Coercion

Negative

1NC (Reject)

<Insert specific link>
You must reject every instance of state infringement on individual economic
freedomsotherwise is to condone genocide and totalitarianism
Dorn 04 (James A., The Road to Serfdom after 60 Years, the Washington Times, Cato Institute,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/road-serfdom-after-60-years)//MY
In The Road to Serfdom and other works, Hayek expounded those liberal principles and warned
against protectionism and other forms of social planning. He understood that substituting
socialist ends in particular, freedom from want for capitalist means competition
and choice would destroy the very freedom necessary for a great society. He certainly would
have agreed with the great French liberal Frederic Bastiat, who in 1850 wrote: It is under the law of justice, under the rule
of right, under the influence of liberty, security, stability, and responsibility, that every man will attain to the full worth
and dignity of his being, and that mankind will achieve the progress to which it is destined. Attempts to plan
economic life and achieve social justice wrought havoc in the 20th century. The Soviet
Union, the Peoples Republic of China, East Germany, and other totalitarian states
learned the hard way that Marx was wrong and Hayek was right. What still needs to be
emphasized, however, is Hayeks message that political freedom is meaningless without economic
freedom. When private property rights are violated and economic freedom is attenuated
by various forms of government intervention, our other freedoms are threatened. The
Jews in Nazi Germany first had their economic liberties violated. The rest of the horrors
followed. Any infringement of economic liberty must be nipped in the bud. Constant
vigilance is necessary to prevent the erosion of the principles of a market-liberal order.
1NC (Alternative)

<Insert specific link>
The alternative is to reject government coercion in favor of moral
autonomyfosters harmonious relationships
Shaffer 10 (Butler, Anarchy in the Streets, The Costs of Human Action,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer213.html)//MY
Formal rules divide us from one another; the more rules that are imposed upon our
conduct, the greater the distances among us. Of course, this is the logic upon which the
state always acts: to insinuate itself into our relationships with others, substituting its
coercively-enforced edicts for our interpersonal bargaining. We become conditioned to
look upon strangers as threats, and to regard political intervention as our only means of
looking after our own interests. One sees this mindset of social impotence expressed throughout our lives. I
am fond of asking my students why they do not negotiate with retailers for groceries, clothing, and other consumer items.
They look at me as though I had suggested they attend movies in the nude. "You can't do that," they instinctively respond.
I then offer examples of persons I have known who make a habit of such bargaining, managing to save themselves
hundreds or more dollars each year. Incredulity still prevails. On one occasion, a student raised his hand to inform the
class that he had been an assistant manager of a major retail store in Los Angeles, adding "we did this all the time." How
easily we give up on our own social skills, and at what costs. These experiments with traffic-sign abandonment remind us
how much we rely upon informal methods of negotiating with other drivers, and the socially-harmonious benefits of our
doing so. My own freeway driving experiences provide an example: if another driver signals to move into my lane, or I
signal to move into his, more than a simple lane-change takes place. From that point on, there is nothing this other
motorist can do short of intentionally crashing into my car that will cause me to feel anger toward him. He's "my
guy," and I will feel a sense of neighborliness to him that will generate feelings of protectiveness toward him.
"Neighborliness" is a good word to use here: how many of us could honk our horn or make angry hand-gestures at another
driver we recognized to be someone that we know? This is one of the unintended consequences of
taking the state out of the business of directing our traffic: we regain our sense of society
with others; strangers lose their abstractness, and become more like neighbors to us. If
you doubt the pragmatic and social benefits of these experiments, try recalling those
occasions in which a traffic light goes out at a major intersection. Motorists immediately
and without any external direction begin a "round-robin" system of taking turns
proceeding through the intersection. One of my seminar students related her experience
in this connection. She was parked at the curb, waiting to pick up her mother. She noted
that traffic was flowing quite smoothly, and without any significant delays. Then a police
officer showed up to direct the traffic, with gridlock quickly ensuing. A number of years ago,
someone wrote an op-ed piece in the Los Angeles newspaper, reporting on a major Beverly Hills intersection where some
six lanes of traffic converge. There were no traffic lights governing the situation, with motorists
relying on the informal methods of negotiating with one another. The writer who lives
in the area commented upon the resulting orderliness, going so far as to check police
records to confirm just how free of accidents this intersection was. How counter-intuitive
so much of this is to those who have become conditioned to think that the state is the
creator of order in our lives. In much the same way that people are discovering how
widespread gun ownership reduces violent crime in society, putting power back into the
hands of individuals is the most effective way of fostering both the responsible and
harmonious relationships we have so childishly expected to arise from our dependence
upon, and obedience to, external authorities. What if the idea of living without coercively
imposed rules was to spread from the streets into all phases of our lives? What if we
abandoned our habits of looking to others to civilize us and bring us to order, and
understood that obedience to others makes us irresponsible? As government people-
pushers continue their efforts to micro-manage the details of our lives what foods and
drugs we may ingest; how we are to raise and educate our children; the kinds of cars we may
drive and light bulbs we may use; the health-care we are to receive; our optimal weight levels; how we are to
provide for our retirement; ad nauseam might we summon the courage to end our neurotic fixations on
"security?" Might the quality of our lives be greatly enhanced by the transformation in thinking implicit in
these traffic experiments? Might they offer flashes of insight into how the individual liberty to assess our
own risks and freely act upon the choices we make provide the necessary basis for a life that is both
materially and spiritually meaningful? As our institutionalized subservience and dependency
continues to destroy us, can we learn that what we and our neighbors have in common is
our need to negotiate with and to support one another as autonomous and changing
people in a changing and uncertain world?

LinkGeneric

Foreign aid is ineffectivemisdirected and only minimal benefits to
development

Sachs 05, Jeffrey D., economist, director of The Earth Institute, Columbia University (The End of Poverty, pgs 78-
90, 12/30/05, http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/foreignaff0305.pdf)//RN

Many Americans and senior government officials also mistakenly believe that private giving represents a substantial
amount of U.S. aid to developing countries. The Wall Street Journal and others, citing an earlier study by the U.S. Agency
for International Development (usaid), have even reported that private giving signicantly exceeds official giving, but their
estimates erroneously include $18 billion in private remittances, which are not development aid but income transfers
between family members in the United States and abroad. The dac estimates that U.S. assistance from private voluntary
agencies in 2003 amounted to about $6.3 billion. Even if one added to this gure a high-end estimate of $4 billion in other
giving from private foundations, corporate philanthropy, and other organizations, the sum of U.S. public and private
nancial contributions to international development would amount to around $26.6 billion, or just 0.25 percent of gdp.
Not only are the gures for official development assistance themselves not nearly as large as most Americans believe, but
the dacs estimate of $16 billion also overstates U.S. official aid for economic development by including a considerable
amount of assistance that contributes little or nothing to long-term development. In a recent white paper, usaid makes the
point by distinguishing between ve operational goals for foreign aid: promoting transformational development,
supporting strategic states, strengthening fragile states, providing humanitarian relief, and addressing global challenges
such as the hiv/aids epidemic and climate change. All ve operational goals make sense from a foreign policy standpoint,
but only the rst directly targets economic development. Aid intended for transformational development aims to support
longterm economic change by helping a country achieve structural transformations that should allow it ultimately to
escape dependence on outside aid. Assistance to strategic countries focuses on nations that have geopolitical importance,
such as Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and helps ght terrorism, strengthen alliances, or reduce narcotics
tracking. Aid to fragile states is designed to head to conict or help countries recover from it. Lastly, humanitarian
assistance is earmarked for relief following natural disasters and often takes the form of U.S. grain deliveries. A
surprisingly small proportion of U.S. bilateral assistance is directed at transformational
development, and only a small part of that actually transforms the economies of
developing countries. Washingtons own aid accounting (as opposed to the dacs) makes
a key distinction between developmental assistance and geopolitical aid, which is distributed to
strategic countries mostly as Economic Support Funds (esf). In 2004, the esf program provided $3.3 billion to 42
countries. Economic development is a side effect, not a basic objective, of such aid. Strategic
statesdened here as developing countries receiving more than half of their U.S.
assistance from the esf or similar funding (such as the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, and the Emergency Response Fund for Afghanistan)include several countries in the
Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.1 These 16 countries, plus the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, received about 45 percent of total U.S. bilateral assistance to developing
countries in 2003, even though they accounted for only 11 percent of the population of
developing countries receiving U.S. aid. Many of the strategic states are in fact middle-
income countries that are not high development priorities. In many cases, esf supports
corruption or allows a government to reduce its own development spending to free up
funds for its military. Meanwhile, according to the dac database, very little of the $6.1 billion the
United States spent on bilateral assistance to nonstrategic developing countries in
2003 actually reached the ground as long-term investment in transformational
development. For one thing, $2 billion was distributed as emergency assistance or as
non-emergency food aid. Emergency assistance, although salutary, merely addresses
immediate crises. Food aid for non-emergency purposes, moreover, has enormously high
transaction costs and distorts the local economy by depressing the prices local farmers
receive for their goods. Amazingly, nearly half of the money spent on U.S. food aid in
2004 went to cover transport costs rather than the food itself. In 2003, only $4.1 billion
in U.S. bilateral aid was not spent on strategic countries, food aid, or other emergency
aid. Of that total, moreover, $1.3 billion took the form of debt forgiveness grantsthe
cancellation of old debts, not the granting of new money. Furthermore, recipient
countries saved even less than that amount in actual debt payments in 2003, because the
cash-ow savings that year were only a small fraction of the debt that was erased from
the books. In some countries, debt payments have actually risen thanks to debt
cancellation. (After reaching agreements with creditor nations, countries that had
previously been servicing none of their debt burden have had to resume payments on a
smaller base.) Of the remaining $2.8 billion in 2003 U.S. bilateral aid, very little actually
funded investments in transformational development. According to the dac, the entire
sum went toward technical cooperation: payments made primarily to U.S. entities
consultants from government agencies or nongovernmental organizations (ngos)for assignments in recipient
nations. These missions may be useful, but the expenditures are not long-term investments
in local clinics, schools, power plants, sanitation, or other infrastructure. Washington gave very
little money directly to nonstrategic developing countries to support specic investments in transformational
development. Poor countries have proposed sound plans to build schools and clinics and pay
the salaries of teachers and doctors, but the United States virtually never funds such
programs directly, sending its own consultants instead. In doing so, Washington
contributes to an unworkable proliferation of donor-country pet projects, rather than to
an integrated strategy adopted by the recipient country and supported by the donors. A
balanced and judicious aid program would provide both technical cooperation and budgetary support to countries that
could use the money effectively.

Foreign aid are skewed and effective aid is reduced to nothingSaharan
Africa proves

Sachs 05, Jeffrey D., economist, director of The Earth Institute, Columbia University (The End of Poverty, pgs 78-
90, 12/30/05, http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/foreignaff0305.pdf)//RN

The case of sub-Saharan Africathe poorest region of the world shows how dangerously skewed
U.S. aid priorities are. The prevailing image in the United States is that Washington gives Africa vast sums of
money, which corrupt officials there then fritter away or stash in offshore accounts. But this image, fueled by inaccurate
stereotypes, badly misconstrues the truth. In fact, in 2003, the United States gave $4.7 billion to
sub-Saharan Africa in net bilateral oda. Of that sum, $0.2 billion went to a handful of
middle-income countries, especially South Africa. Of the remaining $4.5 billion, $1.5
billion was apportioned for emergency aid and $0.3 billion for non-emergency food aid.
Another $1.3 billion was designated for debt forgiveness grants, and $1.4 billion went to
technical assistance. This distribution left only $118 million for U.S. in-country
operations and direct support for programs run by African governments and
communities just 18 cents for each of the nearly 650 million people in low-income sub-
Saharan Africa. This gure represents the total U.S. bilateral support, beyond aid in the
form of technical cooperation, for investments in health, education, roads, power, water
and sanitation, and democratic institutions in the region that year. The next time U.S.
officials visit Africa and wonder aloud where the trillions and trillions of dollars went,
they should be reminded of how small those trillions actually are. Two recent U.S. initiatives will
modestly improve the picture, but so far their impact remains very limited. Announced in 2002, the new Millennium
Challenge Account (mca) is designed to give grants to low-income countries that demonstrate good governance. For the
current scal year, $1.5 billion has been appropriated for the mca, and in 2002 the Bush administration promised to
request $5 billion per year in 2006 and beyond. The mca is a highly meritorious new approach. No funds, however, have
yet been disbursed.

Foreign aid does not go to the government its controlled by NGOs

Ivins 95 - Mary Tyler "Molly" Ivins was an American newspaper columnist, author, liberal political commentator, and
humorist. Born in California and raised in Texas, Ivins attended Smith College and the Columbia University Graduate
School of Journalism (Molly, U.s. Foreign Aid Is Really In Trouble With Helms At Helm, Philly.com, 7/24/1995,
http://articles.philly.com/1995-07-24/news/25676545_1_foreign-aid-adventist-development-helms) // JA

In some ways, foreign aid deserves its generally lousy reputation among Americans because for a long time we did
it mostly wrong. Our foreign aid establishment was sort of like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers used
to be - just couldn't stop itself from building huge projects in defiance of common, economic and environmental sense. We
were always funding enormous dam projects, from which corrupt local politicians got very
rich, and building highways in countries where no one had bicycles. The concept of "appropriate technology" took a long
time to take root in the collective mind of our foreign aid people. But that fight has been won long since,
and perhaps the most misunderstood fact about foreign aid is that the really critical part of it is not run by the government
at all. What the government does is provide funding to ''NGOs," which is bureaucratese for
"nongovernment organizations." There are 35,000 of these private groups, an astonishing range from Catholic
Relief Services to CARE to the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International. In Africa,
Asia and Latin America, they are at work building schools and sewer systems, training health-care workers,
teaching new agricultural techniques and making tiny loans to start cottage industries, also known as micro- businesses.
Foreign aid fails governments use aid to increase their power over their
country, businesses and the freedoms of citizens. Theres no real benefit to
aid

Bovard, an associate policy analyst with the Cato Institute, January 31, 1986 (James, Cato Institute Policy
Analysis No. 65: The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid Policy Analysis,
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa065.pdf )//SG

Foreign aid consists largely of one government "helping" another government by beefing
up its budget, increasing its power over the private sector, and multiplying its leverage
over its citizens. As economist P. T. Bauer observed, there is an "inherent bias of government-to-
government aid towards state control and politicization."[62] The marvel of foreign aid is that many
of the same people who oppose government intervention in the United States somehow think we are doing foreigners a
favor by paying for it abroad. Many of the people who recognize that Amtrak has been an expensive mistake have no
objection to subsidizing state railroads in Africa. The same people who would fight any Department of Agriculture effort to
impose ceilings on prices received by American farmers are silent about U.S. financing of African bureaucracies that
burden African farmers with exploitative price controls. Some of the same congressmen who realize that federal
irrigation policies squander billions of dollars worth of water are still enthusiastic about
constructing government irrigation projects in Indonesia. Foreign aid is based on the
premise that foreign governments are devoted to their citizens' welfare--an assumption
that is even less true of foreign politicians than of the members of Congress. AID projects
in Guatemala have failed partly because some Guatemalan government officials oppose
improving the plight of the rural poor.[63] A million people may have starved in the Sudan in 1985 because
the government-owned railroad refused to transport American-donated food.[64] In Africa, where tribal rivalries often
still prevail, AID money is used to prop up the reigning factions in the same way that local American political machines
use federal grants as slush funds. Foreign aid greatly increases the patronage power of recipient
governments. As Bauer notes, "The great increase in the prizes of political power has been a major factor in the
frequency and intensity of political conflict in contemporary Africa and in the rest of the less developed world."[65] AID
officials often justify the agency's handouts by claiming that they persuade recipient
governments to abandon pernicious economic policies. The idea seems to be that the United States
must bribe foreign governments not to commit economic suicide. But few recipient governments have modified their
economic policies in response to AID assistance. Poverty-stricken Burkina Faso imposed a 66 percent tariff on
importation of animal-drawn plows and a 58 percent tariff on engines used for irrigation pumps.[66] In Zambia, the 1985
crop harvest was endangered because the "Zambian state corporation that collects agricultural produce can't afford to buy
the bags it needs."[67] As the World Bank recently admitted, preaching about the virtues of free markets has so far had
little effect on African socialism.[68] Making U.S. aid conditional on policy reform also cannot work simply because AID is
probably more anxious to give than Third World governments are to receive. Consider the case of Mozambique. In the last
10 years, Mozambique's Marxist government has thoroughly destroyed that nation's economy. The New York Times
recently noted that Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, "lacks virtually everything."[69] Mozambican farm policies pay
farmers only a tiny fraction of what their crops are worth, and they are largely responsible for a famine that killed 100,000
citizens in 1984. On the verge of being overthrown by pro-Western guerillas, the Mozambican
government decided to make some modest economic reforms and see what the United
States would pay. AID has rushed in with a $33 million bailout package, even though the country is still full of
Cuban troops and Soviet advisers and is still socialist. The New York Times commented, "The American change of heart is
apparently a result of Mozambique's readiness to accept American aid in its time of despair."[70] For AID, willingness
to accept a handout is sufficient proof of a government's good intentions. There is little
that foreign aid can do that private credit cannot do equally well or better. As Bauer notes,
"The maximum contribution of aid (to development) is the cost of borrowing that is avoided."[71] But the cost of avoiding
interest payments on loans is the transformation of imported capital into a pork barrel for recipient politicians. The
costs of politicizing aid are greater than the costs of interest payments on private credit.
Going on international welfare is frequently as pernicious to Third World governments as going on Aid to Families with
Dependent Children is for struggling American families . At the same time that Third World leaders claim they
are entitled to international welfare to overcome their countries' poverty, they often close
their borders to foreign investors, thus greatly diminishing the amount of capital
entering their countries. In 1960, foreign investment accounted for roughly 30 percent of the net flow of capital
to developing countries. Now, despite a huge increase in foreign investment between industrial countries, it accounts for
barely 10 percent of the net capital flow to the Third World. Foreign investment in the Third World in
real dollars was lower in 1983 than in 1970.[72]Many less-developed countries have
effectively decided that they would rather stay poor than allow foreigners to share the
profits of national development. Governments have expropriated foreign companies, prohibited them from
remitting their profits, and cheated them with "official" foreign exchange rates that are simply a disguised form of
expropriation. The Mexican government recently rejected a proposed $300 million joint truck-building venture with the
Chrysler Corporation because the deal might have endangered the government's control over the Mexican automotive
industry.[73] A Wall Street Journal article recently noted, "In most developing countries, would-be
foreign investors face a web of restrictions and conditions that would sour almost
anyone." In Venezuela, for instance, "Stringent labor laws make it costly to fire inefficient workers. Corruption, red
tape and delays abound; and the government frequently changes the rules of the game."[74] Yet foreign
investment under beneficial conditions would, in contrast to foreign aid, avoid saddling
the recipient countries with hordes of inefficient government corporations or getting
them mired in debt from government borrowing abroad. Foreign investment played a significant role
in the early economic development of the United States, Australia, and other industrial countries. By bankrolling
supermodern factories in Tennessee, Ohio, and elsewhere, foreign investment is helping reindustrialize the present-day
United States. Foreign aid is extremely fungible: every increase in outside donations frees up an equivalent amount of a
recipient government's own revenue to be spent for other purposes. Many less- developed countries routinely squander
their own money. Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaire, has amassed a multi-billion- dollar personal fortune and has built
11 presidential palaces. Ghana, Brazil, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast have spent billions building new capital cities.
Mercedes-Benz automobiles are so popular among African government officials that a new word has come into use in
Swahili to describe them: wabenzi--"men of the Mercedes-Benz." Of course, not all types of foreign aid are automatically
harmful. Private voluntary aid that bypasses a recipient country's political structures can help people in the Third World.
The Peace Corps had good intentions, but it is now largely providing bureaucrats and technicians for foreign governments,
thereby reinforcing political control over development. Rushing in medical supplies after a major earthquake or tidal wave
can help the victims as long as it does not permanently increase the government's power or the people's dependence on
politicians. The question of whether foreign aid is generally beneficial or not ultimately comes down to the question of
whether economic development should be undertaken by government or by the private sector. Perhaps the best answer
was given in 1830 by British historian Thomas Babington Macaulay: There are two or three principles respecting public
works, which, as an experience of vast extent proves, may be trusted in almost every case. It scarcely ever
happens, that any private man, or body of men, will invest property in a canal, a tunnel,
or a bridge, but from an expectation that the outlay will be profitable to them. No work of
this sort can be profitable to private speculators, unless the public be willing to pay for the use of it. The public will not pay
of their own accord for what yields no profit or convenience to them. There is thus a direct and obvious connection
between the motive which induces individuals to undertake such a work and the utility of the work. Can we find any such
connection in the case of a public work, executed by a government? If it is useful, are the individuals who rule the country
richer? If it is useless, are they poorer? A public man may be solicitous for his credit: but is not he likely to gain more
credit by an useless display of ostentatious architecture in a great town, than by the best road or the best canal in some
remote province? The fame of public works is a much less certain test of their utility, than the
amount of toll collected at them. In a corrupt age, there will be direct embezzlement. In
the purest age, there will be abundance of jobbing. . . . In a bad age, the fate of the public
is to be robbed. In a good age, it is much milder--merely to have the dearest and the
worst of everything. . . . We firmly believe, that five hundred thousand pounds subscribed by individuals for
railroads or canals, would produce more advantage to the public than five millions voted by Parliament for the same
purpose.[75] Our foreign aid has made life more pleasant and entertaining for government bureaucrats in poor countries.
However, it has done little to promote the production of wealth, or to breed political responsibility, or to encourage people
tohelp themselves. American foreign aid usually only strengthens oppressive regimes, allows governments to avoid
correcting their mistakes, and bails out bankrupt state-owned enterprises around the world. Regardless of our future good
intentions, American foreign aid programs will still be controlled by politicians anxious to
buy goodwill and administered by bureaucrats anxious to meet their quota of loans, and
they will still be received by foreign governments careless of the use of free gifts. As long as
the same political, bureaucratic, and economic incentives govern international welfare, the same mistakes will be
repeated.

Foreign aid has empirically failed the money isnt used for its intended
purposes

Bovard, an associate policy analyst with the Cato Institute, January 31, 1986
(James, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 65: The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid Policy Analysis,
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa065.pdf )//SG

For 40 years, U.S. foreign aid has been judged by its intentions, not its results. Foreign aid
programs have been perpetuated and expanded not because they have succeeded, but because
giving foreign aid still seems like a good idea. But foreign aid has rarely done anything that countries
could not have done for themselves. And it has often encouraged the recipient governments' worst
tendencies--helping to underwrite programs and policies that have starved thousands of
people and derailed struggling economies. In agriculture, in economic planning, in food assistance, U.S.
foreign aid has routinely failed to benefit the foreign poor. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has dotted the countryside with "white elephants": idle cement plants,
near-empty convention centers, abandoned roads, and--perhaps the biggest white elephant of them all--a growing phalanx
of corrupt, meddling, and overpaid bureaucrats. Since 1946, the United States has given over $146 billion in humanitarian
assistance to foreign countries. In 1985, the United States provided over $10 billion in non-military aid abroad, ranging
from free food to balance-of-payments support to project-assistance and population-planning programs. AID employs
over 4,500 employees to administer these programs, many of which have expanded rapidly under the Reagan
administration. Americans have a long tradition of generously aiding the victims of foreign
earthquakes, famines, and wars. Before World War II, private citizens provided almost
all of America's foreign assistance. After World War II, the Truman administration decided that a larger,
more centralized effort was necessary to revitalize the war-torn economies of Europe. Economic planning was the rage in
Washington in the late 1940s, and Marshall Plan administrators exported their new-found panacea. The Marshall Plan
poured over $13 billion into Europe and coincided with an economic revival across the continent. The best analysis
indicates that Europe would have recovered regardless of U.S. aid, and that the clearest
effect of the Marshall Plan was to increase the recipient governments' control of their
economies.[1]

Foreign aid fails its the opiate of the third world

Bovard, an associate policy analyst with the Cato Institute, January 31, 1986
(James, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 65: The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid Policy Analysis,
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa065.pdf )//SG

When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, many observers expected a thorough reform of U.S. foreign aid. Reagan declared
in a major speech before the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, "Unless a nation
puts its own financial and economic house in order, no amount of aid will produce
progress."[5] Since then, despite Reagan's tough rhetoric on requiring reform from recipient governments, little has
changed. American foreign aid still suffers the same problems it did when Kennedy took office in 1961. Despite countless
reforms, foreign aid is still a failure. Instead of breaking the "endless cycle of poverty," foreign aid
has become the opiate of the Third World. AID and other donors have encouraged Third
World governments to rely on handouts instead of on themselves for development. No
matter how irresponsible, corrupt, or oppressive a Third World government may be, there is always some Western
government or international agency anxious to supply it with a few more million dollars. By subsidizing political
irresponsibility and pernicious policies, foreign aid ill serves the world's poor. American foreign aid has often
harmed the Third World poor. In Indonesia, the government confiscated subsistence
farmers' meager plots for AID-financed irrigation canals. In Mali, farmers were forced to
sell their crops at giveaway prices to a joint project of AID and the Mali government. In
Egypt, Haiti, and elsewhere, farmers have seen the prices for their own crops nose-dive when U.S. free food has been given
to their countries. AID cannot be blamed for all the mistakes made in the projects it bankrolls. However, by providing a
seemingly endless credit line to governments regardless of their policies, AID effectively discourages governments from
learning from and correcting their mistakes. Giving some Third World governments perpetual assistance is about as
humanitarian as giving an alcoholic the key to a brewery. Good intentions are no excuse for helping to underwrite an
individual's--or a country's-- self-destruction. Foreign aid programs appear to be incorrigible.
For 35 years, American foreign aid policymakers seem to have learned nothing and
forgotten nothing. U.S. foreign aid projects routinely repeat the same mistakes today that were committed decades
ago. One telltale ironic report title from the General Accounting Office says it all: "Experience--A Potential Tool for
Improving U.S. Assistance Abroad."[6] This study focuses on the failure of U.S. humanitarian aid to
achieve its goals. It begins with a close examination of one of the most popular foreign
aid programs, Food for Peace. Then comes a review of AID's record in resurrecting the economies of Central
America, followed by an analysis of AID's role in African agricultural development. AID's achievements in Egypt and
Indonesia are then reviewed, followed by an analysis of AID's role in spurring the development of private business and
capitalism in poor countries. The study concludes with an analysis of why U.S. foreign aid has failed in the
past and why it will most likely fail in the future. Military aid and security assistance is a different issue
and is not examined here.

Aid doesnt solvecorruption and lack of democratic controls

Serrano 12 (Alfonso, The Challenge of Mexicos Next President: the Corruption at the Heart of the Crime,
Time, 7/5/12, http://world.time.com/2012/07/05/the-challenge-of-mexicos-next-president-the-corruption-at-the-heart-
of-crime/)//SR

Mexicos old guard is officially the new guard again. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled Mexico for
seven decades with an authoritarian hand, is back after a 12-year hiatus. But can the new face of the party president-
elect Enrique Pea Nieto deal with a national landscape ravaged by a militarized battle against organized crime, one
that has led to comparisons to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Upon election, Pea Nieto stressed that his partys old
ways of corruption are just that old and mistakes that are now in the past. As for the narcotraffickers, he says he will
simply not negotiate with criminals. In an essay he wrote for the New York Times and published the day after he claimed
victory, he stressed that he plans to expand the federal police by 35,000 officers while consolidating sate and municipal
police forces. Pea Nieto also reiterated his plan to establish a national gendarmerie, a militarized force under civilian
control, to safeguard the countrys most violent regions. In an interview with PBS Newshour, Pea Nieto also said Mexico
should start debating the legalization of some drugs as a way to keep profits out of the hands of organized crime, though
he stressed that he is not in favor of legalizing drugs himself. Legislative action, in any case, is likely to be difficult: the
Mexican Senate and Congress not only have a reputation as do-nothings, the recent election has left both bodies as divided
as ever among an array of political parties. Fighting crime is one thing. But the president-elect has not
specified how he will combat corruption, the stubborn remnant of the PRIs seven decades of authoritarian
rule that is at the heart of the drug lords ability to operate in Mexico. Pea Nieto is certainly
not addressing how he is going to control political corruptiona huge problem in Mexico, and one
of the two main pillars of crime all over the world, says Edgardo Buscaglia, a senior law and economics
scholar at Columbia University and president of the Mexico-based nonprofit Citizen Action Institute. (The other
pillar is a dysfunctional justice system, which Mexico also has.) Mexico has a large number
of politicians used to receiving constant flows of money for their campaigns that come from any of the
22 types of economic crimes. This is not being addressed by Pea Nieto in any way. He should
especially since the U.S. in a recent civil suit accused a high-ranking PRI member, former Tamaulipas state Governor
Toms Yarrington, of laundering drug cartel money. (Yarrington denies the charge.) Money is at the black heart of a crisis
that has seen even subsidiary activities of the drug trade monetized at alarming speed. Outgoing President Felipe
Calderns aggressive military offensive against organized crime, which started when he took office in 2006, provoked a
vicious backlash from Mexicos proliferating criminal groups. It also led to a kind of metastasis. The crackdown drove up
the cost of running drugs and forced the cartels to expand their business model to haul in more cash. The result was
lucrative submarkets for kidnapping, extortion, oil theft, and immigrant smuggling. Kidnapping rates, for example, have
tripled since Caldern became president. Forty-nine people are kidnapped every day in Mexicothe highest rate in the
world, according to Mexicos Commission on Human Rights. Kidnappers of migrant workers collected $25 million during
a six-month period in 2011, according to the organization, which stresses that figures can be unreliable because an
estimated 75% of kidnapping cases go unreported. With diversification, the Mexican drug cartels take in between $30
billion to $40 billion a year. Today, the Zetas, Mexicos most violent gang, earn less than half their total revenue from drug
trafficking. The brutal cartel, organized by ex-special forces commandos, derives a good deal of its profits not only from
kidnapping but also from Mexicos oil monopoly Pemex by siphoning off more than $1 billion in oil from Pemex storage
tanks in the last two years. Perhaps with an eye to stemming the flow of corrupting cash, Pea Nieto last month
named general Oscar Naranjo, former head of the Colombian national police, as his top
public security consultant. In Colombia, analysts credit Naranjo with helping to reform
Colombias police and to freeze the assets of that countrys biggest drug dealers, a tactic that led to
the capture of drug capos by making it more difficult for them to bribe officials and meet payments. Naranjo is in good
standing with the United States, which gave Colombia $5 billion in anti-drug aid during the 2000s and has provided
helicopters and surveillance aircraft for Mexico to fight its drug wars. Washington is keen to repress the
narcotraffickers who, with a massive assist from American drug consumers, have helped make the U.S. the worlds
largest market for illegal drugs. Since 2006, the U.S. has funded the $1.6 billion Merida Initiative to
support police and judicial reform in Mexico as well as interdiction (although critics say too
little of the aid so far has gone to reform). Fixing the court system remains a faraway goal. Of
every one hundred crimes in Mexico, only or two ever reach a judicial ruling because of corruption and
incompetence. But observers doubt that Mexico has the same conditons to effect a Colombian-
style reduction in violence. Colombia had fallen into a severe crisis before it righted itself: three presidential candidates
and more than half of its supreme court were assassinated, in addition to large numbers of top businessmen, before the
political elite reached consensus and agreed to control organized crime. The measures resulted in the confiscation of $12
billion from organized crime groups in seven years and the prosecution of 32% of Colombias national legislature for
corrupt dealings with the drug lords. It doesnt matter how many billions of dollars or helicopters the
U.S. brings to Mexico, says Buscaglia. You will not solve violence in Mexico until the political
elite comes to terms with the fact that they have to establish democratic controls. So far, no such
political agreement exists.

LinkVenezuela

Venezuela government corruption means aid goes straight to drug
trafficking

Forero 9 - The Washington Post's correspondent for Colombia and Venezuela, having previously been The New York
Times' Bogot bureau chief. (Juan, Venezuela's Drug-Trafficking Role Is Growing Fast, U.S. Report Says, Washington
Post, 7/19/09, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/18/AR2009071801785.html) // JA

BOGOTA, Colombia, July 18 -- A report for the U.S. Congress on drug smuggling through
Venezuela concludes that corruption at high levels of President Hugo Chvez's government and
state aid to Colombia's drug-trafficking guerrillas have made Venezuela a major
launching pad for cocaine bound for the United States and Europe. Since 1996, successive U.S.
administrations have considered Venezuela a key drug-trafficking hub, the Government
Accountability Office report says. But now, it says, the amount of cocaine flowing into Venezuela from Colombia,
Venezuela's neighbor and the world's top producer of the drug, has skyrocketed, going from an estimated 60 metric tons
in 2004 to 260 metric tons in 2007. That amounted to 17 percent of all the cocaine produced in the Andes in 2007. The
report, which was first reported by Spain's El Pais newspaper Thursday and obtained by The Washington Post on Friday,
represents U.S. officials' strongest condemnation yet of Venezuela's alleged role in drug trafficking. It says Venezuela
has extended a "lifeline" to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, which the United States
estimates has a hand in the trafficking of 60 percent of the cocaine produced in Colombia.

