The Selous Scouts - Pamwe Chete

THE SELOUS SCOUTS "PAMWE CHETE"
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THE SELOUS SCOUTS HOME PAGE / INTRODUCTION
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PAMWE CHETE!
The motto of the SELOUS SCOUTS. Translated from the Shona, literally meaning "Together only!" or
"All Together!"
Welcome to the
SELOUS SCOUTS,
once the most feared
counter-insurgency
force on the African
continent.
During the course of
the war the Selous
Scout were officially
credited with either
directly or indirectly
being responsible for
68% of all terrorist
killed, while losing less
than 40 scouts in the
process.
With this site I tried to
obtain as much
information on the
scouts to give the
reader hopefully clear
idea of who and what
the scouts were and
what they were fighting
for in an around the
former country of
Rhodesia.
In putting this site
together there is a lot of
general information on
many facets of this
counter-insurgency
conflict, so it truly
THE SELOUS SCOUTS REGIMENT
Men fighting a counterinsurgency war need to be
very special, for not only do they have to stalk an elusive
enemy, often operating in difficult terrain, but they also
have to be self-reliant in the field. They have to be fit,
resourceful and capable of working under conditions that
push them beyond the limits of normal endurance.
The Selous Scouts - small Units disguised as the
enemy were used by the British in Malaya and Kenya in
the 1950s but the Scouts, in
became one of the finest exponents of the art.
Their success reflected the
quality and quantity of their training.
All undercover units undergo
strenuous testing but, to many
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becomes a site of not
just the Selous Scouts
but also a Rhodesian
interest site.
This site should be
helpful for some, due to
the fact in some African
countries information
on the Selous Scouts
and the
Rhodesian/Zimbabwe
War of Independence
(Chimurenga War,
1966-1980) was or is
BANNED!
This site is still in the
working and as I find
and obtain more
information on the
scouts, I will
continually update the
site as needed.
Well enjoy the site and
don't forget to sign the
guest book and let me
know what you think.

observers who were unfamiliar with
the harshness of the Rhodesian
bush, it seemed that the Scouts
were subjected to almost barbaric
trials of strength and stomach.
Excessive or not, their training paid
dividends in the field.
Inevitably, because of the
tight security that surrounded the Scouts operations,
members of the regular forces, already resentful of their
special treatment and casual dress, began to question
their worth. Things came to a head in the late 1970s
with the Scouts being accused of gun-running and
poaching. For a time the regiment weathered the storm
but, with the resignation of their commander in 1979, it
was clear that the end was in sight. In March 1980,
following the take-over by African nationalists, the
Selous Scouts were disbanded and the units short
career came to an inglorious end.

-Peter Stiff

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DEDICATION
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DEDICATION
This site is a tribute to the brave
men of the Selous Scouts, who paid
the ultimate sacrifice and to three
gentlemen who made the Selous
Scouts possible.

"PAMWE
DEDICATION
TRAINING
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OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
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TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
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FORCES
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MANUAL
OTHER
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RESOURCES
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Frederick Courteney Selous - For his famous name and honor, for which the
Selous Scouts would have not been known. Frederick was the best remembered
African hunter, a cult hero. A noted marksman, incredible hunter and
bushman. In his sixties he was commissioned into the army as lieutenant, were
on a later operation was killed by a stray bullet to the head killing him. He was
buried were he fell in the African bush, he loved so much.
Ron Reid-Daly - For making, molding and pushing a concept for such a
unorthodox organization, that became the most feared counter-insurgency unit
on the African continent, The Selous Scouts. Para Badge number 001 and 527.
David Scott-Donelan - A original member of the Tracker Combat Unit (TCU),
that was absorbed by the Selous Scout. He served as the Officer Commanding
Training Group which included the Tracking and Bush Warfare School, the
dreaded Wafa Wafa, on Lake Kariba. This is more of a personnel thanks for
keeping one of the skills of the scouts alive and well. The dying and lost art of
mantracking, this was a major skill used by the scouts even if it was just a cover
for black ops. Para Badge number 348.

This poem, said to have been written
by one Sidney I. Lassman, is one of the
few poems written about the Regiment
and is included in tribute to the Selous
Scouts who didn't make it.
"The Selous Scouts"
I used to sit by the water's edge & watch
the campfire glow
& I'd listen to the night-birds cry & feel
the breezes blow.
My belly full of the meat I'd shot, I'd sit
for hours & muse
As the moon came up & the shadows
changed to many different hues.
I used to roam through this country wide
in search of game so fleet
& I'd listen to the lions roar as they too
searched for meat.
I'd make my camp on the grassy plain or
in the mountains tall
& I'd friends at every farm & store &
every native kraal.
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But now when I near a river's edge or
roam this country wide
I've a lot of men to back me, & I think of
them with pride.
They're a scruffy lot to look at, but
they've a tracker's skill;
They're damned fine men in a follow-up,
& damned good at a kill.
The Scouts they're called, & well-named,
too, for the man whose name they bear.
Was the greatest hunter in this land, &
these men fear no dare!
For the game they hunt is vermin that
would pillage, plunder and maim.
& they do their job efficiently, with never
thought of fame!

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UPDATES
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UPDATES
This section is to provide a quick reference and access to all additions as well as to
inform you of all major changes and corrections made to this web site.

05JUL07 - I would like to be contacted by members of the Selous Scouts Association. I
have corresponded with members before on establishing this site as the official site. If
interested contact the webmaster at selousscouts "at" nc.rr.com for the possibilities of
getting this off the ground.
04JUL07 - Happy 4th of July! I have a guestbook up and running and already have had a
handful of entries. I again made some minor corrections and additions as well as added a
UK version of the SKUZ' APO MARKETPLACE.
28JUN07 - Wow! Were does the time go? I finally had some minor updates on the site. I
fixed some problems and added some items. Like the SKUZ' APO MARKETPLACE. I
also took the Tripod ads off the site as well as added some links in the RELATED LINKS
page. I still have no guestbook up yet. I have been slowly working to dump this site layout
for a totally new format with a ton of new information that I been holding out to post on
the site. Well please support the site by shopping through the Marketplace page or make a
donation. All money earned goes to keeping the site up and running, and all money beyond
that I will be donating to the Selous Scouts Association or other relevant Rhodesian
Associations like the Rhodesian SAS or RLI.
24JAN03 - Updated KIA list in the AWARD RECIPIENTS AND KIA section giving brief
remarks on some KIA.
03SEP02 - Added new page to UNIT PROFILE section; SELOUS SCOUTS REGIMENT,
brief regimental history.
01SEP02 - Added new page to WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT section; RHODESIAN
WARFARE BY A SHOESTRING.
23MAY02 - The AWARDS RECIPIENTS AND K.I.A. page has been updated adding the
late John Barry "Chunky" Graham to K.I.A. roll, he was killed in action 13 November
1975. This may also be referenced to in the book "CONTACT" by John Lovett. Special
thanks to Andrew D. Graham for pointing out this omission.
19MAY02 - The RESOURCES page has been updated with more titles that were used to
construct this site. As well this site is now a Amazon dot COM associate. Meaning any
"PAMWE
UPDATES
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
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T.A.L. DOZER
purchase you make through my link to Amazon keeps this site running banner free.
14MAY02 - Updated RELATED LINKS page and corrected minor mistakes.
05MAY02 - Just returned from a tactical tracking course run by former Selous Scout,
David Scott-Donelan. I would like to thank him for an outstanding training opportunity and
highly recommend any of his courses to anyone interested in tactical/combat tracking.
14APR02 - Added domain name; http://www.Selous-Scouts.com. It will require up to 48
hour to activate.
12APR02 - As of now my work commitments for the military are complete, and its nice to
get some R&R back home. The latest update is I now pay to be banner free site and
expanded my bandwidth, so the site does not get as much downtime. I also have a smaller
URL (http://selousscouts.tripod.com). I reworked the Introduction page also. I have a lot to
add in the next couple of weeks. Thanks for all the support!
03APR02 - Like to thank Mr. Chris Pessarra, again for some fine information and I look
forward to your book, keep me posted!
26MAR02 - 100th Anniversary of the death of Cecil John Rhodes.
29SEP01 - Due to work commitments their will be no site updates till further notice.
11SEP01 - Today was a sad day indeed, not just for the UNITED STATES but the world,
we were all targets and we will never forget. We will prevail! God bless AMERICA!!
01SEP01 - I have fallen behind on site updates and have much to and have many loose
ends to tie up within the site. I been have been also having problems with the video clips,
so be patient.
13AUG01 - Added new GALLERY section of exclusive pictures and various audio bits
and video clips.
29JUL01 - Just a heads up on the status of the site. Lately I have not made any major
additions due to my work commitments. I am way behind on the RSF COIN Manual being
converted to PDF format for download and I am currently still working on WEAPONS
AND EQUIPMENT and OTHER RHODESIAN ELITES sections. Be patient they will be
up in due time. Also the site has almost out grew (50 MB limit) its current host at
Tripod.com, I'm currently looking for a new host (must be FrontPage compatible) and or
sponsors to make this site banner free. Any one interested drop me a line.
07JUL01 - Added site copy protection. I would like to thank Huub (check out his site on
the SAS) for providing me with this novel little Java scrip.
03JUL01 - Added a copy of Selous Scouts certificate of successful completion of
selection, in the SELECTION AND TRAINING section.
24JUN01 - Added a site search engine on the SITE INDEX section and all so added a
MESSAGE BOARD to post any relevant rant. This is just a test for another site I am
working on. Personally I do not feel this site warrants this tool. I do not receive enough
traffic for it to be effective. But we will see.
11JUN01 - Added article COUNTERINSURGENCY IN RHODESIA to POLITICAL
OVERVIEW section.
10JUN01 - Added new section OTHER RHODESIAN ELITES, with pages on;
RHODESIAN S.A.S.
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RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY (COMMANDO)
GREYS SCOUTS
RHODESIAN ARMOURED CORPS (RAC) "BLACK DEVILS"
07JUN01 - Added BUSHCRAFT AND TRACKING (POI).
05JUN01 - Webmaster note added to Merc sections and added the article; SELOUS
SCOUTS 1974 - 1980.
04JUN01 - Added a article; SELOUS SCOUTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONNECTION.
04APR01 - Coming very soon, I will be posting the complete R.S.F. COIN MANUAL
PART II - ATOPS (JUN 1975), It will be in .PDF format for download, all 400 plus pages
with all original illustrations. You will need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view it, which is free
to download on there site. To see the edited on line version, check out; RHODESIAN
COIN MANUAL.
03APR01 - Various pages added;
THE MULTIRACIAL UNIT- SELOUS SCOUTS
RHODESIA'S ELITE; A COMPARISON
TRACKING TECHNIQUES FOR PREDATOR AND PREY
RHODESIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH MERCS
24MAR01 - Added BIG GAME BUSHCRAFT TIPS FOR SCOUTS into the TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT section.
23MAR01 - Added a article; TRACKING TERRS / GUERRILLAS in the COMBAT
TRACKING section.
23MAR01 - Added a SITE INDEX for easy access to all pages.
22MAR01 - In the UNIT PROFILE section added article; SELOUS SCOUTS and a sound
bite of the Scouts on parade.
21MAR01 - Added new article in RHODESIAN EXPERIENCE section, titled the MERCS
AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS. its about mercenary employment within Rhodesia.
20MAR01 - Fixed entry link to site and index.htm
20MAR01 - Over this past weekend the site was down, due to technical errors at
TRIPOD.COM they mistakenly deleted some sites and had to repost them. Fortunately
everything is fine now. Sorry for any inconveniences!
04MAR01 - Minor corrections made and broken links fixed.
26FEB01 - Article on ANTI-AMBUSH DEVICES added to RHODESIAN EXPERIENCE
section.
25FEB01 - Added new section RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES. It is to give you an
over view of we the Selous Scouts fit into the scheme of things.
UPDATES
24FEB01 - Article by J.R.T. Wood added; FIRE FORCE (PART ONE) and FIRE FORCE
(PART TWO).
23FEB01 - Various links corrected and Selous Scouts exchange banner by Huub added on
RELATED LINKS section.
20FEB01 - Various pictures added through out site and minor changes tweaked.
19FEB01 - More minor changes made through out site.
18FEB01 - Complete new section added RHODESIAN EXPERIENCE. explains some of
the novel ideas employed during the conflict. This is an extensive section.
17FEB01 - Corrected various areas and RESOURCES section is now giving Mr. Chris
Pessarra due credit on two books listed on this site he has written. Due to matters beyond
his control he has not officially been accredited for his work on these books. So I would
like to thank him for fine work and I look forward to your next book release on African
matters.
15FEB01 - COMBAT TRACKING section has added "The Rules of Tracking", by David
Scott-Donelan.
15FEB01 - OPERATIONS section completed. EXTERNAL OPERATIONS section high
lights the Selous Scouts cross-border activity and INTERNAL OPERATIONS section has
a brief over view of OPS.
14FEB01 - RELATED ARTICLE section deleted. PAMWE CHETE article moved to
UNIT PROFILE section.
13FEB01 - POLITICAL OVERVIEW section has the addition of RHODESIAN ARMY:
COUNTER-INSURGENCY, 1972-1979 (PART 1) and RHODESIAN ARMY:
COUNTER-INSURGENCY, 1972-1979 (PART 2) by Ian F. W. Beckett.
13FEB01 - PSEUDO-TERRORIST OPERATIONS section has a added article on Pseudo
operations by T. A. Lettieri.
12FEB01 - WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT section had various pictures added on the
WEAPONS and UNIFORMS pages.
12FEB01 - COMBAT TRACKING section has a added article; SELOUS SCOUTS,
FOXHOUNDS, BEACONS AND TRANSMITTERS: A experimental and peculiar use of
tracking dogs.
12FEB01 - Broken links fixed on RELATED LINKS page and FFAL page.
11FEB01 - Various grammatical errors corrected through out site. Major work done in
COIN MANUAL.
10FEB01 - Updates page added. Your on it!

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UNIT PROFILE
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Perhaps the best comment
on the fighting ability of
the Selous Scouts is the
fact that during Rhodesias
anti-terrorist war they
accounted for more dead
terrs than the rest of the
Rhodesian Army
combined. Formed in 1974
as the Tracker Combat
Unit and eventually
performing long range
recon missions, tracking
terrorists internally, and
undertaking cross border
raids against terrorist
strongholds, the Selous
Scouts were highly skilled,
parachute trained long
range recon/raiders. Their
selection process was
somewhat similar to that
of the British SAS. In
addition to parachute
training, bush survival and
tracking were emphasized
during Scout training.
Clandestine and counter-
guerrilla skills were also
taught. The Selous Scouts
normally made operational
jumps from about 500 feet
using the T10 static-line
parachute, but many
members within the unit
were also free-fall
parachutist trained.
In August, 1976, the
Selous Scouts launched
the first cross border strike

"PAMWE
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TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
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SECURITY
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RHODESIAN COIN
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against terrorist bases in
Mozambique. In that raid
alone, they killed 1,184
terrorists. Later, the Selous
Scouts under took many
missions in conjunction
with the Rhodesian SAS
which had a strength of
110 men, many of them
former members of the
British SAS. By
comparison, the Selous
Scouts numbered at about
700-1000 men. The Selous
Scouts were especially
feared and hated by the
terrorists, perhaps the best
comment on their combat
effectiveness. As a result
of this hatred, many
former Selous Scouts left
Rhodesia after Mugabe
came to power, probably a
smart move since
members of the SAS had
at one time been sent to
assassinate him. Now
serving in the South
African forces, many
former Selous Scouts were
continuing their war
against Communist backed
terrorists from their new
residence of South Africa.

SELOUS SCOUTS ON PARADE
On the 16
th
June 1978 (the picture to the left is the
rededication parade on the 17 February 1979.),
over 1500 men of the regiment of the Selous
Scouts marched onto the drill square at Andre
Rabie Barracks - the only time that this fine body
of men was ever to parade at full strength. The
occasion was a medal parade at which the Grand
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Cross of Valour was presented to Captain Chris
Schulenburg. This recording is a rare glimpse into
the private world of these professional soldiers.
CLICK ON THE ABOVE PICTURE TO HEAR THE SCOUTS IN CADENCE!

SELOUS SCOUTS REGIMENT: A general overview of the regimental history.
SELOUS SCOUTS: A small look at the Scouts history and employment. If you read but
one article, read this one. Its brief and covers all the major points.
RHODESIA'S SELOUS SCOUTS: This in depth report on the Scouts will be of great
interest to anyone interested in Terrorist activities and unconventional warfare.
THE SELOUS SCOUTS: A brief overview of the scouts employment, training and mission
in the war of independence.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE SELOUS SCOUTS: A good
article on the scouts and their operational techniques they employed through hard learned
lessons.
SCOUTING FOR DANGER: A look at the Rhodesian Selous Scouts from 1973-1980.
Some very good insight.
PAMWE CHETE: The Selous Scouts carve their name with pride! Great little article,
covering history, training and operations.
RHODESIA'S ELITE; A COMPARISON: A brief description of the major elite units.
THE MULTIRACIAL UNIT- SELOUS SCOUTS: A look at the Scouts, were blacks and
whites fought together side by side in the same unit; to stop tyranny. Now that is a far cry
from racism.
SELOUS SCOUTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION: A look at the post
war lineage of the scouts and their relationship and influence with the RECCEs.
SELOUS SCOUTS 1974 - 1980: A brief look into the short lived unit.

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SELECTION AND
TRAINING OF THE
SELOUS SCOUTS

OUTLINE OF COURSE CURRICULUM

PHASE ONE
REGIMENTAL (SELOUS SCOUTS) BASIC TRAINING
PHASE TWO
SELECTION COURSE WITH RECOVERY AND REFIT - 3 WEEKS
TRACKING AND BUSH WARFARE COURSE - 2 WEEKS
PHASE THREE / "DARK PHASE"
PSEUDO-TERRORIST TRAINING - 2 WEEKS
PHASE FOUR
PARACHUTE (STATIC-LINE) TRAINING COURSE - 3 WEEKS
PHASE FIVE / ADVANCE SKILLS TRAINING
FREE-FALL PARACHUTE COURSE - LENGTH UNKNOWN
COMBAT DIVER COURSE - LENGTH UNKNOWN
COMMENTS
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
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GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME ROUGHLY, FOR A NEW RECRUIT WITH
NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE, IS EIGHT AND A HALF GRUELING MONTHS
OF NONSTOP TRAINING TO PRODUCE A BASIC ENTRY LEVEL SELOUS
SCOUT.

A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF TRAINING

Selous Scouts selection course made extensive use of roped obstacles and obstacles of
height to test the candidates confidence levels at heights, as well as overall strength and
dexterity need to complete the rigor of further training. This information would be vital
for there further training as parachutist.

During the weapons training extensive amount of range firing was placed on "COM.
BLOCK" weapon systems to include but not limited to the RPK, AK-47, RPG-7 and
there various variants. This emphasis was due to the later operational employment as
pseudo-terrorist.

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Dark phase was were the Scouts learned the art of there deadly trade of pseudo tactics
and operations, all of which was highly classified at the time. The training covered a vast
amount of material on terrorist modes of operation, which was gleamed from turned
TERRs and was constantly updated from class to class to keep information current and
accurate.

One of the high lights that captivated candidates was the "espite de corp" that came with
being a parachutist, which prior to the Selous Scouts was only a white soldiers
entitlement. the scouts broke that mould and were the first to employ blacks in the
airborne role, and later the free-fall role as well.

Upon successful completion of the
selection course the newly indoctrinated
trooper is awarded his certificate /
diploma of acceptance in to the Selous
Scouts Regiment. At this point the
Trooper is far from done continuous /
advanced training is continues on.
(Above) Example of Selous Scouts certificate.

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POLITICAL OVERVIEW
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/political_overview.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:09]

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POLITICAL OVERVIEW
Below are related articles of the political situation in Rhodesia dealing with the
military view of the Zimbabwean War of Independence. All with heavy reference to
counter-insurgency and the employment of the Selous Scouts. The war lasted
twenty-three years (1957-March 1980). The combatants of this conflict were the
Nationalists against the Rhodesian governments. The war ended with a nationalist
victory and independence of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe (The good guys don't always
win.). Casualties during this war was over 20,000 killed on both sides.

WAR IN THE BUSH: Military and political situation in Rhodesia.
RHODESIAN ARMY: COUNTER-INSURGENCY, 1972-1979 (PART 1): This is a very
thorough essay on COIN operations, which covers many different facets within the RSF, to
include the Selous Scouts.
RHODESIAN ARMY: COUNTER-INSURGENCY, 1972-1979 (PART 2): This essay is
long, but well worth a read, just for the lessons learned from the RSF.
ZAPU AND ZANU: The black nationalist groups.
RHODESIAN INSURGENCY (PART 1): This is a little more than an overview but well
worth the read.
RHODESIAN INSURGENCY (PART 2): This is an awesome amount of information in
such a small piece of work, again it's a great read and well worth the time.
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN RHODESIA: Excellent article written in 1979, about the
conflict in Rhodesia.

"PAMWE
POLITICAL OVERVIEW
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
U D I
On 11 November 1965, Ian Smith of the Rhodesian Front Party issued the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI). This document can be viewed below in all its splendor.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW
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SELOUS SCOUTS GALLERIES.
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/selous_scouts_galleries.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:14]

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SELOUS SCOUTS
GALLERIES
These galleries are exclusive to this site, you will not find any of these pictures in any
other site, book or magazine. As for the audio and video bits, they are in wav. and mpeg.
formats respectively. The clips are sure to add some insight to the Selous Scouts. Just as
a note the video clips are silent and the quality is not super, what the hell their almost 30
years old.
GALLERY ONE
GALLERY TWO
GALLERY THREE
GALLERY FOUR
GALLERY AUDIO AND VIDEO

"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
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OPERATIONS
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/operations.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:19]

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OPERATIONS
OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS

The operations that the Selous Scouts participated in breaks down in to two areas;
Internal Operations - This entails all operations conducted within the border of
Rhodesia.
External Operations - This entails all operations conducted outside the border of
Rhodesia.
The links below provide a more in depth look at both types of operations.

INTERNAL OPERATIONS: This is a brief section on the major operations
conducted by the Rhodesian Security Forces which includes the Scouts.
EXTERNAL OPERATIONS: This section has a little more meat to it, with more
relevant information on the Selous Scouts.

"PAMWE
OPERATIONS
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
OPERATIONS
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WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND UNIFORMS
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/weapons_and_equipment.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:24]

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WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
AS USED BY THE SELOUS SCOUTS
SUMMARY
Within this page my attempt is to give
a brief, but comprehensive overview of
some of the weapons, equipment (kit),
vehicles, uniforms and insignia
distinctive to the Selous Scouts.
The Selous Scouts were renowned
for being unorthodox in their operation
which also showed in there weapons
and equipment. Many Scouts employed
"liberated" items to round out there kit.
Weapons being at the top of the list.
Many of which were Communist Block
issue.
Some items were standard issue
through out the Security Forces, but
were in some cases modified to suit the
needs of a particular operator, while in
other cases items were made or
obtained specifically for the Scouts, for
example the Selous Scouts made PIG
an armored personnel vehicle with
purpose of conducting convoy or
external operations.
The following is not all inclusive, but
again just an overview. If you have
information or scans of items pertaining
to this section, feel free to send them to
the Webmaster. All items will be
credited to the sender.
CONTENTS
WEAPONS
UNIFORMS
EQUIPMENT (KIT)
INSIGNIA
VEHICLES
SUMMARY
l
l
l
l

x
x
x
x

"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
RHODESIAN WARFARE BY A SHOESTRING: A comparison look at the
weapons systems employed by the RSF and the Terrs.

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RHODESIAN EXPERIENCE
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian_experience.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:29]

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This section deals with tactics, techniques, operations and lessons learned during the
Rhodesian counter-insurgency conflict.
Rhodesia, though geographically a Third world country, possessed an essentially
western military establishment and organization based on the British model.
Like many financially hard-pressed Third world countries confronted by insurgents,
The Rhodesian Security Forces as well as the Selous Scouts functioned under serve
financial constraints that limited their access to late model, sophisticated "high tech"
weapons and to large quantities of material.
The Rhodesians' ability to overcome these constraints by embracing innovated
strategies and tactics, including novel techniques in road security, combat tracking,
reconnaissance, small unit tactics, special operations, and intelligence gathering, suggests
that the successful prosecution of a counter-insurgency conflict need not entail a huge
expenditure of vast amounts of conventional weapons and equipment, while employing
conventional war-fighting tactics to successfully wage an effective campaign.
With that I assembled some of the high lights that I feel are relevant and related to the
way the Selous Scouts operated and performed in this campaign.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: A look at disinformation tactics employed by
the Selous Scouts.
SPEC. OPS.- INTELLIGENCE GATHERING: Overview of intelligence ops to
include pseudo ops.
COUNTERING LANDMINES: Varies techniques employed to counter the landmine
threat.
FIREFORCE OPERATIONS: A look at a novel airmobile / air assault technique
employed to battle insurgents.
OVERCOMING TRACKING PROBLEMS: the essence of the Selous Scouts.
SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND SPEC. OPS.: How small patrols (sticks) became
force multipliers buy accomplishing missions with minimal expenditure of personnel.
ANTI-AMBUSH DEVICES: Improvised techniques employed to counter roadside
ambushes and similar attacks.
DRAKE SHOOT: This is an immediate action drill developed by the Selous Scouts,
to break contact or counter an attack in a small patrol engagement.
MERCS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS: One of Rhodesia's answer to manning
issues was that of employing quality "white" soldiers from around the globe, many
being combat veterans; mostly British and Americans.
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER

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PSEUDO-TERRORIST OPERATIONS
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/pseudo_main.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:36]

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There were three particular skills that made the Scouts so special. As stated through out
this site. They were expert trackers and masters of survival / bushcraft, lastly they were
pseudo specialist. The early stated two skills were basically for there cover story of
primarily being a combat tracking unit and not a counter guerrilla / insurgency force,
trained to look, act, operate and fight like a terrorist cell. The Selous Scouts used this
technique to great success during their short history. In the articles below you will read
the highlights of their mastery of pseudo operations.

PSEUDO OPERATIONS
By T. A. Lettieri
What are pseudo operations? Simply in a military scenario it is to perpetrate or pretend
to be someone or something you are not, to sham or fake out an opponent in thinking you
are one of there own in order to attain a decisive tactical advantage or surprise over the
opponent you our impersonating.
Pseudo operations are not new. It is standard operation for most law enforcement
agencies the world over, in police jargon it is known as a sting operation. Pseudo
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
techniques were used successfully by MAC-V-SOG in Vietnam, The British SAS in
Malaya, and by the Rhodesians to name but a few.
During Rhodesias war against insurgents, military authorities within the Rhodesian
Security Forces realized the need for accurate ground truth in a time sensitive nature. With
that in mind a secret unit was devised to acquire this information.
The unit was the Selous Scouts, comprised of intelligence experts from the police and
military, soldiers, and turned terrorist / guerrillas. Eventually this small unit of scout
trackers turned pseudo terrorists expanded to a formidable counter-insurgency force of
close to 1000 operators.
They used stealth, guile and subterfuge during active ground reconnaissance to obtain
current intelligence and ground truth on terrorist infiltration and exfiltration routes, feeding
and staging areas, arms caches, base camps, and support networks. Within the Scouts
members were fluent in the native languages of Rhodesia (Shona being the most common
native tongue) and understood the people, costumes and culture. The use of the turned or
captured terrorist / guerrilla was the final touch giving the pseudo team its credibility to
look, act, and operate as a terrorist cell, with the information gleaned from the turned
terrorist.
These pseudo teams then infiltrated the insurgency infraction with such success that so
much information began filtering through the intelligence system that special operation
were planned with this information to counter the growing insurgency threat to the state.
Which made way for the Scouts to conduct some of its own independent direct action
missions.
The conduct of pseudo operations by the Selous Scouts proved so successful that by the
end of the war in 1980 they were accredited with 70% of all terrorist killed or captured.

PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS: This is probably the
definitive explanation and discussion of the scouts use and employment of pseudo
operations. quite lengthy.
PSEUDO-TERRORIST GANGS: This is a tactical and operations outline of pseudo
operations employment.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LESSONS OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS: A good
article on the scouts and their operational techniques they employed through hard learned
lessons.
THE USE OF PSEUDO GANGS AGAINST THE MAU MAU: This article is not
about Rhodesian pseudo operations but the Kenyan counter-insurgency campaign. which
is primarily were the Selous scouts incorporated and expanded the idea to a art and
science, the article does refer to the Selous scouts. Well worth checking out.
SPEC. OPS.- INTELLIGENCE GATHERING: Overview of intelligence ops to
include pseudo ops.

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The first attempt in Rhodesia to evaluate the pseudo concept as a weapon against
terrorism took place in October 1966.

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COMBAT TRACKING (MANTRACKING)
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/combat_tracking.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:45]

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COMBAT TRACKING
(MANTRACKING)

A person skilled in tracking can consider himself as having reached the pinnacle of bushcraft.
Lt. Col. Ron Reid-Daly

Combat tracking is the art of being able to follow and hunt down a man by following its
path and signs left behind.
How is combat tracking / mantracking different from tracking animals? Animals do not
conceal their tracks and have set characteristics, but the enemy is cunning and skillful
and is capable of concealing his tracks.
The art of tracking is not new. The tactical employment of trackers is not new either.
Tracker were used in Malayan, Kenya, Cyprus, Borneo, Vietnam and yes Rhodesia to
name just a few.
Trackers prove very successful because they were able to pass back valuable
information such as strength, speed, and other pertinent information required to
successfully bring the fight to their foe and destroy.

"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
COMBAT TRACKING TECHNIQUES: How To Track Your Enemy.
TRACKING AND COUNTERTRACKING: Extract from course notes.
TRACKING: Chapter 7 of Rhodesian COIN manual.
FOLLOW UP OPERATIONS: Chapter 8 of Rhodesian COIN manual.
RURAL TRACKING OPERATIONS: Extract from Rhodesian S.A.S. (Special
Air Service) combat field manual.
ZAMBEZI VALLEY MANHUNT: A article about the T.C.U. and one of its
operations. The T.C.U. was absorbed into the Selous Scouts, making up some of
the original cadre of that organization.
TRACKING FOR SURVIVAL: Covers basic knowledge and skills for military
bush trackers.
ADVANCE TRACKING TECHNIQUES: This picks up basically were tracking
for survival leaves off.
TRACKING: THE FOLLOW UP: Techniques employed by scout trackers to pick
up lost spoor.
BUSH TRACKING AND COUNTERTRACKING: Successful techniques
employed in the bush by scout trackers.
SELOUS SCOUTS, FOXHOUNDS, BEACONS AND TRANSMITTERS: A
peculiar and experimental use of tracking dogs.
OVERCOMING TRACKING PROBLEMS: The essence of the Selous Scouts.
TRACKING TERRS / GUERRILLAS: The employment of native trackers and
combat trackers in a counter-insurgency conflict.
TRACKING TECHNIQUES FOR PREDATOR AND PREY: This is some
tracking information on techniques employed by the Rhodesian Security Forces
and the Scouts.
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5 POI NTS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMBAT TRACKI NG
1. Don't move so quickly that you overlook telltale signs.
2. Learn to use your sense of smell as well as your sight and hearing.
3. Don't just observe the tracks: interpret what they mean.
4. Get to know your enemy: study the terrorists' operating procedures, habits and
equipment.
5. Be persistent: don't lose the will to win when you lose the spoor/trail. Try to
find it again.

THE RULES OF TRACKING
Tracker sets the pace.
Record the start point.
Always know your position.
Confirm on aerial spoor.
Keep in visual contact.
Identify the correct tracks.
Never walk on ground spoor.
Get into the quarry's mind.
NEVER GO BEYOND THE LAST KNOWN SPOOR
David Scott-Donelan

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BUSHCRAFT
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/bushcraft.htm[2012-05-28 11:40:50]

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BUSHCRAFT
Bushcraft also known in many countries as
fieldcraft, are simply survival skills. Bushcraft
includes all those skills the scout uses to make his
existence in the bush (This can refer to forests,
jungles, mountains etc.) more efficient, safe, and
comfortable, with if need be minimal creature
comforts and food. This might include
improvising game traps for food; navigation by
natural means such as the sun and stars; purifying
or filtering stagnant water; improvising a shelter
for protection from the elements; fire making with
a bow and drill.
Superior training in such skills as navigation,
camouflage, foraging, tracking (See combat
tracking section for more information) and
staking let the scouts make weather and terrain an ally that protected them while it slowed
and exposed the enemy and sapped his strength.
Bushcraft not only entails all the skills necessary for survival, but also the
improvisation of on hand items to improve or fix, if need be on a patrol. this could
include such things as rigging an improvised antenna; building booby traps; making a
hide site of natural camouflage; and other ingenious bush techniques.
The Selous scout stick leader most go to great lengths to ensure that all his scouts have
developed and maintained their bushcraft prowess to the highest degree. He can never
assume that they are proficient at bushcraft because they are indigenous to the region in
which they are operating. Just because a scout was born and raised in a rural environment
doesn't necessarily mean he will demonstrate the bush savvy his fellow scouts do.
With the above in mind was incorporation of the Rhodesian bushcraft and tracking
school. In the following sections I will cover some the skills employed by the former
Selous Scouts and still being employed by many elite units today. They will be basically
survival skills with a tactical overtone to them.

BIG GAME BUSHCRAFT TIPS: These are basic tips instructed to Scouts operating
in the bush, for that chance contact with big game animals.
"PAMWE
BUSHCRAFT
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
BUSHCRAFT PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION: This is a outline of Bushcraft and
Tracking course curriculum.

BUSHCRAFT
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AWARD RECIPIENTS AND KIA
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ROLL OF HONOR
AWARD RECIPIENTS AND K.I.A.

During it's short history, the Selous Scouts earned:

1 Grand Cross of Valor (only two were ever issued);
1 Commander of the Legion of Merit
7 Officers of the Legion of Merit
10 Members of the Legion of Merit
9 Silver Crosses of Rhodesia
29 Bronze Crosses of Rhodesia
5 Defense Meritorious Medals
18 Military Force Commendations
4 Meritorious Conduct Medals
1 Meritorious Service Medal.
"PAMWE
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OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
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RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
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ELITES
RESOURCES
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A grand total of 85 awards. Another measure of the Regiment's success
was the fact that according to the Rhodesian Government, 68% of the
terrorist fatalities within Rhodesia during the war were credited to the
Selous Scouts, whilst they suffered less than 40 deaths. Quite a record!

KILLED IN ACTION
RANK NAME DATE REMARKS
Sgt Rabie A. 16 Sep 1973
SAS/SS, killed
on active
service, in a
shooting
accident,
through a map
reading error
Lt R. Hughes 18 Oct 1973
TCU/SS, killed
in action by a
gunshot wound,
during a pseudo
operation and a
contact, with
ZANLA
Tpr Musafare E. 29 Apr 1975
Killed in action
by a gunshot
wound
Cpl Muchenje F. 29 Apr 1975
Killed in action
by a gunshot
wound
Tpr Pakayi l.P. 29 Apr 1975
Killed in action
by a gunshot
wound
Cst Muchichiwa
28/29 Apr
1975
BSAP/SS, killed
in action, at
Mount Darwin
Cst Zaranyika
28/29(?)
Apr 1975
BSAP/SS, killed
in action in a
contact
Cpl Graham J. B.
13 Nov
1975
Killed on active
service, in a
shooting
accident
Tpr Mapanzure A.T. 09 Jun 1976
Killed in action
by a gunshot
wound in a
contact
W02 Nel J.A. 26 Jun 1976
Killed in action
in a contact
Tpr Ginyilitshe A. 09 Jul 1976
Killed in action
in a contact
Killed in action,
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Capt R.S.S. Warraker 12 Jan 1977
while flying in a
Canberra B2 in
Mozambique,
when hit by
ground fire from
Malvernia
during
Operation
Manyatela
L/Cpl Kowhai S. 27 Feb 1977
Killed in action
in a contact
L/Cpl Silvesta T. 27 Feb 1977
Killed in action
in a contact
Sgt Mason C.
15 Mar
1977
Killed at
Malvernia
during an
exchange of fire
with FRELIMO.
He killed six
Tpr Tinarwo P. 19 Dec 1977 Killed in action
Cpl Williams R. 12 Jan 1978 Killed in action
unk Chidembo 12 Jan 1978 Killed in action
Sgt Ringisayi C. 05 Feb 1978
Killed in a
convoy ambush
in the Nyajena
TTL
L/Cpl Cook R.G. 05 Feb 1978
Killed in a
convoy ambush
in the Nyajena
TTL
Tpr Moss K. 05 Feb 1978
Fatally wounded
in a convoy
ambush in the
Nyajena TTL
Tpr Whitfield J.B. 05 Feb 1978
killed in a
convoy ambush
in the Nyajena
TTL
Tpr (R)Pungwe M. 05 Feb 1978
Killed in a
convoy ambush
in the Nyajena
TTL
Sgt Zambarah P. 05 Feb 1978
Killed in a
convoy ambush
in the Nyajena
TTL
Sgt Zambara P. 16 Feb 1978 Killed in action
Trp Rungiue 16 Feb 1978 Killed in action
Tpr Rosenfels I.
29 Mar
1978
Killed in action
02 Oct
L/Cpl Mutrase L.
1978
Killed in action
Cpl
Obert Mabaleka
N.
02 Oct
1978
Killed in action
Sgt Wuranda H.
Unknown
1978
Killed/Unknown
Tpr Ushendibaba 0.
05/08(?)
Feb 1979
Killed in action
L/Cpl Jele Moyo 16 Apr 1979 Killed in action
Capt Hardy M. K. 12 Jan 1979 Killed in action
Tpr ONeil G.
27
Sep/Oct(?)
1979
Killed on
Operation
Miracle
Tpr Mann K.
29
Sep/Oct(?)
1979
Killed in action
on Operation
Miracle
Tpr Wixley W. R.
02 Nov
1979
Killed in action
on Operation
Murex
Tpr Muranda J. 27 Dec 1979 Killed in action
Lt Piringondo E. 14 Feb 1980 Killed in action
Cpl Moyo M. 14 Feb 1980
Killed /
Unknown
**Note** Not listed is Smith, Trp, Selous Scout, who was listed as killed with no date or other information.

