Fabrizio Amerini - Pragmatics and Semantics in Thomas Aquinas

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 DOI: 10.
1163/156853411X590453
Vivarium 49 (2011) 95-126 brill.nl/viv
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ri um
Pragmatics and Semantics in Tomas Aquinas
Fabrizio Amerini
Universit di Parma
Abstract
Tomas Aquinass account of the semantics of names is based on two fundamental
distinctions: the distinction between a names mode of signifying and the signied
object, and that between the cause and the goal of a names signication, i.e. that from
which a name was instituted to signify and that which a name actually signies.
Tomas endows names with a two-layer signication: names are introduced into lan-
guage to designate primarily conceptions of extramental things and secondarily the
particular extramental things referred to by such conceptions. On such a conceptual-
istic account of names signication, Tomas recognizes that a generic acquaintance
with external things is a sucient condition for imposing names to signify things. Fol-
lowing this intuition, Tomas at times dwells on the role that pragmatic factors such
as the common usage of names by a linguistic community (usus loquendi) and the
speakers intention (intentio loquentium) play in explaining both the formation and
semantic function of conventional language. Tis paper will focus on what Tomas
had to say about such factors.
Keywords
Medieval Semantics, Medieval Pragmatics, Tomas Aquinas, Names, speakers inten-
tion, linguistic usage
Preface
Tomas Aquinas view of the semantics of natural-kind terms has been the sub-
ject of many important studies.
1
Although his thought has been reconstructed
1)
For an introduction to the medieval views of the semantics of natural-kind terms, see P.V.
Spade, Te Semantics of Terms, in Te Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. N.
Kretzman-A. Kenny-J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), 188-97, and Toughts, Words and Tings:
An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Teory, URL=http://www.pvspade.com/
Logic/docs/thoughts.pdf (1996). For an introduction to Aquinass semantics in particular, one
96 F. Amerini / Vivarium 49 (2011) 95-126
with great accuracy, some points of diculty remain. Among others, it is
still debated whether Tomas advocated a merely intensional or rather an
extensional account of natural-kind terms signication, that is, whether he
promoted an internalist or externalist semantic theory. At rst glance, Tomas
seems to favor an internalist explanation of the semantics of natural-kind
terms such as man or stone to the extent that, he says, such terms sig-
nify conceptual contents in the rst instance. As Tomas makes clear at the
beginning of his Commentary on Peri hermeneias, natural-kind terms or com-
mon names are chosen conventionally to signify primarily our conceptions of
extramental things and only secondarily, through signifying such conceptions,
are they said to signify the particular things of the outer world.
2
Te admis-
may see G. Klima, Tomas Aquinas on the Meaning of the Words, Magyar Filozoai Szemle
3-4 (1984), 298-312, and Te Semantic Principles Underlying St. Tomas Aquinass Meta-
physics of Being, Medieval Philosophy and Teology 5 (1996), 87-141; E.J. Ashworth, Signica-
tion and Modes of Signifying in Tirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,
Medieval Philosophy and Teology 1 (1991), 39-67; R. McInerny, Being and Predication: Tomis-
tic Interpretations (Washington D.C., 1986); C. Panaccio, From Mental Word to Mental Lan-
guage, Philosophical Topics 20 (1992), 125-47; H.J.M. Schoot, Aquinas and Supposition: the
Possibilities and Limitations of Logic in divinis, Vivarium 31 (1993), 193-225; E.C. Sweeney,
Supposition, Signication, and Universals: Metaphysical and Linguistic Complexity in Aqui-
nas, Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Teologie 42.3 (1995), 267-90. For the context of
Aquinass semantics, see G. Pini, Species, Concept and Ting: Teories of Signication in the
Second Half of the Tirteenth Century, Medieval Philosophy and Teology 8.2 (1999), 21-52;
and Id., Signication of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries, Vivarium 39
(2001), 20-51.
2)
Cf. Expositio libri Peryermenias, I, 2, in Opera Omnia I* 1, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome-Paris,
1989), 10-1,88-112: Circa id autem quod dicit: earum que sunt in anima passionum, consid-
erandum est quod passiones anime communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis aectiones, sicut
ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum; et uerum est quod huiusmodi pas-
siones signicant naturaliter quedam uoces hominum, ut gemitus inrmorum et alia similia, ut
dicitur in I Politice. Set nunc sermo est de uocibus signicatiuis ex institutione humana, et ideo
oportet passiones anime hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones quas nomina et uerba et ora-
tiones signicant, secundum sentenciam Aristotilis: non enim potest esse quod signicent inme-
diate ipsas res, ut ex modo signicandi apparet: signicat enim hoc nomen homo naturam
humanam in abstractione a singularibus, unde non potest esse quod signicet inmediate hom-
inem singularem. Vnde Platonici posuerunt quod signicaret ipsam ydeam hominis separatam;
set, quia hec secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sentenciam Aristo-
tilis, set est in solo intellectu, ideo necesse fuit Aristotili dicere quod uoces signicant intellectus
conceptiones inmediate, et eis mediantibus res. See also Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 7,
a. 6. In the rst part of the paper (I), for the sake of brevity, by names I shall refer to natural-
kind terms. In the second part of the paper (II), instead, I shall extend this term to other classes
of terms, taking it as equivalent to the more generic terms. Tis should cause no confusion.
F. Amerini / Vivarium 49 (2011) 95-126 97
sion of a two-layer signication of names may be taken as meaning that names
fundamentally serve a connotative rather than a denotative function. Under
closer inspection, however, some aspects of this semantic view call for clari-
cation. In particular, since it is controversial that Aquinas understood signied
conceptions as some sort of mental replacement of the forms of extra-mental
things rather than as the extramental things forms themselves qua existing in
the mind, it is not certain that Tomas favored a purely internalist explanation
of the semantics of names.
Tis paper reconsiders Aquinas view of the semantics of names by illustrat-
ing how, according to Aquinas, pragmatic factorsespecially, common usage
and the speakers intentioncan interplay with the ordinary semantic func-
tion of names. In the rst part of the paper, I propose an outline of Aquinas
view of the semantics of names. In the second part, I focus on the relationship
between semantics and pragmatics in Aquinas.
I. Part One: Semantics
Tomas view of the semantics of names follows from two fundamental dis-
tinctions: (1) that between a names mode of signifying and the signied
object, and (2) that between the cause and the goal of a names signication.
As we shall see below, the rst distinction enables Tomas to endow names
with connotative force, while the second distinction enables him to endow
them also with denotative power.
1. Te Distinction between the Mode of Signifying and the Signied Object
(1) Te rst distinction, that between a names mode of signifying and the signi-
ed object,
3
is a result of the strong relation that, for Tomas, holds between
semantics and cognition, a relation that, as we saw, Tomas stresses in his
Commentary on Peri hermeneias. Since Tomas assumes that names signify
primarily conceptions of extramental things, the way in which things are
3)
See e.g. Scriptum super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2; d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; d. 23, q. 1,
a. 1. On the formation of the modes of signifying, see especially In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.
On such a rst distinction and its background, see I. Rosier, Res signicata et modus signi-
candi: Les implications dune distinction mdivale, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Geschichte der Sprach-
theorie. III: Sprachtheorien in Sptantike und Mittelalter (Tbingen, 1995), 135-68, esp. 150-2
(on Aquinas). See also L. Valente, Cum non sit intelligibilis, nec ergo signicabilis. Modi sig-
nicandi, intelligendi ed essendi nella teologia del XII secolo, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione
losoca medievale, 11 (2000), 132-94.
conceived is of crucial importance for clarifying the way in which names sig-
nify. Specically, this distinction says that our mind makes a substantial con-
tribution to determining the mode of signifying of names. On the one hand,
one can imagine that a given community of language-speakers has imposed
names above all for talking about the extramental world: when we learn the
meaning of a name such as man or stone, we learn that such a name is used
to talk about a certain kind of extramental thing, namely men and stones,
respectively. Quite naturally, names have been introduced into language to
name external things and nothing else; a proof of this is that our supposed
community of language-speakers has reserved a special class of names for nam-
ing items other than external things. Words like concept or mind, for
instance, have been tasked with referring to mental items. Tomas occasion-
ally emphasizes this point by saying that ordinary science deals with things
and not with concepts, or that real sciences and rational sciences do not over-
lap each other.
On the other hand, however, since the only way for speakers to be acquainted
with external things (and then to name them) is to experience them, it follows
that things can be signied only in the way they can be experienced. Tus, if
the function of names is to refer to things, they can achieve this function only
by virtue of a meaning, which is intended to telescope our natural acquain-
tance with things. Tomas summarizes this aspect of his doctrine by the often-
invoked dictum as we know things so we name them (non possumus aliquid
nominare nisi secundum quod intelligimus).
4
Te relation between signication and cognition must be kept in mind in
order to address correctly Aquinas account of the semantics of names. Such a
relationship is the hallmark of Aquinas view. Let us consider it more closely.
For Tomas, a language-speaking community normally makes use of universal
(concrete or abstract) names for talking about the particular extramental
things. By such names a community of language-speakers means to refer ulti-
mately to things existing in the outer world. Nonetheless, since in the world
no universal entity can be found, it follows that in their case the mode of sig-
nication (i.e. a universal, concrete or abstract, mode of signifying things)
prevents universal names from designating things directlyunless one
endorses a Platonic perspective and argues for the mind-independent exis-
tence of universal beings. Aquinas often expresses this idea by stressing that
the modes of signication of names parallel the modes of understanding of the
4)
Cf. e.g. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; Sum. theol., I, q. 18, a. 2 (see below, note 26); I, q. 32, a. 2;
Compendium theologiae, I, ch. 24; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 11.
mind but not the modes of being of the things.
5
Te relation between signi-
cation and cognition also ts with another feature of Tomas conception of
human language, that is, the idea that human beings were compelled to elabo-
rate a language because they lived in a social community, so they needed a
system of conventional and shared symbols to communicate their personal
knowledge of the world to each other.
