the exact
number of parcels impacted within each municipality are provided along with formal maps layouts which
can be found in the appendix of this report. Our analysis provides a practical GIS application for
emergency services in the event of an accident involving hazardous materials in transport within the
Niagara Region. The project was completed ahead of schedule and within budget contingency of +/-10%.
Upon completion, the final budget for the project was $36,458 (including taxes).
If you have any questions regarding these documents or the assignment in general, please feel free to
email me or call 905-375-9219 at your convenience. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Konrad Hunter B.A.
Project Manager: Hunter Geosystems
KH/
Enclosures:
i) Final Report Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis
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Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis
Executive Summary
Hunter Geosystems, in association with Niagara College, has been provided the opportunity to take part
in a nine-month project which will examine community vulnerability to the transportation of dangerous
goods through the Niagara Region. The client, Darby Pierson of the Niagara Region Emergency Planning
office, has outlined the expectations and requirements which will serve as the framework for carrying
out the project.
The goal of this project is to provide an assessment of community vulnerability to the transportation of
dangerous goods (TDG) over road, rail and marine transport through the Niagara Region. Many
vulnerable communities (residential, commercial and institutional) are located within close proximity to
these transportation routes. This presents an increased risk of community exposure to volatile
substances in the event of an accident involving TDG. The findings of this project will be applied to the
development of mitigation strategies to increase the preparedness of local emergency services, thus
minimizing the potential impacts of an accident involving TDG. The deliverables developed for this
project provide a practical GIS platform for emergency services to utilize in the event of an accident
involving TDG along major transportation networks of the Niagara Transportation Corridor.
Numerous challenges were experienced in an attempt to obtain open-source hazardous materials
(HAZMAT) shipment data and revisions were made to the project methodology in order to complete the
project for an absolute deadline of June 13, 2014. Our final analysis has determined that many
vulnerable communities of the Niagara Region are located within a close proximity to transportation
networks used for TDG. We have established a list of HAZMAT which represents the most commonly
TDG though the Niagara Region. This information was used to develop an assessment of community
vulnerability according to the type of HAZMAT involved in a potential accident during shipment. The
results of our analysis indicate that the potential impact of HAZMAT exposure is highly contingent on the
diurnal condition and/or presence of a fire when an accident occurs. If certain HAZMAT is exposed
following an accident at night, the distance of the evacuation zone increases significantly and therefore
represents a significant threat to community vulnerability within the Niagara Region.
Hunter Geosystems has provided the total number of land parcels impacted by within each municipality
along with corresponding municipal map layouts. MXD files as well as geodatabases were also
developed for the client for future applications. The final budget for the project upon completion was
$36,458.
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Table of Contents
1.0 Project Overview ............................................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Project Issue .................................................................................................................................. 1
1.2. Client Overview ............................................................................................................................. 2
1.3. Study Area ..................................................................................................................................... 2
2.0 Project Goals and Objectives ............................................................................................................ 5
2.1 Project Deliverables ...................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Work Breakdown Structure .......................................................................................................... 7
2.3 Literature Reviews ............................................................................................................................ 8
3.0 Summary of Challenges..................................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Data Collection and Analysis ......................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Open-source HAZMAT Shipment Data ......................................................................................... 9
4.0 Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 Provided Data.............................................................................................................................. 10
4.2 Hazardous Materials Examined .................................................................................................. 10
4.3 Impact Buffer Zones .................................................................................................................... 12
4.4 Land Parcel Data ......................................................................................................................... 14
4.5 Mapping Municipal Community Impact to TDG ......................................................................... 14
4.6 Geodatabases.............................................................................................................................. 15
4.7 MXD Files .................................................................................................................................... 16
5.0 Findings and Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 16
5.1 Community Vulnerability: Rail HAZMAT ..................................................................................... 20
5.2 Community Vulnerability: Road HAZMAT ................................................................................... 25
5.3 Community Vulnerability: Ship HAZMAT .................................................................................... 29
6.0 Summary of Project Management .................................................................................................. 34
6.1 Project Management .................................................................................................................. 36
6.2 Understanding the Project .......................................................................................................... 37
6.3 Collecting/Analyzing HAZMAT Data ............................................................................................ 38
6.4 Assemble Geodatabases ............................................................................................................. 39
6.5 Prepare Maps of Processed Data ................................................................................................ 40
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7.0 Budget Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 41
7.1 Summary of Resources ............................................................................................................... 41
7.2 Final Budget ................................................................................................................................ 42
8.0 Recommendations .......................................................................................................................... 44
8.1 Emergency Response Application ............................................................................................... 44
9.0 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 46
Works Cited ................................................................................................................................................. 48
List of Figures
Figure 1 Niagara Region Study Area Boundary ............................................................................................. 3
Figure 2 Niagara Region Transportation Networks ...................................................................................... 4
Figure 3 Work Breakdown Structure ............................................................................................................ 7
Figure 4 Geodatabase Design ..................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 5 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (LPG Rail Accident No Fire)...................................... 17
Figure 6 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (LPG Rail Accident With Fire) .................................. 18
Figure 7 St. Catharines Community Vulnerability (LPG Rail Accident) ....................................................... 19
Figure 8 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Chlorine Rail Accident With Fire) ........................... 21
Figure 9 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Chlorine Rail Accident Day) .................................... 22
Figure 10 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Chlorine Rail Accident Night) ............................... 23
Figure 11 St. Catharines Community Vulnerability (Chlorine Rail Accident) .............................................. 24
Figure 12 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Gas/Diesel Road Accident No Fire) ...................... 26
Figure 13 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Gas/Diesel Road Accident Fire) ............................ 27
Figure 14 Fort Erie Community Vulnerability (Gas/Diesel Road Accident) ................................................. 28
Figure 15 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Fire) ....................... 30
Figure 16 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Day) ....................... 31
Figure 17 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Night) ..................... 32
Figure 18 Welland Community Vulnerability (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident) ............................................. 33
Figure 19 Cost Breakdown by task (estimated) .......................................................................................... 34
Figure 20 Comparison of Baseline Cost to Actual Cost of Major Tasks ...................................................... 35
Figure 21 Breakdown of Resource Costs .................................................................................................... 41
Figure 22 Earned Value over Time Report .................................................................................................. 43
Figure 23 Example of Emergency Response Application ............................................................................ 45
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List of Tables
Table 1 Project Deliverables ......................................................................................................................... 6