AWARDS AND RECIPIENTS

GRAND CROSS OF VALOR
Capt C.F. Schulenburg SCR

COMMANDER OF THE ORDER OF THE LEGION OF MERIT
Maj R.F. Reid-Daly DMM, MBE

SILVER CROSS OF RHODESIA
2/Lt C.D. Collett MFC
Cpl Chikondo M.
Sgt FranklinA.P.
Sgt Mpofu S.
Cpl Pilate T.M.
Sgt Piringondo E.
Pte Rangarirayi H.
Capt R.S.S. Warraker
Cpl Wuranda H.

OFFICER OF THE ORDER OF THE LEGION OF MERIT
Sgt Fitzsimmons B.P.D.
Lt C.J. Gough
Lt M.K. Hardy
Maj C.J.1. Kriel
Maj A.G. Sachse
Maj M.J. Swart
Capt J.A.C. White BCR, DMM

MEMBER OF THE ORDER OF THE LEGION OF MERIT
Lt T.G. Bax
W02 Balaam A.J. MFC
C/Sgt Chiyaka L.
Maj F.J. Duncan
C/Sgt Jenkinson R.G.
Sgt Lafferty J.W.
Capt A.M. Lindner
W02 Ne! J.A.
Sgt Rabie A.P.
W02 van der Riet W.F.
Lt P.J. van der Riet BCR

BRONZE CROSS OF RHODESIA
L/CpI Boyi D.
L/Cpl Chabata C.
L/CpI Chigudu F.
Cpl ChiyakaL.
L/Cpl Gayon G.
L/Cpl Jele C.
WO2 KrauseC.E.
Pte Mugandani F.
L/Cpl Madhiridza N.
Cpl Mzinda B.
L/Cpl Ndhlovu D.
L/Cpl Ndhlovu D.
Cpl Ndhlovu O.M.
CpI Maposa R.
Sgt Rangarirayi.H. SCR
L/Cpl Robins C.K.
L/CpI Ruwuyu K.
W02 van der Riet P.J.
WO2 White J.A.C.
Sgt Wuranda H. SCR
Sgt Wuranda P.
Sgt Chidembo J.

MERITORIOUS CONDUCT MEDAL
Sgt BowerE.A.
Sgt Clemence P.C.
L/CpI Khama R.
F/Lt B.S. Moss MFC

DEFENSE FORCES MEDAL FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE
Capt J.W.Ley
WO1 Mavengere S.
WO 1 Pretorius J.A. ESM
Capt D.J.Steyn
W02 J.A.C. White BCR

MILITARY FORCES COMMENDATION
Sgt Balaam A.J.
Sgt Boshoff H.
Sgt Bromwich M.C.
Sgt ChiguduF.BCR
Lt C.D. Collett SCR
Sgt Gwatimba K.
Cpl Kanve E.
Tpr Kapungu E.T.
C/Sgt Khama R. MCM
WO2 Laing B.M.M.
Sgt Lewis T.W.L.
Tpr Mabwe D.F.
L/Cpl Madewe J.
C/Sgt Maskell B.A.T.
Cpl Mawedzere K.
Tpr Morgan B.M.
F/Lt B. Moss
C/Sgt Nimmo N.P.

MEDAL FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE
WO2 Link C.

COMMANDER OF THE ARMYS COMMENDATION
S/Sgt Hamilton A.R.

**Note** The source for this material was from the book PAMWE CHETE - The Legend of the Selous Scouts, By
LTC. R.E. Reid-daly.

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RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES
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THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES

THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES STRUCTURE CHART

THE RHODESIAN ARMY

The Rhodesian Armys command structure and organization were modeled directly on the
British Army. A Lieutenant-General commanded the Army and was responsible to the Minister
of Defense. Later in the conflict, when COMOPS (a combined operations organization) was
created, its commander exercised operational control over the Army as well as independently
commanding the Armys special forces. As Rhodesia had very limited white manpower upon
which to draw for professional military service, a large part of the Army consisted of national
service and reserve personnel. Initially, all regular combat units were staffed with full-time
career soldiers, but after 1972, when national service was increased from 18 to 24 months,
inductees were drafted into some of the Armys special forces. In addition, many foreign
volunteers, mostly from South Africa but also from Britain, the United States, France,
Australia, and New Zealand, served in the Rhodesian military.

THE RHODESIAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

Rhodesian African Rifles
The Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) two battalions were composed of black soldiers led by
white officers. The black soldiers knowledge of tribal cultures, ability to speak various tribal
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
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languages, and bush skills enabled them to obtain local intelligence that the average white
soldier could not hope to acquire and function better in Rhodesias harsh climate and terrain
than the average urban-born and raised white trooper. Although the RAR first proved
themselves capable soldiers fighting with the British in Malaya more than a decade before,
their initial performance in Rhodesia was poor, giving them a bad reputation among other
Army units. Improved training, however, raised the RARs performance, and by the end of the
war many RAR personnel were participating in elite force operations, such as the various
Fireforces.

Rhodesian Light Infantry (Commando)
The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) was originally conceived as a light infantry unit but later
changed its tactical mission and structure to a commando organization as it became more
actively involved in the counterinsurgency campaign. The battalion was made up of four
commando units of about 90 men each. They were trained as paratroopers and provided the
backbone of the Fireforces. The RLI also participated in most of the major external
operations and cross-border raids. Because of their proficiency, they were classified as
Special Forces and, after 1977, came under the control of COMOPS.
Special Air Services (SAS)
The SAS was modeled on the elite British unit of the same name and fought beside the British
in Malaya during the 1950s. During the early stages of the Rhodesian counterinsurgency
campaign, the SAS was employed mainly in tracking insurgents. Later, the unit was expanded
into a regiment comprising A, B, C, and D squadrons and for the remainder of the conflict was
employed in clandestine external operations. Volunteers from various units were rigorously
tested for mental and physical stamina before being accepted by the SAS and then were
extensively trained in parachuting, canoeing, bushcraft, explosives techniques, and other
special tasks. The unit maintained a high standard of efficiency and achieved a very high rate
of operational success.
Selous Scouts
The Selous Scouts were formed at the beginning of Operation Hurricane in 1973 and tasked
with obtaining intelligence on the size and movement of insurgent groups. Like the SAS, most
Selous Scout personnel were volunteers who had undergone a stringent selection course before
being trained in parachuting, insurgent tactics, bush survival, and weaponry. Surrendered or
captured insurgents whom the Rhodesians had turned were also included in the unit. Their
inclusion was critical because the information these recent defectors provided kept the unit
current on insurgent tactics and operating procedures. Because of their success, the Selous
Scouts doubled in size over the course of the conflict, and eventually some 420 members were
deployed on active service.

Their role was similarly expanded to include external operations,
and they became responsible for training and administering the combat tracking units in
addition to their pseudo operations role.
Greys Scouts
The Greys Scouts were a mounted unit trained specifically for tracking on horseback. They
could thus cover more ground than trackers on foot and could more easily escape insurgent
ambushes. Personnel were recruited from the regular Army and trained in equitation. The unit
was also used for patrolling and occasionally on cross-border raids. Because it was classified
as special forces, it was also under the control of COMOPS after 1977.

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA POLICE (BSAP)

The BSAP was Rhodesias national police force and was responsible for maintaining law and
order throughout the country. Although it was modeled on the British police system, the BSAP
was more like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in its development, structure, and
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organization. It was commanded by a Commissioner of Police who, in turn, was responsible to
(and appointed by) the Minister of Justice (later, Minister of Justice and Law and Order). The
BSAP was organized into branches, the most important of which were the Duty Uniform
Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Special Branch, Support Unit, and Police Reserve.

THE RHODESIAN AIR FORCE (RhAF)

The Rhodesian Air Force command and rank structure was based on the British Royal Air
Force. It was commanded by an Air Marshal who, like his counterpart in the Army, was
accountable to the Minister of Defense. The RhAF was never a large air force. In 1965, it
consisted of only 1,200 regular personnel. At the peak of its strength during the insurgency, it
had a maximum of 2,300 personnel of all races; but of these, only 150 were pilots actively
involved in combat operations. These pilots, however, were able to fly all of the aircraft in the
Air Force inventory, which gave the RhAF a considerable amount of flexibility. Pilots were
rotated through the various squadrons partly to maintain their skills on all aircraft and partly to
relieve fellow pilots flying more dangerous sorties.

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Department of Internal Affairs (IAD) personnel were the acknowledged experts on tribal
culture and mores and therefore played a prominent role in the conflict. IAD officers served at
the Joint Operational Centers and were heavily involved in implementing such civic measures
as the protected villages program. The paramilitary Guard Force, which was responsible for
the security of the protected villages, also came under IAD control.
White Internal Affairs personnel received extensive training in African tribal law and customs
and were required to speak at least one of the tribal languages. Despite this, it is evident that
many of the senior officers failed to fully appreciate the black populations nationalist political
aspirations. This became clear when IAD assessments of black political opinion were at odds
with Special Branchs assessment. Unfortunately, though IAD was wrong in several of these
cases, IAD senior personnel had the governments ear and LAD assessments were generally
accepted over those of Special Branch.

RHODESIAN ARMY 1977 CIRCA: A very brief look at the order of battle of the
army as it stood in 1977.

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RHODESIAN C.O.I.N. MANUAL
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COUNTER-INSURGENCY
MANUAL
This is a slightly edited and reformatted version of the Rhodesian Security Forces COIN
manual; Part II - ATOPS (Anti-Terrorist Operations in rural areas), dated June 1975. This
is the same document used by the Rhodesian elite forces and the Selous Scouts.
Much of the tactics and techniques within this manual were developed and employed
during there long counter-insurgency conflict. There are many lessons learned and proven
techniques within in this manual that still apply today in a counter-insurgency
environment.
After the independence of the country, when many Rhodesian units fled for South Africa
were many of them were absorbed into the military there, much of the lessons learned
from the Rhodesians was passed on to the South Africans, especial in the case of former
Selous Scouts passing much of there hard learned lessons on to the S.African special
forces, the RECCES. Now it is apparent why the S.African RECCES were so good at
what they did.

"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER

**NOTE** The source for the basis of the HTML for this manual was obtained from Mr. Dovey, John, his
work can be viewed at his site.

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OTHER RHODESIAN ELITE.
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OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITE

This section of the site is a small tribute to some of the other
famous elites within the Rhodesian Security Forces. I attempted
within these pages to give the reader an overview of these
extraordinary units. Without these units many scouts lives could
have been lost and many missions of the Selous Scouts would not
have been as successful or possible, without the external help of
these few....
"Never Forget Rhodesia"
....famous and obscure units.
RHODESIAN SPECIAL AIR
SERVICE (S.A.S.) "C"
SQUADRON (MALAYAN SCOUTS)
The SAS were the most extensively and diversely
trained unit in the R.S.F., specializing in external
operations and reconnaissance.
GREYS SCOUTS
The Greys were one of the unique outfits; a light
infantry mounted tracking unit, but often
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
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SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
mistakenly referred to as a cavalry unit.
RHODESIAN ARMOURED CORPS
(RAC) "BLACK DEVILS"
This elite unit was a armoured cavalry unit with
the mission of rapid reaction and security
operations.
RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY
(RLI) (COMMANDO)
This all white commando units mission was purely
counter-insurgency and they were a major
component to the Fireforces.

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RESOURCES
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COMING
NOVEMBER
2007!!!!
SELOUS
SCOUTS
Co-authored
by Craig
Fourie and
Jonathan
Pittaway

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Who Sent
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(Click
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-1671 days till release date!

RESOURCES : BIOGRAPHY
Listed below on this page is a selection of books that provided a good majority of the
material found on this site. The books are listed in no particular order. Technically
they should be in alphabetical order by authors last name. I am sorry to say the
majority of these books are out of print, so happy tracking.
Selous Scouts is now an associate of Amazon. I
did this to help defray my site expenses. So
your business for your Amazon.com needs,
through this link will keep this site running
and banner free. To use simply cut and paste
the BROWN title or authors name of the book
you wish to search for in the search engine to
the right.
Search by keywords:

Reid-Daly, Ron and Stiff, Peter. 1982. Selous Scouts Top Secret War. Alberton, South
Africa: Galago Publishing.
"PAMWE
RESOURCES
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
Reid-Daly, Ron. 1999. Pamwe Chete - The Legend of the Selous Scouts. Weltevreden,
South Africa: Covo-Day Book. Formally titled "Selous Scouts Top Secret War".
Scott-Donelan, David. 1998. Tactical Tracking Operations - The Essential Guide for
Military and Police Trackers. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press.
Pessarra, Chris. 1981. Rhodesian S.A.S. Combat Manual. Sims, Arkansas: Lancer
Militaria.
Pessarra, Chris. 1986. African Merc Combat Manual. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press.

Cilliers, J. K.. 1985. Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia. Dover, New Hampshire: Biddlees
Ltd..
Cole, Barbara. 1984. The Elite- The Rhodesian Special Air Service. Pietermaritzburg,
South Africa: Three Knights Publishing.
Thompson, Leroy. 1982. Uniforms of the Elite Forces. Dorset, UK: Blandford Book Ltd..
Thompson, Leroy. 1994. SAS - Great Britain's Elite Special Air Service. Osceola,
Wisconsin: Motorbooks International Publishers & wholesalers.
Thompson, Leroy. 1994. Ragged War - The Story of Unconventional and Counter-
Revolutionary Warfare. Strand, UK: Arms and Armour Press.

Thompson, Leroy. 1988. Dirty Wars - Elite Forces VS The Guerrillas. New York, NY:
Sterling Publishing Co Inc.
Helmoed-Romer, Heitman. 1985. South African War Machine. Novato, CA: Presidio
Press.
Thompson, Robert. 1981. War I n Peace - Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare since
1945. New York, NY: Harmony Books.
Macdonald, Peter. 1986. Soldiers of Fortune - The Twentieth Century Mercenary. New
York, NY: Gallery Books.
Abbott, Peter and Botham, Philip. 1986. Modern African Wars (1): Rhodesia. London,
UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd.
RESOURCES
Selous Scouts
Ron Reid-Daly
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Abbott, Peter and Rodrigues, Manuel. 1988. Modern African Wars (2): Angola and
Mozambique 1961-74. London, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd.
Stiff, Peter. 1982. Selous Scouts- A Pictorial Account. Alberton, South Africa: Galago
Publishing Ltd.
Lewis, Jon E. 1997. The Handbook of the S.A.S. - How the Professionals Fight and Win.
London, U.K: Robinson Publishing Ltd.
Stiff, Peter. 1999. The Silent War - South African Recce Operations 1969-1994. Alberton,
South Africa: Galago Publishing Ltd.
Stiff, Peter. 1986. Taming the Landmine. Alberton, South Africa: Galago Publishing Ltd.

Hoffman, Bruce and Arnold, David. 1991. Lessons for Contemporary
Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience / R-3998-A. Rand Corporation.
Beckett, Ian F.W. and Pimlott, John. 1985. Armed Forces & Modern Counter-I nsurgency.
New York, NY: St. Martin's Press Inc.
Turner, John W. 1998. Continent Ablaze - The I nsurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the
Present. New York, NY: Arms and Armour Press.
Mockler, Anthony. 1987. The New Mercenaries - The History of the Hired Soldier from
the Congo to the Seychelles. New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers.
Arniel, A. J. 1987. Badges and I nsignia of the Rhodesian Security Forces 1890-1980.
South Africa, Germiston: Alec Kaplan & Son C.C.

RESOURCES
Moore, Robin. 1977. Rhodesia. New York, NY: Condor Publishing Company, Inc.
Moore, Robin. 1991. The White Tribe. Encampment, Wyoming: Affiliated Writers of
America, Inc. Formally titled "The Crippled Eagles".
Reid-Daly, Ron. 1990. Staying Alive - A Southern African Survival Handbook. Rivonia,
South Africa: Ashanti Publishing Ltd.
Salt, Beryl. 2001. A Pride of Eagles - The Definitive History of the Rhodesian Air Force.
Johannesburg, South Africa: Covos Day Books.
Els, Paul. 2000. We Fear Naught But God - The story of the South African Special
Forces; "The Recces" . Johannesburg, South Africa: Covos Day Books.

Cocks, Chris. 1999. Fireforce - One Man's War I n The Rhodesian Light I nfantry.
Johannesburg, South Africa: Covos Day Books.
Venter, Al J. 1994. The Chopper Boys - Helicopter Warfare in Africa. London, United
Kingdom: Ashanti Publishing.
Lovett, John. 1977. Contact - A Tribute to those who serve Rhodesia. Salisbury, Rhodesia:
Galaxie Press.
Moorcraft, Paul. 1982. Contact - Struggle for Peace. Johannesburg, South Africa: Sygma
Books Ltd.
Cole, Barbara. 1986. The Elite - The Rhodesian Special Air Service Pictorial.
Amanzimtoti, South Africa: Three Knights Publishing.

Lotter, Chas. 1984. Rhodesian Soldier - And Other Who Fought. Alberton, South Africa:
Galago Publishing Ltd.
RESOURCES

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I PERSONALLY FOUND THESE TO BE THE BEST RHODESIAN OR GENERAL
MILITARY RELATED SITES AROUND. IF YOU KNOW OF A RELATED SITE OR
HOMEPAGE YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE POSTED, JUST FOLLOW THE SELOUS
SCOUT FFAL PAGE BELOW AND SUBMIT THE SITE OR JUST CLICK HERE.

FREE SELOUS SCOUT BANNER
You can use this if you like to link your site to this one. Will exchange banners with
related type sites.
Just choose a size and cut and paste to site HTML and upload.
Thanks HUUB for the banners!

LINKS

"PAMWE
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OTHER
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RESOURCES
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GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
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T.A.L. DOZER
SOTTI is a institute dedicated to teaching the art and science of man-tracking to military,
law enforcement and civilians. The school is owned and run by active duty and retired U.S.
Special Forces operators, that all have an extensive background and combat operational
experience hunting and tracking terrorist.

Official site of South African RECCEs, this site is amazing and separates fact from fiction.
A superb tribute to one of the worlds premier elite outfits.

Small Wars Council is the Warriors' Council for those engaged in the practice of Small
Wars. Warrior in this sense is not a military term -- successful conduct of Small Wars
requires consideration and coordination across the many elements of power. We are an
equal opportunity site, painfully aware that we must transcend individual services, and the
military in general, to take a multi-disciplinary, international, multi-cultural look at the
challenges of prosecuting Small Wars in the 21st Century.

SPARTAN MI ND: The SPEC OPS Reading List for Operators - Selected by
Operators
This is one awesome reference site on buying various military books. The site has an
excellent page on "Bush War" books.

RHODESIAN FORCES WEBSITE
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This is a database of every unit from the Rhodesian Bush War era plus others. This is one
awesome site!

300 SPARTANS! The Marketplace
This is the unofficial store for 300 and Spartan/Greek warfare items. Very good site on
niche subject.

This site has everything Rhodesian from clothing and DVDs to books. It is the Rhodesian
super store. Give it a look.

TRACKER: THE ULTI MATE TRACKI NG MARKETPLACE
This is a one shop store for all your tracking book needs.

The Rhodesian Special Forces Troopies

RELATED LINKS
THE SELOUS SCOUTS FFAL PAGE
This is the Selous Scouts FFAL (FREE FOR ALL LINK) page to submit a site of related
interest. Well worth a check and one way to up traffic to your personnel site.

RHODESIAN MILITARIA is the premiere site for identifying legitimate and fake
Rhodesian patches and badges. I highly recommend this site!

Awesome site on the SAS. Not anything about Rhodesia in this site, but anyone familiar
about special operations knows the strong influence the British SAS had on "C" SQN. and
the SELOUS SCOUTS. So give it a look and sign his guest book and let him know what
you think. You will not be disappointed its got to be the best one on the web. Huub
regularly updates this site with current information on the world famous "Hereford Boys"!

Outstanding site for all Rhodesian and South Africa military mater. The only dedicated site
to this genre I know. This site is the mother load!

Mr. Wood is a subject mater expert on the Rhodesian Bush War and has written/published
various articles and books on the subject.

This is the best French Foreign Legion site on the internet and what makes this one even
better then most is that it is all in English.

RELATED LINKS
ALEC KAPLAN & SON CC
This is another highly recommended site on RSF and SA matter, as well as coins, books,
uniforms and notes.

This is a focal point site for all matter on African Militaria.

THE S.W.A.T. SHOP
Deals in unusual and hard to find parachute wing, special forces and police insignia,
uniforms and equipment. Specializing in Southern Africa.

GALAGO PUBLISHING- The leading African publisher for African military, historical and
socio-political bound material.
RELATED LINKS

Books of Zimbabwe is an excellent hub for various books on African interests from various
publishers.

RHODESI ANS WORLDWI DE
This is where to start if you are looking for anything Rhodesian. Buy far the best site of its
kind.

This book is one of the best Selous Scouts or Rhodesian Bush War books to come out in
sometime. This is a great companion piece to "Top Secret War" by Stiff and "Pamwe
Chete" by Reid-Daly.

On Point is a school for tracking, survival and awareness run by a good friend and excellent
tracker. I highly recommend his program of instruction.

RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY
ASSOCIATION
The RLI association is a beautifully done site, dedicated to the warriors who manned the
majority and most successful FIREFORCE missions.

RELATED LINKS
The British South African Police (BSAP) Association site. Excellent site on a organization
that was an integral part of the Selous Scouts.

MAN TRACKING SOLUTIONS - One of a handful of tracking schools I would
recommend. No spirit tracking here, just nuts and bolts!

"C" (RHODESI A) SQUADRON 22 SPECI AL AI R SERVI CE (SAS)
This site is primarily for former members to keep in touch, but has quite a bit of historical
information on the unit from Malayan scout days to 1980. Worth a check.

THE RHODESI AN SECURI TY FORCE VETERANS (NZ)
This is a New Zealand based site for Rhodesian veterans. Excellent site with much
potential.

RELATED LINKS
This military history site is worth a look. It also has a great links page to many Rhodesian
pages.

TACTI CAL TRACKI NG OPERATI ONS SCHOOL, I NC.
This combat mantracking school was founded and is owned by the world famous (and good
friend), former Selous Scout David Scott-Donelan.

J ust Done Productions - Publishing
This company is located in Durban, Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa. Just Done Productions
pride themselves on producing quality, professional press-ready manuscripts for publication.
They have an extensive catalogue of South African military subjects.

This at one time was one of the only (and first) sites totally dedicated to the RLI. Excellent
data base of information. Well worth the time!

RELATED LINKS
This site offers an exclusive video collection covering areas of Rhodesian history from early
pioneer days up to the Independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.

A great site with a lot of good information on the war and a good picture gallery. worth a
look.

Outstanding site, with a vast amount of information on all U.K. elite units of the past and
present; some obscure and others well known like the S.A.S. and S.B.S.

Everything you wanted to know about the Dutch Commandos plus other relevant military
and special operations information. Excellent links page (obviously my site is there). This is
a most see site.

This is the most extensive site and probably the only one of its type on the web. As you sift
through this site you realize just how much influence the British military has had over the
worlds military organizations, especially in the "bush wars" arena; again the Brits set the
standard!

This is an interest site about the elite German Special Forces. Has pages on training and
RELATED LINKS
equipment, also a fine links page.

This is a tribute site to the famous South African parachute battalion, "PARABAT". The site
has excellent pictures and stories of this fascinating airborne unit.

This site has a healthy dose of hard to find items plus all the Rhodesian apparel one would
want, from hats to pull-overs.

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This site index provides easy access and reference to all major pages within this site,
or you can use the site search engine to find specific information.

Search for:

ADVANCE TRACKING TECHNIQUES
AFRICAN TRACK COUNT
AMBUSHING OF TERRORIST
ANTI-AMBUSH DEVICES
APPENDIX ONE
APPENDIX TWO
APPENDIX THREE
APPENDIX FOUR
APPENDIX FIVE
APPENDIX SIX
ATTACKS ON TERRORIST CAMPS
AWARD RECIPIENTS AND K.I.A.
BIG GAME BUSHCRAFT TIPS FOR SCOUTS
BOX METHOD
BUSH TRACKING AND COUNTER-TRACKING
BUSHCRAFT PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
BUSHCRAFT TACTICAL
COIN (COUNTER-INSURGENCY) PREFACE
COMBAT TRACKING TECHNIQUES
COMMAND AND CONTROL
CONCLUSION
COUNTERING LANDMINES
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN RHODESIA
CROSS GRAIN AND 360 METHODS
DAVID SCOTT-DONELAN
DEDICATION
DEFENSE
DIAGRAM
DIAGRAM
DRAKE SHOOT / COVER SHOOT
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OPERATIONS
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K.I.A.
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OTHER
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EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
END NOTES
EQUIPMENT
EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
FIREFORCE PART ONE
FIREFORCE PART TWO
FIREFORCE OPERATIONS
FOLLOW-UP OPERATIONS
FOOT PATROLS
FREDERICK COURTENEY SELOUS
FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE RHODESIAN AWARDS
GALLERY AUDIO AND VIDEO
GALLERY FOUR
GALLERY ONE
GALLERY THREE
GALLERY TWO
GENERAL ELEMENTS
GREYS SCOUTS
HOME
INDEX.HTM
INSIGNIA
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
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INTRODUCTION RHODESIAN COIN MANUAL
MERCS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS
MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS
MOVEMENT SECURITY
OPERATIONS
OTHER RHODESIAN ELITE
OVERCOMING TRACKING PROBLEMS
PAMWE CHETE
POLITICAL OVERVIEW
PSEUDO MODUS OPERANDI
PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS
PSEUDO TERRORIST GANG
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
R.F. REID-DALY
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RHODESIAN ARMOURED CORPS (RAC) "BLACK DEVILS"
RHODESIAN ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY 1972-1979 PT.1
RHODESIAN ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY 1972-1979 PT.2
RHODESIAN ARMY
RHODESIAN COIN MANUAL
RHODESIAN INSURGENCY PART ONE
RHODESIAN INSURGENCY PART TWO
RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY (RLI) (COMMANDO)
RHODESIAN SELOUS SCOUTS
RHODESIAN SPECIAL AIR SERVICE (SAS) (MALAYAN SCOUTS)
RURAL TRACKING OPERATIONS
SCOUTING FOR DANGER
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SELOUS SCOUTS
SELOUS SCOUTS 1974 - 1980
SELOUS SCOUTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION
SELOUS SCOUTS, FOXHOUNDS, BEACONS AND TRANSMITTERS
SITE INDEX
SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
SWEEPS
T.A.L. DOZER
THE CONCEPT
THE FORMATION OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS
THE SELOUS SCOUTS
TRACK SIGNS
TRACKING; THE FOLLOW-UP
TRACKING
TRACKING AND COUNTER-TRACKING
TRACKING FOR SURVIVAL
TRACKING TERRS / GUERRILLAS
TYPES OF OPERATIONS
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LESSONS OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS
UNIFORMS
UNIT PROFILE
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VEHICLES
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T.A.L. DOZER
THE WEBMASTER FOR THIS SITE; THE SELOUS SCOUTS
Let me tell you a little about myself and this web site. First I'm not a former Selous Scout
or even a former Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) citizen. I am a American. I am currently serving
in the U.S. Army Special Forces at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, USA. I've been actively
serving in special operations units or special operation capable units my whole career of
fourteen years, hoping for twenty (not likely).
This web site came about for two reasons; one I bought my
self Microsoft FrontPage 2000, an began my never ending
journey of trying to master this awesome program. Which is
quite hard when you are computer illiterate, like myself. I
have done about three sites to date, all were basically test
shots to see how far along I came in understanding the fine
art of HTML 4. Now that feel pretty comfortable with code, I
decided I was ready to start a site, that would hopefully be
worth a shit.
The second reason is that I am what you would consider an armchair military historian with
a interest in unconventional warfare (go figure). I also am a avid tracker (military trained
and a graduate of the Malaysian man-tracker school and Tactical Tracking Operations
School). With those interest it should be easy to understand why I decided to do a tribute
site to the Selous Scouts.
The Selous Scout were definitely a organization ahead of there time. With many lessons to
be learned by elite units the world over. They were expert bushmen, master trackers and
fine-tuned pseudo operations to an art and science. They were truly hunters of a caliber
F.C. Selous would have been proud of.
"PAMWE
T.A.L. DOZER
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K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
Well for a final note. If you have any questions or information on the Selous Scouts feel
free to E-mail me at the link below or use the guest book. I do not claim to be a subject
matter expert on the scouts, but I do have quite a bit of information on them (all obtained
from open sources.). Also if you find something not properly credited / footnoted to
someone let me know so I can update the site. Well that's all I have.
T.A.L. "Dozer"
E-MAIL ME

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Fr eder i c k Cour t eney Sel ous D.S.O.
1851 - 1917
Big Game Hunter, Adventurer, Explorer, Pioneer, Scout
Mighty hunters, Dutch and English, roamed across the land on
foot and on horseback, alone or guiding the huge white-topped
ox-wagons; several among their number wrote with power and
charm of their adventures; and at the very last the man arose who
could tell us more of value than any of his predecessors."
Mr. Selous is the last of the big game hunters of Southern
Africa; the last of the mighty hunters whose experience lay in the
greatest hunting ground which this world has seen since civilized
man has appeared herein.
Theodore Roosevelt
The White House
May 23, 1907

"PAMWE
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K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
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RHODESIAN
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RESOURCES
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DAVID SCOTT-DONELAN
David Scott-Donelan was a career soldier with almost three decades of
active duty in the war zones of Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique and
South-West Africa/Namibia.
Enlisting in the Army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1961,
Scott-Donelan was one of the original members of the resuscitated 'C'
Squadron (Rhodesia) Special Air Service (SAS), where he was introduced
to the concepts of irregular warfare and tactical tracking by Allan Savory, a
game ranger known for his innovative and successful concepts in hunting
down heavily armed elephant and rhino poachers.
In 1968, Scott-Donelan was posted to the new Tracker Combat Unit (TCU),
commanded by Allan Savory, with the mission of tracking down and
annihilating Communist trained and equipped nationalist insurgents
infiltrating the Rhodesian border from Zambia and Mozambique. He went on to command the TCU and was
responsible for the selection and training of expert trackers for the unit which was beginning to make a name for
itself on operations. In 1974, the TCU was absorbed by an innovative, new, counter-insurgency unit known as
the Selous Scouts and Scott-Donelan was posted to the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI). The RLI was heavily
involved in helicopter and airborne operations against armed and dangerous terrorist gangs infiltrating Rhodesia
in ever increasing numbers. After several years of non-stop action, he served as an intelligence officer at a
Brigade Headquarters (HQ) and Combined Operations HQ, Rhodesia's equivalent to the Pentagon. Frustrated
with staff duties, he agitated for a transfer to the Selous Scouts and was appointed Officer Commanding Training
Group which included the Tracking and Bush Survival School, the notorious "Wafa Wafa", on the shores of Lake
Kariba.
In 1980, due to intense political pressure from the USA, Britain and the UN; Rhodesia, after never having lost a
battle, lost the war and became the Republic of Zimbabwe.
Joining the South African Special Forces in 1980 as a member of 5 Reconnaissance Regiment, Scott-Donelan
commanded the Regiment's Developmental Wing which was responsible for establishing a complete training and
operational resource base as well as conducting training programs for several guerrilla armies. Five years later,
he was seconded to the South-West-Africa Territorial Force as Company Commander and responsible for
operations against the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, which was infiltrating into South-West-
Africa/Namibia from Angola and Zambia.
Immigrating to the USA in 1989, Scott-Donelan is now the Training Director of the Nevada based Tactical
Tracking Operations School and trains law enforcement, corrections and military personnel in the same tracking
techniques which proved so successful against armed and dangerous fugitives in Africa.

***NOTE*** This bio was taken from Scott-Donelan's site; TACTICAL TRACKING OPERATIONS SCHOOL. The original can be seen there.

"PAMWE
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL REID-DALY

Rhodesian-born Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid Daly joined the army in 1951 when he
volunteered to fight, with C (Rhodesia) Squadron of the British SAS, against
communist rebels in Malaya. After transferring to the Rhodesian Army he worked his
way up through the ranks and became a Regimental Sergeant-Major.
In 1973, as a captain, Reid -Daly was
persuaded by General Walls, the chief of the
Rhodesian Army, to form an elite special
forces unit that was urgently needed to combat
the growing threat posed by nationalist
guerrillas.
Drawing on his Malayan experiences Reid
Daly built up a skilled and highly professional
regiment from scratch, but though it performed
magnificently in the field, its unorthodox
methods won him few friends in the regular
army.
Reid Daly had several brushes with the
military authorities, and in 1979 he was court-
marshaled for insubordination after being
involved in a blazing public row with his
superior, Lieutenant-General John Hickman. A
minor reprimand was issued and Reid Daly, no
longer able to count on the unqualified support
of his fellow officers, resigned.
In November 1979 the command of the Selous
Scouts was handed over to Lieutenant-Colonel Pat
Armstrong and Reid Daly ended his association with the regiment he had worked so hard
to create.

By Peter Stiff

"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
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SELOUS SCOUTS REGIMENT
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(Above) Two Selous Scouts on patrol some
were along the Zambezi River. Scouts are
armed with the R4 (FN FAL), wearing the
traditional "bush shorts" and webbing.
Note that these scouts are cleanly shaven,
quite rare.
In 1967 during Operation Nickel and
Operation Cauldron, the two initial terrorist
incursions into Rhodesia, the need became
apparent in the Army for the services of
skilled, aggressive trackers. To fill this
need, a small team of instructors under the
aegis of the School of Infantry, set up a
tracking school at Kariba. With the
commencement of Op Hurricane in
December 1971 the requirement for even
more trackers was forcibly revealed and to
overcome the shortage it was decided to
form a tracking unit. The Tracking School,
or Takkie Wing as it was known formed
the nucleus of the new unit and was named
the Selous Scouts.
The Selous Scouts is an
entirely integrated multiracial
unit comprised of African
Regular and both Territorial
and Regular European
Soldiers, all of whom are
volunteers required to pass a
selection course to gain entry.
The members of the Unit
enjoy a special and possibly
unique relationship, which has
resulted in the Units
numerous successes, many of
which will never be officially
chronicled. Where possible
the customs of both races are
incorporated into the Unit life
and parade procedures. For
example the normal Infantry
(Above) Osprey bird of prey, in its stylized "striking"
pose. This was the adopted insignia for the scouts, it
was most recognized when worn on their brown beret,
it could also be found on the stable belt when in
garrison or parade.
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
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GUESTBOOK
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colors are dispensed with and
a Standard is carried in lieu.
The Standard fits the African
custom of totems and its
symbolic significance is more
easily understood.
(Below Left) A scout "blackened-up" with a black
knit watch cap, from a distance this gave the
impression that he was a African and not from the
"White Tribe". This scout wears a pair of "Takkies",
modified pro-hockey shoes.
The Unit Barracks at Inkomo, near
Salisbury is named after the founder
member of the Unit, Sergeant Andre
Rabie who was an outstanding soldier
and a particularly skilled tracker. He
pioneered many new techniques in
terrorist hunting with outstanding
success. He was killed on operations.
The Regimental colours are green and
brown which are the basic and
dominant colours of the Rhodesian
bush. The Unit badge is a stylized
Osprey, noted bird of prey ~ swift and
courageous.

The African soldiers have
difficulty pronouncing the
words Selous Scouts and have
abbreviated this to Selousie.

