THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR: WHO IS FIGHTING WHO?

WRITTEN BY: KRISTIN RICHARDSON

ABSTRACT
For over three decades, Mexican drug cartels have had a significant effect on the countrys
economic and political stability. In this paper I discuss how drug cartels fight for control of territory and
fight the government so they can continue to traffic drugs. We will take a look at how the war began
and who promoted it along with how it is contributing to Mexicos economic crisis. I also discuss who is
fighting the cartels and how the government is trying to pick up the Mexican economy.
Recommendations are included that bring up possible proposals to promote government reform and
citizen safety.
INTRODUCTION
Within the past three decades, Mexican drug cartels have had a significant impact on the countrys
economic and political stability. When the drug wars began back in the late 60s, the drug cartels began
to rise in power. As the Mexican government tried to put pressure on drug trafficking, the cartels fought
back. Over the past decade, Mexican citizens have grown with fear throughout their daily lives.
Mexicans used to believe that drug cartels only killed one another (Padgett, 2007). However, they are
finding that this violence is broadening to a range of victims including politicians, police and innocent
citizens (Padgett, 2007). As shown in Figure 1 below, the death rate due to the drug war has increased
from an estimated 1,500 individuals to over 20,000 individuals since the year 2000. With death on the
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
2000 2005 2010 Present
D
e
a
t
h
s

Year
Mexican Drug War Deaths over the Past Decade
Rios, Viridiana & Shirk, David.
2010.
Figure 1
up rise, the cartels continue to rise in power while the economic and political stability of Mexico falls.
LITERATURE REVIEW

HOW THE MEXICAN WAR BEGAN
The Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI), which had ruled from the early 1900s to
2000, constructed governability in Mexico (Lindau, 2011). The practices the PRI used to govern Mexico,
exploited drug trafficking organizations and cartels (Lindau, 2011). A set of unwritten rules were created
that regulated the conduct of the organizations, cartels, and their relationship with Mexico (Lindau,
2011). After numerous political mistakes and economic deterioration during the 70s and 80s, the PRIs
popularity and legitimacy diminished (Lindau, 2011). This forced the Mexican government to begin a
gradual process of political reform (Lindau, 2011, p. 181).
The Mexican Drug war began in the late 60s and early 70s in response to a reduced flow of drugs
from the United States (Lindau, 2011). The United States pressured the Mexican state to enact a variety
of measures to reduce the drug flow crossing the border (Lindau, 2011). In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan
and George Bush worked to reduce the supply in drug-producing countries and increase the domestic
penalties within the United States for drug distribution (Lindau, 2011). In response to the successful
efforts to stop the flow of Colombian drugs into Florida, Colombian drug routes shifted to Mexico
(Lindau, 2011). As this deepened, Mexican cartels began to share production and distribution with the
Colombian cartels.
In 1989, the largest cartel, the Arellano Felix cartel, was decapitated by the United States
(Lindau, 2011). The cartels leader, Manuel Arellano Felix, was captured and this encouraged drug
organizations all over Mexico to proliferate (Lindau, 2011). Law enforcement tasks were complicated
and this caused violence to spread throughout Mexico. This rose the conflict that the Mexican police and
military had with the drug cartels (Lindau, 2011).
Cartels all over Mexico began to develop their own drug operations (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010).
They were able to organize their own transportation, warehousing and the actual sale of the product to
the United States (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). Colombian and Mexican trafficking cartels joined forces.
Working together, they smuggled and distributed drugs while reaping the benefits from one another
(Kellner & Pipitone, 2010).
Starting in 2002, an Attorney General of the United States, John Ashcroft, explained the size of
the United States drug market. He reported that Americans spent $62.9 billion on drugs back in 2000
(Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). By 2009, the United States National Drug Intelligence Center estimated that
the Colombian and Mexican cartels were profiting between $17 and $38 billion annually from drug sales
to the United States (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010).

CARTELS FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF TERRITORY
As the Mexican cartels grow, their tactics to control more territory and traffic drugs heightens.
The cartels are willing to take any necessary steps to improve profit, gain control of territory and
improve drug transportation. The cartels use armed assaults, targeted assassinations, ambushes, raids,
blockades and car bombs. They magnify these tactics with savage hangings, beheadings and
dismemberments. A statement is usually associated with the corpse to provide amplification to the
incident (Sullivan & Elkus, 2011).
With a continue rise of violence and drug trafficking, the innocent citizens of Mexico are at risk
daily. Federal law enforcement, national security, and military are forced to grow in order to respond to
these threats (Lindau, 2011). Cartels not only have access to a wide range of infantry weapons, but also
have access to other military equipment and extensive human intelligence networks (Sullivan & Elkus,
2011). As the drug war matures, cartels continually access new weapons in pursuit of profit and power.
With profit potential, the cartels will push any type of violence to sustain their quest for power. (Sullivan
& Elkus, 2011).