Venezuela will re-adopt the Drago doctrine allows foreign residents to
coerce and infringe on the rights of natives

Lorca, Post Doctoral Fellow @ Brown University, 2011
(Arnulf, Sovereignty beyond the West: The End of Classical International Law, Journal of the History of International
Law 13, 2011, pp 19-20)//SG

Drago was remarkably successful in making his ideas widely known and discussed in
diplomatic and international law circles. The note sparked off considerable controversy, when only a few
months after it had been dis- patched, Carlos Calvo translated it into French and passed it to his colleges at the Institut de
France and the Institut de droit international. Responses, some of them fairly critical, by jurists like Westlake, Holland
and Fiore were pub- lished in the Revue de droit international et de lgislation compare.27 Drago himself
defended and reformulated his position in an article published both in French and English, in the Revue
gnrale de droit international public and the American Journal of International law, the most prestigious journals of
respectively France and the United States.28 Moreover, what had become a professional controversy among international
lawyers turned into a debate of diplomatic significance. As an Argentinean diplomatic delegate, and with the support of
other Latin Americans, Drago submitted his doctrine to consideration and defended its
crystallization into conventional inter- national law, first at the 1906 Pan-American Conference in Rio,
and then, and most importantly, at the 1907 Second Peace Conference in The Hague. Taking stock of these professional
and diplomatic debates, Dragos ideas gained strength. Drago went beyond the initial
formulations of the doctrine, which affirmed that since states are sovereign entities enjoying absolute
autonomy and equality, coercive collection of public debt was an illegal intervention under international law. Now,
illegality became rather the end result of a more complex legal argumentation. Well aware of
the legality of the use of force between states as a remedy under classical international law, Drago neither
disputed the use of force in general, nor contested the use of coercion to protect foreign
residents whose rights have been infringed in particular.29 It was clear to Drago that foreign
residents enjoy rights whose infringement gives rise to state responsibility, diplomatic
protection and eventually the use of force. Out of the wealth of claims a state can bring against another
state, Drago only excluded one type of pecuniary claims, those resulting from the contractual relation between a foreign
private lender and a sovereign state. Specifically, he excluded the claim of a state to forcefully collect
bonds of public debt subscribed between their nationals and a foreign state.30 When a state
borrows money emitting a bond, a state acts not in its private capacity but as a sovereign. In Dragos words: [Bonds] are
issued by virtue of the sovereign power of the state, as is its cur- rency, they are authorized by legislation and do not
present any of the general characteristics of the contracts of private law, since there is no person specified in whose favor
the obligations are incurred, payment being promised always to the bearer without discrimination.31 Important
consequences derive from the fact that states act as sovereigns when issuing public debt. According to Drago, a state
determines not only the public nature of the contractual relation, but also the remedies
lenders have in case payment is suspended: interruption in the payments occurs in virtue of the
sovereign authority of the states, manifested jure imperii.32

Venezuelan and Cuban aid does not get handled by the government

Jacobson 11 - senior writer for PolitiFact and the Tampa Bay Times. Earlier, he spent more than a decade covering
politics, policy and lobbying for National Journal magazine. (Louis, Ted Poe decries U.S. aid to Venezuela, Cuba,
Politifact, 3/23/11, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-
venezuela-cuba/) // JA

In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign
countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of
bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe its time to reconsider our foreign aid that we send to countries throughout
the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are
about 192 foreign countries in the world, and we give foreign aid to over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name
some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money,
including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nations in Poes speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and
Cuba. Critics of Venezuelas leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a
communist country for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings,
the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free," while Cuba sits at
the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe suggested
these as two examples of whats wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give
money to Chavez and Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president, makes fun of
our nation. We dont need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give money to
Cuba? Americans cant even go to Cuba. Its off-limits. Its a communist country. But were
dumping money over there." We looked at budget documents for foreign aid and talked to experts in the field, and heres
what we found. Poe is correct that U.S. foreign aid flows into both countries. In fiscal year 2010, the Venezuela account
showed $6 million, while the Cuba account showed $20 million. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has requested a
little less for Venezuela -- $5 million -- and the same $20 million amount for Cuba. To give a sense of context, the 2010
funds allocated for Venezuela amounted to less than 1/100th of 1 percent of the total U.S. foreign-aid budget, and the
figure for Cuba was about 4/100 of 1 percent of the U.S. foreign aid budget. The percentage of the entire federal budget is
even more minuscule. Still, even if the amount is small, taxpayer money is taxpayer money, so Poe has a point. However,
Poe also said in plain language that "we give money to Chavez." And while he didnt say it in as explicit a fashion, Poe
implied that the U.S. sends aid to the Cuban regime. This is where it gets more complicated. The
funding for both nations comes from the Economic Support Fund, which, according to the State Department, "supports
U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing economic assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy.
Programs funded through this account promote stability and U.S. security interests in strategic regions of the world."
Lets take Cuba first. A spokesman for the U.S. Agency for International Development confirmed
that no U.S. aid goes to the Cuban government. In an explanation of its proposed budget, the
administration writes that "Cuba is the only non-democratically elected government in the Western Hemisphere and one
of the most politically repressed countries in the world. In view of these challenges, U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to
empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for human dignity." The $20
million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society
organizations, including associations and labor groups. To advance the cause of human rights in Cuba, U.S.
assistance provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families The
United States supports nascent pro-democracy groups, the use of technology, and new information-sharing
opportunities." A 2006 review by the Government Accountability Office noted that the aid is such a threat to the regime
that it has to be kept under tight wraps on the island. "Given the Cuban governments repressive policies and opposition to
U.S. democracy assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods," GAO reported.
In other words, the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy in what is currently an undemocratic
country -- not to support the government. Poes failure to note that distinction as he attacks aid to "Cuba" strikes us as
misleading. Now lets look at Venezuela. In its $5 million budget request for 2012, the administration said it
wants to "strengthen and support a Venezuelan civil society that will protect Democratic space and seek to serve the
interests and needs of the Venezuelan people. Funding will enhance citizens access to objective information, facilitate
peaceful debate on key issues, provide support to democratic institutions and processes, promote citizen participation and
encourage democratic leadership." Another administration document says aid helps "strengthen the capacity of non-
governmental organizations to monitor and report on government performance" -- in other words, to be a watchdog of the
government, not a supporter. The U.S. AID spokesman confirmed that no money goes to the Venezuelan
government. So far, this sounds a lot like the situation with aid to Cuba. But theres a difference. The same
administration document goes on to say that this civil-society funding "will involve both government and opposition
supporters and will be open to all regardless of political perspectives," providing some support for Poes statement. Still,
most observers see the State Departments openness to funding representatives of Chavezs
government as more of a diplomatic nicety, since foreign efforts to bolster democracy in a country with
democratic shortcomings are typically framed with great rhetorical care. Indeed, there are strong signals that Chavez
himself has no use for U.S. funding. A 2010 study by FRIDE and the World Movement for Democracy, a pair
of non-governmental organizations, noted that members of a local group called Smate who had received U.S. aid for a
project on electoral observance "were accused of conspiracy and betrayal. The trial against them, which was initiated in
2003, is still pending." In a 2006 article based on Freedom of Information Act requests, the Associated Press reported
that Chavez accused his opponents of taking "gringo money" to undermine his regime. So, while its possible that some
U.S. aid has flowed to allies of Chavez, the bulk of U.S. aid goes to independent groups whose existence is more likely to
undermine his authority than strengthen it. Where does this leave us? The one claim for which Poe may have a point is
that some U.S. aid could make its way to supporters of Chavez (though not the government per se), given how the U.S.
wrote the ground rules. However, Chavez has made his opposition to U.S. aid clear, and has even gone so far as to
prosecute some opponents who have taken it. Meanwhile, the aid sent to Cuba is certainly not going into the governments
coffers, and it, like the Venezuela aid, is considered far likelier to undercut the government than
support it. We take no position on the wisdom of Poes bill, but we do think his description of U.S. aid to Venezuela
and Cuba is incorrect. The relatively small amounts of money sent to those two countries is primarily going to bolstering
an opposition to their governments. So while there is a tiny sliver of truth that some U.S. aid could end up going to
supporters of Chavez (though not to the Chavez government itself, nor to the Cuban government), we think the overall
message of Poe's claim -- that U.S. taxpayers are being forced to prop up unfriendly, undemocratic governments -- is
so inaccuate that we are rating his statement False.

LinkMexico

Aid to Mexico empirically failscorruption

Althaus 10 (Dudley, Despite Millions in U.S. Aid, Police Corruption Charges Plague Mexico, Houston
Chronicle, 10/18/10, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Despite-millions-in-U-S-aid-police-corruption-
1710872.php)//SR

City cops killing their own mayors; state jailers helping inmates escape; federal agents mutinying
against corrupt commanders; outgunned officers cut down in ambushes or assassinated because they work for
gangster rivals. Always precariously frayed, Mexico's thin blue line seems ready to snap. Six prison guards were killed
Wednesday as they left their night shift in Chihuahua City, 200 miles south of El Paso. On Tuesday, the head of a police
commander supposedly investigating the death of an American on the Texas border was packed into a suitcase and sent to
a local army base. Mexicans justifiably have long considered their police suspect. But today many of
those wearing the badge are even more brazenly bad: either unwilling or unable to squelch the lawless terror that's
claimed nearly 30,000 lives in less than four years. State and local forces, which employ 90 percent of Mexico's
430,000 officers, find themselves outgunned, overwhelmed and often purchased outright by
gangsters. Despite some dramatic improvements aided by U.S. dollars and training under the $1.6 billion Merida
Initiative Mexico's 32,000 federal police remain spread thin and hobbled by graft. And many in Mexico consider
the American investment little help so far against the bloody tide wrought by drug gangs. Grasping
for a cure, President Felipe Calderon and other officials are pushing to unify Mexico's nearly 2,000 municipal police under
32 state agencies that they insist can better withstand the criminals' volleys of bullets and cash. "The tentacles of organized
crime have touched everyone," said Ignacio Manjarrez, who oversees public security issues for a powerful business
association in Chihuahua, the state bordering West Texas that has become Mexico's most violent. "There are some who
are loyal to their uniform and others who will take money from anyone and everyone. "We let it into our
society. Now we are paying the consequences." Many actions, few results Across Mexico, local, state and federal police
forces have been purged, then purged again. Veteran officers and recruits alike undergo polygraphs, drug tests and
background checks. A national database has been set up to ensure that those flushed from one force don't resurface in
another. Still the plague persists. One of the surest signals that rivals are going to war over a community or smuggling
routes are the dumped corpses of cops who start turning up dead. Many, if not most, of the officers are targeted because
they work for one gang or the other. Scores of federal officers rebelled this summer, accusing their commanders of
extortion in Ciudad Juarez, the murderous border city that Calderon pledged to pacify. As a result, Mexican officials fired
a tenth of the federal police force. The warden and some guards at a Durango state prison were arrested in July after a
policeman confessed in a taped gangland interrogation that they aided an imprisoned crime boss's nightly release so he
could kill his enemies. Another prison warden and scores of guards were detained in August following the breakout of 85
gangsters in Reynosa, on the Rio Grande near McAllen. On Friday, the governor of Tamaulipas state, which borders South
Texas, ordered the purging of the police force in the important port city of Tampico. Gov. Eugenio Hernandez said he took
the action following officers' apparent participation in this week's brief abduction of five university students in the city.
$100 million a month Mexico's top federal policeman, Genaro Garcia Luna, has estimated gangsters pass out some
$100 million each month to local and state cops on the take. "There really is no internal
capacity or appetite to try to get their arms around corruption," said a former U.S. official with intimate
knowledge of Mexico's security forces. "Anyone who sticks their head up, wanting to make a change, is eliminated."
Edelmiro Cavazos, mayor of Santiago, a picturesque Monterrey suburb, had vowed after taking office to clean up its police
force, which many believe is controlled by the gangster band known as the Zetas. He barely got the chance to try. Killers
came for him in August, arriving at his home on five trucks, a surveillance tape showing their headlights slicing the night
like knives as his own police bodyguard waved them in. A workman found Cavazos' blindfolded and bound body a few
days later, tortured, shot three times and dumped like rubbish along a highway outside Santiago. The bodyguard and six
other officers from Santiago's police force are among those accused in the killing. "They considered him an obstacle," the
Nuevo Leon state attorney general said. Following Cavazos' slaying and that of 600 others in the Monterrey area this year,
Nuevo Leon Gov. Rodrigo Medina proposed bringing municipal police forces under unified state command. "We have to
act as a common front," Medina told reporters. "If we are divided in isolated forces and we have a united organized crime
against us and society, we aren't going to be able to articulate the forceful response we need." New command structure The
tiny western state of Aguascalientes created a unified police command this week. And Calderon won support for the plan
Tuesday from 10 newly elected governors. "Having institutions that enjoy the full confidence of the public can't be put off,"
Calderon told the new governors. "The single police command is a crucial element in achieving the peace and tranquility
that Mexicans deserve." Although small training programs for state and local forces exist, American dollars by
way of the $1.6 billion Merida Initiative until now have been aimed mostly at Mexico's federal
police. Intelligence gathering and sharing has been enhanced and computer systems upgraded. U.S. and other foreign
experts have given extensive training to a third of the federal force, officials say, with another 10,000 Mexican officers
attending workshops. "Beyond the money, the Merida plan put information and technology at the disposal of the Mexican
government," said Manlio Fabio Beltrones, president of Mexico's senate, whose Institutional Revolutionary Party is widely
favored to reclaim the presidency in 2012. Its critics argue that the U.S. aid has failed to curtail the
violence, leaving communities and local police forces at the mercy of
gangsters. Javier Aguayo y Camargo, a retired army general who was replaced as Chihuahua City's police chief this
month, said no one has "figured out how to make the reforms work." "The
resources of Merida remain at the federal level," Aguayo y Carmargo said. "We haven't felt
any of it. They need to support the states and municipalities." Gangs reverse gains Chihuahua City, capital of the state
bordering West Texas, underscores just how quickly the drug wars have overpowered even the best attempts to strengthen
local police. Under a succession of mayors since the late 1990s, the city's police steadily improved. Hiring standards were
raised, record keeping improved, arrest and booking processes overhauled. A citizen's oversight committee was set up with
significant influence within the department. Three years ago, the 1,100-officer force became the first in Mexico to be
accredited by CALEA, a U.S.-based law enforcement association that rigorously evaluates police administrative standards.
Only a handful of other Mexican cities have since won accreditation. Then Mexico's gangland wars arrived in 2008. The
city of 800,000 has been racked this year by an average of four killings daily, according to a recent study by El Heraldo,
the leading local newspaper, about 30 times more than a few years ago. It now ranks as Mexico's third most murderous
city, behind Ciudad Juarez and Culiacan, capital of the gangster-infested state of Sinaloa, federal officials say. Scores of
city police officers have been fired for suspected corruption. More than two dozen others have been
killed, either gunned down in street battles or assassinated by gangsters. "If with all this equipment and
training they are overwhelmed by the criminals, what happens in other places?" said Manjarrez, the
businessman who monitors public security matters in Chihuahua. "As prepared as we were, we never saw this tsunami
coming."

Foreign aid to Mexico is badhigh government corruption

Brown 13, Hayes, contractor, Department of Homeland Security, (Mexican Government Aided
Drug Cartels And Participated In Kidnappings, Report Reveals, 2/21/13,
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/02/21/1621011/mexico-drugs-disappearances/)//RN

Security forces in the Mexican government may have been cooperating to facilitate
hundreds of enforced disappearances of citizens as part of the failing struggle to rein in
drug gangs, according to a new report. Mexico has been steeped in a conflict with drug cartels for the last six years,
resulting in thedeath of over 50,000 Mexican civilians. During the course of that conflict, hundreds of civilians have gone
missing or disappeared and are presumed to be dead. Prominent NGO Human Rights Watch, in their report titled
Mexicos Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of a Legacy Ignored, alleges that the government of former Mexican President
Felipe Caldern has not only failed to bring disappearances under control, but actively taken part in some instances:
Human Rights Watch has documented nearly 250 such disappearances that have
occurred since 2007. In more than 140 of these cases, evidence suggests that
these were enforced disappearancesmeaning that state agents participated
directly in the crime, or indirectly through support or acquiescence. These
crimes were committed by members of every security force involved in
public security operations, sometimes acting in conjunction with organized
crime. In the remaining cases, we were not able to determine based on available evidence whether state actors
participated in the crime, though they may have.The report goes on to describe several of those disappearances in-depth,
including the beatings by local police, detentions by federal police, and possible shootings ordered by the Navy. Calderons
war on the cartels did not go as planned, with actions to rein in fighting between organized crime rings instead leading to
greater bloodshed. By conquering all elements of crime and supplanting the government, the
Zetas the largest of the cartels currently controls the third-largest state in Mexico. In
the end, Human Rights Watch urged newly sworn-in President Pea Nieto to take action to reverse the policies of his
predecessor. While disappearances may have started on Calderns watch, they did not end with his term, Human Rights
Watch Americas Director Jos Miguel Vivanco said in a release. In a visit to the White House in November,
Nieto pledged to reduce violence within his country, without offering details on how.

Foreign aid to Mexico is bad- current cartel influence is high

Khan 13 Akbar, Burkle Institute for International Relations, (The War on Drugs: Mexican Cartels, 5/29/13,
http://the-generation.net/the-war-on-drugs-mexican-cartels/)//RN

Furthermore, the Mexican military has struggled to combat the cartels effectively. Each year,
the violence takes on distinct new dimensions, states Victor Clark Alfaro, a security expert for the Binational Human
Rights Center in Tijuana. Its like fighting guerrillas it often defies understanding.This transformation of violence is
demonstrated by the fact that some cartels, particularly the Caballeros Templarios,
consider themselves to be more than simple drug traffickers; they view themselves as
resistance fighters (La Resistencia). The very title Knights Templar (Caballeros Templarios) refers to early
crusaders who protected pilgrims on their passage to Jerusalem. Other cartels substantiate their political
motives to displace the government by organizing community events like picnics and
barbecues. This demonstrates the cartels ability to not only compel violence but to
support their efforts with ideological constructs of organized resistance and community
welfare. To top it all off, corruption within the Mexicos government has severely hampered
the war on drugs. Reports of government officials, police officers, and military personnel
receiving payments from the cartels have repeatedly surfaced. A system-wide network
of corruption has ensured distribution rights, market access, and even official
government protection for drug traffickers in exchange for lucrative bribes according to a
March 2011 CFR report. As one example of the corruption, in 2008, members of SIEDO
(Subprocuradura de Investigacin Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada), the attorney generals office in
charge of investigating and prosecuting organized crime, and directors of the federal
police were arrested for their ties to the Beltrn Leyva cartel. No Ramrez, the former
director of SIEDO, reportedly received $450,000 every month for his services to the
cartels leaders.

Corruption makes aid to Mexico useless Merida Initiative proves

Althaus 10 - GlobalPost's senior correspondent for Mexico and Central America, based in Mexico City. Althaus has
reported on Mexico and Latin America, mostly for Texas newspapers, for nearly all his three decades as a journalist.
(Dudley, Despite millions in U.S. aid, police corruption plagues Mexico, Chron, 10/18/10,
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Despite-millions-in-U-S-aid-police-corruption-1710872.php) // JA

MEXICO CITY City cops killing their own mayors; state jailers helping inmates escape;
federal agents mutinying against corrupt commanders; outgunned officers cut down in ambushes or assassinated because
they work for gangster rivals. Always precariously frayed, Mexico's thin blue line seems ready to snap.
Six prison guards were killed Wednesday as they left their night shift in Chihuahua City, 200 miles south of El Paso. On
Tuesday, the head of a police commander supposedly investigating the death of an American on the Texas border was
packed into a suitcase and sent to a local army base. Mexicans justifiably have long considered their police suspect. But
today many of those wearing the badge are even more brazenly bad: either unwilling or
unable to squelch the lawless terror that's claimed nearly 30,000 lives in less than four years. State and
local forces, which employ 90 percent of Mexico's 430,000 officers, find themselves outgunned, overwhelmed
and often purchased outright by gangsters. Despite some dramatic improvements aided by U.S.
dollars and training under the $1.6 billion Merida Initiative Mexico's 32,000 federal police
remain spread thin and hobbled by graft. And many in Mexico consider the American investment little help so
far against the bloody tide wrought by drug gangs. Grasping for a cure, President Felipe Calderon and other officials are
pushing to unify Mexico's nearly 2,000 municipal police under 32 state agencies that they insist can better withstand the
criminals' volleys of bullets and cash. "The tentacles of organized crime have touched everyone," said Ignacio Manjarrez,
who oversees public security issues for a powerful business association in Chihuahua, the state bordering West Texas that
has become Mexico's most violent. "There are some who are loyal to their uniform and others who will take money from
anyone and everyone. "We let it into our society. Now we are paying the consequences." Many actions, few results
Across Mexico, local, state and federal police forces have been purged, then purged again. Veteran officers and recruits
alike undergo polygraphs, drug tests and background checks. A national database has been set up to ensure that those
flushed from one force don't resurface in another. Still the plague persists. One of the surest signals that rivals are going
to war over a community or smuggling routes are the dumped corpses of cops who start turning up dead. Many, if not
most, of the officers are targeted because they work for one gang or the other. Scores of federal
officers rebelled this summer, accusing their commanders of extortion in Ciudad Juarez, the murderous border city that
Calderon pledged to pacify. As a result, Mexican officials fired a tenth of the federal police force. The warden and some
guards at a Durango state prison were arrested in July after a policeman confessed in a taped gangland interrogation that
they aided an imprisoned crime boss's nightly release so he could kill his enemies. Another prison warden and scores of
guards were detained in August following the breakout of 85 gangsters in Reynosa, on the Rio Grande near McAllen. On
Friday, the governor of Tamaulipas state, which borders South Texas, ordered the purging of the police force in the
important port city of Tampico. Gov. Eugenio Hernandez said he took the action following officers' apparent participation
in this week's brief abduction of five university students in the city. $100 million a month Mexico's top federal
policeman, Genaro Garcia Luna, has estimated gangsters pass out some $100 million each
month to local and state cops on the take. "There really is no internal capacity or appetite to try to get their arms
around corruption," said a former U.S. official with intimate knowledge of Mexico's security forces. "Anyone who sticks
their head up, wanting to make a change, is eliminated." Edelmiro Cavazos, mayor of Santiago, a picturesque Monterrey
suburb, had vowed after taking office to clean up its police force, which many believe is controlled by the gangster band
known as the Zetas. He barely got the chance to try. Killers came for him in August, arriving at his home on five trucks, a
surveillance tape showing their headlights slicing the night like knives as his own police bodyguard waved them in. A
workman found Cavazos' blindfolded and bound body a few days later, tortured, shot three times and dumped like rubbish
along a highway outside Santiago. The bodyguard and six other officers from Santiago's police force are among those
accused in the killing. "They considered him an obstacle," the Nuevo Leon state attorney general said. Following
Cavazos' slaying and that of 600 others in the Monterrey area this year, Nuevo Leon Gov. Rodrigo Medina proposed
bringing municipal police forces under unified state command. "We have to act as a common front," Medina told
reporters. "If we are divided in isolated forces and we have a united organized crime against us and society, we aren't going
to be able to articulate the forceful response we need." New command structure The tiny western state of Aguascalientes
created a unified police command this week. And Calderon won support for the plan Tuesday from 10 newly elected
governors. "Having institutions that enjoy the full confidence of the public can't be put off," Calderon told the new
governors. "The single police command is a crucial element in achieving the peace and tranquility that Mexicans
deserve." Although small training programs for state and local forces exist, American dollars by way of the $1.6 billion
Merida Initiative until now have been aimed mostly at Mexico's federal police. Intelligence gathering and sharing has
been enhanced and computer systems upgraded. U.S. and other foreign experts have given extensive training to a third of
the federal force, officials say, with another 10,000 Mexican officers attending workshops. "Beyond the money, the
Merida plan put information and technology at the disposal of the Mexican government," said Manlio Fabio Beltrones,
president of Mexico's senate, whose Institutional Revolutionary Party is widely favored to reclaim the presidency in 2012.
Its critics argue that the U.S. aid has failed to curtail the violence, leaving communities and
local police forces at the mercy of gangsters. Javier Aguayo y Camargo, a retired army general who was
replaced as Chihuahua City's police chief this month, said no one has "figured out how to make the
reforms work." "The resources of Merida remain at the federal level," Aguayo y Carmargo said. "We haven't felt any
of it. They need to support the states and municipalities."

LinkCuba

Cuban foreign aid gets diverted to military use

Tamayo 13 Juan, editor, Miami Herald (Priest alleges that foreign hurricane aid to Cuba is not reaching the
people, 6/25/13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/25/3470187/priest-alleges-that-foreign-hurricane.html)//RN

Outspoken Cuban priest Jose Conrado Rodriguez alleged that foreign aid sent to his native
Santiago de Cuba province after Hurricane Sandy last year was diverted to government,
military and tourism facilities but denied to private homes. The situation in Santiago is very grave
because many of the more than 100,000 homes damaged by the storm have not been repaired,
Rodriguez told El Nuevo Herald on Tuesday. The aid has not reached the people. Rodriguez first
made the allegations in a public letter to the head of the Communist Party in the province, Lzaro Expsito,
urging him to crack down on the diversion of the aid and the corruption that surrounds you. We
have watched with astonishment the theft of the assistance that so many countries sent
to our people, he wrote, how that aid was sold at inflated prices in flagrant violation of
the intentions of the donors. We have watched with astonishment as government or
armed forces installations were repaired in record time, while the people remain without
roofs, he wrote in the letter, dated June 16. Warning of possible civil unrest, he added, We are witnesses to the peoples
frustrations, to their desperation and impotence, to a threatening silence that makes us think that it could explode at
any time with justified and uncontrollable fury.

Aid to Cuba is empirically wasteful

Richter 08 (Paul, Overhauling Democracy Aid for Cuba, Los Angeles Times, 5/7/13,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/07/world/fg-uscuba7)//SR

The Bush administration is overhauling a controversial democracy-promotion program for Cuba in
hopes of tightening financial controls and broadening the effort beyond the anti-Castro groups in Florida that
have dominated it. The program's goal is to help Cuban dissidents and spread ideas to hasten a shift away from the
Castro government. But critics have charged that the 12-year-old program has been wasteful and
done less for those in Cuba than for the Cuban American-led groups around Miami that receive most of the
grant money. Now the U.S. Agency for International Development, which oversees the program, is trying to persuade
Central European and Latin American nongovernmental groups to join U.S. organizations in applying for its grants. A
chief goal, officials say, is to spend most of the $45-million budget on communications equipment, such as cellphones and
Internet gear, that possibly could be smuggled into Cuba to increase its people's exposure to the outside world. The
transition from Fidel Castro's leadership to that of his brother Raul "is a unique moment" for Cubans, said Jose Cardenas,
who heads the USAID program for the island nation. "We think it presents an opportunity for real, profound change in
Cuba. "Frankly, there's a risk that the regime will confiscate a lot of the stuff. But that's a risk we're
willing to take," Cardenas said, because of the importance of trying to influence public opinion at a crucial point. Some
critics, though welcoming change, remain skeptical that the program can bring much to the
Caribbean island. The program was criticized in a November 2006 Government Accountability Office
report that found it lacked proper oversight. Groups funded by the program made
questionable purchases, including cashmere sweaters and Godiva chocolates, and 92% of its grants had been
awarded without competitive bids, evidence of "internal control deficiencies," the GAO found. In March, the
Cuban American National Foundation, a longtime anti-Castro group, reported that four of the program's largest
grant recipients used only 17% of the money in direct assistance to Cubans. The remainder went to
salaries, research, travel and other operating expenses. The foundation urged in its report that the program spend more on
direct aid, including cash assistance. It also recommended that groups receiving grants be required to have other sources
of revenue, to avoid the appearance of being a creature of the U.S. government. The effort suffered a further blow in March
when a White House aide resigned after the disclosure that the FBI was investigating him for allegedly
misusing funds intended to promote democracy in Cuba. Felipe Sixto, who was special assistant to
President Bush for intergovernmental affairs, formerly worked with the Center for a Free Cuba, a recipient of USAID
grants. Cardenas, of USAID, said that the agency reviewed its procedures in light of the GAO report, and will rely on
competitive bids and increase financial monitoring of the grants. USAID is hoping to receive bids from Central European
and Latin American nongovernmental groups that have experience with dissidents in authoritarian societies, Cardenas
said. "They know how to evade the authoritarian governments' efforts to control your behavior," he said. And because
they are not U.S. organizations, it will be easier for their staff members to enter Cuba and make contact with people, he
said. He acknowledged that these groups face serious obstacles in trying to smuggle gear to Cubans when intelligence
officials are watching. Cardenas also hinted that USAID may change its policy against distributing cash to Cubans, which
was based on concern over accountability. Despite criticism, Congress has tripled the budget of the
democracy promotion program, Cardenas noted. Francisco J. Hernandez, president of the Cuban American
National Foundation, said in an interview that his group was "quite positive" about USAID's planned changes. But others
have misgivings. Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), a leading advocate of expanded contacts with Cuba, praised the use of
competitive bidding, but remained skeptical overall. Lifting travel restrictions would be more effective, he said.

Cuba programs just waste millions

Fox Business News 10 (CDA: Obama should End the Cuba Travel Ban and Stop Wasting U.S. Funds on
Regime Change Effort, Center for Democracy in the Americas, 2/2/10, http://www.democracyinamericas.org/cda-press-
releases/cda-obama-should-end-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-stop-wasting-u-s-funds-on-regime-change-effort/)//SR

Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, issued the
following statement about the Foreign Aid budget request for 2011 which proposes $20
million in wasteful spending on regime change programs for Cuba: Unless its okay for the
United States government to waste money on foreign aid programs that dont work, the Obama
administration should remove the $20 million in spending it has proposed on regime
change on Cuba. Many activities funded by this program are illegal in Cuba, would certainly be illegal if
Cuba conducted them in our country, and they have long histories of wasteful spending in the U.S. and
hurting the intended beneficiaries in Cuba. Activities funded by this program recently landed a U.S.
contractor in a Cuban prison. If you ever wanted to find a wasteful and counter-productive foreign aid
program, this is it. The paradox is this: not one of these wasteful programs can hold a candle to the one policy
change that would pour American information and ideas into Cuba, and bring both countries together namely, ending
the travel ban that stops all Americans from visiting the island and engaging the Cuban people, a program which would
cost the taxpayers nothing. The Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA) is devoted to changing U.S. policy toward
the countries of the Americas by basing our relations on mutual respect, fostering dialogue with those governments and
movements with which U.S. policy is at odds, and recognizing positive trends in democracy and governance. For more
information about CDA, visit our website. CDAs report, 9 Ways for US to Talk to Cuba and for Cuba to Talk to US,
published last year, recommended ending counter-productive regime change programs and relying instead on policies of
engagement to advance Americas interests and lead to normal relations between the U.S. and Cuba.


LinkUnconditional Engagement

Absent conditions corrupt governments take advantage of aid

Rickman 12 - an assistant editor at The Huffington Post UK. She previously worked at the Express and
PoliticsHome (Foreign Aid To Countries Plagued By Corruption 'Should Be Conditional' MPs Warn, Huffington Post UK,
5/1/12, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/01/04/aid-conditional-international-development-malcom-
bruce_n_1182962.html)

Aid to fragile but corrupt countries should be conditional, a committee of MPs has said,
amid concerns that taxpayers' money is being used to prop-up corrupt regimes. The
International Development Committee said countries that flout agreements or refuse to become
accountable should have their aid withdrawn. The warning comes as the Department for International
Development (DFiD) prepare to spend 30% of their budget on projects in fragile states. Committee head Malcom Bruce
told Huff Post UK that while the department were not "failing" they should set out "clearer expectations"
about what they expect from governments of fragile states. He called for DFiD to "sharpen up their
criteria, be more vigilant and be more explicit." "We accept we're operating in fragile states and very often they're fragile
because of bad governments. What we're saying is that there is a limit where the scale of what you do maybe has to be
reviewed." DFiD will give 790m over to parliament of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which transparency
international ranks in the top 20 most corrupt countries on the planet. However the committee set out clear concerns
about alleged secret mining deals. The report recommended DFiD clearly set out what the UK expected from the country,
and withdraw aid if this is not delivered. The international development select committee highlighted that many of
the countries funded by DFiD are affected by fraud and corruption and have ranked poorly on
international Corruption Index measurements. The report said that DFiD should be "straightforward" that there were
risks in giving money to less stable states. Responding to the report international development secretary Andrew Mitchell
said: "We make absolutely clear to countries that transparency and good governance are
vital, and we are prepared to withhold funding through governments when our standards
are not met, as we have done in Malawi."

