N.

People vs Fernando
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
December 17, 1947
G.R. No. L-1138
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
Martin B. Laurea for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General de la Costa and Solicitor Kapunan, Jr., for appellee.
Moran, J .:
Appellant, Laureano Gonzalez, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime
of estafa through falsification of a public document. The information alleges that on or about the 9th of
November, 1940, appellant, as a laborer in the Department of Labor with the duty of running errands,
with intent to defraud the Government of the Commonwealth, forged and falsified a public document,
which is a reimbursement, expense receipt, by preparing the said receipt and writing thereon the
signature of Enrique Corpus, chief of the property section of the Department of Labor, making it
appear that he officially incurred a transportation expense in the amount of sixty centavos (P0.60)
which he claimed to have advanced from his personal funds, when, as a matter of fact he did not incur
in any such expense, and that Enrique Corpus never approved nor signed said receipt; that appellant
thereafter wrote on the forged document his own signature and that of said Enrique Corpus and
presented, it to Gabriel Nazareno, cashier and disbursing officer, for payment and said cashier did
pay; and that accused misappropriated the amount for his own personal use.
Upon arraignment, defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the trial court to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P100 and to
indemnify the Government in the sum of sixty centavos (P0.60). From this judgment he appealed to
this Court questioning the propriety of the penalty imposed upon him.
The offense charged and admitted by appellant constitutes the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of a public document, and comes under No. 4 Article 315, in connection with Article 171,
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed being pursuant to Article 48 of the said code, that
which is provided for the more serious offense to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty
provided for the more serious offense falsification of a public document by a public officer is prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000. Since appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty, the penalty next lower to that provided by law should be
imposed in accordance with Rule 5, Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
But what is the penalty next lower to prision mayor when the latter is to be applied in its maximum
period? There are two prevailing theories on this matter: (1) that the penalty next lower in degree
should be prision mayor in its medium period, and (2) that it should be prision correcional in its
maximum period. The second theory was laid down by this Court U. S. vs. Fuentes, 4 Phil. 404, but it
was later abandoned in People vs. Co-Pao, 58 Phil. 545, and People vs. Haloot, 37 O.G. 2901, wherein
the first theory was adopted as a rule. By stare decisis this Court has been due to special circumstances
brought to our attention we have assented to reopen the question and consider a new all the reasons
advanced in favor of the one and the other theory.
There can be no doubt that the penalty next lower to another should begin where the latter ends,
because, otherwise, if it were to skip over intermediate ones, it would be lower, but not the next
lower, in degree. Thus if, instance, the penalty provided by law is the maximum of prision mayor, the
penalty next lower cannot be the maximum of prision correcional, because we would be jumping over
the intermediate penalties of prision mayor, minimum and medium. According to Rule 4, Article 61, of
the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty prescribed by law is constituted by three periods of a
divisible penalty, the higher and the lower ones must be formed by the same number of periods
immediately following. And, by analogy, when the penalty prescribed by law is constituted by only one
or two periods of a divisible penalty, the higher and the lower ones are formed also by the same
number of periods immediately following, according to Rule 5, Article 61, of the same code.
There is no difficulty in the application of the rule where the penalty provided by law is clearly one
period of a divisible penalty. The difficulty arises when the law, upon fixing the penalty for a felony,
prescribes one composed of three periods to be applied in only one of them by reason of attending
circumstances. For instance, in a robbery case, when the offender does not carry arms and the value
of the property taken does not exceed P250, the penalty should be prision correcional in its medium
period to prision mayor in its minimum period to be applied in its minimum period, according to
penultimate paragraph of Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. It may be said that the penalty
provided by law in this instance is the medium period of prision correccional, a penalty that is complete
for it has its three periods and its limits cannot be exceeded whatever and however numerous the
aggravating circumstances present in the crime may be. On the other hand, if we say that in this case
the penalty next lower in degree to prision correcional in its medium period in prision correcional in its
minimum period, the result would be that the penalty for the crime is heavier than the penalty
provided for a more serious crime, such as robbery of property of the same value but committed with
arms, because in the last crime the penalty to be applied according to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its minimum period, which is lighter
than prision correcional in its minimum period. Should this theory be allowed to prevail, other
anomalies would happen, as, for instance, that the author of a frustrated crime of robbery in an
inhabited house involving an amount not exceeding P250 would, under the same conditions, have to
be punished with a penalty lighter than that of a person directly responsible for a similar offense
involving a lesser amount. Again, prision mayor in its minimum period is a lighter penalty than prision
mayor in its full extent, and yet the penalty next lower to the former is heavier than the penalty next
lower to the latter. Prision mayor in its minimum degree is a graver penalty than prision mayor in its full
extent, and yet the penalty next higher to the former is lighter than the penalty next higher to the
latter.
Visda, commenting on this matter, says:
Cual es la pena inmediatamente inferior en grando que debera aplicarse con sujecion a los arts. 66 y
68., parrafo segundo del 86, al autor del delito frustrado, al complice del consumado y al mayor de
quince aos y menor de diez y ocho autor del delito consumado de robo sin armas y por valor que no
excede de 500 pesetas? En una sola Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo (la de 13 de Junio de 1872,
publicada en la Gaceta de 30 de Julio) se declaro que esa pena inferior era la de presidio correcional en
su grado minimo. (Vease el considerando 2. de la citada Sentencia.) Esta resolucion, empero, que
fue dictada contra el parecer de Ministerio Fiscal, no ha prevalecido. A haber constante esta
Jurisprudencia, hubiera resultado la notaria injusticia de que al autor de un delito frustrado de robo, sin
armas, por valor mayor de 500 pesetas, se la aplicaria el arresto mayor grado medio, concurriendo una
circunstancia atenuante; el grado maximo del propio arresto mayor, no concurriendo circuntancias
atenuantes ni agravantes y el presidio correccional grado minimo, solo cuando concurriesen una o mas
agravantes; mientras que al autor del mismo delito frustrado derobo, sin armas, pero por valor menor
de 500 pesetas, en dicir de un menos grave que aquel, se le habria de imponer siempre la pena
dentro de los limites del presidio correccional en su grado minimo. Y fue tanto mas de extraar la
antedicha resolucion, cuando en otras anteriores Sentencias (notoriamente la de 18 de Marzo de
1872, publicada en la Gaceta de 2 Abril) se habia declarado ya que esa pena inmediatamente inferior
aplicable, con arreglo al art. 68 al mayor de quince aos y menor de diez y ocho, autor del delito
consumado de robo de que se trata (y por consiguiente al complice del propio delito y al autor del
frustrado, a quienes corresponde como a aquel la pena inmediatamente inferior), era la de arresto
mayor en su grado medio como minimo de la pena (vease el penultimo considerando de dicha ultima
Sentencia) Felizmente, reconociendo el Tribunal Supremo el error cometido en la Sentencia de 13 de
Junio de 1872, ha vuelto a la primera resolucion (la de 18 de Marzo de 1872) en mas de veinte fallos
posterios al de 13 de Junio antedicho. (Vease entre otras las Sentencias de 5 de Julio de 1872, Gaceta
de 11 de Agosto; 26 de Septiembre de 1872, Gaceta de 10 de Octubre; 15 de Octubre 18, 1872,
Gaceta de 19 Noviembre; 20 de Diciembre de 1872, Gaceta de 16 de Febrero 1873, etc.).
En todas ellas se ha declarado que la pena inmediatamente inferior en grado asi del mayor de quince
aos y menor de diez y ocho, como del autor del delito frustrado y complice del consumado, cuando
se trata del robo sin armas y que no excede de 500 pesetas, es la de arresto mayor en su grado medio
a presidio correccional en su grado minimo, debiendo imponerse al culpable arresto mayor en su grado
medio (dos meses y un dia a cuatro meses), que es el minimo de la pena. (3 Viada, pp. 394-395.)
In the construction of laws absurdities should be avoided if possible. And the absurdities above
indicated may be avoided if we hold, as we do hold now that though, as a general rule, when the
penalties prescribed by law are constituted by only one or two periods of divisible penalties; the higher
and the lower ones are formed by the same number of periods immediately following this should not
be done when, as in this case, the law prescribes the penalty in connection with another composed of
three divisible periods, and the graduation should therefore be made in accordance with Rule 4 of
Article 61 of Revised Penal Code. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of Jan. 4, 1887.)
In the instant case, the penalty provided by law is prision mayor which should be applied in its maximum
period, because of the complex nature of the offense charged. There being two mitigating
circumstances, the accused is entitled to the penalty next lower in degree. For the purpose of
determining the penalty next lower, the penalty that should be considered as a starting point is the
whole prision mayor, it being the penalty prescribed by law, and not prision mayor in its maximum period
which is only the penalty actually applied because of an attending circumstance. The penalty next
lower to prision mayor is prision correccional and this latter penalty should be applied in its maximum
because of the circumstance above mentioned. In other words, as we have indicated in the Co-Pao
case (58 Phil. 545), the penalty next lower in degree should be determined before imposing it in its
maximum and not reverse as we done before.
This rule is, however, criticized by this Court in People vs. Haloot, 37 O.G. 2901, in that it may give
rise to the same anomaly where the prescribed penalty, instead of being the minimum, is the
maximum of prision correcional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, that
is,prision mayor in its minimum period, for the reason that the crime was committed in an uninhabited
place and by a band (Art. 300, Rev. Pen. Code), inasmuch as in such case the penalty next lower in
degree would be prision correccional in its minimum period, and the same penalty, as the one next
lower in degree, would be imposed if the crime were lighter, not having been committed in an
uninhabited place and by a band, if aggravating circumstances were present without any mitigating
circumstances, which anomaly would consist in the punishment of the crime with the same penalty
both when it is more serious and when it is lighter. This reasoning seems to lie on the erroneous
theory that for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the penalty which is taken as the starting
point in determining the next lower is the penalty in determining the next lower is the penalty actually
imposed after considering all the circumstances modifying liability. According to section 1 of Act No.
4225, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to the prescribed by the code for the offense is provided by the Code without regard to circumstances
modifying criminal liability. In other words, for the purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty next lower should be determined without regard as to whether the basic penalty provided by
the Code should be applied in its maximum or minimum period as circumstances modifying liability
may require. When, however and this may be the only exception to the rule the number of the
mitigating circumstances is such as to entitle the accused to the penalty next lower in degree, this
penalty, in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, should be taken as the starting point
for the determination of the penalty next lower.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the accused, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
upon him shall be the maximum period of prision correccional, that is, from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
to 6 years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Prision correccional is the penalty provided by law
for the offense and the penalty next lower is arresto mayor which may be applied in any of its periods in
the discretion of the court, taking into the account not only the circumstances attending the crime but
such other circumstances as are material for the determination of a penalty adequate to the peculiar
situation of the accused. As we have said in People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 117-118, keeping in
mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to uplift and redeem valuable human
material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness it is necessary to consider criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which is the duty of the court
to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view the penalties shall not be
standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative
necessity of protecting the social order.
The law provides also for the offense charged a fine exceeding P5,000.
The judgment is accordingly modified and the appellant sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 1
month and 1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, and a fine of P100
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the Government in the sum of P0.60,
also with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, without costs in this instance.
Yulo, C.J. Ozaeta, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the doctrine laid down by the Court. I am of opinion however that a correct application of
the rule would make the minimum penalty in this case not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor. The penalty is reduced one degree on account of certain mitigating circumstances and by
another degree by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. If the procedure prescribed in the rule
should be followed the penalty lower by two degrees than the maximum of prision mayor would be
exactly arresto mayor in its maximum degree which ranges from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months.

O. People vs Munoz

P. People vs Nunez
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128875. July 8, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DEMETRIO NUEZ
Y DUBDUBAN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
For sheer carelessness of the prosecutors in this case in ensuring that the information
contains all the essential allegations, a man who deserves no less than the supreme penalty of
death for violating his own flesh and blood gets off with a sentence of reclusion perpetua.
Complainant Janeth Nuez was born on August 30, 1981 to Demetrio Nuez and Nelia
Ebay. When her mother took on a job as domestic helper in Guam, Janeth stayed on with her
father and younger brother in Lower Cabantian, Buhangin, Davao City.
On January 17, 1996, at around 10:00 p.m., complainant was roused from her sleep and
discovered that her shorts and panties had been taken off. Her father, whom she found beside
her, touched her nipple and inserted his finger into her vagina. He also sucked her
nipple. Complainant pushed her father away, whereupon he returned to bed and complainant put
on her shorts and panties and went back to sleep. She woke up again later and saw her father on
top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina. She pushed him aside and felt sticky fluid spill
on her thigh and vagina. When her father left, complainant just sat down and could no longer
sleep.
The following day, complainant confided the incident to her classmate and her teacher, Mrs.
Meliana Geradona, who reported the matter to the police. Complainant thereafter submitted
herself to an examination by the Medico-Legal Officer of the Davao City Health Office, Dr.
Danilo Ledesma, who found a superficial laceration on her hymen at 6:00 oclock position.
The incident made complainant very angry at her father, so she voluntarily instituted a case
which led to the filing of the following Information with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses the above-named persons (sic) of the felony of Rape, under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 7659, at the
instance of Janeth Ebay Nuez, whose affidavit is hereto attached to form part of this
information, committed as follows:
that on or about January 17, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means
of force, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of his
daughter Janeth E. Nuez, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Davao City, Philippines, January 22, 1995.
(sgd)
LOLITO O. EVANGELIO
Prosecutor I
When arraigned on January 30, 1996, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
[1]
Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Dr. Ledesma,
[2]
PO2 Raul Tonzo,
[3]
who arrested the accused, and
Social Welfare Assistant Milagros Basmayor
[4]
who interviewed complainant.
On the second hearing day, November 14, 1996, defense counsel manifested that the
accused was willing to plead guilty. After finding that the accused was making his plea
voluntarily, the court entered his plea of guilt.
[5]

The prosecution then presented its remaining two witnesses, Meliana D. Heradona,
[6]
Janeth
Nuezs teacher, and the victim herself, Janeth Nuez.
[7]

Following the testimony of Janeth, and the offer of its exhibits as evidence, the prosecution
rested its case.
At the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the defense, the accused, through his
counsel, manifested that he would no longer present any evidence, not even his own testimony,
but would merely submit the case for decision based on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
[8]

On January 23, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision,
[9]
the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Accordingly, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove
the guilt of accused, Demetrio Nuez y Dubduban of the offense charged beyond
reasonable doubt, notwithstanding his plea of guilty of the offense charged pursuant to
Rep. Act 7659, Section 11, sub-par. 7 thereof, accused, Demetrio Nuez y Dubduban,
is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection pursuant to Rep.
Act 8176, amending Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659 as to the manner therein provided,
subject to such method of carrying out his sentence as may be provided for under said
Rep. Act or any regulation under such other means and procedure therein provided.
Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code,
governing civil indemnity accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify complainant,
Janeth Nuez, his daughter, the amount of P30,000.00, by way of moral damages for
all the ignominy and sufferings she incurred out of accused demonic act of sexually
abusing his own daughter.
Finally, in accordance with the automatic review of the Supreme Court of this
judgment, it appearing accused was charged of a capital offense, considered heinous
crime, the Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to at once after promulgation
of this judgment to accused, elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for review, evaluation and final appropriate
action.
SO ORDERED.
[10]

In his Appellants Brief, accused raised a lone assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
AND IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO FULLY
DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.
[11]

The records reveal that in making the plea of guilt, the accused was proceeding under the
mistaken assumption that a plea of guilt would mitigate his liability. Rather than correcting this
misconception, the trial court contributed to the mistaken belief of the accused. The records will
show the infirmity attending such plea
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
For the Prosecution, we are ready.
ATTY. TE:
Respectfully appearing for the accused.
COURT:
How many more witnesses?
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Two witnesses and we shall rest our case.
ATTY. TE:
The accused is not yet around your honor.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Considering the gravity of this case in case of conviction for death in view of the qualifying
circumstance of the relationship as father and daughter.
COURT:
If he pleads guilty of the offense, . .
ATTY. TE:
I have conferred with the accused and he is asking for time.
COURT:
There is no more time.
ATTY. TE:
The accused is willing to plead guilty.
COURT:
If he pleads guilty, it could be mitigating. It is still life imprisonment. And so, whether it is life
imprisonment, we still have the prosecution to present its evidence. If he pleads guilty to
mitigating circumstance, the penalty will depend on the evidence of the prosecution.
ATTY. TE:
For humanitarian reason, we may be allowed that accused could not be sentenced to death?
COURT:
The court cannot determine the sentence. If accused will plead guilty, the court will require the
prosecution to present their evidence to determine the penalty.
ATTY. TE:
I have conferred with the accused, accused confided to this representation that he will enter or want to
withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and instead enter a plea of guilty after this representation
explained to accused with regards with his re-arraignment.
COURT:
Re-arraigned the accused upon manifestation of counsel.
(Accused pleaded guilty to the information).
Q - I will ask you this question. In your plea of guilty, did you understand that you are pleading
guilty to a capital offense?
A - Yes.
Q - Your counsel, Atty. Te explained to you the implication of your plea of guilty?
A - Yes.
Q - And I explain to you that when you plead guilty to a capital offense, it is either life or death
penalty?
A - Yes.
Q - I am also explaining to you that consequences, you still continue your plea of guilty of the capital
offense?
A - Yes.
Q - Did the court gets (sic) from you that your admission of your plea of guilty is your own will as
stated by you, as explained by the court as well as your counsel?
A - Yes.
Q - Your plea of guilty is your own personal and voluntary plea without any existing force and
intimidation from anybody?
A - Yes, it is my own will.
COURT:
Since the plea of guilty of the accused as voluntarily entered with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio as well as explanation given by this court to him, entering the plea of guilty of the accused,
withdrawing his previous plea of not guilty, the court will require the prosecution to present their
evidence as required by the court.
ATTY. TE:
May we moved (sic) that the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty of accused be accepted in favor
of the accused.
COURT:
Make that of record.
[12]
(underscoring, Ours)
Evidently, both the trial court and counsel for the accused led the accused to believe that his
plea of guilt would be a mitigating circumstance in his favor. This was clearly misleading
because (1) a plea of guilty may only be considered as mitigating when seasonably interjected,
that is, before the prosecution presents its evidence;
[13]
and (2) the penalty of death is indivisible
and is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Clearly, too, the accused
was not categorically advised that his plea of guilt would not under any circumstance affect or
reduce his sentence, making his re-arraignment flawed.
[14]

However, even if the plea of guilt of the accused was improvidently made, it does not work
to effectively vacate the finding of guilt made by the trial court. We note that at the onset, the
accused had entered a plea of not guilty but had merely changed this plea to one of guilt midway
during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. It is a settled rule that a decision based
on an irregular plea may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported by other
adequate evidence on record.
[15]
And such other evidence supports the finding of guilt in the
instant case.
First, We have the direct and straightforward testimony of Janeth recounting the violation of
body and spirit she suffered from her very own father. Her account of the harrowing incident is
as follows --
Q - Now, on January 17, 1996, where were you?
A - At home.
Q - Sometime in the evening of January 17, 1996, can you tell the court what happened?
A - Yes.
Q - Tell the court what happened.
A - I was molested by my father.
Q - Can you describe to the Hon. Court, how your father molested you?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Please do so.
A - On that night, January 17, 1996, my father told us to sleep at 10:00 p.m.
Q - What happened next?
A - I mean, it was about 7:00 to 8:00 p.m., that he told us to sleep.
Q - What happened next?
A - When I woke up at about 10:00 p.m., on the same night, I have no more short pants including my
panty.
Q - You said, you noticed that you are undress. What else did you notice to your body?
A - He puddled my nipple. (sic)
Q - Are you referring to your father?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What else did you noticed?
A - He inserted his finger in my vagina.
Q - What else did your father do?
A - He sucked my nipple.
Q - Aside from sucking your nipple, what else your father do?
A - I already pushed him aside.
Q - After pushing him, what happened next?
A - He went back to where he was sleeping.
Q - How about you, where did you go?
A - I put on again my panty and short.
Q - Did you sleep again?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What happened when you sleep again?
A - When I woke up again, he was already on top of me.
Q - Who was actually on top of you?
A - My father.
Q - Why did you say that it was actually your father who is on top of you?
A - Because there was no other person in the house, except my father.
Q - When your father was on top of you, what did you feel in your body, if any?
A - He inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q - What made you say that he inserted his penis in your vagina?
A - Because there was a hard thing that penetrate my vagina and I pushed him aside and there was a
sticky thing on my thigh and vagina.
Q - What is this sticky thing are you referring?
A - It was a white sticky thing.
Q - You said that the penis of your father was inserted in your vagina. What is the extent of the penis
that inserted to your vagina?
A - Only a short portion of his penis.
Q - When you know it was your father, who was doing that act to you that evening, what did you do?
A - I was afraid. I was not able to sleep. I sat on the side of the room and never again sleep.
Q - When you mean on top of you, what did you do?
A - I pushed him.
Q - What was the reaction of your father when you pushed him?
A - He again sleep.
Q - Because of the incident, did you report the matter to the police authorities?
A - The following morning, and I confided this to my classmate.
Q - Who else did you confide with?
A - My teacher.
Q - Are you referring to Mrs. Heradona?
A - Yes.
Q - Now, because of the incident, do you recall if you have submitted for a medical examination?
A - Yes.
Q - Showing to you this medical certificate, is this the same medical certificate which was your
medical certificate issued by Dr. Ledesma?
A - Yes.
Q - Were you interviewed by Dr. Ledesma in connection with this incident?
A - Yes.
[16]

We are inclined to give much weight to her testimony since it is a reputable precept that
testimonies of rape victims who are young or of tender age are credible. The revelation of an
innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit. Courts usually lend credence to
the testimony of a young girl especially where the facts point to her having been a victim of
sexual assault.
[17]
Indeed, no woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished.
[18]
More telling, a daughter especially of tender age, would not
accuse her own father of such a heinous crime as rape had she really not been aggrieved.
[19]

Janeths credibility is strengthened by the fact that no motive was shown for her to testify
falsely against the accused, who, incidentally and unfortunately, is her own father.
[20]
That she lost
no time and immediately reported the rape the following day to her teacher further bolsters her credibility.
[21]
Indeed,
Janeths testimony alone, which is credible, is sufficient to sustain the conviction of her ravisher.
[22]

The charge of rape was adequately established not only by Janeths straightforward
testimony but likewise by that of Dr. Danilo Ledesma who testified as follows
Q - As the attending physician in this case, do you confirm all the entries in this particular medical
report Doctor?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Inviting your attention to the genital examination entry in your report Dr. which you said among
other things, that there was superficial laceration at 6:00 oclock position, will you explain the
meaning of that findings?
A - When I examine the genitals of the patient, I saw that the hymen had laceration superficial, and
healing laceration at 6:00 position, corresponding to the face of the watch. Meaning to say, if we
compare the hymen to the face of the watch, the laceration is 6:00 oclock.
Q - As an examiner, what would have cause such laceration?
A - As a general role, the hymen is laceration for the first time during the first sexual
intercourse. (sic)
Q - In your conclusion, you said that there was a healing genital laceration, what do you mean by
that?
A - Meaning to say, when I saw the patient, the laceration was already more than 24 hours.
Q - You are referring to the laceration mentioned in your genital examination?
A - Yes, sir.
[23]

Against these pieces of evidence, the accused had nothing to offer. He did not even testify
in his own behalf and merely submitted his case on the basis of the prosecutions evidence. The
studied silence of the accused on the evidence for the rape amounts to an admission of the sexual
congress.
[24]

In light of the foregoing as well as the clear, convincing and competent physical and
testimonial evidence, this Court is convinced that accused has been proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Although the matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned as an error by the
accused, nevertheless, it is a well-established rule in criminal procedure that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is made
the subject of assignment of errors or not.
[25]

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent or victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
Applying the aforesaid law, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon the accused,
taking into account the minority of Janeth as she was only fourteen (14) years old at the time of
the incident, as well as the relationship of father and daughter between the accused and the
complainant.
The penalty of death cannot be automatically imposed on the accused merely because of the
trial courts appreciation of both the fact of minority and relationship, no matter how clearly
established. Jurisprudence dictates that these twin facts be alleged in the Information or
Complaint before the death penalty can properly be imposed.
Indeed, this Court has consistently held that the seven attendant circumstances under Section
11 of RA 7659 are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which, unlike generic aggravating
circumstances that may be proved even if not alleged, cannot be proved as such unless alleged in
the Information.
[26]

Although it was established that Janeth was a minor at the time of rape, fourteen (14) years
old and a grade six student, to be exact, this qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the
Information.
In the recent case of People v. Calayca,
[27]
the accused was also found to have raped his 15-
year old daughter. As in the instant case, only the fact of relationship between the parties was
alleged in the Information, namely that the victim was the daughter of the accused. The fact of
minority of the victim was not. Finding the crime charged as simple rape, this Court ruled as
follows
A reading of the Information for rape filed against appellant in the present case
reveals that he is merely charged with the crime of simple rape which warrants the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This is so because the fact of
the minority of the victim is not stated in the Information. What was alleged therein
was only the relationship of the offender as the parent of the victim. Again, as we
have emphasized in People v. Ramos, the elements of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must concur. As such, the charge of rape in the
Information is not in its qualified form so as to fall under the special qualifying
circumstances stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. x x x.
(emphasis copied)
Thus, there being no allegation of minority in the Information under which accused was
arraigned and tried in the case at bench, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape.
Strict application of the rule requiring the allegation of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Section 11 of R.A. 7659 was further enunciated in People v. Dimapilis.
[28]
While
the Information there alleged that the victim was the stepdaughter of the accused, it was not
accepted as a proper allegation of the qualifying circumstance that the accused was the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the death penalty imposed by the trial
court was once again reduced toreclusion perpetua.
Taking into account the growing number of cases where qualified rape under Section 11 of
R.A. 7659, although proven during trial, could still not be properly penalized because of defects
in the Information, We urge the prosecuting fiscals who are charged with the responsibility of
preparing Informations to state with particularity the attendant circumstances provided for under
Section 11 of R.A. 7659. More specifically, in qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the
victim and the actual relationship between the parties, as worded in R.A. 7659, must be alleged
in the Information. Otherwise, We shall continue to fail both the law and the victims whom the
law have sought to protect.
We note that the affidavit of complainant Janeth Ebay Nuez was attached to and made part
of the Information in this case. In this connection, we are constrained to lay down the rule that
documentary evidence, such as the affidavits of the witnesses, should not be attached to and
made integral parts of an information. As we have previously held, a criminal indictment should
never be formulated in a melange of accusatory allegations and evidentiary details resulting in
unusual prolixity.
[29]

In the light of the flaw in the Information in the case at bench, the penalty of death imposed
by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 36, 378-96 is reduced toreclusion perpetua.
Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty which, under Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the crime. Thus, while relationship is aggravating in crimes
against chastity such as rape,
[30]
this circumstance will not affect the imposable
penalty
[31]
since reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty.
[32]
Conversely, neither may the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt affect such single indivisible penalty.
Finally, We note that while the trial court awarded P30,000.00 to Janeth in the form of moral
damages, it failed to impose any civil indemnity for the rape committed. Such civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape and is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by
the court in the exercise of its sound discretion.
[33]
While the amount for civil indemnity has been raised
in People v. Victor
[34]
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 if the rape is committed or is qualified by
any of the circumstances which under the law would justify the imposition of the death penalty,
We are constrained to set the civil indemnity award to P50,000.00 since in this case, the rape
charged and proved is not qualified.
[35]

Moral damages may, nevertheless, still be awarded in favor of Janeth since it has also been
resolved that in crimes of rape, such form of damages may be additionally awarded to the victim
without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
[36]
It is assumed that the offended party
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to the award of such damages.
[37]

Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated against the accused when a crime is attended
by an aggravating circumstance.
[38]
Here, such aggravating circumstance justifying an award of
exemplary damages is the relationship between the accused and his victim.
[39]
We follow the
award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages set by this Court in People v. Calayca.
[40]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction of the accused Demetrio Nuez y
Dubduban rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, of Davao City in Criminal Case No.
36, 378-96 is MODIFIED. The accused is hereby found guilty of simple rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant, Janeth E.
Nuez, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Romero, J., on official leave.



[1]

Order, 30 January 1996; Records, p. 16.
[2]

T.S.N., 7 November 1996, pp. 2-7.
[3]

Id., pp. 8-12.
[4]

Id., pp. 13-19.
[5]

T.S.N., 14 November 1996, p. 4.
[6]

Id., pp. 5-13.
[7]

Id., pp. 14-28.
[8]

Order, 11 December 1996; Records, p. 49.
[9]

Records, pp. 53-62.
[10]

Decision, p. 10; Records, p. 62.
[11]

Appellants Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 26.
[12]

T.S.N., 14 November 1996, pp. 1-4.
[13]

People v. Albert, G.R. No. 114001, 251 SCRA 136, 148-149 (1995), citing People v. Manibpel, L-15077, 6
SCRA 936 (1962) and Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code.
[14]

See People v. Estomaca, G.R. No. 117484-86, 256 SCRA 421, 434 (1996).
[15]

People v. Albert, supra, citing People v. Nismal, G.R. No. 51257, 114 SCRA 487 (1982) and People v.
Petalcorin, et al., G.R. No. 65376, 180 SCRA 685 (1989).
[16]

T.S.N., 14 November 1996, pp. 15-18.
[17]

People v. Victor, G.R. No. 127903, 9 July 1998.
[18]

People v. Bernaldez, G.R. No. 109780, 17 August 1998, citing People v. Derpo, 168 SCRA 447, 457 (1988) and
People v. Magpayo, 266 SCRA 13 (1993).
[19]

People v. Dusohan, G.R. No. 97307, 227 SCRA 87, 92 (1993).
[20]

People v. Igat, G.R. No. 122097, 291 SCRA 100, 106 (1998).
[21]

See People v. Tablizo, G.R. No. 88190, 182 SCRA 739, 748 (1990).
[22]

People v. Fuensalida, G.R. No. 119963, 281 SCRA 452, 460-461 (1997); People v. Burgos, G.R. No. 117451,
279 SCRA 697, 707 (1997).
[23]

T.S.N., 7 November 1996, pp. 3-4.
[24]

People v. Delovino, G.R. No. 116132-33, 247 SCRA 637, 648 (1995).
[25]

Pp. v. Calayca, G.R. No. 121212, 20 January 1999.
[26]

People v. Dimapilis, G.R. No. 128619-21, 17 December 1998; People v. Calayca, supra.
[27]

See Note 25.
[28]

See Note 26.
[29]

People v. Guarin, 259 SCRA 34, at 36 (1996), per Justice Florenz D. Regalado.
[30]

People v. Porras, 58 Phil. 578 (1933); People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 (1990).
[31]

People v. Balmoria, G.R. No. 120620-21, 287 SCRA 687, 711 (1998).
[32]

People v. De La Cuesta, G.R. No. 126134, 2 March 1999, citing People v. Ilao, G.R. No. 129529, 29, September
1998.
[33]

People v. Parades, G.R. No. 127569, 30 July 1998.
[34]
See Note 17.
[35]

See People v. Malapo, G.R. No. 123115, 28 August 1998.
[36]

See Note 32.
[37]

See Note 34.
[38]

Article 2230, New Civil Code.
[39]

See People v. Fundano, G.R. No. 124737, 291 SCRA 356, 371 (1998).
[40]

See Note 25.

s. People vs Adriano
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
June 30, 1947
G.R. No. L-477
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
, J .:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the Peoples Court sentencing the
accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano,
who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally
and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines
and the United States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as
follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid
militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemys war efforts and operations
against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted
the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the
United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of
San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines,
sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendants having joined the Makapili organization. What the Peoples Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court
below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did find established
under the two-witness rule, so we infer, that the accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters
in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that
he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that
during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as
sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that upon the
liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to
the mountains with the enemy; and that the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the
Americans.
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two
witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason
imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and
seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is
only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by
them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is
corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at
least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to
the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the
Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization
was created, which, according to the evidence, were to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan; to shed blood and
sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia; to
collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the
Philippines; and to fight the common enemies. Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by
the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one
witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer
vs. U.S. 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except
for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed
himself at the enemys call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though
an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and
comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals
of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced,
his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men
such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of
it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invaders army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement
fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one
day, another witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-
witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull
from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Whartons Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt
act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another witness to another
overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the same
construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: The opportunity
of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their
variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different acts. The rule as
adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires
that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be
two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same
idea: It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to
piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . ..
(Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States
(65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this
doctrine: The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that
it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually
gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged
to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the
possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we
have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy
purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule severely restrictive. This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more
witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the
defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the
culprits guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar,
of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of
a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed
corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully
realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs.
United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention
as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative change.
(Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madisons Journal of the Federal Convention,
Scotts ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated
Cramer case, said: It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern
researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof,
such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence
is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule,
whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that Treason may sometimes be practiced in
such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult as in a traitorous correspondence with an
enemy. The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of
prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension, the
lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have
intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American
forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., dissenting:
Being unable to bring myself agree with the majority upon the application of the two-witness rule
herein, I am constrained to dissent.
As I see it, being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those areas of the
Philippines referred to in the information, was one single, continuous, and indivisible overt act of the
present accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to the Japanese invaders. That membership was
one and the same from the moment he entered the organization till he was captured. The fact that he
was seen on a certain day by one of the state witnesses being a member of the Makapili, and was
seen by another state witness but on a different day being a member of the same organization, does
not mean that his membership on the first day was different or independent from his membership on
the other day it was the selfsame membership all the way through. A contrary construction would
entail the consequence that the instant defendant, if we are to believe the allegations and proofs of
the prosecution, became or was a member of the Makapili as many times as there were days from the
first to the last.
T.E. Holland defined acts in jurisprudence as follows:
Jurisprudence is concerned only with outward acts. An act may therefore be defined . . . as a
determination of will, producing an effect in the sensible world. The effect may be negative, in which
case the act is properly described as a forbearance. The essential elements of such an act are there,
viz., an exercise of the will, an accompanying state of consciousness, a manifestation of the will.
(Websters New International Dictionary, 2d ed., unabridged, p. 25.)
There can, therefore, be no question that being a member of the Makapili was an overt act of the
accused. And the fact that no two witnesses saw him being such a member on any single day or on
the selfsame occasion does not, in my humble opinion, work against the singleness of the act, nor
does the fact that no two witnesses have testified to that same overt act being done on the same day
or occasion argue against holding the two-witness rule having been complied with.
My view is that, the act being single, continuous and indivisible, at least two witnesses have testified
thereto notwithstanding the fact that one saw it on one day and the other on another day.

T. People vs Escleto
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
June 28, 1949
G.R. No. L-1006
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
FILEMON ESCLETO, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
, J .:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former Peoples Court with treason on three
counts, namely:
1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of
Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with the Imperial
Japanese Forces, going out with them in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of
persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movements in the Philippines; bearing arms against
the American and guerrilla forces in the furtherance of the war efforts of the Imperial Japanese Forces
against the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and mounting guard and
performing guard duty for the Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in the municipality of Lopez,
Province of Tayabas, Philippines.
2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of
Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above
named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in
the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with Japanese
soldiers in and around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of guerrillas and
guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movement in the
Philippines.
3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Filemon
Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then
enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest and/or cause to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla
and did turn him over and deliver to the Japanese military authorities in their garrison, since which
time, that is, since the said 18th day of March, 1944, nothing has been heard from said Antonio
Conducto and is considered by his family to have been killed by the Japanese military authorities.
The court found no concrete evidence as to defendants membership in the U. N. or Makapili
organization nor on what the patrols he accompanied actually did once they were out of town, and so
was, constrained to rule that the evidence of the prosecution fails to establish, in connection with
counts 1 and 2, any true overt act of treason. We may add that no two witnesses coincided in any
specific act of the defendant. The Peoples Court, believed, however, that the same evidence is
sufficient to prove beyond question defendants adherence to the enemy.
As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the Peoples Court was that it had been fully substantiated..
The record shows that on or about, March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of seventeen men and
one officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas in barrio Bibito, Lopez, Province of
Tayabas, now Quezon. As a result, some of inhabitants of Bibito and neighboring barrios, numbering
several hundred, were arrested and others were ordered to report at the poblacion. Among the latter
were Antonio Conducto, a guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conductos wife, parents and other relatives.
Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March 18, 1944, at about 5 oclock in the afternoon,
obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her family went to the town from barrioDanlagan.
Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escletos house, Escleto told them to stop and took down their
names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her son Antonio Conductor, and three
grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in the poblacion
where they were questioned by some whose name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard
gunshots and she said yes but did not know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go
home with many others, but Antonio Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son.
On cross-examination she said that when Escleto took down their names Antonio Conducto asked the
accused if anything would happen to him and his family, and Escleto answered, Nothing will happen
to you because I am to accompany you in going to town.
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped her, her mother-in-
law, her husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the latters wife and took down their
names; that after taking their names Escleto and the Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the
PC garrison; that her husband asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
said nothing and assured Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go home; that
Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, This is Antonio Conducto who has
firearm; that afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to her husband.
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower courts findings. It will readily be seen from a cursory
examination thereof that the only point on which the two witnesses, Patricia Araya and Sinforosa
Mortero, agree is that the accused took down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses, among
others, and came along with them to the town. Granting the veracity of this statement, it does not
warrant the inference that the defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he
allegedly did was compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it
convenient as part of his duty to make a list of the people under his jurisdiction who heeded the
Japanese order.
It was not necessary for the defendant to write Conductos name in order to report on him. The two
men appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew Conducto intimately, and the latter was on his
way to town to present himself. If the accused had a treasonable intent against Conducto, he could
have furnished his name and identity to the enemy by word of mouth. This step would have the added
advantage of concealing the defendants traitorous action from his town mates and of not appraising
Conducto of what was in store for him, knowledge of which might impel Conducto to escape.
That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the prosecution is best demonstrated by the
fact that it included, according to witnesses, Conductos wife and parents and many others who were
discharged the next day. The fact that, according to the evidence of the prosecution, spies wearing
masks were utilized in the screening of guerrillas adds to the doubt that the defendant had a hand in
Conductos misfortune.
In short, Escletos making note of persons who went to the poblacion as evidence of overt act is weak,
vague and uncertain.
The only evidence against the appellant that might be considered direct and damaging is Patricia
Arayas testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary soldier, This is Antonio Conducto who
has firearm. But the prosecution did not elaborate on this testimony, nor was any other witness made
to corroborate it although Patricia Araya was with her husband, parents and relatives who would have
heard the statement if the defendant had uttered it.
Leaving aside the question of Patricias veracity, the failure to corroborate her testimony just
mentioned makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt act of treason. In a juridical sense,
this testimony is inoperative as a corroboration of the defendants taking down of the name of
Conducto and others, or vice-versa. It has been seen that the testimony was not shown to have been
made for a treasonable purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. This process of evaluating
evidence might sound like a play of words but, as we have said in People vs. Adriano (44 O.G. 43001)
the authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from which the Philippine
treason law was taken, purposely made it severely restrictive and conviction for treason difficult. In
that case we adverted to the following authorities, among others:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act. (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2038, p. 271.).
It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths;. . . . (Opinion
of Judge Learned Hand quoted as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)
The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show
sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid
and comfort to the enemy. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses. (Cramer vs. U.S. of A., 65 S.
Ct. 918; 89 Law. ed. 1441.)
It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the
framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researches in psychology
warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical
calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to
warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned
by James Wilson that Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof
extremely difficult-as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy. The provision was adopted not
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not
by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered
that prosecution for treason were generally virulent. (Cramer vs. U.S. of A.,supra.)
The decision of the Peoples Court will be and the same is reversed with the costs de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., Mr. Justice Pablo voted to reverse.
Footnotes
1 78 Phil. p. 561.

u. US vs MAgtibay
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1317. November 23, 1903. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. SIMEON MAGTIBAY, Defendant-Appellant.

