S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 02330306

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR

6 March 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Khair Ulla Said Wali
Khairkhwa
Current/True Name and Aliases: Khirullah Said Wali
Khairkhwa , Wali Herat
Place of Birth: Argastan, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan
(AF)
Date of Birth: 1967
Citizenship: Afghanistan
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000579DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention
Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 28 April 2007.
b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee was a senior Taliban official serving as the
Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat, and a military commander. Detainee was directly
associated to Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Taliban Supreme Commander Mullah
Muhammad Omar, and was added to the UN financial freeze list. Following the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks, detainee represented the Taliban during meetings with
Iranian officials seeking to support hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee also
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330306

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
attended a meeting at the direction of UBL, reportedly accompanied by members of
HAMAS. Detainee and his deputy were probably associated with a militant training camp in
Herat operated by deceased al-Qaida commander (in Iraq) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Detainee
was identified as a narcotics trafficker and probably used his position and influences to
become one of the major opium drug lords in Western Afghanistan. Detainee probably used
profits from drugs to promote Taliban interests in the area. JTF-GTMO determined this
detainee to be:
A HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies
A LOW threat from a detention perspective
Of HIGH intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: There are no significant changes to detainees

assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.
Added alias Wali Herat 1

4. (U) Detainees Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainees own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee grew up as a refugee in Pakistan (PK) and has no
formal education, although he noted he studied Islam in school. Detainee was a leader of his
tribe (Popalzai) until the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan. After which, detainee
became a Taliban member and was selected to various Taliban positions based on his
trustworthiness. Detainee served as Taliban spokesman from 1995 to 1996, Taliban Minister
of Interior from 1996 to 27 October 1999, and Governor of Herat Province from 28 October
1999 to December 2001. 2 Detainee accepted the positions based on opportunity and out of
concern for his tribes well-being. 3 During detainees term as the Taliban Governor of Herat,
detainee worked primarily with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and focused on
civilian aspects of Herat Province. Malawi Hanan, aka Abd al-Hanan, ISN US9AF001592DP (AF-1592, Bagram), detainees deputy and a Taliban Supreme Commander
Mullah Muhammad Omar appointee, was responsible for all Arab and military affairs

000758 SIR 30-Apr-2003, 000758 SIR 30-Oct-2006

000579 HANDNOTE 07-FEB-2002, 000579 SIR 06-SEP-2006, IIR 6 034 0691 02, 000579 KB 05-Dec-2002,
000579 AFG Detainees DB entry 1-May-2002
3
IIR 6 034 0691 02

2
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
associated with Herat Province. 4 Detainee denies knowledge of extremist activities,
including training camps, personnel recruitment, or weapons. 5
b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: During his tenure as spokesman for the Taliban,
detainee traveled between Herat and Chaman, PK, on numerous occasions to file official
press statements. As Governor of Herat Province, detainee traveled to Kabul, AF, only
once. 6 Detainee met Mullah Omar twice during his tenure as governor, once to attend the
funeral of Omars son, and later to discuss Taliban military recruitment efforts in Herat
Province. 7
c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee is a friend of current Afghan President,
Hamid Karzai. Immediately prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Mullah Omar
approached detainee concerning his relationship with Karzai. Omar did not trust Karzai and
told detainee that the relationship was under scrutiny. 8 On 3 October 2001, Mullah Abd alManan Niyazi, detainee, and two additional Taliban officials traveled to Islam Qalah, AF
near the Afghanistan-Iran (IR) border for a meeting initiated by Iran, possibly by Irans
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 9 Iranian officials offered to broker a coalition
between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban to unite in their fight against US intervention.
The Iranian delegation offered to open the borders to Arabs who wanted to cross into
Afghanistan to fight against US and Coalition forces.10 When the Taliban lost control,
detainee contacted Karzai to discuss a position with the new government and detainees
personal safety. Several Karzai associates met with detainee in the time between the
Talibans fall and his arrest. 11
5. (U) Capture Information:
a. (S//NF) According to detainee, he traveled to Chaman, Pakistan in January 2002. In
Chaman, detainee called Wali Karzai, Hamid Karzais brother, to negotiate surrender and