LinkDemocracy

Democracy in Latin America results in an increase in the use of coercive
force by State police and military

Pereira, associate professor of political science at Tulane University, 2000
(David, New Patterns of Militarized Violence and Coercion in the Americas, Latin American Perspectives, Vol.
27.2)//SG

Although it was not the principal concern of most of the contributors, all the articles explicitly or implicitly
assess the implications of these conflicts for democracy. Democracy is intimately bound up with the
question of violence 5 because one of the hopes that it offer is greater protection from arbitrary state abuse(Dahl, 1971:27-
29;Przeworsk1i,991: 16,31; Tilly,1995: 370). Popular opposition to Latin America's military regimes of previous decades
stemmed in part from a rejection of the terror and violence that they produced
(CorradiF,agen,andGarret6n1,992).However, as the following articles show, the promise of reduced state
violence has not always materialized, and in many parts of Latin America democratization has
been accompanied by a continuation or even an increase in the use of force by the police
and the military. The case of Mexico, discussed in the article by Angel Gustavo Lopez-Montielis, exemplary in this
regard. While many of the state's coercive institutions have changed the rationale and targets of their violence-for
example, many militaries no longer defend national security by repressing subversives but
instead seek to uphold law, order, and property rights in the face of criminal attack-their
specific practices are often unchanged. An example of this is provided by the article on Brazilian policemen
by Martha K.Huggins. Clearly, much of the new violence is committed by non-state actors, but even in these cases the
failure of the state to protect citizens from predation of all forms undermines citizenshiprights. The result, in many
instances, is "uncivil democracy," in which political rights to vote and participate in politics in
other ways have been achieved but violence, impunity, and weak or malfeasant
judiciaries block the realization of civil rights (Holstonand Caldeira,1998: 263). In these circumstances,
struggles for peace and police and military accountability now rank much higher on
many citizens agendas than do right to electoral participation. This is especially true of those
citizens whose lives are most negatively impacted by crime, coercion, violence, and impunity. For many of them, the
construction of safe-guards and some degree of social order and the guarantee of constitutional rights to lawful search and
seizure and a fair trial now represent the minimum requirements for a viable democracy. Much of Latin America
thus faces a deficit of Hobbesian order, without which democracy is impossible.

LinkGovernment Action

All government actions are coercive

Browne 1995Director of Public Policy for the DownsizeDC.org (Harry, Why Government
Doesnt Work, pg. 10-11, JSTOR)//MY

The distinctive feature of the government is coercion the use of force and the threat of force to win
obedience. This is how government differs from every other agency in society. The others
persuade; government compels. When someone demands that government help flood
victims, he is saying he wants to force people to pay for flood relief. Otherwise, hed be happy to
have the Red Cross and its supporters handle everything. When someone wants government to limit the
price of a product, he is asking to use force to prevent people from paying more for
something they want. Otherwise, he would simply urge people not to patronize those he things are charging too
much. When Congress passes a bill mandating family leave, it forces every employer to provide time off for family
problems even if its employees want the employer to use payroll money for some other benefit. Otherwise, employers
and employees would be free to decide what works best in each situation. Nothing involving government is
voluntary as it would be when a private company does something. One way or another, there is
compulsion in every government activity: - The government forces someone to pay for
something; - The government forces someone to do something; or The government
forcibly prevents someone from doing something. There is no other reason to involve government.

Coercively funded policies tradeoff with more productive voluntary
solutions and must be rejected

Younkins 2000Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling
Jesuit University (Edward Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom, No 63, 6-10-2000,
http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm)//MY

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state
subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such
projects believe only in the power of political society they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be
performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to
propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but
simply its coercion. If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary
cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for
Congress, Congress should: before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there
is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or
eliminate it; ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...; recognize that when
government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes
voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects;
and begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by
voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is
morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient
outcomes. Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government
program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern
themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live
in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians solve our problems
and run our lives.

Aid to Mexico would be uselessthe drug cartels control the government

Ackerman 10 - professor at the Institute of Legal Research of the Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico and
vice president of the International Association of Administrative Law. (John M., The wrong solution in Mexico, LA
Times, 9/10/10, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/10/opinion/la-oe-ackerman-mexicoinsurgency-20100910) // JA

The Obama administration is right to consider boosting funding, but increased militarization to
combat drug cartels is misguided. The U.S. would be wiser to address rampant corruption.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made a dangerous mistake Wednesday when she spoke
of Mexico's drug cartels as "insurgents" and suggested reviving President Clinton's Plan Colombia to
address the issue. That program set up U.S. military bases in Colombia and funneled billions of dollars in military
aid to fight the country's drug-trafficking left-wing insurgency. The last thing the United States needs today is a new
quagmire south of the Rio Grande. Mexico is different from Colombia. Colombia was up against a rebel
organization bent on taking over the government. In contrast, Mexican drug traffickers are businessmen
who we can assume are principally concerned with increasing their profits. In the end, they prefer to use "silver," or
bribes, over "lead," or bullets. Although they are quick to kill or decapitate members of rival gangs, they much
prefer a pliant police officer, soldier or mayor to a dead one. This is why government officials make up
such a small percentage of the dead only about 3,000 out of 28,000, according to official statistics.


LinkDiplomacy/Hegemony

Their focus on US power and gunboat diplomacy is simply to coerce
foreign nationals to do something for their own benefit

Lorca, Post Doctoral Fellow @ Brown University, 2011
(Arnulf, Sovereignty beyond the West: The End of Classical International Law, Journal of the History of International
Law 13, 2011, pp 16-17)//SG

It is important to note that this was not just a special regime of consular protection and extraterritorial jurisdiction, to the
extent that it conferred rights and obligations to states in their mutual relations: this was a regime, part of
general public international law. Classical international law rendered states internationally liable for domestic
acts in violation of the rights of foreign residents. States became directly responsible for the violation
of foreigners rights by governmental agents, or indirectly responsible when having failed
to provide adequate protection to foreigners. In fact, the series of interventions by Western
states in the semi-periphery, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, were
taken by Western jurists as an expression of state practice consolidating a regime of
international responsibility for the protection of foreign residents.20 Linking the infringement by
a state of the rights foreign residents enjoyed within its territory with the international responsibility of the host state,
made avail- able, to the state exercising protection, all the remedies international law considered in the case of a breach of
an international obligation. Under classical international law, remedies included the threat and use of coercion.
Displays of force were at the base of a great powers gunboat diplomacy. Most commonly,
American, British, French or German war- ships appeared in front of the main ports of a nation facing default or civil
unrest; and the show of force persuaded local authorities to settle or pay pecuniary
demands, or to adopt measures preventing episodes of violence against foreign
nationals.21 Actual use of coercion to redress a violation of an international legal
obligation included direct military interposition (euphemism for intervention) to protect
nationals residing abroad as well as military reprisals. Military interpositions to protect foreign
residents adopted the form of police actions to suppress riots and restore order.22 Reprisals included
embargoes, blockade of ports, bombardment of coastal towns, punitive expeditions, and
military occupation of alien territory, typi- cally involving the seizure of the local custom
office in order to take direct control of the satisfaction of pecuniary claims.23

LinkEnergy

Their federal use of energy increases wasteful American tax dollars

Edwards Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org.
He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. March 2010 (Chris, Department of Energy Proposed
Spending Cuts, Downsizing the Federal Government,
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/energy-spending-cuts.pdf)//SG

Department of Energy research activities should be terminated. The private sector is entirely
capable of funding its own research into coal, natural gas, nuclear power, solar power, and other forms of energy.
Businesses will fund new technologies when there is a reasonable chance of commercial success, as they do in other
private industries. Federal energy subsidies impose a burden on taxpayers, and they can be
counterproductive if they steer the marketplace away from the most efficient energy solutions. Furthermore,
federal energy research has a track record of poor management, cost overruns, and
wasteful boondoggles. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the Power Marketing Administrations should be
privatized. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should be terminated. Ending all these
activities would save taxpayers about $18 billion annually, as shown in the table. The bulk of the Department
of Energys activities are defense-related. Those activities, which total about $19 billion annually, should
be moved to the Department of Defense. That would allow for a more transparent presentation of defense costs in the
budget, and it would allow the Department of Energy to be abolished.

LinkDebt

Every dollar of debate takes away our freedom

Mack, the former U.S. Representative for Florida's 14th congressional district, May 31,
2011 (Connie, Mack: "Every Dollar of Debt Harms Our Freedom," Vote Smart, http://votesmart.org/public-
statement/615421/mack-every-dollar-of-debt-harms-our-freedom)JFS#.UdsIvj7wJ_Y )//SG

Congressman Connie Mack (FL-14) announced today that he will oppose any effort to raise the debt ceiling without
serious consideration of lowering the government's runaway spending practices. Mack stated: "With our country
in debt to Communist China and other economic threats to our nation, every dollar of
debt incurred harms our freedom, security, prosperity as well as the next generations'.
The support I have received from Southwest Floridians to oppose any increase in the debt ceiling without serious spending
cuts has been overwhelming. It's time we say enough is enough." Congressman Mack recently launched "The
One Percent Spending Reduction Act of 2011" aimed at bringing the federal budget into balance by 2019. The plan is
simple, it requires the elimination of one penny out of every federal dollar spent. The one
percent spending cuts would be achieved one of two ways: 1) Congress and the President work together to enact program
reforms and cut federal spending by one percent each year; or 2) If Congress and the President fail to do so, the bill
triggers automatic, across-the-board spending cuts to ensure the one percent reduction is realized.

LinkEconomy

Their discourse of economy assumes a world in which individuals are not
free to make their own choices and set their own standards

Haagh, Ph.D. in Politics @ Oxford, October 2012
(Louise Haagh, Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism
Upscales Freedom for All, Polity, Vol. 44.4, pg 550-52)//SG

Yet what makes it likely that such a complex structure might be supported in a particular
state? On a macro-scale, how are the above institutions connected? Is a systemic perspective,
such as in the institutions of development literature is typically linked with good economic outcomes (productive
investments and skills), also applicable here? In neo-liberal and post-libertarian egalitarian theory, a political
preference for spontaneous over made orders entails that such a methodology and
perspective are strongly rejected.23 By contrast, in institutions of development theory, generating a
coincidence of interest requires a high level of purposeful coordination between institutions.24 Is this also true, and how
so, for effective property rights in stability, as it is for investment? The answer here is based on the
observations already made in respect to the unique nature of the modern economy.
These suggest that individuals are not naturally free to set their own standards (to control
time or work on their own) where competitive pro- cesses tend to drive both interpersonal
relations and production to become intense and unstable. This reality has raised the relevance to
effective democracy of a central mechanism for giving control back to individuals in many dimen- sions, including through
promoting more stable production. Progressive public finance (PPF) thus shall be broadly understood below as a tax nexus
that is politically more likely and structurally more capable of supporting both human and stable economic development
across groups in society. Meanwhile, I assume that this would likely involve a high level of taxation in
GDP in a way that is not only progressive upwards, but that also entails a fairly high level
of taxation on average earners.25 This is because an upshot would be to render the shared finance and
formation of common interests and spontaneous commitments to secure economic stability both inside and outside of
production in reality likely. For instance, high marginal rates contribute to lowering inequalities of
income which would otherwise lead to a hierarchical model of opportunities in education
and occupational life (through high education fees). High overall public finance also ensures that the quality of
common services is comparable to private provision and therefore that more groups have effective access to services. In
turn, PPF in this sense can capture much of the essence of T.H. Marshalls practical notion of (social) citizenship as a
balance between public and private finance that favors an equal quality of welfare that the provided not the purchased
service becomes the norm of welfare.26 In contrast to the more exclusive emphasis in neo-liberal theory on private
property, this postwar liberal idea of citizenship regards individual property (as rights) as constituted by common as well
as private property.27 What is common in our analysispublic resourcesis what enables individuals to have economic
security in the form of property rights in hybrid aspects of stability such as more equal schooling and employment returns
(see section on Public Finance, below). Common and hybrid forms of property as our four-fold mix
of rights (strict egalitarian rights and social security inside and outside production) also
then becomes a basis for secure private propertya house or material possessionsand
of greater freedom of contract. In summary, we can say that progressive public finance is in these senses more
democratic. On the tax side it represents a higher level of sharing (assuming, as I discuss below, that not all market
outcomes are inherently just). On the regulatory side, it is likely to raise the quality of shared security and of secure
opportunities on which individual autonomy and social engagement depend. In short, PPF can be considered a
fundamental (democratic) institu- tion28 that enables the positive interaction between other institutions. In Figure 1
this dynamic is presented as a layered institutional approach to understanding the links between (developmental) freedom
and property rights in stability. The model hypothesizes that the libertarian distinction between made
and spontaneous orders is overdrawn: PPF creates the foundation for the emergence of
institutional complementarities and processes between free individuals that allow more
democratic spontaneous orders to be formed and evolve. Without PPF, property and
power might not in effect be dispersed.
LinkForeign Aid

Foreign aid strips away property rights and exacerbates governmental
control and doesnt result in any net benefit

Bovard, an associate policy analyst with the Cato Institute, January 31, 1986
(James, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 65: The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid Policy Analysis,
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa065.pdf )//SG

AID is playing a key role in the Reagan administration's efforts to revive Latin America. U.S. aid has poured into El
Salvador, Honduras, and other countries in a desperate attempt to buy prosperity for strategic U.S. allies. This great flow
of assistance provides a good test of the benevolence of foreign aid. El Salvador is AID's showcase in the Western
Hemisphere, and the biggest game in El Salvador is land reform. In early 1980 the government seized the
property of hundreds of the largest farmers, began setting up cooperatives, and promised
to eventually turn the land over to small farmers. From the beginning, AID has been fully supportive of
Salvadoran land reform, pouring more than $250 million into the cause. In a 1983 Washington Post article on land
reform, AID administrator Peter McPherson claimed that "real progress is being made," that 500,000
campesinos (small farmers) already benefit, that previously poor peasants "now own their land," and that
"agricultural production in the reform sector compares well with pre-reform
production."[23] McPherson's claims are based on wishful thinking. Since the Salvadoran government expropriated
large private farms in 1980, production of coffee, the largest export, has plummeted 30 percent. Sugar and cotton
production have also declined.[24] The government has provided no real compensation to the
expropriated landowners--they were given only worthless government land bonds, which
cannot be redeemed now and whose value is rapidly depreciating as a result of inflation.
The small tenant farmers who now plow much of the land are required by the
government to wait 30 years before selling any of it, which essentially ties them to the
land as though they were medieval serfs. Hence, they lack any real title to their land,
contrary to McPherson's claim. The government forces farmers to sell their crops to the state for prices far
below the crops' true worth, and often it does not pay farmers for as long as two years after they turn in their harvest. The
government of El Salvador has done an abysmal job of administering economic overhaul. The 1983 harvest was disrupted
because the government's central bank failed to make sufficient credit available to farmers during planting season.[25]
After expropriating large farms, the government set up hundreds of cooperatives to manage those
farms. But neither the government nor AID knew exactly how many cooperatives
existed; 317 was the best available estimate. As of September 1983, three and a half years after the
property had been expropriated and the cooperatives created, the Salvadoran government still had not surveyed the
expropriated properties, established the amount and class of lands involved, determined the number of properties
expropriated, or established the amounts owed to the previous owners. The new cooperatives are very poorly managed.
The typical cooperative uses twice as many workers as the previous farmland owners did
to work the same land. As a result, many cooperative members work only two or three
days a week. Much of the land in El Salvador is mountainous and unfit for farming, but the new cooperatives are
futilely trying to squeeze harvests out of the worst-quality land--land on which the previous private owners never
considered wasting seed and fertilizer. The AID inspector general estimated that three-quarters of the new cooperatives
are located on predominantly poor farmland.[26] AID personnel have apparently made only a minimal effort to
investigate how the cooperatives are actually working. The inspector general found that AID officials had visited only 1 of
41 cooperatives randomly selected for audit. Even though land reform is AID's principal project in El Salvador, AID's post
for director of agrarian reform was vacant for 18 months.[27] Throughout Central America, foreign aid has vastly
expanded the size and power of central governments. As Manuel F. Ayau, president of
the Universidad Francisco Marroquin in Guatemala City, observed, foreign aid has been
spent putting governments in the business of power generation and distribution, tele-
communications, railroads, shipping or other ventures that invariably end up charging
monopoly prices and losing money to boot. These ventures not only produce no wealth
for their countries, but they also tax economically productive enterprises to cover their
losses.[28]

LinkConditional Economic Engagement

Effective conditional engagement has to be coercive

Hafner-Burton 5 - professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the
Schools new Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (Emilie, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade
Agreements Influence Government Repression, Cambridge University Press, Summer 2005,
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdfplus/3877810.pdf) // JA

Second, PTAs are designed to enforce voluntary commitments to coordinate market
policies at a transnational level. PTAs accordingly supply different mechanisms of influence, and they
sometimes are designed to influence human rights. As I shall show, when PTAs supply soft human rights
standards, they offer no capacity for coercive influence. Like HRAs, these agreements are at best designed to supply weak
tools of persuasion and are unlikely to have any strong influence on government repression. Third, when they
implement hard standards, PTAs influence through coercion: they provide member
governments with a mandate to protect certain human rights, while they supply the
material benefits and institutional structures to reward and punish members' behavior. As I
shall show, coercing repressive actors to change their behaviors requires a conditional supply of valuable goods wanted
by target repressors. It does not require changing deeply held preferences for human rights and
is likely to take place in a shorter time horizon. These agreements accordingly improve members' human
rights by supplying the instruments and resources to change repressive actors' incentives to promote policy reforms that
would not otherwise be implemented.

LinkMarket

Their reps of market demand are unrelated to the desires of the people
their way forward strips away freedom

Haagh, Ph.D. in Politics @ Oxford, October 2012
(Louise Haagh, Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism
Upscales Freedom for All, Polity, Vol. 44.4, pg 558-52)//SG

The difficulty in promoting a scheme of rights both outside and inside production in
principle derives from the evident problem of specifying moral desert in the market.67
How are we to know who deserves what, when the market itself is quite erratic in measuring skill and worth. On the other
hand, what the market demands, in the form of skills and effort, may be unrelated to a
persons genuine efforts (moral desert, as Rawls observed).68 In addition, would attempting to devise schemes
not take away one of the freedom- enhancing aspects of markets by allowing the state too much power to design the good?
These concerns in liberal thought are not so different from those that have led the
European welfare tradition to often associate de-commodification largely with rights
outside of production (including in the BI defense).69 By contrast, the assumption here is that it is only when
security is more broadly systemichence where it also includes the middle class and productionthat general security
and hence individual liberty are in reality likely. In this light, the way forward proposed here is to see how
linking freedom directly to control of activities (developmental freedom) may reveal how rules of
exchange and production in practice affect the individuals position both within and outside production. The upshot would
be to indicate how different freedoms always relate in some way that is beyond the individuals control. Further, as
institutions inevitably shape this relation, an implication is to have us consider what set
of standards should frame the legitimate scope and limits of resource inequalities as well
as the key areas of pooling of risk.70 In many ways this is preferable, from a liberal egalitarian perspective, to
leaving inequalities and the distribution of security to be wholly determined by markets or neo-classical notions of social
utility, as for instance where even Rawls credits a socially efficient distribution of talents
and their reward to the market.71 With this in mind, then, we might consider that another way to interpret
genuine effort as a source of non-moral desert is to link it to purposeful invest- ment in activities (the Aristotelian
principle72) and thus attach it to well-being rather than moral worth. This, arguably, is what the idea that individuals
deserve stability of expectations seeks to address. The upshot is to position individuals as worthy of equal support in some
way, not just in learning (schooling), but also in working life (inside production).73 It follows that we have a
value of equality of secure opportunity but a reality of inequality of resources for this that
needs to be altered. In turn, it is in this critical respect that the horizontal welfare state is hypothesized to perform
more effectively than the hierarchical one. On the question however of specifying a justice framework in the realm of
productionto in practice realize greater stability of expectationsliberal egalitarian theory has offered only a partial
guide. For instance, Rawls gave well- founded reasons for such a framework, but provided
very little by way of a practical steer for how to evaluate legitimate inequalities or for how
primary goods might entail particular rights. His position is in this, as noted, indicative
of the rejection of economic systems analysis that is commonthough as I argue not
necessaryto liberal analysis. From this follows a tendency to overlook the relation between security for
different groups, and thereby to in practice permit a cash-oriented and charity-based focus on the poor and a general
dilution of citizens rights.


2NC Coercion Kills Property Rights

Property rights cannot exist in a state perpetuating coercion

Skaperdas Professor of Economics @ University of California, Irvine, 1992
(Stergios, Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights, The American Economic Review, Vol. 82,
No. 4, pg 720-21)

Without complete assignment of enforce- able property rights, as assumed in the com-
petitive paradigm of economics, voluntary exchange may not exist; any single agent
cannot be prevented from coercing another agent. No such constraints as property rights
exist in the philosopher's hypothetical state of nature, where coercion and conflict are
the presumed results. Unlike the competi- tive paradigm or the state of nature, prop- erty rights in actual societies
are incom- pletely specified and enforced, and social norms or shared ethical beliefs, which could serve the same function,
do not cover every contingency. Thus, opportunistic behavior and either tacit or open coercion can
and do still exist. Economists have for some time recognized the need to move away from
the stringent assumption of complete property rights, and many of the develop- ments in
economics over the last two decades have been partly motivated by that need.' Yet little
consideration has been given to the extreme case in which property rights are completely absent.2 In this setting, agents
face the classic trade-off between productive and coercive activities in its purest form, free of any institutional con-
straints. Its systematicstudy could prove useful in understanding situations in which this trade-off exists but is either
subtle or limited by institutional constraints. Insights relevant to the evolution of property rights and institutions in
general, currently being pursued under the more abstract goal of "the evolution of cooperation" in
repeated versions of the prisoner's dilemma, can also be expected to follow from a
concrete anal- ysis of this state. With these more distant objectives as background, this paper illuminates two
is- sues about interaction in the absence of property rights. First, the possibility of co- operation in a static setting, its
characteris- tics, and the conditions under which it pre- vails are explored. Second, an important source of asymmetric
power distribution is identified. I examine a model with two agents, each of whom can either transform her initial
resources into a useful good or into "arms." The agents' choices in useful production determine the
total available product, while the relative levels of arms investment determine each
agent's probabil- ity of winning a war. The winner receives the total product as prize, or
under an alter- native interpretation, the agents could di- vide the total product before
war takes place in proportion to their respective probabili- ties of winning.3

2NC Human Rights Impact

Property rights are a basic human right

Rothbard 07 Murray N. economist, Austrian school, ( The Ethics of Liberty, 5/1/1998,
http://mises.org/daily/2569)//RN

Liberals generally wish to preserve the concept of "rights" for such "human" rights as freedom of speech, while denying the
concept to private property.[1] And yet, on the contrary the concept of "rights" only makes sense as property rights. For
not only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former
rights lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when
property rights are not used as the standard. In the first place, there are two senses in which
property rights are identical with human rights: one, that property can only accrue to
humans, so that their rights to property are rights that belong to human beings; and two,
that the person's right to his own body, his personal liberty, is a property right in his own
person as well as a "human right." But more importantly for our discussion, human rights, when not put in
terms of property rights, turn out to be vague and contradictory, causing liberals to weaken those rights on behalf of
"public policy" or the "public good."

Property rights are key to maintaining liberty and justice across multiple
different sectors

Bandow 10 (Doug, Help the Third World-Protect Property Rights, Cato Institute, 2/23/10,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/help-third-world-protect-property-rights)//SR

Haiti recently was devastated by a massive earthquake. Yet social desolation in Haiti long preceded the natural disaster.
The tragic Caribbean nation does not have the economic freedom and legal stability necessary to build a prosperous
economy. Much goes into the process of economic development. One of the most important factors is the
protection of property rights, both physical and intellectual. Today the Property Rights Alliance (PRA) released its
latest annual International Property Rights Index (IPRI), written by Victoria Strokova, with
contributions from many others. Countries which do the most to strengthen property rights have
the best economic results. Prosperity is not everything, of course. As Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman observed:
The preservation of liberty, not the promotion of efficiency, is the primary justification for
private property. Efficiency is a happy, though not accidental, by-product. Property
rights promote justice, allowing people at all economic strata to enjoy the fruit of their
labor. Americans enjoy believing that the U.S. is the most market-oriented society on earth. But the U.S. is not number
one on general economic freedom indexes, though it remains in the top ten. America doesnt even fall within the top ten
on protecting property rights. The U.S. was 15 not bad out of the 125 countries ranked, but nevertheless disappointing
given Americas freedom heritage. Here, as in so many areas, the U.S. is losing its position as the global leader in
promoting individual liberty and limited government. Property rights always have been important. Barun
S. Mitra, head of Indias Liberty Institute, who wrote the foreword to the latest IPRI ratings, observes that A modern
economy is built on clear ownership of property whether tangible or intangible be it land, shares, or intellectual
property. Property rights promote justice, allowing people at all economic strata to enjoy the
fruit of their labor. More important from the economic standpoint, property rights create an
extraordinarily powerful incentive to raise and use resources productively and efficiently. Alas, the
challenge to economic freedom has grown in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Notes Kelsey Zahourek,
the PRAs executive director, many people across the globe are continuing to see their basic property rights stripped away
from them in the shadow of a global economic crisis. No surprise, the greatest challenge faces the poorest nations. Writes
Mitra: While world attention is focused on the economic situation in the U.S. and other developed countries, the situation
also underscores the perpetual economic crisis in many developing nations and poor communities. In these societies,
recognition of property rights and respect for ownership are weak, and a title document is often non-existent. Typically,
these are places where informal economic activities dominate. But the consequences are very similar in both lack of
credit. Ironically, the problem of the poor is not that they do not have assets; instead, they are unable to effectively to
capitalize their assets. The present crisis demonstrates that the rich are equally vulnerable to being unable to capitalize
their assets if they lose their connection to the real economy and the clear titles that it requires. Protecting property rights
take many forms. One aspect is the legal and political environment. At issue are judicial independence, rule
of law, political stability, and control of corruption. Notes the PRA report: Even the
most comprehensive de jure property rights cannot be enforced unless a strong rule of
law and independent judiciary are present to enforce them. Political instability and
corruption make it harder to acquire and preserve private property, and to benefit from
using and improving private property. These factors typically are most lacking in poor Third World states.
Defending physical property rights is one leg of the property stool. One aspect is the strength of independent institutions,
most notably the judiciary, standing against attempts to seize private assets. Other aspects include the ease of registering
property and borrowing money. Explains the PRA: access to a bank loan without collateral serves as a proxy for the level
of development of financial institutions in a country. Another, increasingly important aspect of property is intellectual
property rights. Today, with economies increasingly dependent on information and other new technologies, intellectual
property is an increasingly important aspect of economic growth and prosperity. IPRI looks at both de jure and de facto
protection for intellectual property, as well as strength of patent law and level of copyright piracy. Useful information
about many countries is lacking, which limits the number of states covered by IPRI (such as Haiti, which is absent).
However, the 125 nations listed account for 97 percent of global GDP. And the rankings, if not exact, are broadly accurate
in assessing national commitments to stronger property rights regimes. The best performers are the Scandinavian
states. Although these governments typically spend more than Washington, they also often regulate with a
lighter, more efficient, and less corrupt hand. In the case of property they tend to be far more
protective of individual liberty. The top ten are Finland (number one for the fourth year in a row), Denmark,
Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, and Austria. No surprise, all of these
nations enjoy productive and prosperous economies. At the bottom are Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia, Burundi, Chad, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Ivory Coast, and Bangladesh. Obviously, much is
wrong with these nations, as well as others that rank poorly on the IPRI. However, unless they are able to remedy their
flawed property rights regimes, they are unlikely to successfully develop even if they meet their other challenges end
external wars, pacify internal conflicts, overturn dictatorships, and so on. North America is the freest region. Western
Europe is the second. The Mideast and Asia are roughly tied for third-fourth. Eastern Europe/Central Asia, Latin America,
and Africa trail. The U.S. is only number 15 overall but ties for first regarding IP. America is number 18 on legal/political
environment and ties for 11 on physical property. The U.S. did improve overall slightly from 2009 to 2010, though little
substantive changed much. While the relationship is not perfect, nations in the top IPRI quintiles do far better
economically than those in the bottom quintiles. Although most countries which protect physical property also promote
intellectual property, there are differences of emphasis. Overall, nations in the top IPRI quintile enjoy an average per
capita income of $35,676. The average for the second quintile is $20,087. The third comes in at $9,375. Countries in the
fourth quintile have an average of $4,699 while those in the fifth fall in at $4,437. The report includes tables matching
IPRI score and per capita GDP. Again, while the relationship between freedom and prosperity is not perfect, it is strongly
positive. Positive IPRI scores relate positively to other economic factors, such as foreign direct investment inflows and
GDP growth. The poorest countries are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of economic statism. Wealthy, industrialized
nations tend to have a free and prosperous heritage upon which they can rely. Third World states have no such advantage.
The report includes a number of specific case studies. One of the saddest is Venezuela, where all liberties, including
private property protections, are under assault. Notes PRA: Commencing in 2001 with a set of decree-laws (i.e., executive
orders with value and rank of laws) such as the one on Agrarian Reform , a new trend began in Venezuela to ignore
private property rights protected by article 115 of the 1999 Constitution. Moreover, with the takeover of a significant
number of private agrarian lands starting in 2005, such a trend has become a State policy. The governments strategy of
systematically denying the existence of private property in different areas reached its highest manifestation with the
enactment of new decree-laws in 2008 and recent legislation passed in 2009 by the National Assembly. The result has
been tragic for Venezuelan democracy as well as Venezuelan prosperity. The report also notes how better property
rights can promote non-economic ends, such as environmentalism. The study observes the
World Bank found that weak IP regimes were another form of [non-tariff barrier] undermining the transfer of climate
friendly technologies. Moreover, better protection of property rights is essential for gender
equality. Poor countries tend to do worse on protecting womens property rights just as they do worse on protecting
property rights generally. Of particular importance are womens access to credit, land, and other property, as well as
inheritance practices and social rights. In Uganda, for instance, Despite the importance of land to women, the overriding
feature of their relationship to land is insecure tenure. All countries could do better. Even Finland, notes the PRA: The
one area in which Finland needs to make progress is in [intellectual property rights], specifically copyright protection.
Pirated material in business software is estimated to account for over 25 percent of the business software on the market.
The U.S. has further to go. The opportunities for improvement are modest, but nevertheless real. Liberty is good. Milton
Friedman was right: the most important justification for freedom is moral. But efficiency matters too.
And protecting property rights is a critical basis of an efficient, productive, and innovative economy. Governments of rich
and poor nations alike need to finally learn this lesson.