(above) A pair of the famous Selous Scout wings.
(Left) The Standard of the scouts, this was taken by
the scouts in 1980 to South Africa were the RECCEs
have adopted it, in respect to the the Regiment.
(Below) A Selous Scout stops on the follow-up to
confirm ground spoor. The scouts were all superb in
bushcraft and combat tracking.
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RHODESIAN WARFARE BY A SHOESTRING
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RHODESIAN WARFARE BY A
SHOESTRING
It might surprise some to learn that terrorists (or freedom fighters, depending on
ones point of view) are often equipped with superior, more modern weapons than
the government forces they are fighting. This was certainly true in Rhodesia, where
government troops were also frequently outnumbered by as many as forty-to-one.
Lacking the manpower resources and technology, the Rhodesian Security Forces
(RSF) success in battle after battle against ZIPRA and ZANLA must be attributed to
the following:
1. Superior individual troop training.
2. More involved and direct command structure.
3. Generally shorter and more accessible supply routes.
4. The use of air power.
5. Most importantly, the ability to pick the time and place to initiate contactin
other words, mobility.
The following charts below give a side-by-side comparison of the arsenals of the
Rhodesian Defense Forces and the terrorist organizations, along with the arsenals of
the countries that supported these organizations (commonly referred to as the
frontline states). The defense forces of both Zambia and Mozambique were
directly involved in the fighting between the RSF and terrorist insurgents.
The constant threat of air intervention in the war was something that had to be
considered whenever cross-border incursions were planned. Both Zambia and Mo-
zambique had far larger and more modern Air Forces during the last two years of the
war. Direct intervention would have witnessed results as basic as in a rock fight.
Even had Rhodesia won the air battle, it would have immediately lost the war.
Raids into Mozambique almost always involved contact with FRELIMO, and the
threat of armored intervention by tanks was a likelihood that had to be considered in
all RSF plans.
Rhodesian intelligence had access to ZIPRAs long-term military plans. Developed
by the Russians, these plans called for short-term conventional warfare against the
RSF. Upon conclusion of this phase of the war, ZIPRA would besiege Mugabes
"PAMWE
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EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
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COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
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forces, and ZANLA would find itself unable to offer a defense against a massive
conventional army. Nkomos army was to be supported by Russian-trained and
Russian-advised armored contingents of a least divisional strength.
Rhodesias military units, particularly the Special Forces, could not have carried on
the war without resupply from captured arsenals. The Selous Scouts were entirely
equipped with such weapons; their roll mandated the use of enemy materials of war.
It was a simple matter to resupply with captured equipment, especially ammunition,
when on cross border raids. Weapons of choice, were frequently the enemys own
weapons of war.
The RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade was only available to the enemy, but were
rapidly adopted and used by the RSF. Their land-mines were far superior to the
RSFs World War II types, and there can be little argument that the AK-47 is one of
the finest killing machines ever invented. Captured terrorist weapons were initially
very good barter items with the South African Defense Forces. However, when the
SADF became embroiled in their own war, they were able to capture the same or
similar weapons and no longer had to trade for them.
Cost, of course, is another compelling argument for the use of captured equipment.
Rhodesias lack of foreign exchange was a controlling factor in the planning of mili-
tary operations. For example, the ammunition for the 30mm cannon used in the
Hawker Hunter jet, cost $12.00 (Rhodesian currency) per round, which translated to
$18.00 U.S. per round of ammunition. The Hunter aircraft carried four Aden 30mm
cannons, each cannon firing 1,200 to 1,400 rounds per minute (rpm). The actual cost
of this ammunition became a critical factor in military planning. Here was a unique
situation for Rhodesia, a war material readily available but very expensive.
As an interesting aside, it might be noted that the pilots skill was such that single
round kills on non-armored vehicles were documented. One Hunter pilot from Texas
where else? boasted of his shooting prowess, resulting in a rather sizeable bet
concerning his ability. The intrepid young man bet that he could hit a garbage can
from his Hunter with one round. The can was placed in the middle of a clearing at
the range outside Que-Que. The pilot took off from Thornhill, and his deed was as
good as his word. The can was bronzed, and kept on display in the Officers Mess.
The following tables below are not exhaustive, for many subtypes of weapons were
used in the Rhodesian War. However, they do show the dominant types and will give
you an overview of the weapons used.

SELECTED ARMAMENT COMPARISON
RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES TERRORIST/GUERRILLAS
SMALL ARMS - HANDGUNS
Star 9mm (Spain) Scorpion (Czechoslovakia) 32. ACP
Browning Hi-Power 9mm (Belgium) Tokarev M1933 7.62mm (Russian)
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Enfield Revolver .38 S&W (British)
SMALL ARMS - SHOTGUNS
Browning 12ga (Belgium)
Greener 12ga (Britain) (1)
NOTE: (1) Issued only to Guard/Territorial units.
SMALL ARMS - SUBMACHINE GUNS
UZI 9mm (Israel) PPSH M1941 7.62mm (Russian)
PPS M1943 7.62mm (Russian)
SMALL ARMS - RIFLES
Lee Enfield No. 4 .303 (Britain) (1) SKS Carbine 7.62x39mm (Russian)
FN (FAL) (R-1) 7.62mm (Rhodesia) AK-47 7.62mm (Russian)
G-3 7.62x51mm (German) AKM 7.62x39mm (Russian)
M-16A1 5.56mm (USA) (2)
NOTE: (1) Used only by reserves or second echelon troops. (2) Received in limited numbers toward the
end of the war. Used by Special Forces only.
SMALL ARMS - SNIPER RIFLES
Lee Enfield Mk4 .303 (Britain) Mosin-Nagant 7.62x54mm (Russian)
Bron 7.62x51mm (Czechoslovakia) (1) Dragunov (SVD) 7.62x54mm (Russian)
NOTE: (1) These were commercial rifles modified to military specifications for accuracy and durability.
SMALL ARMS - LIGHT MACHINE GUNS
Bren 7.62x51mm (Britain) (5) RPD Degtyarev 7.62x39mm (Russian)
MAG58 7.62x51mm (Belgium) (1) RPK 7.62x39mm (Russian) (2)
Browning M1919A1 7.62x51mm (USA)
(3)
DP Degtyaryova 7.62x54mm (Russian) (4)
NOTE: (1) Basic LMG in RSF, usually one LMG per 4-man stick. (2) The RPK may be the finest LMG in
use at that time. (3) Converted from 30/06 caliber weapons used primarily as a vehicle mounted weapon.
(4) Seen early in the war, replaced by RPD and RPK. (5) These were originally cambered in .303 caliber.
SMALL ARMS - HEAVY MACHINE GUNS
Browning M2 .50cal (USA) (1) DShK Degtyarev 12.7mm (Russian) (2)
KPV 14.5mm (3)
ZU-23 23mm (Russian) (4)
NOTE: (1) Used on vehicles only, very few in RSF. (2) Used to defend training camps, very seldom
brought into Rhodesia. (3) This is the most powerful machine gun in the world. Found in training camps
only. The RSF used many of these guns after capture from the terrorists. (4) This is not really a HMG or a
cannon, but has been encountered on external raids into Mozambique and Zambia were they were being
employed in the air and ground role.
SMALL ARMS - ROCKETS
RPG-2 80mm (China) (1)
RPG-7 85mm (Russian) (2)
NOTE: (1) The RPG-2 was encountered early in the war. The RPG-7 a more effective device, was more
predominate. (2) One of the terrorists most effective weapons. Used to terrify locals and very effective in
ambushes. Also used to great effect in farm raids.
ARTILLERY
25 Pounder 88mm (Britain)
Pack Howitzer M56 105mm (Britain) (1)
NOTE: (1) These weapons were issued to Territorial troops/units only.
ARMOURED VEHICLES / TANKS
Eland Armoured Car 90mm (South
Africa) (1)
T-34/85 85mm (Russian) (2)
T-54 100mm (Russian) (3)
NOTE: (1) This was the most accurate cannon in the RSF arsenal. It should be understood that the terrorist
RPG-2 and RPG-7 rockets could destroy the Eland easily, as could their 12.7mm and 14.5mm machine
guns. (2) The Rhodesian terrorist did not have tanks. But the FRELIMO in Mozambique did and they
attempted to use them against the RSF on cross border raids. (3) This model tank was in use by FRELIMO
in Mozambique. The Russians had stock piled this tank in large quantities in Zambia, for issue to ZIPRA
when their troops had been trained to operate them. This was to begin the conventional type war against the
Rhodesians.
AIRCRAFT
Hawker Hunter (Britain) Mikoyan MIG-17 (Russian) (1)
DeHavilland Vampire (Britain) (3) Mikoyan MIG-21 (Russian) (1) (2)
Canberra Mk8 (Britain) (4)
Cessna 337 Lynx (USA) (5)
Dakota C-47 (USA) (6)
NOTE: (1) The Rhodesian terrorist did not have aircraft. However, the "frontline" countries did, and there
was a constant threat of their use. (2) The FRELIMO had an estimated 47 MIG-21 aircraft and Zambia had
at least 48 MIG-21 and 24 MIG-17 fighters. The Rhodesian Air Force had 26 Hunter aircraft and 12
Vampires. These totals are misleading as there were never anywhere this many available, due to the lack of
spare parts. (3) This was the first operational jet made in England. The Vampire was put into service
immediately after WWII. This aircraft at one time was used by more countries than any other jet fighter.
However, Rhodesia's were very old and tired, and they were used only in dire emergencies. (4) These
Aircraft were in very poor condition, and spare parts almost impossible to come by. The RSF derated the
performance of these aircraft considerably. Particularly as related to top speed. In 1976, Rhodesia had only
10 of these aircraft, but several were used as spares. (5) This aircraft was very unpopular with the
Rhodesian pilots. At the altitudes and weights they were operating at in Rhodesia, the plane would not fly
on one engine. (6) This aircraft, as in many other parts of the world, was the work horse of the RSF.
HELICOPTERS
Alouette III (France) (1)
Bell 205 UH-1D Huey (USA) (2)
NOTE: (1) Without the Alouette it is safe to say that Rhodesia could not have waged the war as
successfully as she did. (2) Without this helo the raids that were carried out toward the end of the war, in
neighboring countries would not have taken place.

(NOTE) The information for this page was obtained from the book "Red Zambezi" by Joe Hale.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY IN RHODESIA.
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COUNTERINSURGENCY
IN
RHODESIA
By Captain James K. Bruton Jr., US Army Reserve
The Rhodesian army has been called the worlds finest counterinsurgency force. The
author had occasion to visit Rhodesia and study its military structure, training and
tactics. His opinion is that Rhodesia has the necessary manpower to counter the
insurgency, but a shortage of funds limits the expansion of the training base and
other programs. This article was written in the fall of 1978. Portions of the article
may have been overtaken by events 8uch as the change in governments on 31
December 1978, but, on the whole, this piece represents one mans opinion of what
is happening in Rhodesia today.

The Rhodesian army has been called the worlds finest counterinsurgency force.
Although branded as an outlaw nation and constricted by United Nations-imposed trade
sanctions, the Rhodesians have responded to the threat of a Marxist-directed terrorist war
with determined resiliency and astounding ingenuity.
This nations eclectic applications of the principles of war are embedded in the training
system and reflected in tactical operations. Rhodesias improvisations include the use of a
horse-mounted infantry unit, the deployment of austere bush wise, long-range tracking
teams, insertions of quick-reaction forces in operational jumps, protected movement
afforded by hideous looking, mine-protected armored vehicles and an assortment of locally
manufactured weapons.
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
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GUESTBOOK
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T.A.L. DOZER

Soldiers seeking information from tribesmen in the Tribal
Trust Lands (TTL).
Rhodesias counterinsurgency doctrine has been influenced specifically by the armys
experience as part of the British Commonwealth forces in Malaya and, in general, by the
study of revolutionary movements in Africa. This doctrine can be broken down into six
points:
Popular support or fighting a war for people, not for terrain. This is sought through
the maintenance of government services administered by the Internal Affairs branch.
Protection of the populace from terrorist harassment through the establishment of
protected villages guarded by special guard troops.
Predominant reliance on local police intelligence and operations as the means of
maintaining civil order.
Coordination of combined operations between civilian and military services at district
and
Continuous small unit tactical operations using observation posts, patrolling,
ambushes and tracking conducted by highly mobile forces who spend extended periods in
the bush.
Surprise cross-border raids on terrorist training camps within their sanctuary areas of
Zambia and Mozambique.
Most significant in instilling the tactical applications derived from the doctrine is the
Rhodesian training system. This system generates a steady flow of officers,
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers into the force structure while continually
advancing their professional development. A proficient leadership cadre is seen as an
essential requirement in any counterinsurgency effort.
Critics who see the Rhodesian war as a racial struggle are often surprised upon
discovering that three-quarters of the Security Forces are African, with blacks and whites
fighting side by side, and that most businesses, restaurants, hotels, discotheques and the
national university are multiracial as well.
(1)

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Troopers from the Rhodesian African Rifles on patrol in
the unforgiving bush.
The majority of Rhodesias African population of six to seven million are farmers and
craftsmen living in the Tribal Trust Lands. The towns and cities support a growing African
middle class.
This group and the 265,000 Europeans, who have held key positions in the government,
in the military and police units and in the commercial sector, have the capability of
providing the social and political leadership needed to administer the country.
In March 1978, Prime Minister Ian Smith, representing the strongest party of the
European population, the Rhodesian Front Party, concluded a settlement with three of the
moderate African nationalist leaders. These are Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, the Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole and Senator Chief Jeremiah Chirau who, with Prime Minister Smith,
form the provisional Executive Council. An interim government filled by both African and
European officials is preparing for national elections scheduled in December. On 31
December 1978, power will be transferred to a black parliamentary majority government.
Rhodesia then will officially become Zimbabwe (the traditional African name).
Opposed to the evolvement of such moderate leadership with concomitant support of the
whites, the Marxist-directed Patriotic Front (PF), under the doctrines of revolutionary
warfare, has been conducting a campaign of terrorism and subversion to gain ascendancy
within Rhodesia. Recent targets of the terrorists have been the moderate black party leaders
and their supporters.
(2)

Out on the "follow-up", two Selous Scouts read a
group of "terrs" spoor, while the rear scout covers
them.
The importance of Rhodesia to the West is both moral and strategic. Morally, the
realization of a multiracial government based on British parliamentary procedure and
English common law, and committed to a liberal capitalist society, can serve as a needed
model of stability and growth on a continent suffering from a shortage of democracies and
an excess of repressive oneparty states administering stagnant economies.
(3)
Strategically, Rhodesia is a minerally rich area contiguous to an even richer area. It is a
leading supplier of asbestos, beryllium, chromium, copper, lithium, magnesium and nickel.
It is a dagger pointed at the Republic of South Africa, with its strategic geographic
significance, as well as its resources of platinum, chrome ore, gold, diamonds, uranium and
copper. Furthermore, both countries have vast food potential.
Rhodesia has become the prime target within the Soviet Unions strategy of liberating
Southern Africa through the use of surrogate forcesnamely, indigenous terrorist
organizations such as the Patriotic Front and the South-West Africa Peoples Organization,
trained and supported by advisers and technicians from Soviet bloc nations and Cuba.
(4)
Intelligence reports link the planning and orchestration for the Patriotic Front to an African
veteran and top KGB (Committee of State Security) man, Soviet Ambassador
Solodnovnikov, who is stationed in Lusaka, Zambia.
(5)
Rhodesia was founded in 1890 as a British colony by a minerals magnate, Cecil
Rhodes. It was administered under a Royal Charter granted to the British South Africa
Company.
This early period saw longstanding hostility erupt into war between the warlike
Matabele and the more peaceful Mashona tribal groups, followed by a rebellion of the
Matabeles and then the Mashonas against the white settlers. Upon completion of peace
negotiations between the settlers and the tribesmen, the administrative and economic
foundations were established for the development of modern-day Rhodesia. When the
Royal Charter expired in 1923, Rhodesia became a self-governing colony of Great Britain.
In both world wars, Rhodesia contributed its share of men, both black and white, to the
imperial British forces.
(6)


Another famous unit of trackers; Greys Scouts.
Specializing in pursuit operations.
During the 1960s, Britain began granting independence one by one to its former African
colonies. After a complicated dispute with the London government on the constitutional
question about the speed toward black majority rule, Rhodesia, under Prime Minister Ian
Smith, proclaimed its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November
1965.
(7)
Britain retaliated with a trade embargo, and, in 1968, it persuaded the United Nations to
impose mandatory economic sanctions to bring an end to the rebellion against the
Crown.
(8)
Subsequent talks between British and Rhodesian representatives to resolve the
matter have been unsuccessful.
Origins of the current terrorist organization go back to legal African nationalist
movements in the 1950s. Civil disturbances by militant elements of some African
nationalist parties broke out in several African townships in 1961. Because of political
violence, two parties, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU), were banned, their leaders arrested and their remnants
scattered in exile in neighboring countries.
During this period, ZANU and ZAPU cadre began to receive military and political
training in Tanzania from the Chinese. Small teams conducted incursions into the northeast
from Mozambique and the northwest from Zambia from 1966 to 1972.
The terrorists, in groups of six to 10 men, attacked mainly farmhouses, abducted black
workers, ambushed lone vehicles or planted mines. Rhodesian Security Forces encountered
little difficulty in tracking down and killing or capturing most of these terrorists.
As a briefing officer of the Cornbined Operations Headquarters in Salisbury described
the situation:
From 1970 onwards ZAPU played no part in the terrorist war. They were in a state of
disarray following their decisive defeats within Rhodesia, and they took the opportunity of
consolidating their position by sending their terrorists, outside the country, on extended
courses to Russia, Cuba, and North Korea. This situation as regards ZAPU continued until
1976. ZANU took time out to re-think the tactical lessons that they had learnt. At this time,
we saw increasing Chinese Communist influence with ZANU.... The most significant
development was that ZANU learnt the lessons of Mao Tse Tung, namely, that it was
pointless to operate in remote areas without the support of the local population.
(9)
However, ZANU guerrilla attacks intensified toward the end of 1972. A coup in Lisbon,
Portugal, in April 1974, brought about a change for the better for the ZANU. The new
Portuguese government negotiated with the Marxist guerrilla movement in Mozambique
(FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front)) to give independence to its former colony.
The FRELIMO not only gave complete sanctuary to the Rhodesian terrorists and permitted
establishment of training camps, but also placed vehicles, railways and ships at their
disposal.
(10)
Rhodesia, which is about the size of California, now faced what was to become a four-
front war: ZANU incursions in the northeast and eastern highlands from Mozambique,
terrorist attacks in the northwest by the ZAPU and limited terrorism and recruiting mainly
by the ZAPU along the western border with Botswana. Only 225 miles of border, that with
South Africa, remained that could be called friendly toward Rhodesia.
The ZANU, under the titular leadership of Robert Mugabe, a declared Marxist, allied
itself in 1976 with the ZAPU faction under Joshua Nkomo to form the Patriotic Front.
Chinese advisory and logistical support appears to have been withdrawn from Mozambique
camps, if not from Tanzania. Soviet, Cuban and, reportedly, East German support remains.
ZANU camps are based in Mozambique, while the ZAPU continues to operate out of
Zambia and sometimes Botswana.
The Patriotic Front is a marriage of convenience. The ZAPU derives most of its support
from the Matabele tribal groups in the west; the ZANU from the Mashona groups in the
east. Both factions are wracked with internecine power struggles.
At the time of this writing, the ZAPU is trying to expand its influence to the east, and
the ZANU is pushing to the west. Armed clashes between the two organizations have been
reported.
(12)
Both terrorist leaders thus far have declined invitation to participate in the December
elections. Nkomo and Mugabe are not interested in power-sharing nor in black majority
rule in and of itself, but, rather, in total power with which to affect the revolutionary
transformation of society under their aegis. In free elections, many doubt whether Nkomo
and Mugabe together could win 15 percent of the vote, hence the resort to gun-barrel
politics.
Should international pressures cause the current governmental structure of white and
moderate black administration to collapse and the Patriotic Front to assume power, the
underlying tribal animosities could easily trigger the bloodiest conflagration in Africa since
the Nigerian Civil War.
The PF strategy is to undermine government control over the population in three ways.
First is disruption of internal administration and governmental services. In the vast Tribal
Trust Lands and African townships, health clinics, medical stations, local council offices,
cattle dips and schools, as well as missionaries, have been prime targets.
(13)
Government
spokesmen acknowledge that while no part of Rhodesia has been given up, there are areas
where the government has difficulty maintaining its presence.
The second part of PF strategy is complete intimidation of the populace through the use
of murder, mayhem and savage barbarism. The terrorists seek to hide among the people to
recruit support and to resupply themselves. They attempt to neutralize government
intelligence and anti-PF sentiment. The terrorist strikes, therefore, focus on soft civilian
targets. One objective is to break down the traditional tribal authority, with its implied
replacement, ultimately by some new form of social organization. The other objective is to
demonstrate government inability to provide security.
While insurgent attacks on white civilian establishments, including International Red
Cross teams, missionaries and commercial airliners, receive most of the attention in the
world press, around 90 percent of the terrorist victims are black.
Reports document mass killings of African workers, abduction of school children,
incidents of enforced cannibalism, the public torture and execution of village headmen and
others randomly selected as sellouts to the Smith regime, mining of civilian road traffic
and urban terrorism. While an overwhelming majority of Africans resent terrorist
intrusions, many remain cowed by the terrorist threat.
The third part of PF strategy is to render the entire counterinsurgency effort of
government cost-ineffective. Attacks on farmers have caused approximately 10 percent to
abandon their farms.
Distribution services, affecting the sales volume of many manufacturing industries, have
been severely curtailed as a result of guerrilla activity.... Distribution has collapsed
completely in much of the former sales area, causing a severe cutback in turnover and
profit margins.
(14)
The decline in farming and commercial activity has reduced the government tax base,
while the cost of fueling the military machine is increasing. The war effort, along with the
economic sanctions, is costing Rhodesia over one million dollars a day.
The war against soft civilian targets has mobilized Rhodesia into an armed camp.
Security alarm fences guard farmhouses, police convoys protect vehicular movement in the
countryside, women become adept at handling pistols and Uzi submachine guns and many
camouflage-uniformed soldiers remain armed while in the otherwise normal-looking cities
of Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali. Most men of the European population from 18 to 50
are subject to varying lengths of military or police commitments.
The Security Forces conducting the counterinsurgency include roughly 40,000 persons
in the air force, the police and the army, whose total strength approximates that of a full
division. The army is composed of regular units and Territorial Army units.
The backbone of the counterinsurgency effort is represented by battalions from two
regular infantry regiments: the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and the Rhodesian African
Rifles (RAR). The entire RLI and most of the RAR are airborne qualified. Most European
regulars volunteers with contracts of three years or moreare assigned to the RLI. Most
African regulars are posted to the RAR, Rhodesias senior regiment.
The 1st Battalion, Rhodesian Light Infantry, is organized along commando lines. It
consists of three company-size units called Commandos and a support group with
mortar, reconnaissance and tracking detachments. Trained to operate either as small teams,
as separate commandos or as an integral battalion, the RLI has the general mission of
following up suspected terrorist presence or of backing up other troops in contact.
Volunteers for the RLI receive their 16 weeks of recruit training within the regiment and
undergo continuous unit training within their respective Commando. Normally, RLI units
spend a month to six weeks in the bush and 20 days in their camp south of Salisbury for
rest and retraining.
By any standard, the Rhodesian African Rifles is an elite unit. As there are on a weekly
basis far more African volunteers than positions to fill, the RAR recruits are handpicked.
Six months of basic training at the depot RAR in Balla Balla cover both conventional and
counter-insurgency tactics intensively and extensively. The newly trained soldiers are
assigned to subunits within the regiment.
A rigid selection system in the RAR produces candidates for junior and senior NCO
training courses. Officer candidates are likewise selected from among the NCOs. RAR
units are farmed out to the operational commands for security missions, for seek-and-
destroy operations or for area wide reaction force contingencies.
The Territorial Army corresponds to the US National Guard or Army Reserves. It is
filled by national servicemen who, as opposed to regulars, enter the army with an 18-month
initial commitment, followed by periodic call ups thereafter.
Following four and a half months of basic training at Llewellin Barracks, the majority
of these men are assigned to one of the battalions of the Rhodesian Regiment (RR) or to
independent companies where they serve their initial tour. Some are selected to serve in a
specialist unit or a Service Corps unit. Completing their 18-month requirement, the
territorials are then assigned to a reserve RR battalion at a center near their homes where
they train and serve during their call ups.
The constant retraining and the maintenance of unit integrity results in a high
experience level for the Territorial Army. The RR battalions now assume as active a
combat role as do the regular battalions.
Specialist units, those with unique combat specialties, include the Rhodesian Armored
Corps (RAC), the Artillery Regiment, the Greys Scouts, the Selous Scouts and the Special
Air Service (SAS). Formerly known as the Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment, the RAC
fulfills an armored cavalry mission. It possesses antitank capability and usually functions
with its sub elements assigned to operational commands for task organization. The corps
represents a unit approximately regimental size along with an armored car training center.
Armored car operational techniques are influenced by US, British, German and South
African doctrine and experience.
Officers, NCOs and soldiers of the RAC all have had infantry training, followed by
armored car training in the corps depot. Drivers, gunners and vehicle commanders are
cross-trained in others skills and in vehicle maintenance as well.
Particulars about most of the armored vehicles are classified. Generally, their design
protects the occupants from mine blasts which damage little more than the tire.
As with the armored troops, the gunners of the 1st Field Regiment Rhodesian Artillery
are trained first as infantry. Using 88mm gun howitzers and heavier pieces (which are
classified), the batteries are oriented to both the conventional and counterinsurgency
requirements.
The Greys Scouts are a mounted infantry unit about battalion size that specializes in
tracking and pursuit.
(
There are few places in Rhodesias highveld and lowveld that horses
cannot go, and horses are more silent than army lorries or land rovers.
The Greys are deployed in the operational areas by squadron. A squadron (roughly
equivalent to a company) is made up of three troops (roughly equivalent to platoons), each
with four eight-man sections. The Greys Scouts consist of three saber (combat)
squadrons and a support squadron containing a 60mm and 81mm mortar section, a
reconnaissance troop and a tracking dog troop using mostly English foxhounds.
With better visibility and faster mobility, an eight-man section can cover the same
ground as a foot-bound infantry battalion. This section, working in two teams of four, can
advance on a 550-meter front. Sometimes when closing in on fleeing terrorists, the Greys
radio for heliborne reinforcement of a fireforce for mopping up operations.
Most soldiers in Greys Scouts are selected from recruits who undergo basic training
with the RU. They then receive 16 additional weeks of training, including horsemanship,
with the Greys at Inkomo Barracks, north of Salisbury.
The Selous Scouts have become legendary during their short existence.
(16)
They
basically are a 300-man tracking unit, about half African, half European, who can travel
and survive in the bush for extended periods on limited rations. The Selous generally work
from friendly lines forward. In pursuit of terrorists, they also radio for reinforcement, if
required.
Their selection course is rough. Every eight months, up to 400 trained soldiers may be
screened to select about 100 candidates for the arduous training course. Of these, only one-
sixth will complete a four-week endurance and survival course, with constant deprivation
of food and sleep. Once in the unit, the men are prepared literally to follow terrorist spoor
for weeks on end in all types of Rhodesian terrain while living off the land.
The mission of the Special Air Service is long-range reconnaissance, generally far in
front of and working back toward friendly positions. The SAS has an additional role as a
quick-reaction force and the capability for direct-action missions such as cross-border
operations.
Modeled upon the British SAS, the men of this unit experience the most diversified
training of men in any of the units. Initially, this includes static-line parachuting, light and
heavy weapon training, bushcraft, first aid, communications, watermanship (handling
canoes and boats) and minor SAS tactics. Successful completion of the above just gets the
volunteer into the unit!
From this point on, he has to undergo a series of specialist courses in such subjects as
advanced medical work, demolitions, free-fall parachuting, tracking, aqua-lung diving and
a course in indigenous language. SAS training can take up to three years.
Combat support and combat service support is provided by supporting services. These
include the Service Corps, the Medical Corps, the Military Police, the Pay Corps, the
Rhodesian Womens Service, the Engineers and the Signal Corps.
While the army provides the preponderance of forces in most of the operational areas,
the Rhodesians see their stage-one level of counterinsurgency as essentially a police
operationand correctly so. The terrorists are not treated as a true guerrilla organization,
subject to the Geneva Convention, but as criminal lawbreakers. Evidence concerning
incidents is accumulated, presented in court within established legal procedure and the
defendants sentenced accordingly.
The British South Africa Police have both a regular police role and a paramilitary
function. The Support Units are predominantly African regulars with both police
investigative and bush warfare training. Nicknamed the Blackboots, they operate
nationwide. The Police Antiterrorist Units are predominantly European reservists who
operate on call up within their own locales.
The command and control of operations are exercised from the Combined Operations
Headquarters in Salisbury under one commander to four major JOCs, each of which
incorporates an army brigade headquarters and controls a major operational area.

Under
each major JOC are several mini-JOCs, corresponding with districts.
A JOC is a combined operating center containing representatives of the army, the air
force, the police and Internal Affairs. Sometimes present. are the Special Branch personnel,
the governments intelligence service. The army commander is the senior commander of
the JOC. The various elements of the Security Forces assigned to each operational
command are task-organized for that areas requirements.
Three of the major JOCs each controls a quick-reaction force called a fireforce.
Described by one officer as our best killing machine, the fireforce (comprising regular or
Territorial Army units) is airdropped and/or air-landed by helicopter to reinforce forward
units in contact and to pursue, block and close with terrorist forces.
The government has countered the guerrilla presence by the establishment of protected
villages within the affected areas. The villagers remain in these fenced-in complexes under
a dusk-to-dawn curfew. The villages are protected by a Guard Force unit and administered
by Internal Affairs advisers.
Where terrorist presence or avenues of approach are known, police or army forces
conduct searches, extensive patrolling and ambushes. Attention is directed toward the
populated areas where terrorist incidents are frequent. Very few fire fights develop that are
of the intensity or duration that US troops encountered in Vietnam. This is because the
terrorists, who usually operate in 10 to 15-man sticks at the most, try to avoid contact with
the Security Forces or, failing that, simply flee after a brief skirmish. On the whole, the
Patriotic Fronts freedom fighters are considered neither a well-trained nor a well-
disciplined military force.
The Rhodesian military training system has three distinct features supporting continuous
evolvement of doctrine and tactical application. First is that the three major schools are
staffed by officers and NCOs who rotate to instructor positions from their respective parent
regiments. Between training cycles, these instructors visit the operational units. Thus, vital
feedback channels between the combat realities at the Sharp End and the presentation in
the classroom are maintained.
The second feature is the wealth of experience represented by the instructor cadre
themselves. The instructors backgrounds reflect their diverse experience derived from their
parent units like the RLI, the RAR, the SAS and the Selous Scouts, hence a great amount
of cross-fertilization of ideas.
The third feature is the emphasis in the schools given to producing NCO instructor
cadre. Trained as instructors in specific disciplines, these men return to their units to help
maintain the high level of basic or of continuation training within the units.
The three major schools are the School of Infantry at Gwelo, the Depot RR at Llewellin
Barracks near Bulawayo and Depot RAR in Balla Balla.
The School of Infantry is organized into three training wings: the tactical, the cadet and
the regimental wing. The tactical wing conducts courses in tactics and operations from
junior NCO level up to battalion/brigade level for captains and majors.
(18)
The cadet wing
offers training for both European and African officer candidates who have been selected by
a board. Aside from direct appointment, this school is the only source of army commission.
The regimental wing instructs NCOs in drill and in weapons and has one weapons course
for junior officers.
The school holds that men can actually get rusty in the bush with regard to weapons
handling and training, and require formal retraining. With only 30 officers and 45 NCOs,
the School of Infantry is expected to train up to 3,000 students in 1978.
National servicemen undergo four and a half months of basic training at Llewellin
Barracks. Those selected by a board the first week can go directly into officer cadet or
NCO cadet training. African regular recruits receive six months of basic at the Depot RAR,
Balla Balla, where junior leader courses also are taught for privates and corporals to
advance.
Rhodesian military training places emphasis in four areas: close-order drill, physical and
mental conditioning, marksmanship and immediate-action techniques in conventional and
counterinsurgency situations.
In the British tradition, the Rhodesians see square-bashing, or drill, as the foundation
for discipline, esprit and leadership. The results from the parade field can be seen in the
sharp appearance and impeccable military etiquette reflected throughout the army.
The training for recruits and for officer and NCO cadets is rigorous physically and
mentally. A number of foreign volunteers in the Rhodesian army, including some American
Vietnam veterans, have failed to complete their initial training course successfully or have
eventually taken the gap (deserted). Night-long land navigation exercises, 15 to 20-
kilometer forced marches over difficult terrain in full combat kit and negotiation of an
assault course of 12 or so obstacles, where live fire, smoke and simulators add
verisimilitude, serve to toughen and to instill confidence.
On the rifle range, each recruit fires 800 to 1,000 rounds to perfect his marksmanship.
The FN self-loading rifle is the standard infantrymans weapon.
Seeing classical, conventional war as their long-term threat, the Rhodesians spend 70
percent of their training time on conventional tactics. Thirty percent goes to counter-
insurgency tactics. Counter-insurgency training includes study of terrorist tactics,
patrolling, ambush, vehicular movement in an operational area, organization of patrol
bases, cordon and search operations, attack on terrorist camps, and mounted and
dismounted counter ambush techniques. Field training exercises and tactical exercises
without troops rehearse both conventional and counter-insurgency techniques within a
realistic scenario.
Rhodesias is a performance-oriented army. Instructors assess officer and NCO
performance in the schools to recommend their subsequent assignments to troop leadership
or to administrative positions. One may opt to serve indefinitely in one capacity,
maintaining his present rank, or to advance to a different position for which he is qualified.
In Rhodesias small army, retention of expertise and experience at various levels of
administration and command is preferable to the up-or-out syndrome known to other
armies. However, a qualified, motivated trooper, African or European, can rise to NCO
rank or to commissioned rank in a relatively short time.
To maintain the link between the people and the government, an increasingly large
cadre of administrators, advisers, policemen, technicians, health workers and teachers are
needed.
Rhodesias counter-insurgency effort is definitely hampered not by any manpower
shortage, but by shortage of funds required to expand training facilities and programs. The
survival of Rhodesia as a free, multiracial society hinges on this economic factor rather
than on the fighting ability of the Security Forces. A strained economy with a decreasing
growth rate curtails the expansion of such programs.
If Western nations began lifting sanctions to establish trade and domestic investment
resumed its former level, this broadened base of trade and commercial activity would
enable the government to expand its Internal Affairs activities. Under these favorable
conditions, the insurgency could be overcome within 10 to 18 months.
Many have erroneously counted the survival of Rhodesias present form of government
in just a matter of months: first, after the UDI in 1965, after imposition of UN sanctions in
1968 and again after the Portuguese collapse in Mozambique in 1974. Not considered was
a homogeneous European society, supported by a sizable segment of the African
population, that was willing to tax itself to the limit and to conscript almost its entire
manpower. Also not considered is the most important factor of all in international politics
the sheer force of willwhich Rhodesians have aptly demonstrated over the last 14
years.

FOOTNOTES:
1 In Rhodesian parlance, the term African refers to the indigenous black population. The term European refers to the whites
regardless of national origin or length of family duration in the country.
2 The terms terrorist, guerrilla and insurgent are used interchangeably in the Rhodesian context. Given the brutal attacks on
civilians to break down law and order, the term terrorist is not misapplied.
3 Some of the African states most vociferous in their call for one-man, one-vote black majority rule for Rhodesia are those ruled
by their armies and those with presidents for life.
4 The border area between Angola and South-West Africa, which is administered by the Republic of South Africa, is the scene of
another insurgency. South African forces and South-West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) terrorists based in Angola are
locked in conflict over control of the Ovambo tribal area. Sea Al J Venter, South Africa vs. SWAPO Terrorists, Soldier of Fortune,
November 1978.
5 Count Hans Huyn, Rhodesia and Southern Africa: Decision for the Future of the Free World, Journal of International
Relations, Volume Ill, Spring 1978, p 63.
6 Among these was a farmer named Ian Smith who flaw in the Rhodesian Squadron of the Royal Air Force during World War II.
On one occasion, his Spit fire was shot down behind German lines in Italy. He lived for a time with Italian partisans, than evaded
through German positions to the American lines.
7 For an account of the events leading up to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the British viewpoint, see Robert
Blake, A History of Rhodesia, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., N.Y., 1978.
8 The sanctions had the reverse effect of compelling the Rhodesians to develop local industry to manufacture what had been
imported. From 1968 to 1976, the. economic infrastructure strengthened, minerals and food were exported and the economy
continued to expand.
9 Lieutenant Colonel A. E. H. Lockley, A Brief Operational H/story of the Campaign in Rhodesia Covering the Period
1964-1978. a briefing paper originally drafted in November 1977 and revised subsequently.
10 Ibid.
11 In more precise terminology, the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) end the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union)
refer to political parties. The ZANU cells Its guerrillas the ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) and the ZAPUs
guerrillas are known as the ZIPRA (Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army). Rhodesians regard Nkomos ZIPRA, although the less
active of the two groups, to be better trained.
12 Godwin Matatu, Zimbabwe: A Journey Without Maps, Africa, May 1978, p 12.
13 With 903 schools destroyed, around 218,000 African children have been deprived of education and 4,900 teachers left un-
employed. Cattle are dying by the hundreds due to diminishing veterinary services. See John Maynard, The Forces of War and
Disorder, Illustrated Life Rhodesia. 3 August 1978, p 8.
14 Ibid.
15 Named after Captain George Grey who organized a mounted infantry unit during the 1896 Matabele uprising.
16 Named after F. C. Selous, 19th-century scout and hunter.
17 These operational areas are named Tangent under 1st Brigade (the west and northwest), Hurricane under 2d Brigade (the
northeast), Thrasher under 3d Brigade (the eastern highlands) and Repulse under 4th Brigade (the southeast). There are also two
minioperetional areas: Grapple (the midlands) and Splinter (Lake Kariba).
18 These courses are the junior NCO tactical course; the tactical instructors course for NCOs; the senior NCO tactical course; the
combat team course for training officers to run a company with a background in battalion functions; the joint services counterin-
surgency course on Joint Operations Center operations for army, air force, police and Internal Affairs personnel; the territorial
company commander and platoon leader course; and the battle group commander course for captains and majors, covering battalion
operations, with a background in brigade operations.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Captain James K Bruton Jr., US Army Reserve, is a sales representative for Hilti Inc. He received a B.A. from
Washington and Lee University, a Master of International Management degree from the American Graduate
School, and is a USACGSC graduate. He has served in Korea, Vietnam and Thailand, and in the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Readiness and Intelligence, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine
Command. He is currently mobilization designee to the 3d Battalion, 12th Special Forces Group

***(NOTE)*** Source for this article is from Military Review, Vol. LIX, March 1979, No3, pp 26-39.


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RHODESIAN
ARMOURED CORPS (RAC)
"BLACK DEVILS"

By T. A. L. "Dozer"

BRIEF LINEAGE
Southern Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment - Raised February - 1941
Southern Rhodesian Reconnaissance Car Regiment - 1941-1947
Southern Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment - 1948-1956
Disbanded 1956
Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment (RAC) - Reactivated - 1973-1979
Rhodesian Armoured Corps (RAC) - 1980
Introduction
The Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment (RAC) was originally raised in February 1941 for service in
WWII. Later being disbanded and re-established in 1972 as the Rhodesian Armoured Corps (RAC) to combat
Marxist terrorist in Rhodesias insurgency conflict as an armoured cavalry unit. The RAC represents a unit of
approximately regimental size along with a Armoured car training center.
During this time the unit received this unofficial nickname; Black Devils from the enemy, because of
the distinctive all black jumpsuits worn by the regiment. This uniform was authorized by the regimental
commander to give the elite outfit a unique look.