Enrique Barrera for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; CONFESSION. The confession in open court, upon which a defendant may
be convicted of treason under section 9 of the act of Congress of March 8, 1902, is a confession of guilt. The
section can not be extended so as to include admissions of fact, from which his guilt may be inferred, made
by-the defendant in giving his testimony after a plea of not guilty.

2. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE. The testimony of one witness to a confession made by the defendant, to the effect
that he had joined the insurrectionary forces, and to the finding upon his person of a commission making
him a lieutenant in such forces, is insufficient to support a conviction for the crime of treason, as such
conviction can only be had upon the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act of treason.


D E C I S I O N


WILLARD, J. :


The defendant has been convicted of the crime of treason as defined in Act No. 292, section 1, and
sentenced to death.

It was proved that he was a soldier in the Constabulary stationed at Imus, in the Province of Cavite; that on
October 13, 1902, he deserted and was captured on October 27, 1902. When he was captured he stated to
the inspector, according to the latters testimony, that he had given the arms which he took with him to his
general, Montalon. Upon his person was found a commission, making him a second lieutenant, signed by
Montalon and dated October 14. The only witness to the finding of this commission was the inspector. There
was evidence that, in October, Montalon was in armed rebellion against the Government and that there had
been engagements in that month between his troops and the forces of the Constabulary.

Section 9 of the act of Congress of March 8, 1902, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"SEC. 9. That no person in the Philippine Islands shall, under the authority of the United States, be
convicted of treason by any tribunal, civil or military, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or on confession in open court."cralaw virtua1aw library

Passing for the present the testimony of the defendant at the trial, there was no other evidence in the case
to show that he had ever joined the forces of Montalon, except the testimony of the inspector as to the
confession made when he was captured and the commission as second lieutenant found upon his person.
Under the act of Congress there can be no conviction, unless two witnesses testify to the same overt act of
treason. There is no such testimony in this case. The evidence of the Government related exclusively to the
desertion of the defendant and his capture.

The act of Congress provides that there may be a conviction upon a confession in open court. The defendant
testified as a witness in his own behalf at the trial. He denied that he had deserted, but claimed that he had
been carried off by force by soldiers of Montalon and taken to the latters camp. He promised to serve them,
and they made him a lieutenant and gave him a revolver. He remained with them two weeks, but he says
that it was against his will and that he had no opportunity to escape, except the time when he was captured.
This was not a confession within the meaning of the said section 9. The confession there mentioned means a
confession of guilt. The section can not be extended so as to include admissions of facts made by him in
giving his testimony after a plea of not guilty, from which admissions his guilt can be inferred. The evidence
required by the act of Congress does not appear in this case.

It is unnecessary to consider the point made by the defendants counsel that, in view of the official
proclamations, there existed no state of insurrection or war in Cavite in October, 1902.

The judgment is reversed and the defendant acquitted only of the crime charged in this complaint, with the
costs de oficio, and without prejudice to the presentation of complaints for the other crimes of which the
evidence in this case indicates that the defendant may be guilty.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

V. People vs Tulin
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-
appellants.
D E C I S I O N
MELO, J .:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for
sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in
pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of
regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87. was
sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew
and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear
portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was
forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the
ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to
the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it
remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained
at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern
warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until
April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline
by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of
Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for
fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by
accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in
Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were
brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at
U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant
Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way
by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No.
532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel
to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to
the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in
their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and
disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to
the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with
Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were
told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with
additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had
no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only
went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid
P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home
sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he
studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the
course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his
cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the
Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the
vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the
company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph
Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his
return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel
oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered
to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on
board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the
port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port
clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the
brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then
told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil
transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called
"Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask
for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride"
and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby"
signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and
William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm
" from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed.
This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the
company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March
30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and
wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for
the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as
contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that
weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under
the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out
to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI
agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree
No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under
Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory
death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot
impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante,
]r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San
Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article
52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to
return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the
accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,
jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of
P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused
including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines,
Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said
cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to
Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court
erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being
represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional
right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as
counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the
trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after
Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that
during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign
statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied
assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional
rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege
that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all
times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime
committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts
attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and
punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction
to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any
participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues
that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing
the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been
committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects
and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?;
(2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did
Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5)
can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991,
stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-
lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During
the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of
the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992,
pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact
that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that
"[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil
Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that
he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy , but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that
the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of
Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and
with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs.
Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to
the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during
custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution
even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the
accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was
not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-
called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter
in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained
(People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise
inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient
evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction
of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the
words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals -
...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members
of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said
Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2,
1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its
cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the
vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon
which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the
price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991...
x x x
x x x
x x x
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on
board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April
10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the
mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were
taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their
"Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some
of the pirates.
x x x
x x x
x x x
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of
March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its, destination, which
turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not
supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain
denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
[1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate
tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to
work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time
without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the
details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such
evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the
trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had
to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place
merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17,
he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite,
sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more
so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant
must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was
physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to
do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the
highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the
demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part
to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court,
there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off
Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them
to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare
and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-
appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain
Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other
hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity
.Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding
"M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio
Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at
large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy
in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of
Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994) which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree
No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or
duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree
No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who
are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659
shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel,
hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize
a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel,
its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Underscoring ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood, as
follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole
or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement
or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person. including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that
piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is
covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise
no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee"
by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and
sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it
is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal
code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan,
278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
[1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was
convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-
appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and
his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 532 which provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway
robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit
therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal
officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section
has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal
(People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in
the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores,
40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No
532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He
profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew
List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities,
and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port
(tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services
personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities.
Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities
could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in
his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T
Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-
appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on
March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels
of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list
of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong;
that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of
Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled
to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer
1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco
a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride"
was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed
his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that
he then paid $150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco
also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at
Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH",
Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the
high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons
of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It
was likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco
supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors
and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and
nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the
cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to
show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the
purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation
relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo
whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer
took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his
firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan
involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if
Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the
value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at
P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-
half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody
in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation
-only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act
of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo
that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of
his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of
Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-
operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk,
Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial
court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances
show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng
Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the
transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer
the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.


X. People vs Catantan
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO
CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged
with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery
Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed
weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation,
wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene
Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu,
and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.
[1]

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan
y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
[2]
Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June
1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3
kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up
with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, boarded the
pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck
Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa."
[3]
Then Catantan
told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene,
forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left
behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that
they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be
killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene
asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with
bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the
open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his
brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the
point of a tres cantos
[4]
held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked
whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito
and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers
to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz,
another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up
his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you."
[5]
Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and
Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front
part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw
Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his
brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another
pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of
any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or
the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed
in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of
passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall
include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential
that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion
did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on
board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw
another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they
could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply
committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was
obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the
victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers
of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in
that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did
they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard
the pumpboat (underscoring supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring
supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
xxxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon.
[6]

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters
was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As
Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their
pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness
Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with
a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims
at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of
his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence
the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding
"whereas" clauses of the decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating
such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in
sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of
the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the
townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive
them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD
No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and community progress
of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of
the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a
broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke
down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back
to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they
were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local
authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced
in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it
again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the
pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of
piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.



[1]
Rollo, p. 1.
[2]
Decision penned by Judge Renato C. Dacudao, RTC-Br.14, Cebu, 26 May 1994.
[3]
To lie down.
[4]
A 3-bladed knife.
[5]
Rollo, p. 14.
[6]
TSN, 13 January 1994, pp. 5-6.

Y. People vs Lol-lo
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
November 20, 1917
G.R. No. 17958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for appellee.
Johnson, J .:
The present action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A.S. Crossfield, judge, granted the writ as prayed for, from
which order the Collector of Customs appealed to this court.
It appears from the record that some time prior to the commencement of the action in the lower
court, a Chinaman by the name of Chieng Ah Soon, who claimed to be a merchant doing business at
Nos. 79 and 81 Calle San Jacinto, in the city of Manila, returned from China bringing with him two
boys, named respectively Chieng Ah Lui, 20 years of age, and Chieng Ah Sui, 16 years of age. These
boys, Chieng Ah Lui and Chieng Ah Sui, were at first denied admission to the Philippine Islands. An
investigation was held by the board of special inquiry, which board, after hearing all of the witnesses
which the father, Ah Soon, desired to present, found that the said Ah Lui was the son of Ah Soon and
therefore admitted him. The board, from the evidence, found that Ah Sui was not the son of Ah Soon,
and refused him admission. From that decision Ah Soon appealed to the Insular Collector of Customs,
the Honorable H.B. McCoy, who, upon due investigation, found that Ah Sui was not the person that he
represented himself to be and was not the son of Ah Soon, and therefore confirmed the decision of the
board of special inquiry.
Upon petition a second hearing was accorded by the board of special inquiry, and again it was decided
that Ah Sui was not the son of Ah Soon, and therefore not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands.
Again an appeal was made to the Insular Collector of Customs, who again confirmed the finding of the
board of special inquiry.
A third hearing was asked for and granted by the Collector of Customs. Upon the third hearing the
board of special inquiry, after hearing all of the evidence which Ah Soon offered, again found that Ah
Sui was not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. A third appeal was taken to the Insular Collector of
Customs, and again the finding of the board of special inquiry was affirmed.
A fourth hearing was asked for on the part of Ah Soon, which was denied by the Insular Collector of
Customs in the following language:
In reply to yours dated the 14th instant (September, 1910) requesting a rehearing in the case of Chieng Ah Sui, I have to inform
you that in this case the records show that three separate and distinct hearings have been given, at each of which testimony was
introduced on behalf of the applicant, and the record of each of these hearings discloses the fact that all of the witnesses
presented were heard. It would seem that this applicant has had every reasonable and necessary opportunity to present any
testimony which tended to prove his right to enter the Philippine Islands. These hearings were held on July 19 and 23, and
August 10, while the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs upon the appeal therefrom was not rendered until September 3,
one and a half months after the first hearing. It would appear that even reasonable diligence would have secured the attendance
of any necessary or competent witnesses within the time stated prior to the decision of this case on September 3.
For the foregoing reasons the application for rehearing is denied.
(Signed) H. B. McCoy, Insular Collector of Customs.
From the third decision of Colonel McCoy, as Insular Collector of Customs, an appeal was taken to the
Court of First Instance, and there some proof was taken in addition to that submitted before the board
of special inquiry. Upon the record in the present case, the right of the Court of First Instance to take
evidence in addition to that presented to the board of special inquiry is very questionable indeed. In
the present case, however, the judge of the Court of First Instance declared that the testimony taken
before him in no way influenced his judgment in declaring that the applicant was entitled to the writ
of habeas corpus.
Several Chinese witnesses before the board of special inquiry claimed that they knew Ah Soon and his
family in China; that they lived in the same town and swore that he had several children, among
whom was the boy Ah Sui. It appears also from the record that some months prior to the time when
Ah Soon returned to the Philippine Islands with the two boys Chieng Ah Lui and Chieng Ah Sui, and
upon leaving the Philippine Islands for China, he made a declaration which was placed on file in the
office of the Insular Collector of Customs, in which he gave the names of the members of his family.
The name of Ah Sui did not appear then as a member of his family. Ah Sui was sixteen years of age. If
he were a member of the family when Ah Soon returned to the Philippine Islands, he must have been
a member of the family a few months theretofore. Children do not reach the age of sixteen years in a
few months. Some objection was made to the right of the board of special inquiry to take notice of
said declaration presented by Ah Soon in relation to the members of his family. The declaration
constituted a part of the records of the office of the Insular Collector of Customs. The board of special
inquiry is a board connected with that branch of the government and it had a perfect right to take
judicial notice of relevant facts found in their records.
We are of the opinion that the Insular Collector of Customs in no way abused the discretion conferred
upon him in reaching the conclusion that Chieng Ah Sui was not the son of Ah Soon and was,
therefore, not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands.
Upon all of the facts contained in the record, we are of the opinion that the order of the lower court
admitting into the Philippine Islands the Chinese boy, Chieng Ah Sui, should be revoked, and that an
order should issue that the said Chieng Ah Sui should be returned to the custody of the Insular
Collector of Customs, in order that he may be deported, in accordance with the law. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE vs. LOL-LO AND SARAW 43 PHIL. 19
FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920, six vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which was on its way
between the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24
armed Moros. The dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At first, the Moros asked for
food, but once on the Dutch boats, took for themselves all the vessels cargo, attacked some of the
men and brutally violated 2 of the women by methods too horrible to be described. All of the persons
on the boat, with the exception of the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made
on it and holes were made on it, with the idea that it would submerge. Two of the Moro pirates, late
identified as Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to Tawi-tawi, Sulu where they were arrested.
STATE: Piracy.
ACCUSED: The offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI of Sulu nor any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands.
HELD: It cannot be contended with any degree of force that the CFI of Sulu was without jurisdiction on
the case. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit
of a foreign state. The crime of piracy was accompanied by rape and the abandonment of persons
without means of saving themselves. LOl-lo was penalized with death by being hanged until dead
while Saraw were penalized with life imprisonment.

y. People vs Lol-lo
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J .:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by sixvintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-
lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that
the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of
the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in
the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As
it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations.
This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor
to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.)
The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of
piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy
are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case
of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal
Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

aa. People vs Corbes
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113470. March 26, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO
CORBES Y OLAZO, MANUEL, VERGEL Y PASCUAL, and six (6)
JOHN DOEs, accused. DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO and MANUEL
VERGEL Y PASCUAL, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .:
DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL appeal from the
decision dated 27 December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br. 124,
finding them guilty as principals by conspiracy of the crime of robbery with homicide
under par. 1, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua plus damages.
[1]

The antecedents: At about nine o'clock in the morning of 17 November 1990 six
(6) armed men entered the premises of the Caloocan Consortium Corporation at No.
305 Cordero Street, Caloocan City, and took away from the establishment P169,000.00
in cash and P4,500.00 from Mateo Figuracion, an employee therein. They also took
with them the .38 calibre revolver of security guard Timoteo Palicpic whom they shot to
death. The malefactors then ran towards 8th Avenue where Daniel Corbes and Manuel
Vergel had parked their getaway vehicle, a blue passenger jeep. They then sped away.
That same day, Manuel Vergel went to the Caloocan Police Station and reported
the incident. He claimed that the robbers used his passenger jeep in fleeing from the
Caloocan Consortium Corporation, but he denied any previous knowledge of the
robbery or of any intentional participation therein. However, upon further interrogation
by P/Cpl Daniel G. Del Rosario, Supervisor of the Dayshift Investigation Section,
Caloocan City Investigation Division, Vergel retracted his earlier statements and pointed
to Danilo Corbes who together with the other accused allegedly planned the
robbery and convinced him to drive for them.
[2]
When apprehended and brought to the
police station, Corbes in turn pointed to a certain "Benny" as the brains behind the
crime.
[3]

Corbes, Vergel and six (6) John Does (still at large) were charged as principals by
conspiracy. On the witness stand Vergel however diverged from his earlier story and
insisted that the jeep he was driving was merely hired by Corbes and Benny on the
pretext of hauling scrap metal from Caloocan City. As soon as he parked his jeep
along 8th Avenue, Benny alighted from the jeep leaving him with Corbes. Vergel
maintained that at that time he knew nothing of the robbery being perpetrated at the
Caloocan Consortium Corporation and that he became aware of it only when Benny
came back from the direction of Cordero Street about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes
later with several armed men who boarded the jeep and threatened him with bodily
harm if he would not start its engine and drive. So he did as they ordered. After the
men alighted at 9th Avenue, he proceeded to the house of Avelino Vergel, the owner of
the jeep, and together they went to the Caloocan City Police Station to report the
matter.
Daniel Corbes likewise professed innocence. Although he admitted having
approached Vergel, he contended that he did so only to accommodate Benny who had
sought his help in looking for a jeep for hire. Being the Vice-President of DAMATA
(Damayan ng Maralitang Tahanan), a neighborhood association in Letre, Malabon, he
accompanied Benny to Sangandaan and there waited for Vergel who agreed to have
the jeep he was driving hired for a fee of P250.00. Then together with Vergel and
Benny he left for Caloocan City allegedly upon Vergel's invitation.
The trial court rejected the pretensions of Corbes and Vergel; instead, it convicted
the two (2) accused on the basis of the eyewitness account of Elena San Jose whose
testimony established their participation in the robbery as lookout and driver,
respectively.
Specifically, Elena San Jose testified that while she was rocking her baby to sleep
in the veranda of her house at 8th Avenue she noticed a blue-colored jeep parked about
three (3) meters away. Vergel was at the driver's seat. She saw Vergel alight several
times from the jeep ostensibly to inspect its engine and other parts as if something was
wrong with them, while Vergel's companion whom she identified as Corbes walked to
and fro along 8th Avenue up to the corner of Cordero Street. Half an hour later Elena
saw four (4) men in a jolly mood approaching and shouting "Yahoo! Yahoo!" from the
direction of Cordero Street. They immediately boarded the jeep as Vergel hurried them
up: "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!" The vehicle then drove away in the direction of F.
Roxas Street.
[4]

The court a quo accorded evidentiary weight to the testimony of Dante Despida,
owner of the Gulf-Pacific Security Agency, Inc., who testified that on 19 November 1990
Vergel and Corbes admitted to him inside the Caloocan Police Station that they
participated in the robbery holdup as driver of the getaway vehicle and as lookout,
respectively. Thus, Vergel and Corbes were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay jointly and severally, (a) the amount of cash
stolen, (b) the value of the .38 cal. revolver taken, and (c) P50,000.00 as consequential
damages to the heirs of Timoteo Palicpic.
Appellants contend in this appeal that conspiracy was not sufficiently proved since it
cannot be inferred solely from their mere presence at the crime scene. In additon,
Vergel disparages the testimony of Elena San Jose as being rehearsed and replete
with inconsistencies, while that of Dante Despida relative to the oral confessions
allegedly made to him inside the Caloocan Police Station as unworthy of belief
considering that he had no business inside the detention cell since he was not even
a police investigator, and considering further that he was the uncle
[5]
of security guard
Timoteo Palicpic who was gunned down during the robbery.
We sustain the claim of appellants that the evidence failed to meet the quantum of
proof required by law to establish conspiracy which jurisprudence dictates must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself.
[6]
No
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.
[7]

In the instant case, no conclusive proof was presented that appellant Manuel Vergel
conspired with the other accused to commit robbery. What is indubitable is that he was
approached by Corbes who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle and was
persuaded to act as driver in fetching the group from the venue of the robbery. Vergel's
feigned ignorance of any prior knowledge of the robbery is negated by his remark,
"Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!" made to the robbers as they were boarding the
jeep. Such utterance, which indicates knowledge of the criminal design of the
malefactors, coupled with his act of driving for the robbers, makes appellant Vergel
guilty as an accomplice, i.e., one who knows the criminal design of the principal and
cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which even if not rendered the
crime would be committed just the same.
[8]
In one case,
[9]
we held that the
driver of the taxicab, knowing that his co-accused were going to commit
robbery per mitted them to use his taxicab in going to the place where the robbery was
committed, is an accomplice.
As regards appellant Danilo Corbes, there is similarly a lack of adequate evidence
of conspiracy. The evidence merely points out that Corbes looked for a jeep to be used
as getaway vehicle of the robbers and, to that end, he intentionally sought out and
convinced Manuel Vergel to act as driver. Moreover, he went with Vergel and Benny to
Caloocan City where the robbery was staged. We have also held that the liability of one
whose participation was limited to looking for a banca and providing one to a gang of
bank robbers,
[10]
or one who went with the actual perpetrators of a crime without
conspiring with them, is only that of an accomplice.
[11]
Where the quantum of proof
required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused
acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of
liability, that of a mere accomplice.
[12]
Besides, in several cases wherein the Court
confirmed the existence of conspiracy, some accused were held liable as mere
accomplices only because their role in the commission of the crime was not
indispensable; in other words, minor.
[13]
Courts sometimes draw the inference of guilty
participation in the criminal design from concerted acts in the consummation of the
criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered. To
reiterate, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.
[14]

Furthermore, we reduce appellants' liability to the crime of robbery only. It was not
established by the evidence that the other accused, who are at large, had agreed to kill
if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. On the contrary, the records show
that one of the robbers berated the gunman for having shot the security
guard.
[15]
Therefore, what appellants may be said to have joined was merely the criminal
design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must accordingly be
limited to the robbery, not to the killing of Timoteo Palicpic. Waiting only at the parked
jeep at 8th Avenue could not have given them the opportunity to prevent the killing, as is
required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the
robbery.
[16]
The Court had occasion to rule that the jeep driver, who was unaware of
the killing perpetrated inside the building as he stayed always near his jeep, could not
be deemed a co-conspirator in the killing of the guards, as the killing was not part of the
original plan but arose only during the exigency of the moment.
[17]

The penalty for robbery under par. 5, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period the duration of
which is four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. As the robbery
was committed by a band under Art. 295 the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period. Since accused-appellants are found guilty only as accomplices to the robbery
in band, the imposable penalty shall be one degree lower which is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period or four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, if only for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed, the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., destierro in its maximum period
to arresto mayor in its medium period or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day
of destierro to four (4) months of arresto mayor medium, while the maximum shall be
taken from the maximum of the imposable penalty as herein before stated or four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. Both accused-
appellants having already been detained since 20 November 1990,
[18]
or more than the
maximum of their indeterminate penalty, they should now be immediately released from
custody pursuant to B. P. Blg. 85.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants
DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL are declared GUILTY
merely as ACCOMPLICES to the crime of robbery and sentenced accordingly to an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor medium as minimum to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.
Accused-appellants Danilo Corbes y Olazo and Manuel Vergel y Pascual having
already been detained for more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, their
immediate release from custody is likewise ordered unless they are held for another
lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.



[1]
Decision penned by Judge Rene Victoriano, RTC-Br. 124, Caloocan City; Rollo, pp. 22-31.
[2]
TSN, 1 April 1991, pp. 16-17.
[3]
Id.; Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.
[4]
TSN, 6 February 1991, pp. 4-9.
[5]
Id., 28 January 1991, p. 2.
[6]
People v. Jorge, G.R. No. 99379, 22 April 1994, 23 SCRA 693; People v. Argawanon, G.R. No.
106538, 30 March 1994, 231 SCRA 614; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94817, 4 November 1992,
215 SCRA 349; People v. Donato, G.R. No. 94530, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 125;
People v. Campos, G.R. No. 91716, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 387; People v. Laurio, G.R. No.
95351, 9 August 1991, 200 SCRA 465; People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, 14 November 1990, 191
SCRA 377; Bayan v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77050, 6 February 1990, 181 SCRA 844; De la
Concepcion v. People, G.R. No. 73854, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 253; Valdez v.People, G.R.
Nos. 75896-99, 5 May 1989, 173 SCRA 163; People v. Sabilano, Nos. L-32866-7, 21 September
1984, 132 SCRA 83; People v. Custodio, No. L-30463, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 289, 302.
[7]
Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13; Fonacier v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50691, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 655; People v. Villagonzalo, G.R.
No. 105388, 18 November 1994, 238 SCRA 215; People v. Manuel, G.R. Nos. 93926-28, 28 July
1994, 234 SCRA 532; People v. Orehuela, G.R. Nos. 108780-81, 29 April 1994, 232 SCRA 82;
People v. Gaoat, G.R. No. 97028, 21 May 1993, 222 SCRA 385; People v. Divina, G.R. Nos.
93808-09, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 209; People v. Camaddo, G.R. No. 97934, 18 January 1993,
217 SCRA 162; People v. Lacao Sr., G.R. No. 95320, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 317;
Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, 6 December 1989, 180 SCRA 9; People v. Tacaa,
No. L- 35652, 29 September 1989, 178 SCRA 56; Castaeda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
61243, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 263; Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84423, 31 January
1989, 169 SCRA 861; People v. Elizaga, G.R. No. 78794, 21 November 1988, 167 SCRA 516;
People v. Drilon Jr., No. L- 33431, 28 June 1983, 123 SCRA 72.
[8]
People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12 (1955); People v. Fronda, G.R. Nos. 102361-62, 14 May 1993, 222
SCRA 71; People v. Custodio, No. L-30463, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 289.
[9]
People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12 (1955); see also People v. Ubia, 97 Phil. 515 (1955);
People v. Balotan, 45 Phil. 573, 576 (1923) citing United States v. Lagmay, No. L-15009, G.R.
No. 15009, 30 August 1919 (unreported).
[10]
People v. Doble, No. L- 30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131.
[11]
People v. Balili, No. L-14044, 5 August 1966, 17 SCRA 892.
[12]
People v. Bongo, No.L-26909, 22 February 1974, 55 SCRA 547; People v. Torejas, No. L-29935, 31
January 1972, 43 SCRA 158; People v. Tolentino, No. L-29419, 31 August 1991, 40 SCRA 514;
People v. Pastores, No. L-29800, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 498; People v. Ablog, No. L-15310,
31 October 1962, 6 SCRA 437.
[13]
People v. San Miguel, Nos. L-30722-30725, 31 July 1981, 106 SCRA 290; People v. Doble, No. L-
30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131; People v. Nierra, No. L-32624, 12 February 1980, 96
SCRA 1; People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 (1923).
[14]
People v. Tolentino, No. L-29419, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 514; People v. Tatlonghari, No. L-22094,
28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 726; People v. Clemente, No. L-23463, 28 September 1967, 21 SCRA
261; People v. Tividad, No. L-21469, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 549; People v. Riveral, No. L-
14077, 31 March 1964, 10 SCRA 462.
[15]
TSN, 5 June 1991, p. 18.
[16]
Art. 296, The Revised Penal Code; People v. Doble, No. L-30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131;
People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225, (1951).
[17]
People v. Adriano, Nos. L-25977, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 107.
[18]
Records, p. 194.

z. People vs Tolentino
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
May 23, 1958
G.R. No. L-11036
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO TOLENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Rafael P. Caniza for appellee.
Quintin B. Alcid for appellants.
, J .:
Florentino Tolentino was, together with three other persons, accused in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela with the crime of murder (Criminal Case
No. 759), and to secure his provisional release, a bail bond in the amount of
P25,000 was, on March 16, 1950, posted in his favor by Agustin Bersamin,
Marcelina Cabrero, Nicolas F. Garcia, Donato Tolentino, Eduardo Salvador,
Damaso Tolentino, Presentacion Baldonado, Mariano Tolentino, Marcos
Soliven, Feliciano Baldonado and Francisco Legaspi.
On July 13, 1950, the criminal case was called for trial and because the
accused Florentino Tolentino failed to appear, the lower court issued an
order giving his bondsmen five days to explain why their bond should not be
confiscated, and postponing the trial to August 21, 1950. On June 12, 1951,
the court ordered the confiscation of Tolentinos bail bond, giving the
bondsmen thirty days within which to produce the body of the accused,
otherwise judgment would be rendered for the execution of the bond. A year
later, the provincial fiscal moved for the execution of the bond and on
December 24, 1952, the lower court ordered its execution.
On February 16, 1953, counsel for Tolentinos bondsmen filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the order to execute the bond on the ground that
Tolentino had died on October 27, 1952 in an armed encounter between a
patrol of the Philippine Army and some Huks in the vicinity of Sta. Lucia,
Magalang, Pampanga, but the court denied the motion for the reason that
death of the accused after judgment against the bail bond had become final
does not release the sureties. Whereupon, on September 15, 1953, the
provincial fiscal asked for the issuance of a writ of execution against the
bondsmen, and pursuant thereto, the court issued a writ of execution on
October 2, 1953 in accordance with which the sheriff advertised for sale at
public auction the properties given by the bondsmen as security.
Before the execution sale could take place, however, several incidents
occured in the case, namely: (a) the heirs of bondsman Mariano Tolentino,
who had died during the pendency of the case, filed a petition in court for
the exclusion of the properties of the deceased included in the notice of sale
on the ground that notices of the orders of confiscation and execution of the
bail bond could not have been validly served upon the deceased Mariano
Tolentino because he had died before said orders were issued by the court;
(2) bondsman Francisco Legaspi moved for the exclusion of his residential
house from the lot given by him as security for the bond, alleging that said
bouse was never given by him as security; and (3) one Nicolasa Garcia
moved to exclude lots 4179 and 595 of the Santiago Cadastre from the
execution sale on the ground that they belonged to her and not to bondsman
Nicolas Garcia, In view of the pendency of these motions, the court
postponed the auction sale indefinitely until said motions would have been
studied and resolved.
On December 19, 1953, the accused Florentino Tolentino was apprehended
in the province of Cagayan and immediately brought before the court a qou
by his bondsmen, who all prayed for the lifting of the orders of confiscation
and execution of their bail bond, but the motion was denied by the court.
The court had, in the meantime, released from the order of execution the
two lots claimed by Nicolasa Garcia which it found to belong to this claimant
and not to bondsman Nicolas Garcia.
On October 6, 1955, the bondsmen filed another motion to reconsider the
orders of forfeiture and execution of their bond, giving as reason for their
inability to produce the accused on the dates ordered by the court the fact
that he went into hiding because of a certain threat against his life. Again
denied the court denied the motion for consideration; but in the same order,
it released from the notice of execution sale the house which bondsman
Francisco Legaspi claims should be excluded therein, having found that said
house was constructed only after the bail bond was posted and
consequently, could not have been given by Legaspi as security therefor;
and with respect to the motion of the heirs of bondsman Mariano Tolentino,
the court found that Tolentino had already died before the issuance of its
orders of forfeiture and execution of the bail bond so that he could not have
been validly notified thereof, and so set aside the order of execution with
respect to the properties begining to the estate of Mariano Tolentino. The
other bondsmen sougth reconsideration of this last order, which the court
denied. Wherefore, four of the bondsmen, namely, Marcelina Cabrero,
Agustin Bersamin, Donato Tolentino, and Feliciano Baldonado appealed to
this Court.
Appellants assign two errors allegedly committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in not remitting the forfeiture of the bailbond upon
application of the bondsmen on the ground that they have captured the
accused and presented him before the court.
2. The lower court erred in not releasing the bailbond of all the bondsmen
when it released two of the bondsmen from the obligation under the
bailbond.
Anent the first assignment of error, we see no merit in appellants claim that
they are entitled to full exoneration or discharged under their bail bond
because they had been able to surrender the accused Florentino Tolentino to
the court below. Although it may be true that the capture and surrender of
the accused was brought about by the efforts of the bondsmen to comply
with their undertaking and that by his surrender, the purpose of the bond
had been accomplished, appellants, however, can not claim full discharge
because the arrest of the accused was effected only after the order of
confiscation and forfeiture of the bond had already become final. The rule is
that where the period given to the bondsmen to produce the accused had
elapsed and the accused had not been brought before the court, the sureties
can not be completely discharged (People vs. Calabon, 53 Phil. 945; People
vs. Alamada, 97 Phil. 1).
Pursuant to the uniform ruling of this Court, however, that where, even after
judgment against the bond had become final and executory, the purpose
thereof has been accomplished by the capture and surrender of the accused,
the liability of the sureties may, in the discretion of the court, be reduced or
mitigated (People vs. Reyes, 48 Phil. 139; People vs. Calabon, supra, People
vs. Puyal,1 L-8091, February 17, 1956; People vs. Calderon, L-9497, July
31, 1956; People vs. Daising,2 L-6713, April 29, 1957; People vs. Tan,3 L-
6239, April 30, 1957), appellants are entitled to a reduction of their liability
under their bond, especially since they are not compensated sureties or
sureties for profit, but have put up the bail bond of the accused Florentino
Tolentino only upon considerations of friendship and generosity, so that an
even more liberal and lenient treatment should be accorded them.
Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the liability of the bondsmen
of the accused Florentino Tolentino be reduced to the amount of P10,000.
With respect to appellants second assignment of error, we can not agree
with their proposition that because the court a quo had released the
properties of the deceased bondsman Mariano Tolentino from the order of
execution sale and reduced the liability of bondsman Francisco Legaspi to
P100, the entire undertaking of all the bondsmen under the ball bond has
been novated or released.
With respect to the properties of the deceased Mariano Tolentino, the order
of the court merely lifted the execution as to the same, but did not relieve
the estate of said deceased from the obligations he had undertaken by virtue
of the bond. The only purpose of the courts order was to afford the heirs of
Tolentino a hearing and an opportunity to established, whatever defenses
they might have against the order of forfeiture; but there is nothing to show
that the court intended to effect a discharge of Tolentino or his estate.
Hence, the latter remains bound under the original recognizance. The
appellants, in turn, have no cause for complaint against the action of the
court, since the solidary obligation assumed by them renders each one, of
them liable for the entirety of the obligation, which the government, as
creditor, may elect to collect from any number of the solidary bondsmen. Of
course, those who pay may in turn demand from their obligors the
corresponding proportional share, by way of contribution (New Civil Code,
Articles 1216 and 1217).
ART. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those, which may subsequently be directed
against the others, as long as the debt has not been fully collected.
ART. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the
obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may
choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share
which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made.
If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the
intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency,
reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be
borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.
Regarding the action of the court in reducing the liability of bondsman
Francisco Legaspi to P100, such action plainly constitutes a true remission of
the rest of the share of said Legaspi in the bond; wherefore, the release
accrues pro tanto to the benefit of the other solidary obligors (8 Manresa, 214-
215). But it does not operate to discharge the entire obligation, as
contended by appellants, in the absence of any intent to do so. It must be
recalled that solidary guaranties, like that of appellants, are subject to the
rules of solidary obligations (Art. 2047, New Civil Code).
The share of each of the eleven bondsmen, in the forfeiture of P10,000, is
P909.09. The court below having lowered Legaspis share to P100 only, the
liability of the others should be reduced to ten thousand minus P809.09 or
P9,190.91, without prejudice to their right to collect P909.09 from the estate
of the late Mariano Tolentino, by way of contribution.
Wherefore, the orders of forfeiture and executions of the bail bond in
question are affirmed, except that its amount is hereby reduced to P10,000,
which the bondsmen shall, as among themselves, share in the manner
indicated herein. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Endencia and, Felix, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 98 Phil. 415.
2 101 Phil. 228.
3 101 Phil. 324.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29419 August 31, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAURO TOLENTINO and VIDAL TOLENTINO, defendants, VIDAL
TOLENTINO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio A. Nieva for defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J .:
Vidal Tolentino in this appeal impugns the correctness of a judgment
finding him guilty of the crime of murder. The information under which he
and his co-accused his brother Lauro Tolentino, were found guilty was
worded thus: "That on or about the 18th day of June, 1962, at Barrio Laya,
Municipality of Tabuk Subprovince of Kalinga, Province of Mountain,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Lauro Tolentino and Vidal Tolentino, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually aiding each other, with treachery, evident pre-
meditation and abuse of superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted, stabbed and wounded with a knife one
Juan Mundo, thereby inflicting a fatal wound on the vital part of his body
which directly caused his death shortly thereafter."
1

The decision ordered imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both.
The brother, Lauro Tolentino, who inflicted the fatal wound, apparently was
willing to take the consequences of his act and did not appeal. Not so,
appellant Vidal Tolentino, who would have us set aside the decision against
him contending that there was no conspiracy, as it was through sheer
chance that he made his appearance at the scene of the crime when the
combatants were confronting each other and that all he did was to hold the
deceased by the collar with intention of pacifying them. After a careful study
of the evidence of record, this Court is of the opinion that while the
existence of conspiracy was not completely rebutted, appellant's
participation at the most was that of an accomplice. So we decide.
In the appealed decision, there is a brief recital of the facts resulting in the
death of the victim Juan Mundo. Thus: "It appears that on the afternoon of
June 18, 1962, Saturnino Mundo and his father Juan Mundo, residents of
Dagupan, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao Province (then Mountain Province) went
to the Barrio of Laya, Tabuk to repair or fix the shade of the sugar mill of
Francisco Garcia. There were several persons working in the repair and
fixing of the shade. Among them were Federico Bartolong, Diosdado
Madriaga, Kenis Padua, Gabriel Cabrera and Francisco Madriaga besides
Saturnino Mundo and father Juan Mundo. When they were working
between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock on the said afternoon, the accused Lauro
Tolentino came. He invited the deceased Juan Mundo to come with them.
At a distance of four (4) meters, Saturnino Mundo heard Lauro Tolentino
ask his father what he (Juan Mundo) [was] asking [the day before]. At this
instant, Juan Mundo was squatting. Juan Mundo answered "none".
Suddenly, the other accused Vidal Tolentino appeared from nowhere and
seized the collar of Juan Mundo's shirt. Consequently, Juan Mundo
assumed a stooping position toward Lauro Tolentino who was at his right
side. At this moment, Lauro Tolentino pulled his knife, Exhibit "C" the blade
of which was eight (8) inches long from its scabbard at his waist and thrust
it at the left side of the abdomen of Juan Mundo. After stabbing him. Juan
Mundo said, "I am dying." He tumbled down with his back on the ground, ...
dead."
2
The apparent motive, according to the decision, was that a
daughter of the deceased, Rosita Mundo, "left the accused Tolentino and
went to live with her father Juan Mundo in Dagupan, Tabuk. This caused
the ire of Lauro Tolentino. Previously, Lauro and Rosita were living as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage ceremony."
3

As to the participation of appellant Vidal Tolentino, two witnesses testified
for the prosecution. The first was the son, Saturnino Mundo, and the
second was one of those present at the occurrence, a certain Federico
Barlolong. This was what the son testified: "Vidal Tolentino held the collar
of my father's shirt and at that instant Lauro Tolentino thrust his knife at the
left side of my father's abdomen."
4
What preceded such testimony was his
narrating the fact that the other accused, Lauro Tolentino, asked his father
that they have a talk for the purpose of finding out whether the latter was
looking for him, the answer of the father being in the negative.
5
Not much
else of value was elicited from him, as by his own admission and in answer
to the question of what he was doing at the time of the incident, he stated in
all candor: "I was frightened and I lost consciousness."
6
It is noteworthy,
likewise, that he apparently was not even aware of the bad blood that could
have existed between his father and Lauro Tolentino, for he did inform the
court that both in their previous place of residence in Aurora, Isabela and
thereafter in Dagupan, Tabuk, his father and the Tolentino brothers were
"in good terms", their relationship being
"good."
7
As to the other eyewitness, Federico Barlolong, what he could say
on the matter was simply this: "What I saw was, the moment that Juan
Mundo seated himself beside Lauro Tolentino, Vidal Tolentino went to Juan
Mundo and held the back collar of Juan Mundo."
8
He was ignorant of
where Vidal Tolentino, who apparently was not present at the beginning of
the incident, came from: "That is what I do not know, all what I saw was
when he was holding the collar of Juan Mundo, sir."
9

Nonetheless, as above noted, the judgment was one of conviction,
conspiracy having been shown in the opinion of the lower court. The
weakness of such conclusion was stressed in the thorough and exhaustive
brief submitted by his counsel de oficio, Attorney Antonio A. Nieva. The
brief for the government, submitted by the then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice, Felix V. Makasiar on the other hand, pointed out that the
relationship between the accused and the manner in which his holding the
deceased by the collar thus facilitating the thrust of the fatal stab did
indicate the concert of design so essential for a finding of conspiracy. While
not devoid of persuasive force, this Court, as noted, is not disposed to
accord full credence to such an appraisal. It would overlook circumstances
favorable to the appellant. What was done by him did not entail the
responsibility that the law imposes on a principal. His criminal liability
amounts at most to that of accomplice.
So it has been held in the leading case of People v. Tamayo,
10
this Court
speaking through the then Justice Street. Thus: "Upon this point it is
undoubtedly true that concert of action at moment of consummating the
homicide, and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered, may
determine complicity where it would not be otherwise evident. Thus, in a
decision of December 29, 1884, the case was that after two individuals had
beaten another and thrown him to the ground, the accused got upon him,
trampling his breast and face. As a consequence of the injuries received
from the beating by the first two, the injured person died. It was held by the
Supreme Court of Spain that the accused was guilty in the character of
accomplice, saying: "Although the accused did not intervene in giving the
mortal injury caused by the cudgel, for which reason he is not
comprehended in article 13, he simultaneously trampled upon the
deceased who was on the floor; and this simultaneity of acts contributing to
the homicide makes him an accomplice in the same." (Decision, Dec. 29,
1884; Viada, vol. 1, p. 375.)"
11
After referring to several other decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain, as cited by Viada, the opinion went on to
state: "Now although, as thus demonstrated, participation on the part of an
accomplice in the criminal design of the principal is essential to the same
extent as such participation is necessary on the part of one charged as co-
principal, nevertheless, it is evident, and the cases above cited
abundantly prove that, as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes
draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of
concert in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and
manner in which assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same
inference for the purpose of holding the same accused in the character of
principal. This is because, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the
milder form of responsibility."
12

Only recently, the same doctrine was reiterated in People v. Riveral,
13
this
Court speaking through the then Chief Justice Bengzon. As set forth
therein: "However, lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates
the doubt whether they had acted as principals or accomplices in the
perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor the
question, by holding like the court below, that they were guilty of the "milder
form of responsibility," i.e. guilty as mere accomplices."
14

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of July 10, 1968 is modified in the
sense that Vidal Tolentino is found guilty as accomplice of the crime of
murder, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years,
four months and one day as minimum and eight years and one day as
maximum. In all other respects, the appealed decision remains unmodified.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Sentence, Annex 1, Brief for Appellant, p. 1.
2 Ibid, pp. 1 and 2.
3 Ibid, p. 8.
4 T.s.n., Session of March 26, p. 23.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, p. 24.
7 Ibid, p. 32.
8 Ibid, p. 71.
9 Ibid.
10 44 Phil. 38 (1922).
11 Ibid, pp. 52-53.
12 Ibid., p. 54. The Tamayo case has been cited with approval
in the subsequent cases of People v. Caballero, 53 Phil. 585
(1929); People v. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 834, (1930); People v.
Tumayao, 56 Phil. 587 (1932); People v. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580
(1934); People v. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571 (1946); People v.
Ibaez, 77 Phil. 664 (1946); People v. Abarintos, 81 Phil. 238
(1948); People v. Mostoles, 85 Phil. 883 (1950); People v.
Ubina, 97 Phil. 515 (1955); People v. Arranchado, 109 Phil. 410
(1960); People v. Riveral, L-14077, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA
462; People v. Tividad, L-21469, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 649;
People v. Clemente, L-23463, Sept. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 261;
People v. Tatlonghari, L-22094, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 726.
13 L-14077, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 462.
14 Ibid, pp. 468-469.

oo. People vs Siyoh
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW
JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J .:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death
penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,
OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were
accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said to
have been committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the
above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with firearms
and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating together,
aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or
intimidation against persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding,
traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said
pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo
sets, merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P
18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime
herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump
into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the
death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is,
said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the
timely medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented
his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh
and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive
portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of
them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of
Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme
poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so
called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id,
p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public
Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979,
Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman
received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and
stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were
received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for
themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor
returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by
Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his
companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that
caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were
also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan,
to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them
had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of
July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of
Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide
Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July
12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at
another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They
returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house.
However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day
when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of
Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place
suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They
returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by
Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh
were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the
group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling
its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two
persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling
their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return
to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front
while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw
another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat
(pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two
shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn).
There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De
Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a
house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to
the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the
way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their
money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions
ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de
Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of
you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de
Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the
pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn).
But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the
mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo
de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station
at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano
Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de
Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested
before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de
Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his
pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial Health
Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and
issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138;
140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility
of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone
prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who
claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had
the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they
testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record
does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which was
overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a
reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the following claims of
the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at
the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling
together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would
make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims
before they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing
and killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was
both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record
does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of
important consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense
are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be
members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever
presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution
also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has
been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an
army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take
the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made?
(Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this observation: "..., this
Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused
testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be
inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason
why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such
heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder?
The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken
by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused
immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the
accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the
report of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report and
placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-
128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio
de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro,
state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that
their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust
of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali
were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the
proven conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this
case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly
conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2)
armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased
and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the
same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island
near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two armed
strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman
and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while
the two accused remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their
part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs.
Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the
conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of
all of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never
recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still
alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The incident
took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June
8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers
qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on
the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries
sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The
cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is:
"Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D
and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that
the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while
Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the
facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of
necessary votes the penalty imposed shall bereclusion perpetua; and (b) each
of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased
indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente,
Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Aquino, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.