6
In the light of this distinction, there is no doubt that Tomas intends signi-
cation as a semantic relation of referring which brings linguistic names to
extra-linguistic things: not however directly to the things existing in reality
but to those aspects of things that have been selected, gathered and unied by
the mind. Tomas view of the two-layer signication of names should be
understood therefore as a complex semantic procedure. Names signify primar-
ily (or immediately, or directly) a mental item from which one can obtain
information about the collection of extramental things that instantiate such a
primarily signied item.
7
Tis is to say that, although names have been intro-
duced into language to name things, they name things qua instances of a cer-
tain kind, namely things of a certain kind or, what amounts to the same for
Tomas, a certain kind of things. Te reason for this inferencei.e. from
naming a thing of a certain kind to naming a certain kind of thingis that,
given the way Tomas accounts for the mechanisms of human intellectual
cognition, cognizing a particular thing means knowing what a thing is. In
other words, we cognize intellectually a thing when we know something about
a thing, that is, we cognize a thing A when we know that A is, say, B. But the
What is it? procedure, applied to a particular thing, always ends with the
kind of that thing, thus we can be said to cognize intellectually a particular
thing only when we arrive at knowing the kind under which that thing falls,
i.e. of which kind the thing is, and the kind is thought of as something uni-
versal in character.
5)
See e.g. Expositio libri Metaphysicorum, VII, lec. 1, edd. M.-R. Cathala-R.M. Spiazzi (Turin-
Rome, 1964), n. 1253; Summa theologiae, I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2; De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 7.
6)
Cf. Expositio libri Peryermenias, I, 2, 9-10, 25-48.
7)
Occasionally, Aquinas calls the two items, respectively, the formally and materially signied
object. See e.g. De potentia, q. 9, a. 4, ed. P.M. Pession (Turin-Rome, 1965), 232-3: Sed scien-
dum, quod aliquid signicat dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. Formali-
ter quidem signicatur per nomen ad id quod signicandum nomen est principaliter impositum,
quod est ratio nominis; sicut hoc nomen homo signicat aliquid compositum ex corpore et
anima rationali. Materialiter vero signicatur per nomen, illud in quo talis ratio salvatur; sicut
hoc nomen homo signicat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes, sine quibus non
potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali.
According to this procedure, one should not be surprised to discover that
Aquinas takes the following expressions as equivalent: to signify a thing
according to a certain conception and to signify a certain conception of a
thing. As E. Jennifer Ashworth pointed out,
8
one can nd texts where Aqui-
nas says that if two names signify the same thing according to dierent concepts
or senses (rationes) they are not synonymous because they signify two dierent
concepts or senses of one and the same thing. Such texts seem to be scarcely
consistent in so far as Tomas says that names signify things and that, at the
same time, they signify concepts. But they are so only in appearance, because
for Tomas names can signify things only qua end-products of the process of
intellectual cognition, i.e. only qua cognized things. Te fact that at the end
of the process of intellectual cognition of a particular thing, we always reach a
universal kind explains why a language-speaking community employs univer-
sal names for talking about particular things. Applying this scheme to a con-
crete case, we have that names such as animal and man can both signify
Socrates, for example if we say this is an animal or this is a man indicating
Socrates. Te reason is that signifying Socrates qua man or animal by using the
words man or animal, is for Tomas equivalent to signifying man or ani-
mal, namely a thing made in such-and-such a way, of this or that kind. So
when one states Socrates is a man or Socrates is an animal, one means that
Socrates and every other thing substantially similar to it is a thing of the spe-
cic kind-man or of the more generic kind-animal. It must be said neverthe-
less that man and animal signify Socrates according to dierent concepts or
meanings, respectively qua man and qua animal, and this is why Tomas says
they are not synonymous.
For Tomas, in conclusion, stating that names signify things and that they
signify concepts turns out to be the same. Te reason is that names signify both
things and concepts, because things can be signied only after they have been
conceived and only qua conceived. Tus, if names are said to signify princi-
pally concepts of things, this must be taken to mean that they signify things
qua conceived. Tomas reaches this conclusion by combining two ideas con-
cerning concepts: rst, the idea that concepts are natural likenesses (simili-
tudines) of external things, and as such they are able to refer back immediately
to the things from which they have been derived, and second, the idea that
concepts express precisely the way things, once conceived, can exist in the
mind. Like cognizing, signifying may be seen therefore as an intrinsically
8)
For the reference, see above, note 1.
intentional or referential process: signifying a particular thing by a universal
name amounts to signifying something universal about a particular thing.
At this point, one may draw some conclusions. It is clear that, for Tomas,
the process of cognition of a thing above all impinges on the mode of signi-
cation of a name, since such a mode mirrors the mode of understanding.
But at the same time, it is also clear that the mode of signication contributes
to constructing the signied object to a certain degree, and so one may fur-
ther conclude that the process of cognition also plays a role in xing the refer-
ence of a name. Take for instance the names man and humanity. Neither
man nor humanity directly signies a particular extramental thing, as was
said. What do, then, they signify? Aquinas often repeats that both signify the
same thing and that this is the form of humanity (i.e. being a rational ani-
mal). Nonetheless they signify it in dierent ways: humanity signies the
form of humanity in the abstract, i.e. excluding explicitly the accidents of
man from its signication; as a result, it signies the form of humanity as a
part (ut pars, per modum partis) of man and then as a form; man instead
signies the form of humanity in the concrete, that is, relative to a given
man: although man does not include explicitly the accidents of man in its
signication, nonetheless it does not exclude explicitly them, so it signies
the form of humanity as a whole (ut totum, per modum totius) and then as if
it were a concrete substance. In particular, man signies the form of human-
ity as concretized in a generic subject or, what seems to amount to the same
for Tomas, the generic subject of the form of humanity. As we saw, the
logically universal mode of signifying of man prevents Tomas from stating
that man signies directly a particular thing of the external world; now we
can add that its grammatically concrete and substantive mode of signifying
nevertheless allows Tomas to arm that man signies what it signies as if
it were a per se existing thing in the external world.
9
Tomas is here applying
9)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), 770: quod signicatur
concretive, signicatur ut per se existens, ut homo vel album. Similiter de ratione abstracti duo
sunt, scilicet simplicitas, et imperfectio; quia quod signicatur in abstracto, signicatur per
modum formae.; also d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. An inverse situation occurs in the case of accidents
(see Exp. Met., VII, lec. 1, nn. 1253-1255). It must be said, though, that things are much more
complicated than as presented here. Leaving aside the problem of the semantics of abstract
names like humanity, it is not always clear whether, for Tomas, (1) a concrete common name
such as man principally signies the form of humanityand, in this case, whether man signi-
es it (1a) as an inhering form (i.e. the humanity of a given supposit) or (1b) as if it were a sepa-
rately subsisting thing (i.e. a supposited humanity)or (2) man principally signies the bearer
of the form of humanity (habens humanitatem). Sometimes Tomas seems to regard (1) and (2)
a qualication he can nd in Aristotle. In the fth chapter of the Categories,
Aristotle claried that the name of every secondary substance (like man)
signies the substantial quality of a substance (quale quid ), although it seems
to signify a determinate substance (hoc aliquid ) because of the grammatical
form of the expression.
10
On the account of this qualication, one may ascribe
to Tomas the conviction that the modes of signifying of names determine
the signied objects to a certain degree, in so far as they signify the substan-
tial features of a thing as if such features were a separately subsisting thing.
Tis is to say that the modes of signifying of names give rise to a linguistic or
semantic ontology which not always overlaps the ontology of the outer world.
11

As Tomas usually expresses himself, no reication is involved in signica-
tion. Obviously, this qualication has eect on the supposition of names as
well.
12
Since there does not exist in the world things signied directly by
namesalthough extramental things are what are ultimately referred to by
names: these are what Tomas calls signied things (res signicatae), it
follows that names rst and above all signify the conceptual contents that are
derived from the things, what could be called the concept or sense of a name
as equivalent (see e.g. Sum. theol., III, q. 4, a. 3). For more on this point, see my forthcoming
Mental Representation and Semantics. Two Essays in Medieval Philosophy. In general, on the
semantics of concrete terms (especially concrete accidental terms), see S. Ebbesen, Concrete
Accidental Terms. Late Tirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to such Terms as
album, in N. Kretzmann (ed.), Meaning and Inference in medieval Philosophy. Studies in Mem-
ory of Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1988), 107-174 (rep. in Topics in Latin Philoso-
phy from the 12th-14th Centuries. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen, [Farnham, England-Burlington,
USA, 2009], vol. 2, ch. 8, 109-152).
10)
See e.g. Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 1; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 13.
11)
Cf. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, ed. Mandonnet, 532-3: Cum enim dicitur, quod
nomen signicat substantiam cum qualitate, non intelligitur qualitas et substantia proprie,
secundum quod logicus accipit praedicamenta distinguens. Sed grammaticus accipit substan-
tiam quantum ad modum signicandi, et similiter qualitatem; et ideo, quia illud quod signi-
catur per nomen signicatur ut aliquid subsistens, secundum quod de eo potest aliquid
praedicari, quamvis secundum rem non sit subsistens, sicut albedo; dicit, quod signicat subs-
tantiam, ad dierentiam verbi, quod non signicat ut aliquid subsistens. Et quia in quolibet
nomine est considerare id a quo imponitur nomen, quod est quasi principium innotescendi,
ideo quantum ad hoc habet modum qualitatis, secundum quod qualitas vel forma est princi-
pium cognoscendi rem.
12)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2; d. 5, q. 1, a. 1 d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2,
ad 2; Sum. theol., I, q. 39, a. 4; De unione verbi, a. 1, ad 12; De 108 articulis, q. 8.
(ratio nominis) or even its meaning (signicatum)
13
which Tomas says
precede each historical language.
14
In his works, Tomas seems to make no appreciable distinction between the
phrase signied thing (res signicata) and the term meaning (signicatum).