Table 2 Literature Reviews ............................................................................................................................ 8
Table 3: Hazardous Materials of Interest .................................................................................................... 11
Table 4: 2012 Welland Canal Traffic Report ............................................................................................... 11
Table 5 Impact Buffer Zones for Hazardous Materials ............................................................................... 13
Table 6 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (LPG Rail Accident - No Fire) .................................................... 17
Table 7 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (LPG Rail Accident With Fire) ................................................ 18
Table 8 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Chlorine Rail Accident With Fire) ......................................... 21
Table 9 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Chlorine Rail Accident Day) .................................................. 22
Table 10 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Chlorine Rail Accident Night) ............................................. 23
Table 11 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Gas/Diesel Road Accident No Fire) .................................... 26
Table 12 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Gas/Diesel Road Accident Fire) .......................................... 27
Table 13 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Fire) ..................................... 30
Table 14 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Day) ..................................... 31
Table 15 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Night) ................................... 32
Table 16 Project Management .................................................................................................................... 36
Table 17 Understanding the Project ........................................................................................................... 37
Table 18 Collect/Analyze HAZMAT Data ..................................................................................................... 38
Table 19 Assemble Geodatabases .............................................................................................................. 39
Table 20 Prepare Maps of Processed Data ................................................................................................. 40
Table 21 Project Budget Overview.............................................................................................................. 42
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List of Appendices
Appendix A Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis Gantt Chart .................. A
Appendix B Original Request for Proposal ................................................................................................. B
Appendix C Project Overview Statement ................................................................................................... C
Appendix D Municipal Impact Tables: Rail Materials ................................................................................ D
Appendix E Municipal Impact Tables: Road Materials ............................................................................... E
Appendix F Municipal Impact Tables: Ship Materials ................................................................................ F
Appendix G Municipal Maps: LPG Road Transport Accident .................................................................... G
Appendix H Municipal Maps: Gas/Diesel Road Transport Accident ..........................................................H
Appendix I Municipal Maps: Chlorine Rail Transport Accident .................................................................. I
Appendix J Municipal Maps: LPG Rail Transport Accident.......................................................................... J
Appendix K Municipal Maps: PVC Rail Transport Accident........................................................................ K
Appendix L Municipal Maps: Sulphuric Acid Rail Transport Accident ....................................................... L
Appendix M Municipal Maps: LPG/PVC Ship Transport Accident ............................................................ M
Appendix N Municipal Maps: Gas/Diesel Ship Transport Accident .......................................................... N
Appendix O Municipal Maps: Sulphuric Acid Ship Transport Accident .................................................... O
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1.0 Project Overview
The Niagara Region represents a major transportation corridor in Southern Ontario. Highways such as
the QEW, numerous railway lines and extensive shipping via the Welland Canal define how goods move
through the area. As industrial development in Canada increases in the wake of our booming energy
sector, the transportation of hazardous materials and dangerous goods increased as a result. This has
raised much concern over the safety and wellbeing of the general public as well as the natural
environment, considering the major impacts that occur in the event of an accident involving hazardous
materials in transport. The Niagara Region represents a unique area for transportation due to a close
proximity to the United States border, as well as providing the infrastructure to support all forms of
transportation. Therefore, this region provides an ideal location for implementing a hazard and
vulnerability analysis using Geospatial technologies.
As of April 1, 2014 the client representative from the Niagara Region was taken over by Darby Pierson,
Emergency Planner with the Niagara Region Emergency Planning department. The methodology for
analysis was revised from the project proposal, in accordance with the client, to ensure the project
would meet the absolute deadline of June 13, 2014. The initial plan to utilize open-source HAZMAT
shipment data for this analysis was not successful due to a number of challenges gaining access to such
information. With Land Parcel data provided by the client, Hunter Geosystems has provided an
assessment of the number of vulnerable communities by identifying specific land parcels that represent
Residential, Commercial and Institutional communities within each municipality of the Niagara Region
impacted by an accident involving TDG. Our analysis was developed using a list if Hazardous Chemicals
of Interest, provided by the client to represent the most commonly transported HAZMAT through the
Niagara Region via major highways, railways and the Welland Canal. This report will outline our findings
and provide a visual analysis of community vulnerability to TDG by municipality within the Niagara
Region.
1.1. Project Issue
A study by the McMaster Institute for Transportation and Logistics (2011) revealed that, in Canada,
there are upwards of 30 million hazardous good shipments per year. The problem remains that many of
these transportation routes are located in close proximity to communities. This presents a major risk of
community exposure to volatile substances following a disaster involving TDG. Recent accidents
involving the transportation of dangerous goods (TDG) have served as a reminder to significant risk
involved with such activity. Most notably the derailment in Lac Magnetic, Quebec of a 74-car train
carrying petroleum crude oil resulted in a massive explosion and devastating fire, which leveled 30
buildings and caused 47 fatalities on July 6, 2013 (Blatchford, 2013). This event, as well as others like it,
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provides important insight into the significant risks involved with transporting hazardous goods through
communities, regardless of the mode of transportation.
There has not been a significant assessment of community vulnerability to the TDG over road, rail and
marine transport throughout the Niagara Region. Many communities (both residential and Commercial)
are located within close proximity to these transportation routes, thus presenting a risk of community
exposure to volatile substances in the event of an accident. The Niagara Region provides the necessary
infrastructure to support all modes of transportation. Instances of hazardous good transportation are
wide spread in this area, therefore the likelihood that a disaster involving hazardous goods in transport
is potentially high. Investigating community vulnerability will be critical for implementing future
mitigation strategies for the Niagara Region Emergency Planning department, as well as increase the
preparedness of local emergency services.
1.2. Client Overview
The Niagara Region Emergency Management division manages the corporate emergency readiness
functions in preparation for any large scale threat to public health and safety and ensures compliance
with the mandatory legislated requirements of the Emergency Management Act. This includes
responsibility for the Regional Emergency Management Plan, Program Advisory Committee, Emergency
Operations Centre, Training and Exercise Strategy, Emergency Recovery Strategy and Emergency
Information Strategy. The Niagara Region works with area municipal emergency coordinators,
emergency response services, the provincial emergency management agency as well as cross border
partners to ensure joint response capabilities and promote disaster resilient communities (Niagara
Region Emergency Management, 2013).
1.3. Study Area
The Niagara transportation corridor represents a large region, covering the majority of the Niagara
Peninsula. This project will examine the extensive transportation networks which define the flow of
goods to, from and throughout the area. Specifically, this project will examine the road, rail and shipping
networks and the associated hazardous good transport that each mode of transportation predominately
carries. Figure 1 displays the study area boundary for this project. The major transportation networks
that will be analyzed for this project are displayed in Figure 2.
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Figure 1 Niagara Region Study Area Boundary
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Figure 2 Niagara Region Transportation Networks
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2.0 Project Goals and Objectives
The goal of this project is to develop a vulnerability and risk assessment of communities (land parcels
deemed residential, commercial or institutional) located within close proximity of transportation
networks known to transport hazardous materials. These communities are at risk of exposure to
hazardous materials given an accident occurs during HAZMAT transportation in the Niagara Region. This
project will provide valuable information on community vulnerability that will be incorporated into the
hazard mitigation planning process developed by Niagara Regions Emergency Management
department. The information produced in the findings of this project will help increase the preparedness
of local emergency services, thus working to effectively minimize the potential impacts of an accident
involving hazardous materials in transport within the Niagara Region.