(Above) RAC white metal cap badge circa 1973-1980.
(Left) The outdated Ferret scout car as used by the RAC.

Mission
The primary function of RAC was as a rapid reaction /deployment contingent, with a secondary mission
in security operations and supporting roles in reconnaissance, patrolling, escort duty, crowd control, and
roadblocks.

RHODESIAN BULLET (IFV)
(Left) Front view of the then prototype
infantry fighting vehicle.
(Above) Right side view. Pictures show no
armament mounted.
(Right) Back view of the low cost Bullet.
Structure and Equipment
The Black Devils organizational structure is loosely comparable to western armored cavalry units. The
Corps consists of four operational armoured squadrons (roughly regimental size), which in turn have four troops.
Three of the squadrons were commanded by a cadre of regular officers and non-commissioned officers, and
manned by territorials who were activated for incremental periods. The fourth squadron was manned as a regular
establishment.
The Black Devils maintained a pool of armoured vehicles of the wheeled variant all of foreign
manufacture, with the exception of a couple. The majority of these vehicles were four-wheel drive, with various
mounted armament of machine guns; either a 50 caliber machine gun, twin Brownings or a 20mm aircraft gun.
The Rhodesians manufactured two additional combat vehicles. The Bullet was a wheeled infantry-
fighting vehicle. It carried a 10-man crew. The vehicle commander was also the squad leader.
The second was the Vaporizer, so named because if it were to hit a landmine it would vaporize. It was a
high-speed dune buggy type vehicle used in the scout/reconnaissance role. This is a good example of the units
ingenuity; it was built upon a light chassis with a fiberglass body. It was manufactured for less than $1500, and
mounted with a 30 or 50 caliber machine gun.

RAC BASIC TABLE OF EQUIPMENT
TYPE QUANTITY ROLE ORIGIN
UR-416 50 (Approximately) Armoured Personnel Carrier West German
Eland 60 Armoured Car France
Ferret 20 Light Scout Car Great Britain
S/90 54 Scout Car South Africa
Vaporizer Unknown Scout/Reconnaissance Rhodesia
Bullet Unknown Infantry-fighting Vehicle Rhodesia
Crocodile Unknown Armoured Transport Rhodesia
RHODESIAN
VAPORIZER
(Left and right) A look
at the high mobility
scout/recon vehicle,
developed in 2 months
for $1500.00 each.
RHODESIAN CROCODILE
(Right) This armoured transport was the
successor to the Puma mine protected
vehicle. This was one of the better
manufactured and developed Rhodesian
concepts. It was designed to be armoured
and mine-proof. At the time of production
all data on the specifications of the
Crocodile was classified.

Tactic and Techniques
The tactics initially used by the RAC reflect its British heritage, and the United Kingdoms association
with NATO. However, as the war progressed, the RAC began to experiment with a blend of tactics incorporated
from German, South Africa, French, and American. The Rhodesians studied these tactics, and modified them to
the terrain and character of an African insurgency.
The Black Devils employed tactic that fell into two major categories:
Tactics against ground troops with possible anti-tank capability.
Tactics against Conventional type Armour thrust
The armour column always moved with the supported mechanized infantry, with one of the elements of
combined arms in support. Air support was used only when absolutely essential. In order to compensate for the
lack of an aerial umbrella, the armoured car units developed a tactical doctrine which emphasized:
movement
Speed
Offensive action
WEAPONS TRAINING
(Left) A Black Devil firing a 50cal. from a 4x4.
(below) Another Black Devil firing twin 30cal.
Brownings.
(Right) Members of the RAC qualified every 10 day
with their weapons and re-zeroed after every
operation.
Selection and Training
The Black Devils only maintained the best leadership and troopies in their field, weather they were
Squadron commander, vehicle commander, drivers or mechanics. All members of RAC our infantry trained and
qualified prior to arrival to the corps depot for armoured car training. The curriculum was done through a 12-
week basic selection and armour car training course, required for all personnel assigned to RAC. After this basic
course they would begin their formal training in their assigned duty. The length of this phase of training
depended on the individuals specialty. In general all the training is rigorous and demanding, physically and
mentally. Upon successful completion of all training troopers are issued their black jumpsuits. Once assigned to
the unit Drivers, gunners, and vehicle commanders our cross-trained in others' skills as well as in vehicle
maintenance.

(Above) Black Devils observe trainees conduct live fire exercises at a secret
training location in Rhodesia.
(Right) Note the Browning twin 30cal, mounted on the 4x4.
Conclusion
Although the Rhodesian Armoured Corp was small and virtually self-reliant, it was a potent force which
included an anti-armour capability. The Rhodesians never possessed tanks, but they had modified a number of
their vehicles to carry anti-armour weapons. Throughout 1978-1979 they became justifiably concerned over the
introduction of approximately 200 T-34, T-54 and T-62 Soviet tanks into Zambia accompanied by Cuban
military advisors. With the introduction of this force into one of the Frontline Nations, Rhodesia received
considerable assistance in upgrading its anti-armour capability from South Africa and possibly Israel. It has been
impossible to define the exact nature of its anti-armour capacity, but both Janes and World Armies speculate
upon the existence of a credible deterrent.
The Black Devils have been reported to achieve contact with insurgent forces in excess of 90% of all
their performed operations. This was impressive, but should be tempered with the knowledge that a squadron
was never committed until military intelligence had established a large concentration of guerrilla forces. This
was due to growing economical restraints, and it became imperative for the Black Devils to monitor cost factors
and economy of force of all operations, to get the best and biggest bang for the buck.

The Rhodesian Armoured Corps (RAC) troopers are issued black jump suits after successful
completion of training. Nicknamed Black Devils By a terrorist radio station in Maputo,
Mozambique, after a highly successful raid.
Bibliography
Stiff, Peter. Taming the Landmine. (1986)
Moore, Robin. Rhodesia. (1977)
Arniel, A.J. Badges and Insignia of the Rhodesian Security Forces 1890-1980. (1987)
Brown, Robert. The Black Devils. (Soldier of Fortune, January 1979)
Lohman, Charles and MacPherson, Robert. Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat. (1983)

ON OPERATIONS
(Above and Right) The Black Devils on operations in the Tribal
Trust Lands (TTL) have porsued "Terrs" to a cluster of huts
formerly ocupied, prior to them being burt to the ground. Note in
the background the huts burning.

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I. Bushcraft Introduction
A. Principles of survival
1. Remain calm
2. Conserve water and rations
3. Evaluate your situation

B. Survival conditions
1. Static survival
2. Non-static survival

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C. Mental and physical aspects of
survival
1. Stress
2. Natural human reactions
3. Preparing yourself

II. Water Procurement
A. Locating water
B. Methods of obtaining water;
1. Digging
2. Dew
3. Vegetation
Aloe species
Bamboo
Ilala palm
Wild cucumber
Spicy cucumber
Horned cucumber
Bitter lemon
4. Stills
Steam
Solar
Vegetation
5. Bush and game indicators
Game / animals
Birds
Insects
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6. Water purification and filtration

III. Food Procurement
A. Survival / energy requirements
B. Edibility test (Plants)
C. Food sources
1. Plant / vegetation
Mushrooms
Grass
Sedge
Ferns
Water lilies
Black Jack
African orange / Sweet monkey orange
Marula tree
Baobab tree
Mabola plum
Wild loquat
Water berry
Donkey berry
Poison brides bush
Common brides bush
Figs
Bramble
African mangosteen
Snot apple
Wild grape
Sprawling bauhinia
2. Birds / bird eggs
3. Reptiles
Lizards
Snakes
Frogs
4. Insects
Worms
Grasshoppers / locusts
Termites
5. Game animals
6. Fish
D. Trapping
1. Principles of trapping
2. Snares
3. Deadfalls
4. Skerms
E. Fire Making
1. Fire site
2. Building the fire
Tinder
Kindling
Fuel
3. Fire starting
Friction
Magnifying glass
Flint and steel
Battery cell
Ammunition cartridges
F. Food Preparation
1. Skinning and quartering
Animals
Fish
Birds
2. Utilization of food
3. Preserving and cooking
Smoke drying meat
Sun drying meat
Parboiling
Rotten meat

IV. Shelter
A. Bashing up
B. Types of shelter
1. Lean-to
2. Poncho shelters
3. Improvised tent / tepee
4. Natural shelter
5. Hammock shelter

V. Direction Finding and Navigation
A. Map reading
B. Use of prismatic compass
C. Expedient direction finding
1. Watch method
2. Stick and shadow method
3. Stars
Southern cross
Orion
4. Moon
5. Improvised compasses
6. Primitive direction finding from;
Plants / trees
Wind
Sun
Anthills
Game / birds

VI. Tracking
See COMBAT TRACKING Section in site

VII. Improvised Tools, Weapons,
and Equipment
A. Lashing and cordage
B. Cooking and eating utensils
C. Improvised clothing and insulation
D. Expedient weapons
1. Club
2. Spear
3. Edged weapons
4. Bow and arrow
5. Throwing stick

VIII. Selected Emergency First Aid
A. Basic trauma / life support
B. Fractures, wounds, and bleeding
management
C. Heat casualty prevention
1. Heat cramps
2. Heat exhaustion
3. Heat stroke
D. Medicinal plants
E. Poisonous plants
1. Rules for avoiding poisonous plants
2. How plants poison
Ingestion
Contact
Absorption
Inhalation
F. Dangerous wildlife
1. Dangerous game
Lion
Cheetah
Hippo
Rhino
Elephant
Buffalo
Wild boar
Leopard
2. Big game tips
Caution
Evasion
Charges
Stampedes
3. Snakes
General points
Snake identification
4. Venomous snakes
Puff Adder
Gaboon Viper
Night Adder
Berg Adder
Peringueys Adder
Horned Adder
Black Mamba
Green Mamba
Barred Spitting Cobra
Boomslang
Twig Snake
Vine Snake
Bird Snake
5. Insects
Scorpions
Button Spiders
Bees
Ticks
Leeches
Tsetse Fly
6. Reptiles (other than snakes)
Crocodiles
7. Treatment
Animal bites
Snake bites
Insect bites
Bite zones
Polyvalent antiserum
Antivenom
Rabies

IX. General Points
A. Survival kits
1. Personal kits
2. Evasion and escape kits
B. Hygiene
C. Forecasting weather
1. Weather lore
2. Reading clouds and wind
3. Understanding barometric pressure
D. Expedient water crossing
1. Rivers / streams
2. Rapids
3. Lakes
4. Rafts
Bush raft
Australian poncho raft
Donut raft
Log raft
5. Improvised flotation devices

E. Signaling techniques
1. Fire / smoke
2. Mirror
3. Ground to air signals
F. Observation
1. Principles
2. Night vision
3. Range estimation
4. Field sketching
G. Camouflage and concealment
1. Principles and rules
2. Stalking
H. Whipping and lashing
I. Tribal Culture and encounters
1. Languages
2. Customs
3. Religions
J. Malaria
1. Prevention
2. Signs
3. Symptoms

(END)

***SOURCE*** This is adapted and outlined by T. A. L. Dozer from R. E. Reid-Dalys book; STAYING ALIVE- A
Southern African Survival Handbook.

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SELOUS SCOUTS 1974 - 1980.
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/selous_scouts_were_formed_in_197.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:13]

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SELOUS SCOUTS
1974 - 1980
The Selous Scouts were formed in 1974 following Rhodesias Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. By 1973 guerrilla activity had developed into
a major campaign, strengthened by the Portuguese withdrawal from neighboring
Mozambique. The Selous Scouts, named after Fredrick Selous, a close friend of the
countrys founder Cecil Rhodes, were originally trained as a tracker-combat unit with
their prime role being one of deep penetration and intelligence gathering.
Selous Scouts conduct intell gathering from a LP/OP.
At the height of the war in 1976, the Selous Scouts, which numbered about 700 men,
were under the command of Colonel Reid-Daly, a Rhodesian who had served with the
SAS in Malaya. They worked in small units of four to six men who would parachute or
heli-hop into the bush in hot pursuit of ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas. The Selous Scouts
were lightly equipped, carrying mostly ammunition and water which enabled them to
quickly track and close on the fleeing guerrillas. Once spotted, the Scouts would call for
soldiers of C Squadron Rhodesian SAS to parachute forward of the guerrillas in order to
cut them off. The Selous Scouts methods were so effective they accounted for more
guerrillas than the rest of the Rhodesian Army put together. Along with the Rhodesian
SAS, the Selous Scouts were disbanded in 1980 when the Prime Minister Ian Smith
handed over to Robert Mugabes government and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. Most of
the Selous Scouts made their way into the South African Army.
(END)

"PAMWE
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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/selous_scouts_and_the_south_afri.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:18]

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SELOUS SCOUTS AND
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CONNECTION
BY T. A. LETTIERI
In 1980 with the end of Rhodesia also came the end of the Selous Scouts, as we
know them. The Selous Scouts can directly trace their lineage down two roads, the first
one being within the Zimbabwe army. The unit to inherit this lineage is the Zimbabwe
PARAS, but for political reasons is not recognized by most within that organization.
With the coming of the new regime to power many of the Scouts feared for their
life as well as their families safety. With many Scouts heading south to safety, a great
many chose to stay in Zim and continue their service in other organizations within the
military. The Selous Scouts among other Special Forces units were disbanded and
absorbed into various other units, one being the PARAs, which was basically what
remained of the black Selous Scouts. Remarkably true to Mugabes words there was no
major reprisals against the remaining military outfits.
The second road you can trace this lineage down and incidentally the one the
Rhodies and former Scouts recognize as the most appropriate, is within the South
African Special Forces (SASF); the RECCEs.
The Selous Scouts connection with the SASF was more of a bound, due to the
situation in which both countries found themselves; both fighting communist expansion,
while sharing and employing the same tactics, techniques and ideas of unconventional
warfare. But the Scouts had and employed an unorthodox technique of warfare; pseudo-
terrorist operations which they fine-tuned to an art and science. The South Africans
realizing this gap in their curriculum quickly made arrangements with Rhodesia to
correct this problem.
During December of 1976 a handful of operators secretly left South Africa to
attend a course in Rhodesia in training black men in pseudo type operations, while other
went off and trained with other elements of the Selous Scouts, were they undertook
advanced training in tactical tracking and bushcraft. During this time they learned how to
operate with black members for the first time. This time frame was the beginnings of 5
Reconnaissance Commando. During the following year members of 5 RECCEs secretly
conducted internal and external operations in Rhodesia with the S.A.S. and Selous
Scouts, to see firsthand how professionals operated.
By order of the Minister of Defence, 3 Reconnaissance Commando was
established but not activated on the 1
st
of May 1976, and maintained as a paper unit.
In April 1980, 3 RECCEs was activated with the arrival of over 120 Selous Scouts in
"PAMWE
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TRACKING
TACTICAL
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South Africa from Rhodesia. This unit was only activated with the arrival of the Scouts.
When the Selous Scouts and S.A.S. joined the SASF their Rhodesian Special Forces
qualifications were carried over and accepted, all were awarded the South African
Special Forces Operators badge of the RECCEs. The only requirement they need, was to
undergo retraining in a parachute conversion course to familiarize the Scouts with the
airborne equipment and kit employed by the RECCEs.
Some interesting notes about 3 RECCEs; a distinctive badge was never authorized
for the unit. The Selous Scouts did bring their Regimental standard with them from
Rhodesia, and continued to utilize it to represent their new home, as well as other items
like the famous church door from Inkomo barracks and a painting of F. C. Selous, which
was hung respectively in the officers mess.
On the 1
st
of January 1981, 3 Reconnaissance Commando and 5 Reconnaissance
Commando joined forces to form 5 Reconnaissance Regiment. With this transition came
the finale recognition and tribute to the Selous Scouts in the RECCEs lineage, that being
the influence and significance of the Shona words PAMWE CHETE from the Selous
Scouts motto, meaning All Together and the presences of the superimposed wings of
the Osprey, a bird of prey used by the Selous Scouts as their emblem, being incorporated
into 5 RECCEs Regimental unit badge in recognition of the connection between
themselves and the Selous Scouts. This badge was authorized February 13
th
1982.
Within the Zimbabwe Army they currently maintain no unit with any resemblance or
capability like that of the Selous Scouts. The PARAs are basically formed along airborne
infantry lines, but it is rumored that Zim is possibly standing up or maintain a S.A.S. type
unit, Zimbabwe Special Air Service?

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RHODESIAN C.O.I.N MANUAL CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION;
CONTENTS

Intro (Items I - II in one file)
I. Preface
II. Definitions
Chapter 1 : General Elements
Chapter 2 : Command and Control
Chapter 3 : Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Chapter 4 : Employment of Forces
Chapter 5 : Types of Operations
Chapter 6 : Foot Patrols
Chapter 7 : Tracking
Chapter 8 : Follow-Up Operations
Chapter 9 : Attacks on Terrorist Camps
Chapter 10 : Ambushing of Terrorists
Chapter 11 : Sweeps
Chapter 12 : Defense/Protection of sensitive points
Chapter 13 : Movement Security
Chapter 14 : Mines and Booby Traps
Chapter 15 : Land / Air Operations (coming soon)
Chapter 16 : Miscellaneous (coming soon)
Chapter 17 : Logistics in COIN (coming soon)

***NOTE*** Also coming soon the complete RSF COIN Manual on PDF format for
download. This is the complete original 1975 version.

"PAMWE
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GALLERY
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WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
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TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/multiracial_unit_selous_scouts.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:28]

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THE MULTIRACIAL UNIT-
SELOUS SCOUTS
The Selous Scouts, a multiracial unit formed in 1973 with the aim of conducting
a clandestine war against ZANLA and ZIPRA, both inside and, later on, outside
Rhodesia. The Selous Scouts operated as pseudo-terrorist groups, collecting
intelligence on the enemy and then, at the right moment, destroying him. This
was not a new idea, it having been used with some success by Special Branch
against Communist guerrillas in the Malayan crisis and later in Kenya against
Jomo Kenyattas Mau Mau. As the war in Rhodesia escalated, General Walls
decided to form such a force and chose for its commander the somewhat
unorthodox Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid Daly. Reid Daly, who had served with
Walls during the Malayan campaign and was later regimental sergeant-major
when Walls commanded the Rhodesian Light Infantry, was the driving force
behind the Selous Scouts. Learning from the experiences of BSAP Special
Branch, who had operated a small number of pseudoteams on a limited basis,
Reid Daly recruited his officers and NCOs from the Army, mostly from the RLI and
the SAS. Captain Jeremy Strong, one of the first to be recruited, was a former
British Army officer who had resigned and returned to Rhodesia after UDI. Most of
the others were either soldiers from the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), or tame
terrs, as ex-guerrillas recruited by the Security Forces were called. These ex-
members of ZANLA and ZIPRA, together with the RAR and white Rhodesian
soldiers, formed one of the most successful counterinsurgency units in the
Rhodesian Army.
It is interesting to note that Reid Daly had never before commanded African
troops, and that many of the whites came from all-white units such as the RLI or
the SAS. Nevertheless this multiracial, multinational unit was responsible, either
directly or indirectly, for over 60 per cent of all enemy killed within Rhodesia
during the war, and won a total of 85 awards for bravery. They lost less than 40 of
their own men.
The Selous Scouts had the toughest selection and training of any unit in the
Rhodesian Security Forces, including the SAS. Operating in small groups, the
"PAMWE
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OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
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PSEUDO-
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OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
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men, mostly Africans, dressed in nondescript clothing such as that worn by
ZANLA and ZIPRA and carried Soviet-made weapons. The Selous Scouts were
undoubtedly the most feared and perhaps effective unit in southern Africa.
(END)

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesias_elite_a_comparison.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:32]

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RHODESIA'S ELITE;
A COMPARISON
By Peter Macdonald
The first Rhodesian special force was raised in response to a recruiting campaign for the
Malayan Emergency and was to become C Squadron of the Malayan Scouts and
subsequently the reconstituted SAS. When that task ended the squadron of 250, all ranks,
was based at Ndola in Northern Rhodesia as part of the armed forces of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland but when the federation collapsed was reduced to a cadre. However, it later
grew again in response to the threat posed by the guerrilla wars in Angola and
Mozambique. Joint operations with the Portuguese took men of the unit into combat and
the Squadron saw continuous action from 1967 until Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in
1980. In 1978 C Squadron was redesignated the Rhodesian SAS and its all-white troops
became the cadres for squadrons.
Uniform was optional when the unit was on operations and the distinguishing features
of the SAS were not worn. Men carried AK-47 automatic rifles or the SVD Dragunov
plus the 12.7mm Soviet heavy machine gun, or the usual Western weaponry.
The Selous Scouts were undoubtedly the most effective of the many Special Forces,
which have been used in Africa. Raised by Reid-Daly, an ex-Rhodesian SAS officer, the
ideals of that regiment were the basis upon which he developed a unit specially tailored
for the terrain and type of action it encountered and endowed it with special skills such as
tracking. It was multi-racial so its members were able to pose as ZIPLA or ZANLA
guerrillas on both sides of its borders and thus identify the guerrillas structure,
composition and supply systems. Guerrilla squads were then maneuvered into contact
with conventional troops. Because of the entangled nature of their operations with, at
times, each side posing as the other, there were cases of atrocities being perpetrated by
both sides, although the Scouts certainly did not deserve the infamous reputation they got
as a result of enemy propaganda.
The 17-day selection of the Scouts was similar to that of the SAS with recruits being
watched for the real individual who would emerge after starvation, hardship and
exhaustion, the latter being ensured by speed-marches of 32 km (20 miles), of which the
last 12 km (7.5 miles) had to be done in two and a half hours while carrying a sand bag.
The dedicated few that passed this test were then examined for a blend of gregariousness
and self-sufficiency. Their emblem was a silver-winged Osprey badge worn on a brown
beret.
On operations there was much overlap between Scouts and SAS, although the former
tended to work mostly in the tribal lands on foot while the SAS tended to do those
operations involving HALO or small-boat raids (for the purpose of intelligence gathering
across borders) and attacks on guerrilla bases in conjunction with the Rhodesian Light
Infantry (RLI).
"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
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GUESTBOOK
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Together these three elite fighting units, the Rhodesian SAS, the Selous Scouts and the
Rhodesian Light Infantry Commandos saw some of the fiercest action of the counter-
terrorist war. Between them they were responsible for more enemy dead per man than
any other military unit.
Since the end of the war in 1980, these units have been disbanded, but many of their
former members are serving with other armies, either in South Africa or elsewhere,
where their skills and experience are being put to use in similar conflicts.
(END)
***SOURCE*** This article is from THE SPECIAL FORCES - A History of the World's Elite Fighting Units, by Peter Macdonald.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/tracking_techniques_for_predator.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:39]

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TRACKING
TECHNIQUES FOR
PREDATOR AND PREY
By Jack Thompson
As the Land-Rover rounded a corner on
the long, dusty road near Fort Victoria,
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), my attention
froze on a large free lying across the road.
Slamming on the brakes and counter-
steering a skid, we came to rest about two
meters from the obstacle. Then the ambush
was sprung.
"The old tree across the road followed
by an ambush trick, I thought. Hope
they forgot the Claymore! Glad they
forgot the land mine! Reacting instantly
with counter fire is what saved our lives,
because it had the ZANU (Zimbabwe
African National Union) terrorists already
fleeing before we dismounted. Honest to
God, it looked like the Olympic 100-meter
finals viewed from the south end of the
stadium. The after action silence made It
feel like the ambush never happened. After
quickly reorganizing, we were happy to
find no casualties. Already, only about a
minute after the encounter, the enemy was
hundreds of meters away with no sign
of slowing down.
Organizing ourselves into a follow-up
group took only seconds, and leaving a
security group to look after the vehicle, we
moved out. But where to? And to do
what? How could we possibly catch up
with an ambush group that melted so fast
into the bush? Tracking, my friends,
tracking. Tracking is the skill (some call it
an art) of pursuing the enemy by following
the signs he leaves behind. For in their
haste to flee our counter fire, they left
enough clues to allow us to follow them.
And follow we did. And not only follow
them, but catch up with them, and kill

"PAMWE
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OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
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COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
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them.
Now, how do you track? How do you
read the signs the enemy leaves behind?
Sign (or spoor) falls into two main
categories: ground spoor and aerial spoor.
Ground Spoor, as the name implies, is
sign found on the ground. Examples are
footprints, disturbed earth, overturned
rocks, etc. Aerial spoor is found above the
ground in the form of trampled grass,
broken bushes, broken cobwebs, etc.
(Maybe your mother wears combat boots,
but mother nature doesnt look for any
signs which nature does not make).
Upon locating tracks, we need to study
them to learn at least three things:
1. Approximate number in the group.
2. Age of the spoor.
3. Direction of travel.
Determining the number in the group is
accomplished as follows:
1. Measure off 30 inches (or the length of
one stride) along the tracks between two
points.
2. Draw two lines at right angles to the
tracks at those two points.
3. Count the number of footprints between
the lines this will give you the number
of people who have passed through the
area.
This technique is very simple, but it
only works accurately up to about 10-12
people.
Estimating the age of a footprint is a
little harder. Tracks, especially human
footprints, lose their sharp edges over time
because of wind, rain and sunshine. Wind
erodes the prints, rain washes them out
and the sun dries prints that are in mud. It
is especially important to consider what
the weather was like over the past few
days to judge the age of the spoor
accurately. Has it rained recently? How
much did it rain? Has it been windy?
Age of aerial spoor can be judged by
the state and position of trodden
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vegetation. Long grass, for example, is
resilient and will spring back after being
walked on. Also, the juice inside the
blades will make freshly trodden long
grass somewhat damp. If such grass is
completely dry when you come upon it,
the spoor is obviously not fresh.
Unfortunately, only practice and
experience will teach you how to judge the
age of tracks accurately.
Direction of travel is determined with a
compass. However, dont be fooled into
thinking that the initial line of travel wont
change. It will usually take about two
kilometers to accurately determine the true
direction.
Now that we have recognized tracks,
estimated the number of enemy, know
how much of a head start they have, and
know the general direction of travel, we
can deal with how to follow tracks.
Before moving out, it is important to
find an actual footprint or boot print. We
call this confirmed spoor. Aerial spoor is
not confirmed spoor. Ground spoor that is
not an actual print of a boot or foot, like
overturned rocks, crushed leaves, etc. is
not confirmed spoor either. So the rule is
to start out on confirmed spoor. The
tracker must memorize the characteristics
of the prints (tread pattern, if any, and
size), which he encounters so that he
doesnt become confused later if he
encounters a different set of tracks.
Track with your head up and look about
10 feet in front of you. New or
inexperienced trackers typically look at the
ground nearer their feet and tend to miss
tracks farther away. This tends to slow the
rate of tracking. Remember this: You must
track at a faster pace than the enemy is
walking if you want to catch up with him.
Do not walk directly on the spoor, but
rather to the side, so as not to obliterate it.
It is easier to track into the sun, than
with it at your back This is because the
sun casts a shadow on the indentations of
the boot print, making it easier to see.
When tracking away from the sun, this
shadow cannot be seen so what you do is
to track alongside of the spoor and
occasionally look over your shoulder,
down at the spoor. This gives you the
same view as if you were tracking into the
sun.
While tracking, the tracker must be
constantly alert for booby traps and
possible ambush sites, If your tracking is
successful, at some point you will be
catching up with the enemy, and its not a
good idea to be caught off guard. Possible
ambush sites should be cleared before
passing near them. Examples are small
hills, thick bushes, narrow defiles, etc.
Occasionally, due to the nature of the
ground, lime of day (tracking at noon casts
little or no shadow) or tracker fatigue, the
tracks will be lost Now what?
Go to the last confirmed spoor and draw
a line behind it, across the tracks. Stand
behind the line, take time to survey the
landscape in front of you, then ask
yourself Where would I go if I were
walking along here? Look for the logical
line of advance, and then go check it out If
you find the spoor again, continue to track.
If not, go back to your line and do a 3600
circle. It goes like this: Using your last
confirmed spoor as your starting point,
walk 15 meters forward and walk in a
circle around your point looking for tracks.
Keep enlarging this circle until tracks are
found, then continue tracking.
Sometimes, you may run out of
available light at the end of the day. In
this case, you have to sleep on the spoor
and continue in the morning, obviously
starting at first light.
The skill of tracking is valuable because
a group with the ability to track and read
tracks can engage enemy units that they
otherwise could not It only stands to
reason, then, that an understanding of this
skill will also enable them to better hide
their own tracks when on patrol. And that
brings us to anti-tracking how to avoid
being the trackee.
Though it is virtually impossible to
avoid leaving spoor, certain techniques
can be employed to minimize detection.
The aim is to make the job of the enemy
tracker as hard as possible and maybe
youll be lucky enough that your anti-
tracking techniques will defeat his tracking
ability. However, keep in mind there are
those who can track you no matter what
techniques you employ. In such cases,
since you cant outwit the enemy tracker,
you can buy yourself some time through
deception and a consistently fast rate of
march that will keep you one step ahead.
Hopefully you will avoid contact until
dusk, at which lime he will literally have
to stop dead in your tracks. You, on the
other hand, continue to make tracks, but in
a night march, slipping farther away in the
process.
Lets look at some proven anti-tracking
techniques. First, examine the sole of your
boot Vibram soles and jungle boots are a
Christmas present to a good tracker. If you
have no choice as to your boots, tie a
sandbag over them to cover the tread
pattern. A smooth sole is naturally harder
to track than a cleated one. In Africa we
were issued a high-topped, smooth-soled
boot called boots clandestine and they
worked very well.
Second is patrol technique. Try at every
opportunity to walk on ground that is hard
or rocky, double back, split into groups,
change boots, or take them off and walk
barefoot for a while. This can throw off,
slow down or confuse a tracker, even a
good one. One of the best ways to avoid
being tracked is to kill the tracker! Sniper
fire, a well-placed booby trap, or doing a
dogleg and ambushing your own tracks
will definitely take the fighting edge off a
follow-up group.
Tracking and anti-tracking are skills that
are difficult to learn but very much worth
the effort. Practice definitely makes for
proficiency. At limes your patience and
perseverance will be tested because you
might be on tracks for days only to have
them disappear into thin air. Learning
these skills can breathe a lot of confidence
into individual soldiers as it helps
them.......
(NOTE; End of this article was lost I will
post it as soon as I can find another copy
of it.)

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesias_experience_with_mercs.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:43]

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WEBMASTERS NOTE; The volunteers who fought alongside the Rhodesians during the bush war,
contrary to the popular perception abroad (and guerrilla propaganda), were not mercenaries (in the legal
sense of the word), but signed up in the Rhodesian Security Forces under the same conditions and at the same
rate of pay as Rhodesian regulars. The word and tile "MERC" appears here because the following articles are
about MERCs who served Rhodesia, But not necessarily in that mode. So the word is not politically correct, so
what!

It is perhaps the counter-insurgency war in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern
Rhodesia), fought between 1965 and 1980, that offered the elite mercenary
soldier the most interesting recent opportunity to practice his military skills. There
were probably around 1,500 non-Rhodesian mercenaries in the Rhodesian
security forces; including British, Australians, Canadians, Dutch, French,
Germans, Greeks and Scandinavians. Little official recruiting went on outside the
country; such recruitment as there was taking place by word of mouth and written
invitation. The Rhodesian Information Office advised applicants on the enlistment
processes, after which aspirants had to make their own way to the training
centers. Successful mercenaries did however have their fares refunded.
Mercenaries who joined the Rhodesian armed forces did so for a minimum term
of two years and were treated identically to local volunteers. Their basic salary,
although a little higher than that then paid in the British Army, was far from
generous, and was certainly not in itself sufficient reason for enlistment. Most men
joined because they liked the life, the comradeship and the excitement; few for
reasons of overt racism.
Mercenaries served in every element of the Rhodesian armed forces, including
the SAS (which was reputed to have a tougher selection process than its sister-
unit in Hereford), the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI).
Others served in the counter-insurgency wing of the rather confusingly named
British South Africa Police (BSAP) Special Branch.
With the coming of independence and the formation of Zimbabwe in 1980, a
number of elite units - including the SAS, the Selous Scouts and the RLI - were
disbanded. Those mercenaries who remained left quickly, many joining the now
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unemployed Rhodesians from these former units in the move south to seek
employment with the South African Defence Forces. It is believed that at least one
unit crossed the border with its armory and entire fleet of vehicles.
(END)

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BIG GAME BUSHCRAFT TIPS
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FOR SCOUTS

There is no doubt that big game in the Rhodesian bush is a more apparent
danger than Terrs or guerrillas to the inexperienced scout. If the following simple
facts are borne in mind, however the apprehension of new scouts to the bush will be
relieved;
Elephant, Lion and Buffalo have excellent senses of hearing and smell. They
will usually move away if humans are about the area.
All big game usually keep to game trails/tracks and therefore, provided the
camp is made off the game tail and in thick bush, there is relatively little
danger.
Elephant, Buffalo, Lion and Rhino are however, particularly dangerous in
areas which have been recently bombed. In these circumstances they frequently
charge on sight and particular precautions are necessary.
A knowledge of the reactions of certain game animals upon scenting or
encountering human beings will be of value to the scout from the operational aspect.
Elephants, Buffalo, Lion and Rhino should they suddenly stampede when you have
not caused them to do so, the wind being in your favorer, may well mean that they
have seen or scented terrorist/guerrillas in the area.
Baboon, Bushbuck, Sykes Monkey, Colobus Monkey and Laurie Birds give
off distinctive warning cries if they scent or see humans. Be on the watch for
circling vultures, as they may well indicate a hideout/camp were food or scraps our
left about. Hyenas calling repeatedly at night or many hyena tracks concentrating in
one direction may also mean a hideout or camp.
Do not attempt to shoot game. Current service rifles are not made to kill
large animals, the round is not designed to penetrate through the heavy bone, hide
and flesh of large game.
Should a patrol be charged by a big game animal it should get off the path
upwind of the beast as quickly and as quietly as possible without panic. Animals,
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being normally more frightened of humans than humans are frightened of them,
seldom charge meaninglessly. More often than not, so-called charges are only
animals making off in all directions in blind panic.
Herds of cow elephants with calves and rhino and buffalo with calves should
however be avoided at all times by moving round them upwind.
These big game bushcraft tips for scouts were taught to all scouts as a
minimum, this list of tips is not all-inclusive but provided a good basic knowledge
for that big game encounter. These skills were more relevant to the small sticks or
patrols operating in the vast bush, were there signature was minimal and a chance
contact with game more likely, then compared to a conventional unit operating in
large numbers in the bush.
(END)

The "BI G FI VE" of Rhodesia

The Elephant
The Lion
The Rhino
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The Leopard
The Buffalo

***NOTE*** In some circles and other locations on the "Dark Continent" the "BIG FIVE" includes
the Hippo; usually substituting the Leopard, as is the case in Malawi. Incidentally the Hippo is
responsible for more deaths yearly then any of the aforementioned.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/tracking_terrs__guerrillas.htm[2012-05-28 11:43:55]

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NOTE: This Tracking information is the basis of what the Rhodesian tracking program built off. This data was
used and expanded from conflict to conflict; Kenya, Malaya and then for Rhodesia. This outline concentrates
on the use of African native trackers, due to the fact it was originally written by British army personnel, were it
was common practice to employ indigenous persons for various tasks; like tracking. The British indecently
were quite aware of the importance of trackers in a counter-insurgency conflict but maintained no tracking
unit per say at the time. The Rhodesians took the tracking concept to new heights; not only did they maintain
dedicated tracking units (TCU / Selous Scouts / Greys Scouts), but the whole Rhodesian Security Forces had
taught all personnel a basic level of tracking awareness.