We should embrace egalitarian principles they are the root of income
security and equality

Haagh, Ph.D. in Politics @ Oxford, October 2012
(Louise Haagh, Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism
Upscales Freedom for All, Polity, Vol. 44.4, pg 558-52)//SG

The BI exemplifies the drive toward greater autonomy and personal choice that is, as argued, a trend of the modern
economy and that also typifies the concern with greater freedom from state control that is increasingly emphasized in
liberal discourse. Because the BI frees the individual from state scrutiny over her life style, and
in particular her employment, decisions, it embodies the idea of privacy as a human right
that, when it emerged as a legal category in the U.S. in the 1970s, was referred to as the
right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the most valued by civilized
men.56 It is apt to recall, however, that the BI is only one among other relevant sources of economic stability and
individual autonomy. Its attraction to its supporters today is partly that it does not properly exist as a right.57 A key
challenge there- fore, as said at the outset, is how to endorse it without losing sight of the collective and production-based
aspects of other contributory forms of security. The BIs strict egalitarian formula can appear to
demand a more general appli- cation of a similar principle: an individual-focused and led
kind of egalitarian welfare that therefore posits as an alternative to universal services,
organized employment, and social security (the false distinction between made and spontaneous orders
again). For instance, the BIs procedurally neutral form has appealed on a practical level as a more direct means to control
work and time as compared with societal tools like work-time regulation and minimum wages.58 It is seen as offering
scope for the individual payment of or organizing of work or care.59 Some proposals envisage that it might replace
universal schooling, unemployment insurance, and organized care,60 and its finance has been linked to flat or even
regressive taxation.61 The problem, then, is that if the value of the BI is thus to be maximized and/or taxation is to be flat
or even regressive, then the finance for and legitimacy of other egalitarian principles and areas of economic security of the
more horizontal welfare state (see Figure 1) will be crowded out. A mix of egalitarian principles, and
therefore coverage of more groups and situations in society, is at the root of more multi-
dimensional systems of income security.62 In Denmark, for instance, unemployment insurance
(UI) operates as a higher tier of protection of the incomes of those who work and it receives a significant subsidy from
general taxation (around 30%). To provide a similar quality of coverage, the scheme treats people
unequally in respect to the absolute protection of previous pay (in Denmark starting at around
90%to a certain threshold). This means that higher earners often do receive moreto an upper limit (though they also
contribute more). This absolute inequality, however, enables a higher quality of freedom for all, in this case as the life style
of a middle earner is also supported. In addition, the scheme has a strong needs component, as lower
earners are subsidized. When individuals do not or no longer qualify, general taxation
will cover their basic income support. Notably, this lowest tier has tended to be higher than the flat rate in
Britain. In summary, the point of this case is to show how a complex interaction of egalitarian
principles is needed to in practice support a notion of equal security.

2NC Atrocities

Government coercion causes the worst atrocities in history every coercive
policy justifies atrocities like the nightmares of Cambodia, the Soviet Union
and Nazi Germany

Browne, 95Director of Public Policy for the DownsizeDC.org (Harry, Why Government
Doesnt Work, pg. 10-11, JSTOR)//MY

The reformers of the Cambodian revolution claimed to be building a better world. They
forced people into reeducation programs to make them better citizens. Then they used force to regulate every aspect of
commercial life . Then they forced office workers and intellectuals to give up their jobs and harvest rice, to round out their
education. When people resisted having their lives turned upside down, the reformers had to use more and more force.
By the time they were done, they had killed a third of the country's population, destroyed the
lives of almost everyone still alive, and devastated a nation. It all began with using force for the best of
intentions-to create a better world. The Soviet leaders used coercion to provide economic security and to
build a "New Man" - a human being who would put his fellow man ahead of himself. At least 10 million people died to help
build the New Man and the Workers' Paradise. But human nature never changed-and the workers' lives were always Hell,
not Paradise. In the 1930s many Germans gladly traded civil liberties for the economic revival and
national pride Adolf Hitler promised them. But like every other grand dream to improve society by force, it
ended in a nightmare of devastation and death. Professor R. J. Rummel has calculated that 119 million
people have been killed by their own governments in this century. Were these people criminals?
No, they were people who simply didn't fit into the New Order-people who preferred their own dreams to those of the
reformers. Every time you allow government to use force to make society better, you move
another step closer to the nightmares of Cambodia, the Soviet Union, and Nazi
Germany. We've already moved so far that our own government can perform with impunity the outrages described in
the preceding chapters. These examples aren't cases of government gone wrong; they are
examples of government-period. They are what governments do-just as chasing cats is what dogs do. They
are the natural consequence of letting government use force to bring about a drug-free nation, to
tax someone else to better your life, to guarantee your economic security, to assure that no one can mistreat
you or hurt your feelings, and to cover up the damage of all the failed government programs that came before.

Freedom from government control is necessary to sustain life.

Peron, 12 [Jim, The Liberal Tide: From Tyranny to Liberty, 5-15,
http://www.freemarketfoundation.com/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleType=Issue&ArticleId=3325]//MY

The French liberal Frederic Bastiat explained liberal principles in his classic work The Law. Bastiat starts with the fact that
all people are given the gift of life. But he says that life cannot maintain itself alone. Humans have
marvelous faculties to produce that which is required for life and man sits amidst a
variety of natural resources. By the application of our faculties to these natural
resources we convert them into products and use them. This process is necessary in
order that life may run its appointed course. To survive man must apply his rational
mind to natural resources. Life requires freedom and if man is to survive he must keep
the product of his labor or, in other words, he must have rights to property. Liberals have
argued that it is for this reason that legitimate governments are created. Jefferson said the purpose
of government was to secure rights already held by the individual.

2NC Turns Policy-Making

Allowing and expanding individual decisions is key to governmental success

Glaeser Professor of Economics at Harvard University, 5/11/2007 (Edward, Coercive Regulation and the Balance
of Freedom http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/05/11/edward-glaeser/coercive-regulation-balance-freedom)//JS

I start with the view that individual freedom is the ultimate goal for any government. The
ultimate job of the state is to increase the range of options available to its citizens. To me,
this is not a maxim, but an axiom that is justified by both philosophy and history. On a basic level, I believe that human
beings are the best judges of what is best for themselves. I also believe that the right to make our own
decisions is an intrinsically good thing. I also believe that people become better decision-makers through
the course of regularly making their own decisions. Moreover, the historical track record looks a lot better
for governments that put freedom first. The liberal democracies, defined by their
affection for liberty, have been far better for their citizens, than alternatives, whether Communist
or Fascist, that enforced state-sponsored visions of how people should live their lives. A belief in
the value of liberty flows strongly through mainstream neoclassical economics. Economists frequently speak
about an aim of maximizing utility levels, and this is often mistranslated as maximizing
happiness. Maximizing freedom would be a better translation. The only way that economists know
that utility has increased is if a person has more options to choose from, and that sounds like freedom to me. It is this
attachment to liberty that makes neoclassical economists fond of political liberty and
making people richer, because more wealth means more choices. There is a recent wave
of scholarship suggesting that the government can help individuals be happy by reducing
their choices. While happiness may be a very nice thing, it is neither the obvious central desiderata for private or
public decision-making. On a private level, I make decisions all that time that I expect to lower my
level of happiness, because I have other objectives. On a public level, I cant imagine why we
would want to privilege this emotion over all other goals. A much better objective for the
state is to aim at giving people the biggest range of choices possible, and then let people
decide what is best for them. But putting freedom first doesnt mean abandoning the
state. At the very least, we rely on the government to protect our private property against incursions by others. Even
most libertarians think that it is reasonable for the state to enforce contracts. This enforcement
increases the range of contractual options and this is, in a way, expands liberty.

2NC Turns Poverty

Economic freedom solves poverty in Latin America

Ortega 2/12/2012, (Israel, Bachelors degree in Government, More Economic Freedom Translates Into Less
Povery http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/02/more-economic-freedom-translates-into-less-poverty
)//JS

Why are some countries mired in poverty while others are prosperous? Are natural resources, geography or the
consequences of history responsible for the divide between the rich and the poor, as some contend? Blaming the rich fits
neatly into the narrative of populist class warfare, but the data reveals something else: The more economic
freedom a country enjoys, the more likely it is able to reduce poverty. This is
precisely one of the many conclusions that a team of economists and scholars come up with when compiling The Heritage
Foundations Index of Economic Freedom, which we co-publish with The Wall Street Journal. Now in our 18th edition, the
annual Index analyzes the relationship between greater economic freedom and economic opportunity and prosperity.
Index scores are based upon measures of regulatory efficiency, tax burdens, open markets, and the rule of law to
determine the economic freedom for 179 countries. For example, under regulatory efficiency we look at how easy (or
hard!) it is to start a business while the rule of law category studies the impact of corruption. The United States continued
to slip in this years rankings, falling from 9th to 10th place because of deteriorating scores for government spending,
freedom from corruption and investment freedom. The U.S. dropped out of the coveted Free category two years ago;
now we are only Mostly Free. As a whole, Latin American countries reveal a study of contrasts. On the one hand youve
got a country like Chile. It did exceedingly well in this years Index by embracing the free market and rejecting
protectionist measures such as non-tariff barriers. On the other hand, youve got countries like Venezuela and Cuba. They
finished at the very bottom of the worlds rankings. (A disappointing 174 and 177, respectively.) Venezuelan and
Cuban regimes have wrapped themselves in the mantle of 21st century socialism, but economic
freedom has been wiped out -- all thats left for the people is misery and
discontent. And yet the lore of populism continues to draw millions of followers all across Latin America. For
countries like Nicaragua and Ecuador, the temptation that the government can spend their way out a recession and
generate wealth has been too great to resist. Unfortunately, the time-honored maxim by the great Margaret Thatcher
continues to ring true: The trouble with socialism is that you eventually you run out of other peoples money. For all the
Latin Americas caudillos promise of lifting people out of poverty, their new breed of 21st century
socialism has been a miserable failure. Freedom, not repression, is the key
to reducing poverty

Coercion results in fewer public services and decreases in literacy especially
in Latin America

Blattman, Assistant Professor of Political Science & International and Public Affairs at Columbia University,
2010

(Chris, Why is Latin America poor? More evidence for coercion and commodities, Chris Blattman,
http://chrisblattman.com/2010/02/10/why-is-latin-america-poor-more-evidence-for-coercion-and-commodities/ )//SG
Why is Latin America poorer than its northern cousins? One story is unfree labor institutions,
bequeathed by the Spanish, especially where plantation crops were most easily grown. Most of the evidence, though, is
based on dodgy cross-country regressions. A new paper by Gustavo Bobonis and Peter Morrow provides some convincing
micro-level support: A significant share of labor arrangements during the colonial period in
the Americas involved the use of coercion. To what extent did labor coercion affect individuals
accumulation of human capital? What was the role of primary commodity exports in influencing this relationship? We
study these questions in the context of nineteenth century Puerto Rico, where unskilled laborers were forced to work for
legally-titled landowners from 1849 until 1874. During the coercive period, governments in coffee
growing regions allocated more public resources towards coercive labor measures and
fewer resources towards primary schooling with the latter declining 40 percent. Following the abolition
of coercive measures in 1874, literacy rates declined 25 percent, consistent with a significant
drop in the skilled labor wage differential. These results strongly suggest that labor market liberalization
reduced the extraction of rents from unskilled laborers wages by local landowners.

2NC Turns War

Legitimizing state power makes war and genocide inevitable war is a by-
product of state powerturns the case

Martin 90 (Brian, Uprooting War, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw07.html)//MY

Is the state system really so bad? War is the most obvious indictment of the system, and this alone
should be enough to justify questioning the state. As wars have become more destructive, there is no sign that any steps to
re-examine or transform the state system are being taken by state elites. This should not be surprising. War is not
simply a by-product of the state system, to be moderated and regulated when it becomes
too dangerous to populations. Rather, war is part and parcel of the state system, so the
destructiveness of war makes little difference. State elites (and many others) see the
world as a state-structured world, and all action is premised on this perspective. War is
the external manifestation of state violence. Political repression is its internal form.
Political freedoms are not only at a premium under military dictatorships and state socialism, but are also precarious in
the representative democracies, especially in relation to 'national security.' One of the most telling indictments of the state
system is found in Leo Kuper's book Genocide. Kuper documents the most horrific exterminations in this century,
including the killing of the Jews by the Nazis, the massacre of the Bangladeshis by the Pakistan army in 1971 and the
extermination in Cambodia beginning in 1975. What is damning of the state system is the reluctance
of governments (and of that assemblage of state actors, the United Nations) to intervene
against even the most well documented genocidal killing. The reason for this reluctance
is the concern for the autonomy of the state. In short, maintaining the 'integrity' of the
state system is more important for state elites than intervening against genocide. There
are many other social problems caused, sustained or aggravated by the state, including
suppression of dissent, state support for corporate elites, and the activities of spy
agencies and secret police. These problems stem essentially from the system of unequal
power and privilege which the state both is part of and sustains. The state is not the only way to
embody and sustain unequal power and privilege: it is a particular way involving bureaucracies for administration and
military forces for defending against external and internal enemies.
State power requires passivity to maintain dominant power structures
allowing the state to control foreign aid makes the state appear necessary
and makes individuals demobilized and powerless, making war inevitable
Martin 90 (Brian, Uprooting War, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw07.html)//MY
The state cannot survive solely by the use of violence to enforce acquiescence. A fair
degree of popular support or at least passivity is required. State objectives can be more effectively
promoted if members of the population are mobilised to support and work for the state. This process of mobilisation to
serve the state is a key one. It proceeds on many levels. Individual psychology The state is a symbol of strength
and domination with which many individuals can identify. As the traditional sources of allegiance,
such as the family, religion and local community, lose their force, the more abstract allegiance to country and state takes
its place. Patriotism is the most obvious manifestation of the mobilisation of psychology to serve the state. More
pervasive is the tendency to perceive the world from the viewpoint of one's state and to
identify one's own interests with those of the state. The process of identifying with the
state is most widespread in relation to international relations, where the influence of the
individual is least. Individual powerlessness can promote identification with what is seen
as the source of power, the state. Mobilisation of individual psychology helps
mobilisation for war, and in turn war is a potent method for generating patriotism.
Participation In many cases agencies of the state can act without consulting or involving members of the public. But when
community disenchantment or outright opposition begins to play a major role, then the state may sponsor limited
participation which helps to mobilise consent for its policies and actions. For example, city planners for many years simply
proceeded without consulting the public. But in the late 1960s and 1970s community resistance developed: local pressure
groups were established to oppose freeways, new airports, demolition programmes, uncontrolled commercialisation of
neighbourhoods, and other aspects of urban 'development.' One official response to this grassroots resistance was to
sponsor limited forms of participation in urban planning, for example by setting up neighbourhood councils to advise
planners. Participation as used and promoted by state bureaucrats served to mobilise
support and legitimacy for the state. Low-level participation can serve as a form of social
control. It ensures that 'participation' takes the form of consultation or placation rather
than community control. It also serves to coopt and absorb many social activists, and to
isolate radicals from their constituency.
The affs view of the state exacerbates our reliance on the state increasing
the likelihood of the state waging nuclear war.

Kateb, Professor of Politics and director of the Program in Political Philosophy at Princeton, 1992
(George, The Inner Ocean pg. 121-123)//SG

The virulent practitioners of state activism are, of course, the police state, tyranny,
despotism, and totalist rule in all their varieties. Whenever a nuclear power is also one of the latter
regimes, then the disposition among a compliant population is to get used to the idea that the state, as the source of
practically all benefits and penaltiesall those outside the intimate sphere and many inside ithas
the right to dispose of the fate of the people in any way it sees fit. The way it sees fit seems the
unavoidable way. Such compliance strengthens the readiness of officials to think seriously
about using nuclear weapons. Just as the people are used to the idea that the state has the right to dispose of
their fate, so the state gets used to the idea that it may even use nuclear weapons in disposing of its people's fate. My
concern here, however, is not with the mentality of unfree societies but rather with that of democratic societies. I
propose the ideait is no more than a hypothesisthat the growth of state activism in a democracy
is the growth, as well, of that compliance creating and resting on dependence which
makes it easier for the government to think of itself as a statenot only in our earlier sense of an
entity whose survival is held to be equivalent to the survival of society itself, but in the related but separate sense of an
entity that is indispensable to all relations and transactions in society. The state, in this conceptualization, is
the very life of society in its normal workings, the main source of initiative, response,
repair, and redress. Society lives by its discipline, which is felt mostly as benign and which is often not
felt as discipline or felt at all. The government becomes all-observant, all-competent; it intervenes everywhere; and as new
predicaments arise in society, it moves first to define and attempt a resolution of them. My proposed idea is that
as this tendency grows and it is already quite far advancedpeople will, to an
increasing degree, come to accept the government as a state. The tendency of executive officials
(and some in the legislative and judicial branches) to conceive of government as a state will thus be met by the tendency of
people to accept that conception. People's dependence on it will gradually condition their
attitudes and their sentiments. Looking to it, they must end by looking up to it.I believe
the "logic" of this tendency, as we say, is that officials become confirmed in their sense
that they, too (like their counterparts in unfree societies), may dispose of the fate of the people. Entrusted with so
much everyday power, the entire corps of officials must easily find confirmation for the
rationalization of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the foreign-policy sector of
officialdom. There may be a strong, if subterranean, bond between the state as indispensable to all relations and
transactions in everyday society and the state as entitled to dispose of the fate of society in nuclear war, even though
officials receive no explicit confirmation of this bond by the people. Under pressure, however, a people that
habitually relies on the state may turn into a too easily mobilizable population:
mobilizable but otherwise immobile. My further sense is that a renewed understanding of the moral ideas of
individualism is vital to the effort to challenge state-activism.I say this, knowing that some aspects of individualism do
help to push democratic government in the direction of becoming a state, and to push the state into state activism.
Tocqueville's prescient analysis of democratic despotism must never be forgotten. Even more important, we must
not forget that he thought that democratic despotism was much more likely in those
democracies in which individualism was narrowly or weakly developed and in which,
therefore, the power of a full moral individualism had never corroded the statist
pretensions of political authority. His main anxiety was for France and the Continent, not for America.
Thus, following Tocqueville, we may say that individualism provides no remedy for the deficiencies: the remedy is to be
sought from individualism itself. One task of a renewed and revised individualism is to challenge everyday state
activism? Remote as the connection may seem, the encouragement of state activism, or the failure to
resist it, contributes to nuclear statism and thus to the disposition to accept and inflict
massive ruin and, with that, the unwanted and denied possibility of extinction.
2NC Turns Stability

Property rights are key to maintaining stability

Haagh, Ph.D. in Politics @ Oxford, October 2012
(Louise Haagh, Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism
Upscales Freedom for All, Polity, Vol. 44.4, pg 544-45)//SG

Strict egalitarian rights or private property are viewed by in particular left egalitarian and new right
liberals as permitting more autonomy in transactions, and hence more personal freedom
and a more democratic polity than the traditional welfare of, especially, the Nordic states, given the
latters role in the design and provision of welfare inside and outside production. In contrast to this (Nordic) example,
equal liberty is thought to be better protected through (interpersonally neutral) private
property orin social policyequal shares and outside production This is seen as more likely to
raise everyones freedom and to enable direct citizen engagement in the design of and participation within institutions.
One response to this critique, however, is to ask why we should assume that these objectives are
more likely to be realized by restricting egalitarian policy to one dimension or by
adopting a purely procedural view of democracy? Doing so can detract from the need to assess how, in a
concrete and general sense, the stability of expectations Rawls emphasized, and which comprises a more widely held
positive feature of private and personal property in liberal theory, might come about. The main difference
between liberal positions lies not in the value of stability as a personal good, but in what
makes it happen. As I discuss later, left libertarians see a high value of basic income as the source of personal
stability par excellence. For right liberals, on the other hand, private property and a minimal state would promote a set of
stable, self-reliant households or persons.7 The position here is to stress instead the need for a more
complex frame of rights to security, as generally understood by postwar liberals and
social democrats, as Rawls hinted at but did not spell out. A benefit of considering the role of the
democratic state in relation to more egalitarian aspects of economic security is that we can analyze how different forms of
coordination may impact the overall quality of liberty that individuals can hope to enjoy even where its precise form
differs between particular persons. In turn, this can help to answer the question whether political coordination of
production or centralized distribution are necessarily at odds with raising the self-governance of time or citizen inclusion
within institutions, and even if more shared forms of security may raise the quality of freedom
for all. To explore these concerns more systematically, the essay proceeds as follows. The first section situates
the notion of property rights in stability as a form of economic citizenship and as a basis
for an institutionalist methodology for understanding how developmental freedom and
control over time are supported. The next section then looks at the role of public finance in relation to this
kind of liberty and at how it was weakened in the context of global deregulatory reforms. From this follows first an
assessment of the need to acknowledge the democratic states multi-layered form and its
strategic role in raising multivariate security. Second, this leads to a discussion of the constructive
consequences for egalitarian theory of considering competing notions of equality and freedom within a broader security-
centered framework of justice. Finally, the last section examines empirically how elements of
progressive public finance in proto-typical Nordic states can support a combination of
different aspects of economic security and thereby in practice improve individuals
overall control over time and their participation within institutions.

Rights are key to economy and stability

Haagh, Ph.D. in Politics @ Oxford, October 2012
(Louise Haagh, Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism
Upscales Freedom for All, Polity, Vol. 44.4, pg 548-49)//SG

But, finally, how can wider forces in the external environment improve the chances that this
overall state of control is attained, that is, to enjoy control in all three dimensions? I want
to argue that this is a function of the degree of general extension of a sense of property right in stability as derived from a
bundle of sources. Individuals today are more dependent on vast and complex distri- bution
networks beyond their control. In this context, stability of expectations has become a
non-tangible aspect of opportunity and of ownership in this sense which can only be
secured through a mix of social security and strict egalitarian rights both inside and
outside production. This is what makes the positive connection between stability and responsibility as highlighted
before. Indeed, this four-fold mix is uniquely important in a modern setting, where individual freedom is highly valued yet
insecurity is a major risk. The greater separation between the occupational and the familial realms of activity and
economic security potentially gives the individual greater autonomy from familial relations. However, it also poses
a risk to her social security. Therefore, the response that optimizes real autonomy is one
that offers more independent sources of economic security in each of the three core
realms of social activity or beingthe familial, the occupational, and the personal, that is, to enjoy at the same
time, static, dynamic, and constant control. The upshot for egalitarian theory is that the modern economy generates
demands for rights along strict egalitarian dimensions (to raise basic autonomy), as well as for rights to social
security, that is, for more resources, where relevant, to generate equal opportunities for stability
and to respond to needs. An example of the first kind of right is the unconditional right to a basic life-time
income for all, a basic income (BI). In principle, its defense can be likened to that of the uncondi-
tional right to vote, and to universal preventive health care or initial schooling. In practice
the BI furnishes something like the basic control and autonomy that, in the past, private
ownership of land or common access to the forest (which the modern strict dependence on
employment removed) might afford, but for everyone.20

Coercion increases instability

Cornelius, CCIS Director Emeritus and Theodore Gildred Distinguished Professor of Political Science and U.S.-
Mexican Relations, Emeritus, and Co-Director, Center of Expertise on Migration and Health, 1989 (Wayne, A., Judith
Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith. "Overview: the dynamics of political change in Mexico." Mexico's Alternative Political
Futures, pg. 30)//SG

Increasing repression would be very costly for the regime's legitimacy . . . both at home and abroad. Indiscriminate
use of coercion would divide the ruling political elite even more deeply than neoliberal
economic policies have done. The country would become increasingly ungovernable,
with the proliferation of bitter, Un- mediated conflicts. Private investment would be
frightened away by the prospect of destabilization. For all of these reasons, it seems likely that any
endurecimiento [hardening] of the regime would stop well short of overt repression.

Property rights are key to stability

Haagh, Ph.D. in Politics @ Oxford, October 2012
(Louise Haagh, Democracy, Public Finance, and Property Rights in Economic Stability: How More Horizontal Capitalism
Upscales Freedom for All, Polity, Vol. 44.4, pg 542-43)//SG

In this article I identify the extension of economic stability as a problem for justice and
examine the implications for public finance as a source of economic citizenship and in
turn for egalitarian theories of rights and democracy. The idea that a person deserves a sense of
stability is common in liberal thought. For Rawls, famously, it is impossible to specify entitlement
through moral worth in production.1 However he thought stability of expectations is
important to enable a person to make and revise a rational life plan.2 Personal liberty
and as an extension, the likelihood of forms of democracyare also commonly tied to
material security, both social and personal.3 In what way, however, can the modern economy
secure for individuals a sense of stability in the anticipation of outcomes from their choices and actions? To
address this question, this essay explores three specific assumptions. The first is that stability as a
source of freedom (here developmental freedom) can be best understood in relation to
the level and distribution of the control that individuals can exercise over relevant
activities and dimensions of time.4 The second is that though property (as access to resources) is still a
key to stability, the resources at stake are so varied today that the relation between property and stability warrants
revision. The suggestion, therefore, is to think of property rights in stability as a general state that is socially defined by
several forms of economic security and the ties between them.5 In this context, property rights in stability
refers to an overall frame that can raise a persons confidence that she can control her
life. Rights to economic security, on the other hand, relate to contributory institutions or streams of resources. To follow,
the third assumption is that this framework has implications for how we conceive of democracy in relation to justice and
economic stability. It suggests that democracy as a system of equality of liberty must be able to
safeguard economic stability so that the rights and finance involved are not easily
revoked through the electoral process or markets. One avenue I assume to be critical is public finance,
given its potential impact on economic security in many dimensions. Hence more or less progressive public
finance thus understood may be seen as key to how more horizontal and hierarchical
forms of capitalism differ in terms of the distribution of developmental freedom via
access to effective property rights in stability.

2NC Turns Economy

Property rights are key to the economy

Boettke 05, Peter, economics and philosophy professor, George Mason University (The Role of Private Property in
a Free Society, April 2005, http://www.virginiainstitute.org/viewpoint/2005_04_2.html) //RN

Few concepts have been more important for human survival, yet maligned as unjust by intellectuals, as the concept of
private property rights. Since at least the time of Aristotle, the superiority of private property
over collective ownership in generating incentives to use scarce resources effectively has
been recognized. It was a core idea of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith, as
well as the American Revolutionaries such as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington. Historical
experiences with the disaster of collective ownership and the benefits of private ownership can be
found in the examples of the Jamestown and Plymouth colonies, the Soviet Union, and today's less
developed countries. Collective ownership, or poorly defined and weakly enforced private property rights, leads to
perverse incentives with regard to the use of scarce resources and insecurity with regard to investment in the
improvement of those resources. In the Plymouth colony, for example, the attempt was made to rely on Christian
principles to induce hard work for the communal good, but the colony was on the verge of starvation when it switched to a
private property system in 1623. Within a short period after this change, the lives of the inhabitants were richly improved.
Similarly, in the former communist countries, where less than 1% of the agricultural land
was held in private plots, these private plots outperformed the collective farms. In the
less developed world of Latin America and Africa, insecurity of ownership and the
constant threat of predation by public and private actors has destined millions of people
to live in squalor and poverty. The importance of private property rights could not be clearer in terms of the
historical evidence. Economics is the discipline that has devoted the most time and effort to explaining the functional
significance of private property on an economic system. Unfortunately, for most of the 20th century economists lost their
way in recognizing the critical importance of property rights because they treated it as the background to analysis rather
than the subject of analysis. There were a few intellectual dissenters in the ranks of economists in this regard. Perhaps the
most important of these were Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek. In their critique of socialism, they
emphasized not only the incentives that individuals face in the context of private property versus collective property
arrangements, but the functional significance of clearly defined and enforced property rights
for the economic calculation of alternative investment opportunities. Without a clear
notion of "mine" and "thine," the institutional basis for exchange is lost. Without exchange
relationships, monetary prices will not be formed on the market. Without money prices upon which to compare and
contrast prospective employments of scarce resources, profit and loss signals will not be able to guide adjustments to
resource use. In short, as Mises established theoretically in the early 20th century, and the reality of Soviet life and the
collapse of the Soviet system demonstrated in the late 20th century, without clearly defined and enforced
private property advanced economic development is not possible. The implications of this
argument are profound for our understanding of social organization. Private property rights are important
to economic development because: Recognized private property rights provide the legal
certainty necessary for individuals to commit resources to ventures. The threat of
confiscation, by either private individuals or public officials, undermines confidence in
market activity and limits investment possibilities. Clear property rights tend to make
decision makers pay close attention to resource use and the discounted value of the
future employment of scarce resources. Absent private property rights, economic actors
will tend to be short-sighted in their decision making and not conserve resources over
time. Property rights are the basis of exchange and the extension of ownership to capital
goods provides the basis for the development of financial markets that are essential for
economic growth and development. Secure private property rights, as indicated in the above quote
by Thomas Jefferson, is the basis for limited and civilized government. The elimination of arbitrary
confiscation and the establishment of regular taxation at announced rates enables
merchants to calculate the present value of investment decisions and pass judgment on
alternative allocations of capital. Recent research on economic freedom around the world has demonstrated
these four points repeatedly. Adam Smith, writing in the notebooks that would eventually become his justly famous An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, wrote: "Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest
degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest
being brought about by the natural course of things." Smith's friend and philosopher David Hume argued in his work that
civil society could be defined as one in which the principles of "property, contract and consent" guide human interaction.
In contemporary writings, Hernando de Soto has stressed the vital importance of recognized private property rights for
unleashing the entrepreneurial talents of the poor throughout the less developed world. The great philosophers of Western
civilization, the great classical economists, and the best modern economists have drawn our attention to the importance of
defined and enforced private property rights for achieving economic prosperity and social harmony. Public policy
professionals all over the world are learning from history and recognizing this link. Unfortunately, there is much
work to be done as hundreds of millions of people still live in countries where there is little regard
for private property rights, and even less of an understanding of how these rights
contribute to the economic and political well-being of a nation. In the United States, where we
have always benefited from private property and free enterprise, our biggest threat to
continued prosperity lies in the slow erosion of the respect for private property by
government through taxation and regulation. Thus, one of the most important roles that economists can
play as scholars and teachers is to articulate clearly the significance of private property for economic development and
social cooperation. If we don't, we will have failed in our scientific responsibility to convey the basic teachings of our
discipline and the lessons learned from human history.

2NC America First

The US has several areas to invest in itself such as education, infrastructure,
and research

Olen 2013/6/18, (John, Staff Writer at Economy in crisis, http://economyincrisis.org/content/us-needs-
education-industry-and-research-succeed )//JS

The United States needs to start investing in itself once again. We need investment
in areas such as education, our industrial infrastructure and research and development if we
hope to build an economy that can be competitive in the future. However, each of these
areas needs a lot of attention in order to succeed. The educational system in the United States
is not producing students who are well versed enough in math and science
to compete around the world. In 2009, American 15-year-olds ranked 25th among their peers from 34
countries in a standardized math test administered by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation &
Development. This lack of preparation at lower levels is failing to produce
students who are interested in and prepared for advanced study in areas
related to technology and innovation. High college graduation rates will not help rebuild our
economy if those graduates are not majoring in engineering, math or science. Retaining and rebuilding
our industrial infrastructure will necessitate serious changes in our trade
policies. Our current policies have been based on the idea that free trade will boost our exports enough to offset the
job losses that will inevitably occur from the flood of cheap imports and offshoring of jobs. These theoretical benefits
have not been seen despite years of free trade and the passage of numerous trade pacts. If we are going to
rebuild our industrial infrastructure we need to recognize that free trade
is not the way to do it. We need policies that will protect our vital industries and protect jobs so that we can
build strong communities again. Investing in research and development can help to
both reduce our trade deficit and rebuild our industrial base. For instance,
development of green energy and cleaner, more efficient transportation could help reduce or eliminate our dependence on
foreign oil, which currently sends huge sums of money out of the country each year. But in order for
investment in research and development to be most effective, we must close
the loopholes that allow knowledge and technology that is developed in the
U.S. to be sent and turned into manufactured products overseas. Any casual
observer can see that our economy and national security depend on addressing these things. Our leaders need
to recognize that we need them all, and that they are interrelated in order to
come up with a plan to move the United States forward. Unfortunately, our leaders have
not offered any such plan at this point.