IIR 6 034 0442 02, IIR 6 034 0568 02; Analyst Note: AF-1592 was captured by US forces on 11 June 2004. For
additional details see 001592 AFG Detainees DB entry 12-Jun-2004, and 001592 CENTCOM AFG BAT Entry 11Apr-2005.
5
IIR 6 034 0691 02, 000579 SIR 18-APR-2005
6
IIR 6 034 0568 02, IIR 6 034 0539 02, Analyst Note: Detainee used the term wayan, or official spokesman. See
000579 SIR 26-MAY-2005.
7
000579 SIR 02-MAY-2005, 000579 SIR 21-JAN-2005
8
IIR 6 034 0459 03
9
Analyst Note: Abd al-Manan Niyazi was the Taliban Governor of Kabul. Reporting from mid-March 2006
indicated Mullah Omar was providing Abd al-Manan Niyazi with funds to conduct attacks against US and Coalition
forces in Herat Province. See TD-314/20513-06. Variants of Islam Qalah include Eslam Qaleh.
10
IIR 2 340 6656 02, IIR 6 034 0691 02
11
IIR 6 034 0459 03

3
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
integration into the new government. 12 The following day, Abd al-Manan (probably Abd alManan Niyazi), a former Governor of Kabul, arrived and invited detainee to his house. Soon
after detainee arrived at Manans house (16 February 2002), Pakistani border patrol arrived
with orders to arrest Manan. Manan was able to escape, but detainee was arrested.13 US and
Coalition forces were aware of detainees movement within Pakistan in early January 2002,
indicating detainee was also a target of the raid. 14 Pakistani authorities held detainee for 18
days until he was transferred to US custody in Quetta, PK. 15
b. (S) Property Held: None
c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 1 May 2002
d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the
following:
Taliban weapon shipments from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar in 1998
Taliban leaders living in Pakistan
Demography of the Herat area
Iranian support to extremist groups in Afghanistan
Iranian intelligence collection capabilities
Iranian support to Taliban through arm shipments, to include air defense weapons and
border crossing procedures.

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainees Account: Detainee is extremely intelligent and may

have detailed knowledge about the inner workings of the Taliban than any other detainee held at
JTF-GTMO. Detainee provided a vast amount of information, but has not given sensitive,
unique, and possibly incriminating information about himself or high profile Taliban and alQaida members. Detainee refused to photo-identify his deputy claiming that he did not want AF1592 to be captured. 16 Detainee has attempted to distance himself from the opium trade.17
Detainee stressed his commitment to public service as motivation for accepting a post as the
Governor of Herat Province, rather than strong support of the Taliban ideology. 18 Detainee

12

IIR 6 034 1283 04, IIR 6 034 0539 02

IIR 6 034 0442 02, IIR 6 034 0539 02
14
IIR 7 300 0267 02
15
000579 SIR 30-DEC-04
16
IIR 6 034 0810 04
17
000579 SIR 03-SEP-2004, 000579 SIR 04-NOV-2005
18
000579 SIR 26-MAY-2005
13

4
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
claimed to be a long-time family friend of current Afghan President, Hamid Karzai19 and
pledged to support the new administration if released. 20
7. (U) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat
to the US, its interests and allies.
b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee was a senior Taliban official
serving as the Minister of Interior, Governor of Herat, and a military commander. Detainee
was directly associated to UBL and Mullah Omar and was added to the UN financial freeze
list. Detainee attended a meeting at the direction of UBL, along with members of HAMAS.
In his position as Governor of Herat Province, detainee represented the Taliban and attended
meetings between Taliban and Iranian officials seeking to support hostilities against US and
Coalition forces. Detainee and his deputy were probably associated with a militant training
camp in Herat operated by deceased al-Qaida commander (in Iraq) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Detainee was identified as a narcotics trafficker and probably used his position and
influences to become one of the premier opium drug lords in Western Afghanistan. Detainee
probably used profits from drugs to promote Taliban interests in the area.
(S//NF) Detainee was a senior member of the Taliban who was trusted and respected
by both UBL and Mullah Omar. Detainee was the Governor of Herat Province and
formerly the Minister of Interior.
(S//NF) Detainee acknowledged he served as Taliban spokesman, Taliban
Minister of Interior, and as Taliban Governor of Herat Province during a period of
hostilities with US and Coalition forces. 21
(S//NF) Detainee attempted to distance his association with Taliban military
affairs in Herat stating he worked primarily with NGOs, while his deputy AF1592 was responsible for all Arab and military affairs. 22 However, recovered alWafa NGO documents from Herat Province list AF-1592, but do not mention
detainee, 23 the al-Wafa director acknowledged meeting with AF-1592, 24 and
detainee has denied meeting anyone from al-Wafa. 25
(S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee may have wanted to place responsibility for
his actions related to Taliban and Arab militant affairs on his deputy, although it