Introduction to Visual Tracking
The Terrs will rarely stand and fight they make raids and return to their hideouts as quickly
as possible. To make contact with them is difficult. One of the methods used to hunt down and
kill the Terrs is by tracking. Tracking is used by Africans normally when hunting animals or
finding strayed stock. Animals do not conceal their tracks and have set characteristics which,
when known to the trackers, make animal hunting comparatively easy.
Tracking Terrs is very much more difficult. Realizing that the Security Forces are using
African trackers to hunt them down, the Terrorist gangs are using all sorts of methods to
conceal their tracks. Following the comparatively ill-defined human fool prints, as compared
with the well-defined hoof-marks made by game, is difficult enough without the Terrs
concealing their tracks. Therefore first-class trackers must he used. Many Africans can track,
but the first-class tracker is not found in the average African. He is born, and no amount of
practice and experience will make the average tracker as good as the born tracker.
The method of making contact with gangs by tracking is nevertheless very successful and
every effort must be made to keep up the morale of the trackers and realize their importance in
patrols. They are part of the team.
The Handling of Trackers
General
The Africans is simple, not very intelligent, but very willing if treated in the right way. Do
not regard him as a slave but as an equal. You will find that most Africans have an innate
respect for the White Man. This respect is easily increased or destroyed, depending on the
treatment given to them.
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The respect will be destroyed if familiarity is shown or they are allowed to take liberties.
This does not mean that they should not be spoken to or offered cigarettes. They appreciate
cheerfulness and the odd joke. They have a good sense of humor which, although not entirely
similar to that of the White Man, is none the less present. They dislike being sworn at, even in
fun, and cannot understand sarcasm.
Small things, such as making them stand up when spoken to, are important. They should
come under the direct control of patrol commander and other members of the patrol should
understand this.
The African Mentality
It must be understood that the African has a completely different view of life and code of
morals from ours. He does not think of the future, which the White Man has difficulty in
understanding and finds irritating.
Morale
A high standard of morale among trackers must be maintained, and this will depend mainly
on how the Europeans in the patrol behave. They like to air their troubles, and these must be
listened to.
Administration
Although their physical needs are a great deal less than ours, do not disregard the Africans
comfort. There is a scale of clothing and rations for African trackers, and it must he ensured
that they get it.
Tracking Patrols
Use of Correct Trackers- Not all trackers are of the same tribe and location. Care should
therefore be taken that the trackers in operational use by battalions are from the tribes most
suited to the terrain in which the battalion is located. If the tracker is a low land dweller
employ him in similar terrain same for high land dwellers, also try to maintain integrity of the
trackers by keeping similar tribes together.
Composition of Tracking Group in a Patrol- The ideal is a group of three trackers and one
scout or bodyguard. Owing to the shortage of first-class trackers within the Command, more
often only two trackers and one scout are used.
Formation Using Three Trackers- A trackers leads the patrol on the tracks which he is
following. Behind the leading tracker is his bodyguard or scout, following the bodyguard ate.
The other two trackers, one watching for tracks breaking off to the right and the other watching
left. Ibis formation is only used when time patrol is canalized in the forest, and is adapted to
suit open country according to circumstances.
Formation Using Two Trackers- The formation is identical, except that only one tracker
follows the bodyguard and has to watch for tracks breaking right and left.
The Bodyguard- The duty of the bodyguard is exactly the same as that of a leading scout in
a normal patrol. The trackers all have their eyes to the ground and therefore cannot look out for
ambushers, camps, or the enemy
The Duty of the Trackers- The duty of the trackers is to track. They should not be made to
carry heavy loads or become odd-job men. They should be trained in the use of firearms, silent
signals, immediate action drills, and to pass all information to their patrol commander.
Action on Finding Tracks
Upon encountering tracks it is essential that some small time be spent in studying them, as
invaluable information can he obtained, such as when the gang passed the spot, the numbers,
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whether they were laden (i.e. food carriers or armed members), and direction. It is also
important that time spot is fixed on the map.
Summary
In tracking down Terrs, persistence, alertness, silence, and the ability to shoot straight and
quickly are important. Be firm yet fair, and study your trackers for their individual
peculiarities.

Trails and Tracks
Introduction
To move silently and quickly in most parts of the bush is impossible unless use is made of
trails. There are a considerable number of paths in the bush, originally made by big game
during their nightly or seasonal migrations. Since big game animals find difficultly in climbing
or descending steep, slippery slopes it will be found that game trails are very easy going, the
inclines being gentle.
Both the Terrs and our own patrols use these trails when quick, silent movement is required.
Always check for Terrorist tracks when using these trails and remember that it is on these trails
that ambushes are easily laid, both by security forces and the Terrs, though the latter, to date,
have not taken full advantage of the opportunity offered.
Tracks on trails are inclined to be quickly obliterated by game and rain, as some trails are
so wide that there is little overhead cover.
Types of Trails
Ridge Crest Trails- Formed by game along main ridges to enable movement from one part
of the country to another Usually well defined and useful for rapid movement in thick bush, but
not used to a great extent by the terrs for fear of leaving tracks on the trails used frequently by
security forces.
Contour Trails- Found only in area of shallow valleys and generally join crests of ridges
by following the contour round the head of the valley. Used by the terrs considerably, to enable
them to have easy routes to their camps
Spur Trails- These follow the small spurs often found projecting from main ridges into
deep valleys. Often rather vague, but are useful for crossing heavy country across the grain.
Again used considerably by the terrs.
Common Tracks
Man- Barefoot prints are soft rounded impressions formed by the heel, ball of foot, or toes.
Womens tracks are generally smaller and have on the whole two characteristics. Firstly, they
tend to be pigeon-toed and secondly, their toes are more splayed out than the males.
Animals- Due to the fact that most animals have cloven hooves, the impressions formed on
the ground have sharp, clear-cut edges.
Tracking
The following are signs the experienced tracker looks for when tracking spoor:
(a) Crushed and bent grass and vegetation
(b) Broken twigs and leaves
(c) Overturned leaves
(d) Mud displaced from streams
(e) Cobwebs
(f) The state of dew on a trail
(g) Mud or scratches on stones or logs
(h) Moss scraped from trees
Running Men- Points to observe are skid marks, depth of impressions, running on balls of
feet and toes. Splayed out toes and badly damaged vegetation with resultant lack of
concealment of trail.
Loaded Men- Short footsteps, deeper impressions than normal in soft ground and toes
splayed out.
Judging Age of Tracks
(a) Weather: The state of the weather- rain, wind, sunshine- should always be recorded
in ones mind as it is one of the most important points in deciding the age of a
track.
(b) Vegetation: The state and position of trodden vegetation; various grasses have
different grades of resilience and only practice and experience can enable a tracker
to use this factor for accurate ageing of a track.
(c) Impressions in mud: Always note the state of dryness of a track in mud or soft
ground. If the track is very fresh, water would have run back into the depression
made by a foot. Later the water runs back and later still the mud which has been
pushed up round the depression and the mud kicked forward by the foot leaving the
ground begins to dry.
(d) Obliteration by rain or dripping from mist: By remembering when it last rained,
more accurate judgment of the age of tracks is easy. If the tracks are pockmarked,
obviously they were made before the rain and if they are not pockmarked they
were made after the rain. Similarly, by looking to see if the tracks have been
pockmarked by mist dripping from brush, the age can be better judged.
(e) Game tracks superimposed: Remember that most animals lie up during the day and
move about at night. Therefore if human prints on main bush tracks have animal
tracks superimposed, and these tracks show that the game have moved in both
directions, the human prints are probably at least one night old. If the animal tracks
show that game have moved only in one direction, then the human tracks were
probably made during the night, after the game had moved down to salt or water
but before the game moved back.
(f) Cracks in bent grass or leaves: An indication of the age of a track may be gained
by the state of dryness of these cracks. When fresh they are green, but after a few
days turn a brown colour. Again the amount of sunshine and rain during the last
few days should be taken into account.
(g) Leaves covering tracks: In the bush leaves are always falling from the bushes. The
number of leaves that fall depends on wind and rain. By looking at the number of
leaves covering the tracks and taking into consideration the amount of wind and
rain during the past few days, another indication as to the age of tracks is obtained.
Remember the seasonal characteristics of your operational area; Kenya for example
has no autumn; so the leaves fall from trees all the year round there.
Conclusion
A tracker has many things to consider whilst tracking. He must possess certain qualities,
such as extraordinary eyesight, memory, intelligence, fitness, and understanding of Nature.
Although practice and experience will make the average man a tracker, he can never be as
good as the born tracker, for the real tracker is born, not made. African trackers track best in
the areas In which they were born, and when moved to new areas must be given time to
become used to the climatic conditions and the difference in vegetation and soils. Patience,
persistence and acute observation are the basis of good tracking.
Terrorist Signs and Fieldcraft
Introduction
The Terrs have their own methods of informing members of their gangs where they have
gone, or where they have hidden their food, and they also have their own warning system.
These can be spotted by an alert patrol. The examples of signs given below are old and were
only effective in certain areas. Signs vary from area to area and from gang to gang. Patrols
should attempt to recognize new signs and pass back all information regarding these signs. The
interrogation of prisoners must include the finding out of signs. The examples noted are only
given as a guide as to what to expect. All signs are as inconspicuous as possible in order to
conceal them from the security forces.
Direction Signs- Direction signs as below are usually found at track junctions
(a) Bent bamboo; Bent down and pointing in the direction required. Inconspicuous as it
is usually interpreted as having been done by big game.
(b) Bamboo leaves crossed and pinned to the ground with a twig, the longest arm of
the cross indicating direction.
(c) Bamboo bent across a path indicates either ambush or warning to Terrs that the path
is known to security forces.
(d) The food cache sign- Three small holes arc dug at regular distances up the middle of
time path. At right angles to one of these, a hole is dug on either side of the path.
These are lined up with a conspicuous tree or bamboo in which there is a panga cut.
By placing a panga in the cut and sighting along the blade the direction to a food
cache is obtained.
(e) Abandoned hide- A tree near the abandoned hide is indicated by cutting off a large
piece of bark. The lowest branch of the tree points in the direction of the new hide.
The branch merely indicates the direction. The new hide will not be visible, but by
following the indicated line, tracks leading to the new hide will be found. The new
hide may be a considerable distance away.
Concealment of Tracks
(a) Walking backwards, mainly in soft ground or dusty patches. Note that the mud flakes
being kicked up are kicked up by the heel instead of the toe. The heel mark lends to be
deeper than that of the ball of the foot and the feet are placed wider apart although the
pace is shorter.
(b) Walking on the edges of or astride paths.
(c) Stepping in one anothers tracks-used also to disguise numbers in a gang.
(d) Use of streams and stream beds.
(e) Splitting up into small groups or individuals over easy tracking ground or on nearing
hideout.
(f) Bent bamboo: Should it be necessary for a gang to cross a wide path, the last member
pulls down a bamboo or bush with ample foliage to cover the tracks. This also is
frequently interpreted as having been done by big game.
(g) Walking along fallen trees, oven- rocky ground, or stepping from rock to rock.
(h) Stolen cattle: Dragging bush over trail; Splitting herds and mixing with herds of other
(i) Other tricks:
(i) Tip-toeing;
(ii) Rear man covering tracks with bamboo leaves; False tracks;
(iv) Gang walking in each others footprints, rear man cutting off the feet of dead
elephant or rhino and tying them to his feet and obliterating human footprints.
Concealment of Hideouts
The main methods used are:
(a) Concealment of tracks leading to hideout.
(b) Use of many devious entrance tracks.
(c) Sighting hideout in most unlikely places. Usually close to a commanding position where the
gang can lie-up during the daylight hours.
Types of Hideout
(a) Underground ground- soil thrown into the river and the entrance concealed. In the bush
these may be small and accommodate small numbers, but in Reserves are normally for only
one or two men.
(b) Caves under waterfalls- all sizes used.
(c) Hut hideouts in Reserve-holes dug under beds capable of holding up to five men, having
small concealed entrances.
(d) Trees- often two- or three-man hides in holes amongst the roots of large trees. The shells
of burnt-out trees are sometimes used as sentry boxes or observation posts.
(e) Lie-ups where no form of construction is erected, the gang merely lying up under naturally
thick cover.
(/) Armed members of some gangs live separately from the food carriers. In many gangs the
women members are segregated, and in some cases the gang leader lives close by them.
Keeping Up to Date
Tracking humans who are always trying to conceal their tracks is difficult, even for an
experienced African tracker, who is more used to tracking animals. Just as the method of
breaking and entering used by a burglar will often give his identity away to the Police, so the
methods by which a gang conceals its tracks, and the way it establishes its hideouts, will give
away the gang. Therefore it is essential that all new methods of concealing tracks be brought to
the notice of your tracker, and, conversely, if he finds new methods, the information should be
passed back.
Conclusion
When a patrol is sent out with trackers it is essential that the patrol commander himself has
a fair knowledge of tracking. This knowledge may be more theoretical than practical but he
should be able to recognize signs when pointed out to him by his trackers. As trackers will
sometimes have different opinions as to what certain signs or tracks indicate, the patrol
commander must have sufficient knowledge to make a final decision.
In British units language difficulties between patrol commander and trackers can be most
tiresome. The good patrol commander will learn enough of the native dialect to eliminate this
difficulty. Just as the trackers must be patient when tracking so must the patrol commander be
patient when dealing with his trackers. The basis of successful tracking patrols is the team
spirit, which lies within all the members of the patrol.

(END)

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SELOUS SCOUTS
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By;
Major Charles M. Lohman, USMC
Major Robert I. MacPherson, USMC

Every war produces its lite unit, and the Rhodesian War was no exception. The
professional reputation of the Rhodesian Security Force was justified, but the skills of the
Selous Scouts have become legendary. The founder and commander of the Scouts was a
Rhodesian born officer, Lt.Col. Ronald Reid-Daly. He entered the Rhodesian Army in
1951 and served with the Rhodesian Squadron of the British Special Air Services (SAS)
in operations against insurgents in Malaya in 1951. Rising to the rank of Sergeant Major
in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, he was later commissioned and achieved the rank of
Captain. He retired from the Army in 1973. In late 1973 he was persuaded to return to
active duty in order to form the Selous Scouts.
The unit remained on active duty until Robert Mugabe was elected Prime Minister in
1980. One of his first acts was to order the immediate disbanding of the Scouts; Mugabe
also threatened to bring its members to trial as war criminals. During the transition period
under British protection, most of the units members left Zimbabwe. In 1981 Newsweek
magazine reported that the Republic of South Africa incorporated the majority of the unit
as a combat element into its Self Defence Force. Its former commanding officer is
currently serving as a Major General in charge of the Defence Force of the Transkei, an
independent black state within the border of the Republic of South Africa.
Prime Minister Mugabes reaction to the Selous Scouts is of interest. Upon assuming
office he made a concerted effort to ensure the dignity and structure of the minority
European community. This was particularly evident in the Army. Mugabe realized that
his link to a peaceful future for Zimbabwe lay in its armed forces. He was very cautious
in handling this delicate issue, but with the single exception of the Selous Scouts.
The basis for the new governments mistrust of the unit was founded upon the efficiency
of the organization. During the war the Scouts were credited with the deaths of 68% of
the insurgents killed within the borders of Rhodesia.
The purpose of the unit was the clandestine elimination of the Nationalists without regard
to international borders. The foundation of the units effectiveness was its members
ability to live off the land, combined with the tracking skills of the individual soldier. All
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members were volunteers and combat veterans. They were initiated into the Scouts via a
very severe indoctrination programme, which eliminated approximately 85% of the
respondents. The training course was six weeks in length and incorporated an excess of
physical and psychological stress. The unit was entirely integrated and all soldiers had to
pass the same course of instruction in order to win access to the unit. The final test
included a 90 mile forced march with a 70 pound pack. This may not seem excessive to
American Marines, but the hike was divided into four courses. At the completion of
each course, the volunteer was given a difficult combat task to accomplish prior to
continuing onto the next phase.
The emphasis throughout the entire training cycle was the development of Bush and
Tracking techniques. The Scout had to become absolutely self-reliant. The unit
incorporated the same tactics that the British had initiated in Malaya and Kenya. It was
defined as a Pseudo-Gang concept. A team of 4-7 men was deployed into an operational
area. All other friendly forces in that region were withdrawn. The team was dressed in
insurgent uniforms, carried communist weapons, and gave the appearance of being a
guerrilla force. The key was that they were better trained and more disciplined than the
nationalists. Once they ascertained the presence of an insurgent force, they began to stalk
them. They were proficient at remaining undetected throughout this phase. This gave
them the advantage of initiating contact with the insurgents at their discretion. The Selous
Scouts achieved remarkable results by carrying the war directly to the guerrillas. Their
success carries the key to an effective counterinsurgency campaign. They were simply
much better at guerrilla warfare than their opponents.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/mercs_and_the_selous_scouts.htm[2012-05-28 11:44:06]

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WEBMASTERS NOTE; The volunteers who fought alongside the Rhodesians during the bush war,
contrary to the popular perception abroad (and guerrilla propaganda), were not mercenaries (in the legal
sense of the word), but signed up in the Rhodesian Security Forces under the same conditions and at the same
rate of pay as Rhodesian regulars. The word and tile "MERC" appears here because the following articles
are about MERCs who served Rhodesia, But not necessarily in that mode. So the word is not politically
correct, so what!

White-ruled Rhodesia lacked white manpower; and as in the mid-Seventies the war
against the guerilla forces of Joshua Nkomo based in Zambia and those of his rival
Robert Mugabe based in Mozambique grew more ferocious and more murderous,
conscription of the local white settlers proved insufficient to fill the ranks. Therefore, at
first discreetly, then much more openly, Ian Smiths regime began to recruit professional
white soldiers from all over the Western world. Most were British and American. They
were of course fighting for a country that was technically a British colony in rebellion
against the British Crown; but they can hardly be described as traitors. For Rhodesia was
quintessentially British in style and way of life, and proud of it. Perhaps that is why so
very few South Africans joined the Rhodesian army there has always been a strong
mutual antipathy between the Boers of South Africa and the British of Rhodesia despite
their common boundary, shared interests and similar colour of skin. But a certain
number of Americans came to Rhodesia, recruited indirectly via articles and
advertisements in Soldier of Fortune and more directly via Major Robert Brown, the
magazines publisher, who came himself to Salisbury in June 1977 to discuss recruiting
with Colonel Lamprecht, head of Rhodesias recruiting office.
The pay was at the time not high a mere 40 a week and the contract long: three
years. But as the war against the guerillas intensified, the pay rose to $800 a month
minimum, up to $3,000 maximum, and the number of foreigners serving with the
Rhodesians, either as volunteers or as immigrants, to no less than fifteen hundred.
British and Americans apart, a number of other whites from different parts of the world
were recruited. Precise figures are difficult to come by but it seems that the RLI the
Rhodesian Light Infantry was largely composed of West Germans and Danes and mat
both the Selous Scouts, a ferociously ruthless guerilla-killing unit and Greys Scouts,
who patrolled stealthily on horses, were in effect mercenary units.
The foreigners were mercenaries, of course, but they were joining a structured, regularly
paid regular army as individuals; and so they can hardly be said to constitute mercenary
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war-bands in the sense of what had been done in the Congo. Many of these hired
soldiers found them selves gravitated toward the Rhodesian Special Forces. A certain air
of mystery surrounds Special Forces. The Special Forces continued to function after the
ceasefire of November 1979 up to and through the elections of February 1980. On 4
March Lord Soames his last act of importance as Governor asked the victor in the
elections, the Marxist-orientated Mugabe, to form a government. There had been
rumours in the interim of a last desperate fling by the still white-commanded army, a
coup in Salisbury to preempt Mugabes installation as Prime Minister. It came to
nothing. The white units the Special forces; Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Selous
Scouts and SAS were dissolved. Many of the Mercs and Soldiers of these units then
headed south, away from possible reprisals, across the into the Republic of South Africa.
Many of these men were immediately enrolled, most of them, in a rather special unit of
the South African Defence Force (as the Republics armed forces were called), the
Reconnaissance Regiment known as The RECCES.
Ron Reid-Daly, the former commander of the Selous Scouts, found a new mercenary
niche as commander of the Transkei Defence Force, with other fellow ex-Selous Scouts,
becoming the CO of the Transkei Regiment.
The Rhodesian veterans did not, however, apparently fit in too well with what was very
much an Afrikaner-dominated Afrikaner-speaking force; and when their contract came
up for renewal, many were not renewed. This meant that Natal in general and Durban in
particular, the former center of British power in South Africa to which the ex-
Rhodesians naturally gravitated, was by early 1981 full of disgruntled ex-soldiers who
had led an adventurous life in Rhodesia, who had had to become reconciled to the idea
that the South Africa army did not want them, and who were trying half-heartedly to
reconcile themselves to civilian life and civilian employment.
***Source*** This information is edited from; THE NEW MERCENARIES -The History of the Hired Soldier from the Congo to the
Seychelles. By Anthony Mockler.

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ANTI-AMBUSH DEVICES
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The Rhodesians also developed several devices that could be fitted to security force
vehicles to counter ambushes. The objective was to provide the occupants of vehicles with
some means of killing, injuring, or pinning down the ambush party until security forces
could outflank them. One such measure involved mounting devices similar to claymore
mines facing outward from the sides of vehicles. The vehicles were protected by reinforced
backing plates and the mines were detonated electronically from within the cabs. In one
instance, this device killed 11 insurgents during an ambush. Rhodesian engineers also
developed other similar grenade dischargers, including one that used old bolt-action .303
rifles with Ballistic cartridges as a propellant to launch hand grenades from a cup holder
affixed to the barrel. The grenades activating lever was secured by the cup until it was
discharged. Care had to be taken in loading and unloading the dischargers, which were
placed at various points along the vehicle to provide complete coverage. The triggers were
activated by a pull cord and could be fired individually or at once. Another device involved
two AK-47s mounted on the back of a Land Rover. The guns were fired from a solenoid
activator located inside the cab.
All these devices required the driver to travel through the kill zone as quickly as possible
once an ambush occurred. If enough occupants were available to retaliate against the
attackers, the driver would stop the vehicle once it was clear of the ambush point and the
security forces would determine the direction of fire by a quick examination of any bullet
holes on the vehicle. Although the retaliatory devices did not actually kill many insurgents,
reports indicate that they were quite successful in providing a diversion. They also did
much to enhance security force morale.
In sum, mine-protected and mine-resistant vehicles were among the most successful
countermeasures of the war. Although mine warfare, among other insurgent tactics,
imposed a garrison-mentality on Portuguese troops in Mozambique during the early 1970s
and in El Salvador more recently, the Rhodesians actively fought to regain and then retain
control over the roads. The Rhodesians commonsense approach was characterized by a
flexibility in the design and constant modification of the vehicles to keep pace with the
insurgents changing tactics. They thus were able to cope not only with the initial mining
threat, but with each new tactic the insurgents developed. When the insurgents began to
combine small-arms fire with mining, the Rhodesians were able to overcome the new threat
and remained on the roads. Similarly, when the insurgents began planting nonmetallic
mines, the Rhodesians readjusted their mine-detecting devices to home in on the holes
rather than the mines themselves.
Many of these countermeasures were first developed by the police. Civilians contributed as
well, advancing the countermeasures through refinement and improvement. Thus, when the
Army did begin to develop mine-resistant and protected vehicles, it did so from a rich base
of mostly nonmilitary domestic research and experience. In addition, rather than importing a
few expensive vehicles, the Rhodesians inexpensively developed and built their own,
scrounging many of the parts. Again, characteristic of their approach to the entire conflict,
the Rhodesians relied on ingenuity, innovation, and close cooperation to overcome
constraints placed on them by scarce resources and foreign currency shortages.
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FIRE FORCE - PART ONE
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Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia: 1962-1980
by Prof. J.R.T. Wood
In December 1976, an Arospatiale Alouette III helicopter
(configured as a troop-carrying 'G-Car')
1
was rocked by a
volley of 7.62mm rounds at 800 feet as it descended
towards the tree savannah of central Rhodesia. Flown by
Flight Lieutenant Victor Bernard Cook, the G-Car was
carrying a Rhodesian Army medic on a mercy mission to
treat an African civilian, who had been wounded in a contact that morning.
The bullets, flashing up from a clearing in the trees, were fired by 27 members of the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) (supporting Robert Mugabe)
whose base camp Cook was about to overfly. They severed the Alouette's tail rotor shaft
and wounded Cook in the right foot and arms. His technician, Finch Bellringer, was semi-
conscious after being hit by two rounds which penetrated his body armour. The medic was
mercifully unhurt but shocked.
Vic Cooke told his story to Deon du Plessis of The Star (published on 15 April 1977). Du
Plessis wrote that Cooke (33) was flying with his technician and an army medical orderly
to pick up African civilians who had been injured. An army patrol was with the civilians,
waiting for Cook to arrive. Cook was at 1000m when his helicopter came under heavy fire.
He felt some rounds hit his aircraft, and, unable to see where the fire was coming from,
took evasive action, plunging down to tree level.
I levelled off but, I was still under heavy fire. I was almost on top of them. A
lot more rounds hit us. It was fierce. I felt the controls going, there was
vibration. I realised I had to force land. The fire got fiercer. I picked a place to
land. Then I lost tail rotor control. The chopper swung violently. It would have
started cartwheeling. I pulled it up on its tail to knock off forward speed. The
speed came down but we continued to yaw. Still I was quite pleased with what
was happening as I has a semblance of control. I touched the power but could
not hold it down on to its tail. I managed to pull the nose up a little. All the
time they were still shooting. Then I saw them. I thought : There are about as
many as a rugby team.
Coming in for a forced landing, Cook saw a group of about five terrorists standing ahead of
him shooting. Cook made his decision : 'I aimed the aircraft at them deliberately. We
thumped down nose first and I lost sight of them.' As they landed a piece of the control
column came off in Cook's hand. The thump of the landing jerked Cook forward. His jaw
struck the top of the control stick, stunning him and cutting his chin deeply. His foot was
badly gashed. Cook did not realise it and did not know how it happened. 'The engine was
still running and I left it idling, hoping this would make them think we were all right.'
Cook's memory was hazy. His Uzi had been hit and was useless. The medic's FN was bent.
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'I knew the buggers were coming back. I needed a weapon. Then I saw this terr lying
beyond the chopper. He may have been hit by the rotor when we came down. I don't know.
But he had an AK and all I knew was he was between me and that weapon. I grabbed his
AK and shot him with it. He was shouting in Shona when I shot him. I don't know what he
was doing. I don't remember if we even struggled. I shouted to the medic and tech : 'Run
for the high ground'. I ran, but then saw they were not following me. I shouted again :
'Let's move!' But the tech said : 'I can't move.' The tech had been shot while they were in
the air. Together Cook and the medic dragged the tech to the higher ground. Cook then saw
the terrorists moving in the bush 100 metres away. Cook ran forward and fired a magazine
from his AK at them. 'I saw other movement and I bolted to another position and ripped off
another burst.' Cook then positioned himself between the enemy and his crew. 'Then I went
out further and did a few circuits of the chopper. The movement disappeared and I moved
from tree to tree and rock to rock. I was in a good strong position.'
Cook was 'bloody angry' at being forced down, and wanted to pursue the terrorists. But he
kept tripping and only then did he see the deep gash in his foot. He could see the bone.
'After that I didn't feel so aggressive,' he said. He helped the medic erect a drip stand on the
wounded technician. Of the medical orderly, Cook said 'He was a star. At no stage did he
abandon his patient.'
The Rhodesian Army unit, which had called Cook from Rutenga (in south eastern
Rhodesia) was close by and heard the crash and the firing. It summoned help. Fifty minutes
later a Reims Cessna FTB 337G 'Lynx', twin-engined light aircraft, arrived overhead, to be
followed shortly by the Fire Force. Cook and his crew were evacuated by helicopter and a
follow-up on the tracks on his attackers was instituted. Cook recalled : 'There were four
brown jobs. They were a beautiful sight.' Cook was awarded the Silver Cross but said he
did not believe that he deserved it. 'Not when you see what the browns do. Those RLI
guys, they are all Silver Cross material.'
2
For his gallantry, Victor Cook was awarded the Silver Cross of Rhodesia.
3
Flying the helicopter came later in the life of the always small, if potent, Rhodesian Air
Force. When the helicopter was adopted, its agility - its ability to hover, to land and take-
off in almost impossible terrain - was exploited to the full by the Rhodesians in their
counter-insurgency war. Indeed the Rhodesians were to produce a unique and deadly
variant of the tactic of vertical envelopment of a target by helicopter-borne infantry
which they called Fire Force.
There was nothing new in the military use of helicopters. As soon as helicopters were
available, the air forces and armies of the world gave them a multitude of tasks. The first
workable machines appeared in the Second World War - the American Sikorsky R-6A and
the German Flettner F1 282 Kolibri. Helicopters found general use thereafter. They were
used for casualty evacuation in Korea and for moving forces to combat insurgents in
Malaya, French Indo-China and in Kenya. In Algeria the French developed the use of
armed helicopters, the first gunships (armed Alouette IIs) working with parachute troops
and helicopter-borne infantry (carried in American Vertol H-21 twin rotor helicopters) to
isolate and eliminate insurgent units.
There was a clear need for helicopters in Rhodesia but almost all of the terrain was over 2
000 feet above sea level and the climate was hot. As height and heat drastically reduced the
efficiency of helicopter engines, a special helicopter was required. Such a helicopter was to
be developed by the French who took the lead early on in the race to design light turboshaft
engines. The man of vision in France was Joseph Szydlowski, who founded the Socit
Turbomca in 1938 and worked on small gas turbines throughout the Second World War
despite Nazi occupation of his factory. By 1949 he produced the Artouste Mark II gas
turbine which produced 400 shaft horse power (shp) and, at 253 lbs, weighed less than half
than any equivalent piston engine. The American Boeing Company was working on gas
turbines and one powered the first gas-turbine helicopter in the world, the Kaman K-225
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twin-rotor egg-beater of the US Navy, which flew on 10 December 1951. But Boeing
soon lost interest and left the field to the French.
In 1953 the Artouste Mark II replaced the radial piston engine of the small crop-spraying
helicopter, the Sud-Aviation (later Arospatiale) SE3120 Alouette [Lark]. This gave it such
a unique performance that Socit Turbomca became the leading supplier of small turbine
helicopter engines in the western world.
The Alouette II had an open girder frame, exposed engine, skid landing gear and bubble
canopy. Aside from the pilot it could carry four passengers, or two stretchers and two
sitting wounded, or a 1 100 lb load - either in a sling under the fuselage, or in the form of
guns, missiles or homing torpedoes. In June 1955 this little helicopter set a new world
height record by climbing to 26 932 feet and found a ready market in 33 countries.
Turbomcas next jet engine, the Astazou (derated from 530 to 350 shp)
4
gave constant
power under any conditions of height and hot climate. It doubled the load-carrying
capacity of the Alouette II and led to even wider sales. The Indian version, the HAL
Cheetah, landed and took-off at heights above 24 600 feet in the Himalayas. In June 1958
the Alouette II set a height record for helicopters at 36 037 feet. The arrival of the even
more powerful Artouste engine (derated from 870 to 570 shp) resulted in the bigger
Alouette III which first flew on 28 February 1959 and was soon performing spectacularly.
In June 1960, it landed and took-off with seven people on board at an altitude of 15 780
feet on Mount Blanc in the French Alps. In November 1960, carrying two crew members
and a 550 lbs load, it landed and took-off at an altitude of 19 698 ft. This was
unprecedented in the world of helicopters.
The Alouette III SA316B could accommodate the pilot and six fully equipped troops. The
Rhodesian practice was to carry a technician and four troops and to mount a FN 7.62mm
MAG machine-gun [after 1976 twin Mk 2 .303 Brownings - the RAF's turret and wing
guns of the Second World War] at the port rear door. The passenger seats were easily
removed, allowing the carriage of a variety of different loads. Experience in combat led the
Rhodesians to remove the doors and to reverse the front passenger seats to widen the
available floorspace and gain flexibility. Casualties could be put on the floor. It was easier
to leave the helicopter quickly and more could be carried.
5
There was provision for an
external sling for cargoes weighing up to 1 650 lbs (750 kgs). A hoist could be fitted with a
380 lbs (175 kgs) capacity to allow casualties and other loads to be winched up. The
Alouette III could carry two stretcher cases and two seated wounded.
Produced after first flying on 27 June 1968 and exported after 1970, the SA319B Alouette
III was powered by the Astazou XIV (derated from 870 to 600 shp) which was even more
effective in hot and high conditions and more economical. The SA319B had strengthened
main and tail rotor transmissions. It weighed slightly more but could carry a heavier
payload.
The Alouette III SA316B had a maximum speed of 124 mph at sea level and a cruising
speed of 115 mph. The Alouette IIIs service ceiling was 13 100 feet and it had a hovering
ceiling in ground effect of 9 450 feet. Out of ground effect, the hovering ceiling was 5 000
feet. Its range at optimum altitude is given at 335 miles. SA319B had a slightly longer
range. In practice these ranges were considerably shorter. Under Rhodesian conditions,
when loaded with troops, the Alouette would fly at 65 knots (or 75 mph) and, with a light
load, at 84 knots (or 97 mph). At 84 knots, its range was 242 miles (210 nautical miles).
The Alouette III SA316B 'K-Car' gunship, armed with a 20mm cannon and ammunition,
and a crew of three, would have an endurance of an hour and a quarter to an hour and a
half when loaded with 600 lbs of fuel. The Alouette III SA316B troop-carrying 'G-Car'
with 400 lbs of fuel, a crew of two and four fully equipped troops had an average
endurance of forty-five minutes.
The Alouette III is a magnificent military machine, capable of being operated well beyond
what its designers expected. It uses jet fuel (paraffin) but can operate on diesel - and petrol
in a dire emergency [and only for a short flight]. It is capable of absorbing astonishing
quantities of small arms fire and even hits from anti-tank rockets. An Alouette III, flown
by Ted Lunt and carrying Major Pieter Farndell of Support Commando, Rhodesian Light
Infantry, was hit in the tail section by an RPG7 rocket and still brought them home safely.
On 14 October 1978, Dick Paxton's Alouette III, with Major Nigel Henson (also of Support
Commando) aboard, was riddled by small arms fire when Paxton flew it slowly at a low
altitude over a hidden insurgent camp. Paxton was caught like this because of confusion
over an incorrect map reference supplied by the personnel of an observation position (OP)
overlooking the camp. With all instruments shattered and a blade punctured, Paxton was
still able to climb to his operational height, 800 feet, orbit, and put down suppressive fire,
before flying out.
6
The celebrated pilot and, later, Selous Scout, Michael Borlace, brought
an Alouette III home to Fort Victoria airfield with tail rotor control failure and landed it
without harm to its crew and its complement of black soldiers. As has been seen, Flight
Lieutenant Victor Cook was able to land his Alouette even after its tail rotor drive shaft
had been severed. The impression must not be given, however, that the Alouette was
invulnerable because a hit in the engine or the main rotor gear box could be fatal.
7
Both versions of the Alouette III were bought by Rhodesia while finding favour in 68 other
countries.
8
How many of each type Rhodesia possessed has not been revealed. Given
international sanctions as a consequence of the unilateral declaration of independence by
Ian Smith on 11 November 1965, clarity of records cannot be expected. It is known that :

3
were acquired in April
1962
(1 damaged beyond repair: on 17 January 1972)
2 in July 1962
3
(with hoists) in August
1963
4 in August 1968
(2 damaged beyond repair: on 1 July 1970 and 20
November 1973)
1 in April 1972 (1 damaged beyond repair: on 17 March 1977)
5 in December 1972
2 in January 1974
1 in July 1974
2 in January 1975
2 in March 1975
4 in June 1975 (1 shot down: on 18 May 1977)
1 in February 1977
5 date not known
3 in June 1979
12 date not known