Separate Opinions

CUEVAS, J ., dissenting:
considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was
committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

Separate Opinions
CUEVAS, J ., dissenting:
considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was
committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
cc. Cham vs Valdez
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
1

Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
FERIA, J .:
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent
judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil
case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the
so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law
granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and
memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established
in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of
Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the
Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army."
In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military
Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as
well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for
the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their
present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of
"Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on
January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in
the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman
thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the
existing central administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what
had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in Chief, who
was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central
administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated
January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the
peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with
the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said
Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of
Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February
20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine
Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial
powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the
administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based
upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was
inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in the
organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during
the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered
and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte,
General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the
Philippines which declared:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is,
subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United
States, the sole and only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on
February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the
United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under
the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here
established as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal
questions to be resolved in the present case may be reduced to the
following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing
in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States
and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23,
1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United
States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes
of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all
judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If
the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said
proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which
were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese
military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings
pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not
under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and
proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de
facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is
whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the
names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de
facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will
of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth,
first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that
which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in
Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the
United States. And the third is that established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against
the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in
revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the
second and third kinds of de facto governments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said:
"But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military
power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the
laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are
established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are
usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by
military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in the
case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 .
. . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of
Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United
States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases of
temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at
war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are
regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a
revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same
subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power
having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take
steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force
in the country."
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent
occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order
and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of
a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate
new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is
enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances
prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the
country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social
and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political
nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of
assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to
travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in
abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil
administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a
country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals
are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other
judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the
belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the
supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander
in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of
all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by
the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy
and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one
of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the
enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by
which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings
of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate
private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as
they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his
pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an
occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague
Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of
War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United
States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are
absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they
are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or
superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not
usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before
the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials
connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the
authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the
land as between man and man under the supervision of the American
Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President,
X, p. 209.)
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized
the government set up by the Confederate States as a de factogovernment.
In that case, it was held that "the central government established for the
insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at Castine and
Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts
of regular war; but it was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme.
And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which
these are examples. . . .
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of
the United States, discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate
States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general
laws for the administration of justice and protection of private rights, which
had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its
continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair
or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights
of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as
valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law.
ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen
the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations
maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced,
marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of
property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are
aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the
insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they
were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of
the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other
cases."
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400),
held: "That what occured or was done in respect of such matters under the
authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be
disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were
organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution;
this, because the existence of war between the United States and the
Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the insurrectionary
lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society
nor do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws,
and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as
organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or
remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government
organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except
when proved to have been entered intowith actual intent to further invasion
or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective
states composing the so-called Confederate States should be respected by
the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement
to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive
Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23,
1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government
established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de
facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the
government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United
States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established
over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the
powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and
is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little
consequence whether such government be called a military or civil
government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the
same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so
far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world,
those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p.
466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not
a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese
nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied the
greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the
general direction of a french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV,
25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France,
authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions,
apparently without appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches,
XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in
1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every
department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by
the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by
the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the
same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate
source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and
government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October
23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy
duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines'
was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free
expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the
United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the
Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize
the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation
and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent
dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in
the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in International Law,
recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits
compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to
the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional,
does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although
the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the
power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9
Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs.Page, 9
Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the
Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the
Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese
gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the
hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by
doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of
the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied
nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the
free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the
American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the
Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government
under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government
would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in
insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. And as
such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized
by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as
such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases,
notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs.Bruffy, and
Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the
Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United
States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-named case, the
Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898,
having first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the
Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the
Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession
thereof was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1898. And
the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the
class of de facto governments described in I Moore's International Law
Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government de facto, but which
might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount
force . . '." That is to say, that the government of a country in possession of
belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests
upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army
of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-
known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained
good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the
fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into
the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in
a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for
one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts
done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the
continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time
by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were
it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an
invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be
scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made
under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general
interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by
the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have
been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy
applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time
substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently
in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called
Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments,
which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after
reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed
by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23,
1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of
the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to
abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase
"processes of any other government" as used in the above-quoted
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 that is,
whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American
Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of
the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative,
as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or
other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above
indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all
judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other
government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation
of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of
the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than
judicial processes of court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule
of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation,
as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully suspend existing laws
and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the
exigencies of the military occupation demand such action. But even
assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a
commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own
territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and
before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the
commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation
(although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than
those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur,
who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the
President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of
nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early
period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and
later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is
not to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the
same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the
Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the
international policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard
in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution,
which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the Nation."
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public
hardship would result, and great public interests would be endangered and
sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again
settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set
aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against
them may have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially
now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by
fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of
statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a
particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or
sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the
court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R.
C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or
his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy, may
set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which
the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to
insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be
sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it
would have to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit their
litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be
annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or
offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if judgments
rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and
proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, is
impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law,
issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of
the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the
laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order
abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have
heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted
to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes
that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese
military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of
General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or
refer to cases which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the
Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to
March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be
presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of
Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2,
1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed
cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from
judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese
regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law
which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid and
under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent
conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show
that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be
committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by
the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than
this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p.
245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion
that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is
a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no
rule of international law that denies to the restored government to decide;
that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored
government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon
it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the
overthrown government."
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate
most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws, regulations and
processes other than judicial of the government established by the
belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the
words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial processes"
prisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas
MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to
be determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of
the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the
proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and
void the judicial processes of any other government, it would be necessary
for this court to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas
MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the
proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof
was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of
Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law,
as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, the
laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience,
constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions;
Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of
the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in
discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the obligation to
establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions,
which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a
Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party,"
forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using
their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of
Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1
K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice
in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from
asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the
military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is
restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said
courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the
purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted,
for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in
said courts the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the
military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law
that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower
another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or
commanding officer of the United States Army has violated restraints
imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a
domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on the
executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from
general rules of international law and from fundamental principles known
wherever the American flag flies."
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued
by the officer in command of the forces of the United States in South
Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered
by a court of chancery in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was
declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March
2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which
defined the powers and duties of military officers in command of the several
states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said;
"We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19,
1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military
commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in
question. . . . The clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that
Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so
exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good
end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred the
power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It
is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the
rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the
exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey,
4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt.
2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we
hold that the order was void."
It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of
October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and processes
of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the
judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the
courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings
were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation
of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the
Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and
continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine
Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said
courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the
American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was
restored.
Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-
quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War on
May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually
abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of
view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute
his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as
military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.596.)
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary
pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in
Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila
was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory
occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue
to be affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials
shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their duties as
before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by
Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942,
the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1
and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace
of courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given
by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3
of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were
continued with no substantial change in organization and jurisdiction
thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese
military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue
of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue
said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a
foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a
law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same
exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content."
(Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in
support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila presided
over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said
proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and unless the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have
provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct
Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the left pending
therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth
Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the
Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the
laws and the courts had become the institutions of Japan by adoption
(U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws
and institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines."
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that
the laws and institutions of the country occupied if continued by the
conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of
the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as
already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional
and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to
the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and institutions are
continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force
from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws
and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or
courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the Philippines,
therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of
nations, laws and courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of
the Hague Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of the
population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power,
"extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a change made
by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate
in the political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the
continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the courts of justice are
allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed
to give their sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake,
Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the
victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in
1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering,
after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer
justice in the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and
Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of
French people and government was at least an implied recognition of the
Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany
originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers occupying
Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the name of the
Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English
ed. 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature,
"Law once established continues until changed by the some competent
legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty."
(Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing
Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in
his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131):
"There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes
into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must
last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it
persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such
changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of
constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by
legislative acts creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of
the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident
that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change
of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until
repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are
expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in
force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of
respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that
Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had
afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that
the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts of Japan,
as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same
courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless
and until they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
upon them are repealed by the said government. As a consequence,
enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be
continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere
change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the
former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no
longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings
commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having
jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the
Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came
into the possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court
was continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take
cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the
Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was
substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands
during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending
therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act
No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of
First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were
enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order
that the courts in the Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No.
136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts
created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during
the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the
transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper
tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance,
or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later
on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was
abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that
criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court
created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.
That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning
during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings
in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have
already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second
question. Said Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals
created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be
abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have
heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted
to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order
considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that existed
prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government; for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question,
almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had theretofore
(that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have
been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called
Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said
Executive Order was not the same one which had been functioning during
the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese
occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to
and up to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the
said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
decision.
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue,
to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion,
pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First
Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties
under the laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at
the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent
judge of the court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty
resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially
taking into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein
involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases
now pending in all the courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ
of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
DE JOYA, J ., concurring:
The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the
proceedings held in civil case No. 3012, in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation; and the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of
General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. The decision of this
question requires the application of principles of International Law, in
connection with the municipal law in force in this country, before and during
Japanese occupation.
Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law
(Juntington vs. Attril, 146 U.S., 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 224; 36 Law. ed., 1123);
and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as, under the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is a part of the fundamental law
of the land (Article II, section 3).
As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be ascertained
and administered by this Court, whenever questions of right depending
upon it are presented for our determination, sitting as an international as
well as a domestic Tribunal (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup.
Ct. 552; 46 Law. Ed., 838).
Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as
regulating their mutual relations, the proof of the existence of a given rule is
to be found in the consent of nations to abide by that rule; and this consent
is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nations, and to ascertain
what these usages and customs are, the universal practice is to turn to the
writings of publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the
different countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.S., 677; 20 Sup. Cit.,
290; 44 Law. ed., 320).
But while usage is the older and original source of International Law, great
international treaties are a later source of increasing importance, such as
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on
land, expressly declares that:
ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation applies only to be territory where such authority is
established, and in a position to assert itself.
ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually
passed into the hands of the occupant, the later shall take all steps in
his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country. (32 Stat. II, 1821.)
The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted by the
nations giving adherence to them, among which is United States of
America (32 Stat. II, 1821).
The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may
exercise governmental authority, but only when in actual possession of the
enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of
international Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co, [1874], 20 Wall., 387;
Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S. 416; 33
Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law Ed., 1260; II Oppenheim of International Law,
section 167).
There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese military
occupation, from January, 1942, up to the time of the reconquest by the
armed forces of the United States of the Island of Luzon, in February, 1945.
It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State continue
in force, in so far as they do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably.
The regular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory continue usual for the
invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, partly because
it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and
partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the
native officials, and partly because the latter are more competent to
administer the laws in force within the territory and the military occupant
generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers
as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by
the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by
him.(Young vs. U.S., 39; 24 Law, ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97
U.S., 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct.,
955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor on International Law, sections 576. 578;
Wilson on International Law; pp. 331-37; Hall on International Law, 6th
Edition [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476; Lawrence on International Law, 7th
ed., pp. 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-
332 335; Holland on International Law pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake on
International Law, 2d ed., pp. 121-23.)
It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the
so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, respecting the
laws in force in the country, and permitting the local courts to function and
administer such laws, as proclaimed in the City of Manila, by the
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942,
was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.
If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the territory
under military occupation governmental agencies for the preservation of
peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance
with the laws in force within territory it must necessarily follow that the
judicial proceedings conducted before the courts established by the military
occupant must be considered legal and valid, even after said government
establish by the military occupant has been displaced by the legitimate
government of the territory.
Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the
American Civil War, merely settling the rights of private parties actually
within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of
the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion
had been declared valid and binding (Cock vs.Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed.
Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 118;
Williams vs.Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570;
Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700;
Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of
Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for the purchase money of slaves
was held valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in
1871(Frenchvs. Tumlin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No.
5104).
Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the
Confederate States of America were considered legal and valid and
enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because
they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The
Confederate States were a de facto government in the sense that its
citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil matters,
and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such acts of
obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.], 9; 19 Law. ed., 361).
In the case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Court held
"It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil war the same
general form of government, the same general law for the administration of
justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States
prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As
far as the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy
of the national authority, or the just and legal rights of the citizens, under
the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding."
(William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570;
Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700.)
The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese
occupation, would seem to fall under the following definition of de
facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:
But there is another description of government, called also by
publicists, a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more
aptly denominateda government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are (1) that its existence is maintained
by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while
it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such
force, do not become responsible, as wrong doers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
government of this sort are established over districts differing greatly
in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by
military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil
authority, supported more or less directly by military force.
(Macleod vs. United States [1913] 229 U.S., 416.)
The government established in the Philippines, under the so-called
Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and should be
considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings
conducted before the courts which had been established in this country,
during said Japanese occupation, are to be considered legal and valid and
enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American
forces, as long as the said judicial proceedings had been conducted, under
the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely
refer to the settlement of property rights, under the provisions of the Civil
Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before
and during Japanese occupation.
Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null
and void, under the provisions of the proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation "nullifies
all the laws, regulations and processes of any other government of the
Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."
In other words, petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, a contention which, in
our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and
uncertainties.
When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will
maintain and the others destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former
(U. S. vs. Coombs [1838], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of
Supervisors of Granada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law.
ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guarina [1913], 24 Phil., 37;
Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always
alive to the dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the scales of its
decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the
public policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All
laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so
limited in their application as not lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this
character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter
(U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall. [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed., 278; Church of Holy
Trinity vs. U. S., 143 U. S. 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226;
Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U. S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law.
ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in
construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions
to adopt that which saves is constitutionality, includes the duty of avoiding a
construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it
can be avoided (U. S. vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct.,
527; 53 Law. ed., 836).
According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal
doctrines cited above, the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts
of justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely
applying the municipal law of the territory, such as the provisions of our
Civil Code, which have no political or military significance, should be
considered legal, valid and binding.
It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with said
rules and principles, as International Law is an integral part of the
fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States. And it is also to be presumed that
General MacArthur his acted, in accordance with said rules and principles
of International Law, which have been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of
the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted
before our courts, during Japanese occupation would lead to injustice and
absurd results, and would be highly detrimental to the public interests.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.