19

IIR 6 034 0459 03, IIR 6 034 1283 04

000579 SIR 05-OCT-2004
21
000579 HANDNOTE 07-FEB-2002, 000579 SIR 06-SEP-2006, IIR 6 034 0691 02, 000579 KB 05-Dec-2002
22
IIR 6 034 0442 02, IIR 6 034 0568 02
23
AFGP-2002-900414, AFGP-2002-900424, AFGP-2002-900024
24
IIR 6 034 0618 02
25
000579 SIR 27-Aug-2007
20

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JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
is unlikely AF-1592 acted independently. As governor or Herat, it is probable
detainee also met members of the Herat office of al-Wafa, an NGO created with
the assistance of UBL in Afghanistan and whose senior officers met with senior
Taliban officials. 26
(S) The UN added detainee to the financial freeze list pursuant to UN Security
Council Regulation (UNSCR) 1267. The list identified detainee as the former
Governor of Herat and the Governor-General of the Northwestern Zone which
included the provinces of Farah, Herat, Badghis, Nimroz and Ghor. UNSCR 1267
requires member states to freeze financial resources of suspected Taliban members. 27
(S) Detainees willingness to support the Taliban objectives was reported by
the Pakistani Military Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) which
assessed detainee to be a hardliner in his support of the Taliban philosophy. 28
(S/NF) Possibly related to his duties as Governor-General, detainee
commanded Taliban forces that conquered Mazar-e-Sharif in 1996 and was
known to have close ties to UBL. 29
(C) Similarly, in 1997 an Afghan embassy official in Islamabad, PK,
identified detainee as acting Minister of Interior and the senior Taliban
commander of the northern portion of the country, who oversaw Taliban offensive
operations against anti-Taliban factions in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif. 30
(S//NF) A reliable contact stated UBL named detainee as a Taliban representative
to a joint delegation in March 2001. The delegation was tasked to meet with
Northern Alliance officials and drive a wedge between the Northern Alliance and its
leader, Ahmad Shah Masoud. Other members of the delegation included HAMAS
members and trusted associates of UBL. 31
(S//NF) A source with indirect access reported as of mid-April 2001, detainee
controlled access to one of UBLs most important bases located in Herat Province at
Point Seven (Nuqta-i-Haft). The camp was established as a Taliban facility, but was
controlled by UBL. Only UBL or detainee could authorize entrance into the camp,

26

For additional information on al-Wafas links to the Taliban, see JTF-GTMO recommendations for ISNs
US9SA-000005DP, US9SA-000243DP, US9KU-000568DP, and US9YM-000627DP.
27
SECSTATE 098588 22-May-2002
28
IIR 6 873 0122 02
29
TD-314/34626-99
30
000579 State Dept Islamabad 008107 17-SEP-1997, 000579 NSA 3 OO 2734898 Tearline 01-SEP-1998
31
TD-314/11944-00; Analyst Note: HAMAS is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 2
Counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 2 targets are defined as Issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are
expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already
identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor
terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and
capability to attack US persons or interests.