There were many more helicopters brought down by fire from the ground than the above
list indicates and many were re-built. In fact, all Alouettes are rebuilt totally in the course
of their preventive maintenance cycle. The engine would be changed after 1 200 flying
hours and the airframe after 3 600.
9
In the difficult times after 1965, many helicopters were
built entirely from spares.
10
This list gives a total of 50 Alouettes but how many were actually owned by Rhodesia and
how many were on loan from South Africa is not clear.
11
At one stage, 27 South African
helicopters were deployed in Rhodesia. Within No. 7 (helicopter) Squadron, the South
African Alouettes were designated as belonging to Alpha Flight. In 1980, when Rhodesia
had become Zimbabwe, the Air Force of Zimbabwe was left with eight Alouettes which
gives some indication of its true strength. By deft evasion of the international sanctions and
the consequent arms embargo, eleven Italian Agusta- Bell 205A (the Rhodesians called
them, Cheetahs) were acquired in August 1978. The AB205A was the celebrated
American Huey of Vietnam fame built under licence in Italy with a range of 400
kilometres and a maximum speed of 126 miles per hour. It was designed to carry 11
passengers but because these particular AB205As were elderly, and after armour and twin
.303 inch machine-guns had been fitted, they could transport eight troops. Thus they had a
greater range and double the carrying capacity of the Alouettes. In 1979 the use of the
205As on external operations into neighbouring countries meant that the Fire Forces
engaged in internal operations were not constantly robbed of their Alouette IIIs. This
allowed the creation of large 'Jumbo' Fire Forces which contributed to the increased
casualties inflicted on the insurgent forces.
The purchase and immediate fate of the Rhodesian AB205As before they arrived in
Rhodesia is not clear. They came to Rhodesia via the Comoro Islands, a common route for
embargoed items. It is believed that thirteen AB205As were ordered from Agusta in Italy
by a customer in Kuwait. They were delivered by ship in Beirut, were unloaded and moved
to Kaslik, a Maronite suburb of Beirut. Then they were bartered for arms from Israel for
Major Haddads Christian militia in southern Lebanon. The Rhodesians were led to believe
that they had purchased new aircraft but the AB205As they received were beyond their
safe flying life. With vital parts corroded, the Rhodesians had a major task in restoring the
aircraft to a flying condition. Early in their operational life, one AB205A was lost when its
tail rotor sheared on 12 February 1979 but otherwise they were to make a significant
contribution to the counter-insurgency operations.
The importance of helicopters to Rhodesia was such that, when its counter-insurgency war
was at its height, No. 7 Squadron was the largest squadron in the world with 40 Rhodesian
pilots and some 20 seconded South African Air Force pilots, flying 45 aircraft. Pilots
served three year tours on the different aircraft types of the Rhodesian Air Force. When,
because of political pressures, South African pilots were withdrawn, the loss was made up
by seconding senior qualified personnel from headquarters (after a five-hour
refamiliarisation course) and by calling up former pilots who had returned to civilian life.
The Rhodesian Air Force might have been of excellent quality but it was always the
smallest of the Rhodesian units. Its greatest strength in the 1970s was only ever 2 300
personnel (150 of them pilots) and including the General Service Unit which was deployed
to guard its installations.
The birth of Rhodesias air force was unintentional. In the mid-thirties, when the re-
emergence of a German threat to peace caused nations to re-examine their defences, the
members of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia did likewise. In a gesture of
loyalty, they offered Britain 10 000 for the Royal Navy to strengthen imperial defence.
They were not expecting the British to respond with the suggestion that Southern Rhodesia
should establish an air training unit. This illustrated the unique position of the Colony of
Southern Rhodesia in the British Empire because, not only was she self- governing, but she
had the right to defend herself despite not having the status of a dominion and therefore
sovereignty. As external threats hardly existed, defence was left to the only regular force in
the colony, the British South Africa Police (BSAP), reinforced by the part-time white
territorials of the Rhodesia Regiment and district rifle platoons.
The air training unit, placed under command of the Rhodesia Regiment, sent the first six
trainee pilots for instruction at the local flying school run by the de Haviland Company at
Belvedere Airport, Salisbury [now Harare], in November 1935. They trained on Wednesday
afternoons and weekends in Gipsy Moths and Tiger Moths. By 1937-1939 the unit had a
new airfield, at Cranborne in the southern outskirts of Salisbury, and 15 biplanes - six
Hawker Hart bombers, six Hawker Audaxes two-seat army co-operation aircraft and three
Gloster Gauntlet single seat fighters.
The imminence of war led to the mobilisation of the Air Unit and on 28 August 1939,
Southern Rhodesia was the first in the British Empire to send her servicemen abroad. Two
flights of Harts and Audaxes took off for Kenya to replace No. 233 Squadron of the Royal
Air Force which had departed for the Sudan. Again Southern Rhodesia had demonstrated
her loyalty to Britain and would remind Britain of this when relations soured twenty years
later.
On 19 September 1939 the Air Unit was renamed the Southern Rhodesian Air Force with
its three flights in Kenya becoming No. 1 Squadron. Southern Rhodesia also formed the
Rhodesian Air Training Group to train British aircrew under the Empire Training Scheme,
building training establishments outside Salisbury, Bulawayo and Gwelo [now Gweru],
which produced 2 000 pilots and 300 navigators for the Royal Air Force.
In 1939 the 69 000 whites in Southern Rhodesia were able to spare 10 000 men and women
for war. To avoid devastating casualties, major Rhodesian units, with the exception of the
Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), were not sent abroad. Instead Rhodesians were seconded
to the South African and British services. On 22 April 1940, No. 1 Squadron of the
Southern Rhodesian Air Force was absorbed by the Royal Air Force as No. 237 (Rhodesia)
Squadron. Two other Royal Air Force squadrons, No. 266 and No. 44 had Rhodesia
added to their titles. 977 Rhodesian officers and 1 432 airmen served in the Royal Air
Force with 579 becoming casualties and of those 498 died. Rhodesian airmen won 256
medals. One member of No. 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron was Ian Douglas Smith, later the
Prime Minister.
The end of the war and demobilisation left Southern Rhodesia with only two regular
defence units, the RAR and the Permanent Staff Corps, which supplied the instructors for
the compulsory territorial service which young white males underwent in the Rhodesia
Regiment, attending short camps and weekend parades. Within the Staff Corps, however,
there were airmen fresh from war, and their enthusiasm led to the revival of the air unit
and, then, in 1947, to the re-establishment of the Southern Rhodesian Air Force (SRAF).
Its strength was 69 officers and men, flying North American Harvard advanced trainers
acquired from the South African Air Force and the Royal Air Force. In 1948 Field Marshal
Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, donated a Douglas C47 Dakota. In 1951
twenty- two Supermarine Spitfire Mark XXIIs were acquired to be flown by short-service
officers and part-time pilots. In 1952-1953 the SRAF entered the jet age, re-equipping with
sixteen Vampire FB9 fighter- bombers, sixteen Vampire T11 jet-trainers and sixteen
Percival Provost piston-engined basic trainers.
Again the money for these aircraft had come from a loyal gesture. The Imperial defence
authorities had informed the Southern Rhodesian Government that, without jet aircraft, the
SRAF was useless for defence of the Empire and should be disbanded. Southern Rhodesia
was, as ever, short of money, so the long-serving Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir
Godfrey Huggins, turned for help to his future partner in the coming Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Roy Welensky, the Leader of the Unofficial Members in the
Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. Not wanting to lose the SRAF and knowing that
re-equipment was inevitable once the Federation was in being, Welensky persuaded the
Northern Rhodesian Government to meet the bill of 200 000.
12
The British sanction of the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland - an
unlikely marriage of a self-governing colony with two protectorates - was the product of a
sustained campaign by Roy Welensky and Godfrey Huggins, both of whom hoped to create
a great British dominion north of the Limpopo. Although the Federation did not gain
sovereign status, it inherited Southern Rhodesias right of defence and took over the SRAF
and the army units of the three territories. The Queen granted the title Royal Rhodesian
Air Force (RRAF) and khaki army uniforms and rank structures were exchanged for
British style Air Force blues and ranks.
In 1956 the RRAF comprised No. 1 and No. 2 Vampire squadrons; No. 3 transport
squadron, with eight C47 Dakotas and two Percival Pembroke light transports; and No. 4
training squadron, with Provosts. The air station at Thornhill was acquired from the
departing Royal Air Force and was modernised. The Federation undertook to supply
infantry and air force reinforcements to the British Middle East Command as its
contribution to Commonwealth defence. Consequently in 1959 it bought four Canadair C4
transports
13
and fifteen English Electric Canberra B2 light bombers. In 1958, the Vampire
squadrons helped the Royal Air Force deal with dissident tribesmen in the Aden
Protectorate. In 1961 Rhodesian transport aircraft supported British forces in the Kuwait
crisis and dropped food in a flood-relief operation in Kenya. In 1959-1963 the Canberra
squadrons regularly reinforced the Royal Air Force in Cyprus. In 1963 the front-line
strength was enhanced when No. 1 Squadron re-equipped with twelve Hawker Hunter
FGA9 ground attack fighters. The RRAF remained small but justly proud of its efficiency.
While the Royal Air Force needed a ratio of 300 men per jet aircraft, the Rhodesians could
achieve a better rate of serviceability with only 30 men per aircraft.
14
The role of the RRAF by then was not an entirely external one. From 1956 onwards the
Federal forces began to concentrate on internal security operations. In response to
awakening African rejection of white rule and the British and French retreat from empire,
the RRAF formed No. 6 Squadron, equipped with Provosts, for an internal security role.
There were clear signs of strengthening African nationalism in all three territories of the
Federation. In 1957 there were riots in an African township in Salisbury. In 1958 Dr
Hastings Banda returned from abroad to lead the African resistance in Nyasaland and
would by 1962 convince the British that the Federation could not endure and that
Nyasaland had to secede. Applying equal pressure was Kenneth Kaunda in Northern
Rhodesia. After 1957 the African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia, with Joshua Nkomo
taking a prominent role, became more militant. In February 1959 the RRAFs No. 3
Squadron flew troops from Southern Rhodesia to quell unrest in Nyasaland. RRAF
Provosts flew in support of the police and troops, dispersing crowds with air-delivered tear
gas canisters, dropping leaflets and undertaking reconnaissance. Vampire jets flew
showing the flag flights as did the new Canberra bombers. Belgiums sudden decision in
1960 to withdraw from the Congo, creating Zare, brought mutinies, insurrection and the
Katanga crisis. The Federal Army was deployed to the Northern Rhodesia northern border
while the RRAF protected Federal airspace and flew out of the Congo over 2 000 whites
refugees, fleeing the violence.
Experience in Nyasaland highlighted the need for rapid reinforcement of troops. The
feasibility of the use of paratroops was examined in March 1960 when the RRAF adapted
Dakota aircraft for tests.
15
The acquisition of helicopters was considered but the
contemporary helicopters were useless in the Federations hot and high conditions. The
Alouette III helicopter was not yet available.
Then, on 9 May 1960, in a review of Imperial defence, the Chief of Imperial General Staff,
Lord Louis Mountbatten, suggested to Welensky (then the Federal Prime Minister) that the
Federal contribution should be reduced from an infantry brigade to a squadron of SAS
parachute-trained special forces, providing the Federal Army with its paratroops. The
mutinies of black soldiers in the Congo in the next month encouraged the Federal
Government to establish white professional army units - C Squadron of the SAS, the First
Battalion of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (1RLI) and an armoured car squadron - as
insurance.
16
The territorial army was expanded, with reserve battalions increasing the
number of the Rhodesia Regiment battalions to ten. The BSAP recruited a police reserve of
30 000 whites and blacks. The RRAF formed a parachute school to train the SAS and
created the Volunteer Reserve to tap the skills of the civilian population. It ordered
Alouette III helicopters, choosing them not only because they suited local conditions, but
because their price suited the Federal Treasury. The Alouette III was also the choice of the
South African Air Force which meant that training facilities and expertise could be shared.
The Portuguese Air Force had also purchased Alouette IIIs and would be the first to use
them with French 20mm cannons.
This strengthening of forces was also in response to the increasing African nationalist
sponsored unrest in all the territories and in Southern Rhodesia in particular. The
emergence of the militant Youth League in 1957 gave black resistance a new edge. In
February 1959 the Southern Rhodesian Government responded with a state of emergency,
designed to crush resistance quickly so that troops could be released to deal with Banda in
Nyasaland. By then the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had decided to speed up
the decolonisation process dramatically and seek Britains future in Europe. Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia were moved rapidly towards independence while in 1961 Southern
Rhodesia was given a new constitution, designed to give blacks an enhanced political role
and eventual domination. The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead,
had in fact been seeking quasi-dominion status but the British Government was in no mood
to give the whites - less than five per cent of the population - perpetual political
domination. If Southern Rhodesia were to become an independent sovereign nation, she
had to accept rule by the majority. While this was rejected by the whites, it encouraged
black resistance. The National Democratic Party demanded power and persuaded its leader,
Joshua Nkomo, to reject the new constitution.
Whitehead attempted to meet black aspirations with a number of reforms of racial
legislation but when he threatened to deal with the fundamental black grievance, that of the
unequal racial allocation of land, the white electorate ousted him in the general election of
1962. He was succeeded by the Rhodesian Front led by Winston Field who promised not to
tamper with land tenure and to secure independence at the demise of the Federation in the
next year. Field did not deal with the land issue and he failed to secure independence. His
party replaced him in 1963 with Ian Smith. British intransigence on the independence issue
led Smith to declare Rhodesia independent on 11 November 1965.
Black resistance in Southern Rhodesia had led Whitehead to strengthen the police force, to
ban the National Democratic Party (only to see it replaced instantly by the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union (ZAPU)) and to introduce security legislation. The African
nationalists countered with urban unrest - riots, strikes and the like. The favoured weapon
was the petrol bomb aimed mostly at blacks collaborating with the whites. In addition, in
1962, the African nationalists decided on an armed struggle and sent young men for
training in Ghana, Tanganyika and at insurgency warfare schools in Russia and its satellite
countries. Also in 1962 the police began to uncover arms caches. Over a thousand African
nationalist supporters were arrested and Whitehead banned ZAPU. African nationalists set
fire to forests at Chipinga on the eastern border and the SAS parachuted in to deal with
them.
Thus the war of liberation, known as the Chimurenga, began in late 1962. The pattern of
urban violence continued for a year or more and then fizzled out because of good police
work and the effectiveness of the law. The African nationalists split into two factions, the
ZAPU led by Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by the
Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (later to be ousted by Robert Mugabe), and established
themselves in sympathetic Zambia across the Zambezi. From there, from 1966 onwards,
they sent men into Rhodesia to foster rebellion in the urban and rural areas. The towns
remained unco-operative but the rural areas began to harbour the insurgents in 1972 when
the success of FRELIMO rebels in Mozambique provided the Rhodesian African
nationalists with safe havens and supplies close to the border.
Internal security was a responsibility of the police who were assisted by the Army and the
RRAF. The new No. 7 Squadron, equipped with the Arospatiale SA316B Alouette IIIs,
was able to insert personnel quickly to precise points and rescue the stranded and the
injured. Three Alouettes arrived in April 1962, two in July and three in August 1963. As
soon as the first two pilots, trained in France and South Africa, were on strength, they were
sent to fly over the townships, dropping leaflets and tear-gas grenades on rioting crowds
(only rarely), sky shouting, acting as airborne and command posts, and generally
assisting the police. As pilots only have time to listen to snappy, brief transmissions, the
police and army were forced to revise their ponderous radio procedures.
In the division of assets at the break-up of the Federation in 1963 the RRAF was returned
to Southern Rhodesia with all its aircraft except for three transport aircraft which were
given to Zambia. By then the RRAF had 1 200 regulars including a General Service Unit of
black soldiers for guard and transport duties. Some adjustments were made. The Argonauts
were sold and No. 6 Squadron (then a Canberra squadron) was disbanded and its aircraft
went into storage.
At the time of UDI in 1965 the RRAF had concentrated at two bases - New Sarum near
Salisbury and Thornhill near Gwelo.
New Sarum housed the administration, the photographic and the air movements sections,
the aircrew selection centre, the apprentice training school and the parachute training
section. Its air units were No. 3 Squadron (transport), No. 5 (bomber) with Canberras and
No. 7 Squadron (helicopter) with Alouettes.
Thornhill had No. 1 Squadron (fighter) with Hunters, No. 2 Squadron (fighter) with
Vampire FB9s and No. 4 Squadron (flying training) with Provosts. The trainees first flew
Provosts and then Vampire T11s before flying the Vampire FB9s on armament training.
Thereafter all pilots rotated through the squadrons, learning to fly a variety of the aircraft
on strength. This gave the RRAF pilots considerable versatility. They would serve tours on
helicopters, ground attack aircraft, fighters, or transports before becoming instructors.
17
The types they flew depended on the pilot's nature. The more sedate pilots would fly
transports and the Canberra bombers while the more aggressive would be posted to the
fighters. Pilots would serve two tours with the squadrons before they were posted on their
instructors courses, flying Provosts on basic flying training for a year or two before going
on to jet instruction or taking up instructors' posts with the squadrons.
18
Facing little external threat, the first challenge facing the RRAF (which in 1970 would drop
Royal from its title when Rhodesia became a republic) was how to procure spares and
aircraft in defiance of international sanctions. This was met with ingenuity and subterfuge.
The jet engines were a particular challenge as, prior to 1965, they had been sent to Rolls
Royce in Britain for servicing. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11
November 1965 prompted the British to seize fourteen Avon engines being serviced for the
Rhodesian Hunters and Canberras. This loss forced the Rhodesian Air Force technicians to
service and maintain the remainder of their engines and equipment themselves with the
help of local industry. After 70 starts, the starter motors for the Hunters had previously
been sent back to Rolls Royce for servicing at a cost of 14 000 per motor. The RRAF
technicians taught themselves to strip down the starter motors and service them at a cost of
76 pence per unit! That nine of the twelve Hunters were still flying 16 years later was a
measure of their success. Spares and weapons were secured through clandestine purchasing
and local manufacture - including the production of a singularly lethal range of aircraft
bombs - the Frantan, Alpha and Golf.
19
While jet fighters and bombers could not be purchased and had to be repaired, it was
possible to replace the light aircraft. In August 1967, No. 6 Squadron was revived to take
over No. 4 Squadrons role of basic flying training with seven Provosts. No. 4 Squadron re-
equipped with ten new Aermacchi AL60- B2Ls for the counter-insurgency role.
Assembling them themselves, the Rhodesians called the AL60- B2Ls, 'Trojans' to confuse
the outside world. In fact, 28 refurbished North American T28 'Trojans'
20
had been bought
from France in 1966-1967 but the ship carrying them had turned back within sight of Cape
Town when the United States Government threatened to revoke all manufacturing licences
held by the French. In January 1976 the Aermacchi AL60-B2L Trojans were replaced by
twenty-one Reims Cessna FTB 337G Lynxes, twin-boom, twin piston-engined light attack
aircraft. In 1977 thirty-one SIAI Marchetti SF260 Genets were bought to replace the
Provost trainers of No. 6 Squadron and to provide more light attack aircraft. In 1976 six
Britten-Norman BN-A Islanders were obtained for No. 3 Squadron to join additional
Dakotas, a Cessna 421A and a Beech 95 C-55 Baron. In 1978 a new Squadron, No. 8, was
created to fly the eleven Agusta Bell 205A Cheetah helicopters.
Time caught up with the Canberras and the Vampires and they became dangerous to fly. A
Canberra B2 was re-built from spare parts and the South Africans passed on surplus
Vampire FB52s and T11s. In the mid-seventies, when the T11s were beyond repair, South
Africa set up a flying school in Durban where young Rhodesians flew Impala jet trainers.
In addition, when needed, the South Africans would reinforce the Rhodesian Canberra
force with Canberra B12s of their own. The South African contribution included building
two advanced airfields, capable of handling jet aircraft, at Wankie, just south of Victoria
Falls, and at Fylde, near Hartley west of Salisbury. These bases were intended to provide
for joint Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese defence. More important was South
Africa's helicopters and crews. These were sent into Rhodesia in support of the South
African Police units which served in Rhodesia between 1967-1975 or were seconded to the
Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) as Alpha Flight or were allowed to join the RhAF for tours
of duty. Some South African aircrew did tours as long as three years. When major cross-
border operations were being mounted, such was the cooperation with the South African
Air Force that the Rhodesians could field 50 helicopters.
The South African helicopter force was, however, a double-edged sword on occasions. The
South African Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, used it to apply political pressure on the
Rhodesian Government. In 1976, for example, when he was seeking to coerce Ian Smith
into accepting majority rule, Vorster withdrew 27 pilots on the pretext of protesting at the
escalation of the Rhodesian war, represented by the raid by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts on
an insurgent camp at Nyadzonya in Mozambique on 8 August. Vorster also cut off
Rhodesia's supplies of ammunition and fuel, forcing Ian Smith to accept the settlement
proposals offered to him in September by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Once
Smith's acceptance of majority rule had produced the first African dominated government,
that of Bishop Muzorewa, the South African support was liberally renewed with, amongst
other aid, two South African-manned Fire Forces being established in the south of
Matabeleland, with four South African Arospatiale Pumas each. The troops were South
African Parabats (paratroopers) with Rhodesian pilots and army personnel assisting.
When the RhAF required long-range transports for cross border operations it borrowed
them from the commercial air line Air Trans Africa whose owner, Jack Malloch, was an
officer in the Volunteer Reserve. Many vital spares were brought in by Malloch who ran a
sustained exercise in the evasion of sanctions. Other members of the Volunteer Reserve
were used to staff forward airfields (FAFs) in the operational areas, established once the
insurgency became a fact of life, to provide air support for the ground forces. Eventually
there were nine such bases : FAF1 (Wankie); FAF2 (Kariba); FAF3 (Centenary); FAF4
(Mount Darwin); FAF5 (Mtoko); FAF6 (Chipinga); FAF7 (Buffalo Range); FAF8 (Grand
Reef); and FAF9 (Rutenga). In addition, impromptu FAFs would be created as needed
anywhere there was a 1 000 yard runway.
It was from the FAFs that the helicopters and aircraft assigned to Fire Force operated.
Thornhill and New Sarum provided facilities for major maintenance and repair but the
helicopter units of four to six aircraft were mostly self-sufficient because each helicopter
crew comprised a pilot and a qualified technician who maintained the aircraft as well as
manning its machine-guns or 20mm cannon. The jet squadrons based at Thornhill and New
Sarum, being in the centre of Rhodesia, were able to provide quick response anywhere
when a target tough enough to need the attention of Hunters and Canberras presented itself.