15

Te latter is only more extended than the former since it is employed to refer
not only to the thing that is signied but also to what is signied about a thing.
In most cases Tomas uses signied thing and meaning interchangeably.
Nonetheless, as E. Jennifer Ashworth again pointed out, there are texts where
Tomas takes the term meaning (signicatum) to express more precisely the
signied thing in so far as it is considered as resulting from the mode of sig-
nication and the phrase signied thing (res signicata) to express the thing
in so far as it is considered as independent of such a mode. According to these
shades of meaning, Tomas holds that dierent meanings and consequently
dierent linguistic formulas expressing those meanings can be associated with
one and the same signied thing,
16
as well as that dierent signied things
may correspond to one and the same meaning. Finally, dierent modes of sig-
nication can generate what Tomas at times calls dierent co-signications,
17

while a names meaning is what establishes the linguistic features of a name as
expressed by the grammar of an historical language. Tis is what Tomas also
calls the propriety of speech ( proprietas locutionis).
18
13)
Cf. Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi, a. 2, ad 4; Scriptum super I Sententiarum, d. 22, q. 1,
a. 2, ad 1, ed. Mandonnet, 535-6: Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod cum in nomine duo sint,
modus signicandi, et res ipsa signicata, semper secundum alterum potest removeri a Deo vel
secundum utrumque; sed non potest dici de Deo nisi secundum alterum tantum. Et quia ad
veritatem et proprietatem armationis requiritur quod totum armetur, ad proprietatem autem
negationis sucit si alterum tantum desit, ideo dicit Dionysius, quod negationes sunt absolute
verae, sed armationes non nisi secundum quid: quia quantum ad signicatum tantum, et non
quantum ad modum signicandi.; Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11; De poten-
tia, q. 8, a. 2, ad 7; Sum. theol., I, q. 39, a. 4.
14)
See In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 1, q.la 3, ad 1; also De veritate, q. 10, a. 3; Sum. theol., I, q. 93,
a. 7, ad 3.
15)
See e.g. the text quoted above, note 13.
16)
Cf. e.g. Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 98; In II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5; Sum. theol., I-II, q. 53,
a.2, ad 3; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 1 and lec. 5.
17)
Cf. e.g. Quodlibet IV, q. 9, a. 2.
18)
Cf. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Mandonnet, 536: . . . et secundum talem rationem
signicatam in nomine, magis attenditur veritas et proprietas locutionis, quam quantum ad
modum signicandi, qui datur ex consequenti intelligi per nomen. See also In III Sent., d. 7,
q. 2, a. 1.
Concluding our analysis of the rst distinction, we may say that Aquinas
clearly advocates internalist semantics, to the extent that the meanings of
names are supposed to exist only in our mind. At the same time, Tomas does
not renounce realism in semantics, for the meanings of names are nonetheless
taken as summarizing real features of things. Meaning is what determines the
reference of a name and at the same time is what names primarily refer to.
Names principally signify meanings, although they name the things that are
signied by way of such meanings. Tere is no room for discussing at greater
length here the function of naming in Aquinass semantics. For our purpose,
it suces to note that Tomas does not draw any sharp distinction between
signifying and naming. Although naming seems to perform a more referential
function than signifying (and sometimes it does), Tomas actually regards
naming as a function semantically equivalent to expressing or being a sign of
a concept, just like signifying. In fact, like the process of signifying, Tomas
also relates the process of naming a thing to the process of cognizing that
thing: if we cognize imperfectly a thing, we name it imperfectly. Similarly, we
can name by one word things that are really distinct in the world as well as
give dierent names to one single thing according to the dierent concepts
that we can derive from it.
19
2. Te Distinction between the Cause and the Goal of Signication
(2) Te idea that signication serves rst of all a connotative function is occa-
sionally related by Tomas to the distinction between signication and sup-
position of names, between that which a name signies and that for which a
name stands or supposits in a proposition.
20
Tis distinction closely relates to
the second foundational distinction of Tomas semantics mentioned above,
namely that between the cause and the goal of a names imposition, a distinc-
tion that Tomas especially inherits from Albert the Great. Tis latter leads us
to the conclusion that, for Tomas, names not only serve a connotative func-
tion but also a denotative one.
As Tomas usually says, that from which (id a quo) a name has been imposed
to signify does not coincide with what (id quod ) a name actually signies.
21

19)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 10; Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 8;
q. 108, a. 5; De potentia, q. 9, a. 9. For other references, see above, note 4, and below, note 26.
20)
See De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.
21)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Mandonnet, 559: Ad primum ergo dicendum,
quod in signicatione nominis duo sunt consideranda, scilicet id a quo imponitur nomen ad
signicandum, et id ad quod signicandum imponitur. As is known, this second distinction has
Following the tradition, Tomas calls the former a property or quality ( propri-
etas or qualitas) while calling the latter a subject or substance (subiectum or
substantia): that is, a name has been imposed to signify on the basis of a things
property or quality but it does not signify that property or quality, but the
subject or substance of such a property or quality.
22
Tis distinction clearly
leads us to identify the goal of a names impositionwhat a name has been
imposed to signifywith the names reference and the cause with the occa-
sion for the names imposition. According to this distinction, the interpreter
is legitimate to say that, for Tomas, names fulll not only a connotative func-
tion but also a denotative one.
With respect to this distinction, though, one must proceed with caution
because Tomas seems to change his mind between earlier and later works. In
his early writings, Tomas softens the distinction between the cause and the
goal of a names signication, in so far as he identies the cause of a names
imposition with the signied object itself and the goal of a names signica-
tion with the supposit (suppositum).
23
In some texts dating to the end of his
career, Tomas emphasizes such a change by arguing for the possibility of
attaching dierent names to a thing according to whether they are associated
to the starting-point or the end-point of the process of imposing names
on things.
24
Te clash between earlier and later works, however, is only apparent.
Already in the Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas recognized that the
things properties or qualities on which a names imposition is based are
merely the occasion or the cognitive principle guiding us to impose a name to
a long story. It traces back to grammarians such as Priscian and it is employed at least by Por-
phyry and Gilbert of Poitiers. For the history of this second distinction, see J. Pinborg, Logik und
Semantik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1972) and, more recently, L. Valente, Logique
et thologie. Les coles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220 (Paris, 2008).
22)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, exp. text.; Exp. Per., I, ch. 4, in Opera Omnia I* 1, 22,137-
42: unum nomen imponitur ad signicandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem <est>
id a quo imponitur nomen ad signicandum, ab eo quod nomen signicat; sicut hoc nomen
lapis imponitur a lesione pedis, quod non signicat, ad signicandum conceptum cuiusdam
rei. Note that the dichotomy quality/substance has rst of all semantical and epistemological
rather than metaphysical signicance (see above, note 11).
23)
See In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, and especially In III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3.
24)
See e.g. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 11, ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui
est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur,
scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum signicandi et consignicandi, ut dictum est. Sed quan-
tum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad signicandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus,
quod imponitur ad signicandum naturam divinam.
signify that thing.
25
Such texts allow the inference that, for Tomas, a lan-
guage-speaking community normally imposes names on the basis of a natural
acquaintance with external things and that at the very beginning such an
acquaintance is likely approximate, since, Aquinas says, it depends on appar-
ent and macroscopic properties of things.
26
But once imposed, names signify
a certain kind of thing rather than the properties that have occasioned the
imposition of those names. So the fact that the original imposition of names
depends on a primordial acquaintance with external things and that such an
acquaintance is likely approximate has an important consequence for the
semantics of names. When a linguistic community imposes a name to signify
a thing, it imposes a name to signify precisely a thing characterized by a de-
nite collection of essential properties that are thought of as causally responsible
for the accidental, apparent and macroscopic properties from which the impo-
sition initially stemmed. At the onset, such a collection of essential properties
may be even completely unknown to the community imposing this name.
What really matters, however, is that the community based the imposition of
this name on the stipulation that a causal link holds between such an alleged
collection of essential properties and the accidental properties that the
thing exhibits.
If one pursues this line of argument, he/she can explain the apparent con-
ict in Tomas works in two possible ways, and both consist in qualifying
what Aquinas says in his earlier and later works. First, one could note that, in
those passages from the Commentary on the Sentences where the signied object
is not identied with what a name has been imposed to signify, Tomas seems
to be interested above all in distinguishing between signication and supposi-
tion. Tis is the reason why he states that names signify the properties from
which they have been imposed (since names are supposed to signify a collec-
25)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3 (see above, note 11); d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Man-
donnet, 559: Contingit autem quandoque quod substantia alicujus rei nominatur ab aliquo
accidente quod non consequitur totam naturam de qua nomen illud dicitur; sicut lapis dicitur
ex eo quod laedit pedem, nec tamen omne laedens pedem est lapis, vel e converso. Et ideo judi-
cium de nomine non debet esse secundum hoc a quo imponitur, sed secundum id ad quod sig-
nicandum instituitur.
26)
Cf. In III Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; Sum. theol., I, q. 18, a. 2: Et inde est quod ex his quae
exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus
aliquid sicut cognoscimus illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a proprietati-
bus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad signicandas essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina
quandoque accipiuntur proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas signicandas principaliter sunt
imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus
proprie.
tion of essential properties), while they stand for the particular bearers of such
properties. Alternatively, one could stress that in the later works Tomas seems
rather to be interested in classifying names: in some cases the cause and the
goal of a names imposition coincide (like in the case of accidental terms such
as white), in other cases they do not coincide (like in the case of substantial
terms such as stone).