PERFECTO, J ., dissenting:
Law must be obeyed. To keep the bonds of society, it must not be evaded.
On its supremacy depends the stability of states and nations. No
government can prevail without it. The preservation of the human race itself
hinges in law.
Since time immemorial, man has relied on law as an essential means of
attaining his purposes, his objectives, his mission in life. More than twenty-
two centuries before the Christian Era, on orders of the Assyrian King
Hammurabi, the first code was engrave in black diorite with cunie form
characters. Nine centuries later Emperor Hung Wu, in the cradle of the
most ancient civilization, compiled the Code of the Great Ming. The laws of
Manu were written in the verdic India. Moses received at Sinai the ten
commandments. Draco, Lycurgus, Solon made laws in Greece. Even
ruthless Genghis Khan used laws to keep discipline among the nomad
hordes with which he conquered the greater part of the European and
Asiastic continents.
Animal and plants species must follow the mendelian heredity rules and
other biological laws to survive. Thanks to them, the chalk cliffs of the
infusoria show the marvel of an animal so tiny as to be imperceptible to the
naked eye creating a whole mountain. Even the inorganic world has to
conform the law. Planets and stars follow the laws discovered by Kepler,
known as the law-maker of heavens. If, endowed with rebellious spirit, they
should happen to challenge the law of universal gravity, the immediate
result would be cosmic chaos. The tiny and twinkling points of light set
above us on the velvet darkness of the night will cease to inspire us with
dreams of more beautiful and happier worlds.
Again we are called upon to do our duty. Here is a law that we must apply.
Shall we shrink? Shall we circumvent it ? Can we ignore it?
The laws enacted by the legislators shall be useless if courts are not ready
to apply them. It is actual application to real issues which gives laws the
breath of life.
In the varied and confused market of human endeavor there are so many
things that might induce us to forget the elementals. There are so many
events, so many problem, so many preoccupations that are pushing among
themselves to attract our attention, and we might miss the nearest and
most familiar things, like the man who went around his house to look for a
pencil perched on one of his ears.
THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION
In October, 1944, the American Armed Forces of Liberation landed
successfully in Leyte.
When victory in islands was accomplished, after the most amazing and
spectacular war operations, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as a
commander in Chief of the American Army, decided to reestablish, in
behalf of the United States, the Commonwealth Government.
Then he was confronted with the question as to what policy to adopt in
regards to the official acts of the governments established in the Philippines
by the Japanese regime. He might have thought of recognizing the validity
of some of said acts, but, certainly, there were acts which he should
declare null and void, whether against the policies of the American
Government, whether inconsistent with military strategy and operations,
whether detrimental to the interests of the American or Filipino peoples,
whether for any other strong or valid reasons.
But, which to recognize, and which not? He was not in a position to gather
enough information for a safe basis to distinguished and classify which acts
must be nullified, and which must validated. At the same time he had to
take immediate action. More pressing military matters were requiring his
immediate attention. He followed the safe course: to nullify all the
legislative, executive, and judicial acts and processes under the Japanese
regime. After all, when the Commonwealth Government is already
functioning, with proper information, he will be in a position to declare by
law, through its Congress, which acts and processes must be revived and
validated in the public interest.
So on October 23, 1944, the Commander in Chief issued the following
proclamation:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
PROCLAMATION
To the People of the Philippines:
WHEREAS, the military forces under my command have landed in
the Philippines soil as a prelude to the liberation of the entire territory
of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the seat of the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines has been re-established in the Philippines under
President Sergio Osmea and the members of his cabinet; and
WHEREAS, under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as
the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14,
1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor
the sanction of the Government of the United States, and is
purporting to exercise Executive, Judicial and Legislative powers of
government over the people;
Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army,
as Commander in Chief of the military forces committed to the
liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and the only
government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control;
2. The laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and
legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free enemy occupation and control; and
I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and
extend to the people of the Philippines the sacred right of government
by constitutional process under the regularly constituted
Commonwealth Government as rapidly as the several occupied areas
are liberated to the military situation will otherwise permit;
I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and
obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted
government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine
soil.
October 23, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General U. S. Army
Commander in Chief
IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW?
In times of war the Commander in Chief of an army is vested with
extraordinary inherent powers, as a natural result of the nature of the
military operations aimed to achieve the purposes of his country in the war,
victory being paramount among them.
Said Commander in Chief may establish in the occupied or reoccupied
territory, under his control, a complete system of government; he may
appoint officers and employees to manage the affairs of said government;
he may issue proclamations, instructions, orders, all with the full force of
laws enacted by a duly constituted legislature; he may set policies that
should be followed by the public administration organized by him; he may
abolish the said agencies. In fact, he is the supreme ruler and law-maker of
the territory under his control, with powers limited only by the receipts of the
fundamental laws of his country.
California, or the port of San Francisco, had been conquered by the
arms of the United States as early as 1846. Shortly afterward the
United States had military possession of all upper California. Early in
1847 the President, as constitutional commander in chief of the army
and navy, authorized the military and naval commander of our forces
in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and
form a civil government for the conquered country, and to impose
duties on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the
support of the government, and of the army which has the conquest
in possession. . . Cross of Harrison, 16 Howard, 164, 189.)
In May, 1862, after the capture of New Orleans by the United States
Army, General Butler, then in command of the army at that place,
issued a general order appointing Major J. M. Bell, volunteer aide-de-
camp, of the division staff, provost judge of the city, and directed that
he should be obeyed and respected accordingly. The same order
appointed Capt. J. H. French provost marshal of the city, the Capt.
Stafford deputy provost marshal. A few days after this order the
Union Bank lent to the plaintiffs the sum of $130,000, and
subsequently, the loan not having been repaid, brought suit before
the provost judge to recover the debt. The defense was taken that the
judge had no jurisdiction over the civil cases, but judgement was
given against the borrowers, and they paid the money under protest.
To recover it back is the object of the present suit, and the contention
of the plaintiffs is that the judgement was illegal and void, because
the Provost Court had no jurisdiction of the case. The judgement of
the District Court was against the plaintiffs, and this judgement was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. To this affirmance error
is now assigned.
The argument of the plaintiffs in error is that the establishment of the
Provost Court, the appointment of the judge, and his action as such in
the case brought by the Union Bank against them were invalid,
because in violation of the Constitution of the United States, which
vests the judicial power of the General government in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish, and under this constitutional provision they were
entitled to immunity from liability imposed by the judgment of the
Provost Court. Thus, it is claimed, a Federal question is presented,
and the highest court of the State having decided against the
immunity claimed, our jurisdiction is invoked.
Assuming that the case is thus brought within our right to review it,
the controlling question is whether the commanding general of the
army which captured New Orleans and held it in May 1862, had
authority after the capture of the city to establish a court and appoint
a judge with power to try and adjudicate civil causes. Did the
Constitution of the United States prevent the creation of the civil
courts in captured districts during the war of the rebellion, and their
creation by military authority?
This cannot be said to be an open question. The subject came under
the consideration by this court in The Grapeshot, where it was
decided that when, during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent
territory were occupied by the National forces, it was within the
constitutional authority of the President, as commander in chief, to
establish therein provisional courts for the hearing and determination
of all causes arising under the laws of the States or of the United
States, and it was ruled that a court instituted by President Lincoln for
the State of Louisiana, with authority to hear, try, and determine civil
causes, was lawfully authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. Its
establishment by the military authority was held to be no violation of
the constitutional provision that "the judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may form time to time ordain and establish."
That clause of the Constitution has no application to the abnormal
condition of conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering,
army. It refers only to courts of United States, which military courts
are not. As was said in the opinion of the court, delivered by Chief
Justice Chase, in The Grapeshot, "It became the duty of the National
government, wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, and the
territory which had been dominated by it was occupied by the
National forces, to provide, as far as possible, so long as the war
continued, for the security of the persons and property and for the
administration of justice. The duty of the National government in this
respect was no other than that which devolves upon a regular
belligerent, occupying during war the territory of another belligerent. It
was a military duty, to be performed by the President, as Commander
in Chief, and instructed as such with the direction of the military force
by which the occupation was held."
Thus it has been determined that the power to establish by military
authority courts for the administration of civil as well as criminal
justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the National
forces, is precisely the same as that which exists when foreign
territory has been conquered and is occupied by the conquerors.
What that power is has several times been considered. In
Leitensdorfer & Houghton vs. Webb, may be found a notable
illustration. Upon the conquest of New Mexico, in 1846, the
commanding officer of the conquering army, in virtue of the power of
conquest and occupancy, and with the sanction and authority of the
President, ordained a provisional government for the country. The
ordinance created courts, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. It
did not undertake to change the municipal laws of the territory, but it
established a judicial system with a superior or appellate court, and
with circuit courts, the jurisdiction of which declared to embrace, first,
all criminal causes that should not otherwise provided for by law; and
secondly, original and exclusive cognizance of all civil cases not
cognizable before the prefects and alcades. But though these courts
and this judicial system were established by the military authority of
the United States, without any legislation of Congress, this court ruled
that they were lawfully established. And there was no express order
for their establishment emanating from the President or the
Commander in Chief. The ordinance was the act of the General
Kearney the commanding officer of the army occupying the
conquered territory.
In view of these decisions it is not to be questioned that the
Constitution did not prohibit the creation by the military authority of
court for the trial of civil causes during the civil war in conquered
portions of the insurgent States. The establishment of such courts is
but the exercise of the ordinary rights of conquest. The plaintiffs in
error, therefore, had no constitutional immunity against subjection to
the judgements of such courts. They argue, however, that if this be
conceded, still General Butler had no authority to establish such a
court; that the President alone, as a Commander in Chief, had such
authority. We do not concur in this view. General Butler was in
command of the conquering and the occupying army. He was
commissioned to carry on the war in Louisina. He was, therefore,
invested with all the powers of making war, so far as they were
denied to him by the Commander in Chief, and among these powers,
as we have seen, was of establishing courts in conquered territory. It
must be presumed that he acted under the orders of his superior
officer, the President, and that his acts, in the prosecution of the war,
were the acts of his commander in chief. (Mechanics' etc.
Bank vs. Union Bank, 89 U. S. [22 Wall.], 276-298.)
There is no question, therefore, that when General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur issued on October Proclamation, he did it in the legitimate
exercise of his powers. He did it as the official representative of the
supreme authority of the United States of America. Consequently, said
proclamation is legal, valid, and binding.
Said proclamation has the full force of a law. In fact, of a paramount law.
Having been issued in the exercise of the American sovereignty, in case of
conflict, it can even supersede, not only the ordinary laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, but also our Constitution itself while we
remain under the American flag.
"PROCESS" IN THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION
In the third section of the dispositive part of the October Proclamation, it is
declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth, are null and void.
Does the word "processes" used in the proclamation include judicial
processes?
In its broadest sense, process is synonymous with proceedings or
procedures and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a judicial cause
from it commencement to its conclusion.
PROCESS. In Practice. The means of compelling a defendant to
appear in court after suing out the original writ, in civil, and after
indictment, in criminal cases.
The method taken by law to compel a compliance with the original
writ or command as of the court.
A writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority
law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings; Gollobitch vs. Rainbow, 84 la., 567; 51 N. W., 48; the
means or method pointed out by a statute, or used to acquire
jurisdiction of the defendants, whether by writ or notice. Wilson vs. R.
Co. (108 Mo., 588; 18 S. W., 286; 32 Am. St. Rep., 624). (3 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, p. 2731.)
A. Process generally. 1. Definition. As a legal term process is a
generic word of every comprehensive signification and many
meanings. It is broadest sense it is equivalent to, or synonymous
with, "proceedings" or "procedure," and embraces all the steps and
proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion.
Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a
court compels a compliance with it demands. "Process" and "writ" or
"writs" are synonymous in the sense that every writ is a process, and
in a narrow sense of the term "process" is limited to judicial writs in an
action, or at least to writs or writings issued from or out of court,
under the seal thereof, and returnable thereto; but it is not always
necessary to construe the term so strictly as to limit it to a writ issued
by a court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction; the term is
sometimes defined as a writ or other formal writing issued by
authority of law or by some court, body, or official having authority to
issue it; and it is frequently used to designate a means, by writ or
otherwise , of acquiring jurisdiction of defendant or his property, or of
bringing defendant into, or compelling him to appear in, court to
answer.
As employed in the statutes the legal meaning of the word "process"
varies according to the context, subject matter, and spirit of the
statute in which it occurs. In some jurisdictions codes or statutes
variously define "process" as signifying or including: A writ or
summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings; all writs,
warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial
officers; or any writ, declaration, summons, order, or subpoena
whereby any action, suit or proceeding shall be commenced, or which
shall be issued in or upon any action, suit or proceeding. (50 C. J.,
PP. 441, 442.)
The definition of "process" given by Lord Coke comprehends any
lawful warrant, authority, or proceeding by which a man may be
arrested. He says: "Process of law is two fold, namely, by the King's
writ, or by proceeding and warrant, either in deed or in law, without
writ." (People vs. Nevins [N. Y.] Hill, 154, 169, 170; State vs. Shaw,
50 A., 869; 73 Vt., 149.)
Baron Comyn says that process, in a large acceptance, comprehends
the whole proceedings after the original and before judgement; but
generally it imports the writs which issue out of any court to bring the
party to answer, or for doing execution, and all process out of the
King's court ought to be in the name of the King. It is called "process"
because it proceeds or goes upon former matter, either original or
judicial. Gilmer, vs. Bird 15 Fla., 410, 421. (34 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 147.)
In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means whereby a
court compels the appearance of the defendant before it, or a
compliance with it demands, and any every writ, rule order, notice, or
decree, including any process of execution that may issue in or upon
any action, suit, or legal proceedings, and it is not restricted to mesne
process. In a narrow or restricted sense it is means those mandates
of the court intending to bring parties into court or to require them to
answer proceedings there pending. (Colquitt Nat. Bank vs. Poitivint,
83 S. E., 198, 199; 15 Ga. App., 329. (34 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)
A "process" is an instrument in an epistolary from running in the
name of the sovereign of a state and issued out of a court of justice,
or by a judge thereof, at the commencement of an action or at any
time during its progress or incident thereto, usually under seal of the
court, duly attested and directed to some municipal officer or to the
party to be bound by it, commanding the commission of some act at
or within a specified time, or prohibiting the doing of some act. The
cardinal requisites are that the instrument issue from a court of
justice, or a judge thereof; that it run in the name of the sovereign of
the state; that it be duly attested, but not necessarily by the judge,
though usually, but not always, under seal; and that it be directed to
some one commanding or prohibiting the commission of an act.
Watson vs. Keystone Ironworks Co., 74 P., 272, 273; 70 Kan., 43. (34
Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)
Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Process" has two qualifications:
First, it is largely taken for all proceedings in any action or
prosecution, real or personal, civil or criminal, from the beginning to
the end; secondly, that is termed the "process" by which a man is
called into any temporal court, because the beginning or principal part
thereof, by which the rest is directed or taken. Strictly, it is a
proceeding after the original, before the judgement. A policy of fire
insurance contained the condition that if the property shall be sold or
transferred, or any change takes place in title or possession, whether
by legal process or judicial decree or voluntary transfer or
convenience, then and in every such case the policy shall be void.
The term "legal process," as used in the policy, means what is known
as a writ; and, as attachment or execution on the writs are usually
employed to effect a change of title to property, they are or are
amongst the processes contemplated by the policy. The words "legal
process" mean all the proceedings in an action or proceeding. They
would necessarily embrace the decree, which ordinarily includes the
proceedings. Perry vs. Lorillard Fire Ins. Co., N. Y., 6 Lans., 201,
204. See, also, Tipton vs. Cordova, 1 N. M., 383, 385. (34 Words and
Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)
"Process" in a large acceptation, is nearly synonymous with
"proceedings," and means the entire proceedings in an action, from
the beginning to the end. In a stricter sense, it is applied to the
several judicial writs issued in an action. Hanna vs. Russell, 12 Minn.,
80, 86 (Gil., 43, 45). (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition,
1940, edition 149.)
The term "process" as commonly applied, intends that proceeding by
which a party is called into court, but it has more enlarged
signification, and covers all the proceedings in a court, from the
beginning to the end of the suit; and, in this view, all proceedings
which may be had to bring testimony into court, whether viva voceor
in writing, may be considered the process of the court.
Rich vs. Trimple, Vt., 2 Tyler, 349, 350. Id.
"Process" in its broadest sense comprehends all proceedings to the
accomplishment of an end, including judicial proceedings. Frequently
its signification is limited to the means of bringing a party in court. In
the Constitution process which at the common law would have run in
the name of the king is intended. In the Code process issued from a
court is meant. McKenna vs. Cooper, 101 P., 662, 663; 79 Kan., 847,
quoting Hanna vs. Russel, 12 Minn., 80. (Gil., 43 ); Black Com. 279;
Bou vs. Law. Dict. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition 1940
edition, p. 149.)
"Judicial process" includes the mandate of a court to its officers, and
a means whereby courts compel the appearance of parties, or
compliance with its commands, and includes a summons. Ex
parte Hill, 51 So., 786, 787; 165 Ala., 365.
"Judicial process" comprehends all the acts of then court from the
beginning of the proceeding to its end, and in a narrower sense is the
means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out
the original writ in civil case and after the indictment in criminal cases,
and in every sense is the act of the court and includes any means of
acquiring jurisdiction and includes attachment, garnishment, or
execution, and also a writ. Blair vs. Maxbass Security Bank of
Maxbass, 176 N. W., 98, 199; 44 N. D. 12 (23 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 328.)
There is no question that the word process, as used in the October
Proclamation, includes all judicial processes or proceedings.
The intention of the author of the proclamation of including judicial
processes appears clearly in the preamble of the document.
The second "Whereas," states that so-called government styled as the
"Republic of the Philippines," based upon neither the free expression of the
people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States, and
is purporting to the exercise Executive, Judicial, and Legislative powers of
government over the people."
It is evident from the above-mentioned words that it was the purpose of
General MacArthur to declare null and void all acts of government under
the Japanese regime, and he used, in section 3 of he dispositive part, the
word laws, as pertaining to the legislative branch, the word regulations, as
pertaining to the executive branch, and lastly, the word processes, as
pertaining to the judicial branch of the government which functioned under
the Japanese regime.
It is reasonable to assume that he might include in the word "process."
besides those judicial character, those of executive or administrative
character. At any rate, judicial processes cannot be excluded.
THE WORDS OF PROCLAMATION EXPRESS UNMISTAKABLY
THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHOR
The October Proclamation is written in such a way that it is impossible to
make a mistake as to the intention of its author.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat in the
Supreme Court of the United States, the following:
When the words in their literal sense have a plain meaning, courts
must be very cautious in allowing their imagination to give them a
different one. Guild vs. Walter, 182 Mass., 225, 226 (1902)
Upon questions of construction when arbitrary rule is involved, it is
always more important to consider the words and the circumstances
than even strong analogies decisions. The successive neglect of a
series of small distinctions, in the effort to follow precedent, is very
liable to end in perverting instruments from their plain meaning. In no
other branch of the law (trusts) is so much discretion required in
dealing with authority. . . . There is a strong presumption in favor of
giving them words their natural meaning, and against reading them
as if they said something else, which they are not fitted to express.
(Merrill vs. Preston, 135 Mass., 451, 455 (1883).
When the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and doubt, and
express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the framer, there is no
occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to
interpret what needs no interpretation.
Very strong expression have been used by the courts to emphasize the
principle that they are to derive their knowledge of the legislative intention
from the words or language of the statute itself which the legislature has
used to express it. The language of a statute is its most natural guide. We
are not liberty to imagine an intent and bind the letter to the intent.
The Supreme Court of the United States said: "The primary and general
rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the law-maker is to be
found in the language that he has used. He is presumed to know the
meaning of the words and the rules of grammar. The courts have no
function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will of the legislator.
It is true that there are cases in which the letter of the statute is not deemed
controlling, but the cases are few and exceptional and only arise where
there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and
accurately disclose the intent. No mere ommission, no mere failure to
provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise should have specifically
provided for will justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute."
(United States vs. Goldenberg, 168 U. S., 95, 102, 103; 18 S. C. Rep., 3;
42 Law. ed., 394.)
That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be the
sole and only government in our country; that our laws are in full force and
effect and legally binding; that "all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government are null and void and without legal effect", are provisions
clearly, distinctly, unmistakably expressed in the October Proclamation, as
to which there is no possibility of error, and there is absolutely no reason in
trying to find different meanings of the plain words employed in the
document.
As we have already seen, the annulled processes are precisely judicial
processes, procedures and proceedings, including the one which is under
our consideration.
THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHES A CLEAR POLICY
Although, as we have already stated, there is no possible mistakes as to
the meaning of the words employed in the October Proclamation, and the
text of the document expresses, in clear-cut sentences, the true purposes
of its author, it might not be amiss to state here what was the policy
intended to be established by said proclamation.
It is a matter of judicial knowledge that in the global war just ended on
September 2, 1945, by the signatures on the document of unconditional
surrender affixed by representatives of the Japanese government, the
belligerents on both sides resorted to what may call war weapons of
psychological character.
So Japan, since its military forces occupied Manila, had waged an intensive
campaign propaganda, intended to destroy the faith of the Filipino people in
America, to wipe out all manifestations of American or occidental
civilization, to create interest in all things Japanese, which the imperial
officers tried to present as the acme of oriental culture, and to arouse racial
prejudice among orientals and occidentals, to induce the Filipinos to rally to
the cause of Japan, which she tried to make us believe is the cause of the
inhabitants of all East Asia.
It is, then, natural that General MacArthur should take counter-measures to
neutralize or annul completely all vestiges of Japanese influence, specially
those which might jeopardize in any way his military operations and his
means of achieving the main objective of the campaign of the liberation,
that is, to restore in our country constitutional processes and the high ideals
constitute the very essence of democracy.
It was necessary to free, not only our territory, but also our spiritual
patrimony. It was necessary, not only to restore to us the opportunity of
enjoying the physical treasures which a beneficent Providence
accumulated on this bountiful land, the true paradise in the western Pacific,
but to restore the full play of our ideology, that wonderful admixture of
sensible principles of human conduct, bequeathed to us by our Malayan
ancestors, the moral principles of the Christianity assimilated by our people
from teachers of Spain, and the common-sense rules of the American
democratic way of life.
It was necessary to free that ideology from any Japanese impurity.
Undoubtedly, the author of the proclamation thought that the laws,
regulations, and processes of all the branches of the governments
established under the Japanese regime, if allowed to continue and to have
effect, might be a means of keeping and spreading in our country the
Japanese influence, with the same deadly effects as the mines planted by
the retreating enemy.
The government offices and agencies which functioned during the
Japanese occupation represented a sovereignty and ideology antagonistic
to the sovereignty and ideology which MacArthur's forces sought to restore
in our country.
Under chapter I of the Japanese Constitution, it is declared that Japan shall
reigned and governed by a line Emperors unbroken for ages eternal (Article
1); that the Emperor is sacred and inviolable (Article 3); that he is the head
of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of the sovereignty (Article 4);
that he exercises the legislative power (Article 5); that he gives sanction to
laws, and orders to be promulgated and executed (Article 6);that he has the
supreme command of the Army and Navy (Article 11); that he declares war,
makes peace, and concludes treaties (Article 13).
There is no reason for allowing to remain any vestige of Japanese
ideology, the ideology of a people which as confessed in a book we have at
our desk, written by a Japanese, insists in doing many things precisely in a
way opposite to that followed by the rest of the world.
It is the ideology of a people which insists in adopting the policy of self-
delusion; that believes that their Emperor is a direct descendant of gods
and he himself is a god, and that the typhoon which occured on August 14,
1281, which destroyed the fleet with which Kublai Khan tried to invade
Japan was the divine wind of Ise; that defies the heinous crime of the ronin,
the 47 assassins who, in order to avenge the death of their master Asano
Naganori, on February 3, 1703, entered stealthily into the house of
Yoshinaka Kiro and killed him treacherously.
It is an ideology which dignifies harakiri or sepukku, the most bloody and
repugnant from suicide, and on September 13, 1912, on the occasion of
the funeral of Emperor Meiji, induced General Maresuke Nogi and his wife
to practice the abhorrent "junshi", and example of which is offered to us in
the following words of a historian:
When the Emperor's brother Yamato Hiko, died in 2 B. C., we are told
that, following the occasion, his attendants were assembled to from
the hito-bashira (pillar-men) to gird the grave. They were buried alive
in circle up to the neck around the thomb and "for several days they
died not, but wept and wailed day night. At last they died not, but
wept and wailed day night. At last they did not rotted. Dogs and cows
gathered and ate them." (Gowen, an Outline of History of Japan, p.
50.)
The practice shows that the Japanese are the spiritual descendants of the
Sumerians, the ferocious inhabitants of Babylonia who, 3500 years B. C.,
appeared in history as the first human beings to honor their patesis by
killing and entombing with him his window, his ministers, and notable men
and women of his kingdom, selected by the priests to partake of such
abominable honor. (Broduer, The Pageant of Civilization, pp. 62-66.)
General MacArthur sought to annul completely the officials acts of the
governments under the Japanese occupation, because they were done at
the shadow of the Japanese dictatorship, the same which destroyed the
independence of Korea, the "Empire of Morning Frehsness"; they violated
the territorial integrity of China, invaded Manchuria, and initiated therein the
deceitful system of puppet governments, by designating irresponsible Pu Yi
as Emperor of Manchukuo; they violated the trusteeship granted by the
Treaty of Versailles by usurping tha mandated islands in the Pacific; they
initiated that they call China Incident, without war declaration, and,
therefore, in complete disregard of an elemental international duty; they
attacked Pearl Harbor treacherously, and committed a long series of the
flagrant violations of international law that have logically bestowed on
Japan the title of the bandit nation in the social world.
The conduct of the Japanese during the occupation shows a shocking an
anchronism of a modern world power which seems to be re-incarnation of
one whose primitive social types of pre-history, whose proper place must
be found in an archeological collection. It represents a backward jump in
the evolution of ethical and juridical concepts, a reversion that, more than a
simple pathological state, represents a characteristics and well defined
case of sociological teratology.
Since they entered the threshold of our capital, the Japanese had
announced that for every one of them killed they would kill ten prominent
Filipinos. They promised to respect our rights by submitting us to the
wholesale and indiscriminate slapping, tortures, and atrocious massacres.
Driving nails in the cranium, extraction of teeth and eyes, burnings of
organs, hangings, diabolical zonings, looting of properties, establishments
of redlight districts, machine gunning of women and children, interment of
alive persons, they are just mere preludes of the promised paradised that
they called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".
They promised religious liberty by compelling all protestant sects to unite,
against the religious scruples and convictions of their members, in one
group, and by profaning convents, seminaries, churches, and other cult
centers of the Catholics, utilizing them as military barracks, munitions
dumps, artillery base, deposits of bombs and gasoline, torture chambers
and zone, and by compelling the government officials and employees to
face and to bow in adoration before that caricature of divinity in the imperial
palace of Tokyo.
The Japanese offered themselves to be our cultural mentors by depriving
us of the use of our schools and colleges, by destroying our books and
other means of culture, by falsifying the contents of school texts, by
eliminating free press, the radio, all elemental principles of civilized
conduct, by establishing classes of rudimentary Japanese so as to reduce
the Filipinos to the mental level of the rude Japanese guards, and by
disseminating all kinds of historical, political, and cultural falsehoods.
Invoking our geographical propinquity and race affinity, they had the
insolence of calling us their brothers, without the prejuce of placing of us in
the category of slaves, treating the most prominent Filipinos in a much
lower social and political category than that of the most ignorant and brutal
subject of the Emperor.
The civil liberties of the citizens were annulled. Witnesses and litigants
were slapped and tortured during investigations. In the prosecuting
attorney's offices, no one was safe. When the Japanese arrested a person,
the lawyer who dared to intercede was also placed under arrest. Even
courts were not free from their dispotic members. There were judges who
had to trample laws and shock their conscience in order not to disgust a
Nipponese.
The most noble of all professions, so much so that the universities of the
world could not conceive of higher honor that may be conferred than that of
Doctor of Laws, became the most despised. It was dangerous to practice
the profession by which faith in the effectiveness of law is maintained;
citizens feel confident in the protection of their liberties, honor, and dignity;
the weak may face the powerful; the lowest citizen is not afraid of the
highest official; civil equality becomes reality; justice is admnistered with
more efficiency; and democracy becomes the best system of government
and the best guaranty for the welfare and happiness of the individual
human being. In fact, the profession of law was annulled, and the best
lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in Fort Santiago and other centers of
torture were the military police, concubines, procurers, and spies, the
providers of war materials and shameful pleasures, and the accomplices in
fraudulent transactions, which were the specialty of many naval and military
Japanese officers.
The courts and Filipino government officials were completely helpless in
the question of protecting the constitutional liberties and fundamental rights
of the citizens who happen to be unfortunate enough to fall under the
dragnet of the hated kempei. Even the highest government officials were
not safe from arrest and imprisonment in the dreaded military dungeons,
where torture or horrible death were always awaiting the defenseless victim
of the Japanese brutality.
May any one be surprised if General MacArthur decided to annul all the
judicial processes?
The evident policy of the author of the October Proclamation can be seen if
we take into consideration the following provisions of the Japanese
Constitution:
ART. 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law
according to law, in the name of the Emperor.
ART. 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been
infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authority .. shall be
taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nobody dared challenge the validity of the October Proclamation.
Nobody dared challenge the authority of the military Commander in Chief
who issued it.
Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of General
of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Supreme Commander, the
military hero, the greatest American general, the Liberator of the
Philippines, the conqueror of Japan, the gallant soldier under whose
authority the Emperor of the Japan, who is supposed to rule supreme for
ages as a descendant of gods, is receiving orders with the humility of a
prisoner of war.
No challenge has been hurled against the proclamation or the authority of
the author to issue it, because everybody acknowledges the full legality of
its issuance.
But because the proclamation will affect the interest and the rights of a
group of individuals, and to protect the same, a way is being sought to
neutralize the effect of the proclamation.
The way found is to invoke international law. The big and resounding word
is considered as a shibboleth powerful enough to shield the affected
persons from the annulling impact.
Even then, international law is not invoked to challenge the legality or
authority of the proclamation, but only to construe it in a convenient way so
that judicial processes during the Japanese occupation, through an
exceptional effort of the imagination, might to segregated from the
processes mentioned in the proclamation.
An author said that the law of nations, the "jus gentiun", is not a fixed nor
immutable science. On the country, it is developing incessantly, it is
perpetually changing in forms. In each turn it advances or recedes,
according to the vicissitudes of history, and following the monotonous
rythm of the ebb and rise of the tide of the sea.
Le driot des gens, en effet, n'est point une science fixe est immuable:
bein au contraire, il se developpe sans cesse, il change eternellement
de formes; tour il avance et il recule, selon less vicissitudes de
histoire et suivan un rhythm monotone qui est comme le flux et le
reflux d'un mer. (M. Revon, De l'existence du driot international sous
la republique romain.)
Another author has this to say:
International law, if it is or can be a science at all, or can be, at most a
regulative science, dealing with the conduct of States, that is, human
beings in a certain capacity; and its principles and prescriptions are
not, like those of science proper, final and unchanging. The
substance of science proper is already made for man; the substance
of international is actually made by man, and different ages make
differently." (Coleman Philippson, The International Law and Custom
of Ancient Greece of Rome, Vol. I, p. 50.)
"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." (Pound, Interpretations
of Legal History., p. 1. ) Justice Cardozo adds: "Here is the great antimony
confronting us at every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked,
are equally destructive. The law, like human kind, if life is to continue, must
find some path compromise." (The Growth of Law p. 2.) Law is just one of
the manifestations of human life, and "Life has relations not capable of
division into inflexible compartments. The moulds expand and shrink,"
(Glanzer vs. Shepard, 233 N.Y., 236, 241.)
The characteristic plasticity of law is very noticeable, much more than in
any other department, in international law.
In a certain matters it is clear we have made substantial progress, but
in other points, he (M. Revon) maintains, we have retrograded; for
example, in the middle ages the oath was not always respected as
faithfully as in ancient Rome; and nearer our own times, in the
seventeenth century, Grotius proclaims the unquestioned right of the
belligerents to massacre the women and the children of the enemy;
and in our more modern age the due declaration of war which Roman
always conformed to has not been invariably observed. (Coleman
Philippson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and
Rome, Vol. I, p. 209.)
Now let us see if any principle of international law may effect the
enforcement of the October Proclamation.
In this study we should be cautioned not to allow ourselves to be deluded
by generalities and vagueness which are likely to lead us easily to error, in
view of the absence of codification and statutory provisions.
Our Constitution provides:
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the Nation. (Sec. 3, Art. II.)
There being no codified principles of international law, or enactments of its
rules, we cannot rely on merely legal precepts.
With the exception of international conventions and treaties and, just
recently, the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in San Francisco
Conference on June 26, 1945, we have to rely on unsystemized judicial
pronouncements and reasonings and on theories, theses, and propositions
that we may find in the works of authors and publicists.
Due to that characteristic pliability and imprecision of international law, the
drafters of our Constitution had to content themselves with "generally
accepted principles."
We must insists, therefore, that the principles should be specific and
unmistakably defined and that there is definite and conclusive evidence to
the effect that they generally accepted among the civilized nations of the
world and that they belong to the current era and no other epochs of
history.
The temptation of assuming the role of a legislator is greater in international
law than in any other department of law, since there are no parliaments,
congresses, legislative assemblies which can enact laws and specific
statutes on the subject. It must be our concern to avoid falling in so a great
temptation, as its, dangers are incalculable. It would be like building castles
in the thin air, or trying to find an exit in the thick dark forest where we are
irretrievably lost. We must also be very careful in our logic. In so vast a field
as international law, the fanciful wandering of the imagination often impair
the course of dialistics.
THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Is there any principle of international law that may effect the October
Proclamation?
We tried in vain to find out in the majority opinion anything as to the
existence of any principle of international law under which the authority of
General MacArthur to issue the proclamation can effectively be challenged.
No principle of international law has been, or could be invoked as a basis
for denying the author of the document legal authority to issue the same or
any part thereof.
We awaited in vain for any one to dare deny General MacArthur the
authority, under international law, to declare null and void and without
effect, not only the laws and regulations of the governments under the
Japanese regime, but all the processes of said governments, including
judicial processes.
If General MacArthur, as commander in Chief of the American Armed
Forces of Liberation, had authority, full and legal, to issue the proclamation,
the inescapable result will be the complete viodance and nullity of all
judicial processes, procedures, and proceedings of all courts under the
Japanese regime.
But those who are sponsoring the cause of said judicial processes try to
achieve their aim, not by direct means, but by following a tortuous side-
road.
They accept and recognize the full authority of the author of the
proclamation to issue it and all its parts, but they maintain that General
MacArthur did not and could not have in mind the idea of nullifying the
judicial processes during the Japanese occupation, because that will be in
violation of the principles of international law.
If we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion we will have to reach the
conlusion that the world "processes" does not appear at all in the October
Proclamation.
It is stated more than once, and reiterated with dogmatic emphasis, that
under the principles of international law the judicial processes under an
army occupation cannot be invalidated.
But we waited in vain for the specific principle of international law, only one
of those alluded to, to be pointed out to us.
If the law exist, it can be pointed out. If the principle exists, it can stated
specifically. The word is being used very often in plural, principles, but we
need only one to be convinced.
The imagined principles are so shrouded in a thick maze of strained
analogies and reasoning, that we confess our inability even to have a
fleeting glimpse at them through their thick and invulnerable wrappers.
At every turn international law, the blatant words, are haunting us with the
deafening bray of a trumpet, but after the transient sound has fled away,
absorbed by the resiliency of the vast atmosphere, the announced
principles, which are the very soul of international law, would disappear too
with the lighting speed of a vanishing dream.
WEAKNESS OF THE MAJORITY POSITION
In the majority opinion three questions are propounded: first, whether
judicial acts and proceedings during the Japanese occupation are valid
even after liberation; second whether the October Proclamation had
invalidated all judgement and judicial proceedings under the Japanese
regime; and third, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth may
continue the judicial proceedings pending at the time of liberation.
As regards the first question, it is stated that it is a legal tourism in political
and international law that all acts of ade facto government are good and
valid, that the governments established during the Japanese occupation.
that is, the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines, were de facto governments, and that it necessarily follows that
the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of those governments,
"which are not of a political complexion," were good and valid, and by virtue
of the principle of postliminium, remain good and valid after the liberation.
In the above reasoning we will see right away how the alleged legal truism
in political and international law, stated as a premise in a sweeping way, as
an absolute rule, is immediately qualified by the exception as to judicial
acts and proceedings which are of a "political complexion."
So it is the majority itself which destroys the validity of what it maintains as
a legal truism in political and international law, by stating from the
beginning of the absolute proposition that all acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto governments
are good and valid.
It is be noted that no authority, absolutely no authority, has been cited to
support the absolute and sweeping character of the majority proposition as
stated in their opinion.
No authority could be cited, because the majority itself loses faith in the
validity of such absolute and sweeping proposition, by establishing an
unexplained exception as regards the judicial acts and proceedings of a
"political complexion."
Besides, it is useless to try to find in the arguments of the majority anything
that may challenge the power, the authority of a de jure government to
annul the official acts of a de facto government, or the legal and
indisputable authority of the restored legitimate government to refuse to
recognize the official acts, legislative, executive and judicial, of the usurping
government, once the same is ousted.
As to the second question, the majority argues that the judicial proceedings
and judgments of the de factogovernments under the Japanese regime
being good and valid, "it should be presumed that it was not, and could not
have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur to refer to judicial
processes, when he used the last word in the October Proclamation, and
that it only refers to government processes other than judicial processes or
court proceedings."
The weakness and absolute ineffectiveness of the argument are self-
evident.
It is maintained that when General MacArthur declared the processes of
the governments under the Japanese regime null and void, he could not
refer to judicial processes, because the same are valid and remained so
under the legal truism announced by the majority to the effect that, under
political and international law, all official acts of a de facto government,
legislative, executive or judicial, are valid.
But we have seen already how the majority excepted from said legal truism
the judicial processes of "political complexion."
And now it is stated that in annulling the processes of the governments
under Japanese occupation, General MacArthur referred to "processes
other than judicial processes."
That is, the legislative and executive processes.
But, did not the majority maintain that all acts and proceedings of legislative
and executive departments of a de facto governments are good and valid?
Did it not maintain that they are so as a "legal truism in political and
international law?"
Now if the reasoning of the majority to the effect that General MacArthur
could not refer to judicial processes because they are good and valid in
accordance with international law, why should the same reasoning not
apply to legislative and executive processes?
Why does the majority maintain that, notwithstanding the fact that,
according that said legal truism, legislative and executive official acts of de
facto governments are good and valid, General MacArthur referred to the
latter in his annulling proclamation, but not to judicial processes?
If the argument is good so as to exclude judicial processes from the effect
of the October Proclamation, we can see no logic in considering it bad with
respect to legislative and executive processes.
If the argument is bad with respect to legislative and executive processes,
there is no logic in holding that it is not good with respect to judicial
processes.
Therefore, if the argument of the majority opinion is good, the inevitable
conclusion is that General MacArthur did not declare null and void any
processes, at all, whether legislative processes, executive processes, or
judicial processes, and that the word "processes" used by him in the
October Proclamation is a mere surplusage or an ornamental literary
appendix.
The absurdity of the conclusion unmasks the utter futility of the position of
the majority, which is but a mere legal pretense that cannot stand the least
analysis or the test of logic.
A great legal luminary admonished that we must have courage to unmasks
pretense if we are to reach a peace that will abide beyond the fleeting hour.
It is admitted that the commanding general of a belligerent army of
occupation as an agent of his government, "may not unlawfully suspend
existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory if and
when exigencies of the military occupation demand such action," but it is
doubted whether the commanding general of the army of the restored
legitimate government can exercise the same broad legislative powers.
We beg to disagree with a theory so unreasonable and subversive.
We cannot accept that the commanding general of an army of occupation,
of a rebellious army, of an invading army, or of a usurping army, should
enjoy greater legal authority during the illegal, and in the case of the
Japanese, iniquitous and bestial occupation, than the official representative
of the legitimate government, once restored in the territory wrested from the
brutal invaders and aggressors. We cannot agree with such legal travesty.
Broad and unlimited powers are granted and recognized in the
commanding general of an army of invasion, but the shadow of the
vanishing alleged principle of international law is being brandished to gag,
manacle, and make completely powerless the commander of an army of
liberation to wipe out the official acts of the government for usurpation,
although said acts might impair the military operation or neutralize the
public policies of the restored legitimate government.
We are not unmindful of the interest of the persons who might be adversely
affected by the annulment of the judicial processes of the governments
under the Japanese regime, but we cannot help smiling when we hear that
chaos will reign or that the world will sink.
It is possible that some criminals will be let loose unpunished, but nobody
has ever been alarmed that the President, in the exercise of his
constitutional powers of pardon and amnesty, had in the past released
many criminals from imprisonment. And let us not forget that due to human
limitations, in all countries, under all governments, in peace or in war, there
were, there are, and there will always be unpunished criminals, and that
situation never caused despair to any one.
We can conceive of inconveniences and hardships, but they are necessary
contributions to great and noble purposes. Untold sacrifices were always
offered to attain high ideals and in behalf of worthy causes.
We cannot refrain from feeling a paternal emotion for those who are
trembling with all sincerity because of the belief that the avoidance of
judicial proceedings of the governments under the Japanese regime "would
paralyze the social life of the country." To allay such fear we must remind
them that the country that produced many great hereos and martyrs; that
contributed some of highest morals figures that humanity has ever
produced in all history; which inhabited by a race which was able to
traverse in immemorial times the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean and
the Pacific with inadequate means of navigation, and to inhabit in many
islands so distantly located, from Madagascar to the eastern Pacific; which
made possible the wonderful resistance of Bataan and Corregidor, can not
have a social life so frail as to be easily paralyzed by the annulment of
some judicial proceedings. The Japanese vandalisms during the last three
years of nightmares and bestial oppression, during the long period of our
national slavery, and the wholesale massacres and destructions in Manila
and many other cities and municipalities and populated areas, were not
able to paralyze the social life of our people. Let us not loss faith so easily
in the inherent vitality of the social life of the people and country of Rizal
and Mabini.
It is insinuated that because of the thought that the representative of the
restored sovereign power may set aside all judicial processes of the army
of occupation, in the case to courts of a future invasions, litigants will not
summit their cases to courts whose judgement may afterwards be annulled,
and criminals would not be deterred from committing offenses in the
expectancy that they may escape penalty upon liberation of the country.
We hope that Providence will never allow the Philippines to fall again under
the arms of an invading army, but if such misfortune will happen, let the
October Proclamation serve as a notice to the ruthless invaders that the
official acts of the government of occupation will not merit any recognition
from the legitimate government, especially if they should not conduct
themselves, as exemplified by the Japanese, in accordance with the rules
of action of a civilized state.
One conclusive evidence of the untenableness of the majority position is
the fact that it had to resort to Executive Order No. 37, issued on March 10,
1945, providing "that all cases that have heretofore been appealed to the
Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
decision." The far-fetched theory is advanced that this provision impliedly
recognizes the court processes during the Japanese military occupation, on
the false assumption that it refers to the Court of Appeals existing during
the Japanese regime. It is self-evident that the Executive Order could have
referred only to the Commonwealth Court of Appeals, which is the one
declared abolished in said order. Certainly no one will entertain the absurd
idea that the President of the Philippines could have thought of abolishing
the Court of Appeals under the government during the Japanese
occupation. Said Court of Appeals disappeared with the ouster of the
Japanese military administration from which it derived its existence and
powers. The Court of Appeals existing on March 10, 1945, at the time of
the issuance of Executive Order No. 37, was the Commonwealth Court of
Appeals and it was the only one that could be abolished.
Without discussing the correctness of principle stated the majority opinion
quotes from Wheaton the following: "Moreover when it is said that
occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be
abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that on
crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any
international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that most
matters are allowed to stand by the stored government, but the matter can
hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th
English edition of 1944, p. 245)
Then it says that there is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the
right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws,
regulations and processes other than the judicial of the government
established by the belligerent occupant.
It is evident that the statement just quoted is a complete diversion from the
principle stated in the in an unmistakable way by Wheaton, who says in
definite terms that "it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to
show that if his acts (the occupant's) should be reversed, any international
wrong would be committed."
It can be clearly seen that Wheaton does not make any distinction or point
out any exception.
But in the majority opinion the principle is qualified, without stating any
reason therefore, by limiting the right of the restored government to annul
"most of the acts of the occupier" and "processes other than judicial."
The statement made by the respondent judge after quoting the above-
mentioned principle, as stated by Wheaton, to the effect that whether the
acts of military occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question
that is up to the restored government to decide, and that there is no rule of
international law that denies to the restored government the right to
exercise its discretion on the matter, is quoted without discussion in the
majority opinion.
As the statement is not disputed, wee are entitled to presume that it is
concurred in and, therefore, the qualifications made in the statement in the
majority opinion seem to completely groundless.
THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON OCCUPANT ARMY ARE NOT LIMITATIONS
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
The majority opinion is accumulating authorities to show the many duties
imposed by international law on the military occupant of an invaded
country.
And from said duties it is deduced that the legitimate government, once
restored in his own territory, is bound to respect all the official acts of the
government established by the usurping army, except judicial processes
political complexion.
The reasoning calls for immediate opposition. It is absolutely contrary to all
principles of logic.
Between the duties imposed in the military occupant and the legal
prerogatives of the legitimate government there are no logical relationship
or connection that might bind the ones with the others.
The military occupants is duty bound to protect the civil rights of the
inhabitants, but why should the legitimate government necessarily validate
the measures adopted by the said occupant in the performance of this duty,
if the legitimate government believes his duty to annul them for weighty
reasons?
The military occupant is duty bound to establish courts of justice. Why
should the legitimate government validate the acts of said courts, if it is
convinced that said courts were absolutely powerless, as was the case
during the Japanese occupation, to stop the horrible abuses of the military
police, to give relief to the victims of zoning and Fort Santiago tortures, to
protect the fundamental human rights of the Filipinos life, property, and
personal freedom?
The majority opinion recognizes in the military occupant the power to annul
the official acts of the ousted and supplanted legitimate government, a
privilege which is inversely denied to the last. This preference and
predilection in favor of the military occupant, that is in favor of the invader
and usurper, and against the legitimate government, is simply
disconcerting, if we have to say the least.
PRESUMPTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS AGAINST TRUTH AND FACTS
The invading military occupant is duty bound to establish and maintain
courts of justice in the invaded territory, for the protection of the inhabitants
thereof. It is presumed that the restored legitimate government will respect
the acts of said courts of the army of occupation. Therefore, it is a principle
of international law that said acts are valid and should be respected by the
legitimate government. It is presumed that General MacArthur is
acquainted with such principle, discovered or revealed through presumptive
operations, and it is presumed that he had not the intention of declaring null
and void the judicial processes of the government during the Japanese
regime. Therefore, his October Proclamation, declaring null and void and
without effect "all processes" of said governments, in fact, did not annul the
Japanese regime judicial processes.
So run the logic of the majority.
They don't mind the that General MacArthur speaks in the October
Proclamation as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army,
as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces committed to the liberation of
the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control. (emphasis supplied.)
General MacArthur says categorically "all processes", but the majority
insists on reading differently, that, is: "NOT ALL processes." The majority
presume, suppose, against the unequivocal meaning of simple and well
known words, that when General MacArthur said "all processes", in fact, he
said "not all processes", because it is necessary, by presumption, by
supposition, to exclude judicial processes.
If where General MacArthur says "all", the majority shall insist on reading
"not all", it is impossible to foresee the consequences of such so stubborn
attitude, but it is possible to understand how they reached the unacceptable
possible conclusion which we cannot be avoid opposing and exposing.
Are we to adopt and follow the policy of deciding cases submitted to our
consideration, by presumption and suppositions putting aside truths and
facts? Are we to place in the documents presented to us, such as the
October Proclamation, different words than what are written therein? Are
we to read "not all", where it is written "all"?
We are afraid to such procedure is not precisely the most appropriate to
keep public confidence in the effectiveness of the administration of justice.
That is why we must insists that in the October Proclamation should be
read what General MacArthur has written in it, that is, that, besides laws
and regulations, he declared and proclaimed null and void "ALL
PROCESSES", including naturally judicial processes, of the governments
under the Japanese regime.
THE COMMONWEALTH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO
CONTINUE JAPANESE REGIME JUDICIAL PROCESSES
Now we come to the third and last question propounded in the majority
opinion.
The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth tribunals is defined, prescribed, and
apportioned by legislative act.
It is provided so in our Constitution. (Section 2, Article VIII.)
The Commonwealth courts of justice are continuations of the courts
established before the inauguration of the Commonwealth and before the
Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935. And their jurisdiction is the
same as provided by existing laws at the time of inauguration of the
Commonwealth Government.
Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Organic Act of the
courts of justice of the Philippines, is the one that defines the jurisdiction of
justice of the peace and municipal courts, Courts of First Instance, and the
Supreme Court. It is not necessary to mention here the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, because the same has been abolished by Executive
Order No. 37.
No provision may be found in Act. No. 136, nor in any other law of the
Philippines, conferring on the Commonwealth tribunals jurisdiction to
continue the judicial processes or proceedings of tribunals belonging to
other governments, such as the governments established during the
Japanese occupation.
The jurisdiction of our justice of the peace and municipal courts is provided
in section 68, chapter V, of Act No. 136. The original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance is provided in the sections 56, 57,
Chapter IV, of Act No. 136. The original and appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is provided in 17 and 18, Chapter II, of the same Act. The
provisions of the above-cited do not authorize, even implicitly, any of the
decisions and judgements of tribunals of the governments, nor to continue
the processes or proceedings of said tribunals.
NECESSITY OF ENABLING ACT UNDER THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
PREVAILING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Taking aside the question as to whether the judicial processes of the
government established during the Japanese occupation should be
considered valid or not, in order that said processes could be continued
and the Commonwealth tribunals could exercise proper jurisdiction to
continue them, under the well- established legal doctrine, prevailing not
only in the Philippines, but also in the proper enabling law.
Almost a half a century ago, in the instructions given by President McKinley
on April 7, 1900, for the guidance of the Philippine Commission, it was
stated that, in all the forms of the govenment and administrative provisions
which they were authorized to prescribed, the Commission should bear in
mind that the government which they were establishing was designed not
for the satisfaction of the Americans or for the expression of their of their
theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people
of the Philippines, and the measures adopted should be made to conform
to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just
and effective government.
Notwithstanding the policy so outlined, it was not enough for the Philippine
Commission to create and establish the courts of justice provided in Act
No. 136, in order that said tribunals could take cognizance and continue the
judicial proceedings of the tribunals existing in the Philippines at the time
the American occupation.
It needed specific enabling provisions in order that the new tribunals might
continue the processes pending in the tribunals established by the
Spaniards, and which continued to function until they were substituted by
the courts created by the Philippine Commission.
So it was done in regards to the transfer of the cases pending before the
Spanish Audiencia to the newly created Supreme Court, in sections 38 and
39 of Act No. 136 quoted as follows:
SEC. 38. Disposition of causes, actions, proceedings, appeals,
records, papers, and so forth, pending in the existing Supreme Court
and in the "Contencioso Administravo." All records, books, papers,
causes, actions, proceedings, and appeals logged, deposited, or
pending in the existing Audiencia or Supreme Court, or pending by
appeal before the Spanish tribunal called "Contencioso
Administravo," are transferred to the Supreme Court above provided
for which, has the same power and jurisdiction over them as if they
had been in the first instance lodged, filed, or pending therein, or, in
case of appeal, appealed thereto.
SEC. 39. Abolition of existing Supreme Court. The existing
Audiencia or Supreme Court is hereby abolished, and the Supreme
Court provided by this Act is substituted in place thereof.
Sections 64 and 65 of the same Act allowed the same procedure as
regards the transfer of cases and processes pending in the abolished
Spanish Courts of First Instance to the tribunals of the same name
established by the Philippine Commission.
SEC. 64. Disposition of records, papers, causes, and appeals, now
pending in the existing Courts of First Instance. All records, books,
papers, actions, proceedings, and appeals lodged, deposited, or
pending in the Court of First Instance as now constituted of or any
province are transferred to the Court of First Instance of such
province hereby established, which shall have the same power and
jurisdiction over them as if they had been primarily lodged, deposited,
filed, or commenced therein, or in case of appeal, appealed thereto.
SEC. 65. Abolition of existing Courts of First Instance. The existing
Courts First Instance are hereby abolished, and the Courts of First
Instance provided by this Act are substituted in place thereof.
The same procedure has been followed by the Philippine Commission
eventhough the courts of origin of the judicial processes to be transferred
and continued belonged to the same government and sovereignty of the
courts which are empowered to continue said processes.
So section 78 of Act No. 136, after the repeal of all acts conferring upon
American provost courts in the Philippines jurisdiction over civil actions,
expressly provided that said civil actions shall be transferred to the newly
created tribunals.
And it provided specifically that "the Supreme Court, Courts of the First
Instance and courts of the justice of the peace established by this Act (No.
136) are authorized to try and determine the actions so transferred to them
respectively from the provost courts, in the same manner and with the
same legal effect as though such actions had originally been commenced
in the courts created" by virtue of said Act.
MUNICIPAL COURTS UNDER ACT NO. 183
On July 30, 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted the Organic Act of
the City of Manila, No. 183.
Two municipal courts for the city were created by section 40 of said Act,
one for the northern side of Pasig River and the other for the southern side.
They were courts with criminal jurisdiction or identical cases under the
jurisdiction of the justices of the peace then existing in Manila. Although
both courts were of the same jurisdiction, in order that the criminal cases
belonging to the justice of the peace courts may be transferred to the
municipal courts just created, and the proceedings may be continued by
the same, the Philippine Commission considered it necessary to pas the
proper enabling act.
So on August 5, 1901, it enacted Act No. 186, section 2 of which provides
that all criminal cases and proceedings pending in the justices of the peace
of Manila are transferred to the municipal courts, which are conferred the
jurisdiction to continue said cases and proceedings.
THE CABANTAG CASE
On August 1, 1901, Narciso Cabantag was convicted of murder by a
military commission. (Cabantag vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil., 273.) The decision was
confirmed on December 10, 1901, and his execution by hanging was set
for January 12,1902. .
On December 26, 1901, he fled, but surrendered to the authorities on July
18, 1902. The Civil Governor on December 2, 1903, commuted the death
penalty to 20 years imprisonment. The commutation was approved by the
Secretary of War, following instructions of the President.
Cabantag filed later a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that, with the
abolition of the military commission which convicted him, there was no
existing tribunal which could order the execution of the penalty of
imprisonment.
The Supreme Court denied the writ, but stated that, if the petitioner had
filed the writ before the enactment of Act No. 865, the question presented
to the Supreme Court would have been different.
Act No. 865, enacted on September 3, 1903, is enabling law, wherein it is
provided that decisions rendered by the provost courts and military
commission shall be ordered executed by the Courts of First Instance in
accordance with the procedure outlined in said Act.
It is evident from the foregoing that this Supreme Court has accepted and
confirmed the doctrine of the necessity of an enabling act in order that our
Courts of First Instance could exercise jurisdiction to execute the decision
of the abolished provost courts and military commission.
It is evident that the doctrine is applicable, with more force, to the judicial
processes coming from governments deriving their authority from a foreign
enemy state.
THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
It is also evident that the Congress of the United States, by enacting the Bill
of the Philippines on July 1, 1902, confirmed also the same doctrine.
In effect, in section 9 of said Act, the Congress approved what the
Philippine Commission did as to the jurisdiction of the courts established
and transfer of cases and judicial processes, as provided in Acts Nos. 136,
186, and 865.
The same doctrine was adopted by the United States government as part
of its international policy, as could be seen in Article XII of the Treaty
concluded with Spain on December 10, 1898, in Paris.
Even in 1866 the Congress of the United States followed the same
doctrine.
The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in the District
Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, where a
decree was rendered for the libellant. From the decree an appeal was
taken to the Circuit Court, where the case was pending, when in
1861, the proceedings of the court were interrupted by the civil war.
Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the courts and
officers of the United States were excluded from its limits. In 1862,
however, the National authority had been partially reestablished in
the State, though still liable to the overthrown by the vicissitudes of
war. The troops of the Union occupied New Orleans, and held military
possession of the city and such other portions of the State as had
submitted to the General Government. The nature of this occupation
and possession was fully explained in the case of The Vinice.
Whilst it continued, on the 20th of October, 1862, President Lincoln,
by proclamation, instituted a Provisional Court of the State of
Louisiana, with authority, among other powers, to hear, try, and
determine all causes in admiralty. Subsequently, by consent of
parties, this cause was transferred into the Provisional Court thus,
constituted, and was heard, and a decree was again rendered in
favor of the libellants. Upon the restoration of civil authority in the
State, the Provincial Court, limited in duration, according to the terms
of the proclamation, by the event, ceased to exist.
On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits, causes
and proceedings in the Provisional Court, proper for the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, should be transferred to that court, and heard, and
determined therein; and that all judgements, orders, and decrees of
the Provisional Court in causes transferred to the Circuit Court should
at once become the orders, judgements, and decrees of that court,
and might be enforced, pleaded, and proved accordingly.
It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment by the
President of a Provisional Court was warranted by the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was
properly established by the President in the exercise of this
constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power, upon
the close of the war, and the dissolution of the Provisional Court, to
provide for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its
judgement and decrees, to the proper courts of the United States. (U.
S. Reports, Wallace, Vol. 9, The Grapeshot, 131-133.)
JUDGEMENTS OF THE REBEL COURTS IN LOUISIANA WERE
VALIDATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
During the civil war in 1861, the prevailing rebel forces established their
own government in Louisiana.
When the rebel forces were overpowered by the Union Forces and the de
facto government was replaced by the de jure government, to give effect to
the judgments and other judicial acts of the rebel government, from
January 26, 1861, up to the date of the adoption of the State Constitution, a
provision to said effect was inserted in said document.
Section 149 of the Louisiana Constitution reads as follows:
All the rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, contracts, and all laws in
force at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, and not
inconsistent therewith, shall continue as if it had not been adopted; all
judgments and judicial sales, marriages, and executed contracts
made in good faith and in accordance with existing laws in this State
rendered, made, or entered into, between the 26th day of January,
1861, and the date when this constitution shall be adopted, are
hereby declared to be valid, etc. (U. S. Report, Wallace, Vol. 22,
Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union Bank, 281.)
EVEN AMONG SISTERS STATES OF THE UNITED STATES
JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT EXECUTORY
The member states of the United States of America belong to the same
nation, to the country, and are under the same sovereignty.
But judgements rendered in one state are not executory in other states.
To give them effect in other states it is necessary to initiate an original
judicial proceedings, and therein the defendants in the domestic suit may
plead bar the sister state judgement puis darrien continuance. (Wharton, on
the Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, p. 1411.)
Under the Constitution of the United States, when a judgement of one
state in the Union is offered in a court of a sister state as the basis of
a suit nil debet cannot be pleaded. The only proper plea is nul
tiel record. (Id., p. 1413.).
It is competent for the defendant, however, to an action on a
judgement of a sister state, as to an action on a foreign judgement, to
set up as a defense, want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the
judgement; and, as indicating such want of jurisdiction, to aver by
plea that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the state rendering
the judgement, and had not been served with process, and did not
enter his appearance; or that the attorney was without authority to
appear. (Id., pp. 1414-1415.)
The inevitable consequence is that the courts of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in the absence of an enabling act or of an express legislative
grant, have no jurisdiction to take cognizance and continue the judicial
processes, procedures, and proceedings of the tribunals which were
created by the Japanese Military Administration and functioned under the
Vargas Philippine Executive Commission of the Laurel Republic of the
Philippines, deriving their authority from the Emperor, the absolute ruler of
Japan, the invading enemy, and not from the Filipino people in whom,
according to the Constitution, sovereignty resides, and from whom all
powers of government emanate.
The position of Honorable Asenio P. Dizon, the respondent judge of the
Court of the First Instance of Manila in declaring himself without jurisdiction
nor authority to continue the proceedings which provoked the present
controversy, being a judicial process of a Japanese sponsored
government, is absolutely correct, under the legal doctrines established by
the United States and the Philippine Government, and consistently,
invariably, and without exception, followed by the same.
If we accept, for the sake of argument, the false hypothesis that the
Commonwealth tribunals have jurisdiction to continue the judicial
processes left pending by the courts of the governments established under
the Japanese regime, the courts which disappeared and, automatically,
ceased to function with the ouster of the enemy, the position of the Judge
Dizon, in declining to continue the case, is still unassailable, because, for
all legal purposes, it is the same as if the judicial processes in said case
were not taken at all, as inevitable result of the sweeping and absolute
annulment declared by the General MacArthur in the October
Proclamation.
In said proclamation it is declared in unmistakable and definite terms that
"ALL PROCESSES" of the Japanese sponsored governments "ARE NULL
AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT", and they shall remain so
until the Commonwealth, through its legislative power, decides otherwise in
a proper validating act.
The fact that the Japanese invaders, under international law, were in duty
bound to establish courts of justice during the occupation, although they
made them completely powerless to safeguard the constitutional rights of
the citizens, and mere figureheads as regards the fundamental liberties of
the helpless men, women and children of our people, so much so that said
courts could not offer even the semblance of protection when the life, the
liberty, the honor and dignity of our individual citizens were wantonly
trampled by any Japanese, military or civilian, does not change the
situation. "ALL PROCESSES" of said court are declared "NULL AND VOID
AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT" in the October proclamation, and we do
not have any other alternative but to accept the law, as said proclamation
has the full force of a law.
The fact that in the past, the legitimate governments, once restored in their
own territory, condescended in many cases to recognize and to give effect
to judgments rendered by courts under the governments set up by an
invading military occupant or by a rebel army, does not elevate such
condescension to the category of a principle, when Wheaton declares that
no international wrong is done if the acts of the invader are reversed.
Many irrelevant authorities were cited to us as to the duties imposed by the
international law on military occupants, but no authority has been cited to
the effect that the representative of the restored legitimate government is a
bound to recognize and accept as valid the acts and processes of said
occupants. On the contrary, Wheaton says that if the occupant's acts are
reversed "no international wrong would be committed."
Following the authority of Wheaton, undisputed by the majority, General
MacArthur thought, as the wisest course, of declaring "NULL AND VOID
AND WITHOUT EFFECT," by official proclamation, "ALL PROCESSES"
under the Japanese regime, that is legislative, executive and judicial
processes, which fall under the absolute adjective "ALL".
That declaration is a law. It is a law that everybody bound to accept and
respect, as all laws must be accepted and respected. It is a law that the
tribunals are duty bound to give effect and apply.
We are not unmindful of the adverse consequences to some individuals of
the annullment of all the judicial processes under the Japanese regime, as
provided in the October Proclamation, but the tribunals are not guardians of
the legislative authorities, either an army commander in chief, during war,
or a normal legislature, in peace time. The tribunals are not called upon to
guide the legislative authorities to the wisdom of the laws to be enacted.
That is the legislative responsibility. Our duty and our responsibility is to
see to it that the law, once enacted, be applied and complied with.
No matter the consequences, no matter who might be adversely affected, a
judge must have the firm resolve and the courage to do his duty, as, in the
present case, Judge Dizon did, without fear nor favor. We cannot see any
reason why we should not uphold him in his stand in upholding the law.
It is our official duty, national and international duty. Yes. Because this
Supreme Court is sitting, not only as a national court, but as an
international court, as is correctly stated in the concurring opinion of Justice
De Joya, and we should feel the full weight of the corresponding
responsibility, as the American courts with admiralty jurisdiction and the
Prize Courts of England did feel. In fact, it is in the judiciary where, more
than in any point of view is more pressing, more imperative, more
unavoidable. Justice has no country. It is of all countries. The horizon of
justice cannot be limited by the scene where our tribunals are functioning
and moving. That horizon is boundless. That is why in our constitution the
bill of rights has been written not for Filipinos, but for all persons. They are
rights that belong to men, not as Filipinos, Americans, Russians, Chinese
or Malayan, but as a members of humanity. The international character of
our duty to administer justice has become more specific by the membership
of our country in the United Nations. And let us not forget, as an elemental
thing, that our primary duty is to uphold and apply the law, as it is; that we
must not replace the words of the law with what we might be inclined to
surmise; that what is clearly and definitely provided should not be
substituted with conjectures and suppositions; that we should not try to
deduce a contrary intention to that which is unequivocally stated in the law;
that we should not hold valid what is conclusively declared null and void.
The October Proclamation declared "ALL PROCESSES" under the
Japanese regime "AND VOID WITHOUT EFFECT", so they must stand.
There is no possible way of evasion. "ALL PROCESSES", in view of the
meaning of the absolute adjective "ALL", include "JUDICIAL
PROCESSES". Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.


CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons we conclude:
1. That General MacArthur had full legal authority to issue the October
Proclamation, and that no principle of the international law is violated by
said proclamation, no international wrong being committed by the reversal
by the legitimate government of the acts of the military invader.
2. That said proclamation was issued in full conformity with the official
policies to which the United States and Philippine Governments were
committed, and the annulment of all the facts of the governments under the
Japanese regime, legislative, executive, and judicial, is legal, and justified
by the wrongs committed by the Japanese.
3. That when General MacArthur proclaimed and declared in the October
Proclamation "That all laws, regulations and processes" of the Japanese
sponsored governments, during enemy occupation, "are null and void and
without effect", he meant exactly what he said.
4. That where General MacArthur said "all processes" we must read and
understand precisely and exactly "all processes", and not "some
processes". "All" and "some" have incompatible meanings and are not
interchangeable.
5. That the word "processes" includes judicial procedures, proceedings,
processes, and cases. Therefore, "all processes" must include "all judicial
processes.".
6. That we have no right to attribute General MacArthur an intention
different from what he has plainly, clearly, unmistakably expressed in
unambiguous words with familiar meaning generally understood by the
common man.
7. That the judicial proceedings here in question are included among those
adversely affected by the October Proclamation.
8. That the Commonwealth tribunals have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of nor to continue the judicial proceedings under the Japanese
regime.
9. That to exercise said jurisdiction an enabling act of the Congress is
necessary.
10. That respondent Judge Dizon did not commit the error complained of in
the petition, and that the petition has no merits at all.
We refuse to follow the course of action taken by the majority in the present
case. It is a course based on a mistaken conception of the principles of
international law and their interpretation and application, and on a
pinchbeck. It is a course based on misconstruction or misunderstanding of
the October Proclamation, in utter disregard of the most elemental
principles of legal here meneutics. It is a course that leads to nowhere,
except to the brink of disaster, because it is following the dangerous path of
ignoring or disobeying the law.
Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived. The issue confronting us is not
of passing importance. It is an issue of awesome magnitude and
transcendency. It goes to and reaches the very bottom. It is simple. Lacking
in complexities. But it may shake the very foundation of society, the
cornerstone of the state, the primary pillar of the nation. It may dry the very
foundation of social life, the source of vitalizing sap that nurtures the body
politic. The issue is between the validity of one or more Japanese regime
processes and the sanctity of the law.
That is the question, reduced to its ultimate terms. it is a simple dilemma
that is facing us. It is the alpha and the omega of the whole issue. Either
the processes, or the law. We have to select between two, which to uphold.
It is a dilemma that does not admit of middle terms, or of middle ways
where we can loiter with happy unconcern . We are in the cross road:
which way shall we follow? The processes and the law are placed in the
opposite ends of the balance. Shall we inclined the balance of justice to
uphold the processes and defeat law, or vice versa?
We feel jittery because some judicial processes might be rescinded or
annulled, but we do not tremble with sincere alarm at the thought of putting
the law under the axe, of sentencing law to be executed by the guillotine.
We feel uneasy, fancying chaos and paralyzation of social life, because
some litigants in cases during the Japanese regime will be affected in their
private interests, with the annulment of some judicial processes, but we
adopt an attitude of complete nonchalance in throwing law overboard. This
baffling attitude is a judicial puzzle that nobody will understand. So it is
better that we should shift to a more understandable way, that which is
conformable to the standard that the world expects in judicial action.
No amount of arguments and lucubration's, no amount of speculative
gymnastics, no amount of juggling of immaterial principles of international
law, no amount of presumptions and suppositions, surmises and
conjectures, no amount of dexterity in juridical exegesis can divert our
attention from the real, simple, looming, hypostasis of the issue before us:
Law. It is Law with all its majestic grandeur which we are defying and
intending to overthrow from the sacred pedestal where the ages had placed
her as a goddess, to be enshrined, obeyed, and venerated by men, forever.
Let us not dare to lay our profaning hands on her vestal virginity, lest the
oracle should fling at us the thunder of his prophetic anathema.
We cannot therefore vote except for the denial of the petition.


HILADO, J ., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion of the majority and, pursuant to the Constitution,
proceed to state the reason for my dissent.
The proceeding involved in the case at bar were commenced by a
complaint filed by the instant petitioner, as plaintiff, on November 18, 1944,
in civil case No. 3012 of the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila, the
complaint bearing this heading and title: "The Republic of the Philippines
In the Court of First Instance of Manila" (Annex X of Exhibit A of petition
for mandamus). The farthest that said proceedings had gone before the
record was burned or destroyed during the battle for Manila, was the filing
by counsel for plaintiff therein of their opposition to a motion for dismissal
filed by opposing counsel.
It is, therefore, plain that the case had not been heard on the merits when
the record was burned or destroyed.
The respondent judge, in his order dated June 6, 1945, disposing of the
petition dated May 25, 1945 filed by petitioner, as a plaintiff in said case,
and of the petition filed by respondent Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh, as
defendant therein, on May 31, 19045, held: " first, that by virtue of the
proclamation of General MacArthur quoted above, all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
Commonwealth became null and void and without legal effect in Manila on
February 3, 1945 or, at the lates, on February 27 of the same
year; second that the proceedings and processes had in the present case
having been before a court of the Republic of the Philippines and in
accordance with the laws and regulations of said Republic, the same are
now void and without legal effect; third, that this Court as one of the
different courts of general jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, has no authority to take cognizance of and continue said
proceedings to final judgement, until and unless the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in the manner and form provided by law,
shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the
now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the causes commenced and
left pending therein, to the courts created and organized by virtue of the
provisions of Act No. 4007, as revived by Executive Order No. 36, or for the
validation of all proceedings had in said courts."
Petitioner prays that this Court declare that the respondent judge should
not have ordered the suspension of the proceedings in civil case No. 3012
and should continue and dispose of all the incidents in said case till its
complete termination. In my opinion, the petition should denied.
In stating the reasons for this dissent, we may divide the arguments under
the following propositions:
1. The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under
General of the Army MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944 (41 Off.
Gaz., 147, 148);
2. (a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive
Commission "and later as the Republic of the Philippines", established here
by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by his order
was not a de-facto government the so-called Court of First Instance of
Manila was not a de facto court, and the judge who presided it was not a de
facto judge; (b) the rules of International Law regarding the establishment
of a de facto Government in territory belonging to a belligerent but occupied
or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the
governments thus established here by Japan;
3. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our
Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese occupation;
4. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as
now restored, is to be bound by the acts of either or both of those
Japanese-sponsored governments;
5. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militate against
petitioner's contention.
I
The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under
General of the Army MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944
(41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148).
In this proclamation, after reciting certain now historic facts, among which
was that the so-called government styled as the "Republic of the
Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943 "under enemy duress, . .
. based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the
sanction of the Government of the United States," the great Commander-in-
Chief proclaimed and declared:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and
xxx xxx xxx
I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and
obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted
government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine
soil.
The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted is, I
think, that as the different areas of the Philippines were progressively
liberated, the declaration of nullity therein contained shall attach to the
laws, regulations and processes thus condemned in so far as said areas
were concerned. Mark that the proclamation did not provide that such laws,
regulations and processes shall be or are annulled, but that they are null
and void. Annulment implies some degree of the effectiveness in the act
annulled previous to the annulment, but a declaration of nullity denotes that
the act is null and void ab initio the nullity precedes the declaration. The
proclamation speaks in the present tense, not in the future. If so, the fact
that the declaration of nullity as to the condemned laws, regulations, and
processes in areas not yet free from enemy occupation and control upon
the date of the proclamation, would attach thereto at a later date, is no
argument for giving them validity or effectiveness in the interregnum. By the
very terms of the proclamation itself, that nullity had to date back from the
inception of such laws, regulations and processes; and to dispel any
shadow of doubt which may still remain, we need only consider the
concluding paragraph of the proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief
of the army liberation solemnly enjoined upon all loyal citizens of the
Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts
of their duly constituted government. This is all-inclusive it comprises not
only the loyal citizens in the liberated areas but also those in areas still
under enemy occupation and control. It will be noticed that the complaint in
said civil case No. 3012 was filed twenty-six days after the above-quoted
proclamations of General of the Army MacArthur. If the parties to said case
were to consider the proceedings therein up to the date of the liberation of
Manila valid and binding, they would hardly be complying with the severe
injunction to render full respect for and obedience to our Constitution and
the laws, regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government
from October 23, 1944, onwards. Indeed, to my mind, in choosing between
these two courses of action, they would be dangerously standing on the
dividing line between loyalty and disloyalty to this country and its
government.
The proceeding in question, having been had before the liberation of
Manila, were unquestionably "processes" of the Japanese-sponsored
government in the Philippines within the meaning of the aforesaid
proclamation of General of the Army MacArthur and, consequently, fall
within the condemnation of the proclamation. Being processes of a branch
of a government which had been established in the hostility to the
Commonwealth Government, as well as the United States Government,
they could not very well be considered by the parties to be valid and
binding, at least after October 23, 1944, without said parties incurring in
disobedience and contempt of the proclamation which enjoins them to
render full respect for the obedience to our Constitution and the laws,
regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government. Nine days
after the inauguration of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines,"
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States declared in one
of his most memorable pronouncements about the activities of the enemy
in the Philippines, as follows:
One of the fourtheenth of this month, a puppet government was set
up in the Philippine Island with Jose P. Laurel, formerly a justice of
the Philippine Supreme Court, as "president." Jorge Vargas, formerly
as a member of the Commonwealth Cabinet, and Benigno Aquino,
also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with
Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was
to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second act was a
hyphocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud
and deceit, and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino
people.
I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist
"Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present "Philippine
Republic " has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the
United States. . . .
Our symphaty goes out to those who remain loyal to the United
States and the Commonwealth that great majority of the Filipino
people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.
October 23, 1943.
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
President of the United States
(Form U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, 1943,
pp. 93, 94.).
It is a fact of contemporary history that while President Manuel L. Quezon
of the Philippines was in Washington, D.C., with his exiled government, he
also repeatedly condemned both the "Philippine Executive Commission"
and the "Philippine Republic," as they had been established by or under
orders of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces. With
these two heads of the Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines condemning the "puppet regime" from its
very inception, it is beyond my comprehension to see how the proceedings
in question could be considered valid and binding without adopting an
attitude incompatible with theirs. As President Roosevelt said in his above
quoted message, "Our symphaty goes out to those remain loyal to the
United States and the Commonwealth that great majority of the Filipino
people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.
The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of occupation
was in control in the Islands and their paramount military strength gave
those of our people who were within their reach no other alternative, these
had to obey their orders and decrees, but the only reason for such
obedience would be that paramount military strength and not any intrinsic
legal validity in the enemy's orders and decrees. And once that paramount
military strength disappeared, the reason for the obedience vanished, and
obedience should likewise cease.
As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 719), "In the face of
an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may often be a
necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No concession is thus made
to the rightfulness of the authority exercised." (Emphasis ours.) The court
there refers to its own former decision in Thorington vs. Smith, and makes
it clear that the doctrine in the Thorington case, so far as the effects of the
acts of the provisional government maintained by the British in Casetine,
from September, 1814 to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the
consideration of Tampico as United States territory, were concerned, was
limited to the period during which the British, in the first case, retained
possession of Castine, and the United States, in the second, retained
possession of Tampico. In referring to the Confederate Government during
the Civil War, as mentioned in the Thorington case, the court again says in
effect that the actual supremacy of the Confederate Government over a
portion of the territory of the Union was the only reason for holding that its
inhabitants could not but obey its authority. But the court was careful to limit
this to the time when that actual supremacy existed, when it said: . . .
individual resistance to its authority then would have been futile and,
therefore, unjustifiable." (Emphasis ours.)
Because of its pertinence, we beg leave to quote the following paragraph
from that leading decision:
There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. Smith
(supra), which conflicts with these views. In that case, the
Confederate Government is characterized as one of paramount force,
and classed among the governments of which the one maintained by
great Britain in Castine, from September 1814, to the Treaty of Peace
in 1815, and the one maintained by the United States in Tampico,
during our War with Mexico, are examples. Whilst the
British retained possession of Castine, the inhabitants were held to
be subject to such laws as the British Government chose to recognize
and impose. Whilst the United States retainedpossession of Tampico,
it was held that it must regarded and respected as their territory. The
Confederate Government, the court observed, differed from these
temporary governments in the circumstance that its authority did not
justifying acts of hostility to the United States, "Made obedience to its
authority in civil and local matters not only a necessity, but a duty." All
that was meant by this language was, that as the actual
supremancy of the Confederate Government existed over certain
territory, individual resistance to its authority then would have been
futile and, therefore, unjustifiable. In the face of an overwhelming
force, obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the
interest of order, a duty. No concession is thus made to the
rightfulness of the authority exercised. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 24 Law
ed., 719; emphasis ours.)
The majority opinion, in considering valid the proceedings in question,
invokes the rule that when a belligerent army occupies a territory belonging
to the enemy, the former through its Commander in Chief, has the power to
establish thereon what the decisions and treaties have variously
denominated provisional or military government, and the majority holds that
the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines was such a
government. Without prejudice to later discussing the effects which the
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy contained in our
Commonwealth Constitution, as well as in the Briand-Kellog Pact, must
have produced in this rule in so far as the Philippines is concerned, let us
set forth some considerations apropos of this conclusion of the majority. If
the power to establish here such a provisional government is recognized in
the Commander in Chief of the invasion army, why should we not
recognize at least an equal power in the Commander in Chief of the
liberation army to overthrow that government will all of its acts, at least of
those of an executory nature upon the time of liberation? Considering the
theory maintained by the majority, it would seem that they would recognize
in the Japanese Commander in Chief the power to overthrow the
Commonwealth Government, and all of its acts and institutions if he had
choosen to. Why should at least an equal power be denied the Commander
in Chief of the United States Army to overthrow the substitute government
thus erected by the enemy with all of its acts and institutions which are still
not beyond retrieve? Hereafter we shall have occasion to discuss the
aspects of this question from the point of view of policy or the practical
convenience of the inhabitants. If the Japanese Commander in Chief
represented sovereignty of Japan, the American Commander in Chief
represented the sovereignty of the United States, as well as the
Government of the Commonwealth. If Japan had won this war, her
paramount military supremacy would have continued to be exerted upon
the Filipino people, and out of sheer physical compulsion this country would
have had to bow to the continuance of the puppet regime that she had set
up here for an indefinite time. In such a case, we admit that, not because
the acts of that government would then have intrinsically been legal and
valid, but simply because of the paramount military force to which our
people would then have continued to be subjected, they would have had to
recognize as binding and obligatory the acts of the different departments of
that government. But fortunately for the Filipinos and for the entire civilized
world, Japan was defeated. And I now ask: Now that Japan has been
defeated, why should the Filipinos be still bound to respect or recognize
validity in the acts of the Japanese-sponsored government which has been
so severely condemned by both the heads of the United States and our
Commonwealth Government throughout the duration of the war? If we were
to draw a parallel between that government and that which was established
by the Confederate States during the American Civil War, we will find that
both met with ultimate failure. And, in my opinion, the conclusion to be
drawn should be the same in both cases.
As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra),
referring to the Confederate Government, its failure carried with it the
dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking down in pieces of the whole
fabric of its government. The Court said among other things:
The immense power exercised by the government of the Confederate
States for nearly four years, the territory over which it extended, the
vast resources it wielded, and the millions who acknowledged its
authority, present an imposing spectacle well fitted to mislead the
mind in considering the legal character of that organization. It claimed
to represent an independent nation and to posses sovereign powers;
as such to displace to jurisdiction and authority of the United States
from nearly half of their territory and, instead of their laws, to
substitute and enforce those of its own enactment. Its pretentions
being resisted, they were submitted to the arbitrament of war. In that
contest the Confederacy failed; and in its failure its pretentions were
dissipated, its armies scattered, and the whole fabric of its
government broken in pieces. (24 Law, ed., 719; emphasis ours.)
By analogy, if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines had
been lawful which, however, is not the case and if Japan had
succeeded in permanently maintaining the government that she
established in the Philippines, which would have been the case had victory
been hers, there would be more reason for holding the acts of that
government valid, but because Japan has lost the war and, therefore, failed
in giving permanence to that government, the contrary conclusion should
legitimately follow.
The validity of legislation exercised by either contestant "depends not upon
the existence of hostilities but upon the ultimate success of the party which
it is adopted" (emphasis ours). And, referring to the overthrow of the of the
Confederacy, the Court, said, "when its military forces were overthrown, it
utterly perished, and with it all its enactments" (emphasis ours)
The majority cite on page 9-10 of their opinion a passage from the same
case of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, which is a mere obiter dictum. The
majority opinion says that in this passage the Court was "discussing the
validity of the acts of the Confederate States." In the first place, an
examination of the decision will reveal that the controversy dealt with an act
of the Confederate Government, not of the Confederate States individually;
and in the second place, the quoted passage refers to something which
was not in issue in the case, namely, the acts of the individual States
composing the Confederacy. But even this passage clearly places the case
at bar apart from the Court's pronouncement therein. The quoted passage
commences by stating that "The same general form of government the
same general laws for the administration of justice and the protection of
private rights, which has existed in the States prior to the rebellion,
remanded during (its) continuance and afterwards. "In the case at bar, the
same general form of the Commonwealth Government did not continue
under the Japanese, for the simple reason that one of the first acts of the
invaders was to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution and, therefore,
the constitutional government which existed thereunder, as an effect of the
following acts and decrees of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Forces:
1. Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942 of the Commander in Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces to the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission directed that, in the exercise of legislative, executive and
judicial powers in the Philippines, the "activities" of the "administrative
organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the
existing status, order, ordinances and the Commonwealth Constitution (1
Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, page 34). Under
the frame of government existing in this Commonwealth upon the date of
the Japanese invasion, the Constitution was the very fountain-head of the
validity and effects of all the "status, orders, and ordinances" mentioned by
the Japanese Commander in Chief, and in overthrowing the Constitution
he, in effect, overthrew all of them.
2. Instruction No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration (Vol. 1, usages
36 et seq., Official Gazette, edited at the Office of the Executive
Commission) gave the "Detailed Instruction Based on Guiding Principle of
the Administration," and among other things required "The entire personnel
shall be required to pledge their loyalty to the Imperial Japanese Forces. . .
." (This, of course, was repugnant to the frame of government existing here
under the Commonwealth Constitution upon the date of invasion.)
3. Proclamation dated January 3, 19452 of the Japanese Commander in
Chief provided in paragraph 3 that "The Authorities and the People of the
Commonwealth should sever their relations with the U.S. o . . ." (This is,
likewise, repugnant to the Commonwealth Constitution and the to the
Government of that Commonwealth Constitution and to the Government of
that Commonwealth which was expressly made subject to the supreme
sovereignty of the United States until complete independence is granted,
not by the mere will of the United States, but by virtue of an agreement
between that Government and ours, under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.)
The individual States of the Confederate and their governments existed
prior to the Civil War and had received the sanction and recognition of the
Union Government, for which the Federal Supreme Court was speaking in
the Williams-Bruffy case; while the Japanese-sponsored governments of
the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Republic of the Philippines"
neither existed here before the war nor had received the recognition or
sanction of either the United States or the Commonwealth Government
nay, they had received the most vigorous condemnation of both.
The Court further says in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra):
No case has been cited in argument, and we think unsuccesfully
attempting to establish a separate revolutionary government have
been sustained as a matter of legal right. As justly observed by the
late Chief Justice in the case of Shortridge vs. Macon, I Abb. U.S.,
58, decided at the circuit, and, in all material respects like the one at
bar, "Those who engage in rebellion must consider the
consequences. If theysucceed, rebellion becomes revolution, and the
new government will justify is founders. If they fail, all their acts
hostile to the rightful government are violations of law, and originate
no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the nation whose
authority and existence have been alike assailed. S.C., Chase, Dec.,
136. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 716, 718.)
(Emphasis ours.)
I am of opinion that the principles thus enunciated for the case of an
unsuccessful rebellion should be applied with greater force to the case of a
belligerent who loss the war. And since the founding of the Japanese-
sponsored government in the Philippines was designed to supplant and did
actually supplant the rightful government and since all its acts could not but
a hostile to the latter (however blameless the officials who acted under
enemy duress might be), and since Japan failed, all said acts, particularly
those of the Japanese-sponsored court in said civil case No. 3012, "are
violations of law, and originate no rights which can be recognized by the
courts of the nation whose authority and existence have been alike
assailed", quoting the language of the court in Shortridgevs. Macon, cited
by Mr. Justice Field in Williams vs. Bruffy, supra (24 Law. ed., 718).
II
(a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive
Commission" and later as the Republic of the Philippines",
established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Forces or by the his order was not a de facto government--
the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de factocourt
and the who presided it was not a de facto judge;
(b) The rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de
facto government in territory belonging to a belligerent but occupied
or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the
governments thus established here by Japan.
Under the doctrine of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, and the pertinent cases
therein cited, the short-lived provisional government thus established by the
Japanese in the Philippines should be classified, at best, as a government
of paramount force. But this is not all. The Constitution of this
Commonwealth which has been expressly approved by the United States
Government, in Article II, section 3, under the heading "Declaration of
Principles", renounces war as an instrument of national policy. This
renunciation of war as an instruments of national policy follows an equal
renunciation in the Briand-Kellog Pact. The rules of International Law , cited
in support of the power or right of a belligerent army of occupation to set up
a provisional government on occupied enemy territory, were evolved prior
to the first World War, but the horrors and devastations of that war
convinced, at least the governments of the United States and France, that
they should thereafter renounce war as an instrument of national policy,
and they consequently subscribed the Briand-Kellog Pact. Those horrors
and devastations were increased a hundred fold, if not more, in this second
World War, but even before this war occurred, our own people, through our
Constitutional delegates, who framed the Commonwealth Constitution also
adopted the same doctrine, and embodied an express renunciation of war
as an instrument of national policy in the instrument that they drafted. It is
true that in section 3, Article II, above-cited, our Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles of International Law as a part of the law of the
Nation. But, of course, this adoption is exclusive of those principles of
International Law which might involve recognition of war as an instrument
of national policy. It is plain that on the side of the Allies, the present war is
purely defensive. When Japan started said war, treacherously and without
previous declaration, and attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on
those two fateful days of December 7 and 8, 1941, she employed war as
an instrument of the national policy. Under the Briand-Kellog Pact and our
Commonwealth Constitution, the United States and the Commonwealth
Government could not possibly have recognized in Japan any right, as
against them, to employ that war as an instrument of her national policy,
and, consequently, they could not have recognized in Japan power to set
up in the Philippines the puppet government that she later set up, because
such power would be a mere incident or consequence of the war itself. The
authorities agree that such a power, under the cited rules, is said to a right
derived from war. (67 C.J., p. 421, sec. 171.) There can be no question that
the United States and the Commonwealth Governments were free to refuse
to be bound by those rules when they made their respective renunciations
above referred to. Indeed, all the United Nations have exercised this free
right in their Charter recently signed at San Francisco.
As necessary consequence of this, those rules of International Law were
no longer applicable to the Philippines and to the United States at the time
of the Japanese invasion as a corollary, it follows that we have no legal
foundation on which to base the proposition that the acts of that Japanese-
sponsored government in the Philippines were valid and binding. Moreover,
I am of opinion, that although at the time of the Japanese invasion and up
to the present, the United States retains over the Philippines, a certain
measure of sovereignty, it is only for certain specified purposes
enumerated in the Tydings-McDufie Act of the Commonwealth Constitution.
(Ordinance appended to the Constitution.) And our territory was at the time
of the Japanese invasion not a territory of the United States, within the
meaning of the laws of war governing war-like operations on enemy
territory. Our territory is significantly called "The National Territory" in Article
I of our Constitution and this bears the stamps of express approval of the
United States Government. The Philippines has been recognized and
admitted as a member of the United Nations. We, therefore, had our own
national and territorial identity previous to that invasion. Our nation was not
at war with the Filipinos. And line with this, the Japanese army, in time,
released Filipino war prisoners captured in Bataan. Lt. Gen. Maeda, Chief
of Staff, Imperial Japanese Forces, in his speech of January 2, 1942, said:
. . . we had not the slighest intensions to make your people our
enemy; rather we considered them as our friends who will join us has
hand-in-hand in the establishment of an orderly Greater East Asia. . .
., (Official Gazette, edited at the Office of the Executive Commission,
Vol. I, p. 55.)
If the Philippines was a neutral territory when invaded by the Japanese, the
following principles from Lawrence, International Law (7th ed.), p. 603, are
pertinent:
The Duties of Belligerent States Towards Neutral States. . . . To
refrain from carrying on hostilities within neutral territory. We have
already seen that, though this obligation was recognized in theory
during the infancy of International law, it was often very imperfectly
observed in practice. But in modern times it has been strickly
enforced, and any State which knowingly ordered warlike operations
to be carried on in neutral territory . . . would bring down upon itself
the reprobation of civilized mankind. Hostilities may be carried on in
the territory of either belligerent, on the high seas, and in territory
belonging to no one. Neutral land and neutral territorial waters are
sacred. No acts of warfare may lawfully take place within them. . . .
(Emphasis ours.)
In all the cases and authorities supporting the power or right to set up a
provisional government, the belligerent had the right to invade or occupy
the territory in the first instance. Such was not the case with the Philippines.
President Roosevelt, in his message to the Filipino people, soon after the
landing of American Forces in Leyte, on October 20, 1944, characterized
Japan's invasion and occupation of the Philippines as "the barbarous,
unprovoked and treacherous attack upon the Philippines," and he
announced the American people's "firm determination to punish the guilty."
(41 Off. Gaz., 149.) (Emphasis ours.) The illustrious leader of the United
Nations could not have in more unmistakable terms the utter illegality of
that invasion and occupation. If the establishment of a provinsional
government in occupied territory by a belligerent is "a mere application or
extension of the force by which the invasion or occupation was effected"
(67 C.J., p. 421, sec 171), the illegality of the invasion, would necessarily
permeate the government, which was its mere application or extention.
The fact that shortly before December 8, 1941, the date of the "barbarous,
unprovoked and treacherous attack," the meager and almost untrained
forces of the Philippine Army had been inducted into the American Army,
did not change the neutral status of the Philippines. That military measure
had been adopted for purely defensive purposes. Nothing could be farther
from the minds of the government and military leaders of the United States
and the Philippines in adopting it than to embark upon any aggressive or
warlike enterprise against any other nation. It is an old and honored rule
dating as far back as the 18th century that even solemn promises of
assistance made before the war by a neutral to a nation which later
becomes a belligerent, would not change the status of the neutral even if
such promises were carried out, so long as they were made for purely
defensive purposes. In the words of Vattel "when a sovereign furnishes the
succor due in virtue of a former defensive alliance, he does not associate
himself in the war. Therefore he may fulfill his engagements and yet
preserve an exact neutrality." (Lawrence, Principles of International Law
[7th ed.], pp. 585, 586.)
If the Filipinos had, from contemptible cowardice and fear, allowed their
shores to be invaded, and their territory occupied by the Japanese without
resistance, such invasion occupation would undoubtedly have been
considered in violation of International Law. Should the Filipinos be
punished for having had the patriotism, bravery, and heroism to fight in
defense of the sacredness of their land, the sanctity of their homes, and the
honor and dignity of their government by giving validity, in whatever limited
measure, to the lawless acts of the ruthless enemy who thus overran their
country, and robbed them of the tranquility and happiness of their daily
lives? And yet, to my mind, to give any measure of validity or binding effect
to the proceedings of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First Instance of
Manila, involved herein, would be to give that much validity or effect to the
acts of those same invaders. To equalize the consequences of a lawful and
a wrongful invasion of occupation, would be to equalize right and wrong,
uphold the creed that might makes right, and adopt "the law of the jungle."
If said Japanese-sponsored government was not a de facto government, it
would seem clearly to follow that its "Court of First Instance of Manila" was
not a de facto court. But it should additionally be stated that for it be a de
facto court, its judge had to be a de facto judge, which he could not be, as
presently demonstrated.
As said by President Osmea, in replying to the speech of General of the
Army MacArthur when the latter turned over to him the full powers and
responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, on February 27, 1945:
xxx xxx xxx
The time has come when the world should know that when our forces
surrendered in Bataan and Corregidor, resistance to the enemy was
taken up by the people itself resistance which was inarticulate and
disorganized in its inception but which grew from the day to day and
from island until it broke out into an open warfare against the enemy.
The fight against the enemy was truly a people's war because it
counted with the wholehearted support of the masses. From the
humble peasant to the barrio school teacher, from the volunteer
guard to the women's auxilliary service units, from the loyal local
official to the barrio folk each and every one of those contributed
his share in the great crusade for liberation.
The guerrillas knew that without the support of the civilian population,
they could not survive. Whole town and villages dared enemy reprisal
to oppose the hated invader openly or give assistance to the
underground movement. . . . (41 Off. Gaz., 88, 89.)
Under these facts, taken together with the General of the Army MacArthur's
accurate statement that the "Republic of the Philippines" had been
established under enemy duress, it must be presumed to say the least
that the judge who presided over the proceedings in question during the
Japanese occupation, firstly, accepted his appointment under duress; and
secondly, acted by virtue of that appointment under the same duress. In
such circumstances he could not have acted in the bona fide belief that the
new "courts" created by or under the orders of the Japanese Military
Commander in chief had been legally created--among them the "Court of
first Instance of Manila," that the Chairman of the "Philippine Executive
Commission" or the President of the "Republic of the Philippines", whoever
appointed him, and conferred upon him a valid title to his office and a
legitimate jurisdiction to act as such judge. Good faith is essential for the
existence of a de facto judge (Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 872).
The very idea of enemy duress would necessarily imply that but for the
duress exerted upon him by the enemy he would have refused to accept
the appointment and to act thereunder. And why? Because he must be
presumed to know that the office to which he was thus appointed had been
created by the enemy in open defiance of the Commonwealth Constitution
and the laws and regulation promulgated by our Commonwealth
Government, and that his acceptance of said office and his acting therein, if
willfully done, would have been no less than an open hostility to the very
sovereignty of the United Sates and to the Commonwealth Government,
and a renunciation of his allegiance to both. There is no middle ground
here. Either the judge acted purely under duress, in which case his acts
would be null and void; or maliciously in defiance of said governments, in
which case his acts would be null and void for more serious reasons.
The courts created here by the Japanese government had to look for the
source of their supposed authority to the orders of the Japanese Military
Commander in chief and the so-called Constitution of the "Republic of the
Philippines," which had been adopted in a manner which would shock the
conscience of democratic peoples, and which was designed to supplant the
Constitution which had been duly adopted by the Filipino people in a
Constitutional Convention of their duly elected Constitutional Delegates.
And it was decreed that the Commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese
Forces "shall exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts." (Vol. 1, p. 7, Official
Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, cited on pp. 2, 3, of the
order of the respondent judge complained of and marked Exhibit H of the
petition for mandamus.) How can our present courts legitimately recognize
any efficacy in the proceedings of such an exotic judicial system, wherein
the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces possessed the
highest judicial jurisdiction?
III
The courts of those governments were entirely different from our
Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese occupation.
Executive Order No. 36 of the President of the Philippines, dated March 10,
1945, in its very first paragraph, states the prime concern of the
government "to re-establish the courts as fast as provinces are liberated
from the Japanese occupation." If the courts under the Japanese-
sponsored government of the "Republic of the Philippines" were the same
Commonwealth courts that existed here under the Constitution at the time
of the Japanese invasion, President Osmea would not be speaking of re-
establishing those courts in his aforesaid Executive Order. For soothe, how
could those courts under the "Republic of the Philippines" be the courts of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines when they were not functioning under
the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laws enacted in pursuance
of said Constitution? The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth courts was
defined and conferred under the Commonwealth Constitution and the
pertinent legislation enacted thereunder, that of the Japanese-sponsored
courts was defined and conferred by the orders and decrees of the
Japanese Commander in Chief, and, perhaps, the decrees of the
"Philippine Executive Commission" and the laws of the so-called
Legislature under the Republic, which was not composed of the elected
representatives of the people. The Justices and Judges of the
Commonwealth courts had to be appointed by the President of the
Commonwealth with confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
pursuant to the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was
appointed by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces,
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Judges of first Instance and
of all inferior courts were appointed by the Chairman of the Executive
Commission, at first, and later, by the President of the Republic, of course,
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the
Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, the President and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, and the Judges of First Instance and of all inferior courts in the
Commonwealth judicial system, had to swear to support and defend the
Commonwealth Constitution, while this was impossible under the
Japanese-sponsored government. In the Commonwealth judicial system, if
a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated to continue in the discharge
of his official duties, his successor was appointed by the Commonwealth
President with confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and said
successor had to swear to support and defend the Commonwealth
Constitution; in the exotic judicial system implanted here by the Japanese,
if a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated, his successor would be
appointed by the Japanese Commander in Chief, if the dead or
incapacitated incumbent should be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
or otherwise, by the Chairman of the "Executive Commission" or the
President of the "Republic", of course without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the Commonwealth Congress, and, of
course, without the successor swearing to support and defend the
Commonwealth Constitution.
If, as we believe having conclusively shown, the Japanese-sponsored
courts were not the same Commonwealth courts, the conclusion is
unavoidable that any jurisdiction possessed by the former and any cases
left pending therein, were not and could not be automatically transfered to
the Commonwealth courts which we re-established under Executive Order
No. 36. For the purpose, a special legislation was necessary.
Executive Order No. 37, in my humble opinion, does not, as held by the
majority, imply that the President recognized as valid the proceedings in all
cases appealed to the Court of Appeals. Section 2 of that order simply
provides that all cases which have been duly appealed to the Court of
Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. The
adverb "duly" would indicate that the President foresaw the possibility of
appeals not having been duly taken. All cases appealed to the Court of
Appeals before the war and the otherwise duly appealed, would come
under the phrase "duly appealed" in this section of the Executive Order. But
considering the determined and firm attitude of the Commonwealth
Government towards those Japanese-sponsored governments since the
beginning, it would seem inconceivable that the President Osmea, in
section 2 of Executive Order No. 37, intended to include therein appeals
taken to the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals, or from the Japanese-
sponsored inferior courts. It should be remembered that in the Executive
Order immediately preceeding and issued on the same date, the President
speaks of re-establishing the courts as fast as provinces were liberated
from the Japanese occupation.
IV
The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government,
as now restored, is to be bound by the acts of either or both of those
Japanese-sponsored governments.
In the last analysis, in deciding the question of validity or nullity of the
proceedings involved herein, we are confronted with the necessity to
decide whether the Court of first Instance of Manila and this Supreme
Court, as re-established under the Commonwealth Constitution, and the
entire Commonwealth Government, are to be bound by the acts of the said
Japanese-sponsored court and government. To propound this question is,
to my mind, to answer it most decidedly in the negative, not only upon the
ground of the legal principles but also for the reasons of national dignity
and international decency. To answer the question in the affirmative would
be nothing short for legalizing the Japanese invasion and occupation of the
Philippines. Indeed, it would be virtual submission to the dictation of an
invader our people's just hatred of whom gave rise to the epic Philippine
resistance movement, which has won the admiration of the entire civilized
world.
V
Even considerations of policy or practical convenience militate
against petitioner's contention.
In this connection, the respondent judge, in his order of June 6, 1945,
complained of, has the following to say:
It is contended, however, that the judicial system implanted by the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic was the same as
that of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation; that the
laws administered and enforced by said courts during the existence
of said regime were the same laws on the statute books of
Commonwealth before Japanese occupation, and that even the
judges who presided them were, in many instances, the same
persons who held the position prior to the Japanese occupation. All
this may be true, but other facts are just as stubborn and pitiless. One
of them is that said courts were of a government alien to the
Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true
enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation,
but they had become the laws and the Courts had become the
institutions-of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter, 27 F. Case No.
16,146), as they became later on the laws and institution of the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines.
No amount of argument or legal fiction can obliterate this fact.
Besides, I am of the opinion that the validity of the acts of the courts in the
"judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic "would not depend upon the laws that they "administered and
enforced", but upon the authority by virtue of which they acted. If the
members of this Court were to decide the instant case in strict accordance
with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth but not by the
authority that they possess in their official capacity as the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, but merely as lawyers, their decision would surely be null
and void. And yet, I am firmly of opinion that whoever was the "judge" of
the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila who presided
over the said court when the proceedings and processes in the dispute
were had, in acting by virtue of the supposed authority which he was
supposed to have received from that government, did so with no more legal
power than if he had acted as a mere lawyer applying the same laws to the
case. If duplication of work or effort, or even if confussion, should be
alleged to possibly arise from a declaration of nullity or judicial proceedings
had before those Japanese-sponsored courts, it should suffice to answer
that the party so complaining in voluntarily resorting to such courts should
be prepared to assume the consequences of his voluntary act. On the other
hand, his convenience should not be allowed to visit upon the majority of
the inhabitants of this country, the dire consequences of a sweeping and
wholesale validation of judicial proceedings in those courts. Let us set forth
a few considerations apropos of this assertion. It is a fact of general
knowledge that during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the
overwhelming majority of our people and other resident inhabitants were
literally afraid to go any place where there were Japanese sentries, soldiers
or even civilians, and that these sentries were posted at the entrance into
cities and towns and at government offices; that the feared Japanese "M.
P.'s" or Kempeitai's" were a constant terror to them; and lastly, that the
greater number who lived or had evacuated to places for from the
Japanese, were found precisely in the cities and towns where the courts
were located; and as a consequence, the great majority of the people were
very strongly adverse to traveling any considerable distance from their
homes and were, one might say, in constant hiding. Add to these
circumstances, the fact of the practical absence of transportation facilities
and the no less important fact of the economic structure having been so
dislocated as to have impoverished the many in exchange for the
enrichment of the few and we shall have a fair picture of the practical
difficulties which the ordinary litigant would in those days have encountered
in defending his rights against anyone of the favored few who would bring
him to court. It should be easy to realize how hard it was for instances, to
procure the attendance of witnesses, principally because of the fact that
most of them were in hiding or, at least, afraid to enter the cities and towns,
and also because of then generally difficult and abnormal conditions
prevailing. Under such conditions, cases or denial of a party's day in court
expected. Such denial might arise from many a cause. It might be party's
fear to appear before the court because in doing so, he would have had to
get near the feared Japanese. It might be because he did not recognize
any legal authority in that court, or it might be his down-right repugnance of
the hated enemy. And I dare say that among such people would be found
more than seventeen million Filipinos. These are but a few of countless
cause. So that if some form of validation of such judicial proceedings were
to be attempted, all necessary safeguards should be provided to avoid that
in any particular case the validation should violate any litigant's
constitutional right to his day in court, within the full meaning of the phrase,
or any other constitutional or statutory right of his. More people, I am afraid,
would be prejudiced than would be benefited by a wholesale validation of
said proceedings.
Much concern has been shown for the possible confusion which might
result from a decision declaring null and void the acts processes of the
Japanese-sponsored governments in the Philippines. I think, this aspect of
the question has been unduly stressed. The situation is not without remedy,
but the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. As the
courts cannot create a new or special jurisdiction for themselves, which is a
legislative function, and as the situation demands such new or special
jurisdiction, let the legislature act in the premises. For instance, the
Congress may enact a law conferring a special jurisdiction upon the courts
of its selection, whereby said courts may, after hearing all the parties
interested, and taking all the necessary safeguards, so that, a party's day in
court or other constitutional or statutory right under the Commonwealth
Government should not be prejudiced by any of said acts, processes or
proceedings, particullarly, those in Japanese-sponsored courts, and subject
to such other conditions as the special law may provide, validate the
corresponding acts, processes or proceedings. This, to my mind, would be
more conducive to a maximum of benefit and a minimum of prejudice to the
inhabitants of this country, rather than the procedure favored by the
majority.
Finally, let us not equalize the conditions then prevailing in Manila to that
prevailing in the provinces, where the greater number of the people where
then living outside the towns, in the farms and the hills. These people
constitute the great majority of the eighteen million Filipinos. To them the
semblance of an administration of justice which Japanese allowed, was
practically unknown. But they constituted the majority of loyal citizens to
whom President Roosevelt's message of October 23, 1943 refers. They
the majority of our people had an unshaken faith in the arrival of
American aid here and the final triumph of the Allied cause. They were
willing to wait for the restoration of their rightful government, with its courts
and other institutions, for the settlement of their differences. May in their
common hardship and sufferings under yoke of foreign oppression, they
had not much time to think of such differences, if they did not utterly forget
them. Their undoubted hatred of the invader was enough to keep them
away from the judicial system that said invader allowed to have. Those who
voluntarily went to the courts in those tragic days belong to the small
minority.
As to the public order why! any public order which then existed was not
due to the courts or other departments of the puppet government. It was
maintained at the point of the bayonet by the Japanese army, and in their
own unique fashion.