2NC Alternative Solvency

Any infraction of liberty makes tyranny inevitablewe must reject every
instance

Machan o2fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Auburn University (Tibor,
Liberty and Hard Cases, pages xii-xv, Scribd)//MY

Yet as Robert Higgs (in Crisis and Leviathan) and others have shown, it is nearly impossible to
reestablish limits on government once it has acquired the legal authority to expand its
powers for the sake of handling emergencies. In the law and in the making of public policy, precedent
counts for a great deal; there is a slippery slope here. Once an approach is legitimized,
extensions of power beyond the particular and special areas originally intended are
almost inevitable. The denition of what constitutes an eligible emergency tends to broaden.
Eventually, no dire need whatever can be neglected by lawmakers. What might slow or reverse
such encroachment is a change of heart, some fear of going too far or the like. But once the logic of intervening
in a particular special case has been established, it is difcult to offer a persuasive
rationale for declining to apply the same logic to similar casesunless the legitimacy of the original
intervention itself is challenged. As a result, most temporary powers assumed by government
remain part of its permanent repertoire. Consider gun control legislation. The Second Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution was undermined early on in our legislative history. And now, especially in the wake of tragic shootings
at schools, restaurants, post ofces, amusement parksit has become harder and harder to raise principled objections
against more and more restrictions on the right of self-defense. Vocal members of the citizenry demand it, and the
politicians have precedents. Such decline and fall of political principles serves to underscore the integrity of those
principles. They cant normally be violated, even a little, with impunity; minor incursions tend
to snowball, especially when hallowed in law. Even so, a powerful tradition of political thinking challenges the value of
such integrity. In contemporary U.S. politics and, indeed, around the world, it is often deemed to be a good thing to be
exible. Principled politics is dismissed by many sophisticated thinkers as mere
ideology. Instead of ideology, they argue, we should embrace pragmatism. The term ideology
is burdened by a number of pejorative con-notations, often imported into the implicit denition of the term. For example,
there is Marxs claim that principled economic and political thinking can be nothing but rationalization for class interest
(with his own economic and political thinking somehow granted exemption from this indictment, however). Those who
defend a substantially laissez-faire, free market systemsuch as A dam Smith and David Ricardoare on this view merely
doing so to promote the class interest of capitalist, wealthy people served by such a system. Their principled advocacy
amounts to nothing more than special pleading. Ideology is also supposed to be the hobbyhorse of the simplistic thinker,
inclining one to provide knee-jerk solutions to complex problems. This is the charge lodged against those who would apply
political principles to judge what public ofcials ought to do in particular cases. Presumably, the resort to principle allows
one, per-haps even encourages one, to ignore details of the specic context at hand. An objective denition of ideology
(i.e., one that doesnt import various charges against believers in a particular ideology) might be a set of political values
and doctrines advanced in support of a particular social- political system. The denition says nothing about what those
values and doctrines might be or whether their justication of a particular social system is successful. That has to be
evaluated independently (i.e., the sheer fact of possessing a belief cannot be taken as proof of the falsehood or
disingenuousness of that belief; it may well be that even if a capitalist says 2 plus 2 is 4, it really is 4.) And, to be sure, even
the critics of ideology have ideologies of their own. Of course, theirs is usually construed as being the result of long and
hard thinking and observations about community life, productive of sound judgments and evaluations; its the other
person with the other ideology who is the thought less propagandist for rigid and unworkable answers. We dont have to
choose between facts of the case and principles that govern, however. Politics, in fact, requires both principled thinking
and proper exibility in applying those principles to the relevant context. Just as in our personal lives, so in politics
and law we need basic ideas that serve as the foundation for understanding how human
communities ought to function. And we need to practice and abide by those ideas. If
theyre valid, we ought not ignore them when t he tough cases come along, sacricing the
long-term benets of principled action for the sake of short-term convenience. Yet it is also vital that
cases be considered in light of the detailed facts, many of which may be new and might even require some modication of
the principles that guide legal decision making. New ways of communicating, new religious movements, and new forms of
artistic expression all require the application of familiar principles (such as those embodied in the First Amendment) in
imaginative yet consistent ways. Certainly, it is unrealistic to expect that either exible case-by-case assessment alone, or
rigid and unreective application of principles alone, could be sufcient to formulate sound public policy. The dogmatic
approach is largely eschewed by prominent contemporary political intellectuals. However, many do regard every problem
as unique, thus fostering public policies and legal decisions that do not in practice conform to any basic principles (except
perhaps the principle of pragmatism itself). As a result, those who administer public policy and law
more and more have become the ultimate arbiters of what will be acceptable public
policy. And that, in turn, defeats the ideal of the rule of law, the only reasonable alternative to the rule of arbitrary
human will, whether of a majority, a king, or a single ruling party. The rule of law allows everyone to participate in the
assessment of public policy and legal decision making; we can all evaluate whether our policy and lawmakers are doing the
right thing by reference to a knowable, objective standard. If no principles apply, then anything goes.
Usually, the most emotionally appealing choice of the moment is accepted, which means
that those who are most adept at expressing and manipulating emotionsthe
demagoguesare the ones who tend to carry the day. In emergencies, especially massive
emergencies that have a wide impact on a society, the opportunities for such
demagoguery abound.



2NC Decision Rule

Individual liberty comes firstrejecting every instance of coercion is key

Petro 74Professor of Law at NYU (Sylvester, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480,
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html)//MY

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to
bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus,
it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance
because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos,
tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In
sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for
any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of
freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

Coercion is not justified to even decrease the net violation of rights

Pilon, 1Vice President for Legal Affairs and Director of the Center for Constitutional
Studies at the Cato Institute (Roger, Two Kinds of Rights, the Cato Institute,
www.cato.org/current/terrorism/pubs/pilon-011206.html)//MY

As the Declaration of Independence says, the main business of government is to secure rights, but
legitimate government can't do it by any means. It can't violate rights in the name of
securing them. That frames the issue. Between those boundariesand given a world of uncertaintythe
devil is in the details. Governments too restrained leave rights exposed. By contrast, societies that trade liberty
for security, as Ben Franklin noted, end often with neither.

Freedom comes first

Glaeser, 7the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard University
(Edward, Coercive Regulation and the Balance of Freedom, the Cato Institute http://www.cato-
unbound.org/2007/05/11/edward-glaeser/coercive-regulation-and-the-balance-of-freedom/)//MY

I start with the view that individual freedom is the ultimate goal for any government. The
ultimate job of the state is to increase the range of options available to its citizens. To me,
this is not a maxim, but an axiom that is justified by both philosophy and history. On a basic level, I believe that human
beings are the best judges of what is best for themselves. I also believe that the right to make
our own decisions is an intrinsically good thing. I also believe that people become better
decision-makers through the course of regularly making their own decisions. Moreover, the
historical track record looks a lot better for governments that put freedom first. The liberal
democracies, defined by their affection for liberty, have been far better for their citizens, than
alternatives, whether Communist or Fascist, that enforced state-sponsored visions of how people should live their lives.

AT: Altruism

Altruism has unintended consequences-flawed model for crafting policy,

Taranto 13 (James, Pathological Altruism, Wall Street Journal, 6/14/13,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324688404578545523824389986.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_MIDDLE
TopOpinion)//SR

We don't think we'd ever heard of Oakland University, a second-tier institution in suburban Rochester, Mich., but Barbara
Oakley, an associate professor in engineering, may help put the place on the map. Earlier this week Oakland's Oakley
published a fascinating paper, "Concepts and Implications of Altruism Bias and Pathological Altruism," in the Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences. The paper is a concise summary of an innovative idea that informed Oakley's two
recent books: "Cold-Blooded Kindness: Neuroquirks of a Codependent Killer, or Just Give Me a Shot at Loving You, Dear,
and Other Reflections on Helping That Hurts" (Prometheus, 2011) and "Pathological Altruism" (Oxford University Press,
2012). The former has been described as a true-crime thriller; the latter is a dense, 496-page collection of 31 academic
papers, edited by Oakley and three other scholars. The PNAS paper has the virtue of brevity, running only eight pages
despite including 110 footnotes. Yet it's remarkable for its breadth and depth. It introduces a simple yet versatile idea that
could revolutionize scientific and social thought. Oakley defines pathological altruism as "altruism in
which attempts to promote the welfare of others instead result in unanticipated harm." A crucial
qualification is that while the altruistic actor fails to anticipate the harm, "an external observer would conclude [that it]
was reasonably foreseeable." Thus, she explains, if you offer to help a friend move, then accidentally break an expensive
item, your altruism probably isn't pathological; whereas if your brother is addicted to painkillers and you help him obtain
them, it is. As the latter example suggests, the idea of "codependency" is a subset of pathological altruism. "Feelings of
empathic caring . . . appear to lie at the core of . . . codependent behavior," Oakley notes. People in codependent
relationships genuinely care for each other, but that empathy leads them to do destructive things. Yet according to Oakley,
"the vital topic of codependency has received almost no hard-science research focus, leaving 'research' to those with
limited or no scientific research qualifications." That is to say, it is largely the domain of pop psychology. "It is reasonable
to wonder if the lack of scientific research involving codependency may relate to the fact that there is a strong academic
bias against studying possible negative outcomes of empathy." That is a provocative charge, and one that Oakley levels
more generally at the scientific establishment: Both altruism and empathy have rightly received an extraordinary amount
of research attention. This focus has permitted better characterization of these qualities and how they might have evolved.
However, it has also served to reify their value without realistic consideration about when those qualities contain the
potential for significant harm. Part of the reason that pathologies of altruism have not been studied extensively or
integrated into the public discourse appears to be fear that such knowledge might be used to discount the importance of
altruism. Indeed, there has been a long history in science of avoiding paradigm-shifting approaches, such as Darwinian
evolution and acknowledgment of the influence of biological factors on personality, arising in part from fears that such
knowledge somehow would diminish human altruistic motivations. Such fears always have proven unfounded. However,
these doubts have minimized scientists' ability to see the widespread, vitally important nature of pathologies of altruism.
As psychologist Jonathan Haidt notes, "Morality binds and blinds." "Empathy," Oakley notes, "is not a
uniformly positive attribute. It is associated with emotional contagion; hindsight bias; motivated reasoning;
caring only for those we like or who comprise our in-group (parochial altruism); jumping to conclusions; and
inappropriate feelings of guilt in noncooperators who refuse to follow orders to hurt others." It also can produce
bad public policy: Ostensibly well-meaning governmental policy promoted home ownership, a
beneficial goal that stabilizes families and communities. The government-sponsored enterprises
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae allowed less-than-qualified individuals to receive housing loans and
encouraged more-qualified borrowers to overextend themselves. Typical riskreward considerations were
marginalized because of implicit government support. The government used these agencies to promote social goals
without acknowledging the risk or cost. When economic conditions faltered, many lost their homes or found
themselves with properties worth far less than they originally had paid. Government policy then shifted . . . the
cost of this "altruism" to the public, to pay off the too-big-to-fail banks then holding securitized subprime
loans. . . . Altruistic intentions played a critical role in the development and unfolding of the housing
bubble in the United States. The same is true of the higher-education bubble. As we've argued,
college degrees became increasingly necessary for entry-level professional jobs as the result of a well-intentioned Supreme
Court decision that restricted employers from using IQ tests because of their "disparate impact" on minorities.
Universities altruistically established admissions standards that discriminated in favor of minorities, a
policy that proved pathological because underqualified minority students struggled to succeed and even
qualified ones face the stigma of being assumed to be "affirmative action" beneficiaries. The institutions tried
to help by setting up separate orientations, which of course only reinforced their separation from the broader student
body. And when, in 2003, the discriminatory admissions standards faced a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court
upheld them. In Grutter v. Bollinger, a five-justice majority declared that administrators' declaration of altruistic intent--
"obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body"--was sufficient to meet the court's purportedly
exacting standard of "strict scrutiny." It was left to Justice Anthony Kennedy, in dissent, to note the absence of "empirical
evidence." The court is currently revisiting the question-- Fisher v. Texas is expected to be decided in the next few weeks--
and one hopes that, if it stands by the "diversity" rationale, Kennedy will finally succeed in imposing some scientific rigor.
Pathological altruism is at the root of the liberal left's crisis of authority, which we discussed in our
May 20 column. The left derives its sense of moral authority from the supposition that its intentions
are altruistic and its opponents' are selfish. That sense of moral superiority makes it easy to justify
immoral behavior, like slandering critics of President Obama as racist--or using the power of the Internal Revenue
Service to suppress them. It seems entirely plausible that the Internal Revenue Service officials who targeted and harassed
conservative groups thought they were doing their patriotic duty. If so, what a perfect example of pathological altruism.
Oakley concludes by noting that "during the twentieth century, tens of millions [of] individuals were
killed under despotic regimes that rose to power through appeals to altruism." An
understanding that altruism can produce great evil as well as good is crucial to the defense of human
freedom and dignity. Mine Your Own Business The National Security Agency's broad collection of phone and other
electronic data is for the purpose of finding terrorists and stopping attacks. Opposition to it would presumably be much
stronger, and with good reason, if law-enforcement agencies were using the data to investigate ordinary domestic crimes.
But McClatchy-Tribune reports on a Florida case in which a defendant in a criminal trial is seeking to break down the wall
between the NSA and the criminal-justice system: Since the end of May, Terrance Brown has been on trial on suspicion of
masterminding a Brinks armored-truck robbery in south Florida that left a man dead in October 2010. About a week into
the trial, the Guardian newspaper published a top-secret order showing the U.S. government forced wireless provider
Verizon to hand over phone records and metadata on millions of customers daily. Official acknowledgment of a broader
program shortly followed. . . . Phone data have long been used in court to show what defendants were doing--and where
they were--at the time of a crime. In Brown's case, the FBI used phone data to compile maps that show that least one of
Brown's codefendants had apparently made calls in the same multi-block area where a series of robberies related to the
case were committed. Investigators weren't able to find all the relevant data for Brown's phones, because his carrier
apparently didn't keep records covering the entire span of the crimes. On Sunday, after federal officials acknowledged the
NSA trove, Brown's attorney, Marshall Dore Louis, filed a mid-trial motion asking the NSA to turn over Brown's phone
records. "The records are material and favorable to Mr. Brown's defense," Louis wrote, adding that the request was "not
intended as a general fishing expedition." It's much easier to argue that the NSA data trove should be off-limits to
prosecutors than that it should be inaccessible to a defendant if it contains exculpatory evidence. On the other hand, what
if the NSA has incriminating as well as exculpatory evidence about a defendant? Would it be fair to admit the former but
not the latter? The NSA's data-collection efforts may turn out to raise a lot of unexpected, troubling but fascinating legal
questions.
AT: Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a flawed way of thinking that justifies atrocities

Theophilogue 9 (Theophilogue, Utilitarianism: What is it? Why does it not work?, November 19, 2009,
http://theophilogue.com/2009/11/19/utilitarianism-what-is-it-why-does-it-not-work/) // JA

Two of the most popular approaches to ethics in modern philosophy are utilitarianism and deontological ethics, both of
which are normative theories. Normative theories of ethics are those that offer a principle as the key criterion by which
actions are determined to be good or bad. The more common of these two approaches today is probably utilitarianism.
The strength of this view can be seen, for example, in the influence of ethicist Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at
Princeton University. As one of the leading ethicists of our day, his paradigm for ethics is thoroughly utilitarian. It
leads him to some very counter-intuitive opinions about what is right and what is wrong. He
argues, for example, that killing handicapped infants is the best thing to do if the parents will
have a second infant who has the prospects for a happier life (Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. pp. 181-91). How does he come to such a conclusion? In order to
understand this, you would have to have a basic understanding of the utilitarian philosophy of ethics. What is
utilitarianism? Utilitarianism is the moral doctrine that we should always act to produce
the greatest possible balance of good over bad for everyone affected by our actions (9). By this
criterion, actions considered by themselves are morally neutralit all depends on
theirconsequences as to whether they are good or bad. Apart from consideration of such consequences, actions are neither
blameworthy nor praiseworthy. Because of this criterion, it is often the burden of utilitarian
thinkers to convince their readersagainst their better intuitionsthat the reason we call certain
desires or actions good or bad is not because they are bad in themselves but because
we associate good or bad consequences with such actions. Thus, we come to think of them as good or
bad actions, when in reality, the actions are not good or bad, but are widely believed to have good or bad consequences.
(NOTE: In a previous post, I showed how one utilitarian took on the ambitious task of convincing his readers that the
desire to torture other human beings is not wrong). At this point, I need to make a qualification. Many people (myself
included) would probably incorporate some degree of utilitarianism in their criterion for ethics. For example, although I
personally believe that certain actions are inherently wrong (apart from evaluation of their
consequences), I would still allow for the degree of wickedness to increase or decrease depending on its
consequences. For example, its a bad thing for a man to rape and beat a woman (regardless of consequences), but its
even worse if as a result of the brutality, her unborn daughter is killed and the rape victim who survives gets AIDS. This
makes the crime much, much worse


Utilitarianism is a contradictory belief

Wilkinson 11 - Contributor, Big Think (Will, The wicked souls of utilitarians, Big Think, 9/27/11,
http://bigthink.com/the-moral-sciences-club/the-wicked-souls-of-utilitarians) // JA

Are utilitarians bad people? Probably not. But is there nevertheless something wrong with them? This study, summarized
in The Economist,seems to be getting around, and seems to suggest as much. A utilitarian, for example, might
approve of the occasional torture of suspected terroristsfor the greater happiness of
everyone else, you understand. That type of observation has led Daniel Bartels at Columbia University and David
Pizarro at Cornell to ask what sort of people actually do have a utilitarian outlook on life. Their answers, just published in
Cognition, are not comfortable. [...] Dr Bartels and Dr Pizarro knew from previous research that around 90% of
people refuse the utilitarian act of killing one individual to save five. What no one had
previously inquired about, though, was the nature of the remaining 10%. To find out, the two
researchers gave 208 undergraduates a battery of trolleyological tests and measured, on a four-point scale, how utilitarian
their responses were. [...] Dr Bartels and Dr Pizarro then correlated the results from the trolleyology with those from the
personality tests. They found a strong link between utilitarian answers to moral dilemmas
(push the fat guy off the bridge) and personalities that were psychopathic, Machiavellian or
tended to view life as meaningless. Utilitarians, this suggests, may add to the sum of human happiness, but
they are not very happy people themselves. If you think utilitarianism is the correct theory, you might infer, as does Roger
McShane, my colleague at Democracy in America that "If we really want the greatest happiness of the greatest number, we
should be electing psychopathic, Machiavellian misanthropes." Set aside the truth or falsity of utilitarianism. This is a
mistake. Utilitarianism is a theory of the good (happiness, pleasure, what have you) and of the right (do that which brings
about the most good). So, according to utilitarianism, one should accept utilitarianism only if
accepting utilitarianism leads one to do more good than accepting one of the many alternatives to
utilitarianism. As one of philosophy's greatest utilitarian theorists (and an early president of the Cambridge Moral
Sciences Club)taught: [A] Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his
conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his
system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations
render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands. Henry Sidgwick here is holding on to the
possibility that the influence of utilitarianism may be benign if limited to a technocratic elite, a convenient opinion for the
colonial overseers of the British Empire, who knew they had to break a few eggs to bring civilized omelets to the savage
races. But Sidgwick's point is general: a utilitarian may desire, on utilitarian principles, that all of his conclusions should
be rejected by mankind entirely. That utilitarianism as a creed leads to good utilitarian results is an empirical matter
impossible to settle through philosophical argument. Since it seems implausible that we are best off governed by
Machiavellian psychopaths, I take the findings of Bartels and Pizarro--that those attracted to utilitarianism tend toward
the psychopathic and Machiavellian--as prima facie evidence that utilitarianism is "self-effacing," that it
recommends its own rejection. This is a study about how, if you are a utilitarian, you should probably do the
world some good and shut up about what you really think is best.

Coercion makes extinction and violence inevitableforced imprisonment of
Jews, Japanese, Cambodians, and Chinesemeans utilitarianism doesnt
apply

Rand, 89 (Ayn, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, pg. 145)//MY

A society that robs an individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the
freedom of his mind, or compels him to act against his own rational judgment, a society that sets up a
conflict between its ethics and the requirements of mans nature is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob
held together by institutionalized gang-rule. Such a society destroys all values of human
coexistence, has no possible justification, and represents, not a source of benefits, but the
deadliest threat to mans survival. Life on desert island is safer than and incomparably
preferable than existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.

No value to life under coercion renders all benefits of utilitarianism
irrelevant

Raz 1986Philosopher (Joseph, The Morality of Freedom, JSTOR)//MY

One way to test the thesis of the primacy of action reasons is to think of a person who is entirely passive
and is continuously led, cleaned, and pumped full with hash, so that he is perpetually
content, and wants nothing but to stay in the same condition. Its a familiar imaginary
horror. How do we rank the success of such a life? It is not the worst life one can have. It is simply
not a life at all. It lacks activity, it lacks goals. To the extent that one is tempted to judge it more harshly than that and
to regard it as a negative life this is because of the wasted potentiality. It is a life which could have been and was not. We
can isolate this feature by imagining that the human being concerned is mentally and
physically effected in a way which rules out the possibility of a life with any kind of
meaningful pursuit in it. Now it is just not really a life at all. This does not preclude one from saying
that it is better than human life. It is simply sufficiently unlike human life in the respects that matter that we regard it as
only a degenerate case of human life. But clearly not being alive can be better than that life.

Utilitarianism reduces individuals to nothing, making them expendable

Schroeder, 86Professor of Law at Duke University (Christopher H. Schroeder, Columbia Law
Review, Rights Against Risks, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 495, JSTOR)//MY

The anxiety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that cannot be overrun by larger social considerations
underlies what H.L.A. Hart has aptly termed the "distinctively modern criticism of utilitarianism," 58 the criticism that,
despite its famous slogan, "everyone [is] to count for one," 59 utilitarianism ultimately
denies each individual a primary place in its system of values. Various versions of utilitarianism
evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to maximize happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the
satisfaction of desires. 60 Whatever the specific formulation, the goal of maximizing some measure of
utility obscures and diminishes the status of each individual. It reduces the individual to
a conduit, a reference point that registers the appropriate "utiles," but does not count for
anything independent of his monitoring function. 61 It also produces moral requirements
that can trample an individual, if necessary, to maximize utility, since once the net effects of a proposal
on the maximand have been taken into account, the individual is expendable. Counting pleasure and pain
equally across individuals is a laudable proposal, but counting only pleasure and pain permits the
grossest inequities among individuals and the [*509] trampling of the few in furtherance
of the utility of the many. In sum, utilitarianism makes the status of any individual radically
contingent. The individual's status will be preserved only so long as that status
contributes to increasing total utility. Otherwise, the individual can be discarded.

Individual liberty outweighs all other consequences

Callahan, 73- Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics (Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, Pages
91-93, JSTOR)//MY

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the
name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including
the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades, fueled the
drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other
social needs. During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without due
process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States (1944) in a general consensus that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The
survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner
of survival, the government of South Africa imposed a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most
elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one of the greatest of the many
absurdities tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in order to save
them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and unarguable value. The main
rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for
survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious,
ethical, and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as
grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying
and beating children. Some have suggested we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts
to find means to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a
normal life and thus procreate more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to
cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness
to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving
populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies For all these reasons, it is possible to
counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil
which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights,
liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger
when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about
the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies.
But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at legitimate concern for survival, when
that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy
other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value
is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an
obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at
nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for
survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and
if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life - then how will it be possible to honor
and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in
human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of
survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be
make to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

Utilitarian perceptions of property rights isnt enoughmorality is more
than just pragmatics

Merrill and SmithCharles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School,
and Fred A. Johnston Professor of Property and Environmental Law, Yale Law School
(Thomas W. and Henry E., The Morality of Property, William and Mary Law Review,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2090.1/Fagundes/Fagundes.fn069.Merrill_and_Smith.Morality
_of_Property.pdf)//MY

If property is critically dependent on simple moral intuitions about the importance of protecting possession against
unwanted invasions, then this has critical implications for the way the institution is understood. First, it suggests that.
the type of morality needed to sustain a system of property rights must be something
other than unconstrained pragmatism Much effort has gone into explaining, justifying, and
critiquing property from a consequentialist point of view. Much of this theorizing has
implicitly assumed that property is fully malleable.6 5 Based on this expert-oriented view," one might
think that the more property can be justified in utilitarian terms, the more utilitarianism
would succeed at putting property on its own foundation without regard to extralegal
moral considerations, such as the intuition that it is wrong to steal. The wrongness of theft can be seen as part and
parcel of a thing-based right-to-exclude view of property, which is too naive to stand in the light of sophisticated analysis.6
7 But success in justifying an institution on utilitarian grounds does not foreclose a role
for deontology in the institution. This can be seen in the case of those rights that have
even stronger prelegal moral intuitions backing them-civil and human rights. Rights not
to be killed or subject to violence clearly serve an important function in society and are
obviously welfare-increasing. But this is not to say that this is all there is to such rights, that
people generally think about them in these terms, or that they make decisions involving
them using utilitarian calculus. Although both property rights and civil or human rights
can be justified on utilitarian grounds, that does not mean that they can be cashed out
into mere utilitarian precepts or rules of thumb and nothing more. Moral philosophers
and legal activists who champion human or civil rights, such as rules against torture or rape, would
agree that such rights have utilitarian justifications. But most would not, out of this consideration, acquiesce in
the notion that these rights are just utilitarian rules of thumb, subject to case-bycase
adjustment in accordance with pragmatic considerations." The same general point holds
true for property rights: just because property serves utilitarian ends does not mean that
the definition and enforcement of property rights reduces to case-bycase pragmatics.

AT: Consequentialism

The moral act is what mattersnot the consequences

Vesilind 91 Aarne, civil engineering, Bucknell University (Views on Teaching Ethics and Morals, April 1991,
http://ascelibrary.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1061/%28ASCE%291052-
3928%281991%29117%3A2%2888%29)//RN

A second method of classifying ethical theories is on the basis of the act, as it is being
performed, versus the consequences of the act. Some theories hold that the very act is
what matters, and that it is my duty as a rational human to act in certain ways toward all
others, in the hopes that they will in turn act similarly toward me. In such theories, lying,
for example, is a clear violation of my duties to others, and thus is an unethical act
regardless of the consequences.

We act morally because it is our duty to- we dont think of consequences
when performing our duty

Kemerling No Date Garth, philosophy, university of Iowa, (Kant: The Moral Order,
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm)//RN

We begin with the concept of that which can be conceived to be good without qualification,
a good will. Other good features of human nature and the benefits of a good life, Kant pointed out, have value only under
appropriate conditions, since they may be used either for good or for evil. But a good will is intrinsically good;
its value is wholly self-contained and utterly independent of its external relations. Since
our practical reason is better suited to the development and guidance of a good will than
to the achievement of happiness, it follows that the value of a good will does not depend
even on the results it manages to produce as the consequences of human action. Kant's
moral theory is, therefore, deontological: actions are morally right in virtue of their
motives, which must derive more from duty than from inclination. The clearest examples
of morally right action are precisely those in which an individual agent's determination to act in
accordance with duty overcomes her evident self-interest and obvious desire to do otherwise. But in such a case, Kant
argues, the moral value of the action can only reside in a formal principle or "maxim," the
general commitment to act in this way because it is one's duty. So he concludes that "Duty is the
necessity to act out of reverence for the law."

Consequences shouldnt be factored- the outcome of good moral actions will
always outweigh the consequences

Kant 85, Immanuel, German philosopher (General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 1785,
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/morals/ch03.htm)//RN

Imputation, in the moral sense, is the judgement by which anyone is declared to be the
author or free cause of an action which is then regarded as his moral fact or deed, and is
subjected to law. When the judgement likewise lays down the juridical consequences of the deed, it is judicial or
valid (imputatio judiciaria s. valida); otherwise it would be only adjudicative or declaratory (imputatio dijudicatoria). That
person individual or collective who is invested with the right to impute actions judicially, is called a judge or a court
(judex s. forum). When any one does, in conformity with duty, more than he can be
compelled to do by the law, it is said to be meritorious (meritum). What is done only in exact
conformity with the law, is what is due (debitum). And when less is done than can be demanded to be done by the law, the
result is moral demerit (demeritum) or culpability. The juridical effect or consequence of a culpable act of demerit is
punishment (paena); that of a meritorious act is reward (praemium), assuming that this reward was promised in the law
and that it formed the motive of the action. The coincidence or exact conformity of conduct to what
is due has no juridical effect. Benevolent remuneration (remuneratio s. repensio benefica) has no place in
juridical relations. The good or bad consequences arising from the performance of an
obligated action as also the consequences arising from failing to perform a meritorious action cannot be
imputed to the agent (modus imputation is tollens). The good consequences of a meritorious action as also the
bad consequences of a wrongful action may be imputed to the agent (modus imputation is poneus). The degree of
the imputability of actions is to be reckoned according to the magnitude of the
hindrances or obstacles which it has been necessary for them to overcome. The greater
the natural hindrances in the sphere of sense, and the less the moral hindrance of duty,
so much the more is a good deed imputed as meritorious. This may be seen by
considering such examples as rescuing a man who is an entire stranger from great
distress, and at very considerable sacrifice. Conversely, the less the natural hindrance, and the greater the
hindrance on the ground of duty, so much the more is a transgression imputable as culpable. Hence the state of
mind of the agent or doer of a deed makes a difference in imputing its consequences,
according as he did it in passion or performed it with coolness and deliberation.

Acts of morality come firstno need to consider consequences

Kant 90 Immanuel, German philosopher ( Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 1790,
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/religion/religion-within-reason.htm)//RN

But although for its own sake morality needs no representation of an end which must
precede the determining of the will, it is quite possible that it is necessarily related to
such an end, taken not as the ground but as the [sum of] inevitable consequences of
maxims adopted as conformable to that end. For in the absence of all reference to an end no
determination of the will can take place in man, since such determination cannot be followed by no effect whatever; and
the representation of the effect must be capable of being accepted, not, indeed, as the basis for the determination of the
will and as an end antecedently aimed at, but yet as an end conceived of as the result ensuing from the wills determination
through the law (finis in consequentiam veniens). Without an end of this sort a will, envisaging to itself no definite goal for
a contemplated act, either objective or subjective (which it has, or ought to have, in view), is indeed informed as to how it
ought to act, but not whither, and so can achieve no satisfaction. It is true, therefore, that morality
requires no end for right conduct; the law, which contains the formal condition of the use
of freedom in general, suffices. Yet an end does arise out of morality; for how the
question, What is to result from this right conduct of ours? is to be answered, and
towards what, as an end even granted it may not be wholly subject to our control we
might direct our actions and abstentions so as at least to be in harmony with that end:
these cannot possibly be matters of indifference to reason. Hence the end is no more than an idea of
an object which takes the formal condition of all such ends as we ought to have (duty) and combines it with whatever is
conditioned, and in harmony with duty, in all the ends which we do have (happiness proportioned to obedience to duty)
that is to say, the idea of a highest good in the world for whose possibility we must postulate a higher, moral, most holy,
and omnipotent Being which alone can unite the two elements of this highest good. Yet (viewed practically) this idea is not
an empty one, for it does meet our natural need to conceive of some sort of final end for all our actions and abstentions,
taken as a whole, an end which can be justified by reason and the absence of which would be a hindrance to moral
decision. Most important of all, however, this idea arises out of morality and is not its basis;
it is an end the adoption of which as ones own presupposes basic ethical principles.
Therefore it cannot be a matter of unconcern to morality as to whether or not it forms for
itself the concept of a final end of all things (harmony with which, while not multiplying mens duties, yet
provides them with a special point of focus for the unification of all ends); for only thereby can objective,
practical reality be given to the union of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the
purposiveness of nature, a union with which we cannot possibly dispense. Take a man who,
honoring the moral law, allows the thought to occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) of what sort of world he would
create, under the guidance of practical reason, were such a thing in his power, a world into which, moreover, he would
place himself as a member. He would not merely make the very choice which is determined by that moral idea of the
highest good, were he vouchsafed solely the right to choose; he would also will that [such] a world should by all means
come into existence (because the moral law demands that the highest good possible through our agency should be
realized) and he would so will even though, in accordance with this idea, he saw himself in danger of paying in his own
person a heavy price in happiness it being possible that he might not be adequate to the [moral] demands of the idea,
demands which reason lays down as conditioning happiness. Accordingly he would feel compelled by reason to avow this
judgment with complete impartiality, as though it were rendered by another and yet, at the same time, as his own;
whereby man gives evidence of the need, morally effected in him, of also conceiving a final end for his duties, as their
consequence sequence.

Evaluating the round under a consequential framework offered by the
affirmative dismisses human rights

Sen 2000 (Amartya, Trinity College, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 97, No. 9 (Sep., 2000), pp. 477-502)//JS

Within a broad consequential framework, ethical or political rights can be
seen to be less narrowly specified than the formalities of legal rights. The
alleged need to specify "perfect obligations" (specifying exactly who will do what) to correspond to rights, which are
some- times taken to be essential for making any sense of rights, are overly restrictive. In contrast, looser
forms of obligations (sometimes called "imperfect obligations"), which point to the need for
others to pay serious attention to their responsibilities in preventing harm
and the violation of freedoms and rights, can have an extensive role in
making us understand such concepts as "human rights" and "basic civil
rights." They need not be dismissed as just loose talk.