The helicopter has unique features to offer the military. Under anything but truly abnormal
conditions, helicopters can ascend or descend at steep angles, allowing them to operate
from confined and unimproved areas such as forest clearings, narrow valleys etc.
Although the French had designed the Alouette II and III as purely clear weather daylight
machines and therefore had not fitted the necessary night flying equipment, the Rhodesian
pilots would fly at night if they could see the horizon. Their take-offs and landings required
only minimum illumination. The ability of the helicopter to fly at high or low altitudes and
to decelerate rapidly, combined with the capacity for slow forward speed and vertical
landing, allows it to be flown under marginal weather conditions. The insistence on a
minimum horizon was the product of an accident which killed Air Lieutenant G. Munton-
Jackson and his technician, Flight Sergeant P.J. Garden, on 17 January 1972. Prior to that,
pilots had flown in the dark, virtually without instruments - the French had fitted an E2A
as the principal compass. In other aircraft, the E2A was a standby device. The lack of
direction finding equipment had led to Peter Petter-Bowyer in 1969, when flying a load of
ammunition and weapons before dawn from Thornhill, Gwelo, to Binga, on the Zambezi
River, to stray north west into Zambia. Low on fuel and lost, Petter-Bowyer landed next to
a farm, near Livingstone, to ask where he was. An African enlightened him but did not tell
him that he had landed next to ZAPU's base at 'Freedom Farm'. This Petter-Bowyer did not
discover until he had landed back in Rhodesia at the Victoria Falls and was told so by Air
Vice-Marshal Harold Hawkins, the Commander of the Air Force. The net result was that
the Alouettes were fitted with Becker radio direction finders. Munton-Jackson was flying
one of a pair of Alouette IIIs en route from New Sarum, Salisbury, to Thornhill. The
Alouettes were caught in a heavy thunder storm and an attempt was made to bring them in
on a radar approach. One Alouette succeeded but Munton-Jackson crashed. It was not
known whether he became disorientated but it was decided that henceforth the helicopters
would only fly when a horizon could be discerned. The pressure of the war would lead to
that ruling often being ignored. In the interests of safety, the officers commanding No 7
Squadron made every effort to enforce the ruling but precedents had been set and it was
difficult to convince the ground forces that a casualty evacuation or other such requirement
was impossible because of the lack of a horizon. Pilots found themselves in difficult and
invidious positions but, as the war progressed, they began to transgress the rule less and
less. They were so often in danger that they could not be persuaded to take even greater
risks.
21
The wide speed range and high manoeuvrability at slow speeds enables helicopters to fly
safely at low altitudes using hills and trees as cover. In low intensity warfare - where there
are no front lines - the choice can be made of the most concealed line of approach to the
enemy. The noise of the engines will alert him, but the reflection of the sound of low-
flying helicopters can deceive him as to the direction being taken. Helicopters can achieve
surprise through 'contour-flying' (flying just above the tree-tops, following the contours of
the land). They can confuse by using dummy deployments of infantry stop- groups, and
can, as the Rhodesians showed, employ a shock effect by putting down lethal fire. The
Alouette III lacked the aerobatic capabilities of more modern helicopters. Nevertheless a
Rhodesian Alouette, configured as a gunship or 'K-Car', flown by Charles Goatley, with
Beaver Shaw manning the 20mm cannon, had the distinction of shooting down a Botswana
Defence Force Islander on 9 August 1979.
22
This happened when Goatley was covering a
recovery by helicopters of troops from an external operation against a Zimbabwe People's
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) base at Francistown.
23
Noise, however, was a constant problem in giving away the approach of an attacking force.
On 5 February 1979, during Operation Dabchick, a raid on Mucheneze Camp across
Rhodesia's south eastern border in Mozambique, the SAS call-sign watching the camp
heard the approaching AB205A Cheetahs eight minutes before they arrived. The
Rhodesians also often flew the noisy Aermacchi AL60-B2L Trojans ahead of the Fire
Force to mask the whine of the helicopters. Peter Petter-Bowyer did this when leading Fire
Force to camps which he had discovered through his aerial reconnaissance. On Operation
Dingo in November 1977 a DC8 jet airliner was flown over ZANLA camps near Chimoio
an hour before the airstrike which opened the attack on them. ZANLA were holding their
muster parade, and, as expected, took cover at the sound of the DC8. They returned to the
parade ground and did not disperse when they heard jet engines again because they
assumed that the DC8 was returning. What they heard was the sound of Hunter ground
attack fighters diving out of the sun and the approach of a small armada of Alouettes.
Crucial factors with regard to masking noise were terrain and wind direction. An
approaching Fire Force would plot its flight to the target with these in mind. In 1979 a Fire
Force would fly from Centenary in a southerly half-circle - having to refuel on the way - to
attack targets in the Sipolilo area in order to exploit a wind from the east to hide its
approach. The warning given by the noise of aircraft led to Fire Force commanders asking
the personnel on an OP to tell them when the aircraft could be heard. Usually the OP heard
the aircraft when they were four minutes from the target and four minutes would give the
insurgents time to run a kilometre and a half. Every minute wasted in finding them,
allowed them to flee a further 500 metres. This meant that the orbit of the searching aircraft
had to be widened continuously.
Given a controlled airspace, helicopters can be used to seize objectives which otherwise
are out of reach of ground troops because of obstacles or enemy action. Helicopters permit
the placement of firepower and troops virtually anywhere. For example, two Alouettes
were deployed with a mortar team. One Alouette carried the tube and ammunition, and the
other carried the crew. Once the mortar was in action, the second helicopter provided aerial
spotting which produced hits on target often with third bomb fired. This was practised from
1971 onwards but was not widely used because the 20mm cannon of the K-Car gave the
Fire Forces potent and instant fire power except when soft ground absorbed its shells. The
helicopter crews were also used to observe and correct the fall of shot for the Rhodesian
Field Artillery Regiment. Vic Cook did this at night, flying above Leopard Rock Hotel in
the Vumba (on the eastern border of Rhodesia) and spotting for the 5.5 inch medium guns
harassing Machipanda in Mozambique. The second shell hit the target.
As well as the rapid insertion of ground forces, helicopters can quickly retrieve troops,
weapons and equipment from situations of danger or for rapid redeployment. With troop
ladders, or close to the ground hovering, troops can be landed or recovered without the
helicopter actually landing. Rhodesian Army units on external operations in neighbouring
countries, like Mozambique, took to wearing special Pegasus harnesses which afforded
them hot extraction literally from the grasp of a pursuing enemy. The Alouette would
lower a trapeze bar, attached to the cargo sling and capable of carrying four troopers. The
troopers would hook on and the Alouette would lift them away. Once out of range, the
troopers would be put down on the ground and would board the aircraft. 'Hot extraction'
could be an uncomfortable ride when the pilot, under fire, reduced height and might drag
its human cargo through the trees. In most cases, however, the G-Car pilot would land
quickly rather than hazarding men on the end of a rope. On occasion, a pair of Hunters
would attack the enemy pursuers to distract them, to get their heads down, while the G-Car
came rapidly into land. 'Hot extractions' were dreaded by the aircrews who regarded them
as the most dangerous of their flying duties because they involved flying deep into hostile
territory, some times refueling twice to reach their objective.
Helicopters can land troops in tactical formations, ready for immediate action. They offer
the battlefield commander the flexibility to deploy troops and their logistical support over a
wide area, enabling him to exploit a tactical situation. Although the Alouette III lacked the
modern mast-mounted sighting equipment which allows a helicopter to remain in a hull-
down position, protected from enemy observation and ground fire, it could still stand-off
and wait for the moment to use its firepower to optimum effect.
The ability to change the nature of the helicopters load at short notice is a major asset.
Cargo can be carried in an external sling and delivered to inaccessible spots. The Alouette
in Rhodesia had a constant daily role of placing radio relay teams on high features,
resupplying them and recovering them. Helicopters can bring back damaged and discarded
equipment which otherwise would be abandoned or destroyed. The Rhodesian Alouettes
and AB205As frequently brought back captured weapons from neighbouring territories.
The ability to extract wounded from any terrain, meant that any wounded could be reached
usually within an hour. This drastically reduced fatalities and boosted the morale of the
ordinary soldier.
The helicopter, of course, has its limitations. It consumes fuel at a high rate which limits its
range and ability to carry loads. The load carrying capacity decreases with increases in
altitude, humidity and temperature. Thus helicopters tend to be short on payload on a given
mission. The Rhodesians compensated for this by establishing aviation fuel dumps at
district commissioners camps, rural police stations and the like. They also sent forward
fuel in trucks and tankers with the land-tail convoy of reinforcements for a deployed Fire
Force so that fuel would be on hand. The 'land-tail' would have to get to within ten
minutes' flying time from the target to be of any assistance. If vehicles could not approach
the area in time, Dakota aircraft would fly in fuel to the nearest airstrip or para-drop it
close to the Fire Force target area. On external operations the Rhodesians would para-drop
fuel into temporary administrative bases set up in remote areas of Zambia and Mozambique
along the flight path of helicopters flying in troops and attacking external camps. In the
case of the second phase of Operation Dingo in October 1977, two administrative bases
were needed to allow the helicopters to reach Tembue camp in central Mozambique near
the Malawi border. The personnel at these administrative bases had no easy task because
the areas were full of trees and rocks among which the drums would land. There would be
little time before the attacking helicopters would be returning to refuel and helicopters
could not land near drums on pallets to which parachutes were still attached because of the
danger of fatal entanglement. On Operation Mascot in 1978 the drums landed amongst a
cluster of 'Buffalo Beans'. A stinging encounter with Buffalo beans is never forgotten.
24
Weight and balance in a helicopter drastically affect the flight control and loads have to be
carefully distributed. Poor weather conditions - hail, heavy rain et al - and winds in excess
of 30 knots handicap helicopter operations. Crosswind velocities of 10-15 knots and
downwind velocities above five knots will affect the selection of the direction of landing or
take-off. Engine and rotor noise can alert the enemy, as has been said. It is more fatiguing
for pilots to fly helicopters than fixed-wing aircraft. The helicopter is unstable and a loss of
control for more than a few seconds spells disaster. The need to keep the right hand on the
cyclic-pitch control column makes the holding of maps awkward. In the case of Rhodesia
the helicopter crews, unlike other aircrew, faced danger every time they flew their daily
tasks. This in itself was wearying. Helicopters require more maintenance than fixed-wing
aircraft and have considerably less range. To reduce crew fatigue when refuelling in the
bush, rolling drums and setting up pumps, the resourceful Peter Petter-Bowyer designed in
1968 a refuelling system based on a simple suction pipe using the Alouette's engine. This
meant that the engine did not have to be switched off, relieving the crew with the problem
of re-starting. Surprisingly, after 1972, the Rhodesian Air Force, however, adopted the
South African practice of carrying a small petrol-driven two-stroke pump. This meant that
high risk fuel had to be carried and the petrol was to catch fire on at least one occasion.
25
While a transport aircraft can deploy 20 or more paratroops in a single drop, the Alouette
and the AB205A helicopters can only bring in small groups. Transport aircraft, however,
are less able to make a concealed approach, cannot land anywhere and do not have the
flexibility of the helicopter which allows quick modifications of its role to meet changing
situations. The troop-carrying aircraft, of course, has a greater range but once its
paratroops have been dropped, their quick recovery is difficult without helicopters to ferry
them out. The Rhodesians, possessed of sufficient Douglas C47 Paradaks (Dakotas
configured for paratrooping), used them in combination with heli-borne troops both on Fire
Force operations and on external raids.
The Alouette in Rhodesia was mainly used to transport and fight with the army in Fire
Force but it also had many other roles to play in countering the insurgency. Its use in
police urban operations, led to all policemen being trained in correct procedures of
boarding and leaving helicopters with full equipment. The Alouette inserted and supported
the Special Urban Emergency Units SWAT teams of the police, lowering them by its
winch onto the roofs of buildings. In the rural areas, the helicopters unique ability to fly at
a reasonable speed close to the ground was exploited in tracking insurgents. Trained
trackers could follow a track from the air which meant that the enemy could be quickly
contacted. At the instigation of Peter Petter-Bowyer, dogs were trained to follow a scent
while its handler followed it in a helicopter. Dogs with radios strapped onto their backs,
allowed the helicopter to follow at a discreet distance until contact was made.
26
Dogs, of
course, need a scent to follow and scents are based on moisture. In the dry, hot conditions
of the Rhodesian veld, scents did not last long after 10 a.m., reducing the value of the
tracker dog.
Aside from those aircraft allocated to the Fire Forces, individual or pairs of Alouette III G-
Cars were positioned at times around the country to assist local efforts. They would be sent
to Rutenga in the south east, to Inyanga barracks in the east or elsewhere. The pilots
worked with the police and the Army units deployed in their area. They had routine but
vital tasks such as resupplying the radio relay teams. They also assisted the ground troops
by supporting trackers, picking up and flying stop groups into cut off positions when an
enemy gang was being pursued. These pilots, working with few means, had to be
remarkably ingenious. The success rate was never high but the disruptive effect was
enormous as the pilot and their, often reservist, troops harried the enemy. Vic Cook
recalled the constant use of 'dummy' drops to confuse the enemy as he tried to convince
ZANLA gangs that they were surrounded when in reality he was moving four men at a
time. And the gangs that a single helicopter could confront need not be small. Vic Cook
found himself alone in the air on one occasion when tackling 85 heavily armed ZANLA on
the eastern border. Led by John Barnes, flying a K-Car, Cook and Bill McQuaid, an
American, had flown from Mtoko ([now Mutoko] north east of Salisbury) to deal with an
incursion from Mozambique. The incursion had been discovered when security forces in
the Inyanga North tribal area had detained African tribeswomen who had been feeding the
ZANLA group. Barnes, Cook and McQuaid flew in without troops because the intention
was to use the men of a territorial company of the Rhodesia Regiment which was in the
area. To find the ZANLA, the tribeswomen were carried aloft to point out the enemy but
nothing was seen. Eventually, the K-Car fired searching rounds into a wooded area and
drew a murderous reply from the heavy 12.7mm machine-gun and other weapons of
ZANLA. The K-Car was hit but continued to fire until its gun jammed. McQuaid's G-Car,
flying close to the trees, was so severely damaged that he just managed to fly it over a
nearby hill before putting it down. The K-Car returned to Mtoko, leaving Cook alone in a
running fight of seven to eight hours. Cook used the terrain to advantage, popping up from
behind ridges to fire on the ZANLA, drawing hot responses. He moved the territorial
troops, in sticks of four, to cut off the enemy and late in the fight put all the MAG gunners
in an ambush position. The Rhodesian effort was rewarded by the harried ZANLA deciding
to retreat, abandoning their intention to attack Inyanga Village and later the Grand Reef
Airport (outside Umtali (now Mutare)). Cook made so many hard landings, moving troops,
that finally his left undercarriage axle broke. As the upper oleo strut, from which the wheel
still hung, was banging against the helicopter's side, Cook's tech broke off a branch from a
tree, over which Cook hovered, and wedged it into the broken mechanism to hold the
broken undercarriage in place. Cook flew back to Mtoko but obviously could not land
without crashing and damaging the aircraft. The ground crew built a mound of sandbags to
support the G-Car, and Cook landed gently on it, ending a long day.
For a Fire Force to trap and eliminate ZANLA or ZIPRA insurgents, their whereabouts had
to be discovered. This was accomplished by a variety of means. One method was the use of
the road runner or a bugged portable commercial transistor radio receiver. The Rhodesian
Special Branch left 'road runners' lying around in likely areas, or on the shelves of rural
stores, so that the insurgents would pick them up and take them back to their unit. The 'road
runners' were also supplied to double agents, such as the Reverend Kandareka (a close
colleague of Bishop Muzorewa and supporter of ZANLA), who were providing the
insurgent gangs in the field with supplies.
27
The 'Road Runner' contained a homing device
which was activated by the radio being switched off and could be picked up by an aircrafts
homing equipment. The sound of an aircraft would prompt the insurgents to switch off the
radio, ironically, therefore transmitting their position to the aircraft. Once 'road runners'
were known to be in an area, the RhAF would send up helicopter or a Lynx with a Becker
radio direction finder to detect the signals. A second Lynx, flying on a parallel or opposing
course would secure second co-ordinates. The criss-crossing of the direction finding of two
aircraft would secure a likely area of a kilometre square into which a Fire Force would
descend. Numerous insurgents were taken by surprise by the unheralded arrival of a Fire
Force.
28
The lack of precision in target identification and the absence of an OP to talk the
Fire Force on, however, meant that many would escape.
29
Fire Forces would react to incidents - ambushes, farm attacks and the like - and would be
called in when trackers or cross-graining patrols made contact with the enemy and called
for reinforcement. As the Rhodesian Army patrols - regular or reservist - comprised
sections of four men called sticks (each stick possessing a VHF radio and an MAG
machine-gun), it was of great comfort to know that reinforcement in the form of the
formidable Fire Force was merely an hours flying time away. Intelligence gathered by the
police Special Branch, and other agencies, and by the fearsome Selous Scouts, through
their pseudo-gang operations, often resulted in Fire Force action. Information would come
from a Selous Scout detachment, disguised as ZANLA and operating with them, that
there would be a ZANLA meeting at a particular time and location. Fire Force would then
arrive at the meeting. While Selous Scouts-generated information produced results,
intelligence generally tended to be dated at least and too often produced lemons i.e. Fire
Force call-outs when the insurgents had already left the area or were never there.
An important method of detecting the insurgents was by aerial reconnaissance. By the early
seventies a number of pilots, flying Provosts, Trojans, Cessna 185s and later Lynxes,
became highly skilled at spotting crapping patterns in the wilder parts. These pilots would
pick up a series of radiating tracks, for example, from a dense clump of bush made by
insurgents going about their daily functions. The level of success on reaction to these
sightings and interpretations was satisfactorily high. As the Officer Commanding 4
Squadron, Peter Petter-Bowyer taught himself the telltale signs of human habitation in the
bush and then passed them on to his pilots. The most skilled of these was Kevin 'Cocky'
Benecke who was possessed of the most phenomenal eyesight and could see men on the
ground under cover when others could not. The Air Force's Medical Officer, Doctor Brian
Knight, discovered that Benecke had a minor visual defect in the green-brown range which
enabled him to distinguish dark objects in shade which people with normal eyesight could
not see. This meant that, when Benecke summoned Fire Force to a camp, it was
occupied.
30
Pseudo operations were combined with the practice of establishing OPs on hills which
commanded significant terrain such as known infiltration routes, villages of sympathisers
and the like. The purpose of the OP was to observe the pattern of life and detect anything
out of the ordinary which might give away the presence of the insurgents. OPs would
notice, for instance, an unusual amount of cooking taking place or lines of women carrying
cooked food into groves of trees and other hiding places. The skilled OP operators were the
Selous Scouts but all units were used on OPs with greater or lesser success. The problem of
the OP was to remain undetected by the local population which took considerable skill at
concealment. Once the OP was certain there was an insurgent presence, the commander of
the OP would summon Fire Force. Success depended on the OP's skill at map reading so
that he could direct Fire Force with precision to the target. Analysis by the Rhodesian
Intelligence Corps (RIC) in early 1979 was to show that the highest ratio of success was
achieved when Fire Force action was initiated by an OP as compared to the other means
already discussed.
31
The precursor to Fire Force operations, the first use of armed helicopters supporting ground
forces on 28 April 1966, reached a level approaching farce but had important
consequences. This engagement is now graced with the title of the 'Battle of Sinoia' and its
date celebrated in Zimbabwe as a public holiday to mark the beginning of the 'Chimurenga
or War of Liberation'.
32
On 3 April 1966 a well-led and disciplined unit of 20 armed members of ZANU had
crossed the Zambezi near Chirundu from Zambia and moved southwards through the bush
eventually marching down the power line to Salisbury from the Kariba hydro-electric dam.
When the group reached the small town of Sinoia (now called Chinhoyi) it split up. Five
ZANU left for Umtali (to blow up the oil pipeline and to attack white farmers), two for
Fort Victoria, six for the Zwimba Tribal Trust Land and seven were destined for the
Midlands. The main aim was to recruit local support for their cause. The various members
of the ZANU unit were steadily killed or captured over the coming weeks, but not before
they had murdered a white farmer, Johannes Viljoen, and his wife Johanna at Hartley (now
called Chegutu) on 16 May 1966. The seven Midlands men based themselves near Red
Mine on Hunyani Farm just north east of Sinoia to sabotage pylons and the like. Their
training was deficient and they often inserted the detonator into the Russian TNT slabs in
the wrong place, missing the primer, and simply blowing the slab to pieces.
These incidents brought Peter Petter-Bowyer, as the standby pilot (fresh from a conversion
course to helicopters), to Sinoia in an Alouette III to support the police efforts to root out
the gang. In charge of operations was Chief Superintendant John Cannon, DFC, the Officer
Commanding the Police Lomagundi District and a former RAF bomber pilot of Second
World War vintage. The ZANU group had sent one man on to Salisbury to make contact
with the African nationalist politicians. However, the police had thoroughly penetrated
ZANU and, in fact, this man reported to the police on 28 April, telling them the location of
his comrades and their intention to change into black clothes and mount armed attacks on
the white farmers near Sinoia. The informer explained that he would drive back to the gang
early the next morning in a blue Peugeot.
Cannon and Petter-Bowyer suggested that the elimination of this gang was a task for the
Army and that the Operations Co-ordinating Committee should be involved but the Police
Commissioner, F.E. Barfoot, refused, saying that the police would handle the problem.
Murray Hofmeyr was detailed to follow the police informer in an Alouette, flying at 11 000
feet through the early dawn of 28 April. Hofmeyr's aircraft had been hastily armed with an
MAG machine-gun (equipped only with its iron infantry sights) mounted on an A frame at
the left rear doorway. The informer said that he would rendezvous with his comrades just
past the intersection of the main road with the old strip road to Sinoia, a kilometre before
the bridge over the Hunyani River. The ZANU men would be hiding in the bush just to the
left of the road, he said. Consequently, Cannon planned to spread his mixed force of forty
police and farmers serving in the Police Reserve along the main and old roads and conduct
a sweep and search operation in the triangle formed by the two roads and the Hunyani
River. The police and reservists, clad in blue denim, were deployed, armed with venerable
Lee Enfield .303 bolt-action rifles (hardly adequate against the five AK47s, one rocket
launcher and one light machine-gun of the insurgents).
33
Hofmeyr, however, then reported that the informer was turning off the main road on to the
old strip road. The informer drove a hundred metres, stopped and strode off into the bush
to the left. This meant that the seven ZANU were outside the triangle. Cannon responded
by hastily deploying half his men in a line from the main road to the Kariba power line
which ran parallel to the main road some distance to the south. He placed the other half
along the powerline as a stop line. The first group began to advance parallel to the old road
towards the last sighting. The helicopters circled above.
Realising that he could not command the operation from the ground, Cannon handed over
control to Peter Petter-Bowyer who took off with four policemen in his Alouette. The
police in the sweep lines, however, could not communicate with the helicopters because
they did not have compatible radios. Thus the helicopter pilots had to land to direct the
sweep lines. In the south western corner, where the two police lines started to converge,
Pilot Officer David Becks had to do so to prevent them shooting each other.
Flying in the vicinity of the last sighting, between the old road and the power line, Petter-
Bowyer noticed what seemed to be a policeman standing under a tree. Petter-Bowyer,
lacking intercomm, shouted to his passengers, pointing out the figure under the tree, but
was horrified when one of his policeman opened fire out of the aircraft's window, his
Sterling 9mm bullets passing through the spinning tilted blades. The enraged Petter-Bowyer
landed his passengers on the road before resuming his patrol over the area.
Near the river a figure in a white shirt opened fire on Petter-Bowyer, who, having never
been shot at before, was somewhat outraged. Flying on a right hand orbit, Petter-Bowyer
called in Hofmeyr to use his MAG. However, due to inexperience, Petter-Bowyer did not
realise that Hofmeyr was circling left to allow his gun to engage and was on a collision
course with him. Petter-Bowyer first saw the man on the ground running with dust spurting
around him, then Hofmeyr's incoming shadow. Petter-Bowyer broke away. It took
Hofmeyr's technician, George Carmichael, 147 rounds, fired in four bursts, to bring down
the running insurgent just south of the powerline. Such expenditure, Air Force
Headquarters later ruled, was intolerable. In fact, given the lack of proper sights for
deflection shooting, the amount of rounds fired was modest.
Traversing the ground, Petter-Bowyer next spotted two figures in the bush off the old road
but before he could do them any harm, they looked up and he saw their white faces. He
waved them back to the road. They were Detective Inspectors Bill Freeman and 'Dusty'
Binns who had driven up the road and plunged into the bush ahead of the sweep line,
anxious not to miss the fun.
Another pair to join the fun was Major Billy Conn of the RLI and his sergeant who had
driven through Sinoia from Kariba and had come upon the helicopters and the armed
police. Conn turned round and drove straight to the Police Station to volunteer his services
to his friend John Cannon. Cannon readily agreed and Conn drove out along the main road
and turned onto the strip road, arriving just as the advancing sweep line from the east shot
and killed an insurgent. The sight of a dead ZANU drew the inexperienced police forward
to cluster around the body. Conn shouted at them to disperse and as he did two ZANU rose
out of the nearby grass and bush, one aiming his rifle. Conn opened fire killing both. The
second had been in the act of throwing a grenade which then exploded. The chastened
sweep line continued and eventually eliminated the remaining four insurgents.
34
Petter-
Bowyer was awarded the Military Forces Commendation for his coolness under fire and
for his control of the operation.
35
This incident had profound effects. The anger of the army at being excluded led to future
operations being planned and handled by all arms of the security forces, controlled by Joint
Operations Centres (JOCs) on which all services were represented. The gathering and use
of intelligence was centralised with the Special Branch reporting to the Central Intelligence
Organisation. In March 1977 all operations came under a single commander, Lieutenant
General Peter Walls, as Commander, Combined Operations.
36
Dissatisfaction with his own
unpreparedness, led Petter-Bowyer, when an instructor, to train his men to fly with
maximum weight. He also stressed the need for map reading skills. The Air Force came to
demand that its pilots be capable of reading maps so well that they could navigate with a
margin of error of 50 metres to find their target.
After 1966, helicopters were armed, on occasions, with 7.62mm MAGs, but, until 1973,
were expressly forbidden to engage insurgents in a 'gunship' role. International sanctions
meant that it was impossible to replace a Hunter fighter, for example, and it was very
difficult to secure new helicopters to replace any which were shot down. To conserve the
eight the air force possessed, their operations were limited to support and not offensive
roles.
37
In this early period the helicopters were treated as such precious objects that the
Rhodesian Army liked to believe that the RhAF would only allow their men on board with
clean boots. Certainly all weapons had to be cleared and all magazines removed. The
pressure of war would bring relaxation of such rules to such an extent that a black RAR
soldier boarded a helicopter at Marymount Mission in the north-east with a Zulu rifle
grenade still mounted on the muzzle of his rifle and accidentally discharged the grenade
through the roof of the Alouette.
38
When the war intensified from December 1972, and white farmhouses were attacked in
north-eastern Rhodesia, there was a need for a quick reaction force and helicopters
obviously offered the quickest and most effective method of deploying one. It was apparent
that a helicopter gunship could drastically aid the rapid elimination of the enemy. In
February 1974 a dedicated Alouette III gunship, the K-Car, was ready for trials. Its
rearseats had been replaced with an armoured seat for the gunner postioned to fire a Matra
MG 151 20mm cannon out of the rear port doorway. The cannon was mounted on a French
manufactured special floor fitting to cater for its weight and recoil. Trials on the Inkomo
Range in March, May and June led to further modifications including the practice of
removing the yaw pedals when trooping. In September 1974 K-Cars were fitted with anti-
STRELA [the Russian SAM7] shrouds on their engines and were given matt paint finish.
39
The K-Car was ready.
Like the German MGFF and MG151 20mm cannons mounted in the Messerschmidt 109
and Focke- Wulf 190 fighters, the Matra MG 151 cannon fired a shell with a short
cartridge which contained less than normal propellant. This reduced the recoil of the gun,
making it suitable for the Alouette. The muzzle velocity was low and the rate of fire was
slow. To allow deflection shooting the gun was equipped with a Collimateur reflector gun
sight which was calibrated for the cannon to be fired at 90 degrees to the fore and aft axis
at an altitude 800 feet from an Alouette travelling at 65 knots. The guns were initially
obtained from the Portuguese and for a long time so was the high explosive incendiary
(HEI) rounds used in Rhodesia. The rounds were expensive - 35 Rhodesian dollars each -
and difficult to obtain. Ammunition also added weight to the helicopter, affecting its range.
Thus the cyclic rate was adjusted downwards to 350 rounds per minute. The gunners fired
bursts of three rounds or less and would regard themselves as off form if more than five
rounds were expended per enemy killed. A good gunner would be able to fire accurately at
lower heights and indeed some preferred 600 feet. The cannons were equipped with trays
which took 200 or 400 rounds. The HEI rounds were highly effective except when fired on
soft ground which negated their explosive effect because the shells had to decelerate
sharply for their inertial fuses to be activated. Gunners would look for rocks or hard ground
to fire at to maximise the effect of the shrapnel. In Fire Force contacts a high proportion of
the enemy were killed and wounded as a result of 20mm fire. As the 20mm HEI was prone
to explode harmlessly on contact with trees, the technician/gunners took to loading ball
rounds on a ratio of one ball : five HEI shells.
To solve the problem of soft ground and trees, other guns were tried. Twin Browning .5
inch heavy machine-guns were fitted but were abandoned because of the weight factor and
because the .5 bullet was not a cannon shell so a direct hit had to be scored which could be
achieved with the lighter .303 round. Later, 1979, some K-Cars were equipped with four
Mk 2 .303 Browning machine-guns which were slaved to a remote hand operated sighting
and hydraulic driver system code-named of 'Kat-oog' [Cat's eye]. Out of this project would
come a highly successful helmet sight. Peter Petter-Bowyer, as Staff Officer (Planning),
was involved in this development at the CSIR in South Africa - called the Dalmation
Project - and brought it back to Rhodesia to test it in the field in 1978. Ted Lunt flew the
Dalmation fit helicopter while Petter-Bowyer found him targets, using his skills as a recce
pilot. So successful was this combination that in the first week of trials 31 ZANLA
insurgents were killed. Petter- Bowyer and Lunt would attack the target and then call Fire
Force to get troops on the ground to complete the operation.
40
The four gun fit was mostly
used in the role of a second K-Car. The Dalmation K-Cars flew at tree top height and, with
.303 ammunition freely available and with each gun firing at a cyclic rate of 1 150 rounds a
minute, achieved devastating results in 1979. The Dalmation K- Cars were used to drive
the enemy into the open where they became targets for the 20mm.
Until 1976, as has been said, the troop-carrying Rhodesian G-Car Alouettes were armed
with single 7.62mm MAGs and the South African G-Cars with single Mk 2 .303
Brownings. The arming of the G- Car went back to September-October 1965 when
investigations began into the feasibility of mounting the FN 7.62mm MAG. This was done
and the weapon was evaluated in early November. Modifications to the standard Army
weapon were minimal. The bipod and the wooden butt were removed. The rear buffer
spring housing was padded and a short wooden handle projecting to the left of the weapon
was added. The normal aperture sight was retained. The results of the trials were not
spectacular. Modifications to the sighting system progressed to a wire ring and bead sight
to the GM2 Reflector Gunsight, and finally to the Collimateur Lightweight Reflector Sight
which was used thereafter. The MAG mounting progressed from a simple post to a fitting
which accommodated the spent cartridge cases and ammunition belts and which limited the
weapon's travel to prevent accidental damage to the aircraft. The weapon was fitted with a
padded chest plate and twin handgrips to improve the handling and steadiness of aim. None
of these modifications had taken place when Murray Hofmeyr took an armed G-Car into
the first incident at Sinoia in April 1966. That incident led to the formal training of
helicopter technicians as air-gunners.
41
Because the drag on the belts reduced the cyclic
rate of fire of the MAGs to 400 rounds a minute, the Rhodesian G-Cars were re-armed
with the faster firing Mk 2 .303 Brownings on twin mountings in 1976. The G-Cars carried
500 rounds per gun.
42
When the South African Pumas were deployed, they were armed
with twin side-firing .5 or .303 inch Brownings.
43
The K-Car was also used as a mobile command post to allow the commander of the heli-
borne troops to direct their operations from the air above them. Thus radio equipment and a
specially adapted rearward- facing chair next to the pilots were provided. The army Fire
Force commander was in overall charge but the K-Car pilot, usually the most senior pilot
in the unit, would direct the air operations. Their roles being equally important for success
but in many cases the experienced pilots would dominate and sometimes control the entire
operation. The pilots defined responsibilities were : to transport the Fire Force troops to
the target; mark the target (with the gunner throwing out the smoke grenade); direct the
landing of the troop-carrying helicopters (the G-Cars) and the dropping of paratroops
where the Fire Force commander indicated (sometimes delegating the talk-in of the Dakota
to the first immediately available G-Car); bring in and direct airstrikes; send aircraft away
for reinforcements and refuelling; and control the recovery of troops, equipment and dead
and captured enemy. Occasions, seasoned pilots were flying with inexperienced or
incompetent Fire Force commanders and therefore would have more influence than the
theory would allow.
The combinations of aircraft of the Fire Forces varied widely with what aircraft were
available. Before the arrival of the AB205As, the Fire Forces were constantly stripped of
their helicopters to support external operations by the SAS and other units. This meant that
Fire Forces might be reduced for some days to a K-Car and a G-Car, using the G-Car to
ferry in troops. The delays occasioned by this robbed the Fire Force of any effectiveness.
The Rhodesian Intelligence Corps study in 1979 concluded that the most successful
combination was a K-Car, four G-Cars (each carrying four troopers) reinforced by a
Dakota (modified for paratrooping and carrying 16 paratroops) and a Lynx for light air
strike (with 63mm SNEB rockets, mini-Golf bombs [blast and shrapnel], napalm, and twin
.303 inch machine-guns mounted above the wing). As contact was made typically with 6 to
12 ZANLA, this force level of 32 gave the Fire Force a three to one ratio of superiority on
the ground. The Fire Force quickly yielded an 80 to 1 kill rate by trapping the enemy gangs
and eliminating them by air and ground fire.
This is not to say that the enemy did not fight back and with some ingenuity. For example,
in failing light at 5.20 p.m. on 17 August 1976, Support Commando, 1RLI, commanded by
Major [later Lieutenant Colonel] P.W. Armstrong, contacted 20-30 ZANLA who had set up
an aircraft ambush near Mount Darwin in the north east of Rhodesia. Aside from their
normal small arms, the ZANLA had positioned in the trap a 75mm recoilless rifle, a
7.62mm machine gun with an anti-aircraft sight and 60mm and 82mm mortars. In addition
they had buried six electrically-fired anti-aircraft booby traps, comprising TNT buried a
foot deep in the earth on top of which was placed 8-10 stick grenades. The ZANLA
planned to draw a Fire Force into the trap. In the event a Lynx, supporting a stick of men
pursuing a body of ZANLA, took the bait. The Lynx put in an airstrike and was badly
damaged by fire from the ground and by the explosion of three booby traps. The ZANLA
split into small groups and awaited the arrival of the Fire Force. The Fire Force was
deployed without waiting for the K-Car which had to be summoned back from a trip to
Salisbury. Stops were put down but nothing transpired until, in the fast fading light, the K-
Car arrived and drew heavy fire. The stops swept forward and, although they only found an
abandoned machine-gun, they were subjected to mortar, rifle and machine gun fire from a
long range. Corporal Crittal was slightly wounded in the leg by the mortar fire and
Corporal Titlestad was mortally wounded aboard a helicopter. There were no ZANLA
casualties until in the night two of them were wounded and captured, and one was killed in
an ambush by Two Independent Company of the Rhodesia Regiment.
44
The G-Cars would make dummy landings to confuse the enemy, while placing men in cut-
off or stop positions. The G-Cars were then on hand for quick evacuation of casualties or
the re-positioning of troops. The G-Cars thereafter would be sent back to base or to
rendezvous with a land-tail of vehicles bringing forward reinforcements, fuel and
ammunition [20mm, .303 inch, 7.62mm for the helicopters and the troops; grenades; flares
and bunker bombs and tear gas for the clearing of caves]. The G-Cars would fire their
machine-guns when a target presented itself, would fire to pin down escaping enemy, or
flush out insurgents from thick cover. The K-Car pilot would always keep at least one G-
Car orbiting on the periphery of the battle to be able to move stops quickly, to extricate
casualties, to assess a dropping zone and, perhaps, to talk in the Paradak. This G-Car
would act as a reserve command post if the K-Car had to transfer the Fire Force
commander and depart for fuel. While few helicopters were shot down (considering the
numerous daily call-outs) many were hit by ground-fire and a number of Fire Force
commanders and aircrew were killed and wounded as they orbited at 800 feet, directing the
action on the ground.
45
Deployed in January 1974, the Fire Force enjoyed its first action a month later, on 24
February, after being called in by Lieutenant Dale Collett of the Selous Scouts.
46
Stunningly successful from the outset, Fire Force went through three phases of
development : Phase One - 1974-1976; Phase Two - 1977- 1979; and Phase Three - 1979-
1980 after the election of the first black majority government led by Bishop Abel
Muzorewa.
In Phase One, there would be a preliminary briefing before take-off, if Fire Force was not
needed immediately. The K-Car would fly in to be talked onto the target by the personnel
manning the OP (if a sighting was the reason for the call out). Difficulties of judging the
position of an aircraft in the sky to a target on ground often caused delays which afforded
the enemy time to escape. When over the approximate area of the target, the K-Car gunner
would throw out a smoke grenade so that the OP could use the smoke to re-direct the K-
Car to the target. The K-Car would then pull up to its optimum orbiting height of 800 feet
and put down fire to annihilate the enemy or dissuade them from leaving the area. The G-
Cars would fly in a wider pre-arranged orbit, waiting for orders to put their stops down on
the escape routes. This was a somewhat rigid, slow and cumbersome procedure and was
sometimes fruitless because the enemy had fled. It was soon realised that the aircrew had to
look outside the circle constantly as the insurgents covered the ground at their astonishing
rate of 500 metres a minute.
The changes made in Phase Two drastically improved the success ratio. The briefing would
normally be held at the refuelling stop on the way to the target, to save time and because
by then the OP would have crucial information on enemy movement or the lack thereof. By
1977 it was realised that the K-Car had to fly in from behind and over the OP in order to
see what he was seeing and therefore waste no time in finding and marking the target with
a white smoke generator. The K-Car would pull up and fire on the enemy. As the G-Cars
arrived, they would fly directly to prescribed stop positions on the escape routes and orbit
them individually. Instead of having to wait for the Fire Force commander, the G-Cars
were given some autonomy. If the G-Car crew spotted the enemy, they could land their
stop group without reference to the K-Car. If they did not spot the enemy, they would not
put down their stop group. This meant that this stick remained airborne for quick
deployment elsewhere. There would, however, be an alternative plan - Plan Alpha. The
Fire Force commander would simply state 'Plan Alpha' and the G- Cars would deposit their
stop groups on the predetermined stop positions. This meant minimum delay in bottling up
the enemy. Once the escape routes were sealed, the Fire Force commander would have his
paratroopers brought in to sweep the area, driving the quarry into the open where the 20mm
could deal with them or into the ambushes of the stop groups. The achievement of Phase
Two was that the quick positioning of stops often trapped the enemy.
Phase Three, in which the 'Jumbo' Fire Force came into being, was the product of the
constant availability of G-Cars in 1979 because the forces deployed on external operations
at last had available the longer-range and greater troop carrying-capacity of the AB205A
'Cheetahs'. The Jumbo Fire Force was created by bringing two Fire Forces together, giving
it two K-Cars, eight G-Cars, a Dakota and a Lynx, often with the support of Hawker
Hunters. When the Fire Force was seven minutes out from the target, the two K-Cars
would accelerate and pull away. Once directed onto the target, the K-Cars (being used like
tanks on the battlefield) would immediately attack without pulling up, seeking to
traumatise, if not kill, the enemy. The Fire Force commander might bring in the jet aircraft
immediately with their devastating Golf bombs to lower the enemy's morale further. The
effect would be to 'stabilise' the situation. Those insurgents who survived would go to
ground. The stops would be in position quickly and the paratroops would follow to sweep
the area. Actions that used to take an entire morning or a day thenceforth were often over
in an hour. The commander of Support Commando, 1RLI, Major Nigel Henson recalls
tackling and killing 22 insurgents at 6 a.m. By 7 a.m. his Fire Force was in action against
ten more and, having dealt with them, was by mid-morning in a third contact.
In this last phase, the RLI took over the exclusive task of Fire Force, scoring formidable
tallies of kills. In the period after the election of Muzorewa's Government in April 1979
until the ceasefire in December 1979,

One Commando, RLI, killed 450 insurgents
Two Commando 350
Three Commando 410
Support Commando 470
Total: 1680
Andr Dennison's fine 'A' Company, 2RAR, by contrast killed 403 insurgents in the period
September 1977 to July 1979. Perhaps there is no comparison but in nine years of
campaigning in Malaya, the British SAS killed 108 of their enemy.
Major Nigel Henson, who commanded Support Commando for two and a half years (1977-
1979) was called out 111 times. 73 of these call-outs were in 1979 and 68 of them resulted
in contacts. In 1979 only one in six call-outs were unproductive 'lemons' and this he
attributes to the full deployment of the Selous Scouts on the OPs and their professionalism
as well as to the experienced dedication to their task of the aircrews, himself and his men.
There had always been a high rate of unsuccessful call-outs but many of them were the
product of the Fire Force not spending time combing the area. In many cases, if nothing
appeared, despite the OP's sighting, the Fire Force would depart. Of course, it was often
ordered away by the JOC to a new target.
Fire Force - Part 2