6
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
and any Taliban commanders requiring entrance to the camp had to coordinate with
detainee. 32
(S//NF) In late 1999, Mullah Omar selected detainee as Governor of Herat
Province. Mullah Omar tasked detainee to improve trade and diplomatic relations
between Iran and the Taliban government. Detainee reportedly had substantial
business connections in the region. 34
(S//NF) Akhtiar Muhammad, ISN US9AF-001036DP (AF-1036, transferred),
identified detainee as the Taliban Governor of Herat Province and a former
military corps commander. AF-1036 also identified detainee as a former
governor in Mazar-e-Sharif, Balkh Province, AF, and a trusted sub-commander of
Mullah Omar. 35
(S//NF) Detainee has other associations with Mullah Omar:
(S//NF) A private notebook belonging to Mullah Omar found on 8
December 2001 noted Mullah Omar directed his finance minister, Haji Mullah
Gul Agha, to disburse $75,000 US for the purchase of a vehicle for detainee in
September 2001. 36
(S//NF) According to a source with indirect access and no established
reporting record, Mullah Omar met with detainee at a home in Baghran,
Helmand Province, AF, on 20 December 2001. The meeting progressed into
the evening, and Mullah Omar departed early the next day. 37
(S//NF) A senior United Arab Emirates (AE) military officer reported
detainee was one of a very few trusted Taliban individuals with whom Mullah
Omar would meet after he (Mullah Omar) was nearly killed by a cruise
missile attack in October 2001. 38
(S//NF) Detainee attended meetings between Iranian intelligence and the Taliban,
where the transfer of arms for use against US forces and intelligence cooperation were
discussed.
(S//NF) On 3 October 2001, detainee acted as an escort for Kabul Province
Governor Mullah Abd al-Manan Niyazi and two other Taliban officials when they
attended a meeting initiated by Iran, probably by the IRGC. Iran offered to sell SA-7
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and other unidentified weapons to the Taliban. The
Iranian delegation also promised to open Irans borders to Arabs entering Afghanistan

32

TD-314/15283-01
TD-314/15283-01
34
TD-314/34626-99
35
001036 SIR 27-DEC-2005
36
IIR 7 739 3165 02, 000579 AFGP-2002-800112
37
TD-314/50971-01
38
IIR 6 931 0020 02
33

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
to fight jihad and to broker an agreement between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance, to which Iran had been covertly supplying weapons and materiel. 39
(S//NF) Badruzzan Badr, ISN US9AF-000559DP (AF-559 transferred), stated an
Iranian delegation met with detainee to offer the Taliban Russian-made shoulderlaunched SAMs for use against high-flying US aircraft. AF-559 reported detainee
informed him the offer was made as an effort to rally Muslim nations, all mujahideen,
and the Taliban to fight against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. 40
(S//NF) Detainee reported Iranian officials offered him unidentified overhead
intelligence and signals intelligence personnel and equipment for use against US and
Coalition forces following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.41 (Analyst Note:
The extent of detainees relationship with Iranian elements requires further
exploitation to determine the role Iran played in Taliban operations.)
(S//NF) Detainee is probably associated with a militant training camp in Herat
operated by deceased al-Qaida commander (in Iraq) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
(S//NF) Detainees deputy, AF-1592, was reportedly a senior Taliban commander
with strong ties to senior Anti-Coalition Militant (ACM) leaders, possibly including
UBL. AF-1592 sent personnel to Zarqawis training camp in Herat in 2000. 42
(Analyst Note: AF-1592s association with Zarqawi and his camp and, along with
detainees own claim that both he and AF-1592 performed the same work, suggest
that detainee possesses knowledge of Zarqawis camp. 43)
(S//NF) Numerous reports indicate Zarqawi established a specialized training
camp near Herat in mid-2000. The camp was for foreign fighters and was
operated exclusively by Zarqawi and his lieutenants. 44
(S//NF) Detainee was identified as a narcotics trafficker and probably used his
position and influences to become one of the premier opium drug lords in Western
Afghanistan. Detainee probably used profits from drugs to promote Taliban interests in
the area.
(S//NF) In 2000, Herat-based sources working for the then-exiled warlord Ismail
Khan reported after detainee arrived in Herat, detainee spent most of his time
establishing himself as the premier narcotics trafficker in the region. The sources
reported detainee used security forces to eliminate small-scale smugglers and

39

IIR 2 340 6656 02, IIR 6 034 0691 02

IIR 6 034 0092 04
41
IIR 2 340 6657 02
42
Abdul Hanan Info Sheet 23-MAR-2006, Abdul Hanan Jamiat-e-Islami ID Card 20 September 2004; Analyst
Note: ACM is an NIPF Priority 1 Target, defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to
rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as
Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated both intention
and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests
43
000579 SIR 02-JUN-2005
44
TD-314/07295-02, TD-314/33872-04, IIR 6 034 0189 05
40