2.1 Project Deliverables
The project deliverables have been divided into three phases which consist of various tasks to achieve
the successful completion of each milestone. Phases one and two of the project have been completed
on schedule and within budget, with all required deliverables submitted to the client. The third phase of
the project was also completed on schedule, however the work completed for the corresponding tasks
exceeded the estimated time and budget allocation determined for the project proposal. The project
deliverables are outlined in Table 1 Project Deliverables.
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Table 1 Project Deliverables
Phase 1: Project Proposal
Deliverable 1.1: Project Overview Statement
Deliverable 1.2: Project Proposal Presentation
Deliverable 1.3: Proposal Report
Phase 2: Progress Report
Deliverable 2.1: Progress Report
Deliverable 2.2: Progress Report Presentation
Deliverable 2.3: Bi-Weekly Status updates
Phase 3: Final Report
Deliverable 3.1: Analyze hazardous material transportation by road
Deliverable 3.2: Analyze hazardous material transportation by rail
Deliverable 3.3: Analyze hazardous material transportation by marine freight
Deliverable 3.4: Prepare maps of vulnerable communities by municipality
Deliverable 3.5: Final report and presentation
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2.2 Work Breakdown Structure
A Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), which divides the project phases according to major tasks and
subtasks, was developed to provide a layout of the various tasks associated with completing the Niagara
Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis. The successful analysis of community
vulnerability to the transportation of dangerous goods throughout the Niagara Region was reliant on the
completion of each structured task. Hunter Geosystems has completed all major tasks along with the
corresponding subtasks to meet the project deadline of June 13, 2014. Figure 3 displays the project
WBS.
Figure 3 Work Breakdown Structure
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2.3 Literature Reviews
Literature reviews were critical to help our team gain an understanding of similar projects and how GIS
technologies are applied to conduct an analysis on the impact of transporting hazardous materials
through communities. Numerous literature reviews were conducted using various relevant sources prior
to beginning our analysis of community vulnerability for the Niagara Region. Table 4 displays the studies
that have been reviewed by Hunter Geosystems.
Table 2 Literature Reviews
Year Author Title Scope Region
2000 Jianjun Zhang, John
Hodgson, and
Erhan Erkut
Using GIS to assess the risks of
hazardous materials transport
in networks
Assess the routing of
hazardous materials to
understand possible threats
to communities and
environment.
Alberta, Canada
2001 Vedat Verter and
Bahar Y. Kara
A GIS-based Framework for
Hazardous Materials
Transport Risk Assessment
Assessing the hazardous
materials transport risk in a
multicommodity, multiple
origin destination setting.
Ontario and
Quebec, Canada
2007 Shawn M. Strange Alternative Hazardous
Material Routes for Victoria
County that Minimize Risk to
Population
Examining current highway
routes used for the
transportation of hazardous
materials to establish a risk
assessment and offer
alternative routing.
Victoria City,
Texas
2011 McMaster Institute
for Transportation
and Logistics
Movements of Dangerous
Goods Across the Credit
Valley Conservation
Watershed
Assess the movements of
dangerous goods across the
Credit Valley Watershed for
the modes of truck and rail.
Ontario, Canada
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3.0 Summary of Challenges
3.1 Data Collection and Analysis
The beginning phases of this project were marred with issues gaining access to data that would be
applicable for an accurate analysis of community vulnerability to the transportation of dangerous goods.
Hunter Geosystems had signed a confidentiality agreement with CN Rail to obtain their shipment data
for HAZMAT through the Niagara Region. This was facilitated by the client in the early stages of the
project. However, this data was never received due to unforeseen circumstances and never used for our
study. The initial scope of the project also considered the availability of open-source data regarding
HAZMAT road and marine shipments through the Niagara Region Transportation Corridor. This
processes failed to produce relevant information considered applicable to this study and, with client
approval, revisions were made to the project scope. The following section will discuss the challenges of
researching open-source data in further detail.
3.2 Open-source HAZMAT Shipment Data
Hunter Geosystems has investigated numerous open-source resources in attempts to obtain HAZMAT
shipment data for dangerous goods transported through the Niagara Region by road and marine
transport. Extensive online research has been executed, in attempts to find current data regarding the
transportation of dangerous goods throughout the Niagara Region. This proved to be a difficult task, as
most corporations do not provide HAZMAT shipment information to the public due to issues of
confidentiality. Also, it has been difficult to find HAZMAT shipment data for the Niagara Region
specifically, which is crucial for an accurate assessment of community vulnerability.
There have been numerous efforts made to contact the St. Lawrence Seaway as well as the Ministry of
Transportation Ontario (MTO), requesting access to any HAZMAT transportation information.
Unfortunately, MTO has declined our request for information claiming they do not have such
information or are simply unable to release it. Hunter Geosystems was able to contact a few employees
of the St. Lawrence Seaway with a request for HAZMAT shipment data for the Welland Canal. However,
these individuals were not permitted to release the shipment data and referred me to their superiors.
However, the many attempts to contact these individuals were unsuccessful as most simply did not
respond to email or phone messages left by Hunter Geosystems.
It became clear how challenging data acquisition can be for a GIS project of this caliber. The issue of
confidentiality regarding HAZMAT shipment data has significantly impacted our research, proving that
not all information is available via open-sources such as the internet. Corporations do not see a benefit
from the findings of this project; therefore they are reluctant to provide confidential information such as
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HAZMAT shipment data. There are also concerns with the accuracy of open-source data, as it could
present information that is out-of-date or no longer relevant to the study area. Therefore, Hunter
Geosystems took a different approach to complete an analysis of community vulnerability for the
Niagara Region within the established time-line.
4.0 Methodology
4.1 Provided Data
Given the circumstances of time-line constraints with an absolute deadline of June 14, 2014, the client
provided a list of chemicals of interest as well as feature class data for the entire Niagara Region. This
included Land Parcel data and transportation networks such as the Welland Canal, Ministry of
Transportation Ontario (MTO) highways, municipal roads as well as Canadian Pacific (CP) and Canadian
National (CN) railways. Hunter Geosystems used a Niagara Region Municipal Census Subdivision feature
class provided by Niagara College to determine the number of Land Parcels impacted within each
municipality. This data was utilized by Hunter Geosystems to perform an analysis of community
vulnerability to TDG by municipality.