Footnotes
1
Resolution on motion for reconsideration, see p. 371, post.

ee. People vs Victoria
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
March 13, 1947
G.R. No. L-369
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
Perfecto, J .:
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and costs, Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the
reversal of the decision of the Peoples Court.
He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito
Victoria, Carling Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article
114 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December,
1944, more specifically on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the
different places hereunder stated, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a foreigner but a Filipino
citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire
of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war,
giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following manner, to wit:
1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the
Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort,
joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies and a
Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of
Malaking Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of
hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when
some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that
said accused directed several men in the patrol in picking up the dead spy
and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same day, the
same party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the
Japanese Military Police, went again to the house of Federico Unson and did
feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and treasonably arrest him, together with
Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the house; that with
their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said
patrol after setting fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias
Perez were found lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and that
Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and
there killed.
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other
Japanese spies, Pedro Raviera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto
Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others who were all armed, for the purpose
of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the
house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and
brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short
wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at
the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same
day, but on the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese
garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned.
3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with
Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro
Raviera, all members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all
armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid
and comfort, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna,
placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the
Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves
near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing
was heard of him.
4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 oclock in the morning,
the accused, accompanied by two Japanese Military Police and two
undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in
Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two
Japanese Military Police and the accused conducted a search of the house
and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was
subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser
of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 oclock in the morning, the
accused then acting as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent
to aid said enemy, did wilfully, feloniously and treasonably cause the
Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended Antonio San Agustin, a
guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there
torture and unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.
6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed
group of undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with intent to
give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr.,
and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas,
where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a
pro-Japanese party, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined
the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces
in levying war against their enemies; that he took military training from the
Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier,
taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning
of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese;
that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from
Bautista to the mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt. Malipuo, Laguna; that
he performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in Mount Malipuo, where
he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure
or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other
wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the
lower court found that the mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of
Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the houses of the victims
which were burned and looted by the same hands, on the day following the
arrest, effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and
several spies of the enemy. The body of Unson which was still tied to a tree
showed that it had been disemboweled by several bayonet thrusts and the
corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was
arrested at the same times as Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in
the garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of. Appellants
testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the previous
morning raid, he did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon
raid in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place, was
not given by the lower court enough weight to prevail over that of the
prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.
With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused
admitted having taken part in the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the
latters arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson, only the latter was
accepted by the lower court, in view of appellants behaviour as recalled by
witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson.
The last that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school
yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the exhumation having
been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life
was ended. These facts relate to the second count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and
Enriqueta Alviar, the lower court found that on February 10, 1945, in the
company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the accused raided the
house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested him as alleged
guerrilla. The accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date
he was in Gagalagin, Manila.
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked
by the Japanese kempei to accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes
Caluags house and admitted that he was present throughout the
investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself,
was tied suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court
did not accept this defense, considering it rather as corroborative of the facts
alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellants participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth
count, according to the lower court, has been abundantly established,
disbelieving appellants feigned ignorance of the arrest because appellant
himself testified that he promised to see what he could do about Labalan and
accepted three chickens from the latters wife which he gave to the
interpreter at the kempei office.
Counts five and seven were not proven.
Upon the record, it appears that the lower courts conclusions on the overt
acts alleged in counts one, two, three, four, and six of the information are
fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellants brief alone, in
taken. It is highly significant that, although appellants brief compromises
one hundred thirty printed pages, it failed completely to point out any
specific error in the conclusions of fact of the lower court, counsel limiting
himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is
unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute
treason but ordinary crimes against the victimized persons.
Admitting that appellants conduct during the Japanese occupation has not
been impeccable, counsel wants us to consider what the accused did in
behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal responsibility, and that
the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain
the correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with
appellants death as decreed by the lower court.
Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he
joined the Japanese in their raids only because he was forced to do so; that
in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it either in
obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of
some prisoners; that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor
Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the mountains so he may
continue helping those who were detained by the Japanese; and that in
October 1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and
that he was released only after he had been made to promise to indicate
who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary promise
exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we
accept this testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive,
and straightforward declarations of the witnesses, for the prosecution.
Appellants claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had helped the resistance
movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners,
does not relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had
committed as alleged in the counts in the information which were declared
proven by the Peoples Court.
The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may
be, is not, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, a justifying,
exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and
although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he
had caused the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the
enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said that: For
whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty
of all (James 2:10).
We do not find any merit in appellants allegations that the acts committed
by him are not punishable as treason and that the Peoples Court who tried
him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the wrong theory of
suspended allegiance and sovereignty.
Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as
found by the lower court, there is disagreement as to the penalty that should
be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members taking part in the
decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death penalty imposed
by the lower court, the writer of this opinion takes the position that the
penalty the accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty
provided by law.
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in
the information as follows:
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure
or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other
wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be
considered as aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in
appellants case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the
treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be
committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof,
not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes
as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil. 801), so much so that
there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others
for several counts, their number not changing the nature of the offense
committed.
For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this
Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the Peoples Courts decision is
modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P15,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority (except Mr. Justice Perfecto) that find the
appellant guilty of the crime of treason as alleged in the information, that is,
with two aggravating circumstances. Among the atrocities committed by the
appellant and companions stand, in bold relief, those testified to by Mrs.
Federico Unson, Jr., and Dolores Calacasan and related in the same decision
of this Court, to the effect that Federico Unson, Jr., was crucified against and
tied to a tree, and then disemboweled with bayonet thrusts; and that Isaias
Perezs body was mutilated with his ankles severed from the trunk and
thrown around the place where the crime was committed. And I dissent from
the dissenting vote of the writer of the decision, Mr. Justice Perfecto, which
prevented the imposition by this Court of the death penalty imposed upon
the appellant by the lower court.
The killing of the victim was unquestionably attended by treachery, that is,
by means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to
insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make, and by a deliberate augment of the
wrong done by the offense by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
commission. But the writer of the opinion says:
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be
considered as aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in
appellants case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the
treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be
committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof,
not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crime
as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil. 801), so much so that
there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others
for several counts, their number not changing the nature of the offense
committed.
The reason or ground on which the dissenter bases his conclusion that the
aggravating circumstances above specified cannot be taken into
consideration in the present case, is clearly wrong. Said aggravating
circumstances have nothing to do with the integral elements of the crime of
treason as charged and committed by the appellant. The fact that the crime
of treason may be committed by a single overt act or a series of overt acts,
committed at one and the same time or at different times, does not, by any
means, make those circumstances essential elements of the offense
committed by the appellant. Said circumstances were not even inherent in or
included by the law in defining the crime of treason. The words treason as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is completely different and
independent from treachery as an aggravating circumstance provided for
in the same Code.
The crime of treason is committed by a citizen, not by merely adhering to
the enemy and giving the latter aid and comfort in abstract, but by
committing one or more overt acts which constitute aid and comfort to the
enemy to which the traitor adheres; and evidently, the commission of such
overt act as the killing of the victim in aid of the enemy may be attended by
the aggravating circumstances above specified, for they were not necessary
in order to give aid and comfort to the enemy. Of course, if one of the
aggravating circumstances provided by law is inherent or included in the
overt acts charged as in aid or comfort of the enemy, it cannot be taken into
consideration as aggravating circumstance attending the commission of that
particular crime of treason.
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur partly in the result. The information and the evidence sufficiently
make out at least a case of murder, qualified by treachery. Appellant had
committed other atrocities for which he could correspondingly be convicted
under the information and evidence of record. As spy, he may also be tried
in a military tribunal and, if found guilty, sentenced accordingly. While he
might be guilty of a violation of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, I hold,
in conformity with my dissenting opinion in Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil. 856),
that said legal provisions was not in force at the time of the commission of
the crime. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is in accordance with the law, but
the provision regarding payment of a fine should be eliminated and the
appellant sentenced to indemnify in the proper amount the heirs of the
victim.

ff. People s Adlawan
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
March 29, 1949
G.R. No. L-456
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for
appellee.
Reyes (Jose), J .:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000
imposed by the Peoples Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason but
convicted of what the said court terms complex crime of crime of treason with
murder robbery and rape.
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended
contains the following counts:
1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3,
1945 in the city of Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the
accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort
to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join
and become a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored
military organization knowing fully well that the aims and purposes of said
organization are among other to extend every aid and cooperation with said enemy in
the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of
said enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to
the enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to them did
go out on numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and
other elements and other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.
2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and
May 3, 1945, and the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court
the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Forces with treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy
in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously
and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai
under the command of a T. Yushida, performing the function and duties of an
informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military police and
did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy
with treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did
in company with other member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to
apprehend guerrilla as they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians
and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the
enemy and to weaken the cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.
3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable
intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as a
member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police
and a guide of the Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the
Japanese Imperial Army did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called mopping up operation for the purpose of
suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance against said enemy and
as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.
4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and
November 1944 in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and
the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably help in the a construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese
soldier against allied air raids and did help in the acquisition of as he did acquire food
supplies for the enemy in preparation against the expected landing of America forces.
5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of
Cebu Philippines the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of
Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did aid
and comfort to the said enemy in company with Japanese Military soldier of the
Japanese Military Police and other Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo
Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio
Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla
activities.
6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of
Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort
to said enemy in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military
Police and other enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said
Francisco Larrobia strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently
bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a
guerrilla.
7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of
Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces
with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy in his
capacity as chief undercover man for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in
company with Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then
and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa
on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter taking said Numeriano Bellesa to
Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano
Bellesa about the latters firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms in
gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano
Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said
investigation.
8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla
Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces
with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District and in company with Japanese soldier of the
Japanese Military Police did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably
apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did investigate the latter as to the
whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer of the
guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did
torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter by the arms so that his body
dangled down striking his stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his
head and finally striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazonas
lower lips.
9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese
Military Police Cebu District in company with other informers said Military Police,
did then and there apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully
and treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as to the whereabouts of her husband
Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division Cebu Area Command and
when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husbands whereabouts
herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the arms strike
her on the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and
otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.
10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province
of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate
Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort said enemy in company with five Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the
Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his capacity
Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan
Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike
said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn
over said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the
ground that said person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano
Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever since then.
11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief
undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt.
Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile designs of said
enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy,
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give,
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief
undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and
inn company with Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a
guerrilla.
13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give,
as he did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters
of the Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did question and investigate
said Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and
when said Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did
said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing, severely beat her and
otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to
her aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese
Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said
headquarters in compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever since.
14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable to give as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in
his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military
Police of Cebu District and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and
spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Pedro Cabanada and did question the latter as the whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco,
a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said investigation, the accused
did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron pipe
thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the latters refusal to divulge said
guerrilla whereabouts.
15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese
Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three
other Japanese informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Marciano Alejandro, Carlos Numera
and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding
said Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with guerrillas.
16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as an informer and spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla
soldier for the latters guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy.
17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of
Cebu, Philippines, particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and
Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, as member of
the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable join and take part in
the general mopping up operation conducted by the Japanese Army under the
command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to Minglanilla
for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting
said enemy.
18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces,
with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in
his capacity as chief informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military
Police, Cebu District, in company with the member of said Japanese Military Police
under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest, maltreat and torture Martin
Francisco and did expose the latters wife and some Filipino girls naked, raping them,
and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said Martin
Francisco:
2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch
P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring
on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.
19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent
to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an informer to the
enemy and in company with soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and as a result of which, Governor Hilario
Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was captured.
20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within
the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as
he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover
man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla
with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him
in an effort to extract confession of the latters connection with guerrillas.
21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the Japanese
Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldier and other agent
of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal,
Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up the hands of said persons,
severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as
consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days
thereafter.
22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within
the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as
did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer, spy and
undercover man of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there
wilfully unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and
John Doe her husband, on suspicion that said persons were cooperating and helping
the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita Delgado and her husband to the
Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused did torture them by hanging
them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.
23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as member
of the enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military
Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill
Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to the said enemy.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in
the information. But he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that
the lower court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1)
voluntary surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as
witness by the CIC in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military
commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and saved the lives of many
civilian and from death in the hands of the Japanese;
2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-
appellant on the strength of the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed
upon him;
3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and
unnecessary cruelty;
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason
with murder, rape and robbery;
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant
should not have been convicted of the so-called complex crime of treason with
murder, robbery, and rape. The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the
information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the
crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and
identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1
L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only.
Appellants claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the
other hand, his admission that he was taken from the house of his mother by an
agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual
arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked (People
vs. Conwi,2 40 O.G. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307.)
The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and
his countrymen have not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any
event be considered as mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that
he would not be sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other
hand, it is denied by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its
order denying appellant motions for reconsideration that No responsible judge can
or would advance his opinion in connection with the decision to be rendered in any
case before he has properly deliberated on the merit of the same.
There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength should not have been considered. These
circumstances are by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be
taken to aggravate the penalty. (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil. 623) But the facts alleged
in the information show that appellant in committing the crime of treason, deliberately
augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects,
subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting them to death, and as
appears in count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in
arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and
then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the
allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellants plea of guilty, these
two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be
appreciated against him. As this said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts
unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between
treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal
grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be
regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy will be regarded as aggravating
circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the
main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty,
fall within the term of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are
adsorbed in treason characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and
other accompanying crimes should be taken in to consideration for measuring the
degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they
were committed. Were not this the rule treason, the highest crime known to law,
would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. To
avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the
range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to which the culprit
has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code just
penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into
execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is
inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of
analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to
the service of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the laws aims.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a
fine of not to exceed P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the
aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should
be imposed in its maximum. But since five member of this court are opposed to the
imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced
toreclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.
Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared
guilty of treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000,
with costs in this instance de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and
Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2 71 Phil. 595.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 100917-18 January 25, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ADLAWAN, JR. alias "Bemboy Adlawan", and VENANCIO
KYAMKO alias "Tata Kyamko", accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reinerio C. Quisido for accused-appellant.

CAMPOS, JR., J .:
On May 3, 1991, the Honorable Gualberto P. Delgado, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Toledo City, convicted the
accused-appellants of the crime of Rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, decision is hereby rendered in
Crim. Case No. TCS-791 finding accused Florentino Adlawan Jr. alias "Bemboy" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Art. 335 RPC as amended and
hereby sentenced (sic) the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify the complainant, Priscilla Canonigo, the amount of P30,000.00 and to pay the
cost and further decision is hereby rendered in Crim. Case No. TCS-796 finding accused
Venancio Kyamko alias "Tata", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
under Art. 335 RPC as amended and hereby sentenced (sic) the accused to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the complainant, Tita Ouano the amount
of P30,000.00 and to pay the cost. However, accused in both cases are given full credit
of their preventive imprisonment provided they complied with the rules and regulations of
a convicted prisoner.
SO ORDERED.
1

From this decision both accused appealed and in their Brief fault the trial court
of one error:
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF COMPLAINING WITNESSES THAT THEY WERE RESPECTIVELY
RAPED BY THE ACCUSED ON JUNE 9, 1987, DISREGARDING THAT THEIR
SINCERITY AND CANDOR ARE FULL OF SUSPICION; THEIR ALLEGATIONS ARE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND THEIR STORY INCREDIBLE: IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED AND THEIR WITNESSES CORROBORATE THE
FACT OF VOLUNTARINESS ON THE PART OF COMPLAINANTS AS ACCUSED AND
COMPLAINANTS WERE IN ROMANTIC MODE (SIC) BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER
THE ALLEGED RAPE (SIC) AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
2

In the two cases at bar, the respective accused-appellants do not dispute the
fact of having had carnal knowledge with their respective complainants. They,
however, deny having used any force or intimidation upon them and allege
that these complainants voluntarily performed the sexual act with their
respective partners.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized in the People's Brief, are as
follows:
On June 9, 1987 at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Tita Ouano and Priscilla
Canonigo went to the Municipality of Pinamungajan on their way to Barangay Lamac, a
remote interior barangay of Pinamungajan, in order to attend a fiesta (p. 7, tsn., Jan. 28,
1988). While they were waiting for a vehicle in going to Lamac, appellants Florentino
Adlawan and Venancio Kyamko arrived and introduced themselves to Tita Ouano and
Priscilla Canonigo (pp. 3-4, tsn., ibid). When it was already 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and there was still no vehicle, Tita and Priscilla decided to walk toward Barangay Lamac
(p. 4, tsn., ibid). Upon reaching a certain distance, appellants Adlawan and Kyamko who
were trailing them told them that they were also going to Barangay Lamac and would like
to go with them (p. 4, ibid). After they had walked for some distance, appellant Kyamko
informed them that there is a short cut, and because they do not know the way, they went
with them (p. 5, tsn., ibid; p. 3, tsn., April 7, 1988). Later they (Tita Ouano and Priscilla
Canonigo) noticed that they were being misled because they were going around without
fix distance
(p. 4, tsn., April 7, 1988). So they decided that both of them will just return to the
Poblacion of Pinamungajan (p. 9, tsn., April 7, 1988). But they were not able to do so
because Adlawan and Kyamko held each of them by pointing knives at them (p. 4, ibid).
Thereafter, Adlawan and Kyamko dragged Priscilla and Tita to a house nearby (p. 5, tsn.,
April 7, 1988;
pp. 5-6, tsn., Jan. 28, 1988). There at the house, Adlawan brought Priscilla to a separate
room with a knife pointed at her and then pushed her down on the floor (p. 7, tsn., April 7,
1988). While she was down on the floor, Adlawan forcibly removed her trouser and T-
shirt (pp. 7-8, tsn., ibid). Priscilla resisted Adlawan's (sic) attempt to remove her trousers,
but because Adlawan was much stronger she became weak and later Adlawan was able
to remove her pants, T-shirt and panty (pp. 8-9, tsn., ibid). Priscilla shouted for help but
Adlawan covered her mouth with his hands (p. 3, tsn., May 11, 1988). Adlawan told her
that even if she shout for help nobody will help them because they are the ones
controlling the place (p. 3, ibid). Adlawan further told her that if he could not satisfy his
desire he would kill her, at the same time continuously pointing the knife and pushing her
stomach (p. 3, tsn., May 11, 1988). When she felt weak, Adlawan placed himself on top
of her (ibid). He was able to have sexual intercourse with her for about thirty (30) minutes
(pp. 3-4, tsn., ibid). All the while that she was being abused, Adlawan warned her not to
report the incident to the police or else, he will kill her (pp. 4-5, tsn., ibid). After the
intercourse, she was made to stand up (p. 4, tsn., ibid). When she stood up, she was
staggering and she felt very weak as she was abused (pp. 2-3, tsn., July 19, 1988).
During the time Adlawan tried to abuse Priscilla Canonigo, Venancio Kyamko was also
on the other room with Tita Ouano (pp. 4-7, tsn., Jan. 28, 1988). Inside the room,
Kyamko pushed Tita's head to the wall and told her not to move while the knife was
pointing (sic) on her neck
(p. 7, tsn., ibid). She struggled and tried her best to free herself but she was overpowered
because of the strength of Kyamko (ibid). She struggled with Kyamko for about fifteen
(15) minutes and thereafter she became weak and did not have enough strength to resist
him (ibid). Thereafter (sic), she kicked Kyamko but the latter continued pointing the knife
to her neck (ibid). After that, he removed her t-shirt and then her bra (ibid). She pleaded
with Kyamko not to harm her, but instead gave her a fist blow on the stomach (ibid). Then
he proceeded to tear her trousers and panty and after that, he undressed himself and
inserted his penis to her vagina (p. 8, tsn., ibid). Tita Ouano cried and struggled hard but
her two (2) hands were being held and she had no more force to resist (p. 9, tsn., ibid).
Kyamko then laid on top of her and had sexual intercourse with her for thirty (30) minutes
(ibid). When he was through, he let her dress up and warned her not to report the
incident to the police or she will be killed (p. 10, tsn., ibid). Afterwards, they went out of
the room and there she saw Priscilla Canonigo coming out of the other room together
with Florentino Adlawan (ibid). She noticed Priscilla Canonigo had a slight injury at her
neck (p. 11, tsn., ibid). She made a sign to Priscilla through her eyes that they will escape
(p. 3, tsn., July 19, 1988; p. 11, tsn., Jan. 28, 1988). Suddenly, they both run (sic) but
after reaching a distance of ten (10) meters, they were overtaken by Adlawan and
Kyamko (p. 4, tsn., July 19, 1988,ibid). At 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Tita Ouano
pleaded Kyamko to allow them to go to the Poblacion of Pinamungajan
(p. 11, ibid). Appellants Kyamko and Adlawan acceded (p. 12, tsn., Jan. 28, 1988). While
they were already walking, somebody along the way called Kyamko and Adlawan (pp.
11-12, tsn., ibid). When Kyamko and Adlawan stopped, Tita and Priscilla run (sic) away
towards the place where the conductors of Jegans Liner were sitting on a bamboo bench
facing the Municipal Building. Tita and Priscilla then proceeded to sit beside the bus
conductors (p. 12, tsn., ibid). Kyamko and Adlawan, however, followed the two women
and tried to pull them away. But Tita Ouano requested one of the bus conductors not to
leave them because appellants had bad intentions on them (p. 12, ibid). The conductor
agreed to their request (p. 13, ibid). Appellants told them to just go with them so that
nothing will happen (ibid). They resisted. One of the bus conductors advised appellants
not to force the women and they left (p. 14, ibid). Thereafter, a woman by the name of
Priscilla Gorres arrived at the scene and asked them what happened to them (ibid).
When they could not answer, as they were both still in shock, Priscilla Gorres invited
them to pass the night in her house (ibid). They readily accepted the invitation.
At the house of Priscilla Gorres, Tita Ouano and Priscilla Canonigo cried while narrating
the harrowing experienced (sic) they had undergone in the hands of appellants Florentino
Adlawan and Venancio Kyamko (p. 15, tsn., Jan. 28, 1988). After hearing their stories,
Priscilla Gorres silently went downstairs and reported the matter to the police (p. 15, ibid).
When Priscilla Gorres came back, she was accompanied by Eulogio Kyamko, the Station
Commander of Pinamungajan, who invited Tita Ouano and Priscilla Canonigo to the
Police Headquarters for investigation and assured them that they will not be harmed
(ibid). At the headquarters, their affidavits were taken (p. 16, tsn., ibid). When they were
through giving their statements, a physician was called (ibid).
Dr. Alfredo Soberano, Medical Health Officer of Pinamungajan, arrived at the
headquarters at around 1:00 o'clock dawn, as he was requested by the police to conduct
a physical examination on the bodies of Tita Ouano and Priscilla Canonigo (pp. 3-4, tsn.,
Jan. 8, 1990; p. 16, tsn., Jan. 28, 1988). From the physical examination of Tita Ouano,
Dr. Soberano observed the following: there was a slight vaginal canal irritation on her: he
did not find old scar on the vagina (sic) wall; there were some injuries and abrasions on
her body; seminal fluid was present, which indicates that she had recent sexual
intercourse: she was still bleeding because she was on her fourth day of menstruation;
and the victim was a virgin (pp. 4-5, tsn., Jan. 8, 1990).
As to Priscilla Canonigo, Dr. Soberano found seminal fluid in her vagina; that her vaginal
canal admits two (2) fingers size 2; there were multiple abrasions on the right side of the
neck and that she was a virgin at the time she was raped (p. 6, tsn., ibid). Both of them
were crying when being examined by Dr. Soberano (p. 8, tsn., Jan. 8, 1990).
3

Upon review of the prosecution evidence it is patent that the sexual contact
between the accused-appellants and the complainants could not have been
voluntary. There are several indications contrary thereto, as shown by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The accused-appellants, in their attempt to discredit the testimonies of the
complainants, point out some inconsistencies which they have committed.
The accused-appellants capitalize, first and foremost, on the lack of perfect
identity between both complainants' sworn statements executed during the
investigation which was conducted right after the alleged crime and their
testimonies in open court. In their affidavits they stated that they started from
Poblacion, Pinamungajan, going to Barrio Lamak together with the accused
Florentino (Bemboy) Adlawan and Venancio (Tata) Kyamko.
4
In open court,
complaining witness Tita Ouano testified that while waiting at Poblacion
Pinamungajan for a truck that would go to Lamak, the accused approached
them and introduced themselves. Since it was already 3:30 p.m., they decided
to proceed to Lamak by walking and the two (2) accused also went with
them.
5
The other complaining witness, Priscilla Canonigo, on the other hand,
declared that they alone proceeded to Lamak from Pinamungajan, and after
walking for quite a distance they were overtaken by the accused Florentino
Adlawan and Venancio Tata Kyamko.
6
The accused-appellants point out
another inconsistency and this refers to the manner in which they were
brought to the house where the alleged crime was committed. In their affidavit,
they stated that they went up to a house immediately while in open court, they
claimed that they were dragged to a distance of about 1/2 kilometer before
they reached the house.
7

We do not find these inconsistencies, which merely refer to minor details,
sufficient to cast a cloud of doubt upon the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. These inconsistencies are not reason enough to depart from the
well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of the trial court, giving full credit to
these witnesses, must be given great weight on appeal.
Moreover, We have previously held that discrepancy between the witnesses'
testimony in court and the affidavits they previously signed as to minor details
regarding the commission of the crime does not constitute sufficient ground to
impeach the credibility of said witnesses where on material and important
points their declaration are consistent.
8
Besides, We have been less exacting
when it concerns inconsistencies or apparent contradictions committed by
rape victims. We cannot expect a rape victim to keep an accurate account of
the traumatic and horrifying experience she went through.
9

Thus, We cannot be convinced that Priscilla Canonigo's failure to exactly state
whether or not she fell unconscious during the moment she was being
sexually abused is a sufficient circumstance to entirely discredit her as a
witness. We cannot expect the rape victim to remember every ugly detail of
her traumatic experience, especially so since she might in fact be trying not to
remember them.
10
It is understandable that there would be minor lapses or
inaccuracies when she is made to recount her experience at different
occasions. The mere circumstance that she was testifying in the presence of
strangers on an intimate matter not usually even mentioned in public might
have caused her not (only) a little embarrassment and confusion that
rendered her narration less than perfect.
11

To impress upon this Court that the accused-appellants' carnal knowledge
with their respective complainants was with the consent of the latter, they
claim that it is quite amazing why the complainants did not go back to
Poblacion Pinamungajan at the earlier stage of their travel and why they
stayed in the company of the accused-appellants, walking a distance of ten
(10) kilometers and/or four (4) hours if they really did not have that desire to
be with the accused-appellants.
We do not find anything amazing in such a narration. The complainants were
tricked by the accused-appellants into going with them through a footpath they
claimed to be a short cut towards Lamak. The complainants, who were
unfamiliar with the said path, had no choice but to follow the lead of the
accused-appellants. Believing that they were taking the shorter route to their
destination, they walked on for several hours. They started to doubt only when
it appeared that they were not heading to any definite direction. It was just
logical that they would decide to go back when they lost hope of ever reaching
their destination.
The accused-appellants also want this Court to take against the complainants
the facts that they did not shout for help despite the fact that they were
allegedly threatened, forced and dragged by the appellants to the house. The
complainants' reactions are understandable. The threat of being killed
especially when in an unfamiliar place, is sufficient to mum complainants and
make them submit to the desires of the accused-appellants.
The accused-appellants further claim that based on the narration of
complainant Priscilla Canonigo of how her clothes were taken off, i.e., with
just one hand, and the other hand holding a knife pointed at her side, she
could not have been held tightly to prevent any determined struggle or
resistance on her part. This, according to the accused-appellants, will point
out that the complainant did not offer any resistance. Since she did not offer
any resistance, the complaint for rape does not have basis.
We cannot fault the complainant for not running away at the first opportunity
she had. This cannot be construed as a showing of consent to the sexual
intercourse, even as We held in another case that the fact that while coitus
was going on between complainant and her abuser, she had a free hand to
resist the accused's further advances is no argument that no resistance was
employed.
12
Besides, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to
prove resistance. What has to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force
or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the
victim.
13
Threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to cow the victim, and it
constitutes an element of rape.
Rape is a crime which is not normally committed in the presence of witnesses,
hence, courts merely rely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony as
weighed against the credibility of the accused.
14

We find no substantial ground to discredit the testimonies of the complainants
as to the allegation that their sexual acts with the respective accused-
appellants were consequences of the use of force or intimidation. Considering
that their testimonies are clear and free from any substantial contradiction and
their sincerity and candor free from suspicion when they said that they were
raped, they say in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed.
15
Moreover, their testimonies are substantially corroborated by the
medical findings of the physician who examined them on the very evening
when the crime was allegedly committed. These findings, which included
slight physical injuries resulting from the use of force by their abusers, had
been presented by the examining physician at the trial.
We find the defense of the accused-appellants simply implausible, if not
completely incredible. We agree with the trial court's findings which We quote:
The following established facts negate the defense that both accused had romantic
relations with the complainants (Instant love and instant sex).
1. Both complainants testified that they were on their way to attend a fiesta in Barangay
Lamak, a remote barangay of the Municipality of Pinamungajan. If we are to believe the
defense of the accused, that they had a romantic relations with both complainants why
the sudden return of the complainants to Poblacion of Pinamungajan instead of
proceeding to Barangay Lamak and spend the whole night and satisfy their lust. The
sudden return of the complainants to Poblacion only indicated that some unusual incident
happened to them;
2. The physical evidence consisting of Exhs. D, E and F of Tita Ouano and Exhs. C, D, E,
and F of Priscilla Canonigo consisting of their torn trouser, torn T-shirt and torn bra and
panty which indicate and prove that force had been applied against them;
3. Identical defenses raised by both accused, that they had romantic relations with the
complainants to its minute details impressing to the Court of instant love and instant sex
is too much of a coincidence, very illogical and inherently improbable, considering that
both accused and both complainants were just introduced to each other in matter of
hours before the incident and considering further, that both accused are not extra
irresistible and no evidence was adduced to show that the complainants are nymphet or
of loose moral character (Pp. vs. Gasendo L-41052 30 September 1982). On the contrary
the identical features in their testimony cannot but generate the suspicion that the
material circumstances testified to by both accused were integral part of a well thought
and pre-fabricated story (Pp. vs. Madriaga IV G.R. 73057 8 March 1989):
4. The most fatal and most damaging fact would practically (sic) demolished (sic) the
whole defense of the accused similar to a house of cards is the behavior of the
complainants immediately and spontaneously after the commission of the acts of the
outrage adequately supports their claim that by force and intimidation they were raped by
the accused. When complainants upon returning to Poblacion, Pinamungajan, lost no
time in reporting the outrage to the owner of the house of a certain Priscilla Gorres and
the police and even in the middle of the night submitted themselves for physical
examination by Dr. Soberano. All these actuations are certainly inconsistent with the
allegations of the accused that they had romantic relations with the complainants (Pp. vs.
Murallon G.R. 85734 September 30, 1990);
5. Lastly, corroborating the testimony of the complainants is the testimony of Dr.
Soberano, as to this findings during the physical examination to both complainants, Dr.
Soberano testified that he found seminal fluids on both complainants, indicating that there
was recent sexual intercourse. He stated further that both were physically virgins. There
were physical injuries, anal irritation on Tita Ouano and abrasions on the right side of the
neck of Priscilla Canonigo. He further testified that both complainants were crying at the
time of the examination. The totality of the findings of Dr. Soberano dissolves any scintilla
of doubt of their guilt and overturns the presumption of their innocence satisfying the
quantum of evidence on moral certainty.
16

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence on the matter, We hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision in
toto, with no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.; Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 Decision, pp. 25-26; Rollo, pp. 57-58.
2 Appellants' Brief, p. 6.
3 Appellee's Brief, pp. 2-10.
4 Appellant's Brief, p. 7.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 17.
8 People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910 (1962).
9 People vs. Feliciano, 195 SCRA 19 (1991).
10 People vs. Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 (1991).
11 People vs. Borja, 191 SCRA 120 (1990) citing People vs. Mancilla, 173 SCRA 373
(1989).
12 People vs. Sarra, 183 SCRA 34 (1990).
13 People vs. Dinola, 183 SCRA 493 (1990).
14 People vs. Tereso, 194 SCRA 154 (1991).
15 People vs. Dalinog, 183 SCRA 88 (1990).
16 Decision, pp. 23-25; Rollo, pp. 55-57.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Dd. People vs San Juan

089 Phil 359:





SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-2997. June 29, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMBERTO
SAN JUAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Francisco P. Carreon and Solicitor
Martiniano P. Vivo, for plaintiff and appellee.

Mariano Mercado for defendant and Appellant.

SYLLABUS
TREASON; ONE COUNT OF INFORMATION, PROVED. Where one of the
counts of the information was proved in accordance with the two-witness
rule, and the defendants adherence to the enemy was implied from the
overt acts charged and established thereunder, and confirmed by his
admission that he evacuated with the Japanese away from the town where
those acts were committed, such proof is sufficient to support the
defendants conviction although the other counts of the information have not
been proven under the two witness rule.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, C.J. :

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, finding the appellant, Lamberto San Juan, guilty of treason and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and its legal accessories, and to pay a
fine of fifteen thousand pesos, plus the costs. The information charged
eleven counts, but appellants conviction is predicated only on counts 1, 2, 8
and 10.


That the appellant is a Filipino citizen is beyond question. The evidence for
the prosecution tends to show that one day in December, 1943, during the
so-called amnesty period, Vivencio Panganiban, Rustico Cabasco, Lt. Tuso,
Lt. Ovena, and Gerundio Villanisa, coming to the town of Lopez, Quezon,
met in the house of Potenciano Desembrana for the purpose of talking about
guerrilla matters. In the midst of their conference, somebody appeared and
gave the news that the Japanese were coming, whereupon the group began
to leave. Meeting Gerundio Villanisa who, upon being asked, disclosed that
he was talking with guerrillas, the appellant proceeded to the Japanese
garrison and returned with four Japanese soldiers, armed like the appellant.
The latter and his Japanese companions went in the direction taken by the
guerrillas, and when the latter approached the hospital, the appellant fired
at them, with the result that the intended victims had to flee. These facts
constitute the basis of count No. 1 and were testified to by Gerundio
Villanisa and Rustico Cabasco.