27
Whatever the case may be, a possible reconciliation of
the two views can be given by Tomas key distinction between the imposition
of a name with respect to us and the imposition of a name with respect to the
thing. Take the name man. With respect to the thing, man has been
imposed on the basis of the feature that nalizes the essential properties that
the name sums up and signies; in the case of a man, this is the specic dier-
ence rational and such an item is also what is primarily signied by the name
man. But since Tomas assumes that the essential dierences of things are
normally unknown to us
28
, it follows that, in practice, speakers attach names
to things by moving from some of their accidental properties, with which they
27)
See e.g. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod in signicatione
nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo imponitur nomen ad signicandum, et id ad quod signi-
candum nomen imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non
tamen imponitur ad hoc signicandum quod signicet laedens pedem, sed ad signicandam
quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne laedens pedem esset lapis.; and a. 8: Respondeo
dicendum quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad signicandum, et id ad
quod signicandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam rei ex proprietatibus vel opera-
tionibus eius cognoscimus, ita substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius opera-
tione vel proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua actione eius, quia laedit
pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad signicandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam
lapidis. Si qua vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, albedo, et huius-
modi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus idem est quod nomen signicat, et id a quo
imponitur nomen ad signicandum.; De potentia, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1. A similar distinction, although
formulated for abstract and concrete names, already occurs in In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.
28)
Cf. e.g. De ente et essentia, ch. 4. For other occurrences of this claim, see In II Sent., d. 3,
q. 1, a. 6; De veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8; q. 10, a. 1, ad 6 ; In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, q.la 1, ad 1;
De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 5; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11, ad 3; Sum. theol., I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 7;
Sentencia libri de anima, I, ch. 1; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 12; Expositio super De generatione, I, lec. 8.
Here I leave aside two possible complications: rst, Aquinas claim that the essential dierences
are unknown to us frequently ( frequenter, multoties) or sometimes (quandoque, interdum) but
not always; second, Aquinas claim that, despite their being unknown in themselves, the essential
dierences of things can be known somehow, i.e. by inference from the accidents. For an exten-
sive discussion of these claims, see my forthcoming Mental Representation and Semantics. For
emphasis on the importance of this condition for the semantics of names, see R. Pasnau, Abstract
Truth in Tomas Aquinas, in Representation and Objects of Tought in Medieval Philosophy, ed.
H. Lagerlund (Aldershot, 2007), 33-63, esp. 54 ., and G. Pini, Scotus on Knowing and Nam-
ing Natural Kinds, History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (2009), 255-72.
are naturally acquainted but which are not what is primarily signied by the
imposed names. Tus, while man in itself signies primarily the specic dif-
ference of animality (i.e. rationality), on which its imposition is based, with
respect to us man does not signify the accidental properties, causally depend-
ing on rationality, from which we imposed the name man to signify rational
beings, but precisely those rational beings.
29
Signicantly, it is according to
this distinction that Tomas dierentiates the signication of a name from its
etymology.
30
Unfortunately, Tomas does not give many examples for eluci-
dating the above-described procedure of imposition of names, except for the
well-known case of stone (lapis). Nonetheless such an example is useful for
summarizing Tomas position and for solving the apparent clash between his
earlier and later works. Clarifying such a procedure will also help us to address
correctly Tomass pragmatic views. What happens in the case of stone?
A warning however is required here. Since Aquinas does not dwell on the
details of the procedure of imposition, we can only conjecture how Aquinas
would have reconstructed the mechanism. Following however the example of
stone, we can imagine that a certain community of Latin speakers has pro-
ceeded in this way: It sees for the rst time a thing of a certain kind that has,
among others, the property of hurting the foot (laedere pedem). Such a thing
shares this property with a lot of other things, such as iron or wood, but the
29)
Cf. e.g. De veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8, in Opera Omnia XXII, I, 2, ed. A. Dondaine (Rome,
1970), 121-2,330-49: Ad octavum dicendum, quod nomen dicitur ab aliquo imponi duplic-
iter: aut ex parte imponentis nomen, aut ex parte rei cui imponitur. Ex parte autem rei nomen
dicitur ab illo imponi per quod completur ratio rei quam nomen signicat; et hoc est dierentia
specica illius rei. Et hoc est quod principaliter signicatur per nomen. Sed quia dierentiae
essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel eectibus loco earum, ut in
VIII Metaphysicae dicitur; et secundum hoc nominamus rem; et sic illud quod loco dierentiae
essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen ex parte imponentis, sicut lapis imponitur ab
eectu, qui est laedere pedem. Et hoc non oportet esse principaliter signicatum per nomen, sed
illud loco cuius hoc ponitur. Similiter dico, quod nomen verbi imponitur a verberatione vel a
boatu ex parte imponentis, non ex parte rei.; and ad 11.
30)
Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod aliud est etymo-
logia nominis, et aliud est signicatio nominis. Etymologia attenditur secundum id a quo
imponitur nomen ad signicandum, nominis vero signicatio attenditur secundum id ad quod
signicandum nomen imponitur. Quae quandoque diversa sunt, nomen enim lapidis imponitur
a laesione pedis, non tamen hoc signicat; alioquin ferrum, cum pedem laedat, lapis esset.; In I
Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. For emphasis on a possible asymmetry in the case of God between
the imposition and the signication of names, see In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; Sum. theol.,
I, q. 13, a. 6; De veritate, q. 4, a. 1; Quaestiones de malo, q. 1, a. 5, ad 19; Compendium theologiae,
I, ch. 27; In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3 and d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, for the dierence between
rst and second imposition of names.
Latin-speaking community decides to assume that property as the distinguish-
ing feature of such a thing, to the point that it imposes the name stone (lapis)
to signify precisely that thing. More precisely, by stone the Latin-speaking
community wants to designate a thing made in such a way that it is able to
account for the property of hurting the foot. In the case of stone, the Latin-
speaking community has therefore taken two steps: rst, having isolated a
recurrent property, it has chosen a name able to express it: this rst step is
summarized by the etymology of the name stone; second, it has attached
such a name to the thing, for referential purposes. Presumably, at the outset
the Latin-speaking community did not know anything denite about what a
stone essentially is, nonetheless it knew that by stone it meant to refer to a
thing exhibiting some denite apparent and macroscopic properties (a certain
form and color, a certain hardness, and so on). Once the procedure of
imposition is achieved, the name stone rigidly designates a thing of a certain
kind, but at the same time it expresses, albeit confusedly and implicitly, the
characteristics of the kind to which that particular thing belongs. Te kind
under which stones fall must be explanatory of the accidental properties that
stones exhibit.
Aquinas does not say whether the same mechanism also governs the impo-
sition of names in the case of living beings. It probably does, given some of
Tomas typical claimsrecall, for example, Tomas tenets that, as men-
tioned above, the essential dierences of a thing are unknown to us
31
, and that
in the external world nothing distinct corresponds to the genus and the dif-
ferentia of a denition but only an empirically unknowable causal principle of
them.
32
Te fact that the cause and the goal of a names imposition refer to
dierent items of Tomas ontology has an important corollary for our argu-
ment. Keep in mind that, for Tomas, the modes of signifying depend on the
modes of understanding rather than on the modes of being; this entails that
such modes of signifying do not bear a one-to-one correspondence with the
modes of being. As was seen, a community of speakers imposes names on the
basis of an original acquaintance with things, and names are somehow subor-
dinated to this primitive knowledge.
33
At the outset, our acquaintance with
things is intuitive and pre-scientic, but the generic character of our rst
knowledge of things does not impede the act of attaching names to things, for
31)
See above, note 28.
32)
Cf. e.g. De ente et essentia, ch. 2; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 5.
33)
Cf. Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 35, ed. C. Pera-P. Marc-P. Caramello (Turin-Rome, 1961),
46, n. 300.
a generic knowledge is a sucient condition for imposing a name to signify a
thing. Such a suciency rests on the causal connection holding between the
mind and the world, a connection that determines our rst cognitive control
on things.
34
Combining therefore the two distinctions we have illustrated above, we
may conclude that, for Tomas, names function as shorthand for a collection
of essential properties which they signify (i) rst, as if such a collection were a
separately subsisting thing (or as if it were exhibited by a separately subsisting
thing) and (ii) second, as if such a collection were the explanatory principle of
the macroscopic properties that occasioned the imposition of names. If I am
right, the above reconstructed mechanism is what allows Tomas to endow
names with both connotative and denotative force. Tis mechanism holds in
the case of concrete common names such as man as well as in the case of
abstract common names such as humanity.
A last thing must be noticed. Although names signify a collection of essen-
tial properties as if it were a separately subsisting thing, nonetheless knowing
what a name signies does not amount to knowing denitely all the properties
summarized by it. Take the case of the name man. We know what man
signies precisely when we know that man signies a thing of a certain kind
or even a certain kind of thing, namely a man (i.e. a rational animal), and not
when we know what the essential features of the kind-man are. Te reason is
that names state only implicitly what their denitions state explicitly (i.e. ani-
mality and rationality). Tis means that, once names are imposed, our knowl-
edge of the essential properties of the things signied by those names can be
specied or revised across time, consequently the denitions of names as well
can undergo a process of updating. Names, though, never cease to designate
the things to which they have been imposed. Knowing what a name signies,
therefore, precisely amounts to knowing this referential fact (i.e. that a name
signies a certain kind of thing, a thing of a certain kind), although the condi-
tions for a name to be able to signify that thing are given by the meaning of
the name, which is expressed by its denition. Specically, denition is for
34)
As a result, for Tomas, since names can be associated to dierent knowledge, it follows that
by names speakers can signify a thing more denitely than they can understand it by concepts
(see Sum. theol., III, q. 60, a. 6). In contrast, because of such a causal link, speakers cannot signify
denitely a thing that they never experienced (Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, I,
ch. 30). In his Commentary on Peri hermeneias (I, ch. 1), Tomas also adds that such a causal
relationship would be a sucient condition for living if men were naturally solitary animals,
since concepts are natural likenesses of things.
Aquinas the linguistic counterpart of our knowledge of the essential properties
of the things that names signify.
In conclusion, according to Tomas semantics of names the original impo-
sition establishes both the denotation of a name, what Tomas calls the signi-
ed thing (res signicata), and its connotation, what Tomas calls the meaning
(signicatum) or the concept or sense of a name (ratio nominis).