4.2 Hazardous Materials Examined
Due to the lack of open-source data applicable for the study, the client developed a list of Hazardous
Materials of Interest to represents the most commonly transported HAZMAT throughout the Niagara
Region (Table 3). These materials were used to analyze community vulnerability once Impact Buffer
distances were determined. However, the provided HAZMAT list only pertained to road and rail
transportation shipments and did not directly reflect known materials for marine shipments through the
Welland Canal. This is because the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation does not provide
shipment data to the Niagara Region Emergency Planning Department, therefore the specific HAZMAT
transported through the Welland Canal remains unknown.
Hunter Geosystems acquired a Welland Canal Traffic Report for 2012 from the St. Lawrence Seaway
website. The report provided a very general description of potential HAZMAT shipments through the
Welland Canal. This information was used to determine if the specific HAZMAT provided by the Niagara
Region could also be used to represent potential materials aboard a given cargo ship passing through
the Welland Canal. Table 4 displays the shipment information provided within the 2012 Welland Canal
Traffic Report for materials considered HAZMAT. This information displays ship cargo tonnage for
Gasoline, Fuel Oil, Chemicals and Other Petroleum Products.
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For the purpose of this study, the Hazardous Materials of Interest provided by the Niagara Region
served as materials applicable for assessing community vulnerability to HAZMAT shipments through the
Welland Canal. Gasoline/Diesel (1202/1203) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (1075) was utilized to
represent Gasoline, Fuel Oil and Other Petroleum Products and Sulphuric Acid (1831), and Vinyl
Chloride (1086) was utilized to represent Chemicals stated in the 2012 Welland Canal Traffic Report.
Table 3: Hazardous Materials of Interest
Table 4: 2012 Welland Canal Traffic Report
Method of Transportation Hazardous Materials of Interest
Rail Transport
(CN and CP)
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Propane)
1017 Chlorine
1086 Vinyl Chloride (PVC)
1831 Sulphuric Acid
Road Transport
(MTO Highway)
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Propane)
1202 Gasoline
1203 Diesel Fuel
Ship Transport
(Welland Canal)
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Propane)
1086 Vinyl Chloride (PVC)
1202 Gasoline
1203 Diesel Fuel
1831 Sulphuric Acid
Ship Cargo (Welland Canal 2012) Tonnage
Gasoline 339,498
Fuel Oil 1,026,176
Chemicals 289,171
Other Petroleum Products 324,978
TOTAL: 1,979,823
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4.3 Impact Buffer Zones
Once the Hazardous Materials of Interest were established for each method of transportation, the
Impact Buffer zones were investigated using the 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) provided
by the Niagara Region. The ERG is a guidebook for first responders during the initial phase of a
transportation accident involving dangerous goods/hazardous materials, developed jointly by Transport
Canada, the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Secretariat of Transport and Communications of
Mexico (Emergency Response Guidebook, 2004). The ERG provides an assessment of a protective action
distance, considered by Hunter Geosystems as the Impact Buffer zone. Certain parameters were
considered to produce an accurate assessment of the Impact Buffer distances for each of the HAZMAT
used in this study. The ERG Impact Buffer zones provide a downwind distance protection zone for
which the evacuation distance is reflective of either a Small spill (up to 200 Litres) or Large spill (over
200 Litres), occurring either during the Day (any time after sunrise and before sunset) or Night (any time
between sunset and sunrise). According to the ERG, it is important to consider the time of day for which
an accident involving TDG occurs as well as climatic conditions such as wind direction and current
temperature. The Emergency Response Guidebook (2004) states:
Daytime spills in regions with known strong inversions or snow cover, or occurring near sunset,
accompanied by a steady wind, may require an increase in protective action distance. When
these conditions are present, airborne contaminants mix and disperse more slowly and may
travel much farther downwind. In addition, protective action distances may be larger for liquid
spills when either the material or outdoor temperature exceeds 30C (86F).
Preparing for the worst-case-scenario is a critical component for any study associated with emergency
planning/disaster management. For the purpose of this study, all potential accidents are considered as
Large spills due to the nature of HAZMAT shipping by road, rail and marine freight. These methods of
transportation generally contain large quantities of goods during shipment. An average tanker truck has
a capacity of approximately 3,500 Litres and the DOT 111 railway tank cars have a capacity of
approximately 131,000 Litres. Therefore, a potential accident involving HAZMAT in transport will most
likely result in a Large spill if given the circumstances of the accident cause such results (e.g. a worst-
case-scenario accident). Evacuation distances are also provided for spills that involve a fire following an
accident involving HAZMAT in transport. Table 5 details the Impact Buffer zones in kilometers for each
of the HAZMAT examined for this study.
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Table 5 Impact Buffer Zones for Hazardous Materials
Hazardous Material Impact Buffer Zone (km)
1017 Chlorine
Day: 2.4 km
Night: 7.4 km
Fire: 0.8 km
1086 Vinyl Chloride (PVC)
Day: 0.8 km
Night: 0.8 km
Fire: 1.6 km
1831 Sulphuric Acid Day: 2.5 km
Night: 6.5 km
Fire: 0.8 km
1075 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Propane)
Day: 0.8 km
Night: 0.8 km
Fire: 1.6 km
1202 Gasoline
Day: 0.3 km
Night: 0.3 km
Fire: 0.8 km
1203 Diesel Fuel Day: 0.3 km
Night: 0.3 km
Fire: 0.8 km
For the Niagara Transportation Corridor community vulnerability analysis, Impact Buffers (or
evacuations zones) were applied to the corresponding transportation network known to ship the
HAZMAT used in this study. Diurnal conditions (Day, Night) and the influence of Fire on the exposed
material are analyzed for each HAZMAT using the Impact Buffer distances examined in Table 5.
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4.4 Land Parcel Data
Land Parcel Data was used to analyze and identify high risk communities within each municipality of the
Niagara Region. The client provided a Land Parcels feature class containing parcels for the Niagara
Region categorized as Commercial, Farm, Industrial, Institutional, Residential or Special Purpose. The
attribute data for the Land Parcels feature class was queried to display only the parcels of interest such
as residential, institutional, and commercial zones. This process was used to extract the Land Parcels by
their designated category for further analysis and map development.
For the purpose of this study, Residential, Institutional, Commercial and Farm parcels were considered
the vulnerable communities or communities of high risk to exposure in the event of an accident
involving the HAZMAT of interest. It is important to note that the Land Parcel data categorized as Farm
refers to all Farm parcels that have at least one residence. This was utilized in the development of maps
to highlight all impacted Land Parcels with a known residence. Any land parcel with a known residence
impacted by an incident involving TDG serves as a top priority community in the event of an accident.
Our analysis provides the number of the Residential, Institutional, Commercial and Farms (land with at
least one residence) Land Parcels that fall within a given HAZMAT Impact Buffer zone. The remaining
impacted Land Parcels are considered for the total number of parcels impacted within each
municipality.