8
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330306
JTF-GTMO-CDR
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000579DP (S)
organized small-time family drug growers into a centralized network that detainee
supervised. Detainee reportedly owned and operated three walled compounds used to
store opium and transport vehicles. 45
(S//NF) The Herat Province is recognized as a primary transit route for
opium, morphine, and heroin entering Iran and Central Asia on the way to
consumer markets in Europe and elsewhere. 46
(S//NF) In October 2001, detainee received orders to provide funds and resources
for the movement of Taliban soldiers to engage US and Coalition interests inside
Afghanistan. 47 (Analyst Note: In his position as commander of Taliban forces in
Western Afghanistan, 48 detainee likely was responsible for the funding and equipping
those forces. Although the source of this money was not specified, detainee received
large amounts of money from narcotics trafficking, and may have used some of this
money to support Taliban operations. The Taliban government is known to have used
drug trafficking to fund its combat operations and to provide income for senior
Taliban officials responsible for specific regions. 49)

c. (S//NF) Detainees Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention

perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and
staff. He currently has 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infractions listed in DIMS with the most
recent occurring on 18 January 2008, when he was in possession of contraband. He has 17
Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 26 May
2003, when he threw water and body fluids at the guard force. Other incidents for which he
has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow
guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, threatening guards,
unauthorized communications, damage to government property, assaults, provoking words
and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a
total of four Reports of Disciplinary Infractions and one so far in 2008.
8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainees
most recent interrogation session occurred on 30 January 2008.
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: In addition to other senior positions, detainee served as
governor of Herat the largest and most important province in Western Afghanistan during the
45

TD-321/39681-00
CIA DI - Afghanistan- Herat Province was an active area in the drug trade C-NF 13 February 2004
47
TD-314/40350-01
48
FBIS IAP20020215000060, FBIS SAP20030602000037
49
TD-321/39681-00

46

9
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S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20330306
JTF-GTMO.CDR
for
SUBJECT:Recommendation Continued
Detention
UnderDoD Control(CD) for
(S)
Guantanamo
Detainee, US9AF-000579DP
ISN
two yearsprior to the fall of the Taliban. Detainee previouslyserved Governor
had
as
of
Mazar-e-Sharif wasa trustedsub-commander TalibanSupreme
and
of
Commander
Mullah
placement access
Muhammad
Omar,aswell asbeingaffiliatedwith UBL. Detainee's
and
suggest
knowledge the highestlevelsof the Taliban. Detainee's
of
relationship
with Iran and
position Govemor Mazar-e-Sharif
as
of
requires
furtherexploitation.
Dueto detainee's
highlevelpositions the Talibangovernment, is assessed
in
it
detainee
would havedetailregarding
Iranianinteraction influence Afghanpolitics.
and
in
c. (S/AID IntelligenceAssessment:Detainee a high-ranking
was
Talibanofficial in Herat
with manyhigh-levelconnections.
Detainee
shouldbe ableto provideinformationon
Mullah Muhammad
Omarandhigh-levelIranianofficials. Detainee involvedin drug
was
traffickingin the HeratProvince canprobablyprovideinformationon opiumtrafficking
and
andthefimdingof Taliban
ACM activities.Detainee
likely possesses
knowledge Iranian
of
support ACM activitiesin Afghanistan may havelimited knowledge UBL andother
to
and
of
possibly knowledge deceased Musabalal-Qaida
senior
leaders.
Detainee
has
of
Abu
Zarqawi's
trainingcampin HeratandAF-l592's role in supportingZarqawi.
d. (S//NF) Areasof PotentialExploitation:
o Taliban
o Mullah Mohammad
Omar
o Organization recruitment
and
o Communicationprocedures
o Al-Qaida
o Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
o Iraniansupport Talibanoperations
to
- Talibanandal-Qaida
o Humanfactors
leadership
r Ethno-linguistic
groupsin Afghanistan tribal demographics
and
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's
was
2004,and
enemy
combatant
status reassessed 11October
on
he remains enemycombatant.
an

Commandins
'

Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
can
October 2001 guide Intelligence l(orning Terminolog,t.

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