35
In particular,
the meaning of a name is what we express by way of a denition. Tis rigid
and intrinsic designative capacity of names, which is not altered by gram-
matical or syntactical modications of names,
36
is what Aquinas, in the wake
of tradition, calls the proper signication of a name (signicatio propria) or the
semantic virtue or force of speech (virtus sermonis, virtus nominis), i.e. the lit-
eral meaning of the words.
II. Part Two: Pragmatics
Te pattern of analysis we have elaborated for natural-kind terms may be
extended also to other names. It must be said, however, that the semantic
function of names is much more dicult to explain in the case of names sig-
nifying abstract or non-existing entities, actions or emotions, states of aairs,
and the like. Still, Tomas seems to think that the semantics of names can be
explained in all of these cases by resorting to the same principle: names signify
things qua conceived (whatever such things are), so the meaning or sense of a
name plays a key role in determining the reference of the name; at the same
time such a meaning turns out to be what is primarily signied by the name.
If names are always imposed to signify things qua conceived, then there is
room for considering some pragmatic factors that can interact and hence
inuence the formation and the semantic function of names. Such factors
intervene in the construction of the semantical structure of conventional lan-
guages, and the appeal to them is useful especially when names occur in a
dialogic context. Aquinas is quite elusive about such factors, but he seems to
regard two of them as particularly signicant for a complete account of the
semantics of names. Tey are (i) rst, the speakers intention (intentio
35)
For the connection between imposition of names and their meanings, compare De veritate,
q. 14, a. 3, with De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 1. For the dierence between meaning and mode of sig-
nication, see Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 30. On the asymmetry between modes of being and
modes of understanding, see Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 34, and Expositio libri Posteriorum, II,
ch. 6 (for the cognition of non-beings).
36)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.
loquentis), and (ii) second, the common usage or linguistic custom (usus/con-
suetudo loquendi). Tese factors are important for explaining some phases of a
names story: the acquisition of a name, its ordinary use by a social commu-
nity, the truth-conditions of the propositions in which it occurs. Let me con-
sider each of these factors in turn.
2.1. Te Common Usage (usus loquendi)
While speakers impose names on things after selecting some of their character-
istic features, as was said, Tomas is of the opinion that, in a given language-
speaking community, names are not normally acquired in this way but by way
of learning. Learning is a process of transmission of knowledge from father
to child or from master to pupil. With respect to the person who acquires
knowledge, Tomas usually presents learning as the progressive specication
of an initially generic knowledge. Te fact that names are normally acquired
by learning implies that there can be a semantic gap between the meaning that
a name possesses in force of its primitive imposition and the meaning that it
possesses when it is learnt (the original meaning and the ordinary meaning
of a name, respectively). In general, the ordinary process of acquisition of
names tends to mirror the way a given language-speaking community at the
outset attached names to things. In fact, Tomas describes the psychological
development of the individual knowledge and use of a conventional language
by way of Aristotles example of children, who at the beginning call every
man father and only subsequently are they able to distinguish and recog-
nize correctly their own father.
37
Tomas seems to introduce this example to
underline two things: rst, that the process of imposition is not re-proposed
whenever we learn to use a name, and second, that nonetheless both the pro-
cess of imposition and that of learning follow the same way, proceeding from
indeterminate to determinate knowledge.
Across time, Tomas observes, a name can undergo a process of extension
38

or restriction
39
of its original meaning, so by learning names are transmitted
37)
Cf. e.g. Expositio libri Physicorum, I, lec. 1; Sum. theol., I, q. 85, a. 3; In II Sent., d. 20, q. 2,
a. 2; Super De caelo, I, lec. 24.
38)
Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., I, q. 67, a. 1: Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter
convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum
nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad signicandum actum
sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen,
secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum.
39)
Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., I-II, q. 35, a. 2, ad 1. Te same holds for propositions, which Tomas
endows with a signication of their own. On the dierence between the signication of names
and propositions, see In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 7; Exp. Per., I, ch. 6.
with a more extended or restricted semantic content. Normally, the process of
stabilization of a names meaning takes a long time and for this reason it can
give rise to cases of miscomprehension or, worse, to heretical positions,
40
and
even end with a radical distortion of the original meaning.
41
However it may
be, a language-speaking community receives names already provided with a
meaning and transmit them to other speakers. Tis mechanism of learning
and transmission of semantic information explains why Tomas often invokes
common usage as the rst lter for discriminating correct from incorrect
(erroneous or idiomatic) utilizations of names. But how do speakers proceed
when, once having learned names, they begin to use them? Aquinas gives
conicting indications about this point. At rst glance, Tomass thought
about common usage seems inspired by what sounds as a genuinely pragmatic
principle, namely that names signify what the majority of a language-speaking
community means to signify by those names.
42
Tomas often introduces this
principle by citing Aristotles dictum from the Topics that names must be used
according to the way in which most speakers use them (nominibus utendum est
ut plures).
43
Tis dictum has two implications. First, when we learn a name,
Tomas seems to suggest that we learn to use it in accordance with the con-
ventions of a given linguistic community. What is more, Tomas seems to
require that speakers must always conform to the linguistic custom of the
social community of which they are members, so they are expected to avoid
any idiomatic or arbitrary use of names. Second, the above dictum allows us
to conclude that, for Tomas, when we learn a name, we learn to use it even
if we do not know what the name properly signies or whether something real
corresponds to it in the physical world. Tis amounts to the admission that we
acquire our linguistic competencies and abilities always by way of learning, i.e.
in a social context. Nonetheless the fact that we learn to use names within a
linguistic community does not guarantee that the ordinary meaning of names,
40)
See Sum. theol., I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3; also I, q. 29, a. 4.
41)
See Sum. theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consuetum est quod
nomina a sui prima impositione detorqueantur ad alia signicanda, sicut nomen medicinae
impositum est primo ad signicandum remedium quod praestatur inrmo ad sanandum, deinde
tractum est ad signicandum artem qua hoc t.
42)
See Expositio libri Posteriorum, I, 4, in Opera Omnia I* 2, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome-Paris,
1989), 19,110-6: Est autem hec recta manifestatio dinitionis: dinitio enim est ratio quam
signicat nomen, ut dicitur in IV Methaphisice; signicatio autem nominis accipienda est ab eo
quod intendunt communiter loquentes per illud nomen signicare, unde et in II Topicorum
dicitur quod nominibus utendum est ut plures utuntur.
43)
See the previous note. See also In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, and
q. 17, a. 1; Quodlibet V, q. 4; De 36 articulis, a. 9, ad arg.; Exp. Post., I, ch. 4; Super De caelo, I,
lec. 5 and 20; II, lec. 8 and 12; III, lec. 8. Te source is Aristotle, Topics, II, 2, 110a15-19.
what is learned, is also what must be followed. As was said, sometimes ordi-
nary meaning and original meaning do not overlap, so one must scrutinize
accurately a names semantics by discerning each supplementary and stratied
meaning, on the way to discovering the original meaning. But obviously, there
are also cases in which the original meaning is not what must be taken up.
Tomas considers dierent cases, although in passing.
In general, names retain their original meaning in the ordinary one. Tis
happens because, Tomas acknowledges, names are imposed on the basis of
conceptions that are natural likenesses of things, so the original meaning of
names is the outcome of a natural inclination that leads us to attach names to
things (quod observatur communiter apud omnes, videtur ex naturali inclina-
tione provenire).
44
So, despite their being chosen conventionally, names are
supposed to respect the causal and natural relationship linking the mind to the
world. For this reason, names tend to preserve their original meaning through-
out their history, and this meaning is commonly received and shared by the
speakers of a given linguistic community. Tere are however cases where orig-
inal and ordinary meaning diverge,
45
and in these cases interpreting names
and propositions requires an accurate scrutiny of the common usage. In such
cases, interpreting names and propositions for the most part amounts to
discerning the original meaning of names. According to Tomas, Aristotle
also assumed common usage as the starting-point for his philosophical
investigations,
46
so even in interpreting Aristotle one is called to consider
carefully common usage.
If, on the one hand, the process of extension or restriction of a names
original meaning confers to a name a certain semantic stability within a com-
munity of speakers, on the other hand, such a process imports equivocation
into language. In his works, Aquinas realizes this point by noting that equivo-
cation is related to the signication of names rather than to supposition.
47
In
particular, equivocation is closely connected to the dierent linguistic codes
with respect to which the signication of a name can be assessedfor instance
if we are speaking properly or commonly, literally or metaphorically, or
according to specic areas of the linguistic community, such as according to
the theologians or to the philosophers.
48
Ascertaining the linguistic code is a
44)
See In De caelo, I, lec. 2.
45)
Cf. In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1.
46)
See e.g. Expositio libri Ethicorum, IV, ch. 12, and VIII, ch. 9; Super De caelo, I, lec. 2, and
lec. 20; Sum. theol., I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.
47)
Cf. e.g. Quaestio de unione Verbi, a. 2, ad 4; especially Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 1.
48)
Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de malo, q. 2, a. 2.
prerequisite condition if one aims to disambiguate the propositions where
equivocal terms occur. Since we follow common usage especially in what con-
cerns the signication of names,
49
this means that we receive equivocal names
from a linguistic community,
50
so our principal task in interpreting conven-
tional language is precisely disambiguating the propositions in which names
occur, for example by assigning a correct supposition to names or by distin-
guishing the dierent meanings imported by names.
51
Let me give an example.
In his Commentary on the Heavens Tomas records three possible descriptions
of heaven (caelum), and according to each of them he gives three possible
accounts of what heaven is. In such cases, the signied object of the term
heaven (i.e. the heaven) does not change; nonetheless dierent descriptions
can be associated to it. It is worth noting that, for Tomas, common usage
settles each of these descriptions.
52
A clarication of these dierent descrip-
tions is therefore needed for making sense of the propositions in which the
name heaven occurs.