Hunter Geosystems developed municipal impact tables to display the number of parcels impacted
within each municipality according to each HAZMAT and the corresponding parameters examined in this
study. Each table provides the total number of parcels impacted within each municipality as well as the
number of Residential, Commercial, Institutional and Farm parcels. All municipal impact tables can be
found in the appendix of this report.
4.5 Mapping Municipal Community Impact to TDG
It was important that all the map layouts created for the Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and
Vulnerability Analysis follow the CAD and Mapping standards established by Hunter Geosystems. The
Land Parcel feature class provided by the Niagara Region was used as the main data source for
developing municipal community vulnerability maps. Municipal maps were created to display the
downwind Impact Buffer zone of accident involving HAZMAT in transport occurs at any point along the
specific transportation network.
For the purpose of mapping, Farm parcels (with at least one residence) and Residential parcels within
the Impact Buffers were categorized as together, colour coded red and labeled as a Vulnerable
Residential Zone. This provides an effective visual representation of the potential impact an accident
involving TDG could have specifically on Land Parcels that contain at least one residence (a critical
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component to this study). Institutional Land Parcels were extracted from the initial Land Parcel data,
colour coded Purple and labeled as Vulnerable Institutional Zones. The same process applied to Land
Parcels categorized as Commercial, which were displayed Yellow and labeled Vulnerable Commercial
Zones. All remaining Land Parcels falling within the determined Impact Buffer zone are colour coded
Orange and labeled Other Vulnerable Communities.
These maps provide a clear visual understanding as to the extent of community vulnerability within each
municipality within the study area. The locations of fire stations, ambulance stations, police stations and
hospitals are indicated on each map to display the proximity of such emergency services in the event of
an accident involving HAZMAT.
Due to the random nature of transportation accidents, our maps examine the potential impact of an
accident occurring at any given location along the specific transportation network examined. In the
event of an accident involving one or more of the HAZMAT used in this study, emergency services can
use the location of the accident to determine the vulnerable communities that require immediate
evacuation. All maps are provided as a digital copy to client and can also be found in the appendix of this
report.
4.6 Geodatabases
Geodatabases were used to store all the relevant geospatial data
used for this analysis. The geodatabases were designed according
to Hunter Geosystems CAD and Mapping Standards to ensure data
integrity for future use. Geodatabases were created for each
transportation method and organized according to the type of
hazardous material being transported. This was utilized for map
development as well as the land parcel analysis used to determine
the specific parcels impacted within each municipality.
Geodatabases were also developed organize the shapefiles that
indicate total municipal impact according to the transportation
method, the associated material being analyzed and the diurnal
condition/presence of fire in the event of an accident involving
TDG. Figure 4 displays and example of geodatabase design by
Hunter Geosystems.
Figure 4 Geodatabase Design
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4.7 MXD Files
MXD documents are mapping files used by ESRI ArcGIS software. The premise of our project design was
to provide the Niagara Region with data that could be utilized by their GIS technicians in the event of a
transportation accident involving a HAZMAT. With this in mind, an MXD was created for every
municipality that experiences community impact to HAZMAT transportation according to the
transportation method being analyzed. Therefore, if an accident actually occurs within the Niagara
Region, our MXD files provide a platform for mapping the location of that accident using the parameters
for assessing community vulnerability as discussed in section 4.3 Impact Buffer Zones.
5.0 Findings and Analysis
Our findings indicate how a large number of communities within the Niagara Region are located in close
proximity to major transportation networks used for shipping various HAZMAT. Upon completing the
analysis of HAZMAT transportation through the Niagara Region by rail, road and marine freight we have
determined that petroleum products represent the most commonly transported HAZMAT. Specifically,
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) was the most common HAZMAT for all three transportation methods
analyzed in this study. LPG in transport produced the highest potential community vulnerability for
HAZMAT shipped by via major highways. This is a result of the Impact Buffer zones associated with an
LPG spill in consideration of both diurnal conditions as well as the presence of fire (producing an
evacuation zone twice as large as without fire). To provide a more detailed understanding of the
potential impact a rail accident involving LPG could present to municipalities within the Niagara Region,
Hunter Geosystems has included charts, tables and maps to display the extent of community
vulnerability. All municipal maps and vulnerable community tables can be found in the appendix of this
report.
Our results suggest the highest community vulnerability is found in the municipalities with highest
number of Land Parcels, such as St. Catharines, Niagara Falls and Welland. Considering the large
populations found in these municipalities, emergency services must consider the potential impact the
transportation of such materials could be extensive. Therefore, mitigation strategies must be in place to
promote a successful response to transportation accident(s) involving such HAZMAT. Figure 5 and Figure
6 displays charts indicating community vulnerability within each municipality to the transportation of
LPG via rail and Table 6 and Table 7 provide the corresponding number of Land Parcels (in total as well
as by category of vulnerable community) associated with each. Figure 7 provides an example of
potential community vulnerability to LPG transported by rail for the municipality of St. Catharines.
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Figure 5 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (LPG Rail Accident No Fire)
Table 6 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (LPG Rail Accident - No Fire)
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Figure 6 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (LPG Rail Accident With Fire)
Table 7 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (LPG Rail Accident With Fire)
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Figure 7 St. Catharines Community Vulnerability (LPG Rail Accident)
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5.1 Community Vulnerability: Rail HAZMAT
Chemical materials analyzed in this study, Chlorine (1017) and Sulphuric Acid (1831) specifically,
produced the largest Impact Buffer zones and therefore impacted the highest number of Land Parcels.
For the purpose of this study, Chlorine and Sulphuric Acid were analyzed as HAZMAT shipped by rail and
marine freight as these are the most common transportation methods used. As determined by the ERG,
the Impact Buffer zones associated with these materials were highly contingent on the diurnal condition
for which an accident (causing spill/exposure) occurs. Unlike the other materials examined, the presence
of fire in the event of an accident involving Chlorine and/or Sulphuric Acid will result in a smaller
evacuation distance (0.8 km) compared to an accident that occurs during the day (~2.5 km) or at night
(6.5km - 7.4 km). Therefore, the diurnal condition of a TDG accident involving Chlorine and/or Sulphuric
Acid is critical to understand because of the significant increase of community vulnerability if the
accident occurs at night.
Figure 8 provides a chart which displays municipal community vulnerability to and accident involving
Chlorine transportation by rail, given a fire occurs. Figure 9 displays municipal community vulnerability
if the accident occurs during the day, and Figure 10 displays municipal community vulnerability if the
accident occurs during the night. The corresponding tables indicate the total number of parcels
impacted within each municipality as well as the specific number of vulnerable parcels by category.
These results indicate how extensive the impact of such an accident can have on communities within the
Niagara Region that are located within the Impact Buffers associated with a transportation accident
involving Chlorine. Special consideration must be given to the increased impact of such an accident if it
occurs at night, due to the significant increase in the required evacuation distance.