Consequentialism is badcoercion is wrongthat means you have to reject
itthe right comes before the good

White 07 CUNY College of Staten Island (Mark, In Defense of Deontology and Kant: A Reply to Van
Staveren, Social Science Research Network, 9/10/07,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=360563)//SR

Deontology is a notoriously difficult term to define; Gaus (2001, pp.189-190) lists no less than ten meanings of it in the
philosophical literature, and no one system of ethics that is widely regarded as deontological corresponds to all them (and
one even applies to Benthamite utilitarianism). But I believe the most common (and relatively moderate) understanding
of the term maintains that not all ethical judgments regarding actions can be made on the basis of
outcomes or consequences; in other words, there can be nonconsequentialist criteria for the
moral evaluation of actions. (This definition is moderate in that it allows that consequentialist evaluation may be
appropriate in some cases.) From a more agent-centered perspective, deontology commonly holds that persons are
often restricted from using certain means to achieve their ends, or are allowed to
take actions that will result in suboptimal outcomes. What both of these descriptions have in common, and what I think
can be seen as the general theme of deontological theories, is that, at least in some cases, the right is given
priority over the good, whereas consequentialists define the right as whatever
maximizes the good. The description of deontology provided by van Staveren (p.23) at times seems too broad. She
writes that deontological ethics is about following universal norms that prescribe what people ought to do, how they
should behave, and what is right or wrong. But this applies to consequentialist theories as wellthey just define right
and wrong differently than deontological theories, in terms of consequences and outcomes rather than rights or duties
(common foundations for the right in deontology). She then writes that deontology is a morality of principles, not of
consequences, but it would be more accurate to say that it is a morality of nonconsequentialist principlesafter all,
consequentialism is based on a principle as well: maximize the goodness of consequences (however that goodness is
defined). It is this similarity between the two systems of ethics that allows Stocker to criticize them both from the
viewpoint of virtue ethics in his 1976 paper The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories, cited by van Staveren (and
on which more later). But there are also times in the paper when van Staverens description of deontology is too narrow.
For much of her discussion of deontology, she is actually describing Kantian ethics specifically, as demonstrated by her
quotation of the categorical imperative (specifically, the variation known as the Formula of Universal Law). For instance,
she attributes the derivation of moral rules to reason alone, a specifically Kantian idea that does not apply to deontology in
general. (The Ten Commandments of the Bible are standard examples of deontological rules, but do not result from mans
reason.) Also, she writes that another principle of deontology emphasizes the equality of human beings based on their
intrinsic dignity; again, this should be considered a feature of some deontological systems (such as Kants, as van Staveren
acknowledges), but not of deontology in general. Also, van Staveren seems to have a very legalistic understanding of
deontology that is in itself not Kantian at all (except as it pertains to explicitly legal matters). Throughout the paper she
emphasizes rules as a central aspect of deontological ethics, but we saw above that utilitarians too are no strangers to rules
(virtue ethics is set apart from both systems on this point). It is not the emphasis on rules that distinguishes deontology,
but rather the source of those rules and its independence from purely consequentialist considerations. (Furthermore, I
will explain below that the emphasis of rule-following in Kantian ethics in particular is often exaggerated.) She also
stresses the need for external enforcement, or universal moral rules enforced through legal measures in deontology
(p.24), and that a moral rule is followed as a duty, although it needs to be backed up by authority (p.25). But deontology
in general merely prescribes (or proscribes) certain behavior; it does not endorse any particular scheme of enforcement,
which varies among different situations, types of rules or duties, and philosophers themselves. Finally, she writes that in
deontology, good intentions are supplemented with the enforcement of rules by an authority, and contrasts this with
virtue ethics, which puts more weight on individual motivation to behave well (p.28). Deontology in general has little to
say on this issue, but Kant famously emphasized self-enforcement of moral duties, especially duties of virtue (such as
beneficence and self-improvement), and he relegated external enforcement for juridical laws (laws prohibiting rights
violations) only. 3. On Kant Now I will change my focus to Kantian ethics specifically. I will argue that many of the
problems that van Staveren finds with deontology in general, or with Kant in particular, can be refuted by
taking a more holistic view of Kants moral theory. First, I will dispute her characterization of Kantian ethics as
being preoccupied with rules, and explain why duties are much richer than rules. Second, I highlight the
little-known importance of judgment in Kants conception of choice, which avoids the shortcomings of
a rule-dominated system. Finally, I argue against the perception that Kantian moral theory is idealistic and
unable to confront real-world moral dilemmas. By confronting these misperceptions, I hope to show that Kantian ethics
have much more in common with virtue ethics than is often realized (as recent books such as Engstrom and Whiting 1996
and Sherman 1997 have shown), and can therefore deal with the same concerns and issues (albeit, of course, not in exactly
the same way). 3.1 Duties versus Rules The most widely known version of Kants categorical
imperative is the Formula of Universal Law, quoted by van Staveren: act only according to that maxim
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant 1785, p.421). It is both understandable
and unfortunate that the universalization aspect of this formula has come to signify Kantian ethics to the exclusion of its
deeper, richer elements. To some extent Kant himself is to blame for this, for he recommended that the Formula of
Universal Law be used to assess the moral status of our plans of action (or maxims): one does better if in moral judgment
he follows the rigorous method and takes as his basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative (1785, pp.436-
437). But the true heart of Kantian ethics is its emphasis on human dignity, reflected in the Formula of
Respect of the Dignity of Persons: act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means (1785, p.429).
This incalculable, incomparable dignity is reflected in the autonomy possessed by each person to make choices based on
his or her reason (independent of external influences as well as internal preferences or inclinations). But at the same time,
each person must recognize the equal dignity and autonomy of every other person, which generates the strong sense of
reciprocity inherent in the universalization requirement (and unites these two versions of the categorical imperative).
Therefore, while useful as a direct test, universalization is merely a reflection of dignity, the real meaning of Kantian
ethics, which is often obscured and distorted by near-exclusive emphasis on the Formula of Universal Law. Another legacy
of the popularity (or infamy) of the Formula of Universal Law is the impression that Kant is obsessed with rules, lending
his ethics a legalistic tone. I already discussed that rules are a common feature of both utilitarian and deontological
systems of ethics in general, but the same cannot accurately be said about Kant, for several reasons. First, rules is an
impersonal termthe language Im following my rules sounds awkward compared to the rules I follow, implying a lack
of true autonomy. Rather than rules, Kant more often wrote of duties, and held that a persons duties truly belong to her
and are imposed on herself. Rules are normally imposed on a person from an outside authority (which is how van
Staveren refers to deontological rules), while Kantian duties are the result of a persons autonomous will
operating out of respect for the moral law. For this reason, the criticisms she makes, following Stocker (1976),
that deontology (and utilitarianism) separate reason from motivation, do not apply to Kant, for whom reason provides the
persons true, ethical motivation.3 3 See Herman (1981) and Baron (1984) for refutations of this concern, the latter
addressing Stocker specifically. Stocker also criticizes these systems for not valuing the inherent dignity of persons, which
is a patently absurd accusation to make of Kant, for whom dignity and respect are central concerns. 4 Of course, not all
perfect duties are so enforcedsuch as noncommercial lyingso van Staverens comments regarding external
enforcement of rules or duties would be relevant only to a subset of perfect duties in Kants system, not perfect duties in
general (or imperfect duties). 5 See White (2004) for a model of Kantian choice incorporating trade-offs amongst
imperfect duties and ordinary preferences. Another way to show that Kantian duties are different from rules is to point out
that many Kantian duties are positive and guiding, not restrictive and constraining. When van Staveren characterizes
deontology as concerning behavior characterized by duties and limitations, I presume she is referring primarily to what
Kant called perfect duties (or narrow duties). These are usually negative in form, such as do not kill and do not lie, and
admit of no exceptions; also, perfect duties are the only duties enforceable by the state, for they are duties of action (or
inaction).4 But Kant also wrote of imperfect duties (or wide duties), which, rather than specifying particular actions or
inactions, instead mandate that certain attitudes or ends be adopted and worked towards whenever possible. The most
obvious example is the duty of beneficence, which requires that we help others whenever doing so does not imply
neglecting other duties (including those to oneself). Imperfect duties have a flexibility in their execution that perfect duties
do not, and therefore there is room for judgment to help make choices and (indeed) trade-offs among them.5 Kant also
wrote of imperfect duties as duties of ends (because they prescribe general goals or aims rather than specific action) or
duties of virtue (since a persons virtue or moral quality is proportionate to the extent to which they satisfy such wide
duties). Indeed, Gregor (1963, p.95) considers that Kants ethics is primarily a study of [imperfect] duties, and blames
the characterization of his ethics as legalistic to overlooking them. Kants emphasis on both perfect and imperfect duties
is just one aspect that separates his ethical theory from simple deontology. Van Staveren writes that deontology, with its
negative orientation, is ill-suited to behavior characterized by choices and ends (p.23) as studied by economists.
Deontology per se may not be directly concerned with ends, but is certainly relevant to
choices, which are always constrained in some way, whether by the scarcity of resources or moral norms or rules. But
Kantian ethics does not simply govern ones choices of means to satisfy ones ends, but encompass the
choice of ends as well, as imperfect duties, or duties of ends, makes clear.

AT: Ethics

Kantian ethics isnt idealistic-accounts for realism

White 07 CUNY College of Staten Island (Mark, In Defense of Deontology and Kant: A Reply to Van
Staveren, Social Science Research Network, 9/10/07,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=360563)//SR

More generally, van Staveren argues for virtue ethics because, unlike utilitarianism and deontology, it
acknowledges that in the real world, agents are concerned with both consequences and duties, but
subject to social relations and context (p.28, emphasis mine). Again, despite popular conception, Kantian
ethics is concerned with both of these things as well. For instance, the focus on social relations is
embodied in our perfect and imperfect duties toward other persons, based on their inherent
autonomy and dignity, and the respect owed to them thereby. A third version of the categorical imperative, the
Formula of the Kingdom of Endsevery rational being must act as if by his maxims he were at all times a legislative
member of the universal kingdom of ends (1785, p.438)makes clear that the overall goal of morality to bring
about a world in which every person can pursue his or her ends, consistently with everyone else
doing the same, achieving a social equilibrium representing maximal respect for all. Given this respect for
personhood (in oneself and others), I maintain that Kant can be considered one of the most humanistic and
socially-oriented moral philosophers.7 The role of context, which I take to mean the realities of human
existence, social or not, is an often misunderstood component of Kants ethics. The categorical imperative, and the duties
resulting from it, are often too general to apply directly to our actual lives, complex as they are: the categorical imperative
is not itself a moral ruleit is an abstract formal principle (Herman 1985, pp.74-75). As such, the categorical
imperative is not contextual, and cannot itself be applied directly to any real-world dilemma. But
application of the categorical imperative to help choose actions does require context, and this is
where judgment is essential: to be sure, these laws require a power of judgment sharpened by experience,
partly in order to distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and partly to gain for them access to the human will as well
as influence for putting them into practice (Kant 1785, p.389). To refer back to the previous discussion of rules, Kant
does derive general rules or duties from the formal moral law, but these are not to be applied
mechanistically to real-life dilemmasthey simply provide guidelines for right action. To decide what we
should actually do in any situation, we make choices guided by our moral compass and informed by the context of the
situation itself. And again, Kant gave us no rules for how to do thisany maxim that tells us how to execute a given maxim
requires a similar maxim itselfbut instead he trusted in our judgment. Finally, van Staveren writes that virtue ethics
alone recognizes human fallibility, referring to failures to do the good, right, or virtuous thing in every
situation. She cites a widely known failure of deontologyit is one thing to know what is best to do, but quite another
to act accordingly (p.26n). This is obviously true, but no fault of deontologyor utilitarianism, which
is subject to the same criticismsince in their simple forms they merely try to prescribe moral action, not
guarantee its actual performance. But Kant explicitly recognizes the moral fallibility of human beings, saying
that the only perfectly moral being is God: the perfect fit of the will to moral law is holiness, which is a perfection of which
no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable (1788, pp.128-129). Since rational persons are autonomous
and free (in a metaphysical sense), doing right is an act of will, and those with stronger wills are understood to be more
virtuous. Van Staverens statement that in deontology, the will automatically follows reason (p.28, emphasis mine),
denies the very freedom of will that endows persons with the dignity emphasized by Kant. She also says that the
categorical imperative assumes that good intentions, universally shared, will not only result in good rules, but will
also result in universal obedience to these rules as moral duties (28), which is certainly the ideal (in the
form of the kingdom of ends), but is hardly assumedKant is far too realistic for that, and
acknowledges that the kingdom of ends is a utopian dream. To Kant, weakness of will was an issue of character, reflecting
a deficit of virtue, and agents have a moral responsibility to develop their resolve in the face of temptation.8



AT: Permutation

Only grassroots appeals like ours that do not rely on state action can solve
their call on the state destroys any hope of change for the permutation.

Martin 90 (Brian, Uprooting War, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw07.html)//MY

These grassroots, self-managing solutions to social problems are in many cases no more than suggestive directions.
Detailed grassroots strategies in most cases have not been developed, partly because so
little attention has been devoted to them compared to strategies relying on state
intervention. But the direction should be clear: in developing strategies to address social
problems, aim at building local self-reliance and withdrawing support from the state
rather than appealing for state intervention and thereby reinforcing state power. Many
people's thinking is permeated by state perspectives. One manifestation of this is the unstated identification of states or
governments with the people in a country which is embodied in the words 'we' or 'us.' "We must negotiate sound
disarmament treaties." "We must renounce first use of nuclear weapons." Those who make such statements implicitly
identify with the state or government in question. It is important to avoid this identification, and to carefully distinguish
states from people. The Italian state is different from the people living in Italy. Instead of saying "China invaded Vietnam,"
it is more accurate and revealing to say something like "Chinese military forces invaded Vietnamese territory" or perhaps
"Chinese military forces, mostly conscripts, were ordered by the rulers of the Chinese state to invade territory which was
claimed by rulers of the Vietnamese state as exclusively theirs to control." Also to be avoided is the attribution of gender to
states, as in 'motherland' or 'fatherland.' Many social action campaigns have a national focus, a
national organisational basis and depend on national activist leaders. This is especially
true when the campaign is based on influencing state elites to implement or change
policies. This national orientation both reflects and reinforces a state perspective and
state power. The alternative is to think and act both locally and transnationally, and to
develop skills and leadership at local levels. This approach has been adopted by some social movements,
but seldom on a sustained and systematic basis.
Permutation gets cooptedcalls to the state as the focal point for new forms
of social organization will only serve to expand and legitimize current state
and elite power structures
Martin 90 (Brian, Uprooting War, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw07.html)//MY
The state has moved into many new areas as they become significant, such as environmental protection,
legislating against racial and sexual discrimination, and promoting nuclear power. This expanding role
of the state helps prevent the rise of any significant competing forms of social
organisation. Many of the roles and activities of the state now seem indispensable. Even those who
complain bitterly about the inefficiencies and abuses of state bureaucracies usually want
only to reform the state rather than provide an alternative structure. Relying on the state
for solutions to the problems of labour exploitation, poverty, racism, sexism and
environmental degradation can be attractive, since the state can and does meet some needs in these
areas. The difficulty is that the expansion of state power also reduces local direct
democracy and increases vulnerability to manipulation by elites. This reinforces the
structural basis for the original social problems whose alleviation was sought. The problem of
war is a case in point. In several instances, what were seen as solutions to the problem of war
succumbed to the moulding force of the state system. Democracy was at one time seen as
an antidote to war. But 'democracy' has been moulded to serve the state, becoming
representative democracy to elect state officials, in which candidates are chosen by
bureaucratised political parties. Far from being an antidote to war, mass representative
democracy has been linked historically with the development of modern war. Indeed, mass
democracies, beginning with the French Revolution, have been quite successful in war-fighting due to the power of
popular sentiment mobilised on behalf of the state. In the two world wars, mass democracies defeated empires.
The alternative solves calls for reform outside of the state system are vital
to true solvencya total rejection of state power is key
Martin 90 (Brian, Uprooting War, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw07.html)//MY
The state system is strong because the actions of many people and groups support it.
Most social activists see state intervention as a solution, often the solution, to social
problems. What can be done about poverty? More state welfare. What about racial
discrimination? Laws and enforcement to stop it. What about environmental degradation? State
regulation. What about sexual discrimination? Anti-discrimination legislation. What about corporate irresponsibility or
excess profits? Added government controls and taxation, or nationalisation. What about unemployment? state regulation
of the economy: investment incentives, job creation schemes, tariffs. What about crime? More police, more prisons, more
counsellors. What about enemy attack? More military spending. What about too much military spending? Convince or
pressure the government to cut back. The obvious point is that most social activists look constantly to the
state for solutions to social problems. This point bears labouring, because the orientation
of most social action groups tends to reinforce state power. This applies to most antiwar
action too. Many of the goals and methods of peace movements have been oriented
around action by the state, such as appealing to state elites and advocating neutralism
and unilateralism. Indeed, peace movements spend a lot of effort debating which demand to make on the state:
nuclear freeze, unilateral or multilateral disarmament, nuclear-free zones, or removal of military bases. By appealing
to the state, activists indirectly strengthen the roots of many social problems, the
problem of war in particular. To help transform the state system, action groups need to
develop strategies which, at a minimum, do not reinforce state power. This means
ending the incessant appeals for state intervention, and promoting solutions to social
problems which strengthen local self-reliance and initiative.
AT: State Involvement Good

State expansion of foreign policy over individual freedom shapes our
perception of deathguarantees immorality and extinction

Beres 99 Professor of political science and international law at Purdue University (Louis Rene, Death, the Herd,
and Human Survival, International Journal on World Peace, JSTOR)//MY

But let us take leave of the metaphysical, and return to the vastly more concrete realm of
international affairs and US foreign policy. What, exactly, must be done to bring individual Americans to
the liberation offered by Santayana? Very little, if anything! "Immortal reason,35 Santayana notwithstanding, will not
wean our minds from mortal concerns. Perhaps, over time, humankind will envisage the eternal
and detach its affections from the world of flux, but that time is far in the future. For now,
we must rely on something else, something far less awesome and far more mundane. We
must rely on an expanding awareness that states in general, and the United States in
particular, are not the Hegelian "march of God in the world,55 but the vicars of annihilation and that
the triumph of the herd in world politics can only hasten the prospect of individual
death. This, then, is an altogether different kind of understanding. Rather than rescue American foreign
policy by freeing the citizenry from fear of death, it recommends educating this populace
to the truth of an incontestable relationship between death and geopolitics. By
surrendering ourselves to states, we en courage not immortality but extinction. It is a
relationship that can be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive
calculus of geopolitics has now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations
all over the planet turn increasingly to states for security. It is the dreadful ingenuity of
states that makes possible death in the millions, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people
seek safety. Indeed, as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms ever larger, the citizens of
nuclear states reaffirm their segmented loyalties, moved by the persistent unreason that
is, after all, the most indelible badge of humankind. It follows from this that increasing
human uncertainty brought about by an unprecedented vulnerability to disappearance is
likely to undermine rather than support the education we require. Curiously, therefore, before we
can implement such education we will need to reduce the perceived threat of nuclear war and enlarge the belief that
nuclear stability (as a short-term objective) is within our grasp. To make this possible we must continue to make progress
on the usual and mainstream arms control measures and on the associated strategies of international cooperation and
reconciliation.

Blindly accepting coercion forces societal self-destructionindividual
reevaluation of our society key to prevent annihilation

Beres 99 Professor of political science and international law at Purdue University (Louis Rene, Death, the Herd,
and Human Survival, International Journal on World Peace, JSTOR)//MY

But what are the connections be tween money and "going along?" Contemporary Americans have entered into a Faustian
bargain wherein "things are exchanged for silence. Nourished from earliest childhood to share in the state religion of
hatred toward another society, baby boomers learned very quickly that questions about this religion rep resented not
dissent but blasphemy. Accepting the right of government to bind all private wills into its own
sacred purposes, we still acknowledge no legitimate political function for ourselves in
foreign affairs save obedience. In the end, to rid ourselves of a foreign policy deformed
by contrived hatredsif not the hatreds of the Cold War, then the "new hatreds of ethnic warfarewe will
need to discover meaningful bases of status and self-worth. To continue to survive as a
nation, we cannot continue to draw meaning from membership in The Herd.
Reconstructing ourselves on the ruins of herd theology, we must begin to distance ourselves from
loyalties that acknowledge only self-contempt, loyalties that demand war and ultimately
oblivion. For now, the herd is not only lonely, but lethal. Left unchallenged as the source of
private identity, it will prod us to accept any lie with indifference. Where this lie informs
us that our value as Americans flows from a caricatural contest with another society or
people, it may push us beyond the limits of safety into collective annihilation.

AT: American First Immoral

Self-interest is moralfree market solves social justice best

Maddock and Vitn 09 (G. Michael and Raphael Luis, Conscious Capitalism: Doing Good Via Self-
Interest, Business Week, 12/8/09,
http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/dec2009/ca2009128_264955.htm)//SR

Maybe if members of the social responsibility movement were to spend less time hectoring companies
about climate change, worker exploitation, and the like, and more time pointing out the greater profits
these businesses could produce by implementing socially responsible ideas, they would
be more effective. If they recast the issue in terms of "and," as in "You can do X, which will increase earnings and by
the way, contribute to the greater good," instead of "or," as in "You can do well or make money, but you can't do both,"
they would have to beat followers away with a stick. At its heart, social responsibility is an innovation
challenge. These are the thoughts we came back with after attending the recent Catalyzing Conscious Capitalism
conference in Austin, Tex. (see highlights here). Conscious capitalism is a new way of thinking about
"social responsibility," the idea that an organization (government, nonprofit, business) has an
obligation to act not only in its own best interests but also in those of all its stakeholders
(customers, employees, suppliers, investors, society). needed: clarity of destinationLet us be clear. Our company is a huge
believer in the idea of doing well by doing good. We are proud of the clients we represent and the contributionsboth
financial and in-kindthat we make. To us, this is not only good business but is also totally consistent with the
kind of company we want to run. It aligns with our purpose and core values. On the way back from the
conference, we sketched the conscious capitalism framework in a way that borrows from the late psychologist Abraham
Maslow and his well-known hierarchy of needs. We think it's an apt parallel. To us, the conscious capitalism movement
requires clarity of destination. We want to be known as a company that makes moneythe middle layerbut more
important, we want our people to know what we believe so that everyone here can work effectively in unison, which in turn
will allow us to make more money for our stakeholders and make more contributions to society. Because of that, we don't
cast the issue of social responsibility in terms of "earthmuffins" vs. "plunderers and/or greenwashers" (people who
pretend to do good, but in actuality don't). That dichotomy is neither helpful nor accurate. We prefer to talk about
"going green" the way Ray Anderson of Interface or Jeff Immelt of GE (GE) do: "It is a way of making more
money." not an end in itself, but a toolIt's much easier to sell a plan to reduce accidents by saying, "if we create a safer
work environment, we will save money on insurance and manpower costs," than it is to run around screaming about the
exploitation of the workforce. We don't know who said it at the conference, but he or she got the idea absolutely right:
"Conscious capitalism is a devastatingly good weapon." It is not an end in itself but rather, a tool.
Creating a win-win-win business modelwith the wins being what benefits the company, its stakeholders, and
the environment/society in generalis the only way to optimize value. That means that n addition to
measuring your success monetarily, you need to adapt new metrics, in terms of relative intent and relative impact, that
will tangibly illustrate the ongoing progress toward the interrelated desired outcomes of the model. At the onset, it could
be as simple as charting your recycling efforts or as complex as measuring the return on investment on your employee-
safety efforts. It will be capitalism, not government or charity, that creates the kind of world we
want our kids and grandkids to grow up in. Getting that world will require innovative thinking, but it is
well worth the trip for many reasons, including money. Nonetheless, if you just see this as a way to make more
moneywhich it isyou are missing part of the point. As a friend once put it: We may not save the world, but it's
important that our kids know we were on the right team and that we were trying.

Self-interest motivates doing good best

Baron 13 (Josh, Is Doing Good Good Enough? Unleashing the Power of Self-Interest in Philanthropy,
Huffington Post, 2/7/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-baron/is-doing-good-good-
enough_b_2637865.html)//SR

Encouraging businesses and individuals to identify what they can get out of philanthropy can feel uncomfortable, even
tawdry. But there are two problems with relying on altruism as the main motivation for philanthropy.
First, most people are altruistic only a small percentage of their time. To really get their attention,
they have to see some value for themselves. Second, it is relatively easy to do good. Real change
is more likely to happen when there is a goal in mind in addition to satisfying the altruistic urge.
Therefore, to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunities for philanthropy to make a difference in society, we have
to encourage people to think more consciously and creatively about: "What's in this for me?" The rationale for self-
interested philanthropy can be traced back to the market economy -- the source of the wealth that makes
philanthropy possible in most countries. Capitalism is fundamentally based on the idea that society benefits from
each person looking out for himself. As Adam Smith put it, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." It is worth noting that
Smith was a moral philosopher by training and not an economist; he believed in the virtue of individual acts of self-
interest. The same "invisible hand" can help unlock the full potential of philanthropy. I have
seen this possibility in action over the last several years in advising family-owned businesses. In my experiences across a
number of clients and continents, I have found that people are motivated to give more, and to do it more
effectively, when there is something to be personally gained from their philanthropy. Without exception
these people have participated in philanthropy because they have a genuine desire to make the world a better place. Yet
many of them also see the benefits that it can bring to them as a business and as a family. Achieving those benefits
requires them to think strategically, measure their results, adopt a long-term perspective, and stick with their initiatives
through tough times, which serves their own needs as well as society's (for specific examples, see PhilanTopic - Embracing
the 'I' in Philanthropy ). Family businesses have a natural desire to see more connection between their business and
philanthropic activities. But the same logic applies to non-family businesses, as well as to individual philanthropists.
Corporations often go out of their way to show how their work in the community is separate from any profit-motive.
Instead, they should look for causes that are closely aligned with their core business. Philanthropy is more likely to be
scalable and sustainable if it is perceived to be central to the company's strategy rather than just a "do-good" project. Since
such endeavors can only payoff when they deliver real results, the more they profit, the more society does
too. I was fortunate to be part of one such effort. In 1999, Bain's former CEO Tom Tierney led the formation of a new
organization that would bring strategic and management consulting to foundations and non-profits. The launch of The
Bridgespan Group was supported by Bain in a number of ways, most importantly by allowing, even encouraging, its
employees to spend part of their careers doing externships. I know from working at both places that this support was done
out of a heartfelt desire to make a difference. But the success of the collaboration was also due to the benefits that Bain
received. Beyond the positive press, Bridgespan has served as an incredibly valuable tool for recruiting and retaining
talented people who want to make a difference in addition to a bonus. Even those that never take advantage of the
externship opportunities value having the option available. The same point applies to individual philanthropists. In his
rationale for participating in the Giving Pledge, Bill Ackman, the American hedge fund manager, said: "While my
motivations for giving are not driven by a profit motive, I am quite sure that I have earned financial returns from giving
money away. Not directly by any means, but rather as a result of the people I have met, the ideas I have been exposed to,
and the experiences I have had". Beyond financial returns, philanthropy can be a vehicle for enhancing the legacy of
donors, preparing their children to deal responsibly with wealth, and bringing their families closer together. Gaining those
benefits requires philanthropists to do it well, which in turn serves society. The need for philanthropy is greater now than
ever in the wake of the Great Recession and the austerity measures required by governments to cut their deficits. The
same companies and individuals who are creating the extraordinary wealth of our time have the
potential to make a tremendous difference when they channel more of their energies towards social
change. Doing good will not be good enough. Instead, it is time to unleash the power of self-interest.

We must focus on domestic problems now

Swenson 2013/6/26 (Ron, Time to focus on domestic needs Resident at St. George
http://www.thespectrum.com/article/20130627/OPINION/306270003/Time-focus-domestic-needs )//JS

A recent report on the costs of our recent wars gave me an idea. We could save a lot of money if we
quit fighting wars so often. What I am referring to are all those wars we have entered and seem to be
losing. Lets go back 50-plus years to the Korean War, which is still costing us billions of dollars for the 30,000 troops
assigned there. Lets just bring the boys home. Then there is the war on poverty; last I heard
we were losing that one, too, with the growing gap between the top and everyone else. The war we
declared on drugs has cost us billions of dollars and many innocent lives. I
dont have a solution, but calling it a war hasnt solved anything. Then theres the war on terror. There
will always be terrorists, so instead of continuing this war, why dont we just quietly go after terrorists? Calling it a war
doesnt make our lives safer. Its just political scare-mongering. Other than Afghanistan, were currently not waging war in
any other countries, but Sen. John McCain is all lathered-up about our not doing enough in Syria. The president is very
cautious about getting us into that tribal and religious cauldron. If Syrian rebels were to succeed in ousting Assad, that
country could become extremely dangerous to Israel and its other neighbors and possibly fall to al-Qaeda forces. Many
today believe that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan was a war of necessity; more important, neither was a justifiable war of
choice . Our fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq cost us dearly in soldiers and
trillions of dollars, yet today the tribes and religious sects are back at their century-old wars and feuds.
President Obamas recent meetings with the leader of China, Xi Jinping got excellent reports on several fronts and shows
promise for improved relations with China, especially with agreement on containing North Korea. A new book by
Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Affairs, titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home, argues
for less foreign policy of the Iraq and Afghanistan type and greater emphasis on domestic
investment. He lists many of the needs we face here in America and adds regarding our Middle East
wars: More than a decade of enormous sacrifice has hurt this countrys reputation for
judgment and competence and failed to produce results commensurate with the human,
military and economic cost of the undertakings. We need to get our own house in order. In the
case of Iraq, we should have learned that it was easy to oust a bad regime, but extremely difficult to replace them with
something better. Some conservatives will scream isolationism. But consider
this: We spend more on defense than the 10 next largest nations, we have
troops all over the world, and our military is modern and able to react fast
and effectively. We can honor commitments to defend our friends. But now
it is time to zero in on Americas needs!

AT: Government Doesnt Coerce

The government is at powercan coerce us through social circumstances

Airaksinen 88, Timo, moral philosophy professor, Helsinki University, (An Analysis of Coercion, Sep. 1988,
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/423429?uid=3739728&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=211
02516604487)//RN

The next important example is THE SLAVE, originally introduced by Robert Nozick in his paper 'Coercion': a slave is
whipped every day in a given slave-owners' society, but one day his master comes to him
and promises no lashes that day if the slave goes to a distant well and brings him some
water.8 It is essential that the master does not whip the slave nor decide himself on this cruel law. But it is in his power
to prevent the daily punishment. The message is obvious: whatever the slave does, he is going to suffer
the (minor) pain of carrying water or the (terrible) pain of being whipped. He is
motivated to go to the well. The master wants to get the water, but the whipping is an
indifferent matter to him. This example shows how and why one may coerce by
exploiting some coercive social circumstances, instead of producing a threat. The master does
not perform the whipping, but the robber must do the shooting. The master just utilizes the pre-existing social
circumstances. In other words, the robber himself produces a threat through his own action, but the master profits from
some standing threatening conditions. According to the present analysis the master is, anyhow, a
genuine coercive agent. - The political importance of this kind of coercion through the
exploitation of nasty social and structural circumstances is obvious. A powerful party
need not create the circumstances which allow them to coerce the weaker parties. The
power wielder may rhetorically deny the existence of any threats in the interaction.

AT: Coercion Inevitable

Even if they win defeat is inevitable, we have a moral obligation to fight
coercionincreases the chances of success

Rothbard 93- dean of the Austrian School of Economics (Murray, On Resisting Evil, The Irrepressible Rothbard,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard178.html)//MY

How can anyone, finding himself surrounded by a rising tide of evil, fail to do his utmost
to fight against it? In our century, we have been inundated by a flood of evil, in the form of collectivism, socialism,
egalitarianism, and nihilism. It has always been crystal clear to me that we have a compelling
moral obligation, for the sake of ourselves, our loved ones, our posterity, our friends, our
neighbors, and our country, to do battle against that evil. It has therefore always been a
mystery to me how people who have seen and identified this evil and have therefore entered the
lists against it, either gradually or suddenly abandon that fight. How can one see the truth,
understand one's compelling duty, and then, simply give up and even go on to betray the
cause and its comrades? And yet, in the two movements and their variations that I have been associated with,
libertarian and conservative, this happens all the time. Conservatism and libertarianism, after all, are "radical"
movements, that is, they are radically and strongly opposed to existing trends of statism and immorality. How, then, can
someone who has joined such a movement, as an ideologue or activist or financial supporter, simply give up the fight?
Recently, I asked a perceptive friend of mine how so-and-so could abandon the fight? He answered that "he's the sort of
person who wants a quiet life, who wants to sit in front of the TV, and who doesn't want to hear about any trouble." But in
that case, I said in anguish, "why do these people become 'radicals' in the first place? Why do they proudly call themselves
'conservatives' or 'libertarians'?" Unfortunately, no answer was forthcoming. Sometimes, people give up the fight
because, they say, the cause is hopeless. We've lost, they say. Defeat is inevitable. The great
economist Joseph Schumpeter wrote in 1942 that socialism is inevitable, that capitalism is doomed
not by its failures but by its very successes, which had given rise to a group of envious and malevolent intellectuals who
would subvert and destroy capitalism from within. His critics charged Schumpeter with counseling
defeatism to the defenders of capitalism. Schumpeter replied that if someone points out
that a rowboat is inevitably sinking, is that the same thing as saying: don't do the best
you can to bail out the boat? In the same vein, assume for a minute that the fight against the
statist evil is a lost cause, why should that imply abandoning the battle? In the first place, as
gloomy as things may look, the inevitable may be postponed a bit. Why isn't that worthwhile?
Isn't it better to lose in thirty years than to lose now? Second, at the very worst, it's great fun to tweak and
annoy and upset the enemy, to get back at the monster. This in itself is worthwhile. One
shouldn't think of the process of fighting the enemy as dour gloom and misery. On the
contrary, it is highly inspiring and invigorating to take up arms against a sea of troubles
instead of meeting them in supine surrender, and by opposing, perhaps to end them, and if not at least to give it a good
try, to get in one's licks. And finally, what the heck, if you fight the enemy, you might win! Think of the
brave fighters against Communism in Poland and the Soviet Union who never gave up, who fought on against seemingly
impossible odds, and then, bingo, one day Communism collapsed. Certainly the chances of winning are a lot
greater if you put up a fight than if you simply give up.