Te equivocity in the common usage of names explains why Aquinas often
contrasts the speakers common usage against some other forms of usage such
as properly speakingwhich depends on the literal meaning of the words or
virtue of speech (virtus sermonis), Aristotles usage, or some technical usage,
53

49)
Cf. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, in Opera Omnia XXII, I, 2, 124,136-45: Unde verbum si proprie
accipiatur in divinis non dicitur nisi personaliter, si autem accipiatur communiter poterit etiam
dici essentialiter. Sed tamen quia, nominibus utendum ut plures secundum Philosophum, usus
maxime est aemulandus in signicationibus nominum, et quia omnes sancti communiter utun-
tur nomine verbi prout personaliter dicitur, ideo hoc magis dicendum est quod personaliter
dicatur.
50)
Cf. De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, in Opera Omnia XXII, II, 515-6,178-98: Et huius distinctionis
haec videtur esse ratio quia cum conscientiae sit aliquis actus, circa actum autem consideretur
obiectum, potentia, habitus et ipse actus, invenitur quandoque aliquod nomen quod ad ista
quatuor aequivocatur, sicut hoc nomen intellectus quandoque signicat rem intellectam, sicut
nomina dicuntur signicare intellectus, quandoque vero ipsam intellectivam potentiam, quan-
doque vero habitum quendam, quandoque etiam actum. In huiusmodi tamen nominationibus
sequendus est usus loquendi, quia nominibus utendum ut plures, ut dicitur in II Topicorum.
Istud quidem secundum usum loquentium esse videtur ut conscientia quandoque pro re cons-
cita accipiatur, ut cum dicitur dicam tibi conscientiam meam, id est quod est in conscientia mea.
Sed potentiae vel habitui hoc nomen attribui proprie non potest sed solum actui in qua signi-
catione sola concordant omnia quae de conscientia dicuntur.
51)
For a clear example, see Sum. theol., III, q. 16, a. 7.
52)
See Super De caelo I, lec. 20.
53)
In Super II Epistolam ad Corinthios lectura, IV, 5, Tomas opposes linguistic custom (consue-
tudo loquentium) to Aristotles linguistic usage, while in In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1, he
opposes custom to the usage of Saints; in In IV Sent., d. 25, q. 3, a. 1, q.la 1, ad 4, Tomas
such as the philosophical and theological usage.
54
Tomas gives dierent case
studies but in all of them common usage is seen as the touchstone of any other
uses. Since common usage regulates the linguistic custom of a given commu-
nity of speakers, it helps us to assess correctly all cases that diverge from com-
mon usage. Sometimes such divergences carry philosophical signicance. An
important example, for Tomas, is the philosophical language used by the
Platonists. Aquinas notes that the Platonic practice of introducing idiomatic
prexes or suxes endowed with philosophical signicance is due to the fact
that commonly universal names are not introduced into language to signify
universal things, given that names reproduce our natural acquaintance with
the external world and in the world no universal entity can be found. So the
Platonists needed to introduce a linguistic device for relating universal names
to universal things.
55
If in most cases the proper signication of names must be preferred to com-
mon usage and any divergence from common usage must be explained, there
are also cases where, Tomas acknowledges, common usage must be preferred.
Tis usually happens in theology, and especially when theological words are
translated from one language into another. In the prologue to the Contra
errores Graecorum, Tomas illustrates the latter case. Consider the Greek term
hypostasis and the Latin term substantia. Tomas points out that they have
exactly the same meaning (both signify a subsisting thing), nonetheless they
cannot be translated into each other.
56
Te reason is that in theology names
opposes commonly speaking to properly speaking. For other oppositions, see In III Sent.,
d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, and In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, q.la 2.
54)
Cf. In III Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 4, q.la 1.
55)
Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3; Exp. Per., I, 10, in Opera Omnia I* 1, 52,208-25:
Ad designandum diuersos modos attributionis adinuente sunt quedam dictiones que possunt
dici determinationes seu signa quibus designatur quod aliquid de uniuersali hoc uel illo modo
predicetur. Set, quia non est communiter ab omnibus apprehensum quod uniuersalia extra sin-
gularia subsistant, ideo communis usus loquendi non habet aliquam dictionem ad designandum
illum modum predicandi prout aliquid dicitur de eo in abstractione a singularibus; set Plato, qui
posuit uniuersalia extra singularia subsistere, adinuenit quasdam determinationes quibus desig-
naretur quomodo aliquid attribuitur uniuersali prout est extra singularia, et uocabat uniuersale
separatim subsistens extra singularia, quantum ad speciem hominis per se hominem, uel ipsum
hominem; et similiter in aliis uniuersalibus.
56)
Cf. e.g. Super Decretales, 1; Contra errores Graecorum, I, pr., in Opera Omnia XL, ed. H.-F.
Dondaine (Rome, 1967), 71,45-65: Secundo quia multa quae bene sonant in lingua graeca, in
latina fortassis bene non sonant, propter quod eandem dei veritatem aliis verbis Latini conten-
tur et Graeci. Dicitur enim apud Graecos recte et catholice quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus
sanctus sunt tres hypostases; apud Latinos autem non recte sonat si quis dicat quod sunt tres
substantiae, licet hypostasis idem sit apud Graecos quod substantia apud Latinos secundum
must be employed according to the usage of the speakers and Greek- and
Latin-speakers are accustomed to use such names in a sensibly dierent
manner.
57
In this case, it is common usage that dictates the rule.
Hence, common usage is regularly followed in theology. Take the case of
the phrase Holy Spirit. One can propose dierent semantic accounts of its
meaning. On the one hand, if the phrase Holy Spirit is taken according to
the semantic virtue of speech, it may refer to each Person of the Trinity, for in
this case it is understood as a grammatical combination of two terms, i.e. a
substantive plus an adjective; but if it is taken according to the new imposition
of the Catholic Church, then it may refer only to the third Person of the Trin-
ity, because in this case the phrase Holy Spirit is equivalent to a sort of de-
nite description of one single name (circumlocutio unius nominis). Te same
happens for other names, such as Person: according to the semantic virtue of
the name it signies a certain essence (i.e. an individual substance of rational
nature), but according to the usage of the Catholic Churcha usage intro-
duced to defend Catholic orthodoxy against hereticsit signies a relation.
58

Both these examples show that common usage must be scrupulously followed
in theology, even if the ordinary meaning of a name can be the result of a
series of subsequent impositions that render the name ambiguous or polysemic.
proprietatem vocabuli, nam apud Latinos substantia usitatius pro essentia accipi solet, quam tam
nos quam Graeci unam in divinis contemur; propter quod sicut Graeci dicunt tres hypostases
nos dicimus tres personas . . . Unde ad ocium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt catholi-
cae dei transferens servet sententiam, mutet autem modum loquendi secundum proprietatem
linguae in quam transfert. For other cases, see Sum. theol., I, q. 68, a. 4; De potentia, q. 10, a. 1,
ad 8; Exp. Met., V, lec. 2. For a justication of such dierent linguistic practices, see Super Evan-
gelium S. Ioannis lectura, ch. 1, lec. 1.
57)
Cf. De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2; Sum. theol., I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum
quod hypostasis, apud Graecos, ex propria signicatione nominis habet quod signicet quod-
cumque individuum substantiae, sed ex usu loquendi habet quod sumatur pro individuo ratio-
nalis naturae, ratione suae excellentiae.
58)
See e.g. In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1, ed. Mandonnet, 268: Ad primum ergo dicendum,
quod hoc quod dico, Spiritus Sanctus, potest dupliciter considerari: vel quantum ad virtutem
vocabulorum, et sic convenit toti Trinitati prout sumitur in virtute duarum dictionum; vel
quantum ad impositionem Ecclesiae, per quam hoc impositum est ad signicandum unam per-
sonam, quasi circumlocutio unius nominis, propter defectum vocabulorum, quia linguae nos-
trae deciunt a narratione Dei; et sic proprie convenit Spiritui sancto.; Sum. theol., I, q. 29, a.
4: hoc nomen persona simpliciter, ex virtute vocabuli, essentiam signicet in divinis, sicut hoc
nomen Deus, et hoc nomen sapiens, sed propter instantiam haereticorum, est accommodatum,
ex ordinatione Concilii, ut possit poni pro relativis; et praecipue in plurali, vel cum nomine
partitivo, ut cum dicimus tres personas, vel alia est persona patris, alia lii. In singulari vero
potest sumi pro absoluto, et pro relativo.
Anyway, these examples also show that one needs an understanding of how
the original meaning of a name enrolled into its ordinary meaning if one
wants to disambiguate correctly the propositions in which such a name
occurs.
59
In philosophy the situation is less dramatic and Tomas usually reconciles
the common usage with the literal meaning. Philosophical terms, such as
idea,
60
intellect,
61
consciousness,
62
word,
63
virtue,
64
free will,
65
and the
like, have modied their semantics across time; as a result, Tomas notes, they
are used to designate dierent things. According to which meaning one is
inclined to match to the name, one can set forth dierent philosophical treat-
ments of the notions meant by such terms. However, Tomas seems to be of
the opinion that the main task of the philosopher is to dig into the semantical
spectrum of those terms and to discover their proper signication or original
meaning. In philosophy, not common usage but the original meaning seems
to play the most prominent role.
In conclusion, Aquinas considers the process of acquisition of names as a
multifarious phenomenon. We learn how to use names within a language-
speaking community. In particular, names are used according to how most
speakers use them, and this entails that at the outset we manage names with-
out knowing denitely their meanings. In a subsequent phase, linguistic cus-
tom must be considered more closely in order to disambiguate and interpret
correctly ordinary propositions. Although names are introduced into language
for a referential purpose, names are supposed to designate things only when a
meaning is matched to them. Matching a meaning to a name is a complex
59)
See Tomas precisions in In I Sent., d. 21, q. 2, a. 2, exp., ed. Mandonnet, 526-7. See also
In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1; In IV Sent., d. 25, q. 3, a. 1, q.la 1, ad 4; Sum. theol., I, q. 31, a. 4, ad
2; I, q. 83, a. 2; De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.