With active railways passing through the most populous municipalities within the Niagara Region, it is
important to analyze the potential community vulnerability to HAZMAT with such high risks associated
(given an accident occurs during transportation). Our findings reveal that over 15,000 residential parcels
alone could be potentially impacted within each of the three most populous municipalities (Welland,
Niagara Falls and St. Catharines) if a rail accident involving Chlorine occurs at night. Over 40,000
residential parcels are considered vulnerable in St. Catharines, which has the highest population in the
Niagara Region. If these conditions are present and the accident was to occur at any point along a
railway within the St. Catharines, the potential community vulnerability is quite extensive. Figure 11
provides a map of community vulnerability for Chlorine transportation by rail for the municipality of St.
Catharines.
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Figure 8 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Chlorine Rail Accident With Fire)
Table 8 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Chlorine Rail Accident With Fire)
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Figure 9 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Chlorine Rail Accident Day)
Table 9 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Chlorine Rail Accident Day)
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Figure 10 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Chlorine Rail Accident Night)
Table 10 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Chlorine Rail Accident Night)
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Figure 11 St. Catharines Community Vulnerability (Chlorine Rail Accident)
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5.2 Community Vulnerability: Road HAZMAT
Our analysis suggests that Gasoline/Diesel (1202/1203) is most commonly transported via road shipping.
In comparison to the other HAZMAT analyzed, Gasoline/diesel also represented smallest Impact Buffer
zone in the event of exposure and does not present an increased risk in according to diurnal condition
for which the incident occurs. However, the Impact Buffer does increase if there is a fire resulting from
an accident/spill. This is important to analyze due to the flammability of these materials, suggesting
there is a considerable probability that fire will result in the event of a transportation accident via road
shipments.
Although these materials are not as volatile as others examined in this study, community vulnerability is
still considerably high if an accident were to occur along a portion of highway within the Niagara Region.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 along with the corresponding tables display the extent of community
vulnerability. Once again, the highest potential community vulnerability remains within Niagara Falls and
St. Catharines, and considerable impact is apparent within Grimsby, Fort Erie, Port Colborne and
Thorold. This is a direct result of the major highways that pass through these municipalities. Our results
provide a clear visual of the increased community vulnerability given a fire is present following an
accident involving Gas/Diesel. Therefore emergency services must prepare for the worst-case-scenario
accident, such as the instance of fire, which will increase the risk of exposure for surrounding
communities.
It was important to analyze the municipalities located close to border crossings that accommodate
transport trucks, as these locations are known to experience high levels of traffic. Figure 14 displays a
map of the potential community vulnerability to a road accident involving Gas/Diesel in transport for the
municipality of Fort Erie (a popular border crossing for transport trucks into the USA).
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Figure 12 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Gas/Diesel Road Accident No Fire)
Table 11 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Gas/Diesel Road Accident No Fire)
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Figure 13 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Gas/Diesel Road Accident Fire)
Table 12 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Gas/Diesel Road Accident Fire)
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Figure 14 Fort Erie Community Vulnerability (Gas/Diesel Road Accident)
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5.3 Community Vulnerability: Ship HAZMAT
The Welland Canal represents unique infrastructure for the Niagara Region, as this transportation
network define the flow of goods along the St. Lawrence Seaway by allowing ships to pass from Lake
Ontario to Lake Erie through a series of eight locks. As the Welland Canal Traffic Report states (Table 4),
almost 2,000,000 tonnes of hazardous cargo passed through the Welland Canal in 2012. Our analysis of
community vulnerability examined the potential shipment of HAZMAT via the Welland Canal using the
materials provided by the client to represent the most commonly transported HAZMAT through the
Niagara Region. For the purpose of this report, we will present the findings of the most significant
potential community vulnerability to ship transport.
Although the Welland Canal intersects only five of the twelve municipalities within the Niagara Region
(St. Catharines, Niagara-on-the-lake, Thorold, Welland and Port Colborne), certain HAZMAT carried by
ship can have widespread impacts if exposure occurs following a shipping accident. Our analysis of
community vulnerability to a ship accident involving Sulphuric Acid indicates that municipalities such as
Pelham, Wainfleet and Niagara Falls experience potential community vulnerability if exposure occurs at
night. This is a direct result of a significant increase in evacuation distance according to diurnal condition
for materials such as Sulphuric Acid and Chlorine.
Figure 15, Figure 16 and Figure 17 along with the corresponding tables displays community vulnerability
to a potential accident involving the transportation of Sulphuric Acid through the Welland Canal. It
becomes apparent how extensive the impact such material has on communities given an accident
occurs at any point along the canal during shipment. As discussed earlier, the diurnal condition for which
the accident occurs is extremely important to analyze due to the significant increase in evacuation
distance. Municipalities such as St. Catharines and Welland experience a high level of community
vulnerability, which is critical for emergency services to identify considering these municipalities contain
a large number of vulnerable land parcels as well as large populations. If an accident were to occur at
night within Welland or Thorold, the potential exposure could impact the majority of the municipality.
Figure 18 displays the total potential community vulnerability for a shipping accident involving Sulphuric
Acid.
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Figure 15 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Fire)
Table 13 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Fire)
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Figure 16 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Day)
Table 14 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Day)
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Figure 17 Community Vulnerability by Municipality (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Night)
Table 15 Municipal Land Parcels Impacted (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident Night)
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Figure 18 Welland Community Vulnerability (Sulphuric Acid Ship Accident)
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6.0 Summary of Project Management
In reference to the WBS (Figure 3), Hunter Geosystems divided the project into 5 major tasks with
corresponding subtasks. This section will outline the progress of each task to-date, analyzing the
proposed start and end dates, the estimated work required (in hours) along with estimated cost and
compares these values to the actual start and end date as well as the actual work completed and the
corresponding costs incurred. Slight revisions were made to accommodate changes to the project
schedule and budget. All tasks were completed by the absolute finish date of June 13, 2014. Figure 19
displays the final budget for each of the major tasks for the project. Figure 20 displays the baseline cost
estimated for each task and compares these values to the actual cost associated.
Figure 19 Cost Breakdown by task (estimated)
$9,824.46
$4,250.00
$1,785.00
$2,465.00
$13,939.99
Cost Breakdown by Major Task
Project Management
Understanding the Project
Collect/Analyze GIS Data
Assemble Geodatabases
Prepare Maps of Processed
Data/GIS Analysis
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Figure 20 Comparison of Baseline Cost to Actual Cost of Major Tasks
$0.00
$2,000.00
$4,000.00
$6,000.00
$8,000.00
$10,000.00
$12,000.00
$14,000.00
C
o
s
t
Project Task
Baseline Cost vs. Actual Cost
Baseline Cost
AC (Actual Cost)
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6.1 Project Management
The first task has been defined as Project Management, which includes on-going meetings with the
client and academic advisor as well as the bi-weekly status updates. This task included planning out the
project to gain an understanding of the project scope and required materials. This information was used
to develop a Project Overview Statement which was presented to the client upon approval from the
academic advisor. The Project Management task was completed slightly over budget (within
contingency) and was completed on schedule.