AT: Coercion Voluntary

The argument that coercion is voluntary is false and a manifestation of state
powermultiple warrants

Rothbard 02dean of the Austrian School of Economics (Murray, The Nature of the State, The Ethics of Liberty,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard160.html)//MY

It has been recently maintained by economists that taxation is "really" voluntary because it
is a method for everyone to make sure that everyone else pays for a unanimously desired
project. Everyone in an area, for example, is assumed to desire the government to build a
dam; but if A and B contribute voluntarily to the project, they cannot be sure that C and
D will not "shirk" their similar responsibilities. Therefore, all of the individuals, A, B, C,
D, etc., each of whom wish to contribute to building the dam, agree to coerce each other
through taxation. Hence, the tax is not really coercion. There are, however, a great many flaws in this
doctrine. First is the inner contradiction between voluntarism and coercion; a coercion
of all-against-all does not make any of this coercion "voluntary." Secondly, even if we assume
for the moment that each individual would like to contribute to the dam, there is no way of assuring that the
tax levied on each person is no more than he would be willing to pay voluntarily even if
everyone else contributed. The government may levy $1000 on Jones even though he might have been willing to
pay no more than $500. The point is that precisely because taxation is compulsory, there is no way to
ensure (as is done automatically on the free market) that the amount any person
contributes is what he would "really" be willing to pay. In the free society, a consumer who voluntarily
buys a TV set for $200 demonstrates by his freely chosen action that the TV set is worth more to him than the $200 he
surrenders; in short, he demonstrates that the $200 is a voluntary payment. Or, a club member in the free society, by
paying annual dues of $200, demonstrates that he considers the benefits of club membership worth at least $200. But, in
the case of taxation, a man's surrender to the threat of coercion demonstrates no
voluntary preference whatsoever for any alleged benefits he receives. Thirdly, the
argument proves far too much. For the supply of any service, not only dams, can be expanded
by the use of the tax-financing arm. Suppose, for example, that the Catholic Church were
established in a country through taxation; the Catholic Church would undoubtedly be
larger than if it relied on voluntary contributions; but can it therefore be argued that
such Establishment is "really" voluntary because everyone wants to coerce everyone else
into paying into the Church, in order to make sure that no one shirks this "duty"? And fourthly,
the argument is simply a mystical one. How can anyone know that everyone is "really"
paying his taxes voluntarily on the strength of this sophistical argument? What of those people
environmentalists, say who are opposed to dams per se? Is their payment "really" voluntary? Would the
coerced payment of taxes to a Catholic Church by Protestants or atheists also be "voluntary"? And what of the growing
body of libertarians in our society, who oppose all action by the government on principle? In what way can this argument
hold that their tax payments are "really voluntary"? In fact, the existence of at least one libertarian or
anarchist in a country is enough by itself to demolish the "really voluntary" argument for
taxation. It is also contended that, in democratic governments, the act of voting makes
the government and all its works and powers truly "voluntary." Again, there are many
fallacies with this popular argument. In the first place, even if the majority of the public specifically endorsed
each and every particular act of the government, this would simply be majority tyranny rather than a
voluntary act undergone by every person in the country. Murder is murder, theft is theft,
whether undertaken by one man against another, or by a group, or even by the majority
of people within a given territorial area. The fact that a majority might support or condone an act of
theft does not diminish the criminal essence of the act or its grave injustice. Otherwise, we
would have to say, for example, that any Jews murdered by the democratically elected Nazi government were not
murdered, but only "voluntarily committed suicide" surely, the grotesque but logical implication of the "democracy as
voluntary" doctrine. Secondly, in a republic as contrasted to a direct democracy, people vote not for specific
measures but for "representatives" in a package deal; the representatives then wreak
their will for a fixed length of time. In no legal sense, of course, are they truly
"representatives" since, in a free society, the principal hires his agent or representative
individually and can fire him at will. As the great anarchist political theorist and constitutional lawyer,
Lysander Spooner, wrote: they [the elected government officials] are neither our servants, agents,
attorneys, nor representatives ... [for] we do not make ourselves responsible for their
acts. If a man is my servant, agent, or attorney, I necessarily make myself responsible for all his acts done within the
limits of the power I have intrusted to him. If I have intrusted him, as my agent, with either absolute
power, or any power at all, over the persons or properties of other men than myself, I
thereby necessarily make myself responsible to those other persons for any injuries he
may do them, so long as he acts within the limits of the power I have granted him. But no
individual who may be injured in his person or property, by acts of Congress, can come
to the individual electors, and hold them responsible for these acts of their so-called agents or
representatives. This fact proves that these pretended agents of the people, of everybody, are really
the agents of nobody.[3] Furthermore, even on its own terms, voting can hardly establish "majority"
rule, much less of voluntary endorsement of government. In the United States, for example,
less than 40 percent of eligible voters bother to vote at all; of these, 21 percent may vote for one
candidate and 19 percent for another. Twenty-one percent scarcely establishes even majority rule, much less the voluntary
consent of all. (In one sense, and quite apart from democracy or voting, the "majority" always supports any existing
government; this will be treated below.) And finally how is it that taxes are levied on one and all,
regardless of whether they voted or not, or, more particularly, whether they voted for the
winning candidate? How can either nonvoting or voting for the loser indicate any sort of
endorsement of the actions of the elected government? Neither does voting establish any
sort of voluntary consent even by the voters themselves to the government. As Spooner
trenchantly pointed out: In truth, in the case of individuals their actual voting is not to be taken as proof of consent.... On
the contrary, it is to be considered that, without his consent having even been asked a man finds
himself environed by a government that he cannot resist; a government that forces him
to pay money renders service, and foregoes the exercise of many of his natural rights,
under peril of weighty punishments. He sees, too, that other men practice this tyranny over
him by the use of the ballot. He sees further, that, if he will but use the ballot himself, he has
some chance of relieving himself from this tyranny of others, by subjecting them to his
own. In short, he finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if he uses the ballot,
he may become a master, if he does not use it, he must become a slave. And he has no
other alternative than these two. In self-defense, he attempts the former. His case is analogous to that of
a man who has been forced into battle, where he must either kill others, or be killed
himself. Because, to save his own life in battle, a man attempts to take the lives of his
opponents, it is not to be inferred that the battle is one of his own choosing. Neither in
contests with the ballot which is a mere substitute for a bullet because, as his only chance of self-preservation, a man
uses a ballot, is it to be inferred that the contest is one into which he voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his
own natural rights, as a stake against those of others, to be lost or won by the mere power of numbers....

Coercing people to pay more in taxes is wrong-programs are unpopular

Machan 12 - PhD, professor emeritus of philosophy at Auburn University, adjunct
scholar at the Cato Institute (Tibor, Asking Versus Forcing Folks to Pay a Little More, A Passion for Liberty,
9/24/12, http://tibormachan.rationalreview.com/2012/09/asking-versus-forcing-folks-to-pay-a-little-bit-more/)//SR

President Obama raised the issue of why anyone would object to asking the very rich to give
some more. As he put the matter, What is wrong with asking those who make more to pay a little more? As it has
been pointed out by all too few people, of course what Obama & Co. advocate isnt to ask anyone to give. It
is about confiscating from them what Mr. Obama & Co. want to have available for the redistribution
of wealth just as they see fit. (For, of course, you and I and other citizens are all doing some serious
redistribution of our wealth already, with no need for help with this from Obama & Co.) Yet hardly anyone in the
mainstream media raises this objection. Millions of Americans, including wealthy ones like Mitt Romney, are
asked to give, mostly by organizations like the American Red Cross, and they come forth with generous contributions
in response to the request. I know I often do, though I am hardly what one would consider wealthy. But millions and
millions send contributions to victims of tsunamis or hurricanes or other disasters. The media is giving Obama & Co. a
pass on so many fronts one wonders if they are sound asleep at the wheel. A point like the one about asking them
versus coercing them is never raised even on the Fox TV talk programs. As if there were a kind of code of
silence in place! But maybe it is because so many folks, even those opposed to Obamas massive forced redistributions,
support some such policies and know that if they raise the issue, then the case for taxing us all for their own pet projects
e.g., the war on drugs, aggressive wars fought abroad, etc.paid for from such redistribution would get undermined. The
slippery slope may account for this silence. Talk of asking people gets mixed up with talk of coercing
people and no one in the public forums objects. But competent journalists are supposed discern the difference between
asking and making people pay! (One can only speculate what sorts of questions are being rehearsed in schools of
journalism. It doesnt seem like the students are enlightened about the difference between forcing and asking people for
support.) I am by no means being original in pointing out these matters but few if any prominent journalists, pundits,
commentators, et al., make it a point to raise the issue. Why?


Affirmative

Coecrion High Now

Coercion high in Latin America now the state marginzalies populations,
rendering them useless

DFPRW, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, January 1
st
, 2005
(DFPRW, UN Organization, Forced Labour in Latin America, Cornell International Labour Office,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=forcedlabor )//SG

In Latin America and the Caribbean today, several governments are tackling forced labour in
earnest. Brazil has taken strong measures against forced labour in agriculture and in remote logging camps. The
government of Brazil officially acknowledged the existence of forced labour at the ILO in 1995. Since then, it has addressed
the problem with high visibility. A National Action Plan against Slave Labour has been implemented since March 2003.
Recently, a number of other Latin American governments have decided to confront forced labour, notably in their
agricultural sectors. Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay have taken important steps to develop, jointly with workers' and
employers' organizations, new policies to combat forced labour. KEY STATISTICS There are an estimated 1.3
million forced labourers in Latin American and the Caribbean, out of a global total of
12.3 million; 75% of forced labourers in Latin America are victims of coercion for
labour exploitation, while the remaining victims are either in state-imposed forced labour or in forced commercial
sexual exploitation; 250,000 forced labourers, or 20% of the total number in the region, have been
trafficked, either internally or across borders; The estimated profit derived in Latin American and the
Caribbean from trafficked forced labour is an estimated US$ 1.3 billion. FORMS OF COERCION AND RECRUITMENT
Substantial numbers of mainly indigenous agricultural workers are in conditions of debt
bondage, mostly as a result of wage advances made to workers by private labour
contractors. Factors which make indigenous peoples in remote areas particularly susceptible to
coercive recruitment and debt bondage include a weak state presence, low investment in
educational services, poor literacy and numeracy, slow implementation of land reforms
as well as the lack of official identity documents, rendering people "invisible" to national
authorities. ILO field research on forced labour and debt bondage in rural areas has documented the following
situations: Agricultural "slave labour", mainly in the state of Par, in the Brazilian Amazon region. The term "slave
labour" refers to degrading work conditions and the impossibility of leaving the farms
due to alleged debts and the presence of armed guards; The enganche and habilitacion labour
systems, based on wage advances in Bolivia's agriculture, in particular in tropical areas of Santa Cruz, the northern
Amazon, and the Bolivian Chaco; Forced labour in the Amazon basin of Peru, both with recruited
workers in logging camps and with isolated indigenous communities; Discrimination and
employment conditions of indigenous people in the cattle farms of the Chaco region in Paraguay. Brazil's National Action
Plan against Slave Labour was adopted in March 2003. Components of the strategy include awareness-raising campaigns,
promotion of a new law with stronger sanctions against offenders such as confiscation of their property, greatly intensified
release of forced labour victims in remote areas through the interventions of mobile police units and other agents of
criminal and labour law enforcement. In Bolivia, the government created a National Commission for the Eradication of
Forced Labour in December 2004 with a mandate to develop and implement an effective strategy against forced labour
with the participation of workers and employers organizations. In Peru, the government is setting up a Multisectoral
Commission which is to design a national policy to eliminate forced labour and strengthen the rule of law in the regions
where forced labour occurs.

No LinkGeneric

People disliking taxes doesnt mean its coercivetwo reasons

The Economist 11 (Taxes, Justice, and Coercion, Democracy in America blog, 1/27/11,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/01/liberaltarians)//SR

MY COLLEAGUE wrote a very good post on his own blog the other day outlining some of the fundamental disagreements
that make it difficult for liberals and libertarians to agree. I think he's right that liberals don't generally agree with quite a
number of the propositions he's laid out, but the one that caught my eye in particular was this one: Taxation is
coercive but imprisoning the guy who nicked your lawn gnome isn't. I found this proposition
ticklish in part because the libertarian emphasis on formulations like "taxation is coercive" really is a good example of
something that drives liberals nuts. I'll address why that is in a minute. But I also focused on it because it reminded me of
one of my favourite episodes of a superb 1990s Dutch documentary TV series called "Buren" ("Neighbours"), produced by
the deadpan telejournalist Frans Bromet, which actually centres on a dispute over lawn gnomes. The dispute in the
episode (which can be viewed here , if you're in the right country) doesn't involve larceny; there are two neighbours who
both sell lawn gnomes out of their homes, they make vague negative insinuations about each other and about the quality
of each others' gnomes, which they both import from Poland, and it turns out to be all bound up with one neighbour's
Polish girlfriend, whom the other neighbour had also imported from Poland. But unlike this one, most episodes of "Buren"
do involve legal disputes. In one episode , a man turns to the police after a pushy neighbour threatens to "cut his throat"
during an argument; the neighbour says it was a figure of speech, the man then says the neighbour's son threw a cherry
bomb in his yard, the son admits it but says it was in retaliation for the other guy's son dumping dog poop on their lawn,
and so forth. In another episode , a family complains because the neighbour's stove hood vents into their yard, and they
don't like the smell of her cooking. "Buren" aired in the years just before another Dutch TV producer, John de Mol, came
up with "Big Brother" and launched the modern reality TV era, and I think you can see the influence. So let me explain
what I think this has to do with the difference between my colleague's approach to taxation and lawn-gnome theft, and my
own. If the thread seems tenuous, I apologise. Anyway, here's what I understand my colleague to be getting at.
Taxation, presumably, is coercive because the government simply orders you to hand over
some portion of the goods you possess, on pain of imprisonment. You haven't signed a contract
regarding this transaction, and it's not punishment for your violation of someone else's rights; it's simply
forced upon you, regardless of whether or not you agree with it. Imprisoning someone who nicks
your lawn gnome, on the other hand, is retribution for their violation of your property rights. It's not coercive; the person
imprisoned has broken a rule with which they can be presumed to agree, the rule that people's possessions belong to them,
and punishing them is simply just. Liberals are likely to disagree with this formulation for two reasons.
First, liberals think of taxation as paying one's fair share for the collective goods that make
society feasible. Every society needs collective goods to function, including
transportation and infrastructure, education, the justice system itself, and so on; the more wealthy
a society wants to be, the more collective infrastructure it needs. Payment for those goods cannot be left
voluntary, as ultimately everyone would welch. So paying your taxes is a basic obligation of
citizenship, and collectively deciding on the level of taxation through democratic
government is the closest we can come to making this transaction consensual. Not paying taxes
means violating your obligations as a citizen; when the state punishes someone for not paying taxes,
it is acting in a fashion no more or less coercive than when it punishes someone for stealing someone
else's property. The second reason liberals would disagree, or why I would disagree, anyway, has to do
with those episodes of "Buren" about property disputes. Basically, in none of these episodes can it be simply
stated that one person nicked another's lawn gnome. How do we know who nicked whose lawn gnome? It's always
subject to dispute. When that first guy said he'd cut the other guy's throat, was that a legally culpable threat, or just
a figure of speech? If one guy's kid tossed a cherry bomb and the other guy's kid dumped the poop, who pays restitution to
whom? Can someone get an injunction to stop their neighbour from cooking where they can smell it? In any case of stolen
lawn gnomes, dumped poop, stinky cooking, fences that may or may not be built on someone else's land, and so forth,
there is likely to be a factual dispute, a dispute at law, or both at the heart of things. If the case comes to trial, it
is the state that will adjudicate the rival claims and impose a decision on the parties. That
exercise of state authority feels just as coercive to people who think they have been
unjustly ruled against in court, as it does to people who don't want to pay the level of
taxation that a democratic society has decided is fair. It's one thing to argue that taxes
are too high, or are too high for some group of earners or for some type of economic
activity. But I feel that a broad libertarian claim that "taxation is coercive" is an attempt
to legitimise refusal to play by the rules, and to delegitimise the exercise of state
authority. The existence of the state involves a certain level of coercion to enforce the
law. But the existence of the state is a good thing, both because it provides the infrastructure of a
prosperous, safe and fair society, and because it enforces property claims such as deciding who has stolen whose lawn
gnome. It makes me happy to see the state providing a decent education to kids whose parents can't afford to buy them
one. It makes me happy to see the state administer justice in a fair and procedurally sound fashion. It makes me happy to
see the state build zoos. And yeah, we all have to pay our taxes for these things to happen. But when I read libertarians
focusing on the intrinsically coercive nature of taxation, I'm reminded of the way Marxists used to focus on the
intrinsically alienating character of wage labour. It just doesn't really get you anywhere.



No Internal LinkGeneric

No internal linkcoercion is confused with brute force

Byman & Waxman, Professor at Georgetown and a Professor at Columbia Law School, 2002, (Daniel and
Matthew, The Dynamics of Coercion ,Pub. Cambridge University Press Pg. 3-5)//JS

Coercion is not destruction. Coercive strategies are most successful when threats need not
even be carried out. Although some destruction is often part of coercion, coercion succeeds when the adversary
gives in while it still has the power to resist. Coercion is best understood in opposition to what Thomas Schelling
termed "brute force": "Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most
successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come,
that can make someone yield or comply. "1 Coercion may be thought of, then, as getting
the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still
have the capacity for organized violence but choose not to exercise it.2 We define coercion as we do to emphasize that it
relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses
of actual force. The limited use of actual force may form a key component of a coercion strategy if its purpose is to
enhance credibility or demonstrate the type of price that continued defiance will bring. Limited uses of force sway an
adversary not only because of their direct and immediate destructive impact but because of their effects on the
adversary's perceptions of future force and the adversary's vulnerability to it. For example, military strikes against some
of an enemy's fielded forces might help induce the enemy to withdraw the rest of its forces by making defense of a
particular territory harder and riskier, by reducing the enemy's ability to repel subsequent strikes, and by demonstrating
one's willingness to resort to military means. Coercion is about how those military strikes affect an adversary's
subsequent decision making and policy moves. The line between coercion and brute force is not always easy to discern.
Once an armed conflict begins, an adversary's behavior will always be dictated by a combination of brute force and
threatened (coercive) force. Nonetheless, pure or near-pure cases of coercion and brute force do exist. In 1994, the
United States effectively coerced the military regime in Haiti to step down by threatening an imminent military
invasion. No force was actually applied before the junta conceded, although the United States did send forces to help
manage the transition. The regime capitulated due to the credible threat of future U.S. action. An example of brute force
is Nazi Germany's 1941 invasion of Russia to conquer territory and seize resources (Operation Barbarossa). German
forces conquered areas of western Russia without \i!ttempting to elicit surrender.3 The Israeli demolition of
Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osiraq in 1981 is another example of brute force.4 Although
destruction of the reactor set back Iraq's nuclear program, it was not expected to
change Iraqi policy-nor did it-and may even have increased Baghdad's desire to acquire
nuclear weapons. Those who reject the distinction between brute force and coercion might respond that all state
behavior, especially surrender, is always volitional to some extent. In no instance, the argument might go, has a state
been so decimated in battle that it had a complete absence of choice. But there are degrees of choice that must be
considered. Generally, as an adversary absorbs more and more destruction, the proportion of its decisions that are
motivated by the threat of future destruction declines. This is because the destruction of more and more of the
adversary's assets narrows the adversary's range of options and, in some cases, leaves the adversary less and less to lose in
the future. Brute force, by contrast, eliminates the adversary's options completely. Allied operations against Nazi
Germany illustrate this point. Even in May 1945, Nazi Germany was physically capable of continuing the war despite
Berlin's capture. But it certainly had fewer options than it had had earlier in the war, at the commencement of the
Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943, when it had yet to suffer serious damage to its homeland. Understanding
the relative contributions that brute force and coercion make to an adversary's actions
is critical to informing policy about minimal uses of force and avoiding the need to
escalate actual uses of force. Most crises involving coercion fall along the continuum between pure brute
force and coercion. The goal of the coercer is usually not total destruction but the use of enough force to make the threat
of future force credible to the adversary. Counterinsurgency campaigns, for example, are typically designed to dislodge
and eradicate pockets of resistance, but the government waging such a campaign usually will accept the voluntary
disbanding and disarmament of rebels. Some conflicts may ultimately be resolved through brute
force because one side's attempts at coercion may be met by refusals to negotiate. It is
only in rare cases-such as campaigns of genocide-that one side will not settle for the
other side's surrender.

Freedom and coercion are one-sided words that reflect inaccurate concepts
in reality neither of them are inherently good or bad

Westen 85 - Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard University; J.D. 1968, University of
California, Berkeley (Peter, "FREEDOM" AND "COERCION"- VIRTUE WORDS AND VICE WORDS, Duke Law Journal,
June-September 1985, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2914&context=dlj&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dcoercion%2Bbad%26btnG%3D%26hl%3Den
%26as_sdt%3D0%252C23#search=%22coercion%20bad%22) // JA

Unfortunately, the capacity of freedom and coercion to express descriptive as well as prescriptive
relationships, though linguistically useful, is also rhetorically treacherous. It causes us to blend
the two kinds of relationships unthinkingly. Instead of recognizing that prescriptive freedoms
are good because they are defined to be good, 141 and that descriptive freedoms themselves are neither good
nor bad, 142 we carelessly come to believe that all freedoms are presumptively good. 143
Instead of remembering that prescriptive coercion is bad because it is defined to be bad, 144 and that
descriptive coercion itself is neither good nor bad, 145 we carelessly assume that all coercion
is presumptively bad. 146 Rather than demand moral argument in favor of particular freedoms, and moral
argument against particular kinds of coercion, we come to believe that freedom is itself something to favor and coercion
itself something to oppose. I do not mean to say that no freedoms are presumptively good, or that no coercions are
presumptively bad. I mean, rather, that there is nothing in their being "freedoms" and "coercions" that makes them
presumptively good or bad. 147 A person who advocates a particular freedom should give reasons for believing that a
particular X ought to be unhindered by a particular Y to pursue a particular Z. Calling it free- dom is either a neutral
description or a question-begging conclusion; it is not, however, a reason for believing X ought to be unrestrained by Y
to pursue Z. Likewise, a person who opposes a particular coercion should give reasons for believing that a particular
proposal leaves X worse off than X ought to be left for refusing to do X's bidding. Calling the proposal coercive is either a
neutral description or a question-begging conclusion, but it is not a reason for believing that X1 proposes to leave X
worse off than X ought to be left for refusing to do Xj's bidding. The danger with words like freedom and
coercion is that by mixing descriptions with prescriptions, they tend to persuade not
through the giving of reasons but through tricks of language. They possess rhetorical
force not by facilitating argument, but by bypassing it. 148 They are words that lay claim to virtues
they do not deserve, and to vices they do not possess.


AT: Taxes Unethical

Taxes are ethical

Kangas, 99Graduate student in Political Science (Steve, Myth: Taxes are theft, 3/19,
http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-taxestheft.htm)//MY

Many conservatives and libertarians make the following populist argument: "If you don't
pay your taxes, men with guns will come to your house, arrest you, and seize your
property." The implication here is that you are being extorted to pay taxes, and this theft
amounts to a violation of your rights. Although the events described are technically correct -- you should
expect such a response from any crime you commit -- the implication that the government is aggressing
against you is false, and not a little demagogic. Taxes are part of a social contract, an agreement
between voters and government to exchange money for the government's goods and
services. Even libertarians agree that breach of contract legitimates a police response. So
the real question is not whether a crime should be met with "men with guns," but whether or not the social contract is
valid, especially to those who don't agree with it or devote their allegiance to it. Liberals have two lines of
argument against those who reject the idea of the social contract. The first is that if they
reject it, they should not consume the government's goods and services. How they can
avoid this when the very dollar bills that the economy runs on are printed by the
government is a good question. Try to imagine participating in the economy without
using public roads, publicly funded communication infrastructure, publicly educated
employees, publicly funded electricity, water, gas, and other utilities, publicly funded
information, technology, research and development -- it's absolutely impossible. The
only way to avoid public goods and services is to move out of the country entirely, or at
least become such a hermit, living off the fruits of your own labor, that you reduce your
consumption of public goods and services to as little as possible. Although these alternatives may
seem unpalatable, they are the only consistent ones in a person who truly wishes to reject the social contract. Any
consumption of public goods, no matter how begrudgingly, is implicit agreement of the social contract, just as any
consumption of food in a restaurant is implicit agreement to pay the bill. Many conservatives and
libertarians concede the logic of this argument, but point out that taxes do not go
exclusively to public goods and services. They also go for welfare payments to the poor
who are allegedly doing nothing and getting a free ride from the system. That, they claim, is
theft. But this argument fails too. Welfare is a form of social insurance. In the private sector
we freely accept the validity of life and property insurance. Obviously, the same validity
goes for social insurance like unemployment and welfare. The tax money that goes to
social insurance buys each one of us a private good: namely, the comfort of being
protected in times of adversity. And it buys us a public good as well (although tax critics are loathe to admit
this). If workers were allowed to unnecessarily starve or die in otherwise temporary setbacks, then our economy would be
frequently disrupted. Social insurance allows workers to tide over the rough times, and this
establishes a smooth-running economy that benefits us all.


2AC Perm

Perm solvescomplete rejection failsthe government is required for
some regulation

Glaeser, 7the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard University
(Edward, Coercive Regulation and the Balance of Freedom, Cato Unbound, http://www.cato-
unbound.org/2007/05/11/edward-glaeser/coercive-regulation-and-the-balance-of-freedom/)//MY

There is a recent wave of scholarship suggesting that the government can help individuals be happy by reducing their
choices. While happiness may be a very nice thing, it is neither the obvious central desiderata for private or public
decision-making. On a private level, I make decisions all that time that I expect to lower my level of happiness, because I
have other objectives. On a public level, I cant imagine why we would want to privilege this emotion over all other goals. A
much better objective for the state is to aim at giving people the biggest range of choices possible, and then let people
decide what is best for them. But putting freedom first doesnt mean abandoning the state. At the
very least, we rely on the government to protect our private property against incursions by
others. Even most libertarians think that it is reasonable for the state to enforce
contracts. This enforcement increases the range of contractual options and this is, in a
way, expands liberty.


2AC Alternative Fails

Accepting total individualism will devastate societycoercion is justified

Galston,05Professor of Civic Engagement and the Director of the Institute for
Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland (William, The Case for Universal
Service, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/AmeriBook/AmeriBook_Chap6.pdf)//MY

Classical liberals will object, of course, on the grounds that it would be an abuse of state
power to move toward mandatory universal service. It is worth noting, however, that one of the high
priests of classical liberalism disagrees. Consider the opening sentences of Chapter 4 of John Stuart Mills On Liberty,
titled Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual: [E]veryone who receives the protection of society
owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe
a certain line of conduct toward the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another, or rather
certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and
secondly, in each persons bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred
for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing at
all costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfillment. It is not difficult to recast Mills position in the vocabulary of con
temporary liberal political thought. Begin with a conception of society as a system of cooperation
for mutual advantage. Society is legitimate when the criterion of mutual advantage is
broadly satisfied (versus, say, a situation in which the government or some group systematically coerces some for
the sake of others). When society meets the standard of broad legitimacy, each citizen has a
duty to do his or her fair share to sustain the social arrangements from which all benefit,
and society is justified in using its coercive power when necessary to ensure that this
duty is performed. That legitimate societal coercion may include mandatory military
service in the nations defense, as well as other required activities that promote broad
civic goals. Brookings scholar Robert Litan has recently suggested that citizens should be
required to give something to their country in exchange for the full range of rights to
which citizenship entitles them. Responding in a quasi-libertarian vein, Bruce Chapman, founder and
president of the Seattle-based Discovery Institute, charges that this proposal has no moral justification. Linking rights to
concrete responsibilities, he says, is contrary to the purposes for which [the United States] was founded and has
endured. This simply isn't true. For example, the right to receive GI Bill benefits is linked to the
fulfillment of military duties. Even the right to vote (and what could be more central to citizenship
than that?) rests on being law-abiding; many states disenfranchise convicted felons during their period of
incarceration and probation. As Litan points out, this linkage is hardly tyrannical moralism. Rather, it
reflects the bedrock reality that the rights we enjoy are not free and that it takes real
workcontributions from citizensto sustain constitutional institutions. If each
individuals ownership of his or her own labor is seen as absolute, then society as such
becomes impossible, because no political community can operate without resources,
which ultimately must come from someone. Public choice theory predicts, and all of human
history proves, that no polity of any size can subsist through voluntary contributions
alone; the inevitable free riders must be compelled by law, backed by force, to do their
part.


2AC Extinction First

Extinction is a prerequisite to morality

Bok, 88- Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis (Sissela, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David
Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, JSTOR)//MY

The same argument can be made for Kants other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: So act as to use
humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply
as a means; and So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of
Ends. No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating
humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a
universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for
the sake of following ones conscience would be, as Rawls said, irrational, crazy. And to
say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other
persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world
was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the
wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a
responsibility seriouslyperhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent
person, in order that the world not perish.

Life should come first

Schwartz, 2- (Lisa, Medical Ethics, http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)//MY

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decision- making is closely related to the
first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the
quality of a given life is a subjective determi-nation to be made by the person
experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that,
ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual
involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did
James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients
concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for
themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook
patients judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to
decide for themselves on the basis of relevant informa- tion about their future, and comparative con- sideration
of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we
must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

2AC Consequentialism

Combining consequences and rights-based principles is key to effective
policy

Machan 10 PhD, professor emeritus of philosophy at Auburn University, adjunct
scholar at the Cato Institute (Tibor, A Misguided Distinction-or Not? A Passion for Liberty, 9/28/10,
http://tibormachan.rationalreview.com/tag/deontology/)//SR

When working out what should guide public institutions and policies in our lives and human
communities, those who chime in from ancient to contemporary times have advanced various proposals and they
have often been divided into two groups. Members of one of these advance certain basic
principles that ought to ground the institutions and policies, while those of the other suggest that the way to
decide is by focusing on the anticipated consequences, never mind any purportedly firm principles (which
tend, in any case, to become obsolete or misapplied). In the United States and in other developed countries the former
group is called deontologists while the latter consequentialists. (In the history of political ideas
Immanuel Kant is deemed to be the quintessential deontologist while John Stuart Mill the most prominent
consequentialist.) Deontologists try to identify principles by which we ought to live and guide our
public affairsfor example, a set of basic rights everyone supposedly has and which may never be violated; this will,
argues the deontologist, insure justice and other good things in community affairs. For the consequentialist the
idea that should govern is whether some policy most effectively promotes what is desirable
for example, spend whatever is necessary so as to eliminate poverty and sickness, never mind if anyones rights are
violated in the process since those rights mostly tend to be obstacles to what needs to be done. Is this a good, useful
distinction? I have my doubts. For one, no one can tell for sure what the result or consequence
of a course of action or public policy will be down the line, not certainly in any detail. And when it is possible to
tell, it is because we have discovered that following some principle is likely to bring forth a given
result. The actual actions or policies are not available for inspection until after they have been tried. So if we are to be
guided by anything, it cannot be the results, which lie in the future and are mostly speculative. It would have to be certain
rules or principles that we have found to be helpful in the past when we deployed them. On the other hand, principles
are always limited by the fact that they were discovered during the past that may not quite be
like the present and future or, even more likely, the scopes of which are limited by what we know so far. Thus, for example,
take the U. S. Constitution that contains a set of principles (especially in the Bill of Rights). It is
subject to amendments in part so as to update these principles in light of new knowledge and new
issues in need of being addressed. Once amendments are seen as possible, even necessary, strict reliance on the
principles is admittedly hopeless. So then what about the two kind of approaches, deontological versus
consquentialist? Neither is really adequate to what human beings need to guide their lives. Yes, they will
have to identify certain ethical, political, legal and other principlese.g., in medicine, engineering, or
automobile drivingbut once they have done so they will still need to keep vigilant so as to make sure they
arent missing some good reason for updating these. However, focusing entirely on the consequences
of their actions and policies will not do the job either since those are not yet here to deal with. They will have to ease up to
them with the help of the principles, more or less complete, that they have found to be soundly based on their knowledge
of the past. Fortunately, although our knowledge is rarely completeand never finalabout anything that surrounds us in
the world, the world itself tends to be fairly steady and predictable (once one has studied it carefully, without bias or
prejudice such as wishful thinking). It is not possible to escape the need to balance reasonably well
established principles and expected consequences. With these in hand, many of our tasks and challenges are
likely to be managed pretty well although we need also to be prepared for surprises. There is no substitute for paying close
attention.