60)
Cf. In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Mandonnet, 839-40: Idea enim dicitur ab eidos, quod
est forma; unde nomen ideae, quantum ad proprietatem nominis, aequaliter se habet ad prac-
ticam et speculativam cognitionem; forma enim rei in intellectu existens, utriusque cognitionis
principium est. Quamvis enim secundum usum loquentium idea sumatur pro forma quae est
principium practicae cognitionis, secundum quod ideas exemplares rerum formas nominamus;
tamen etiam principium speculativae cognitionis est, secundum quod ideas contemplantes for-
mas rerum nominamus.; De veritate, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3; q. 3, a. 3.
61)
Cf. e.g. De veritate, q. 17, a. 1 (see above, note 50).
62)
Cf. e.g. De veritate, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2; Sum. theol., I, q. 79, a. 13.
63)
Cf. e.g. In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1; De veritate, q. 4, a. 1.
64)
Cf. e.g. In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, q.la 1.
65)
Cf. e.g. In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1; De veritate, q. 24, a. 4 and ad 13; Sum. theol., I, q. 83,
a. 2.
procedure that depends on our intellectual cognition of things. A names
meaning can change across time, so the appeal to linguistic custom is a rst
step to discriminating correct from incorrect (especially idiomatic) utilizations
of names and propositions. In theology, following linguistic custom is prefer-
able, while in philosophy the literal meaning is considered by Aquinas as the
principal element.
2.2. Te Speakers Intention (intentio loquentis)
Unlike the rst pragmatic factor (i.e. common usage), Tomas does not dwell
at length on the second pragmatic factor mentioned at the beginning of this
paper, viz. the speakers intention. Probably, the reason is that, on the one
hand, the intention of individual speakers seems irrelevant for explaining the
semantics of names: the meaning of names depends on the linguistic conven-
tions of a language-speaking community and such conventions are beyond the
control of an individual; on the other hand, since the intention of the majority
of speakers regulates the common use of names, this second pragmatic factor
can be reduced to the rst to a certain degree. However it may be, the mean-
ing of a name seems to be, for Aquinas, the outcome of the interconnection of
external and internal factors. For one thing, the meaning of words depends on
circumstances outside us, such as the social or physical environment. We do
not have the ability to change arbitrarily the meaning of words or to name
things that we have never known. Te meaning stemming from our primor-
dial acquaintance with things is what we called the original meaning, which
establishes the proper signication of names. For another thing, though, the
meaning of words is the upshot of what most of a language-speaking com-
munity means by such words. Tis is what we called the ordinary meaning of
words. Te original meaning, as said, can undergo a process of extension or
restriction over time. Variations in the meaning of words can therefore occur,
and in most cases they depend on the intention with which names are used by
a community of speakers. Knowing such an intention may be of some utility
for understanding
66
or disambiguating propositions,
67
although it is obvious
that the reference to the speakers intention must not be counted among the
66)
Cf. De potentia, q. 7, a. 5, ad 4.
67)
Cf. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 1. On the background of this pragmatic factor, see C.
Marmo, A Pragmatic Approach to Language in Modism, in Geschichte der Sprachtheorie, 169-
83; I. Rosier, Elments de pragmatique dans la grammaire, la logique et la thologie mdivales,
Histoire Epistmologie Langage 20.1 (1998), 117-32.
truth-conditions of propositionsunless one is proposing a pragmatic assess-
ment of the consequences of a given speech act.
Tomas deals with the speakers intention on a few occasions. For our argu-
ment, two cases are worth noting in so far as they show two possible ways of
understanding the link between proposition and speakers intention: the rst
understanding concerns the relationship between what a proposition states
and what we meant to state by such a proposition; the second understanding,
instead, concerns the relationship between what a proposition states and what
a propositions means.
Te rst link emerges in the Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 10, a. 7, where
Aquinas explains how to settle a theological disputation. Tomas notes that in
a theological disputation some constraints concern the speaker and others the
hearer. On the side of the hearer, one should consider carefully the degree of
instruction, while on the side of the speaker, one is called to take into account
the intention.
68
In this case, the intention of the speaker is invoked to assess
correctly the ethical consequences of a theological disputation.
Te speakers intention was already invoked as a condition in the Summa
theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 2, to exclude that, when one predicates something F of
God, one means either to remove from God whatever is non-F or, alterna-
tively, to express the causal role played by God with respect to the creatures
being F. For instance, Tomas denies that, when we say God is wise, we
mean either that God does not have the characteristics of non-wise beings or
that God is the cause of created beings wisdom. For Tomas, when one pred-
icates F of God, one means to attribute to God precisely the property of being
F, although it is attributed to God in an imperfect and analogical way. Hence,
the speakers dierent intentions can serve as the basis for dierent accounts
of the predication in divinis.
In a dierent context, the appeal to the speakers intention obviously plays
a role in ethical or sacramental matters where the classication of sins
69
or of
68)
Cf. Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 10, a. 7: Respondeo dicendum quod in disputatione dei duo
sunt consideranda, unum quidem ex parte disputantis; aliud autem ex parte audientium. Ex
parte quidem disputantis est consideranda intentio. Si enim disputet tanquam de de dubitans,
et veritatem dei pro certo non supponens, sed argumentis experiri intendens, procul dubio
peccat, tanquam dubius in de et indelis. Si autem disputet aliquis de de ad confutandum
errores, vel etiam ad exercitium, laudabile est. Ex parte vero audientium considerandum est
utrum illi qui disputationem audiunt sint instructi et rmi in de, aut simplices et in de titu-
bantes. Et coram quidem sapientibus in de rmis nullum periculum est disputare de de. Sed
circa simplices est distinguendum . . .
69)
Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 75, a. 1.
value of sacraments
70
is carried out precisely according to such a pragmatic
factor. But leaving aside such theological cases, for our interest in Aquinas
semantics it is worth noting that Tomas illustrates the speakers intention at
greater length when he classies the fallacious arguments depending on a lie.
An important case is when a hearer believes to be true what a speaker falsely
tells him.
71
In this case, the speakers intention serves to discriminate what
Tomas calls, in the wake a long-standing tradition, the material truth/falsity
of a proposition from its formal truth/falsity. If we apply to Tomas a distinc-
tion in pragmatics current today, that, roughly, is, that between what is stated
by a proposition and what is meant by a proposition, we can say that material
truth/falsity occurs when the true/false is stated but not meant by a proposi-
tion, while formal truth/falsity occurs when the true/false is meant as well as
stated by a proposition. Tus, if we utter a false proposition while meaning to
utter a true proposition, we have uttered a materially false, but a formally true,
proposition.
72
Tis distinction has two important consequences for our argument.
First, albeit implicitly, Tomas presents the speakers intention as the prin-
cipal instrument for conferring ethical, pragmatic or performative value to
some speech acts. As Tomas observes in the Summa theologiae, if we utter a
false proposition while meaning to utter a true proposition we are in a (ethi-
cally) lesser serious situation than if we utter a true proposition while meaning
to utter a false proposition.
73
70)
Cf. e.g. In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, aa. 1-4; Sum. theol., II-II, q. 72, a. 2.
71)
Cf. e.g. In III Sent., d. 38, q. 1, aa. 1-2.
72)
Cf. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 110, a. 1: . . . Si ergo ista tria concurrant, scilicet quod falsum sit id
quod enuntiatur, et quod adsit voluntas falsum enuntiandi, et iterum intentio fallendi, tunc est
falsitas materialiter, quia falsum dicitur; et formaliter, propter voluntatem falsum dicendi; et
eective, propter voluntatem falsitatem imprimendi. Sed tamen ratio mendacii sumitur a for-
mali falsitate, ex hoc scilicet quod aliquis habet voluntatem falsum enuntiandi. Unde et menda-
cium nominatur ex eo quod contra mentem dicitur. Et ideo si quis falsum enuntiet credens illud
verum esse, est quidem falsum materialiter, sed non formaliter, quia falsitas est praeter intentio-
nem dicentis. Unde non habet perfectam rationem mendacii, id enim quod praeter intentionem
est, per accidens est; unde non potest esse specica dierentia. Si vero formaliter aliquis falsum
dicat, habens voluntatem falsum dicendi, licet sit verum id quod dicitur, inquantum tamen
huiusmodi actus est voluntarius et moralis, habet per se falsitatem, et per accidens veritatem.
Unde ad speciem mendacii pertingit.
73)
Cf. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque
magis iudicatur secundum id quod est in eo formaliter et per se, quam secundum id quod est in
eo materialiter et per accidens. Et ideo magis opponitur veritati, inquantum est virtus moralis,
quod aliquis dicat verum intendens dicere falsum, quam quod dicat falsum intendens dicere
verum. See also Sum. theol., II-II, q. 98, a. 1, ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod actus morales
Second, the reference to the speakers intention allows an extension of the
ontological domain according to which propositions can be interpreted and
then veried. Here a certain caution is needed, for at least two reasons: rst,
because Aquinas actually does not say anything new, since such a typology of
truth often recurs in the tradition; second, because Aquinas does not deep into
the distinction between material and formal truth/falsity, nor does he draw
any noteworthy consequence from it. Nevertheless, on the account of Tomas
examples, an interpreter may say that two dierent accounts of truth recur in
Aquinas. A given proposition p can be said to be materially true or false
according to a correspondence theory of truth: in fact, p is materially true or
false if and only if p is or is not the case. Tus, if, for example, Socrates is run-
ning, the proposition Socrates is running is materially true, while the prop-
osition Socrates is not running is materially false. But a given proposition p
can be said to be formally true or false only according to a pragmatic account
of truth: in fact, p is formally true or false only if the speakers intention is to
utter p and to mean that p is or is not the case. Tus, in our example, if
Socrates is running, the proposition Socrates is running is formally true in
two cases: i) if one means to utter such a proposition and knows that it is
materially true (i.e. if one knows that Socrates is running); or ii) if one means
to utter such a proposition and means that it is true, even though one does not
know exactly if it is materially true. If these cases do not occur, the proposition
is formally false. From this pragmatic point of view, it is clear that the relation
that a proposition bears to the speakers intention is more signicant than the
relation it bears to the world. Tis explains why Tomas at times calls the
formal truth/falsity per se truth/falsity and the material truth/falsity per
accidens truth/falsity. In both cases we have a relationship of correspondence.