Table 16 displays information regarding the Project Management task, providing an overview of the
proposed start and end dates, estimated work and estimated costs and compares them to the actual
work completed and the actual costs associated with this task.
Table 16 Project Management
Project Management
Proposed Start Date: Thurs 9/26/13
Proposed End Date: Fri 6/13/14
Estimated Work (hours): 43.5
Estimated Cost: $9,522
Actual Start Date: Thurs 9/26/13
Actual Finish Date: Fri 6/13/14
Actual Work (hours): 45.5
Actual Cost: $9,824
Percentage Complete: 100%
Budget Discrepancy: ($302)
Deliverables: Project Overview Statement, Bi-weekly Status
Updates
Task Complete
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6.2 Understanding the Project
Understanding the project was essential for Hunter Geosystems to determine how to accurately
produce an analysis of community vulnerability to the transportation of dangerous goods throughout
the Niagara Region. This task included extensive background research and literature reviews of similar
projects. This information along with recommendations from the client allowed Hunter Geosystems to
identify the project objectives as well as to define the project deliverables. This task included the
preparation of a proposal report and presentation, which was approved by the academic advisor and
submitted to the client. This task was completed on schedule and remained within budget.
Table 17 examines this task, providing an overview of the proposed start and end dates, estimated work
and estimated costs and compares them to the actual work completed and the actual costs associated
with this task.
Table 17 Understanding the Project
Understanding the Project
Proposed Start Date: Thurs 9/26/13
Proposed End Date: Fri 1/31/14
Estimated Work (hours): 47
Estimated Cost: $3,995
Actual Start Date: Thurs 9/26/13
Actual Finish Date: Fri 12/13/13
Actual Work (hours): 50
Actual Cost: $4,250
Percentage Complete: 100%
Budget Discrepancy: ($195)
Deliverables: Proposal Presentation, Proposal Report
Task Complete
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6.3 Collecting/Analyzing HAZMAT Data
As discussed in Section 3.0 Summary of Challenges, there were significant challenges associated with
obtaining open-source HAZMAT shipment data and revisions were made to the initial project
methodology as a result of timeline constraints. Once the list of HAZMAT was established, Hunter
Geosystems obtained Land Parcel data for the Niagara Region along with the ERG to determine Impact
Buffer distances for an analysis of community vulnerability. This task was completed slightly behind
schedule but remained on budget.
Table 18 outlines the proposed start and end dates, estimated work and estimated costs and compares
them to the actual work completed and the actual costs associated with this task to date.
Table 18 Collect/Analyze HAZMAT Data
Collect/Analyze HAZMAT Data
Proposed Start Date: Mon 2/3/14
Proposed End Date: Wed 3/19/14
Estimated Work (hours): 21
Estimated Cost: $1,785
Actual Start Date: Thurs 2/9/14
Date Completed: Tues 4/15/14
Actual Work (hours): 21
Actual Cost: $1,1785
Percentage Complete: 100%
Budget Discrepancy: $0
Deliverables: Progress Presentation, Progress Report
Task Complete
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6.4 Assemble Geodatabases
Assembling geodatabases according to hazardous material shipments by mode of transportation was
crucial for data organization as well as data analysis. Progress on this task did not start until data was
received and analysis began. The task began behind scheduled however managed to take less work than
proposed. Therefore, the actual cost associated with completing this task was lower than the proposed
cost.
Table 19 examines the proposed start and end dates, estimated work and estimated costs and compares
them to the actual work completed and the actual costs associated with this task to date.
Table 19 Assemble Geodatabases
Assemble Geodatabases
Proposed Start Date: Mon 2/4/14
Proposed End Date: Wed 5/13/14
Estimated Work (hours): 45
Estimated Cost: $3,825
Actual Start Date: Tues 4/1/14
Revised Finish Date: Wed 5/13/14
Actual Work (hours): 29
Actual Cost: $2,465
Percentage Complete: 100%
Budget Discrepancy: $1,360
Task Complete
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6.5 Prepare Maps of Processed Data
The preparation and creation of final maps was one of the most critical components of this project,
providing a visual overview of community vulnerability in the Niagara Region. All maps were created
using ArcMap 10.1. Many hours were required to complete this task, as detailed map layouts were
developed and provided to the client as digital and hardcopy. The MXD files and their associated feature
classes were also organized to maintain data integrity for future use. This task was completed ahead of
schedule but over the proposed budget for completion due to the extra work required.
Table 20 examines the proposed start and end dates, estimated work and estimated costs and compares
them to the actual work completed and the actual costs associated with this task to date.
Table 20 Prepare Maps of Processed Data
Prepare Maps of Processed Data/GIS Analysis
Proposed Start Date: Tue 4/22/14
Proposed End Date: Fri 6/13/14
Estimated Work (hours): 141
Estimated Cost: $11,985
Actual Start Date: 4/22/14
Revised Finish Date: Mon 6/2/14
Actual Work (hours): 164
Actual Cost: $13,939
Percentage Complete: 100%
Budget Discrepancy: ($1,954)
Deliverables: Final Presentation, Final Report
Task Complete
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7.0 Budget Analysis
NOTE: This project budget has been prepared for learning purposes only and in no way is the client
expected to compensate for these proposed costs. The value of this project is being donated to the
client by the student consultant, Niagara College and the advisory staff.
7.1 Summary of Resources
ESRI ArcGIS software was used extensively for this project as well as Dell Precision T1650 desktop. These
resources were calculated into the final budget as resource cost. Mileage was calculated for attending
client meetings. Figure 19 displays a chart of the resources used for this project and the associated cost
of each. The total cost of resources including personnel was $32,264 before tax.
Figure 21 Breakdown of Resource Costs
$26,179
$1,500
$4,500
$85
Breakdown of Resource Costs
Personnel
Hardware
Software
Transportation
Total Cost: $32,264
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7.2 Final Budget
Microsoft Project was utilized to track the amount of work done for each task and subtask (in hours) as
well as the costs associated with the work completed. This information was used to determine values for
the project final budget.
Upon completion, the Planned Value (PV) of the project was calculated to be $31,320. The Actual Cost
(AC) of work completed exceeded PV, totaling $32,264. Calculations reveal that the Earned Value (EV) of
the project is $28,829. The Cost Variance (CV) was calculated to determine if the remained on budget.