MEXICO IS ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY UNSTABLE
The drug war has complicated Mexicos institutionalization of democracy, reduced the efficacy
of judicial reforms and has undermined federalism (Lindau, 2011). Mexicos military and federal police
agencies are funding the fight for the war, delaying the construction of an independent judiciary and
enforcement structure (Lindau, 2011). All of these changes are happening on top of the growing
corruption, violence, human right violations, and the expansion of the states penitentiary (Lindau, 2011,
p. 178). Mexico must adapt and has had to adopt methods that are used to interrogate the cartels in
order to conduct a successful war (Lindau, 2011). With a demand to conduct the war, fight the cartels
and provide great security, law norms have been abandoned (Lindau, 2011). On top of all of this, after
long efforts to create a less super-presidentialist system (Lindau, 2011, p. 183), the federal law,
national security and military have grown. This has increased the power of the Executive branch and
jeopardized their efforts (Lindau, 2011).
Due to the war and expanding government size, the federal budget has grown. In 2003, the
budget for Order, Security and Justice was 37.25 billion pesos. In 2010, the cost grew to 89.6 billion
pesos (Lindau, 2011). The executive branch budget has also grown. The budget has expanded from 18.7
billion pesos in 2003 to 55.6 billion pesos in 2010 (Lindau, 2011, p. 184). The budget for the National
System of Public Security has increased as well. This budget increased from 2.781 billion pesos in 1998
to 8.05 billion pesos in 2008 (Lindau, 2011, p. 184). This is a clear reflection of the drug wars impact on
Mexicos economic crisis.

FELIPE CALDERN FIGHTS BACK
In 2006, Felipe Caldern became Mexicos president and wanted to confront the drug cartels head on
(Flannery, 2013). Immediately, Caldern sent 4,000 troops to patrol the hills in Mexico to capture and
kill cartel leaders (Flannery, 2013). The cartels soared with anger and began to battle among and
between each other for control of the drug trade (Flannery, 2013, p. 182). In 2010, Caldern
announced that 2010 was the year with the most violent deaths in the country (Flannery, 2013, p.
182). By causing more violence to try and capture the cartels, violence among other organizations
became worse and put society in even more danger. The Caldern administration dismissed the violence
for years. They argued that disrupting the drug trafficking cartels was a sign of government effectiveness
(Flannery, 2013). Caldern had good motives to bring back public security and to get government back
on its feet, however failed to do so (Flannery, 2013).
In 2012, Pea Nieto came into office as Mexicos new president. President Nieto has proposed
crime reduction strategies that involve a variety of social, military and police programs (Flannery, 2013).
Rather than taking Calderns approach to attack Mexicos drug cartels, he is prioritizing the reduction
of violence as a whole.

RECOMMENDATIONS
I represent the Security Department of the Mexican Government and have prepared
recommendations on how President Pea Nieto can successfully enforce his new strategy and how we
can stabilize Mexico so Nieto can focus on the economic crisis at hand. With a focus on government
reform, labor market reforms and citizen safety, Mexico can begin to rebuild its economy.
Rather than attacking the Mexican cartels head on, we need to focus on implementing effective
security policies that will protect Mexicans citizens. The police force needs to focus on protecting our
citizens rather than focusing on strategies that will bring more violence to the cartels. In doing this,
cartels will not see government as much as a threat and will step back from directly attacking the
military, police force, and innocent citizens.
Nieto should also focus on reaching out to the United States to fund our anti-drug efforts
(Newswire, 2012). A great majority of drug trafficking goes to the United States. With an effort to slow
down drug trafficking, the United States would benefit off of this effort and should contribute a realistic
dollar amount (Newswire, 2012). So far the United States has promised aid but has not pulled through in
recent years to provide us with the full authorized dollar amount (Newswire, 2012).
Reforming the labor market needs to be a priority of President Nietos. It is important to create
jobs with economic opportunity, so Mexico has an option to move from gangs and move towards
careers. Focusing on labor market reforms is absolutely necessary. As seen in Figure 2, the
unemployment rate of Mexico has risen to the highest it has ever been. It is now around 5% of the
entire population.























Judiciary reforms also should be prioritized. Leading up to recent years, prosecutors do not face
an especially active or empowered defense bar and do not particularly defer to judges in the overall
conduct of investigations (Simser, 2011, p. 8). There are slow paths to justice, corrupted officials, and
inaccurate evidence from prosecutors (Simser, 2011). As this is prioritized and slowly fixed, the rule of
law in Mexico will strengthen while weakening the cartels penetration against our criminal system
(Simser, 2011).

CONCLUSION
The Party of the Institutionalized Revolution seems to have a huge effect on where the
relationship went wrong between drug cartels and the Mexican government. After they regulated illicit
Figure 2
rules with the cartels, the cartels grew in power. When government realized that the PRI was not
helping, they tried pushing the government towards reform. This was disastrous as it interfered with the
illicit laws the government had with the cartels and slowly formed a war. From before 2000 to over a
decade later, the deaths from the drug war has quadrupled. Now with Pea Nieto as President, Mexico
can focus on decreasing the death rate, slowing violence, work on government and labor reform and
then eliminate the cartels.

During my study of Mexico, I did not find any limitations. It took time to research and to find
statistics that supported my thesis, however I was able to find everything I needed. To further research
Mexicos economic and political crisis, it is necessary to follow President Pea Nieto as he journeys
through reforming Mexico.







































REFERENCES

Kellner, T., & Pipitone, F. (2010). Inside Mexico's Drug War. World Policy Journal, 27(1), 29-37.
Padgett, T. (2007). The War Next Door. Time International (South Pacific Edition), (32), 24.
Sullivan, J. P., & Elkus, A. (2011). Tacts and Operations in the Mexican Drug War. Infantry, 100(4), 20-24.
PR, N. (2012, July 3). Mexican Election Puts Drug War in Limbo, Say Robert Weiner, Ex-White House Drug
Spokesman, and George Clingan, Latin American Policy Analyst; Oped in Arizona Republic. PR
Newswire US.
Simser, J. (2011). Plata o plomo: penetration, the purchase of power and the Mexican drug cartels.
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Lindau, J. D. (2011). The Drug War's Impact on Executive Power, Judicial Reform, and Federalism in
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Flannery, N. (2013). CALDERN'S WAR. Journal of International Affairs, 66(2), 181.
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