Counsel for appellant insists that there is a discrepancy in the testimony of
these two witnesses, because Villanisa stated that the appellant rushed to
the Japanese garrison and returned with Japanese soldiers, while Cabasco
alleged that he saw the appellant with Japanese soldiers, without mentioning
appellants trip to the garrison. The discrepancy is more apparent than real.
Cabasco merely omitted a detail which Villanisa was able to recite, but the
formers testimony is nonetheless complete in specifying that the appellant
and his Japanese companions pursued the abovenamed guerrillas and that
the appellant fired at them near the hospital.

We are inclined to agree with counsel for appellant that the other counts,
Nos. 2, 8 and 10, (that the appellant arrested Melecio Villate, that he
delivered a speech in Lopez in which he claimed that the Americans would
not return and General Vera was a bandit, and that the appellant sent a
patrol of Makapilis to barrio Villahermosa with orders to arrest all), have not
been proven in accordance with the two-witness rule; but count No. 1 is
sufficient to support appellants conviction, his adherence to the enemy
being implied from the overt acts charged and established thereunder, and
confirmed by his admission that he evacuated with the Japanese from Lopez
to Atimonan.

There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty
imposed by the trial court is conformable to law. The appealed judgment will
therefore be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ.,
concur.


gg. People vs Prieto
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C.
Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J .:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7
counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3
and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special
prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to
counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them.
The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7
and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not
coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that
in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese
soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry the
American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the
accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was
faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier.
Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he
saw the accused following an American and the accused were Japanese
and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last
witness stated that the American was walking as well as his captors. And
there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night
when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses
failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any
part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S.
Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries,"
with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the
court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the
information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to
technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by
the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the
Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for the
Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of
Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon,
for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts;
that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham
Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter
said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese
companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by
placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there
he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and
detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer
and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving
and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the herein
accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce
and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and his
companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face and in
other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei
Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following
day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more was
heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality
of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving
and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her
military forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese
soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose
of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did
in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6
days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were
taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did
bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the
enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the
torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla
activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts
and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate
from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States
constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there
must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.
One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed
is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter
crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a
defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the
punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should
elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying
on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries
are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried
out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture
and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful
method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty
under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code,
since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended
parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not guilty
to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5
and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment
because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for
the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who
defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for
obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the
legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the
presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel.
(U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed
by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the
contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney
appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed
reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel
assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not
sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in
the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to
protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel
"sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was
not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any
indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of
his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as
the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut
any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the
appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of
treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In
all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of
this instance against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla,
JJ., concur.


PARAS, J .:
I concur in the result. Appellant is guilty of murder.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

80 PHIL 138
People vs. Prieto

FACTS: Accused Prieto was charged with treason. During the Japanese
occupation, the accused joined the paramilitary force of the Japanese and acted
as an undercover agent for them. He assisted in several executions of suspected
guerillas. He was charged of 7 counts of treason. He admitted to counts 1, 2, 3,
and 7, but didnt admit to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor was only
able to present evidence to support count 4.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty of treason for counts 1,2,3, and 7;
but, he was acquitted for count 4. For counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, the accused was
guilty since he admitted. However, he cannot be held liable for count 4 since the
two-witness rule wasnt met. The two witnesses testified to two different
incidents. In a different light, common crimes are absorbed in treason.

hh. People vs De Castro
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
June 28, 1949
G.R. No. L-547
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
L. Javier Inciong for appellant.
Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for
appellee.
Moran, J .:
Appellant has been convicted of treason by the Fifth Division of the Peoples
Court and sentenced to life imprisonment, to a fine of P10,000, and to pay
the costs. The facts proven by the prosecution are as follows:
Appellant was a USAFFE soldier and upon the occupation of the Province of
by the Japanese Army he joined the Bureau of Constabulary and became a
regular constabulary soldier under the government of occupation.
On January 13, 1945, at 2 oclock A. M. a group of four Japanese soldiers
accompanied by some constabulary soldiers, one of them the herein
appellant, went to the house of the Bacani family of Bulacao, in the suburb
of El Pardo, Cebu City. The four Japanese soldiers, headed by Sergeant
Yoshida, investigated the two girls, Anita and Rosario Bacani, living in that
house and suspected of having some connection with the Cebu guerrillas.
The two girls were hanged by their arms, which were tied behind their
backs, by the Japanese soldiers and they were later arrested and imprisoned
together with their younger brother Ricardo in a house near the Redemtory
Monastery. For lack of evidence, the Japanese soldiers released Ricardo, and
also Anita and Rosario subsequently, after fourteen and twenty days
confinement respectively. Yoshida reminded Rosario before releasing her
that she was very lucky for not having been killed.
On or about February 23, 1945, Rosario Bacani was taken from her house by
appellant and others and was brought to the house of Yoshida in Cebu City.
Yoshida made some amorous advances to Rosario and threatened to kill her
and all the members of her family should she not consent to live with him.
Rosario had to yield, according to her, because she was afraid of his
brutality. Yoshida told her to go home and to return the next day with her
mother which she did. Yoshida told Rosarios mother of his desire to have
Rosario as servant, cook and laundry woman, and from then on Rosario
became a mistress of Yoshida.
Rosario testified that while she was living in the house of Yoshida, appellant
was also living there and was giving reports to Tanamaya, Yoshidas
interpreter. There is no evidence, however, of what those reports were, and
their felonious character is not to be presumed.
The facts above stated do not constitute treason. Appellants membership in
the Bureau of Constabulary under the government of occupation is not
treason. That institution was intended for the promotion and preservation of
law and order which were essential during war to the life of the civilian
population. Appellant personally did nothing serious except his having taken
Rosario Bacani from her house to bring her to the house of Yoshida, but
again this is not treason. It may be an aid to satisfy the lust of a japanese
officer, an aid which is not treasonous, as held in People vs. Perez, G. R. No.
L-856.
Neither is appellant guilty as co-author of rape, for no rape is alleged in the
information and no rape had been committed by Yoshida against Rosario,
she having yielded her body to him not because she was afraid that
otherwise she might be the victim of his brutality. It is well settled that when
some hesitation was shown by the woman or that she had contributed in
some way to the realization of the act there is no rape. (Viada as quoted in
U. S. vs. De Dios, 8 Phil. 279, 282.)
Judgment is reversed, appellant is acquitted with costs de oficio.
Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
We concur in appellants acquittal. Our reason for not convicting him of rape
is because this crime is not alleged in the information. It is, therefore,
unnecessary for us to decide it, under the circumstances, Rosario Bacani has
been raped or not by Yoshida and if appellant has any share in the criminal
responsibility, if any.
Moran, C.J., Mr. Justice Pablo voted for this decision.


ii. People vs Badili

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-565 June 27, 1949
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROQUE
BADILI, Defendant-Appellant.
Mariano M. Magsalin for the appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Isidro
C. Borromeo for the appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
The appellant was accused of treason on eight counts, was found
guilty of counts No. 1, 2, 7 and 8, and sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000. In this appeal the
Solicitor General agrees with counsel for the appellant that counts
Nos. 1 and 7 have not been established by the testimony of two
witnesses. He insists only on counts Nos. 2 and 8.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
In support of count No. 2, Macario Castanares testified that on or
about August 16, 1944, while he was sitting inside a truck parked in
T. Padilla street, Cebu City, the accused Roque Badili arrested him
and brought him to the Japanese Kempeitai headquarters, where he
was maltreated and released only after nine days of confinement.
Another witness named Pedro Baton testified that he saw the actual
arrest of Macario Castanares by the accused. No other witness,
however, was presented to corroborate the testimony of Castanares
as to his maltreatment and confinement by the Japanese military
police. We agree with counsel for the appellant that neither has
count No. 2 been fully established by the testimony of at least two
witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It remains for us to pass upon the evidence on count No. 8.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
It appears that in 1944 the accused was a policeman of the City of
Cebu and at the same time served as a secret agent of the
Japanese military police and aided the latter in apprehending
guerrilla suspects. This fact was established by the testimony of
several witnesses who had seen the accused accompanying
Japanese soldiers and forming part of their patrols in Cebu in their
search for guerrillas and guerrilla suspects. On those occasions the
accused was always armed with a revolver.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In count No. 8 it is alleged that on or about July 16, 1944, in Pasil,
San Nicolas, Cebu City, the accused in conspiracy with the enemy
and other Filipino secret agents, with intent and purpose of giving
aid and comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously, and treasonably capture Lt. Pacifico Resales of the
guerrillas, tie and torture him, and did drag him to a sailboat and
kill him while at sea. To prove that allegation three witnesses were
called by the prosecution, namely, Francisca Garcia, Basilio Argoso,
and Pastor Abellana.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Francisca Garcia testified that she was forty years of age, married,
and a resident of Pasil, Cebu City; that on the morning of July 16,
1944, Lt. Pacifico Rosales came to her house to exchange Philippine
currency with Japanese military notes; that since she did not have
enough cash at that time, Rosales left to go to church, saying that
he would come back later; that soon after Rosales came back, the
accused and two other undercover agents named Bautista and
Failing, who were then near her house on the seashore rigging up a
sailboat, saw Rosales and immediately surrounded her house; that
Rosales went out thru the back door in an attempt to escape but
was apprehended by Bautista and the accused. By order of the
accused Lieutenant Rosales' hands were tied at his back, after which
he was dragged to one of the sailboats on the shore. Bautista and
Failing boarded the sailboat where Rosales was and the accused
boarded another sailboat. The two boats then put to sea, and after
that she had not seen nor heard of Lieutenant Rosales any more.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Basilio Argoso, a twenty-three-year-old fisherman and neighbor of
Francisca Garcia, testified that he had known the accused since
before the war; that he also knew Lt. Pacifico Rosales; that on the
morning of July 16, 1944, after hearing mass he saw the accused
and his companions Alberto Bautista and Joe Gabora arrest
Lieutenant Rosales in the premises of Francsica Garcia; that after
capturing Rosales they tied him and brought him to a sailboat; that
the companions of the accused boarded the boat where they had
placed Lieutenant Rosales while the accused boarded another boat,
and then the two boats sailed towards the island of Bohol; that he
knew that Lieutenant Rosales belonged to the Philippine Army; and
that at that time the accused and his companions were armed with
revolvers.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
Pastor Abellana, a twenty-seven-year-old merchant of Cebu City,
testified that in July, 1944, he was technical sergeant and member
of G-2 of the Philippine Army assigned to the Bohol Area Command;
that Lt. Pacifico Rosales was his officer; that on the morning of July
16, 1944, he went to meet Lieutenant Rosales in the house of Mrs.
Francisca Garcia in Pasil because he had an agreement with him to
meet him there; that before he reached the house of Mrs. Garcia he
saw Lieutenant Rosales captured by the accused Roque Badili and
his companions; that instead of going to Mrs. Garcia's house he
went to the house of a friend of his named Godofredo Borres; that
from the latter's house he saw Lieutenant Rosales "being dragged
by these people with his hands tied behind him and he was brought
to the sailboat"; that he (the witness)was about thirty yards from
the place where they brought Lieutenant Rosales; that the accused
Roque Badili was the one holding the rope tied to Lieutenant
Rosales; that as soon as Lieutenant Rosales was placed in the boat
"they headed for the sea." When asked who "they" were, he replied:
"Roque Badili, Bautista, Jose Moro, and there were others I did not
recognize." He further testified that as a member of the military
organization of Lt. Pacifico Rosales, he made an investigation to
ascertain his whereabouts; that according to the members of the
crew of the sailboat Rosales was killed and thrown into the sea; that
the members of the crew had gone to Mindanao and could not be
located at the time of the trial.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
The defense impugns the testimony of Mrs. Francisca Garcia on the
ground that it is prejudiced and biased because on one occasion,
according to the testimony of the accused, she asked him to
intervene with the Japanese on behalf of her husband who had been
arrested by a member of a Japanese navy but that the accused told
her that the navy was a different organization from that to which he
belonged, and so he could not do anything for her husband.
Assuming that to be true, we do not believe it sufficient to destroy
the credibility of Francisca Garcia. The accused had not done any
harm to her or her husband; and the fact that he was not able to
secure the release of her husband by the Japanese navy for the
reason explained by him was not sufficient motive for her to testify
falsely against him. We cannot believe her testimony to be a pure
invention because it was corroborated by that of two other
witnesses, Basilio Argoso and Pastor Abellana. Basilio Argoso's
testimony is also impugned by the defense, alleging that on one
occasion the accused arrested Basilio Argoso on a charge of theft.
But according to the accused he subsequently released Argoso upon
the request of the offended party himself. In any event, even if we
should doubt the veracity of Basilio Argoso, there is still the
testimony of Pastor Abellana, which has not in anyway been
impeached by the defense.chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
The accused testified that he did not know Lieutenant Rosales and
that on July 16, 1944, he was in Bohol. His alibi is not corroborated
by the testimony of any other witness. The only other witness he
called was Sergio Gaboya, an eighteen-year-old laborer, who
testified that in 1943 (he must have been only fifteen years of age
then) he was a soldier belonging to the 85th Regiment; that he and
the accused Roque Badili were guerrillas; that he knew Lieutenant
Rosales, who he said belonged to the Bohol Unit; and that he saw
Rosales in the mountains of Carmen, Bohol, in December, 1944.chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles virtual law
library
We are convinced from the evidence that the accused served the
enemy as a secret agent to apprehend members of the resistance
movement, and that with the aid of two fellow agents he captured
Lt. Pacifico Rosales, who was a member of the Philippine Army and
engaged in the resistance movement; and that as a result of the
treasonous acts of the accused and his companions, Lieutenant
Rosales was prevented from pursuing his patriotic activities. We
make no pronouncement as to whether Lieutenant Rosales was
killed or whether he is still alive, although the members of his
organization could find no trace of his whereabouts. The evidence
on this point in not sufficient upon which to make a definite
pronouncement. But whether Lieutenant Rosales was killed or not,
the act of the accused in apprehending him and preventing him
from pursuing his activities as a member of the guerrilla forces
constituted an aid to the enemy.chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobl es virtual law li brary
Considering all the circumstances of the case, the Court is of the
opinion that the appellant deserves reclusion temporal.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The sentenced appealed from is modified in the sense that the
accused shall suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion
temporal. As thus modified, the sentence appealed from is affirmed,
with costs.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuazon, Montemayor and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Ozaeta, J., I certify that Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Jose Pablo
voted to impose the penalty of reclusion temporal on the appellant.

kk. US vs Caballeros
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 29, 1905
G.R. No. 1352
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J .:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in
the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the
American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells,
and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as
principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of
the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards
Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the
murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate,
who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was
present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a
member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana
plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the
shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro,
the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with
the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by
reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under
such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against
him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that
he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has
been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well
as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly
declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the
aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the
burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made
before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique
Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be
considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto
Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to
him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness
for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio
Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other
defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to
have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No.
619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration
of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and
which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not
punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the
defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the
costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

jj. US vs Bautista

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET
AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by
force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the
Government of the Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4
of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment,
with hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon,
and each of them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine
of $2,000, and all and each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate
share of the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the
event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective fines.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of
the year 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a
number of Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands
by force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be known as
the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that one Prim Ruiz was
recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as
chief of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the
furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward the end of
December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in hidding
on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he
held a number of meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces
whereat was perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in
Hongkong that at these meetings new members were taken into the
conspiracy and plans made for the enlistment of an army of revolution and
the raising of money by national and private loans to carry on the campaign;
that to this end bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the
revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering
the officers thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and
that the conspirators did in fact take the field and offered armed resistance
to the constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of
overthrowing the Government because of their failure to combat successfully
with the officers of the law who were sent against them and of the failure of
the people to rise en masse in response to their propaganda.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a
resident of the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that
Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid
him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after
the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in several of the
above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans of the conspirators were
discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in
answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations
had been made and that he "held the people in readiness." chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the
conspirators through the agency of one Jose R. Muoz, who was proven to
have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of
Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint
certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the
proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was
being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several conferences
with the said Muoz whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection;
that at one of these conferences Muoz offered Puzon a commission as
brigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook to do his part in
organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he assured the said
Muoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly
organized in accordance with the terms of his commission.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the
conspirators; that he had accepted the appointment as brigadier-general of
the signal corps of the revolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking
any further action in the matter, and merely because he did not wish to vex
his friend Muoz by refusing to do so, and that when Muoz offered him the
appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "a joking tone," and that he,
Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy at
that time.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the
testimony of Muoz as to the fact that he had several interviews with Puzon
at which plans were entered into for the advancement of the cause of the
conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the light of a written statement
signed by Puzon himself at the time when he was first arrested, part of
which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation? - A.
My name is Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37
years of age; married; by profession a teacher of primary and secondary
schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do not know him, but by
name, yes.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with
what object he came here? And if you know it to be true, through whom did
you get such information? - A. In the first place I had notice of his coming to
the Islands as well as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and
secondly because J. R. Muoz told me the same on one occasion when I was
in his house to visit him.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? - A. No, sir; I
have no more information than that which I have mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? - A. Yes,
sir.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in this organization,
and who is it who invited you to join it? - A. J. R. Muoz, who is general of
division of this new organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking
me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to
which I, on account of his request and in view of the fact that the said
Muoz is a friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have
organized absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission for
it? - A. Yes, sir; I accepted said employment and although they gave me an
order to organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I had neither the
confidence nor the will.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out
what was intrusted to you, why did you accept employment as general of
the brigade? - A. I accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a
friend, but I never have the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this
statement, but he attempted to explain it away by saying that when he
made it he was so exited that he did not know just what he was saying. He
does not allege that improper means were taken to procure the confession,
and it was proven at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not
the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of reward or
leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent man and was for eighteen
years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish
Government, and during the insurrection he held a commission as an officer
in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His confession is clear and
intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he was so excited as not
to know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in
so far it inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an
officer of the military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as
evidence against him in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases of
the United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes
1
(2 Off. Gaz., 364), United
States vs. Silverio Nuez et al.
2
(3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United
States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al.
3
(3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United
States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al.
4
(4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is
to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record
clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the
apppointment in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied
by such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy,
and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into
consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the
conspirators. In the first of these cases - the United States vs. De los Reyes
- the accused was charged with treason, and the court found that the mere
acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing else being done
either by himself or by his companions, was not an "overt act" of treason
within the meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that -
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game
of government like children, the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the
pictures of flags and seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of
duping and misleading the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be
dignified by the name of treason.
In the second case - the United States vs. Nuez et al. -- wherein the
accused were charged with brigandage, the court held that, aside from the
possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there was no evidence to
show that it they had committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared
that they had never united with any party of brigands and never had been in
any way connected with such parties unless the physical possession of these
appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that each one of
the defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed
men while working in the field and were virtually compelled to accept the
commissions." chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that
de la Serna had confessed that "he was one of the members of
the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion
that the evidence did not sustain a finding that such confession had in fact
been made, hence the doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere
possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor
executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of
Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was "the fact
that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."chanrobles vi rtual law li brary
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was
testimony that four appointments of officials in a revolutionary army were
found in a trunk in the house of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in said
case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere possession of the documents of
this kind is not sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was
"evidence in the case that at the time these papers were received by the
appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the assistant councilmen of
the barrio in which lived, a witness for the Government, showed him the
envelope, and stated to him he had received these papers; that he didn't
know what they were and requested this councilman to open them. The
coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it to the
councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the
appointments in question and that the appellant did not act under the
appointment but immediately reported the receipt of them to the
authorities." chanrobles vi rtual law library
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in
no wise connected with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the
hope that such person would afterwards accept the commission and thus
unite himself with them, and it is even possible that such an appointment
might be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the
possession of the person thus nominated, and that such appointment might
be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in
whose possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of
all intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators
to use his name in this manner nor to send such a commission to him.
Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions
wherein it has been proven that such appointments have been concealed in
the baggage or among the papers of the accused persons, so that when later
discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as evidence against
the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in
this case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an
appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may
properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the
conspirators.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in
open court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be
applied in this case, but this court has always held, in conformance with the
decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of
conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the
crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in
such cases. ( In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)chanrobles vi rtual law library
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de
Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest substantially upon his acceptance of a
number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been
prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out
the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear that he
knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he received
the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle
was, nor that ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to
these bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the bundle and
discovered the nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that
he never had any dealings with the conspirators in relation to the conspiracy
or the object for which it was organized.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in
so far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his
proportionate share of the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said
Anecito de Guzman should be acquitted of the crime with which he is
charged and set a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of
the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon,
should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as it imposes subsidiary
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective
fines, and, there being no authority in law of such provision, so much of the
sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby
reversed.chanroblesvirtualawli brary chanrobles vi rtual law library
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the
record will be returned to the trial court for execution. So ordered.chanroblesvi rtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur as to the penalty imposed upon Bautista and
dissent as to that imposed upon Puzon.



Endnotes:
1 3 Phil. Rep., 349.
2 4 Phil. Rep., 441.
3 4 Phil. Rep., 448.
4 Page 364, supra.

ll. Santos vs Misa
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-319 March 28, 1946
GO TIAN SEK SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, Director of Prisons, respondent.
Mariano Trinidad for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor De los Angeles for
respondent.
BENGZON, J .:
The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February,
1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned
over last September, to the Commonwealth Government, and since then
detained by the respondent as a political prisoner. Such detention, he
claims, is illegal, because he has not been charge before, nor convicted by,
the judge of a competent court, and because he may not be confined under
Act. No. 682, as he owes allegiance neither to the United States nor to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Solicitor-General, for the respondent, admits the detention, for active
collaboration with the Japanese, doubts the allegation of citizenship, and
maintains that, conceding arguendo petitioner's alienage, he may be
charged for espionage, a crime against national security wherein allegiance
is immaterial, and may, therefore, be held in custody under Commonwealth
Act No. 682.
As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject.
The commitment order No. 291 issued by the United States Army
authorities describes him as such. But it does not follow that he is entitled
to liberty now. He is included among those contemplated by section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, which reads partly:
Upon delivery the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as
political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of
Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits
and such other things as the Government of the United States may
have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political
prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc.,
and take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be
proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the
interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred
twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
deemed, as they are hereby suspended, insofar as the aforesaid
political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding
information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension
shall not be than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said
political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government.
His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the
above provisions. As stated by the Solicitor-General, he might be
prosecuted for espionage, (Commonwealth Act No. 616) a crime not
conditioned by the citizenship of the offender, and considered as an
offense against national security.
The contentions advanced during the oral argument, challenging the
validity of the said section 19, Commonwealth Act. No. 682, upon
constitutional grounds must be overruled, in view of our decision in Laurel
vs. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante), copy of which will be furnished to
petitioner by the clerk of this court. The petition is denied, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones,
JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.


Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
We concur with the majority pronouncement to the effect that petitioner is
not excluded from the group of persons contemplated by section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, notwithstanding his foreign status as a
Chinese subject. We also agreed that, if there are facts and evidence to
justify it, he might be prosecuted for espionage, or any other crime not
conditioned by the citizenship of the offender. But we disagree as to the
denial of the petition, it appearing that petitioner is being deprived of his
personal liberty without any due and legal process of law, and as to this
question, we refer to the stand we have been taken in our dissenting
opinion in case G.R. No. L-200,Laurel vs. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante),
the contentions therein we reiterate here.

mm. People vs Rodriguez
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y
MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y
ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-
appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano,
Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy
in an information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the
vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi,
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-
named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime
Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico
Lopez y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter
Power being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter
trade vessel of Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another and armed with
bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3)
daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1) Browning
Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by means of violence
and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully and
unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against
the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other
persona) properties belonging to the crew members and
passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash
money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen
Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal
belongings of passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass,
navigational charts and instruments amounting to Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
the aforementioned owners in the total amount of THREE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine
Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the said
piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed
accused to take, steal and carry away the properties
abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill and with evident premeditation,
treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage
of superior strength, use personal violence upon the persons of
Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos
Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi
Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael
Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam,
Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop
Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid
Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil
Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola
Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil,
Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon
them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries
upon the persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji
Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all
acts of execution which could have produced the death of said
persons, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause
independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said victims which
prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of
superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez,
assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on
March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of
death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty.
However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On
March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to
suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four
defendants because "there was a separate civil action for breach of
contract and damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85
against the several defendants, including the four accused
aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic
review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the
vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria
Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00
in the afternoon. In the evening of the same date, the vessel left for
Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders and crew members. Two
or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the
vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile,
he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on
his way through the engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then
appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with
rifles, started firing towards Que's companions after which they brought
Que to the pilot's house to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted
by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew members
were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of
Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time,
appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor
launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks of
copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and
Dario Dece coming down the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred
Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When
he tried to move, he realized that he was also hit on the right side of his
stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from
one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it could not be
opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them.
Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime
Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of
his men crawled and they took cover in the bodega of copra. While in
hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce.
About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come
out otherwise something worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez
who ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead
bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an
island where the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet
was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which
were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one
pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing
with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions,
gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria
when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at
the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam
Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico
Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani
Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece
claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty to the
accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y
Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa
despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to the alleged sworn
statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-
10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay;
(3) in holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of
the crime of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money to Atty.
Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely:
Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in
G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No.
532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon
conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder
or no homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of
piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death
penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the
plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.In
all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shag be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid
of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11")
to the Malaysian authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15")
before the National Bureau of Investigation of Manila. When said statement
(Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the
same was not objected to by the defense, aside from the fact that Peter
Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of said
declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is
that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority
of Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at
Kudat, you have signed that statement, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the
authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which
We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that his
participation in the commission of the offense was positively testified to by
the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji
Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have
seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who
actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at the
passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and the
fact that after the looting and killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed,
joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there can be no question that he was
in conspiracy with the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave
a statement to the authorities stating therein his participation as well as
those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian
authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of Investigation
authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where they executed their
respective statements after Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the
NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the P527,595.00
and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to
the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers
pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing
you that you are under investigation here in
connection with the robbery committed on the M/V
Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an
Assistant Engineer. You have a right to remain
silent and to refuse to answer any of our questions
here. You have the right to be represented by
counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should
you decide to be represented by a lawyer but
cannot afford one we will provide a lawyer for you
free. Should you decide to give a sworn statement,
the same shall be voluntary and free from force or
intimidation or promise of reward or leniency and
anything that you saw here maybe used for or
against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do
you understand an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature
hereinbelow to signify that you so understand all
your rights as above stated and that you do not
need the services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right
to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F",
"G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each other as each
admits his participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no room
for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a
circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the
crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera,
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay
JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part,


Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:
I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being sufficient direct
evidence and positive Identification by eyewitnesses.
I take exception, however, to the statement therein that accused Peter
Ponce "was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his
right to counsel." The monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" have been
stricken down by the Court as utterly unacceptable as a voluntary and
intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to silence and to counsel
in People vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my separate concurring
and dissenting opinion in the recent case of People vs. Itlanas (G.R. No.
60118, prom. February 28, 1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the
Court's requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA 538) that
"the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently given.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:
I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being sufficient direct
evidence and positive Identification by eyewitnesses.
I take exception, however, to the statement therein that accused Peter
Ponce "was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his
right to counsel." The monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" have been
stricken down by the Court as utterly unacceptable as a voluntary and
intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to silence and to counsel
in People vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my separate concurring
and dissenting opinion in the recent case of People vs. Itlanas (G.R. No.
60118, prom. February 28, 1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the
Court's requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA 538) that
"the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently given.

TITLE II
a. David vs Macapagal-Arroyo
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h. EN BANC
i.
j.
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID,
LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD
LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R.
RAYEL, GARY S.
MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,
Petitioners,

- versus -


GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND
G.R. No. 171396

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

*
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JJ.

Promulgated:

May 3, 2006


G.R. No. 171409


TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,
Petitioners,


- versus -


HONORABLE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA AND
HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO,
JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A.
CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C.
OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN
EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL.
GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J.
VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE
R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO,
JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO
GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-
CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C.
REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL,
ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS,
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI
JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT
OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY
AMADO GAT INCIONG,
Petitioners,

- versus -


EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE










G.R. No. 171485





























SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V.
PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG,
GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF
PNP,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG
AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL
MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-
KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS
NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V.
USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA
P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO,
JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,




- versus -




HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA,
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP
DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO
LOMIBAO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.
(ALG),






G.R. No. 171483






























G.R. No. 171400




Petitioner,
- versus -


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO
SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO
M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA,
JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA
A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C.
ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI,
J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L.
DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA
AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP),
Petitioners,

- versus -


HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF,
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP
CHIEF,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
LOREN B. LEGARDA,
Petitioner,


- versus -













G.R. No. 171489






















G.R. No. 171424


GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN
HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Respondents.

k. x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
l.
m.
n.
o. DECISION
p.
q.
r. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
s.
t.
u. All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid
formula are necessary.
[1]
Superior strength the use of force cannot
make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in
safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their
liberty.
v.
w. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus
most relevant. He said: In cases involving liberty, the scales of
justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the
poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the
weak. Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the
courts with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.
[2]

x. These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners
contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed
efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
y.
z.
aa. Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently
modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine
the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the
degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?
[3]

bb. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20
th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
cc.
dd. NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-
in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
ee.
ff. She cited the following facts as bases:
gg.
hh. WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition
have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by
the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military
adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic
conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
ii.
jj. WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the
President;
kk.
ll. WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified
by certain segments of the national media;
mm.
nn. WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by
obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy
and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in
the future of this country;
oo.
pp. WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
qq.
rr. WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme
Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to
bring down the democratic Philippine State;
ss.
tt. WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense
and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty
of Government;
uu.
vv. WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences,
ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present dangerto
the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
ww.
xx.
yy. On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP
1017, thus:
zz.
aaa. WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left,
represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by
military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine
State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
bbb. WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down our republican government;
ccc.
ddd. WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified
by certain segments of the national media;
eee.
fff. WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by
obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the
future of this country;
ggg.
hhh. WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
iii.
jjj. WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left
and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
the democratic Philippine State;
kkk.
lll. WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and
preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of
Government;
mmm.
nnn. WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences,
ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to
the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
ooo.
ppp. WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued
declaring a State of National Emergency;
qqq.
rrr. NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country;
sss.
ttt. I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the
PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
uuu.
vvv.
www. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which
reads:
xxx. WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
was issued declaring a state of national emergency;
yyy.
zzz. WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated
February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No.
1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as
any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;
aaaa.
bbbb. WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented,
suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;
cccc.
dddd. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
eeee.
ffff.
gggg. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.
[4]
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
hhhh. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor
General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
petitioners counsels.
iiii. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity
of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the
petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he
explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the
questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same,
narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
jjjj. On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio
Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood
mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a
public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all
costs. They called upon the people to show and proclaim our
displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only
by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our
left arms.
[5]

kkkk.
llll. On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled
Oplan Hackle I which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during
the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio
City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some
cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.
[6]
Upon the advice of
her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb
was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
mmmm. On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a
communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession
were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between
members of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA),
a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of
subversive documents.
[7]
Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced
through DZRH that the Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24,
2006, the 20
th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
nnnn. On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were
planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding
General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to disavow any defection. The latter
promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: All SAF units are
under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with
proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.
oooo. On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping
Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-
level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo
administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor
Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about
his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a
man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim,
Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said it was all
systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.
[8]

pppp. B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin
confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the
rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-
Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these
two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers
because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces
foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained
faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He
immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to
return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
qqqq. Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and
revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in
order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA
spokesman Gregorio Ka Roger Rosal declared: The Communist Party
and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the
possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of
bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable
to rule that it will not take much longer to end it.
[9]

rrrr. On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National
Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly
announced: Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are
growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the
families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-
insurgency operations in the field. He claimed that with the forces of
the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative
political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing
since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing its
concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
ssss. Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication
towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as
additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So
is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
(3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila
radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.
[10]

tttt. By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security
advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the
fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and
the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of
command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students
from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the
President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital
Region.
uuuu. For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
vvvv. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation
of all programs and activities related to the 20
th
anniversary celebration
of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated
that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for
purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can already be implemented.
[11]

wwww. Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public
assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members
ofKilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various
parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA
shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently
dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained
policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and
tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the
massed participants. The same police action was used against the
protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of
Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot
policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue
and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.
[12]

xxxx. According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017
as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
yyyy. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested
was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-listAkbayan.
zzzz. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP,
on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices
in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen
from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial
and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila
Police District were stationed outside the building.
[13]

aaaaa. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily
Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
bbbbb. The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor, is meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets
not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing
down this government. The PNP warned that it would take over any
media organization that would not follow standards set by the
government during the state of national emergency. Director General
Lomibao stated that if they do not follow the standards and the
standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government,
or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc.
No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover. National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and
radio networks tocooperate with the government for the duration of
the state of national emergency. He asked for balanced
reporting from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the
coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will
not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that
violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.
[14]

ccccc. Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin
Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The
police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer
explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to
rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been
quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
ddddd. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to
visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while
the rest were dispersed by the police.
eeeee. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the
police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon
City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into
custody.
fffff. Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the
Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates
at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
ggggg. Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur
Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan MunaRepresentative
Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan
Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket
Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the
House of Representatives where the Batasan 5 decided to stay
indefinitely.
hhhhh. Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the
rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being
raised in these petitions.
iiiii. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that
the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
jjjjj. In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the
constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
kkkkk. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and(3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly.
lllll. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of raiding
the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of censorship or prior
restraint. They also claimed that the term emergency refers only to
tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is
absolutely no emergency that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
mmmmm. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative
Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the
House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo,
Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They
asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of
legislative powers; violation of freedom of expression and a
declaration of martial law. They alleged that President Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without
clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence
and a showing that there is necessity to do so.
nnnnn. In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and
their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws
and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they
violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble to redress their grievances.
ooooo. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
(ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because they violate (a) Section 4
[15]
of Article II, (b) Sections
1,
[16]
2,
[17]
and 4
[18]
of Article III,

(c) Section 23
[19]
of Article
VI, and (d) Section 17
[20]
of Article XII of the Constitution.
ppppp. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et
al., alleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the
President of her Martial Law powers. And assuming that PP 1017 is
not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that it
amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without
congressional approval. In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017
goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined
under the Revised Administrative Code.
qqqqq. And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda
maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional for being
violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such
as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters
of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution. In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented
her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
rrrrr. In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General
countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for
being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400
(ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et
al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not
necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis;
and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression
and redress of grievances.
sssss. On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and
heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be
summarized as follows:
ttttt. A. PROCEDURAL:
uuuuu. 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the
petitions moot and academic.
vvvvv. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et
al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.),171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal
standing.
wwwww. B. SUBSTANTIVE:
xxxxx. 1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual
bases of PP 1017.
yyyyy. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional.
zzzzz. a. Facial Challenge
aaaaaa. b. Constitutional Basis
bbbbbb. c. As Applied Challenge
cccccc.
dddddd. A. PROCEDURAL
eeeeee.
ffffff. First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
gggggg. I - Moot and Academic Principle
hhhhhh. One of the greatest contributions of the American system
to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated inMarbury v.
Madison.
[21]
This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --
iiiiii. The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people,
the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the
national government. x x x If the government consciously or
unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority
competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt,
and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as
expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the
beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.
[22]

jjjjjj.
kkkkkk. But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the
courts a self-starting capacity.
[23]
Courts may exercise such power
only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an
actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
[24]

llllll. Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent,
hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.
mmmmmm. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right,
an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.
[25]
The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case
or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered
moot and academic by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.
nnnnnn. Such contention lacks merit.
oooooo. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
[26]
so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
[27]
Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case
[28]
or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.
[29]

pppppp. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021
did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight
(8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged
illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the
present petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is
not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.
[30]

qqqqqq. The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution;
[31]
second, the exceptional character
of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
[32]
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public;
[33]
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
[34]

rrrrrr. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged
that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the
publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
[35]
And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
ssssss. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case,
respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate
Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.
[36]
However, they failed to
take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise
moot case may still be decided provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a
direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right within this
exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
tttttt. I I - Legal Standing
uuuuuu. In view of the number of petitioners suing in various
personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing
discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
vvvvvv.
wwwwww. Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.
[37]
In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[38]
Succinctly put,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
xxxxxx.
yyyyyy.
zzzzzz. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any
other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a
citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
aaaaaaa. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen
and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk,
[39]
where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of
public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the
public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex
rel Case v. Collins:
[40]
In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if
not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan
[41]
held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain
an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied.
bbbbbbb. However, to prevent just about any person from seeking
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed
with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged
in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,
[42]
later reaffirmed
in Tileston v. Ullman.
[43]
The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a
direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he
has a general interest common to all members of the public.
ccccccc. This Court adopted the direct injury test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,
[44]
it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,
[45]
Manila Race Horse Trainers
Association v. De la Fuente,
[46]
Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works
[47]
and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.
[48]

ddddddd. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement
of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers
Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,
[49]
where the transcendental
importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such
liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v.
Comelec,
[50]
this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to
the far-reaching implications of the petition notwithstanding its
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the
suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or
validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
[51]

eeeeeee. Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to
sue under the principle of transcendental importance. Pertinent are
the following cases:
fffffff. (1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
[52]
where the Court ruled
that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information
and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of
transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner
with locus standi;
ggggggg.
hhhhhhh. (2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v.
Zamora,
[53]
wherein the Court held that given the
transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court
may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to
prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking
judicial review of the Visiting Forces Agreement;
iiiiiii.
jjjjjjj. (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,
[54]
while the Court noted that
the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers
absent a showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of
Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its
ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
[55]
that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be
relaxed.
kkkkkkk.
lllllll. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from
the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
mmmmmmm. (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
nnnnnnn. (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
ooooooo. (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in question;
ppppppp. (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
qqqqqqq. (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
rrrrrrr. Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the
Courts attitude toward legal standing.
sssssss. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,
[56]
the Court ruled that the
status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery
contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of
constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any
allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a
concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
ttttttt. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,
[57]
the Court reiterated the direct injury
test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional
issues. It held that there must be a showing that the citizen personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal
official act.
uuuuuuu. In Lacson v. Perez,
[58]
the Court ruled that one of the
petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-
in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders,
members or supporters.
vvvvvvv. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
[59]
the Court ruled that only
the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as
they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a
usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing
their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido
Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be
devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
wwwwwww. Now, the application of the above principles to the present
petitions.
xxxxxxx. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly
David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with
petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing
Co. Inc. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and
unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal
standing.
yyyyyyy. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged
there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of
whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the
interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by
their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged
violations of their basic rights.
zzzzzzz. In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the
liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,
[60]
Kapatiran Ng Mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,
[61]
Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,
[62]
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,
[63]
and Taada v. Tuvera,
[64]
that when the issue concerns
a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws.
aaaaaaaa. In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to
give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to
assert the rights of their members.
[65]
We take judicial notice of the
announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and
canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5.
bbbbbbbb. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national
officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal
standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the
IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the
issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,
[66]
the Court held that the mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance
of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
cccccccc. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a
taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal
disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of
no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation
that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise
aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these
issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission
that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that
PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But
considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue
involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
dddddddd. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus
standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of
judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality
doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP
No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount
importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the
whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of
this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the
application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation
of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.
eeeeeeee.
ffffffff. This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus
standi.
gggggggg.
hhhhhhhh. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency,
[67]
may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the
Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative
and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean
that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official,
he remains accountable to the people
[68]
but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
[69]

iiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjj. B. SUBSTANTIVE
kkkkkkkk. I . Review of Factual Bases
llllllll.
mmmmmmmm. Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual
basis. Hence, it was not necessary for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.
nnnnnnnn. The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of
the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached
its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker
[70]
and Montenegro v. Castaneda
[71]
to the
volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,
[72]
Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,
[73]
and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.
[74]
The tug-of-war always cuts
across the line defining political questions, particularly those questions
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
[75]
Barcelon and
Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide
whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his
decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the
opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the
conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence
of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional
sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the
focus to the system of checks and balances, under which the
President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which in this respect, is,
in turn, constitutionally supreme.
[76]
In 1973, the
unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.
[77]
There,
the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of
whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a
political or justiciable question.
[78]
Then came Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile which greatly dilutedLansang. It declared that there is a need to
re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that in times of war or
national emergency, the President must be given absolute control
for the very life of the nation and the government is in great
peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience,
the People, and God.
[79]

oooooooo. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
[80]
-- a recent
case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar
to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents calling-out
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on
Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial
power, the courts are authorized not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
[81]
It
speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also
of duty.
[82]

pppppppp.
qqqqqqqq. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise
of power, Lansang adopted the test that judicial inquiry can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision
is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the
standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
[83]
In Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support
his assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
rrrrrrrr.
ssssssss. Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of
the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid.
tttttttt.
uuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwww. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
xxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyy. I I . Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
zzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaa. Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
bbbbbbbbb. on the Power of the President
ccccccccc. in Times of Emergency
ddddddddd.
eeeeeeeee.
fffffffff. This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of
the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political
theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our
ensuing discussion.
ggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiii. John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government,
called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem
of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by
the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the
promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations,
the Crown retained a prerogative power to act according to discretion
for the public good, without the proscription of the law and
sometimes even against it.
[84]
But Locke recognized that this moral
restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who
shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its
abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting
that the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases
where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven.
[85]

jjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkk.
lllllllll. Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary
suspension of democratic processes of government in time of
emergency. According to him:
mmmmmmmmm. The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from
adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them
disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the
State
nnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooo. It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong
as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its
law to lapse...
ppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqq. If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are
an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme
lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the
sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will,
and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish.
[86]

rrrrrrrrr.
sssssssss.
ttttttttt. Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or
supreme magistracy as he termed it. For him, it would more likely
be cheapened by indiscreet use. He was unwilling to rely upon an
appeal to heaven. Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of
prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.
[87]

uuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwww. John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of
representative government: I am far from condemning, in cases of
extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a
temporary dictatorship.
[88]

xxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyy. Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one
element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic
contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and
attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus:
zzzzzzzzz. Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be
necessary to resort to extra constitutional measures; for although they may
for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is
once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded
under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect
if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every
emergency and fixed rules for applying it.
[89]

aaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbb.
cccccccccc. Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill
sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of
standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and
controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet
the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and
vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective
constitutional restraints.
[90]

dddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeee. Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the
problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have
employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.
[91]
Frederick M.
Watkins saw no reason why absolutism should not be used as a
means for the defense of liberal institutions, provided it serves to
protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury
in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt
return to the previous forms of political life.
[92]
He recognized the
two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well
as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of
the executive, while at the same time imposing limitation upon that
power.
[93]
Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional
dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a
dictatorship: The period of dictatorship must be relatively
shortDictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in
characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in
any given case must never rest with the dictator himself
[94]
and
the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be strict
political conservatism.
ffffffffff.
gggggggggg. Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of
Watkins.
[95]
It is a problem of concentrating power in a government
where power has consciously been divided to cope with situations of
unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of
powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise
such powers, when, for how long, and to what end.
[96]
Friedrich, too,
offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency
powers, to wit: The emergency executive must be appointed by
constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not
enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency
powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last,
the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the
constitutional order.
[97]


hhhhhhhhhh. Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the
employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar,
Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of
constitutional dictatorship as solution to the vexing problems
presented by emergency.
[98]
Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a
priori the conditions of success of the constitutional dictatorship,
thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional
dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even
indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional
order