But in the rst case, the correspondence in play is that between a proposition
and an extramental state of things, while in the second case, it is that between
a proposition and a mental state.
74
procedunt a voluntate, cuius obiectum est bonum apprehensum. Et ideo si falsum apprehenda-
tur ut verum, erit quidem, relatum ad voluntatem, materialiter falsum, formaliter autem verum.
Si autem id quod est falsum accipiatur ut falsum, erit falsum et materialiter et formaliter.
74)
As one could expect, medieval authors deal with this second relationship especially in the
context of the discussions concerning the lie or the classication of moral virtues and vices
depending on language. I owe this information to Costantino Marmo. For details and refer-
ences, I refer to his Una semantica del verbo nella grammatica e nella teologia tra XII
e
XIII
secolo, in A. Maier-L. Valente (eds.), Medieval Teories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Lan-
guage. Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval logic and Semantics. Rome, June
11-15, 2002, 185-206, esp. 189-94.
Tomas applies the distinction between material and formal falsity in a few
theological cases. Te most signicant case I found recurs in his Commentary
on the Gospel of John. Commenting on chapter 8, verset 55, Tomas wonders
whether Christ could have stated that he does not know the Father even if, in
fact, he knows that he knows the Father. Tomas explains that Christ could
have pronounced materially such a sentenceI do not know the Father,
even knowing that he knows the Father, but not formally, because it is
impossible for Christ to want to pronounce the false. Tus, if Christ had pro-
nounced such a sentence, he would have pronounced a materially false sen-
tence but a formally true sentence, in so far as he would have pronounced the
false without meaning to pronounce the false. Accordingly, the conditional
proposition stated by Christ If I pronounced it, I would have been a liar is
possible and valid, for it is a formally good consequence although both the
antecedent and the consequent are impossible.
75
Tere is a second interesting case concerning the intention of the speaker
that I would like to signal. It reveals the second link mentioned above, namely
that between what a proposition states and what a proposition means. It
occurs in Tomass Commentary on Peri hermeneias, when treating the interpre-
tation of singular categorial propositions. When we formulate a singular prop-
osition with existential import (de secundo adiacente) such as Socrates is,
Aquinas observes, we mean that Socrates exists and the proposition states pre-
cisely this fact, i.e. the existence of Socrates. When we formulate a categorial
singular proposition (de tertio adiacente) such as Socrates is white, we do not
mean that there exists a white Socrates but that whiteness inheres in Socrates,
and the proposition states precisely this fact, i.e. the inherence of whiteness in
Socrates. In both cases, the proposition states the fact that we meant to state
by way of such a proposition: the existence of Socrates in the rst case and the
inherence of whiteness in Socrates in the second case. In a certain sense, in this
second case we have an inversion with respect to the previous case, because in
75)
Cf. Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura, ch. 8, lec. 8, ed. R. Cai (Turin-Rome,1952), n. 1285:
Ideo dicit Si dixero; quasi diceret: sicut vos dicentes scire eum, mentimini; ita ego si dixero me
nescire, cum sciam eum, ero similis vobis mendax. Unde haec similitudo sequitur a contrario, ut
sit similitudo in mendacio; quia sicut isti mentiuntur dicentes se scire eum quem nesciunt; ita
Christus esset mendax, si diceret se nescire quem novit. Sed dissimilitudo est in cognitione: quia
isti non cognoscunt, Christus vero scit eum. Sed numquid potuisset Christus hoc dicere? Potuis-
set quidem verba proferre materialiter, sed non intendere exprimere falsitatem: quia hoc non
potuisset eri nisi per inclinationem voluntatis Christi ad falsum, quod erat impossibile, sicut
impossibile erat eum peccare. Nihilominus tamen conditionalis est vera, licet antecedens et con-
sequens sit impossibile.
the case of categorial singular propositions existence is presupposed or meant
by the proposition but not expressly stated, while in the case of existential
singular propositions the existence is both expressly stated and meant.
76
But in
another sense, this case diers from the previous one, because it shows that
not always does what we meant to state by a proposition entirely coincide with
what a proposition actually means. In fact, in the case of the proposition
Socrates is white, we mean only that whiteness inheres in Socrates, but such
a proposition is true not only if whiteness inheres in Socrates but also if
Socrates exists. In other words, even though the existence of Socrates is not
expressly stated by Socrates is white, such a proposition implicitly means it,
since the existence of the subject must be counted among the truth-conditions
of a singular categorial proposition. Tus, in the case of categorial singular
propositions there is a gap between what we mean by a proposition and what
a proposition means. What a proposition means collects all the truth-condi-
tions of the proposition, that is, whatever is explicitly stated or implicitly
meant by the proposition. What we mean to state by a proposition instead
identies, semantically speaking, only the fact that the proposition literally
states. Unfortunately, Tomas does not say enough about this subtle distinc-
tion. It remains, however, that even in this case the appeal to the speakers
intention is important; specically, it serves to prevent us from getting gener-
alized paraphrases of categorial singular propositions into existential singular
propositions.
Conclusion
In Aquinass works no comprehensive treatment of pragmatics can be found,
only some scattered observations which must be brought together. Nonethe-
less Tomas pays a certain amount of attention to two pragmatic factors, i.e.
(i) the common usage and (ii) the speakers intention. Tomas seems to con-
sider common usage as the starting-point of any serious semantic analysis of
language and, in most cases, as said, he proceeds to contrast the virtue of
76)
Cf. Exp. Per., II, 2, in Opera Omnia I* 1, 88,35-46: Ad cuius euidenciam considerandum
est quod hoc uerbum est quandoque in enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut cum dicitur:
Sortes est, per quod nichil aliud intendimus signicare quam quod Sortes sit in rerum natura;
quandoque uero non predicatur per se, quasi principale predicatum, set quasi coniunctum prin-
cipali predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, sicut cum dicitur: Sortes est albus: non enim
est intentio loquentis ut asserat Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat ei albedinem
mediante hoc uerbo est.
speech, depending on the original imposition of names, against the common
usage of names, which establishes the ordinary meaning of them. Names do
not lose their original meaning when they occur in a more linguistically struc-
tured context. What changes in such cases is the supposition of names. Nev-
ertheless the context can impinge on the signication of propositions, for the
context can inuence the meaning that we associate with the names occurring
in it. Viewed in this way, the two pragmatic factors are important for Tomas.
While common usage gives preliminary information about the semantics of
names as well as the linguistic codes with respect to which propositions have
to be disambiguated, referring to the speakers intention can be useful for
interpreting and verifying propositionsalthough the intention of speakers
(or the relationship that a proposition has with it) must not be counted among
the truth-conditions of propositions. In fact, if someone utters a false proposi-
tion meaning however to utter a true proposition, the proposition is false and
not true, at least materially, as was said.
77
Te speakers intention especially plays a role in explaining such phenom-
ena as the multiplication of names, equivocation, what Aquinas calls the for-
mal truth/falsity of propositions, and the metaphorical, ironical or improper
uses of language (every time words are not taken according to their literal
meaning).
78
Te speakers intention is nally importantbut this is a dier-
ent storyfor assessing the performative value of the acts of uttering, like
what happens in the case of sacramental acts introduced by linguistic formu-
las. In this latter case, the appeal to the speakers intention is decisive when an
act of incorrect pronunciation of the formula is concerned, since a modica-
tion at the beginning of the sacramental formula (unlike a modication at the
end of the sacramental formula) can modify or even nullify the entire meaning
of the formula.
79
Nonetheless Tomas is of the opinion that the use of
77)
Cf. In III Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1.
78)
See especially Super I Epistolam ad Corinthios, XI, 2. See also In III Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad
4; Super De divinis nominibus, ch. 4, lec. 9.
79)
Cf. In IV Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, q.la 2, ad 6; also Sum. theol., III, q. 60, a. 7, ad 3. For more
on this aspect of Aquinass semantics, see I. Rosier, Signes and sacraments. Tomas dAquin et
la grammaire speculative, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Tologiques 74 (1990), 392-436;
I. Rosier-A. de Libera, Les enjeux logico-linguistiques de lanalyse de la formule de la conscra-
tion eucharistique, Cahiers de lInstitut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin 67 (1997), 33-77; and I.
Rosier, Intentions, Conventions, Performativity. Medieval Discussions about Sacramental For-
mulas and Oaths, Hersetec (Journal of Hermeneutic Study and Education of Textural Congura-
tion) 3.1 (2009), 1-14. More generally, on the relationship between language and Eucharistic
formulas, see again I. Rosier, La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la smantique au XIII
e

sicle (Paris, 1994), and La parole ecace: Signe, rituel, sacr (Paris, 2004).
performative verbs or a performative assessment of propositions does not sub-
stantially modify the semantic virtue of names. For example, if I promise to do
a thing in the future, my promise does not alter the meaning of the words and
the temporal indexation of the sentence but limits itself to put a constraint on
the things my promise turns on and therefore it has eect on the act itself of
promising.
80
In conclusion, the impression is that Tomas reserves scarce attention to
pragmatics. He advocates a fundamentally anti-pragmatic account of the sig-
nication of names. All the same, he does not omit considering some prag-
matic factorsviz. common usage and the speakers intentionwhen he
accounts for the equivocation of names or for the distinction between formal
and material truth-conditions of propositions.
80)
Cf. In IV Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1.

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