Deontological criticisms of consequentialism are wrong-they can both be
good or bad

Vuletic 94 PhD in Philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago (Mark,
Deontological Objections to Consequentialism, The Secular Web, 1994,
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/objection_to_consequentialism.html)//SR

One can imagine a deontologist attacking a consequentialist with the following invective: It is
you, not we, who are concerned with your own moral purity. Your position has the effect of
absolving you of all personal responsibility for the things you do. There's no element of
personal decision; you simply calculate, and do what the numbers tell you to do, as if you were a machine.
You tell your victim, 'Sorry, it's not me, you understand, I'm just an instrument of the greater good.' Moreover, if you've
done some horrible thing in pursuit of some supposed greater good, and it turns out to have terrible
consequences, you shrug your shoulders and say, "I'm not to blame, it just turned out that way." In
essence, you try to transform yourself into a kind of unquestioning slave of utility maximization, and
thereby try to escape all personal responsibility by blaming your decisions and actions on your master. [Hypothetical
criticism written by Andrew Cross.] The deontologist uttering these words raises three main questions: (1)
do consequentialist systems of ethics absolve their adherents of all personal responsibility? (2)
Do consequentialists in fact select their system of ethics in order to absolve themselves of all
personal responsibility? (3) Are deontological systems of ethics and their adherents innocent on both
charges? I will examine each of the first two questions in turn - the answer to the third question will become clear in
the process. Consequentialism as Absolution of Responsibility? Our hypothetical deontologist claims that
consequentialism absolves its adherents of all personal responsibility for three presumed reasons: (a) consequentialism
removes all personal decision, as the consequentialist simply turns himself into a "slave of utility maximization"; (b)
consequentialism allows an agent to rationalize away atrocities such as the injury of one person for the benefit of the
many; (c) consequentialism allows one to shrug off disastrous states of affairs that are brought about when one's
consequentialist moral calculus advises a course of action that turns out to be wrong. To reason (a), one may respond that
if the consequentialist makes himself a "slave of utility maximization," then the deontologist
makes himself a slave of a set of rules. Is there any a priori reason why a commitment to utility
maximization should be morally inferior to a commitment to a set of absolutist rules? It does not seem that there is, unless
one begs the question by approaching it from a deontological viewpoint. For reason (a) to stand would necessitate an
indisputable argument showing a non-consequentialist system of ethics to be the right system, as Kant tries to formulate -
but judging from the depth of controversy in moral philosophy today, it seems rather doubtful that such an argument
exists. Reason (a) also ignores the existence of rule-of-thumb-utilitarianism, in which the element of
personal decision certainly is present. The rule-of-thumb-utilitarian has no grand moral calculator to churn out
a spreadsheet commanding him to a certain course of action, nor does he have a set of inflexible rules to constrain him to a
single course of action, as the deontologist does. The rule-of-thumb-utilitarian consults the collective utilitarian wisdom of
the centuries, but the ultimate decision as to what course of action he takes - even while remaining within the framework
of consequentialism - is the agent's personal responsibility. To reason (b), one may respond that the consequentialist
believes the sacrifice of one for the benefit of the many to sometimes be the morally correct thing to do - the
consequentialist would no doubt argue that the ethical systems of consequentialism's deontological critics allow an agent
to rationalize away the atrocity of not injuring one person for the greater good. Briefly speaking, the exact nature of an
"atrocity" is a matter of perspective. Granting this, the deontologist may reply that, indeed, one person must sometimes be
sacrificed for the greater good, but that at least the deontologist will recognize the sacrifice of the one person to be morally
distasteful, whereas the consequentialist will simply drop the ax on the poor man and go merrily along his way. But such
an objection is not without problems. In the first place, if we mean by "morally distasteful" that the action should evoke a
sense of guilt in the perpetrator, then there is no reason to assume that the consequentialist, simply in
virtue of his system of ethics, will not find his actions morally distasteful. Even if the consequentialist
believes that he is "right" to choose the lesser of two evils, what is to prevent him from inwardly longing for a non-existent
third alternative that makes everyone happy? There are clearly independent psychological grounds from which guilt
springs, such that a person can believe what he did to be right - given the options available to him at the time - yet
nevertheless suffer nightmares due to a plagued conscience. It is not clear that an agent must even be in part a
deontologist for this to happen to him. But if by "morally distasteful" we mean that the action is in fact not right, how are
we to say this in any meaningful way? In the first place, it seems silly to presume that given two actions,
one of which is better than the other, and better than doing nothing at all, that performing that action
is wrong - even if it is conducive to guilt. Secondly, to insist steadfastly upon this position
would amount to question-begging, as it starts off with the assumption that the
deontological notion of rightness and wrongness. It is especially simple to see that consequentialism does not
imply a sacrifice of responsibility when one considers rule-of-thumb-utilitarians once again. The rule-of-thumb-
utilitarian, while as much concerned with utility maximization as any good consequentialist, is personally responsible for
how he evaluates each particular situation. If, through a misevaluation of the situation, he performs actions that produce a
very bad state of affairs, he cannot say "I was just following orders." The deontologist may insist that the
rule-of-thumb-utilitarian can always say "oh well, I tried my best," but the deontologist who
produces bad states of affairs can clearly say the same thing - in fact, the ability to shrug off
negative consequences so long as one's motives or intentions were pure is one of the luxuries commonly
associated with deontological ethics. To the consequentialist, it would seem that it is deontological ethics that
frees one from personal responsibility, not consequentialist ethics. To (c), the consequentialist responds in the same way
as the did to (b) - there are grounds independent of one's ethical system from which guilt springs, and from which the
consequentialist might perhaps even encourage guilt to spring so as to discourage other consequentialists from being lax
with their calculations. The consequentialist, no less than the deontologist, is concerned with doing the right thing, even if
he has a different analysis of what the right thing is. And once again, if the consequentialist can shrug off disastrous results
that result from following his moral calculus, the deontologist can certainly shrug off disastrous results that result from
following his rules - in fact (once again) this ability is even more pronounced for the deontologist, since it is with actions,
and not consequences, that the deontologist is concerned. The accidental performing of an act with disastrously wrong
consequences could easily be more morally damaging to the consequentialist, who cares about results, than to the
deontologist, who cares about motivations. Consequentialism as a Refuge for the Morally Irresponsible? It has been
established that devotion to a consequentialist system of ethics does not necessarily entail a shunting of personal
responsibility onto a moral calculus of utility. The question remains whether those who choose consequentialism in fact do
so in order to avoid personal responsibility. The answer to this question is very brief: there is no reason to
assume that consequentialists wish to avoid responsibility. Rather, it is clear that many choose a
consequentialist system of ethics because they perceive it to be the right one. Such people may well view deontology as
blind "rule worship" - as the blatant discarding of personal responsibility of which the deontologist accuses the
consequentialist. For those who assert that consequentialists make themselves into unthinking, mechanical extensions of
the principle of utility maximization, there is the response that the deontologists make themselves
simple mechanical extensions of a set of perhaps arbitrary rules. If someone adopts a system
of ethics in order to absolve himself of moral responsibility, then that person is reprehensible on
almost every account. Granted, such a person could fit into a consequentialist scheme (excluding rule-of-
thumb-utilitarianism) quite well, but he could fit into a deontological system equally well. Throwing around
charges about which system the irresponsible flock to is pointless. As J.J.C. Smart points out, "it may well be that there is
no ethical system which appeals to all people, or even to the same person in different moods"[1], and no doubt it is also the
case that consequentialists and deontologists can each be sincere in believing their system to embody "goodness and
niceness"[2] and the other's to embody "evilness and rottenness"[3]. In this light, assertions by deontologists about
consequentialists denying their true moral obligations by voluntarily becoming extensions of some impersonal calculus,
are seen to be without merit. We can say that the principle of utility maximization and the rules of deontological ethics can
each be employed to absolve oneself of personal responsibility, but that people operating within both frameworks are
likely to be trying their utmost to be decent, moral human beings.

AT: Ethics

Ends justify the meansturns their ethics claims

Issac 02 Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center
for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49,
Iss. 2, Ends, Means, and Politics, p. Proquest)//MY

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military
intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to
which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace
activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the
Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that
most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a
Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and
bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and
important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also
vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or
international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no
such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral
goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power.
Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect
outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of
power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that
are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this
is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to
morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may
be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the
purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to
make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing;
but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral
good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of
real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often
a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to
religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating
violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3)
it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about
intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates
evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it
is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge
these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism
inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes
arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

AT: Objectivism

Their objectivist view of morality is itself immoral and egotisticalfails to be
rational and impartial

Barry and Stephens 13 (Bruce and Carroll U., Objections to an Objectivist Approach to Integrity, The
Academy of Management Review, JSTOR)//MY

Rand's philosophy is decidedly un-postmodern, which may in small part account for her pariah status within
contemporary academe. However, the exclusion of Rand from the academic mainstream of moral philosophy seems to
reflect dissatisfaction less with the focus or ide-ology of her analysis than with its execution. Critics (see especially
O'Neill, 1971, and Rob-bins, 1974; see also several essays contained within Den Uyl & Rasmussen, 1984) have
effectively documented numerous logical contradictions and inconsistencies within her
writings and have taken issue with the ideological stricture with which she has defended
her views and dismissed her critics. Moreover, critics note (and amply document) that Rand
constructs false dichotomies, placing her views in opposition to (and, ultimately, above)
factitious assessments of the sorry state of human nature and social institutions. For
example, according to Rachels, Rand depicts any degree of altruism as so self-abnegating that
nobody, with the possible exception of certain monks, would find it congenial. As Ayn Rand
presents it, altruism implies that one's own inter-ests have no value, and that any demand
by others calls for sacrificing them. If that is the alternative, then any other view,
including [objectivism], will look good by comparison. But this is hardly a fair picture of
the choices. (1986: 71; emphasis in original) With a penchant for straw-man argumentation, Rand's analysis
often appears to take the form of a solution in search of a problem. Rachels (1986)
classifies Rand's philosophy in the broad category of ethical egoism, which fails to meet
at least one-and arguably both-of his criteria for the moral minimum. Briefly stated, Rachels
assumes that most theories of economics, and, by inference, of commerce, rely on a
model of self-interest. To advance one's own interests is to be pragmatic and (often)
hedonistic; ethics come into play only when the interests of others are incorporated into
the calculus of personal and business decision making. The moral minimum consists of
two components: rationality and impartiality. At first glimpse, Rand's objectivism, with its emphasis on
rationality and goal orientation, appears to fulfill the initial criterion. However, Hobbes' (1651/1950) argument
that unalloyed pursuit of self-interest does not result in maximization of individual or
social-system utilities casts the rationality of such a strategy into some doubt. And the
Randian insistence on the primacy and the moral superiority of personal goals clearly
violates the impartiality criterion, since it privileges the self above others. Thus, Rand's theory
of objectivism has met with disapprobration within the discipline of philosophy, not on
the basis of its ideology but because of its failure to meet the basic standards of rigor in
the field. According to Rachels, an ethicist of no discernible ideological bent, "Theories that reject the
minimum conception encounter serious difficulties because they do so. Most
philosophers have realized this, and so most theories of morality incorporate the mini-
mum conception, in one form or another. They disagree not about [the parameters of]
the minimum, but about how it should be expanded" (1986: 11). Becker acknowledges the existence of
alternative approaches to ethics, but he makes no attempt to reconcile them with objectivism. Rather, he asserts that the
intention behind his objectivist focus is to present a perspective that has not received attention in the business ethics
literature. A tacit assumption lurking behind this statement is that Rand's objectivism is a legitimate theory of moral
philosophy that has simply escaped the parochial purview of business ethicists. On the contrary, objectivism is a
school of thought whose coherence and value have escaped the legitimation of essentially
the entire discipline of moral philosophy.

Ayn Rand was wrong and her philosophy is used to justify greed-cap cant
solve and altruism is real and good

Bekiempis 11 (Victoria, Confessions of a Recovering Objectivist, The Guardian, 6/10/11,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/10/confessions-recovering-objectivist-ayn-rand)//SR

Ayn Rand is one of those people whom you just want to go away, but won't. I say this not with hate or ignorance, but with
deep familiarity. When, as a self-absorbed college freshman, I first came across the Russian emigre author of The
Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, she seemed like the coolest thinker ever what selfish person doesn't want to hear that
being selfish doesn't just feel good, but actually is good, too? I quickly devoured nearly all of her atrocious tomes with a
sort of blind hunger that ferocious pseudo-intellectual reading you do only to confirm your beliefs, if you will. Indeed, I
devotedly hung on her every word, even becoming an officer of my university's Objectivist club. At one point, I may even
have been president. Much to the lament of my philosophy classmates, I was that girl who frequently (and loudly!) argued
in favor of Rand's illogical claims that altruism doesn't exist; that selfishness is a virtue; and that "rational egoism" is the
only right way to live. Thankfully, I grew out of that phase. Not surprisingly, but a few years of minimum-wage work
cleaning up cat faeces, without benefits, and other thankless, unstable odd jobs made me question Objectivism's
foundations and rekindled an earlier interest in anarcho-syndicalism. Eventually, leaving Rand was no more different or
difficult than, say, leaving a friend who had grown to annoy me over time sure, I was very intimate with her ideas, but
that just gave me more insight into their outright dysfunctionality, and the strength to say "sayonara!" What's scary is that
so many Americans have not grown out of that mentally puerile phase. Instead, this contingent now largely comprised of
Tea Party radicals remains mired in her pop philosophy. (Only now has Republican Congressman Paul Ryan, perhaps
realizing that supporting an atheist adulterer might hurt his veep chances,changed his tune from Objectivist fanboy to
follower of Thomas Aquinas.) Granted, it's doubtful that any political group so suspicious of the intelligentsia would
actually read Rand's 1,200 page magnum opus, Atlas Shrugged, but her ideas are clearly being used to justify
inequality, giving credence to institutionalized wealth-based elitism. This has to stop, and stop
now. But not just for the reasons that typically get brought up. Anti-Rand commentators have long pointed
out both the pragmatic and personal problems with Rand. As evidenced by the Great Recession, for example,
anything even remotely close to the unfettered capitalism advocated by Rand plainly does not
work. Also, as evidenced by her personal life, she was more a hypocritical, questionable character than
a moral role model. As a teenager in Russia, "she watched her family nearly starve while she treated herself to the theater."
She railed against government benefits but cheerfully collected social security and Medicare . She championed integrity,
but bastardized Nietzsche's best ideas. And her writing skills aren't just mediocre; if anything, her penchant for 200-page
monologues and wooden characters suggests that they're non-existent. And she has this thing for rapey scenes; and her
approach to BDSM goes for a Mad Men-esque chauvinist chic not healthy sex positivism. Of course, all that doesn't
actually say anything about her "philosophy"; it just makes the case that she's a jerk and a hack. That said, her theory
and summarily, its corollaries are belied by the abject sketchiness of their most basic premise: rational egoism . Far
smarter, more articulate people than me have pointed this out, but what needs to be emphasized is that Rand conflates
descriptive psychological egoism (people act in their self-interest) with normative ethical egoism (acting in self-interest is
the right thing to do). Part of this "ought-from-an-is"-type assumption is that altruism does not exist very much the
backbone of her belief system. West Valley College's Sandra LaFave does a great job following this line of thought and
pointing out why it doesn't work. The basic claim of egoists, LaFave notes, is that people "always and invariably act in their
self-interest". However, most moral codes call for altruism, which, in egoists' account, is "demanding the impossible".
Moral codes, so egoists' thinking goes, should not demand "the impossible", so we should take up a "more realistic" system
such as ta-da! ethical egoism. To accept this conclusion, you have to accept the premise that psychological egoism is a
given fact in the first place. To date, neither Rand nor anyone else has been able to prove definitively that the proverbial
soldier who dives on a grenade acts selfishly, not altruistically. Even if, for the sake of argument, we accepted that all acts
were selfish, there certainly seem to be a great many unselfish-looking selfish acts (diving on the grenade to save your
comrades), as well as selfish-seeming selfish acts (blowing your kid's college tuition money on a shopping spree.) LaFave
points out that this "empirical distinction" renders across-the-board selfishness more of a semantic trick than something
that meaningfully describes ethics. Go ahead and claim all human acts come from self-interest, fine. This seems kind of
silly, however, when the morality of said selfish acts will still be measured by how altruistic they seem. Another key
concern is that psychological egoism might not be final stage of an individual's ethical development. We start off selfish,
say some theorists, but we must move beyond convention and toward post-conventional social contract and conscience for
true moral growth. Even if we were to concede that these foundational problems do not deal a death-blow to Objectivism
which would be very generous of us (yet generous in a selfish way, of course) it still seems perverse to peg so much on so
shaky a foundation. The kernel of this belief system is nothing more than a philosophically hollow shell. It should
absolutely not play a role in policy-making especially when the end result would be disastrous. I outgrew
Rand; now I wish America would, too.

Objectivism fails in the real world

Milanovic 10 (Nikola, Denying Objectivism, Stanford Progressive, March 2010,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=183)//SR

Determining ones political, social, and economic beliefs, if done right, is a difficult affair, and one that many Stanford
students undoubtedly grapple with. In my own pursuit for developing the best outlook on life, I came across the peculiar
philosophy of an author named Ayn Rand as a sophomore in high school. Her ideas, entitled Objectivism, have enjoyed a
recent intellectual resurgence on Stanfords campus. This movement brings to mind my own trajectory as an objectivist,
which began with scholarly infatuation but ended with bitterly realistic rejection. Rands principles are, like so
many doctrines, attractive on paper but inapplicable to the real, modern world. Objectivism strives to
provide a comprehensive answer to questions of metaphysics, politics, morality, and epistemology. This article is not an
effort to unravel the rationale behind the philosophy. Instead, it is a comprehensive look at what the objectivist viewpoint
means in everyday life. How does Rands philosophy play out in practice? The central tenet of the movement is that there
is a non-subjective reality that can be accessed through reason, and that when we access it, it becomes clear that rational
pursuit of self-interest is the best way to lead ones life. Based on Rands aggrandizement of self-interest, her followers
believe in libertarian politics, centered around capitalism and the rights of the individual. The world is in a period of
economic recession. Inequality is a pervasive fact for the international community. Systematic
discrimination, unjust wars, and insurmountable barriers to opportunity still impact many
people. Its these facts that make objectivism an unrealistic worldview. The objectivist
standpoints on universal healthcare, government welfare programs, progressive or redistributive taxation, and economic
stimuli are all the same: they contend that these programs are unjust. But in a country where businesses
are declaring bankruptcy, homes are foreclosing at alarming rates, and people are falling below the poverty line and into
the unemployment line, can objectivism be a rationally ethical view? One that doesnt violate our
intuitions about morality? The answer is no, it cant be. Rands intellectual roots can be traced back to
Adam Smith, the famous 18th century economist who championed self-interest. The prevailing system before Smith was
feudalism, which is now universally abhorred because it held that entitlements were God-given. In feudalism, some people
were born into luxury while others were born into poverty, and this was seen to be the natural, and therefore right, order
of things. Much like the insurmountable caste system that creates a birthright hierarchy of some over others, feudalism
arbitrarily justified inequalities due solely to coincidence of birth. Smith, rebelling against the feudal mindset, argued that
through capitalism order, self-interest, and personal liberty could all coexist. Markets are amazing man-made institutions
in that they provide incentives to maintain order. For instance, if I try to cheat people by charging an exorbitant amount
for something I produce, other vendors will enter the market with lower prices, and I will be punished by losing
customers. Markets also allow for personal liberty; I can buy from who I want, and am not tied to one creed or a single
employer. In this way, markets eliminate hierarchies by creating horizontal, instead of vertical relationships; I am not
dependent on any one vendor, just as they arent dependent on any one customer. Smith, like Rand, argued that this was
all possible because people pursue their own rational self-interest. This pursuit harmonizes liberty and order by bringing
people into a network of anonymous, mutually beneficial exchanges. This is the central concept of objectivism: reciprocal
self-interest creates a motivation that allows us to avoid depending on altruism (in the words of economist Albert
Hirschman). For example, if I had to depend on a doctors beneficence to receive a life-saving treatment, I might be out of
luck. But because the capitalist system allows me to pay him (in his interest) in exchange for the treatment (in my
interest), we both win. Smith, though Rands intellectual heirs all idolize him, came to different conclusions
than the founder of objectivism. He did not support laissez-faire capitalism or even mention it in his
writings because he realized that markets could create dependency and subordination due to the
equivalency of money to power. Smith, in his utilitarian analysis of capitalism, understood that markets engender
inequality to an extent that is bad for society, and that they create an inflexibility of options in which
people lose their equality of opportunity based on the conditions theyre born into or the
paths they take. For this reason, he (unlike the libertarian objectivists) supported some government intervention in the
economy. The reason Rands viewpoint is so dangerously misguided in the modern world is because it
rests on the faulty underlying assumption that the state people are born into is justified. In his
paper, Altruism in Philosophical and Ethical Traditions, Will Kymlicka argues that people today are seen by the
Western world as free and equal, and that they therefore deserve equality of opportunity. This being
the case, any inequalities that result in the world should be due to peoples own choices and decisions. Like Thomas
Jefferson asserted in the Declaration of Independence, certain beliefs are held to be true: that all men are created equal
with the rights of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. But these rights are meaningless in the
objectivists world. Without the opportunity or tools to improve their social position, a
right to the pursuit of happiness is hollow to people disadvantaged by inequality. Kymlicka
holds that peoples fates should be determined by their choices, not by the circumstances that they are
born or thrust into. This is not how the world works, however. Consider four people: one born in a war-torn region of
Africa, one born into a poor family in inner-city New York, one born into a middle-class home in Florida, and one born
into wealth in Beverly Hills. These people all have the same right to pursue their own happiness, but they are not born
equal. They lack equality of opportunity. This inequality is not the result of their decisions, but is instead the
result of systematic injustice. To deny that this is injustice would be to deny that people
should be born with equal opportunity. This is what objectivists ignore: that pursuit of our rational self-
interest is meaningless if we are born without tools to pursue it. A popular philosopher in the
objectivist tradition, Robert Nozick, equated tax to theft because he considered it an unjustified sequestration of
money, the same as a robber stealing ones wallet at gunpoint. Famed economist Milton Friedman agreed in his
classification of such taxes as charity through violence. But this, like objectivism, assumes that the conditions
we are born into are justified, exactly what feudalism assumed centuries ago. The fact of the matter is that our
birthright entitlements are not justified. I was born into an upper-middle class family, but this wasnt my
right. So how can I get upset when some of the taxes I pay go to support the poor autoworker in Detroit or the luckless
homeowner in East Palo Alto? If people are born in worse situations than I am, its luck of the draw, but not a justified luck
of the draw. The reason they were born with less opportunity than I is because of systematic, institutional injustices that
exist in our society and create inherent inequality. That is why policies like redistributive taxation,
government-funded education, and unemployment insurance are justified: they serve to level the uneven
playing field we are born into. I loved objectivist libertarianism because it made me feel comfortable about my
privilege. I read just about all of Rands work and attended seminars on her philosophy. It was easy to accept my
abundance of opportunity as a right, but it didnt quiet a nagging thought in the back of my head: I shouldnt feel so
deserving of being privileged. Like Kymlicka assesses, its easy to accept gross inequalities without batting an eye when
they are viewed as natural. Objectivists accept them the same way feudalists accepted serfdom, the way Sharia law accepts
the subjugation of women, the way India accepted castes. Viewed as the natural order of things, objectivism justifies
inequalities that are the result of systematic injustice in how our societies and economies are organized today. Rand
sought to defend inequalities that were not the result of merit, providing no fairness in the available processes of acquiring
property or the resultant distribution. In her best-known collection of essays, The Virtue of Selfishness, Rand affirmed
that compassion is a vice, selfishness a virtue, and that good people should not respond altruistically to others
predicaments. This doctrine only makes sense to those who believe the inequality of birthright to be naturally justified.
Objectivism is a good way to make yourself feel intellectually comfortable with being born into privilege. It is a reassuring
self-justification for many that they shouldnt feel insecure about their luck. Maybe they should. Inequality is a natural fact
of life, but its one that can be reduced and marginalized by the right political and economic systems. We need to pursue
these systems, instead of ignoring inequality the way objectivism would have us do.


2AC Latin America Turn

Their impacts dont apply in this scenario State control in Latin America
has improved quality of lifein fact, citizen on citizen violence is less
frequent

Pereira, associate professor of political science at Tulane University, 2000
(David, New Patterns of Militarized Violence and Coercion in the Americas, Latin American Perspectives, Vol.
27.2)//SG

One possible reaction to this complex reality would be to assert that vio-lence and coercion have always been part of the
region's social fabric. From this perspective, Latin American history is an interminable series of civil
wars, revolutions, and coups in which soldiers, bandits, and guerrillas shoot it out for the
control of territory, resources, and state power. The atrocities of the Guatemalan military in the1980s, the
war of Peru's Sendero Luminoso, the massacres carried out by Mexican authorities and drug traffickers or Brazilian police,
and the maneuvering of Colombia's paramilitaries, guerrillas, and army merely represent new moves in an old game.
However, this view is misleading. First, it ignores the considerable success of state-builders
in Latin American imposing their own vision of "order" in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and thereafter. Many places experienced long periods of relative
nonviolence, even peace, although such tranquility was ultimately backed up by coercion.
And at least when it comes to international war, Latin American in the past two centuries has been
one of the most pacific regions on earth, with fewer deaths in war than South east and South Asia, the
Middle East, Europe, and the United States (Centenon,.d.).If there is a historical legacy to Latin American violence, its
contours and vicissitudes are not yet fully understood. Second, the argument that "violence has always
been with us" ignores several significant recent changes in the form and level of violence
in Latin America. For example, a recent study shows that since the late 1970s homicide rates have
increased sharply in much of the region (including the Carib- bean), meaning that in many places
citizen-on-citizen violence is becoming as pressing a problem as state-directed violence.
While the rate was stable or declining in the United States, Costa Rica, and Paraguay and very low and slightly increasing
in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, in Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, rates have risen to become the highest in
the region - all more than 15 per 100,000, with Colombia's at almost 100. 1As police forces have become
mired in inefficiency, corruption, and crime, moreover, the lines between citizens and
the state have become ever more permeable. 2 Militaries have taken on new internal security missions
prompted in part by the U.S. military's search for new enemies in the post-cold war era. 3These new missions are
sometimes conducted directly for organizations in the pri- vate sector, and drug
trafficking and gang-related and other kinds of crime have increased, often with the direct
participation off-duty (or even on-duty) police. All this has made the peripheries of many large cities zones of low-
intensity warfare and increasing anarchy and social disintegration. One report examining these and other statistics on
violence and crime calls Latin America and the Caribbean "the most violent region in the world"(Ayres,1998:3).

2AC Freedom Turn

Their claims are flawed even if coercion is usually bad, redistributing
income increases freedom

Glaeser 7 - the Fred and Eleanor Glimp professor of economics at Harvard University. He serves as the director of
the Taubman Center for State and Local Government and as director of the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston at the
Kennedy School of Government. (Edward, Coercive Regulation and the Balance of Freedom, Cato, 5/11/7,
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/05/11/edward-glaeser/coercive-regulation-balance-freedom) // JA

Ed Glaeser responds to an essay "Economics and the Distinction Between Coercive and Voluntary Action," by Daniel Klein
by looking at how the coercive power of the state relates to the minimum wage. This is part of a longer essay: Coercive
Regulation and the Balance of Freedom, by Edward Glaeser, Reaction Essay, Cato Unbound: Daniel Klein has written an
elegant essay arguing that minimum wage laws are coercive. He is obviously right. ... Minimum wage laws ... are enforced
with the power of the state. Coercion lies at the core of almost all government policies. Rarely is
voluntary participation a reliable tool for enforcing rules. If we could count on voluntary participation,
we probably wouldnt need the government involved in the first place. But, as Klein notes, just
because something is coercive, doesnt mean that it is wrong. The coercive power of the
state is useful when it protects our lives and property from outside harm. If we think that state-
sponsored redistribution is desirable, then we are willing to accept more coercion to help the less
fortunate. We also rely on state-sponsored coercion regularly when writing private contracts. The ability of creditors to
collect depends on the power of the state to coerce borrowers. The great difficulty is that coercion is both necessary and
terrifying. For millenia, governments have abused their control over the tools of violence. The historical track record
insists that we treat any governmental intervention warily. What principles help us decide on the appropriate limits to
government-sponsored coercion? Are minimum wage laws acceptable coercion or do they fall outside of the pale? I start
with the view that individual freedom is the ultimate goal for any government. The ultimate job of the state is
to increase the range of options available to its citizens. To me, this is ... justified by both philosophy
and history. ... A belief in the value of liberty flows strongly through mainstream neoclassical economics. Economists
frequently speak about an aim of maximizing utility levels, and this is often mistranslated as maximizing happiness.
Maximizing freedom would be a better translation. The only way that economists know that utility has increased is if a
person has more options to choose from, and that sounds like freedom to me. It is this attachment to liberty that makes
neoclassical economists fond of political liberty and making people richer, because more wealth means more choices...
But putting freedom first doesnt mean abandoning the state. At the very least, we rely on the
government to protect our private property against incursions by others. Even most libertarians
think that it is reasonable for the state to enforce contracts. ... While these forms of state action are
readily defensible, many of the thorniest questions involve tradeoffs between the liberty of one person and the liberty of
another. Taking wealth from Peter and giving it to Paul increases the choices available to Peter and decreases the choices
available to Paul. Governmental coercion to redistribute income cannot be opposed purely on
the grounds that it restricts liberty. Certainly, redistribution reduces the freedom of the
taxpayer but it increases the options of the recipient of governmental largesse.
2AC Binary Turn

The America First mentality comes from a desire to agree with the state
creates us/them binaries and kills individualism

Beres 99 Professor of political science and international law at Purdue University (Louis Rene, Death, the Herd,
and Human Survival, International Journal on World Peace, JSTOR)//MY

The threat of the Other is grounded upon a profound and universal human need. It is
intrinsic to human bonding. We cannot define whom "we" are without also defining
"them those who are not "us. "They need not be perceived as threatening: they may be
seen only as different from "usfrom our family, our community, our nation: "they are
others who do not "belong. But if "they are seen as threatening to us, then our own internal
bonding will be all the stronger.... Rome required barbarians, Christendom required
pagans, Protestant and Catholic Europe required each other. Patriotism is love of one's own
country; but it is also hatred or fear or suspicion of others.... Today the Western hemisphere has
been divided into two parts, each of which sees itself as threatened by the Other; yet at the
same time this continuing threat has become necessary to provide internal bonding and
social discipline within each part. Moreover, this threat of the Other has been internalized
within both Soviet and American culture, so that the very self-identity of many American and
Soviet citizens is bound up with the ideological premises of the Cold War. To a very real extent,
the individual American supported permanent rivalry with the Soviet Union largely out
of fear of being alone, outside the herd. That individual thus found the existence of an "Evil
Empire absolutely necessary. Small matter that the Soviet Union was essentially a state like his or her own,
comprised of people like himself or herself. Driven to devalue reason at the outset, this American
was impervious to logic, responding only to the strong emotional benefits of belonging.
Why such a desperate need to belong? The answer lies in our marked incapacity to find self-worth
within ourselves. This incapacity, in turn, is nurtured by a society that ruggedly despises
individualism. Offering a cornucopia of "things to those who would maintain proper faith, this society is
determined to positively cancel the individual.