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G.R. No. L-75079, January 26, 1989, SECOND DIVISION (Paras, J .)

Petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was
authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the
corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the latter. Under their
agreement, she is required to make a periodic report and accounting of
her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office in
Manila. An audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a
shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with
estafa in the RTC of Manila with Hon. Polo as the presiding judge. She
filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the said judge.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It
is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has
no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the
funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely
civil in nature because the fact that a separate civil case was filed
involving the same alleged misappropriated amount. According to her,
this separate filing of civil action is an acceptance that it is not a proper
subject of a criminal action.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the denial of a motion
to dismiss/quash is interlocutory in character and cannot be questioned
by certiorari. According to them, it cannot also be a subject of appeal until
final judgment is rendered.

The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain
exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant
or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
WON the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Petition DENIED.

Yes. In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493)
this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by
the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil.
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed
or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during
the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,
Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which
may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of
the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage
or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its
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principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the
petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused
damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

G.R. No. 149995, September 28, 2007, THIRD DIVISION (Ynares-
Santiago, J .)

Isidro Palana was charged for the violation of BP 22 for issuing a bouncing
check as a loan security to Alex Carlos, his business partner, even though he
knew that he did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank. The warrant
of arrest was recalled and set aside after Palana posted bail. He was then
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Palana raised the
issue of investment. He alleged that Carlos cajoled him to issue a check in
his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the
partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when
the check was issued, complainant knew that the same was not funded.

The RTC decided in favor of Carlos. Palana appealed before the Court of
Appeals but it was dismissed, affirming the RTCs decision in toto. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a
guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners investment theory. The
trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas General
Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner. The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money
does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.

Hence, this petition.

WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision despite the fact that its
jurisdiction was in question during the time of arraignment due to the
effectivity of the RA. 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

HELD: Petition GRANTED with MODIFICATION as to penalty.

No. It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and
not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging
petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that
time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129, which

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the

x x x x

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall

x x x x

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than
four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence
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they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less
than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The
Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action
because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more
than P4,000.00.

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court on June 15, 1994 cannot divest
the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court
has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However,
these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. The
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of
the action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the
passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the
application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature.

G.R. No. 192466, September 7, 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Abad, J .)

Mila is Taroys wife. Mila has an eldest daughter from her first marriage
named Des. The couple lived with Milas children in Benguet at the boundary
of Baguio City.

According to Des, when she was still 10 years old, Taroy raped her when she
was alone cleaning their house. She was told not to tell anyone lest Mila and
her siblings would suffer harm. This incident was followed by another sexual
abuse on the next year. This time it occurred inside Des bedroom where
Taroy pointed a knife at her and ordered her to undress and submit to his
sexual desires.

Des only confided the story to her mother and aunt four years later. They
accompanied her to the NBI to complain. She also underwent medical
examination where it was revealed that there was indeed a history of
previous blunt force caused by an insertion of an erect penis.

The public prosecutor charged Taroy with two counts of before the RTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet.

Correspondingly, the RTC convicted Taroy of the offense and penalized him
to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged
contending that their residence where the alleged offenses took place was at
the boundary of Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony
that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction
since he waived the jurisdictional requirement.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that the
prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Hence, this appeal.

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WON the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet has jurisdiction to hear the rape
cases against Taroy.


Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor
subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of
law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
took place.

The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were
committed in the victim and the offenders house in City Limit,
Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation
conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of Mila and Des as well as the affidavit of
arrest point to this fact. Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated assertion that the
subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides,
he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad
that had jurisdiction to hear the case. Taken altogether, that RTCs
jurisdiction to hear the case is beyond dispute.

G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006, FIRST DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J .)

Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander
Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the RTC of
Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. The RTC of Manila convicted
all of the accused. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where the accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable
Later on, SPO2 Maderal (who was then at large) was arrested. He
executed a sworn confession and identified the other persons
responsible for the deaths of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a
complaint. After which, the judge issued warrants of arrest.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Presiding Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and denied the urgent motion
on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
The new Presiding Judge Anghad took over the case and reversed the
order of Judge Tumaliuan. State Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for
the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of
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Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration and the prayer for
inhibition were both denied.
Hence, this petition.

WON an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.

HELD: Petition DENIED.
No. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or
grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the
accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding
this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs
to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Custody of the law vs. Jurisdiction over the person
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody
of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one
can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.

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G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Nachura, J .)

An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed
against the petitioner before the RTC of Bulacan. The petitioner was
convicted as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.

The CA, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to
have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the
jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from
asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

WON the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of
this case constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in
the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public
prosecutor, amount to estoppel?


No. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the
issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a
litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction
must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially
true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the
court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not
suffer any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way
estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that
he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True,
delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel
by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in
good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state,
if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of
estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15
years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

The trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein
and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his
part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter
may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay
is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

What happened in Sibonghanoy case?
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was
ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling
had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by
laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

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It is noteworthy that the party questioning the jurisdiction actively participated
in the trial and even raised affirmative reliefs. It was only when the adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. This strategy is frowned upon because the party
only challenges the jurisdiction for the purpose of nullifying the entire

G.R. No. 182651, August 25, 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Villarama, Jr., J .)

Jane Honrales was accidentally shot by her husband, Jonathan, which
immediately caused her death. An information for parricide was filed against
Jonathan before the RTC of Manila. He was ordered arrested by judge of
said RTC. He then filed a motion for reconsideration. In view of this, the
assistant public prosecutor moved to defer the proceedings. Jonathan filed
an urgent ex-parte motion to recall the warrant of arrest which the public
prosecutor opposed. The RTC deferred the proceedings in view of the
pending motion for reconsideration. However, the motion to recall the arrest
was denied. The trial court maintained that it found probable cause for the
issuance of the arrest warrant.

After a few years, the assistant public prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw
the information for parricide. While this motion was still pending, an
information for reckless imprudence resulting to parricide was filed against
Jonathan before the MeTC of Manila. Jonathan was arraigned in the MeTc
and pleaded guilty to the charge.
Then Jonathan filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC. He cited that his
arraignment and conviction by the MeTc are grounds for the dismissal of the
pending case against him. On the other hand, the petitioner heirs filed a
motion to nullify the MeTc proceedings for failure to give them due process.
Also, they allege that the information filed before such court was invalid.
Thereafter, the RTC granted the motion to withdraw the information for
parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest against Jonathan. Petitioner heirs
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the said
order. They also filed a motion to interplead the People of the Philippines.
Likewise, the OSG filed a similar motion. However, the CA dismissed the
motions despite finding that the judge who issued the order failed to exercise
his independent judgment and only relied on the DOJs wisdom on the
matter. The CA also held that remanding the case to the RTC would
constitute double jeopardy because the MeTC already decided on the case.
Their subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied.
Hence, this consolidated petitions by the Petitioner heirs and the OSG.
Petitioner heirs argue that the MeTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
the case for parricide through reckless imprudence and that jurisdiction
remained with the RTC where the Information for parricide was filed.
The OSG, for its part, argues that the MeTC could not have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case for the same offense of parricide or any offense
necessarily included therein because the prosecutions motion to withdraw
the Information for parricide before the RTC remained unacted upon by the
said court.
Jonathan, on the other hand, maintains that if the petition is granted, it would
violate his right against double jeopardy. He likewise contends that it is
already too late for petitioner heirs to question the validity of the MeTC
proceedings since its decision has become final and executory, no appeal
having been taken from the decision.

WON the MeTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case while another case
was still pending before the RTC.

HELD: Petitions GRANTED.
No. It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the
warrant of arrest without making an independent assessment of the merits of
the case and the evidence on record. By relying solely on the manifestation
of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the Resolution of the Secretary of
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Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the
case may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right
against double jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be in the
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or
x x x x
Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before
a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still
pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr., we held that once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there
retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide pending before
the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed
before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the
exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law
and can never become executory.

G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004, FIRST DIVISION (Panganiban, J .)

Accused Napoleon Roman was convicted by the RTC of San Fernando,
La Union of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries, and damage to property. The court further ruled
that in case of Romans insolvency, the petitioner shall be liable for the
civil liability. The judgment became final and executory.

Roman remained at large and jumped bail. Counsel for the accused filed
a notice of appeal. However, under the Rules of Court, whenever the
accused jumps bail the notice of appeal shall be denied. The trial court
accordingly denied such appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial
of the appeal.

Petitioner Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
The trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal. When the Office
of the Solicitor General received a copy of the petitioners brief, it moved
to be excused from the filing respondents brief for lack of authority to
represent People in criminal cases on appeal.

The CA ruled that the Phil. Rabbit cannot independently file a notice of
appeal with regard to the civil liability in the criminal case against Roman
because to do so will amount to the nullification, amendment or defeat of
the final judgment as to the dismissal of the notice of appeal filed by its
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Petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-
employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail.
In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the

Hence, this petition.

WON the Petitioner can still file a notice of appeal for the accused.

HELD: Petition DENIED.
No. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate
court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its
pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8
of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal."
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial.
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have
waived the appeal.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused
to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has
waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently
proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship.

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