Due to the actual work required to complete each task, the Cost Variance (CV) was calculated to be -
$944 which remained within the planned contingency of +/-10% of PV. This is supported by the Cost
Performance Index (CPI) ratio of 0.98, which indicates that for every dollar spent there was $0.98 of
work completed. Schedule Variance (SV) will indicate the difference between EV and PV (Booz, Allen, &
Hamilton). The SV was calculated as $2,491 which indicates that the project is ahead of schedule. This
calculation is further supported by the Schedule Performance Index (SPI) of 1.01. Table 21 below
displays the project budget overview. The total cost of the project (with tax) was $36,458.
Table 21 Project Budget Overview
The Earned Value Over Time Report (Figure 22) provides a visual representation comparing EV, PV and
AC and indicates how this has progressed over the duration of the project. The graph supports the
project status, indicating that the project is slightly over budget (within contingency) and finished ahead
of schedule.
Project Budget Overview
Planned Value (PV): $31,320
Actual Cost (AC): $32,264
Earned Value (EV): $28,829
Cost Variance (CV): ($944)
Within Budget
Schedule Variance (SV): $2,491
Ahead of Schedule
Cost Performance Index (CPI): 0.98
Schedule Performance Index (SPI): 1.01
Taxes (+13%): $4,194
TOTAL COST: $36,458
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Figure 22 Earned Value over Time Report
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8.0 Recommendations
Our analysis provides a detailed examination of the dangers associated with transporting HAZMAT
through communities. It became clear that certain HAZMAT can produce significant community
vulnerability if exposed at night, with an increase impact evacuation zone in comparison to daytime
exposure. The increase in community vulnerability according to diurnal condition suggests that
regulations should be established to prevent certain materials from being transported during the night.
This would significantly lower the impact of a potential transportation accident that occurs at involving
HAZMAT such as Chlorine and Sulphuric Acid examined for this study. Hunter Geosystems recommends
that such regulations be put into action to minimize the threat of TDG via the Niagara Transportation
Corridor. Politics played a significant role in the lack of data accessible for this study. We recommend
the Niagara Region request for access to HAZMAT shipping information from the St. Lawrence Seaway,
MTO as well as major rail companies to continue an active response program to promote the
development of future mitigation strategies.
8.1 Emergency Response Application
This project was designed to offer a GIS platform for emergency services to utilize in the event of an
accident involving TDG along any of the major transportation networks of the Niagara Transportation
Corridor. Our goal was to design the MXD files and geodatabases to enable future geoprocessing for GIS
technicians at the Niagara Region for assessing immediate community vulnerability using the known
location of an accident involving TDG as well as the HAZMAT exposed. Our data allows the GIS
technician to use the known location of an accident and map it along the transportation network of
interest. Once this location is established on the MXD, the user can determine the diurnal condition of
the accident as well as the presence of fire and use this information to apply the corresponding Impact
Buffer zones according to the type of HAZMAT exposed. Figure 23 provides an example of this
application for a rail accident that occurs at a specific location in Niagara Falls while transporting Vinyl
Chloride.
This process will provide emergency services with an accurate assessment of vulnerable communities
impacted by a specific accident involving TDG within the Niagara Region. Hunter Geosystems
recommends that the Niagara Region Emergency Planning department utilize applications such as this to
help emergency services develop mitigation strategies to help minimize the potential impact to
vulnerable communities of high risk to exposure.
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Figure 23 Example of Emergency Response Application
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9.0 Conclusion
Our analysis has determined that many vulnerable communities in the Niagara Region are located within
a close proximity to transportation networks used to transport hazardous materials. We have
established a list of HAZMAT which represents the most commonly transported dangerous goods
though the Niagara Region and used this information to develop an assessment of community
vulnerability according to the type of HAZMAT involved in a potential accident during shipment.
Numerous challenges were experienced in an attempt to obtain open-source HAZMAT shipment data
and revisions were made to the project methodology in order to complete the project for an absolute
deadline of June 13, 2014. The final budget for the project upon completion was $36,458.
Identifying communities vulnerable to the exposure of hazardous materials is critical in order to ensure
mitigation strategies will be affective in the event of a disaster involving TDG. This project provides a
practical GIS platform for emergency services to utilize in the event of an accident involving TDG along
major transportation networks of the Niagara Transportation Corridor.
Our analysis has utilized Land Parcel data provided by the Niagara Region to develop maps of
community vulnerability to the TDG as well as MXD files accessible by GIS technicians at the Niagara
Region in the event of an accident involving HAZMAT in transport. The Emergency Response Guidebook
was used specifically to determine Impact Buffer zones according to the type of HAZMAT being
analyzed. Results of our analysis indicate that the impact of certain HAZMAT exposure is highly
contingent on the diurnal condition and/or presence of a fire when an accident occurs. If certain
HAZMAT is exposed following an accident at night, the distance of the Impact Buffer zone increases
significantly. Therefore, we recommend that regulations be established to limit/prevent the
transportation of certain goods during the night to minimize the potential impact to communities within
the Niagara Region.
Hunter Geosystems would like to formally acknowledge Darby Pierson and the Niagara Region
Emergency Management office as well as Niagara College for providing the opportunity to participate in
this project. We are confident that the outcome of this project will benefit both the Niagara Region
Emergency Management and local emergency services as they proceed to develop a Hazard and
Mitigation Strategy and Plan in 2014.
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Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis
Acknowledgements
Hunter Geosystems would like to formally thank the following people/ institutions for the
support throughout the duration of this project:
Darby Pierson
Emergency Planner, Niagara Region
Mike Wallace, CET, OLS, OLIP
Academic Advisor, Niagara College
Niagara College Canada
Final Report
June 11, 2014
48 | P a g e
Niagara Transportation Corridor Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis
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authorities-want-closer-look-at-cargo-from-train-disaster/
Booz, Allen, & Hamilton. (n.d.). Earned Value Management Tutorial. Retrieved March 18, 2014, from
Department of Energy:
http://www.srs.gov/general/EFCOG/04Training/DOETutorials/Mod6MetandPerfMeas.pdf
Emergency Response Guidebook. (2004). Transport Canada, US Department of Transportation,
Secretariat of Transport and Communications. Provided by Niagara Region on April 1, 2014.
McMaster Institute for Transportation and Logistics. (2011). Movements of Dangerous Goods Across the
Credit Valley Conservation Watershed. Retrieved December 1, 2013 from
http://mitl.mcmaster.ca/research/documents/MITL_Credit_Valley.pdf
Niagara Region Emergency Management. (2013). Niagara Community Information Database. Retrieved
December 3, 2013 from http://niagara.cioc.ca/record/NIA0554
Wallace, M. (2014 ). Final Report Terms of Reference. Niagara-on-the-Lake: Niagara College.