2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in
the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator

3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without
making specific provisions for its termination

4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization
of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal
requirements

5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no
regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the
conquest of the particular crisis . . .
iiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjj. 6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a
constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or
effect
kkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllll. 7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons
representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense
of the existing constitutional order. . .
mmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnn. 8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every
action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .
oooooooooo.
pppppppppp. 9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship,
like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the
man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
qqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrr. 10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the
termination of the crisis for which it was instituted
ssssssssss.
tttttttttt. 11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a
complete return as possible to the political and governmental
conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional
dictatorship
[99]

uuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwww. Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the
oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would
secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or
termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the
effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.
[100]

xxxxxxxxxx. Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary
theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, the
suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to
an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation
is not based upon sound constitutional theory. To appraise
emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to
distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether
the term dictator is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian
rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering
emergency powers. However used, constitutional dictatorship cannot
be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of
constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the concept of
constitutionalism articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
yyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzz. A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the
analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the
findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it
does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations
upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed
upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly
recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in
discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical
and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate
processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate
constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated
emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on
governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism
have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in
thelimiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant
difference. In associating constitutionalism with limited as
distinguished from weak government, McIlwain meant government
limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of
force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for
which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary
power and a complete political responsibility of government to the
governed.
[101]

aaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbb. In the final analysis, the various approaches to
emergency of the above political theorists - from Locks theory of
prerogative, to Watkins doctrine of constitutional dictatorship and,
eventually, to McIlwains principle of constitutionalism --- ultimately
aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of
allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief
Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a
sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and
checks.
ccccccccccc.
ddddddddddd. Our Constitution has fairly coped with this
problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986
Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution,
endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jacksons
balanced power structure.
[102]
Executive, legislative, and judicial
powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none
has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is
given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the
other. This system does not weaken the
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In
other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity
and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him
to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
eeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffff. a. Facial Challenge
ggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiii. Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of
its overbreadth. They claim that its enforcement encroached on both
unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the citizens.
jjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkk. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth
doctrine, is uncalled for.
lllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnn. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free
speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment
cases.
[103]

ooooooooooo.
ppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqq. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,
[104]
the US Supreme
Court held that we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment (freedom of
speech).
rrrrrrrrrrr.
sssssssssss.
ttttttttttt. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
[105]
it was held:
uuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvv. It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine
when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary
action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very
least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the
outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that
conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.
wwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyy. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.
[106]
Here,
the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum
of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
zzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbb. Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as
manifestly strong medicine, to be used sparingly and only as a last
resort, and is generally disfavored;
[107]
The reason for this is
obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied
will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court.
[108]
A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further:
cccccccccccc.
dddddddddddd. The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a
statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties
and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute on its face, not merely
as applied for so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the chilling; deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
laws very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression. An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
eeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffff.
gggggggggggg. In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth
doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its
flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners,
but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,
[109]
it was held
that:
hhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiii. [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative
and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.
jjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkk. And third, a facial challenge on the ground of
overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to
show whether this situation exists.
llllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmm. Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP
1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
nnnnnnnnnnnn.
oooooooooooo. Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for
vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.
[110]
It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners
did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common
intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
pppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrr. b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
ssssssssssss.
tttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuu. Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
vvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwww. The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided
into three important provisions, thus:
xxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyy. First provision:
zzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbb. by virtue of the power vested upon me by
Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion
ccccccccccccc.
ddddddddddddd. Second provision:
eeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffff.
ggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiii. and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;
jjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkk.
lllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnn. Third provision:
ooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrr.
sssssssssssss. as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
ttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwww. First Provision: Calling-out Power
xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzz. The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out
power. In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
[111]
this Court, through Mr. Justice
Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
reproduced as follows:
aaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbb. Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ ofhabeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
cccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddd. The Congress, if not in session, shall
within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
eeeeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffffff. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty
days from its filing.
gggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhh. A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
iiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjj. The suspension of the privilege of the writ
shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllll. During the suspension of the privilege of the
writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
oooooooooooooo. grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. CitingIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[112]
the Court
ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is
that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated
earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo
found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast
intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country.
pppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqq. Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But
every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be
careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power
when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of
our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
ssssssssssssss. It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a
distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
rebellion (inSanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national
emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a state of
rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory
authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
tttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuu. SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President
fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx. President Arroyos declaration of a state of
rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited
above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without
legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President
Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed,
PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or
not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzz. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that
PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that
what the President invoked was her calling-out power.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbb. The declaration of Martial Law is a warn[ing] to
citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the
emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not
commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the
restoration of order and the enforcement of law.
[113]

ccccccccccccccc.
ddddddddddddddd. In his Statement before the Senate Committee on
Justice on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
[114]
an
authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law
poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine
which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or
persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the
President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from
harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual
freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
eeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffff. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
ggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiii. Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it
cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of
Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion
of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command
is ultra vires.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which
can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where
there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
ofhabeas corpus.
lllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. Based on the above disquisition, it is clear
that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces
to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. Second Provision: Take Care Power
sssssssssssssss.
ttttttttttttttt. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17,
Article VII which reads:
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwww. SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb. As the Executive in whom the executive power is
vested,
[115]
the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as
well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to
it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or
affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will,
among others, execute its laws.
[116]
In the exercise of such function,
the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as
the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,
[117]
including the Philippine National Police
[118]
under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
[119]

cccccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee. Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza,
and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated
upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation
of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to
enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction.
ffffffffffffffff.
gggggggggggggggg. \
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii. Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP
1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted
[120]
from Former President
Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllllll. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII,
Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire
Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under
martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
oooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppp. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Upon the
other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo
is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to alldecrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
decrees?
ssssssssssssssss.
tttttttttttttttt. PP 1017 states in
part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x
x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv. The President is granted an Ordinance Power under
Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following:
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President
providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in
executive orders.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a
date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which
only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the
President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall
be embodied in memorandum circulars.
ccccccccccccccccc. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands
of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
ddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffffff. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the
foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by
Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws
which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because
they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
[121]

ggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees
and laws through the military?
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
lllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. As this Court stated earlier, President
Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees
are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she
cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military,
under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. Third Provision: Power to Take Over
sssssssssssssssss.
ttttttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. x x x and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of
national emergency.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. The import of this provision is that President Arroyo,
during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees
x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII
which reads:
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb. Sec. 17. In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
cccccccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffffffffff. What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking
the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
gggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. The answer is simple. During the existence of the
state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President,
without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as
a product of the martial law thinking of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
[122]
In effect at the time of its approval was President
Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972
instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over
the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National
Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient
Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its
effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllllllll. Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17,
Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures
emergency powers.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn. This is an area that needs delineation.
oooooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppppp. A distinction must be drawn between the
Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency
and toexercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by
the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power,
hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the
second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
ssssssssssssssssss.
tttttttttttttttttt. SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. (2) In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to
other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare
a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided
so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the
President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The
logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the
existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. Courts have often said that constitutional
provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise
stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which
relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other.
[123]
Considering that Section 17 of
Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to
national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the
limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccccccccccccc. Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
thus:
ddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffffffff. (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
ggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised
to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
[124]

lllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooooooo. Section 17, Article XII must be understood
as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power
is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,
[125]
held:
ppppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq. It is clear that if the President had authority to issue
the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And
it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the
President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from
the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is
placed on provisions in Article II which say that The executive Power shall
be vested in a President . . . .; that he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed; and that he shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
sssssssssssssssssss. The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the
Presidents military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases
upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day
fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even
though theater of war be an expanding concept, we cannot with
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take
possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from
stopping production. This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not for its
military authorities.
ttttttttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because
of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the
President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to
be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal
about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first
section of the first article says that All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . .
[126]

vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the
term emergency under Section 17, Article XII refers to tsunami,
typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences. This is a limited
view of emergency.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
cccccccccccccccccccc. Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the
existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as
normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity,
variety, and perception.
[127]
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a
wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal
heads: a) economic,
[128]
b) natural disaster,
[129]
and c) national
security.
[130]

dddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffffffffffff.
gggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii. Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of
the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence
or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide
proportions or effect.
[131]
This is evident in the Records of the
Constitutional Commission, thus:
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees
definition of national emergency which appears in Section 13, page 5? It
reads:
llllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. When the common good so requires,
the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn. MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat
from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.
oooooooooooooooooooo. MR. GASCON. There is a question by
Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?
pppppppppppppppppppp. MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be
covered by the term national emergency.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq. MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such
proportions such that they would paralyze government service.
[132]

rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. x x x x
x x
ssssssssssssssssssss. MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if national
emergency refers to military national emergency or could this
be economic emergency?
tttttttttttttttttttt. MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or
economic dislocations.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.
[133]

vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. It may be argued that when there
is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and,
therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. In Araneta v. Dinglasan,
[134]
this Court
emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary
measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. x x x
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccccccccccccccc. After all the criticisms that have been made
against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact
remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its
defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one
man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-
loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is,
under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all
the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the
history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have
been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of
enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as
legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed
standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when
it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth
is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform
the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively.
ddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffffffffff. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
ggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone
can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation,
he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power
to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. c. AS APPLIED CHALLENGE
lllllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. One of the misfortunes of an
emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military
necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not
compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many
rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless
arrest;and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of
assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooooooooo. Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate direct
injury.
ppppppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas
alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants
on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20
th
Anniversary of People Power
I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
sssssssssssssssssssss. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the
CIDG operatives raided and ransacked without warrant their
office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible
source of destabilization. Again, the basis was PP 1017.
ttttttttttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and
NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were turned away and
dispersed when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to
celebrate the 20
th
Anniversary of People Power I.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. A perusal of the direct
injuries allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they
resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP
1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does
the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to
declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused
[135]
and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the
manner of application.
[136]
The validity of a statute or ordinance is to
be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish
the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.
[137]
PP 1017
is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing
in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal
arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
cccccccccccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffffffffffffff. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal
acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute
or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of
power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its
exertion.
[138]
This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations
when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers
implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from
the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the
Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have
been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.
gggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii. President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect
the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are acts and commands of
the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. They are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and
regulations create no relation except between the official who issues
them and the official who receives them.
[139]
They are based on and are
the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and
obedience, their object.
[140]
For these reasons, one requirement for these
rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or
capricious.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.
llllllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. Unlike the term lawless violence
which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and
which is invariably associated with invasion, insurrection or rebellion,
the phrase acts of terrorism is still an amorphous and vague
concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of
terrorism.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
oooooooooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq. In fact, this definitional predicament or the
absence of an agreed definition of terrorism confronts not only our
country, but the international
community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
ssssssssssssssssssssss. In the actual unipolar context of international
relations, the fight against terrorism has become one of the basic slogans
when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and
against groups operating internationally. Lists of states sponsoring
terrorism and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being
updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are
clearly determined by strategic interests.
tttttttttttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. The basic problem underlying all these military
actions or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States
against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. Remarkable confusion persists in
regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by
armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. The dilemma can by summarized in the saying
One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom fighter. The apparent
contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term terrorism may
further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national
liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib
Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a
few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory
at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts
the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually
legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccccccccccccccccc. Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations
Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue
of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has
been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate terrorism with
any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or
infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept
of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or
against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state
is concerned.
ddddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee. The dilemma facing the international community
can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of
organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for
Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who are terrorists in
the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier
Contras in Nicaragua freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for
the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to
become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a
group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a
terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating
examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way
because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those
perceptions.
fffffffffffffffffffffff.
ggggggggggggggggggggggg. How, then, can those contradicting
definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same
group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these
striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on
whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival,
or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of
terrorism will fluctuate accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as
protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will
therefore speak of a liberation struggle, not of terrorism when acts of
violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii. The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach
a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting
interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a
particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the
terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A policy of double standards on this
vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. This definitional predicament of an
organization consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in spite of
the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become
even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower
exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of
the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being
marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.
[141]

lllllllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. The absence of a law defining
acts of terrorism may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the
police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely
engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider
the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to
G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It
must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there
is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding
penalty thereon.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppppppppppp. So far, the word terrorism appears only
once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981
enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This
decree is entitled Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and
Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive
Organizations. The word terrorism is mentioned in the following
provision: That one who conspires with any other person for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by
force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion
temporal x x x.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
sssssssssssssssssssssss.
ttttttttttttttttttttttt. P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which
outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President
Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not
define acts of terrorism. Since there is no law defining acts of
terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on
this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be
indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal
of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All
these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far
beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate
the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that
the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5
authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless
violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the
Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
cccccccccccccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee. We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et
al.)
ffffffffffffffffffffffff.
gggggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii. The Constitution provides that the right of the people to
be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[142]
The plain
import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and
arrests are normallyunreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse
to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
[143]

jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllllllllllllll. In the Brief Account
[144]
submitted by petitioner
David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant;second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP
1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he
was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal
suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who held his
head and tried to push him inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was
charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No.
880
[145]
and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7)
hours; and seventh, he was eventually released for insufficiency of
evidence.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
oooooooooooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
ssssssssssssssssssssssss.
tttttttttttttttttttttttt. Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv. (a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. (b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. x x x.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccccccccccccccccccc.
ddddddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffffffffffffff. Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above
justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
[146]
Consequently, the
Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is
insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also
stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of
BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the
leader of the rally.
[147]

ggggggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. But what made it doubly worse for
petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.
lllllllllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
sssssssssssssssssssssssss.
ttttttttttttttttttttttttt. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. Assembly means a right on
the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution
and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights
embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not
subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned
upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government
authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a
public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. The ringing truth here is that petitioner
David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to
peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was
there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the
limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed
to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,
[148]
it
was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
cccccccccccccccccccccccccc. Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion
cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political
action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such
meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the
rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as
to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as
to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the
persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or
are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be
prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a
different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such
offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a
lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
dddddddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffffffffffffffffff.
gggggggggggggggggggggggggg. On the basis of the above principles, the
Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of
KMU et al.(G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal
was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all
permits previously issued by local government units. This is
arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent.
[149]
Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only
upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents
failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts
amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket
revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate
assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They
have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due
notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and
present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the
revocation of their permits.
[150]
The first time they learned of it was at
the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When
a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a
democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable,
and according to procedure.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllllllllllllllll.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn. G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.)
presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the
press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed
to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribunes offices
were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized
several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at
about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the
search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen
stationed themselves at the vicinity of theDaily Tribune offices.
oooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppppppppppppp. Thereafter, a wave of warning came
from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor
was quoted as saying that such raid was meant to show a strong
presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that
would help the rebels in bringing down this government. Director
General Lomibao further stated that if they do not follow the
standards and the standards are if they would contribute to
instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is
in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend
a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald
Solis urged television and radio networks to cooperate with the
government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He
warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of
any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage
during times when the national security is threatened.
[151]

qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
ssssssssssssssssssssssssss. The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of
search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any
other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof
or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct
that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules
were violated by the CIDG operatives.
tttttttttttttttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv. Not only that, the search violated
petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its
media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff
[152]
this Court held that --
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. As heretofore stated, the
premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with
the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed
under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and
even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and
growth of the citizenry.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccccccccccccccccccccc. While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not
padlocked and sealed like the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG
operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of
materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of
the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government
officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary
of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak
only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is
permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to
disobey.
[153]
Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these
arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This
Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even
if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on
public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It
is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto
should always be obsta principiis.
[154]

ddddddddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffffffffffffffff.
ggggggggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the
Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices and
the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal;
and that the same are inadmissible for any purpose, thus:
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. JUSTICE CALLEJO:
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
lllllllllllllllllllllllllll. You made quite a mouthful of admission
when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the
purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen
were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the
admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn. SOLICITOR GENERAL
BENIPAYO:
ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp. Under the law they would
seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your
Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose.
[155]

qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. x x x x x x x x x
sssssssssssssssssssssssssss.
ttttttttttttttttttttttttttt. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv. These have been published in
the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those
past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the
morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly
part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. Well, it was the police that
did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
cccccccccccccccccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddddddddddddddddd. Are you saying that the act of
the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based
on Proclamation 1017.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffff. SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
gggggggggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. It is not based on
Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017
which says that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings
from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllllllllllllllllll. Is it based on any law?
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn. SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppp. As far as I know, no, Your
Honor, from the facts, no.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
ssssssssssssssssssssssssssss.
tttttttttttttttttttttttttttt. So, it has no basis, no legal basis
whatsoever?
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. Maybe so, Your
Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature
to say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have been
injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there
are remedies for this.
[156]

bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc.
ddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd. Likewise, the warrantless arrests and
seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General,
illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffff. CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ggggggggggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh. There seems to be some
confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj. SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllll. I dont know whether this will clarify. The
acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion
of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the
President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts
of the police officers, that is their responsibility.
[157]

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp. The Dissenting Opinion states that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and should
result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to
their letter.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr. The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At
this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out
by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to
G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the
citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.
sssssssssssssssssssssssssssss.
ttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt. In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an
integral part of this ponencia.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. S U M M A T I O N
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy. In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through
the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally
rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was
still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance
thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it,
may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on
April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed if the May 1
rallies become unruly and violent. Consequently, the transcendental
issues raised by the parties should not be evaded; they must now be
resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue
decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by
the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The Court
also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.
cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc.
dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5
valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-
Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of
PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the
military and the police should take only the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O.
No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress
and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While
terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law has been
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the
limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff.
gggggggggggggggggggggggggggggg.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts
narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the
rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members;
(3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the
press; and (4) the warrantless search of theTribune offices and the
whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials,
are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not
even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllll. Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court
cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the
individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually
identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of
action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented
before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making
any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn.
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq. It is well to remember that military
power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in
themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect
the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is
one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state. During
emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from
normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our
peoples liberty.
rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.
ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss. Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn
from the theorists who studied the various competing political
philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to
cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism:the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power,
and political responsibility of the government to the governed.
[158]

tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt.
uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu. WHEREFORE, the Petitions are
partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP
1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww. G.O. No. 5
is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP
and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts
of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
a.
b.
c. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the
dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media
or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
d.
e. No costs.
f.
g. SO ORDERED.
h.
i. ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
j. Associate Justice
k.
l.
m. WE CONCUR:
n.
o.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice



(On leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice


LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice



ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice



MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice



CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice



ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice



MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice





RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice



ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice



DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice



CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
p.
q. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
r. Associate Justice
s.
t.
u. CERTIFICATION
v.
w. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
x.
y.
z. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
aa. Chief Justice
bb.
cc.
dd.
ee.

ff.
gg.
*
On leave.
hh.
[1]
Law and Disorder, The Franklin Memorial Lectures, Justice Tom C. Clark Lecturer, Volume
XIX, 1971, p. 29.
ii.
[2]
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Liberty and Prosperity, February 15, 2006.
jj.
kk.
[3]
Articulated in the writings of the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, 540-480 B.C., who
propounded universal impermanence and that all things, notably opposites are interrelated.
ll.
[4]
Respondents Comment dated March 6, 2006.
mm.
[5]
Ibid.
nn.
[6]
Ibid.
oo.
[7]
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group, Philippine Army, Annex I of
Respondents Consolidated Comment.
pp.
[8]
Respondents Consolidated Comment.
qq.
[9]
Ibid.
rr.
[10]
Ibid.
ss.
tt.
[11]
Petition in G.R. No. 171396, p. 5.
uu.
[12]
Police action in various parts of Metro Manila and the reactions of the huge crowds being
dispersed were broadcast as breaking news by the major television stations of this country.
vv.
ww.
[13]
Petition in G.R. No. 171400, p. 11.
xx.
yy.
[14]
Ibid.
zz.
aaa.
[15]
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
bbb.
[16]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
ccc.
[17]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ddd.
[18]
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
eee.
[19]
(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
fff. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
ggg.
[20]
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
hhh.
[21]
1 Cranch 137 [1803].
iii.
[22]
Howard L. MacBain, Some Aspects of Judicial Review, Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of
the United States (Boston: Boston University Heffernan Press, 1939), pp. 376-77.
jjj.
[23]
The Court has no self-starting capacity and must await the action of some litigant so aggrieved
as to have a justiciable case. (Shapiro and Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, Sixth Edition,
1983, p. 79).
kkk.
[24]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Ed., p. 259.
lll.
[25]
Ibid.
mmm.
[26]
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
nnn.
[27]
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R. No. 132795, March 10, 2004,
425 SCRA 129; Vda. De Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 1165, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 91;
and Paloma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145431, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 590.
ooo.
[28]
Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56, January 26, 2004,
421 SCRA 21; Vda. De Dabao v. Court of Appeals, supra.
ppp.
[29]
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
qqq.
[30]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002, p. 268 citing Norton v. Shelby, 118 U.S. 425.
rrr.
[31]
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra.
sss.
[32]
Lacson v. Perez, supra.
ttt.
[33]
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra.
uuu.
[34]
Albaa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98, Acop v.
Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577, Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
vvv.
[35]
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, et al., No. L- 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438.
www.
xxx.
[36]
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
yyy.
zzz.
[37]
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6
th
Ed. 1991, p. 941.
aaaa.
[38]
Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., 88 Phil. 125 (1951).
bbbb.
[39]
275 Ky 91, 120 SW2d 765 (1938).
cccc.
[40]
19 Wend. 56 (1837).
dddd.
[41]
232 NC 48, 59 SE2d 359 (1950).
eeee.
[42]
302 U.S. 633.
ffff.
[43]
318 U.S. 446.
gggg.
[44]
65 Phil. 56 (1937).
hhhh.
[45]
G.R. No. 117, November 7, 1945 (Unreported).
iiii.
[46]
G.R. No. 2947, January 11, 1959 (Unreported).
jjjj.
[47]
110 Phil. 331 (1960).
kkkk.
[48]
77 Phil. 1012 (1947).
llll.
[49]
84 Phil. 368 (1949) The Court held: Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
mmmm.
[50]
L-No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.
nnnn.
[51]
Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, where the Court held
that where the question is one of public duty and the enforcement of a public right, the people are the
real party in interest, and it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen interested in the execution of the
law;
oooo. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, where
the Court held that in cases involving an assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and part of the general public which
possesses the right.
pppp. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, I nc. v. Tan, L. No. 81311,
June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371, where the Court held that objections to taxpayers lack of personality
to sue may be disregarded in determining the validity of the VAT law;
qqqq. Albano v. Reyes, G.R. No. 83551, July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264, where the Court held that
while no expenditure of public funds was involved under the questioned contract, nonetheless
considering its important role in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the
financial consideration involved, public interest was definitely involved and this clothed petitioner
with the legal personality under the disclosure provision of the Constitution to question it.
rrrr. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, I nc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, where the Court ruled that while petitioners are strictly
speaking, not covered by the definition of a proper party, nonetheless, it has the discretion to waive
the requirement, in determining the validity of the implementation of the CARP.
ssss. Gonzales v. Macaraig, J r., G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990, 191 SCRA 452, where the
Court held that it enjoys the open discretion to entertain taxpayers suit or not and that a member of
the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit where a constitutional issue is raised.
tttt. Maceda v. Macaraig, J r., G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 771, where the Court held
that petitioner as a taxpayer, has the personality to file the instant petition, as the issues involved,
pertains to illegal expenditure of public money;
uuuu. Osmea v. Comelec, G.R. No. 100318, 100308, 100417,100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA
750, where the Court held that where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
transcendental importance to the public of the cases involved demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedures;
vvvv. De Guia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, where the Court held
that the importance of the issues involved concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified
voters affected by the apportionment, necessitates the brushing aside of the procedural requirement
of locus standi.
wwww.
[52]
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
xxxx.
yyyy.
[53]
G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449.
zzzz.
aaaaa.
[54]
G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739.
bbbbb.
ccccc.
[55]
Supra.
ddddd.
eeeee.
[56]
G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 130.
fffff.
[57]
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337.
ggggg.
[58]
G.R. No. 147780, 147781, 147799, 147810, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
hhhhh.
[59]
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
iiiii.
[60]
235 SCRA 506 (1994).
jjjjj.
kkkkk.
[61]
Supra.
lllll.
mmmmm.
[62]
Supra.
nnnnn.
ooooo.
[63]
197 SCRA 52, 60 (1991).
ppppp.
qqqqq.
[64]
Supra.
rrrrr.
sssss.
[65]
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
ttttt.
[66]
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
uuuuu.
vvvvv.
[67]
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the intent of the framers is clear
that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (De
Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 2004 Ed., p. 302).
wwwww.
[68]
Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution provides: Public Office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
xxxxx.
yyyyy.
[69]
Ibid., Sec. 2.
zzzzz.
aaaaaa.
[70]
No. 2908, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 87.
bbbbbb.
[71]
91 Phil. 882 (1952).
cccccc.
[72]
No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448.
dddddd.
[73]
No. L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183.
eeeeee.
[74]
No. L-61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.
ffffff.
[75]
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
gggggg.
[76]
Lansang v. Garcia, supra, pp. 473 and 481.
hhhhhh.
[77]
Supra.
iiiiii.
jjjjjj.
[78]
Five Justices Antonio, Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, and Aquino took the position that the
proclamation of martial law and the arrest and detention orders accompanying the proclamation posed a
political question beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Justice Antonio, in a separate opinion concurred
in by Makasiar, Fernandez, and Aquino, argued that the Constitution had deliberately set up a strong
presidency and had concentrated powers in times of emergency in the hands of the President and had given
him broad authority and discretion which the Court was bound to respect. He made reference to the
decision in Lansang v. Garcia but read it as in effect upholding the political question
position. Fernandez, in a separate opinion, also argued Lansang, even understood as giving a narrow scope
of review authority to the Court, affirmed the impossible task of checking the action taken by the
President. Hence, he advocated a return to Barcelon v. Baker. Similarly, Esguerra advocated the
abandonment of Lansang and a return to Barcelon. And, although Justices Castro, Fernando, Muoz-
Palma, and, implicitly, Teehankee, lined up on the side of justiciability as enunciated
in Lansang, x x x Barredo, however, wanted to have the best of both worlds and opted for the view that
political questions are not per se beyond the Courts jurisdiction ... but that as a matter of policy implicit
in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executives Proclamation.
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 794.)
kkkkkk.
[79]
See Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
supra.
llllll.
[80]
Supra.
mmmmmm.
[81]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Ed., p. 247.
nnnnnn.
[82]
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998, 298 SCRA 756.
oooooo.
[83]
Supra, 481-482.
pppppp.
[84]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President during Crises, 1972, p. 6.
qqqqqq.
[85]
Ibid.
rrrrrr.
[86]
The Social Contract (New York: Dutton, 1950), pp. 123-124.
ssssss.
[87]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President during Crises, 1972, pp. 6-7.
tttttt.
[88]
Representative Government, New York, Dutton, 1950, pp. 274, 277-78.
uuuuuu.
[89]
The Discourses, Bk. 1, Ch. XXXIV.
vvvvvv.
[90]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972. p. 8.
wwwwww.
[91]
Ibid.
xxxxxx.
[92]
See The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 328.
yyyyyy.
[93]
Ibid., p. 353.
zzzzzz.
[94]
Ibid., pp. 338-341.
aaaaaaa.
[95]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 9.
bbbbbbb.
[96]
Constitutional Government and Democracy, Ch. XXVI, rev. ed., Boston: Ginn &
Co., 1949, p. 580.
ccccccc.
[97]
Ibid, pp. 574-584.
ddddddd.
[98]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 10.
eeeeeee.
[99]
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948,
pp. 298-306.
fffffff.
[100]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 11.
ggggggg.
[101]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 12.
hhhhhhh.
[102]
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579; 72 Sup. Ct. 863; 96 L.
Ed. 1153 (1952), See Concurring Opinion J. Jackson.
iiiiiii.
jjjjjjj.
[103]
See Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 393.
kkkkkkk.
lllllll.
[104]
481 U.S. 739, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987).
mmmmmmm.
nnnnnnn.
[105]
Supra.
ooooooo.
ppppppp.
[106]
See Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
qqqqqqq.
rrrrrrr.
[107]
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
sssssss.
ttttttt.
[108]
Ibid.
uuuuuuu.
[109]
401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 680 (1971), United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L.Ed.2d
388 (1989).
vvvvvvv.
wwwwwww.
[110]
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, No. L-
24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849 (1967).
xxxxxxx.
[111]
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656, wherein this Court sustained
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion pursuant to her calling-out power.
yyyyyyy.
zzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaa.
[112]
Supra.
bbbbbbbb.
cccccccc.
[113]
Westel Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States 1591 [2d Ed. 1929,
quoted in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974), (Fernando, J., concurring)].
dddddddd.
eeeeeeee.
[114]
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
ffffffff.
gggggggg.
[115]
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution.
hhhhhhhh.
iiiiiiii.
[116]
Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution.
jjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkk.
[117]
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
llllllll.
mmmmmmmm.
[118]
Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution.
nnnnnnnn.
oooooooo.
[119]
See Republic Act No. 6975.
pppppppp.
qqqqqqqq.
[120]
Ironically, even the 7
th
Whereas Clause of PP 1017 which states that Article 2,
Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and
the State the primary duty of Government replicates more closely Section 2, Article 2 of the 1973
Constitution than Section 4, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that, [t[he prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
rrrrrrrr.
ssssssss.
[121]
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, 1998, p. 1, citing Legaspi v.
Ministry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 (1982); Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce-Enrile, supra. Aquino v.
Commission on Election, supra.
tttttttt.
[122]
Section 17, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads: In times of national emergency
when the public interest so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
uuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvv.
[123]
Antieau, Constitutional Construction, 1982, p.21.
wwwwwwww.
[124]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998, p. 94.

[125]
343 U.S. 579; 72 Sup. Ct. 863; 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).

xxxxxxxx.
[126]
Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, 1959, Power of the President, pp. 255-257.
[127]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 14
yyyyyyyy.
[128]
The Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 opened with a declaration that the economic depression created a serious
emergency, due to wide-spread unemployment and the inadequacy of State and local relief funds, . . . making it imperative
that the Federal Government cooperate more effectively with the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia
in furnishing relief to their needy and distressed people. President Roosevelt in declaring a bank holiday a few days after
taking office in 1933 proclaimed that heavy and unwarranted withdrawals of gold and currency from banking
institutions for the purpose of hoarding; ... resulting in sever drains on the Nations stocks of gold have created a
national emergency, requiring his action. Enacted within months after Japans attack on Pearl Harbor, the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 was designed to prevent economic dislocations from endangering the national defense and
security and the effective prosecution of the war. (Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p.18)

[129]
The Emergency Appropriation Act for Fiscal 1935 appropriated fund to meet the emergency and necessity for relief in
stricken agricultural areas and in another section referred to the present drought emergency.
[129]
The India Emergency
Food Aid Act of 1951 provided for emergency shipments of food to India to meet famine conditions then ravaging the great
Asian sub-continent. TheCommunication Act of 1934 and its 1951 amendment grant the President certain powers in time of
public peril or disaster. The other statutes provide for existing or anticipated emergencies attributable to earthquake,
flood, tornado, cyclone, hurricane, conflagration an landslides.
[129]
There is also a Joint Resolution of April 1937. It made
funds available for the control of incipient or emergency outbreaks of insect pests or plant diseases, including grasshoppers,
Mormon crickets, and chinch bugs. (66 Stat 315, July 1, 1952, Sec. 2 [a]) Supra.

[130]
National Security may be cataloged under the heads of (1) Neutrality, (2) Defense, (3) Civil Defense, and (4) Hostilities
or War. (p. 22) The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 contemplated an attack or series of attacks by an enemy of the United
States which conceivably would cause substantial damage or injury to civilian property or persons in the United States by
any one of several means; sabotage, the use of bombs, shellfire, or atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological means or
other weapons or processes. Such an occurrence would cause a National Emergency for Civil Defense Purposes, or a
state of civil defense emergency, during the term which the Civil Defense Administrator would have recourse to
extraordinary powers outlined in the Act. The New York-New Jersey Civil Defense Compact supplies an illustration in this
context for emergency cooperation. Emergency as used in this compact shall mean and include invasion, or other hostile
action, disaster,insurrection or imminent danger thereof. ( Id., p.15-16)

[131]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998, p. 95.
zzzzzzzz.
aaaaaaaaa.
[132]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, pp. 266-267.
bbbbbbbbb.
ccccccccc.
[133]
Record of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 648-649.
ddddddddd.
eeeeeeeee.
[134]
84 Phil. 368 (1949).
fffffffff.
[135]
Uren v Bagley, 118 Or 77, 245 P 1074, 46 ALR 1173.
ggggggggg.
[136]
Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 34 NM 346, 282 P 1, 70 ALR
1261, cert den 280 US 610, 74 L ed 653, 50 S Ct 158.
hhhhhhhhh.
[137]
Sanitation Dist. V. Campbell (Ky), 249 SW 2d 767; Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211
NY 309, 105 NE 548.
iiiiiiiii.
[138]
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 US 322, 53 L ed 530, 29 S Ct 370.
jjjjjjjjj.
[139]
De Leon and De Leon Jr., Administrative Law, Text and Cases, 2001 Ed., p. 115.
kkkkkkkkk.
[140]
Ibid.
lllllllll.
[141]
In a Lecture delivered on March 12, 2002 as part of the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture
Series, Hans Koechler, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck (Austria) and President
of the International Progress Organization, speaking on The United Nations, The International Rule
of Law and Terrorism cited in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kapunan in Lim v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739.
mmmmmmmmm.
[142]
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
nnnnnnnnn.
[143]
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Reviewer-
Primer, p. 51.
ooooooooo.
[144]
Annex A of the Memorandum in G.R. No. 171396, pp. 271-273.
ppppppppp.
[145]
An Act Ensuring the Free Exercise by the People of their Right Peaceably to
Assemble and Petition the Government for Other Purposes.
qqqqqqqqq.
rrrrrrrrr.
[146]
Annex A of the Memorandum in G.R. No. 171396, pp. 271-273.
sssssssss.
[147]
Ibid.
ttttttttt.
[148]
299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278.
uuuuuuuuu.
vvvvvvvvv.
[149]
Reyes v. Bagatsing, No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.
wwwwwwwww.
xxxxxxxxx.
[150]
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply
with the following guidelines:
yyyyyyyyy.
zzzzzzzzz. x x x x x x
aaaaaaaaaa. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
bbbbbbbbbb.
[151]
Petition in G.R. No. 171400, p. 11.
cccccccccc.
[152]
No. L-64161, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 816.
dddddddddd.
eeeeeeeeee.
[153]
Dissenting Opinion, J. Cruz, National Press Club v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. 102653, 102925 & 102983, March 5, 1992, 207 SCRA 1.
ffffffffff.
gggggggggg.
[154]
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
hhhhhhhhhh.
[155]
Transcript of Stenographic Notes, Oral Arguments, March 7, 2006, p. 470.
iiiiiiiiii.
[156]
Ibid., pp. 432-433.
jjjjjjjjjj.
kkkkkkkkkk.
[157]
Ibid, pp. 507-508.
llllllllll.
[158]
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crisis, 1972, p. 146.