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FIRE FORCE - PART TWO
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FIRE FORCE -2-
Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia: 1962-1980
by Prof. J.R.T. Wood
An infantry company of the RAR or a commando of the RLI
would be designated as a Fire Force at a forward airfield for
six weeks, or sometimes, several months. By 1977 all regular
infantry were trained paratroops and would in turn be
deployed by helicopter or parachute or brought in as
reinforcements from the vehicles of the land-tail.
There were a number of considerations as to where the Fire
Force base would be sited in an operational area. As it
needed only an airstrip in the bush capable of taking a
Dakota, there were a variety of geographical options but, as its role was to react to
incidents as they arose and as intelligence played such a role in Fire Force operations, it
was important to base the Fire Force close to the JOC and its major intelligence agencies
such as the Special Branch.
The tasks of the Fire Force commander were many and varied. The pressures upon him
were intense. His troops demanded kills as a measure of success. The personnel on the OPs
would evaluate his performance in reacting to their sightings. The RhAF would be eyeing
him critically. The burden of command was heavy and his position a lonely one. As will be
seen, successful Fire Force commanders had to be men of high and varying skills.
The siting of the base was only one of the considerations for a Fire Force commander when
he assumed command. If satisfied by the strategic siting, he would review the bases
tactical siting, its vulnerability to attack, its defences, alarm system, the protection of the
aircraft [the Rhodesians protected them with drums filled with sand, fences and overhead
nets to detonate incoming rocket and mortar rounds]. He would be concerned with the
communication systems, the radios which were so vital for his operations, and efficacy of
the joint operations room. In the last three years of the war the RIC was able to supply
maps on which current information had been overlaid which he would need for his
briefings. His troops needed to be reasonably housed, close to the aircraft for speedy call-
outs. He had to establish close rapport with the senior pilot who would fly him in the K-
Car and command the aircraft. He needed the active support of the FAF commander, the
Special Branch representative, the technicians and base personnel. The Fire Force
commander would want to know what other forces were deployed in his area, their tasks
and how many would be available as reinforcements for Fire Force actions. He could never
have enough men.
All related equipment had to be checked. Of crucial importance was his aircraft helmet and
headset. The helmet was not just worn for protection. It muffled the engine noise, making it
easier to hear transmissions. Just as vital were the links that the K-Car's intercom and
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radios provided with the pilot and the troops on the ground. Thus the pressle [transmitting]
switch of the microphone and the headsets connections would be tested. A spare headset
would be carried in case his failed (and it sometimes did), leaving the pilot to direct the
battle. The G-Cars had headsets for all stick leaders to keep them abreast of developments
while in the air. The troops VHF sets, particularly the telehand sets, had to be serviceable
as more than one operation was hampered by faulty radios transmitting continuous carrier
waves. The K-Car would carry two A63/A76 VHF radios, one a spare for the ground
troops and the other for the commander if he had to disembark through the K-Car being
forced down by ground fire or mechanical malfunction or if it had to depart for refuelling.
In the K-Car with him, he would carry the radio codes and in particular the daily Shackle
code. In action some Fire Force commanders would wear gloves to cushion their thumbs
from damage from the repeated use of the pressle switch. All would don flak jackets to
protect them from fire from the ground when orbiting above the battle.
Along with his FN 7.62mm automatic rifle, his webbing (containing ammunition, grenades,
compass, medical kit, and rations), binoculars, and a pen and notebook, the Fire Force
commander would have a spare FN to issue to replace any which malfunctioned in action.
The School of Infantry checklists reminded the Fire Force commander that he could not be
distracted by airsickness and had to have the necessary pills on hand if he was susceptible.
In practice, air sick commanders would have short careers because the K-Car pilots would
not tolerate them. The checklists ordered him to have with him a talc board and
chinagraphs. In practice again, he would write crucial information on the perspex of the
aircraft's windscreen. He would have complete map coverage of the operational area at 1 :
250 000 and 1 : 50 000 in a briefcase. The maps had to be correctly folded and indexed so
that the correct one could be quickly found in the air. Numerous sets of co-ordinates were
pencilled in to avoid having to unfold the whole map to find them along the edge.
The Fire Force commander would check that, as well as the small yellow smoke grenades
for target marking, the helicopters were carrying large smoke generators for marking
dropping zones for the paratroopers and indicating wind direction. The generators were
locally produced and were designed by what Peter Petter-Bowyer describes as 'an
American pyro-maniac' whom local industry had found for him. The generators produced
dense white smoke which lasted for three minutes. The G-Cars would have hoods for
captives and body bags for fatalities.
Each Fire Force stick of four comprised : a junior NCO, equipped with a VHF A63 radio
and a FN rifle; two riflemen; and a machine-gunner carrying a MAG 7.62mm machine-
gun. The MAG was heavy to carry but its high rate of fire often won a fight and it was
highly prized. Indeed, when they could, the stick commanders would include two MAGs in
their section. If a night ambush was contemplated, and if weight was not a consideration,
the stick would be issued with claymore anti-personnel mines. As they had to move rapidly
over the ground, the troops dressed in camouflage tee-shirts, shorts and light running shoes
or hockey boots. They would carry little else other than ammunition, grenades, water,
medical kits and basic rations. Short sharp action meant that they were usually back in base
by nightfall for re-deployment in the morning. If they expected to set a night ambush after
the contact, regulation camouflage denim uniforms would be worn and light sleeping bags
carried.
Because it was crucial to the Fire Force commander to be able to see positions of his troops
on the ground (to avoid sticks firing on each other and the like), methods of visual
identification would be adopted. Troops would use strobe lights (if available), heliographs,
dayglow or white panels, smoke and white phosphorous grenades, or flares. Often the
troops would simply wave the white backs of their maps. One Support Commando stick
leader, 'Messus' Moore, was asked to reveal his position by displaying his map. He replied
that, as he had forgotten his map, he would hold up his cigarette packet. His Fire Force
commander, Major Henson, surprised to see the upheld packet, responded 'Stop One, are
they Kingsgate or Madison?' [two Rhodesian blends].
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Most vital was the team work in the K-Car. The Fire Force commander would take every
opportunity to discuss methods, ideas, latest tactics and lessons learnt with his K-Car pilot.
They would find time to practise their roles in the air. As the pilot had the aircraft to fly
and the airgunner/technician sat well back behind the 20mm cannon, it was the Fire Force
commander who, sitting on the left, was well positioned to spot the enemy. Thus he could
play a crucial role in target identification, for example. This had to be rapid and precise.
On spotting the enemy, he would call a course correction - 'Hard left!' - and point out a
feature close to target and order the firing of two rounds. He would then correct the
gunner's aim from the strike of the shells. Fire Force commanders and pilots, of course, had
much on their minds and very often keen-eyed, experienced gunners saw the enemy first.
Following the action intensely, the gunners would prompt the Fire Force commander on
orientation, the whereabouts of stop groups and other details. The Fire Force commander
had also to understand what the aircraft could and could not do, particularly how long it
could fly. Such matters were, of course, the responsibility of the pilots, but experience
taught the Fire Force commanders to keep an independent eye on the fuel gauge as they
had to base their plans on the aircraft's performance.
47
There was much initial planning to be done and the Fire Force commander, his second in
command, his officers, the senior and other pilots, the FAF commander and the operations
and intelligence officers would meet to review the current intelligence, discuss activating
call-outs, and general modus operandi.
The RhAF personnel would detail how many aircraft were available. The use of the Dakota
would be reviewed including the height and number of paradrops, the drop procedure, the
radio channel for drops, emergency drills and the use of wanker sticks (men dropped
purely to collect the parachutes as sanctions made their replacement costly and difficult).
The wanker sticks more than once found themselves in action when fleeing insurgents
broke through sweep lines. The Lynx and its weapons would be discussed. Command,
briefing and spare radio channels would be allocated. The Fire Force commander would
select an alternative VHF channel for the ground troops so that the command net did not
become cluttered. This channel could be monitored by the accompanying Lynx on its
second radio. Aircraft formations to be used en route to targets, the masking of aircraft
noise and associated problems would be examined. Colour codes would be selected - G-
Car One becoming Yellow One etc. The provision for refuelling and rearming would be
laid down. Finally the equipment to be carried by the aircraft would be reviewed - the
smoke generator, spare VHF radios, spare rifles, body bags etc.
The Fire Force commander would describe the stop details; the callsigns; their equipment;
the dispersal of medics and trackers among the sticks. He would deal with the land-tail,
selecting its commander, escorts, medics, trackers and the second wave reinforcements.
There was a tendency for everyone at a Fire Force base to volunteer for the 'land-tail' but
essential functions at the base could not be neglected, men had to be fed on their return
and much more.
There would be a general briefing of all personnel on call-outs, briefings and methods such
as the OP talk-on; target marking (using the Lynx or the K-Car to deliver smoke or the
firing by the OP of Icarus, Very, the SNEB rocket [the shoulder-held launcher which
Petter-Bowyer had developed] or Miniflare markers); target correction; the marking the
position of the troops (by dayglow or white panels or by waving the white back of maps or
the use of smoke grenades, flares, instant light, heliograph); smoke signals (blue for
casevac, orange for radio failure, white phosphorous for a contact and the white generator
for a dropping zone). Details of the casevac procedures would be given along with the
proximity of hospitals or mobile resuscitation units. The use of air support, tactics in
general and post- contact procedures would be discussed.
The meeting would review the recovery of the heli-borne troops, the paratroops and their
parachutes, the second wave sticks and the dead and captured insurgents and their kit. The
information required from an OP for a call-out would be laid down - the map number; the
OPs locstat, callsign, radio channel; the locstat of the enemy, their numbers, weapons,
dress and current activity. The Fire Force would want to know : if the OP could still see the
enemy or where they were last seen, their escape routes; the nature of the terrain; possible
landing and drop zones; the compass bearing from the OP to the target; the proposed
method for the OP marking the target; and the locstats of other OPs or nearby troops.
If time allowed, all Fire Force and base personnel including the RhAF would practise the
immediate action on call-out, familiarising themselves with emplaning, deplaning and
other drills. The troops would practise fire and movement, movement across open ground,
cave and obstacle clearing and other tactics. They would zero their weapons on the range
and practise quick reaction snap shooting on jungle ranges [bush ranges with targets that
sprung up].
48
Out in the field, hidden in the hills, would be the OPs of the Selous Scouts, other
Rhodesian Army or Police units. Once a target was spotted the OP commander would
report back to his unit, supplying his locstat, callsign etc. He would stand by, observing the
enemy while Fire Force was activated. Everything would be done with a minimum of
words for efficiency. The OP commander would be ready to update his report for the
incoming Fire Force.
At the call-out, sometimes initiated by the sounding of a klaxon, the troops of the Fire
Force would follow the rehearsed procedures. In the early stages, the reaction times were
as little as four minutes. It was soon learnt that time taken in briefing was more valuable
than speed and the Fire Force would take 10 minutes to get airborne. It still depended on
the nature of the reported incident. The first question asked was always : 'How much time
have we? and often there was no choice but to get the aircraft airborne and to plan on the
way to the target. In addition, a refuelling stop on the way, would provide time for a
methodical briefing.
The Fire Force commander and the K-Car pilot would make a quick appreciation of the
OPs report and devise a plan to preserve the element of surprise and annihilate the enemy.
The K-Car pilot would examine the route and consider various options such an initial air
strike by the Lynx (some Fire Forces preceded attacks with a mini-Golf bomb) or, if the
target warranted it, by Canberras or Hunters, to stun the enemy and drive them to ground.
He could use of noise cover by preceding the helicopters with a Trojan or Lynx. The entire
Fire Force could arrive simultaneously from different directions or the K-Car would
accelerate to arrive over the target first to allow the Fire Force commander to orientate
himself, confirm the OPs information and to reassess his appreciation before his troops
arrived. The Fire Force commander and the K-Car pilot would select the optimum killing
zones into which the enemy could be driven. They would identify escape routes - thickly
bushed riverbeds and ravines - which should be blocked by stop groups. To contain the
insurgents they would plan dummy drops of stop groups by the G-Cars and the positioning
of their assault troops near enough to the target to be able to exploit the shock of the initial
airstrike by the K-Car or fixed-wing aircraft. They would select a rendezvous for the
aircraft to meet the vehicles of the land-tail. This would be as close as possible to the
target area and would be in a sufficiently open area to allow two or more helicopters to
land, refuel and re-arm simultaneously. However, to avoid casualties and the loss of
vehicles, the 'land-tail' would often only approach on tar roads to preclude the danger of
mines. The Fire Force commander and the K-Car pilot would select dropping zones for the
paratroopers with a view to bringing them quickly into the action. They would plot the
position of other security forces in the area to avoid firing on them and to employ them,
perhaps, on the periphery of the battle to intercept any fugitives. They would review their
fire power requirements. Teargas to drive insurgents out of difficult places, such as caves,
could be carried. Finally, they would consider having a deputy Fire Forces commander
carried in the Lynx to co-ordinate the resupply by the land-tail, using the aircrafts
second radio, and pass any developments to the JOC. The Lynx pilot, himself, might be
used for these tasks.
The plan would be presented at the overall briefing. While the K-Car pilot briefed the
aircrews and operational staff on the aircraft involved, airstrikes, routing plans and
refuelling, the attack directions, the drop plans, refuelling and recovery arrangements, the
Fire Force commander would be describing to his stick commanders and the second wave
the known details of the target [the map reference, estimated numbers, enemy dress,
weapons, current activity, etc.] and the plan. He would allocate the radio channels and
appoint the heliborne stop groups [giving them easily remembered callsigns such as Stop
One, Stop Two etc and placing Stop One in G-Car Yellow One, Stop Two in Yellow Two
and so forth]. He would describe their drop plan [arranging it in a counter-clockwise
sequence in the order of their stop numbers so that he could remember where they were
and everyone could recall easily who was on their flank]. He would point out the dropping
zone for the paratroopers and give details of the deployment of the second wave and the
equipment and ammunition to be carried by the land-tail. If he assigned a stick the task
of searching for the enemy, the Fire Force commander had to ensure that it contained
trackers or he would reinforce it with trackers.
The Fire Force commander would remind the stick commanders of pro-words to be used
such as Stop; Show Map [the white back of a map would be waved to indicate a stops
position]; Show Dayglow [the troops had dayglow orange panels and sometimes
dayglow linings to their combat caps which, when the cap was turned inside out, would
indicate to the aircraft that they were friendly forces]; Throw Smoke; Go Two for uplift.
A most important proword was Ters visual because too often a stop group would catch
sight of the enemy but, when trying to report the sighting in a normal manner, would be
told Wait, out by a busy Fire Force commander.
The stick leader would return to brief and inspect his men, checking the number and
condition of their loaded magazines, machine-gun belts, grenades, field dressings, rations,
water bottles, sleeping kit. He would share out : the spare radio batteries, the pangas and
toggle ropes [for use in difficult country]. He would check the medic pack and detail who
would carry it. He would show his stick where he carried his morphine. He and his men
had to use camo cream to darken their fair skins a white mans skin, even darkened by
sunburn, could be seen at a considerable distance]. He had to ensure that all controlled
stores [compasses, binoculars etc] and his codes were secure and waterproof. He had to
remember that he had a clean white backing to his map, that he had written his radio
callsign - Stop One, for example - on his hand. He would detail positions in the G-Car and
remind his men of the emplaning and deplaning drills. The MAG gunner would take the
rear right seat to give the aircraft additional firepower if the pilot requested it, (for example,
to keep enemy heads down when landing). The riflemen would not fire from the aircraft
because, unlike the MAG, the FN ejected the spent cartridge case upwards into the
spinning blades and the riflemen could also easily hit the blades from a tilting helicopter.
An additional reason was that loose cartridge cases rolling around on the floor could be
sucked out of the open doors and rearwards into the tail-rotor. The G-Cars guns for this
reason ejected into shoots. The riflemen would take the middle rear and front seats, leaving
the stick commander the left front seat and the spare headset so that he could follow the
progress of the deployment and receive his orders.
The paratroop stick leader would detail the order of the stick. He would remind the stick to
watch where the rest of the sticks landed. He would brief stick on regrouping channels and
which was the senior stick. All stick leaders would remind their men of tactics, formations
: the drills for clearing kraals and caves, for crossing open ground, the use of fire and
movement; what to do if the radio failed; arcs of responsibility, hand signals; action on
contact with the enemy, the use of smoke, of grenades, target indication. Men would be
assigned the searching of bodies and warned against looting. Chains of command within
the stick would be established and everyone would be apprised callsigns and radio
channels.
The stick commander had to answer his radio first time, (in Support Commando failure to
answer immediately would draw the response of a cannon shell from the K-Car which
would have an electrifying effect - it would also confirm that a radio was not working). He
had to remember that he was responsible for the success of his men. If he had 'wankers' or
useless members in his stick he was to report to his Troop or Platoon commander. And he
was warned : If you don't brief your stick properly you will have your arse kicked.
Once the Fire Force was airborne the responsibilities of the K-Car Pilot were navigation,
communication with OP including the OPs talk-on to the target and the co-ordination of
the arrival of the fixed-wing aircraft. The Fire Force commander and the K-Car pilot would
consult the OP for an update on the target, review the plan and rebrief the stick
commanders and the G-Car pilots over the radio on any changes. If the call-out had been
rapid, this might be the first briefing or the first briefing might be held at the refuelling
stop en route. The Fire Force commander would order the second wave sticks to move to
their rendezvous point to be ready for uplift by the G-Cars. He would remind the sticks
how they would be able to recognise the K-Car - by its rotating beacon or by letters or
numbers on its belly or by the height - 800 feet - at which it flew. The G-Cars which would
be hugging the tree- tops for safety.
The Fire Force commander would establish communications with other ground forces to
confirm what callsigns were on the ground, their position in relation to the target, and who
was the senior callsign. When reviewing his selected dropping zone, the Fire Force
commander had to remember that paratroops were not limited by a few trees on the
dropping zone, but heavily wooded areas could be dangerous as were rocks, sloping
ground, powerlines and 15 to 20 knot winds. He had to remember that he and all his troops
had to be orientated on the approach. Paratroops, in particular, had difficulty in seeing the
target area.
On arrival, the OP would give the Fire Force commander the latest information and talk the
K-Car onto the target, indicating it with a tracer bullet or other means.
49
Ron Flint, a
somewhat flustered territorial sergeant, of the Fifth Battalion, the Rhodesia Regiment,
pointed his pencil flare projector and informed the incoming K-Car just behind him :
Marking Target NOW!. The pencil flare refused to ignite. Coolly observing the corporals
agitated efforts, the K-Car pilot laconically commented from above : Dont worry. I can
see where your finger is pointing. On another occasion, great difficulty was experienced in
spotting the smoke of the target marker (an adapted SNEB aircraft rocket), because the
Selous Scout OP, a black sergeant, had marked the target so well that the rocket was buried
in the chest of one of the enemy, dampening the smoke. The Selous Scouts did not,
however, always mark targets because they would be acting as pseudo gangs and wanted to
appear to the tribesmen as the survivors of any contact.
50
The Fire Force commander would select the most prominent feature to the north of the
target as a main reference point and orientate himself with the terrain - the hills, rivers,
roads, maize fields and habitation and the direction in which the terrain and rivers ran -
because his own disorientation was a real possibility as the K-Car orbited.
Pulling up to 800 feet the K-Car pilot would control all aircraft movements and the use of
their weapons. As overall commander, the Fire Force commander bore the responsibility
for the success of the engagement and would make his final tactical appreciation, bearing
in mind the speed of the enemy's flight and the objective of preventing their breakout. He
would intend to 'stabilize' them to ensure their elimination or capture. The insurgents could
be expected to 'bombshell', fleeing in all directions to make it difficult to track them. Thus
dummy drops would be used to convince them that there was no way out of the trap. The
orbiting aircraft would deter them from moving across open ground and a pre-planned
airstrike or a burst of K-Car fire could stun them into immobility. The Fire Force
commander, however, would not deposit his men on the ground until he had a clear idea of
the incident - sighting, ambush or reported insurgent base.
The Fire Force commander would quickly confirm where the stops should be placed and
the G-Cars would be directed to their landing zones by the K-Car pilot. The commander
was trained to draw a sketch-map of the contact area and to mark on it the positions of stop
groups. When a stop group moved, he would re-mark its position on the sketch-map to
avoid contacts between friendly forces. Control from the air by the Fire Force commander
was crucial so it was essential, as has been said, that he remain over the target area at all
times, changing to another aircraft if necessary. He also had to be ready to react speedily to
changing situations. If the insurgents broke out of the net, the Fire Force commander had to
deploy his trackers early to establish the direction of the enemy's flight so that he could
leap-frog his stops ahead to cut them off.
Once his men were on the ground, the Fire Force commander had to recognise their
problems and assist them with them. If a sticks radio failed, and if he could not land to
replace it with the spare, he would ensure that the stick did not move and therefore not
blunder into a killing ground. As soon as he could he would unite them with a stick which
had communications. The commander was not to set his sticks impossible tasks nor was he
to expect them to take independent action. He had to ensure that they identified the features
of the target and were properly orientated, knowing who was on their flanks. He had to
appreciate their difficulties in crossing terrain and not over-estimate the speed at which
they could move. It was not advisable merely to give men the grid reference of their
objective if it was possible to describe the route or if the K-Car could indicate their
objective by overflying it. Anything which could assist the sweep and stop troops would
enhance their performance.
It was vital to apprise the sticks of what was happening, what the enemy was doing. This
did not mean that the Fire Force commander had to provide a running commentary because
the stick leaders would be monitoring to the radio transmissions. The Fire Force
commander was, of course, in a superb position, orbiting at 600-800 feet and sitting on the
extreme left of the aircraft to guide his men.
In quiet moments the Fire Force commander would have the K-Car orbit the sticks to
confirm their positions and to reassure them. The sight of the supporting fixed-wing
aircraft striking the target was always good for morale as was the rapid evacuation of any
casualties by the stand-by G-Car. Prompt congratulations from the K-Car for any success
also boosted morale and preserved the vital intimate trust between the commander in the
air and the men on the ground.
There were fundamental rules with regard to tactics which could not be broken. The first
was : never to sweep uphill - always downhill; the second : never to sweep into the sun;
and the third was always to sweep from cover into open ground - never from open ground
into cover. Major Henson recalls that, whenever he broke these rules, he lost men - five in
all. And he would only break the rules because time was pressing, the sun was setting and
there was no time to get his men round to the top of a hill to start a downward sweep.
It was imperative that the Fire Force commander appeared and sounded calm and
confident. Any displays of impatience, excitement or anger would only rattle inexperienced
sticks and prompt a mutinous reaction from experienced ones slogging through thick bush
in the heat. Calm tones, clear, crisp explanations had a sobering effect on jittery ground
forces. This was particularly important when dealing with African forces whose command
of English was often not good and who might not understand brisk, terse commands,
mistaking affirmative for negative, for example. The Fire Force commander would
allow time for aircraft noise to diminish before speaking to a stick and would arrange that
aircraft orbits were sufficiently high and distant to avoid deafening the stick leaders. An
important duty was to control radio transmissions to prevent the channels becoming
cluttered with unnecessary 'waffle'.
The Dakota bearing the paratroops would have flown to an 'IP' (intermediate point) four
minutes away, out of earshot, to await developments. The Fire Force commander would use
his stops and his firepower to stabilize the situation by immobilising the insurgents. Once
he had stopped their flight and driven them to ground, he would bring in his paratroops to
sweep the area, driving the enemy into the open (the favoured killing ground of the aircraft)
or into the waiting stop groups. Before having his paratroops dropped, the Fire Force
commander would ask his K-Car pilot or the first available G-Car to confirm that the
landing zone was suitable, bearing in mind the vulnerabilities of the paratroopers - exposure
to enemy fire in the air, cross-winds and rough landing zones. The G-Car might establish,
by landing, the precise altitude of the LZ and transmit the QNH setting for the Dakota's
altimeter. The K- Car or G-Car would mark the centre of the dropping zone with smoke
and talk the Dakota in.
Where possible, the troops would be dropped facing the contact area, in the direction of
their sweep. It took considerable skill by the pilots to position the Dakota precisely, when
flying at 90 knots (to create sufficient slipstream to open the canopies), so that the
paratroopers landed on the often small dropping zones. For mutual defence and for
efficiency it was essential that the paratroops came down close to each other. To expose the
paratroops to ground fire for the shortest time, the prescription for the drop was from 500
feet and never lower than 450 feet. The D-10 American parachute used required 250 feet in
which to open fully and in fact, drops were often made from 300 feet so that none of the
paratroops drifted off the dropping zone. The Fire Force paratrooper carried little more than
his weapon, ammunition, grenades, and water and thus was not heavily burdened as often
is the case in military jumps.
The advice was Rather too high than too low. On 17 February 1978, however, paratroops
from A Company, Second Battalion, the Rhodesian African Rifles, were dropped at 300
feet due to an error of 150 feet in the setting of their Dakotas altimeters. Their
commander, Major Andr Dennison, estimated that the canopies were open for only nine
seconds before the men struck the ground - unharmed.
51
John Hopkins, late of the RAR,
maintains that in fact RAR probably held the record as 16 paratroopers commanded by
Lieutenant Blackie Swart jumped on 9 October 1978 at something less than 300 feet,
through a pilot error. They hit the ground only as their chutes began to deploy. None were
killed in the fall but eight were injured, four of them seriously. Four days later, an MAG
gunner died from a fatty embolism being released into his bloodstream.
52
The RLI,
however, would dispute Hopkinss claim as in 1979 a Support Commando drop near
Rushinga left 14 of 22 men injured when their Dakota maintained a constant height over
rising ground. The first men went out at 250 feet but the last jumped at 200 feet.
53
Once on the ground the paratroops would marry up using a separate radio channel and once
gathered together, report ready to the Fire Force commander. They would lay out an
identification panel and face the contact area. The Fire Force commander would attempt to
observe the landing so that further indications were not necessary. Only the leader of the
senior stick of each group would report in once he had regained control of all sticks under
his command. The parachutes would be abandoned to be picked up later by the closest
troops after the contact. Or a wanker stick would be dropped to collect the parachutes.
The Fire Force commander also had to brief all fresh troops on their way to the contact.
While doing all this he would keep the JOC informed so that it could plan its wider
reaction. He would bring in his reinforcements as soon as possible as he could never have
enough troops on the ground and might need a reserve on hand for decisive action or for
unforeseen eventualities. When the reinforcements arrived the K-Car would lead their
helicopters through the pattern of landing zones, ordering each G-Car to deploy its troops
when the particular landing zone was flown over, to maintain the order of the deployment.
The enemy had to be dealt with immediately and never left alive and unattended. Sweep
lines were to disarm and to frisk all insurgents alive or dead on the first sweep. This was to
be done because insurgents were known to feign death when fired on by the K-Car and
then abscond when the sweep line had passed through. It was essential that the first
captured insurgent was flown out immediately for proper and prompt interrogation because
he could reveal precisely how many enemy were in the area, what their intentions were,
where they intended to rendezvous, their destination, last base and name of their leader.
The Fire Force commander would take care not to compromise the identity of captives,
masking them with hoods, keeping them away from the locals because in many cases they
would be turned and recruited into the Selous Scouts for pseudo operations. Thus their
local identity as ZANLA or ZIPRA insurgents had to be protected.
The Fire Force commander would make maximum use of fire from the aircraft into known
insurgent positions. He would use the G-Cars for flushing fire so that the K-Car remained
on station above the target. Flushing fire or Drake shooting, was also used by the sweep
lines. The troops would fire several rifle shots into bushy thickets to drive out the
insurgents from hiding places. To promote accuracy and conserve ammunition, the Fire
Force troops fired their FN Rifles on semi-automatic rather than full-automatic. Fully
automatic fire was restricted to the MAG machine-gun, which would be used to lay down
sustained fire, to cover the outflanking of the position by the remainder of the stick.
54
When insurgents were trapped, the sticks would often call for fire from the K-Car or other
aircraft after the enemy position had been marked by the ground forces with a smoke
grenade and the stick had been pulled back.
55
Most contacts were with small groups so the Fire Forces usually outnumbered their
opponents. Later in the war the Fire Forces did confront groups of a hundred or more but
were never defeated, never driven away. Much of the reason was the presence of air power,
particularly the K-Cars and their 20mm guns but part of it was the discipline and training
of the Fire Force troops and their marksmanship. Their opponents, by contrast, fired widely
and on automatic. Long bursts from an AK lifts the barrel towards the sky.
56
Once the contact was over, the Fire Force commander would have the target area
thoroughly searched so that all abandoned equipment, ammunition and spent cartridge
cases were picked up. This was done for ballistic, intelligence and other purposes and to
deny the survivors ammunition. If there was time, the Fire Force commander would
document bodies, weapons and equipment. Even if no enemy were encountered, careful
sweeping was required so nothing of intelligence value was missed. The next step was the
recovery of all the dead and captured insurgents and their arms and equipment by
helicopter or vehicle. Parachutes and the troops on the ground would likewise be
recovered. In many cases, the troops would be ferried to the Dakota waiting on a nearby
strip or to the vehicles of the land-tail. If necessary, troops would be left to ambush the
contact area or to follow up on the tracks of the fleeing survivors. The Fire Force
commander, before leaving the area, would brief them on their task, directing them to
ambush positions and assigning radio channels for communication with him and the Fire
Force base. He would ensure they were adequately equipped for their task and, in
particular, that they had the correct maps. If they were needed for fresh sightings the next
morning, they could be recovered by helicopter with relative ease. It was not necessary for
them to return to their base every time.
Once everyone was back at base, the Fire Force commander would debrief those involved.
He would review the course of events : the initial briefing; the accuracy of the original
intelligence; the choice of routes to the target and the formations flown; the calibre of the
talk-on and the identification by the OP and the OPs subsequent action; the noise factor;
the possible compromise of the OP; actions by local inhabitants; the difficulties presented
by the insurgents choice of base; the efficacy of air weapons; the performance of the
troops on the ground - the stops, the para-drop, the sweeps and action on contact; casualties
and their subsequent extrication; reasons for insurgents escaping and their numbers; and the
efficiency of the recovery and any subsequent action. The Fire Force commander would
transmit his comments to the unit which had supplied the OP.
57
Rhodesian national servicemen in the independent companies of the Rhodesia Regiment at
times served as Fire Forces, as did the First and Second Battalions of that regiment, and
many impromptu Fire Forces were created by troops present at a JOC. The permanent Fire
Forces, however, were drawn from the ranks of the white regular soldiers of the Rhodesian
Light Infantry, who achieved the highest kill-rate with relatively small loss to themselves,
and the black professional soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles who also achieved
enviable results. The troops assigned to the Fire Forces could expect to find themselves
called out two or three times a day. Many call-outs produced lemons because the
intelligence was faulty or the insurgents had disappeared into the bush or had melded into
the local population or because the Fire Force did not spend enough time searching the
area of a sighting. With deployments in the Rhodesian bush war as long as six-ten weeks,
the strain would often tell. Three operational jumps in a single day was something no other
paratrooper had ever been expected to do. Indeed other paratroops of other nations had
endured nothing like it. In 1950-1952, for example, the French Colonial Paras in Indo-
China proudly boasted of their fifty odd combat jumps.
58
This was more than double the 24
operational jumps which the two vaunted French Foreign Legion Para battalions made
between March 1949 and March 1954.
59
Altogether the French were to make over a
hundred combat jumps while later in Vietnam the Americans only made one major combat
jump. The Americans, of course, were by then making tactical use of helicopters.
60
The records of Support Commando, 1RLI (commanded by Major Nigel Henson) in the
crucial months of February to May 1979 give a taste of Fire Force action at the height of
the war, at the moment when the new constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was brought in,
conceding for the first time majority rule. In late April, Bishop Muzorewa and his United
African National Council gained the majority of the seats in the new Legislative Council
with the overwhelming support of the electorate who had defied the efforts by the ZANLA,
and the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (the military wing of Nkomos
ZAPU), to deter them from voting. Muzorewas popularity would quickly fade because the
governments of the west, and, in particular, the new British Conservative Government of
Margaret Thatcher, refused to recognise the legality of his election.
The forces ranged against Muzorewa - ZANLA and ZIPRA - took a terrible pounding
from the onslaught of the Rhodesian security forces both internally in Rhodesia and
externally in their host countries of Mozambique, Zambia and, on one occasion, deep in
central Angola. Support Commando was in the thick of the fighting as one of five Fire
Forces. The pilots of the Fire Forces had the additional burden of constantly being drawn
away to support a programme of continual air and ground external attacks by the
Rhodesian SAS and Selous Scouts. In April Support Commando itself would raid
Mozambique.
In February 1979 Support Commando was supplying troops for two Fire Forces, Delta and
Echo. On 22 February, at 1.45 p.m. on a bright, very hot afternoon, elements of Support
Command, 1RLI, acting as Fire Force Delta and commanded by Lieutenant V.A. Prinsloo,
contacted twelve green-clad ZANLA cadres at UL 128518 [a grid reference ]
61
in the
mopani forest and thorn bush of Sengwe TTL in the extreme south of Rhodesia, close to
the South African and Mozambican borders. Fire Force Delta had been brought in to
reinforce a callsign of the mounted infantry regiment, the Grey Scouts, who had been on
the spoor of a group of ZANLA. The Greys had killed an insurgent and called for Fire
Force Delta to seal off the escape routes with stop groups and sweep the area.
Fire Force Delta (comprising a K-Car, three G-Cars and a Lynx) had been pre-positioned
nearby but in the five minutes it took to reach the target, the ZANLA were fleeing south
east. The Fire Force flew over the southern area and a keen-eyed trooper in a G-Car
spotted the insurgents some three kilometres from the contact area. The K-Car attacked the
group while Stop One was dropped on a riverline a kilometre west of the target. Stop Two
was dropped about a kilometre south of Stop One on a track. Both stops swept eastward
parallel to each other. Stop Three was dropped in a small kraal 800 metres to the west of
the target. By this time the insurgents had bombshelled, fleeing in all directions. One
insurgent put up his hands and surrendered to the K-Car. He and a wounded man were
taken into custody by Stop Three who immediately thereafter killed a third. The K-Car's
20mm cannon knocked down three insurgents in a gully a hundred metres away to the west
and sent Stop Two to investigate. The K-Car scored its fourth kill another hundred metres
on and dispatched Stop One to clear the area. The Lynx pilot then spotted two ZANLA
running west behind Stop One who turned about and searched west along the other side of
the riverline. The Lynx put in two Frantan attacks onto these two insurgents, apparently
without success, but Stop One killed an insurgent on arrival, re-swept the area and shot and
killed two more.
Lieutenant Prinsloo recorded in his report that nine ZANLA were killed, two were captured
and one escaped. He noted the poor state of the ZANLA weaponry, with its woodwork old
and rotting. Four SKS self-loading rifles, six AK assault rifles, an AKM, six stick
grenades, twelve thirty-round AK magazines, one forty-round AK magazine, three
percussion grenades, 2 000 rounds of 7.62 intermediate rounds, five RPG7 rockets and four
RPG7 boosters and an 82mm mortar secondary were recovered. The twelve RLI troops had
fired 250 rounds of 7.62mm ball and had thrown a white phosphorous grenade. The K-Car
had fired a hundred rounds of 20mm and the Lynx had expended two Frantan bombs and
fired 120 rounds of .303 inch ball from its front guns. A mini flare projector had been lost
as well as three FN magazines. Prinsloo noted that interrogation had revealed that the
insurgents had not known that the Fire Force was in the area despite its earlier move to a
position close by to await the call-out.
62
Two days later, at 10.30 a.m. on the rainy morning of 24 February, Support Commandos
other Fire Force, Echo, commanded by Major N.D. Henson, contacted an unknown number
of ZANLA at US 222435 in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, north of Salisbury and south
west of the white farming area of Centenary. Henson was faced with many problems. He
had only a K-Car, a G-Car and a Lynx, the target area was large (five kilometres by three)
and covered in thick bush. Visibility from the air was poor and heavy rain swept in at ten
minute intervals throughout the day. Henson had responded to a confirmation received at
10.15 a.m. from the Special Branch that ninety-five insurgents were in the area but he was
not given a precise location. Henson had been forewarned and, having only one troop-
carrying helicopter, had pre-positioned his second wave sticks, comprising six RLI and ten
Police Anti- Terrorist Unit sticks [64 men in all] with fuel about five minutes from the
contact area.
No movement was seen from the aircraft when they arrived over the suspected area.
Henson deployed Stops One-Seven in a curving line from south to north along the banks of
the Ruya River. Stops Three- Five started sweeping northwards and contacted an insurgent
across a small tributary of the Ruya. The result was the wounding of Trooper Cummings so
Henson requested airstrikes by the Lynx with Frantan and a mini-Golf bomb. He reinforced
Stops Three-Five with Stops Six and Seven but ZANLA replied with mortar fire. Henson
moved Stops Eight-Eleven to the west and had them sweep north eastwards. Stops Three-
Seven killed an insurgent armed with a 60mm mortar on the hill in front of them and then
resumed their sweep. On the second central hill, Stop Eight reported ZANLA ahead. The
Lynx and the K-Car attacked but an immediate sweep found nothing. Henson ordered a
further sweep of the area, and this time Stops Three-Seven came under intense fire from
the summit. Further airstrikes were put in and the sweep line found three ZANLA bodies
on the northern flank of the hill.
In his report, having recorded the killing of four ZANLA, the escape of fifteen, and the
wounding of Trooper Cummings. Henson stressed the difficulties of operating in heavy
rain which had masked the escapes. The size of the area of operations had also militated
against a bigger kill. An AKM assault rifle, a PPSH submachine-gun, a 60mm mortar,
grenades, ammunition and documents were recovered and handed to the Special Branch at
Mount Darwin. Henson confessed that the idea of tackling 95 ZANLA with a K-Car and a
G-Car was daunting because the lack of G-Cars had drastically limited his ability to move
his troops. Those killed, Henson wrote, had been more inept with their attempted escape
than he had yet experienced.
63
At 6.30 a.m. in the difficult light of the early morning of 6 March, Lieutenant V.A.
Prinsloos Support Commando men of Fire Force Delta contacted seven ZANLA, at TL
016872 in grassland with scattered trees and thorny undergrowth in the Mtetengwe Tribal
Trust Land, north of Beit Bridge in the south of Rhodesia. Intelligence gathered by One
Independent Company, Rhodesia Regiment, (1 Indep) had led the JOC to devise an all-
arms programme to attack five ZANLA camps. The first and second camps (at SL 978892
and SL 971887) were to be bombed by a Canberra at first light. Simultaneously, with a K-
Car, three G-Cars, a Lynx and a Police Reserve Air Wing aircraft (PRAW), Fire Force
Delta was to attack the third (at TL 016872) while the fourth and fifth (at SL 955853 and
SL 956841) were to be engaged by artillery.
The plan went somewhat awry. The artillery bogged down on the mud road and could not
get into position. The Canberra had communications problems and had to abort.
Undaunted Fire Force Delta, which had been pre-positioned nearby, decided to continue
with its task. Stops One and Two were dropped on a cut line [a bush-cleared fire break]
to the east of the third camp. Stop Three was placed on a ridge in the south on the river
which ran directly north to the camp and beyond. When the K-Car flew over the camp,
Prinsloo could see the sleeping places and the blankets but no movement. Stops One and
Two moved directly west along the cut line to the river and then along its banks southwards
towards the camp. On reaching the proximity of the camp area they shot and killed three
ZANLA in the undergrowth. The thorns were so thick that the troops spent much of their
time on their hands and knees. An insurgent killed himself by blowing his head off with a
grenade. Seeing movement in the undergrowth, the troops fired and killed ten African
women. Prinsloo had Stops Four and Five dropped in the east on a tributary of the main
river to work down it towards the camp. Stops One, Two, Four and Five then swept the
swamp just to the north, working up the main river towards Stop Three. In the thick thorn
bush six more African women were killed in dense thorn bush. The sweep returned towards
the camp and captured two females. The bodies of a female and an insurgent were
recovered. The thorns were so thick that the bodies of the other three insurgents and the
African women could not be recovered and were left behind. The captured females
informed the security forces that the camp had held seven insurgents and eleven women. In
the aftermath, the troops were sent on foot to check the other four camps, finding them
unoccupied.
Lieutenant Prinsloo recorded the score of four ZANLA and eight civilians killed, and that
his 20 men (12 RLI and 8 riflemen from 1 Indep) had fired 500 rounds, expended four
white phosphorous grenades and a high explosive grenade. The K-Car had fired fifteen
rounds of 20mm. The troops had lost a MAG belt. An AK, a SKS, two stick grenades, an
offensive grenade, seven AK magazines and 500 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition were
picked up.
64
At 11 a.m. on the next day, 7 March, Prinsloo and his Fire Force Delta were back in action.
They had responded to a sighting by the Selous Scout OP, callsign Three Three Bravo, and
had contacted eight insurgents at OG 624854 in the Godlwayo Tribal Trust Land, south of
Bulawayo, in the Tangent operational area.
The OP bungled the talk-on and time was wasted. Then the K-Car spotted and killed an
insurgent in the camp at QG 624855. and Prinsloo had Stops One and Two dropped to
sweep the area of the camp. During the sweep, an orbiting G-Car noticed two insurgents
about two kilometres north west. The K- Car flew over, shot both of them and diverted
Stops One and Two to search this area while Stops Three and Four were dropped to the
east to sweep the original camp. When Stop One and Two failed to find one of the two men
the K-Car had shot, it was concluded that he had escaped wounded. After searching the
area, all stops were recovered. The Fire Force returned to base.
An hour later, the same OP, Three Three Bravo, called Fire Force Delta back to a position
five kilometres north east of the contact area because it could see that three insurgents had
regrouped on a hill. Fire Force arrived and one insurgent broke cover as Stop One was put
on the ground. The K-Car opened fire and killed him. Stop Two joined Stop One and swept
the northern flank of the hill while Stop Three searched the kraal to the south of the hill.
Stops One and Two flushed two insurgents off the hill who fled north east only to be killed
by Stops One and Two.
A SKS, three AKs, five stick grenades, an armour piercing rifle grenade and 400 rounds of
AK ammunition were recovered and handed to Special Branch at Gwanda. Recording the
score of five ZANLA killed and three escaped, with one of the escapees being wounded,
Prinsloo felt that, if the first talk-on had been accurate, all eight insurgents could have been
killed.
65
On 9 March 1979, the Fire Force manned by Three Commando 1RLI and commanded by
Major Frederick Watts, contacted 23 ZANLA and killed 21 of them.
66
At 4 p.m. that day,
Major Hensons Support Commandos Fire Force Echo (a K-Car, three G-Cars and a
Lynx) contacted an unknown number of ZANLA at US 8085, in the Masoso Tribal Trust
Land in the Zambezi Valley on the northern border with Mozambique. The country was
flat, covered with thick jesse thorn bush interspersed with patches of mealie lands and a
northward flowing riverbed.
Fire Force Echo had been diverted from another call-out but the talk-on by OP, callsign
One Two Charlie, was inaccurate and confused, and wasted twenty minutes while the
aircraft milled about. Henson was particularly annoyed when the OP refused to fire his
target marker into the Muvadonha Valley. The the K-Car only acquired a target when its
aircrew spotted two insurgents fleetingly. The K- Car fired its 20mm at a point where an
east-west track crossed the riverbed. The Lynx followed with Frantan. Henson had Stop
One put down on the track where it skirted a mealie land to the west of the river. Stop Two
was dropped on a mealie land close to the riverbed and just north of the sighting. Stop
Three was put down on a third mealie land in the south. The first in action was Stop Two
who shot and killed an insurgent shortly after landing. They swept forward to the site of
the airstrike where blood spoor and an AK were found. Stop One killed an insurgent on the
eastern edge of their mealie land. Stop Three working up the riverbed, soon encountered an
insurgent and killed him. The light had faded so ambushes were set up on the riverbed. A
sweep at first light yielded no signs of further insurgents. Henson blamed the talk-on, the
thick bush and the poor light for what he considered a poor score of three ZANLA and one
wounded escaped. An RPD light machine-gun, a PPSH submachine-gun, two AKs,
grenades, ammunition and documents were recovered and handed to Special Branch at
Mount Darwin.
67
On 12 March, Second Lieutenant Simon John Carpenter distinguished himself in a contact
with insurgents while commanding a sweep line of ten men from Support Commandos
Fire Force Delta. When the sweep line was held up by five insurgents in a concealed
position, Carpenter coolly outflanked the position, with the result that his section killed all
five.
68
A month later, in April 1979, Carpenter was to account personally for two
insurgents who were concealed in a well-sited defensive position which completely
dominated his own position.
69
At 4 p.m. on 12 March, Major N.D. Hensons Fire Force Echo, contacted an unknown
number of ZANLA at VQ 384518 in the Makoni Tribal Trust Land, east of Rusape, in the
Thrasher operational area. This took place in an area of open fields divided by thickly
bushed riverlines, flowing north to south west, and a range of heavily wooded rocky hills,
running north west to south east. The hills were divided by the river. The OP was on the
summit of the north western hill overlooking the valley. Because the target had seemed so
important Fire Force Echo, comprising a K-Car, three G-Cars, a Dakota and a Lynx, had
been summoned from Mount Darwin, getting airborne at 1 p.m. At Rusape, Fire Force
Echo was told at the briefing in the Selous Scouts Fort that there were three targets, in the
form of huts, within the square kilometre. The first hut was at the foot of the OPs hill, the
second across the riverline directly east between two hills and the third also across the the
river but to the south east at the foot of the south eastern hill.
Once over the target, Henson had Stop One put down to the west of the first hut, Stop Two
was put on the river to the north and Stop Three just south of the third hut. Then, before
any action could be taken on the ground, the orbiting K-Car spotted an insurgent sitting in
a zinc bath in a maize field just north west of the second hut. Attending the man were two
African women who abandoned their role as bath attendants and fled. The bather, however,
now under 20mm fire from the K-Car reached out for an AK47 and fired back. The naked
African stood his ground while the K-Car circled, firing. Then he ran out of ammunition
and began to run. The K-Car gunner knocked him down killing him.
70
The K-Car crew
then spotted two insurgents in the riverbed just beyond at the confluence of a small
tributary and fired at a further insurgent who was captured by Stop One. Henson ordered
the Dakota to drop his paratroopers. Para sticks were dropped to the west of the first hut
and Eagle One and Two [para-sticks] were placed in the north, either side of the
confluence of the river and a tributary. They began a sweep down the river and killed two
insurgents in the riverline near the confluence. At that moment, a G-Car, moving away to
refuel, saw 12 insurgents running in a ravine two kilometres to the south west. Eagle Four
was brought in down the ravine in the south east and began to sweep north west. Henson
knew the direction the insurgents were fleeing but was unable to cut them off because his
aircraft were running out of fuel. The K-Car left to acquire fuel which the Special Branch
personnel of the Selous Scouts Fort at Rusape assured Henson had been pre-positioned
nearby but found nothing. This to Henson was inexcusable. The K-Car had to return to
Rusape to refuel. The G-Cars found some diesel being carried by a Police Anti-Terrorist
Unit stick and refuelled with the help of watering cans. The fuel for the G-Cars did not
arrive until 20 minutes before last light. Thus no fire from the air could be brought to bear
on the fleeing men and the stops could not be re-positioned. All that Henson could do,
shortly before last light, was to have Stop Two and Eagle Four uplifted and placed in
ambush. Sweeps the next day yielded nothing. Henson recorded the score as three ZANLA
killed and one captured. Two SKS and two AKs and miscellaneous documents were
recovered.
71
Twenty-four hours later, at 4.15 p.m. on 13 March, Hensons Fire Force Echo - comprising
a K-Car, two G-Cars, a Dakota and a Lynx - was back in action, contacting fifteen
ZANLA at US 849839 in the Masoso Tribal Trust Land in the north east, just south of the
Mozambique border, among low, sparsely vegetated hills intersected by thickly bushed
riverlines running north. Called out to a sighting of ten- fifteen insurgents in a base camp
the Fire Force Echo had been airborne from Mtoko at 3.40 p.m. The initial talk-on was
poor and finally one kilometre to the east the K-Car spotted some insurgents and opened
fire. Stop One was positioned in the north where the two riverlines converged and Stop
Two was placed in the east of one of the southern hills. The para sticks were dropped in the
south. Eagles One and Two swept north along the westerly river. Eagles Three and Four
joined Stop Two and swept the southern hill from the east. Eagles Five and Six went north
and then moved east along the northern flank of the next range of hills. There they joined
Eagles One and Two on their sweep northwards along the western river. The K-Car killed
an insurgent on the southern side of the second range of hills and killed another in the river
ahead of the sweep line led by Eagle One. Stop One killed an insurgent at the confluence
of the river.
Eagles One and Two, led by Temporary Corporal Neil Kevin Maclaughlin, had killed two
insurgents in the riverline before they reached the second range. Success was attributed to
Maclaughlins clever use of minor tactics. Maclaughlin, ignoring his own vulnerability to
enemy fire, moved down in the open ground of the riverbed to control the sweep
effectively. After Eagles Five and Six joined him, Maclaughlins sweep line came under
fire from a third group of four insurgents, hidden in thick cover on the riverbank near a hut
just to the east. The sweep line returned fire, killing two of the enemy. Undeterred, the
ZANLA kept up their fusillade, bringing down Trooper M.J. Jefferies. Corporal
Maclaughlin ran forward through the hostile barrage to assist Jefferies. Maclaughlin
administered first aid and then, while the aircraft and the sweep line fired to distract the
enemy, carried Jefferies to safety. The K-Car ordered a G-Car to casevac Jefferies,
delaying the advance.
When Maclaughlin led his men forward again, they shot and killed an insurgent within the
first few metres. Stop Two, Eagle Three and Four killed three insurgents in the easterly
riverline as they reached it. They killed a further insurgent on the western flank of the
southern hill. They then swept the second range.
Action continued during the night. Ambushing the area between the two ranges of hills,
Stop One opened fire on locals coming in to remove three undiscovered but wounded
insurgents. One local was killed adding the existing tally of twelve ZANLA dead. The
three wounded ZANLA escaped into the night. Three SKSs, one DP machine gun, two FN
rifles and six AKs and documents were recovered and handed to the Special Branch at
Mount Darwin. Henson concluded that, if he had not had to stop the advance to casevac
Jefferies, a complete kill could have been achieved. The discovery of ZANLA armed with
FNs worried him because of the danger which their powerful rounds posed to his troops
and aircraft. He recommended the decorating of Corporal Maclaughlin.
72
Consequently,
Maclaughlin was awarded the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia on 8 June.
73
At 9.30 a.m. on 19 March, Support Commandos Fire Force, commanded by Lieutenant
Prinsloo, contacted ten insurgents at US 858688, again in the Masoso Tribal Trust Land,
after being called out by a Selous Scouts OP to a sighting in an area that had a river
flowing eastwards across its northern sector. A tributary joined it from the south east. To
the east of the tributary was a long hill running south east to north west. To its south was a
large hill running east-west, on the southern flank of which there were three clusters of
huts. On the northern flank there was a small village in the east and a line of kraals beyond
that. The bush of the area was fairly thick and was dense at the river. The Selous Scouts OP
was on a hill three and a half kilometres to the east.
Prinsloo had Stops One and Two placed in the west at the foot of the first hill. The
paratroops were dropped with Eagle Two across the river, Eagle Three to the west on the
southern flank of the hill and Eagle One just south of the river in the west. Stops One and
Two swept up the eastern stream of the tributary and then worked back down it towards the
river where Eagle Two joined them. They moved back towards the main hill at the foot of
which was the insurgent base camp behind a rocky outcrop. Half way to the hill they killed
three ZANLA. They moved on to the base camp where they met Eagle Three who had
come in from the west along the hill. Eagle Three continued along the hill and killed an
insurgent in front of the small village of huts before moving north. Stops One and Two and
Eagle Two moved north. Eagle One, in the west, moved south and immediately killed an
insurgent. Shortly afterwards they killed another and then another further on, before
sweeping back to the north. In all seven insurgents were killed and three escaped. Seven
SKSs and a nearly new AK were recovered along with webbing, grenades, magazines,
ammunition and documents which were handed to the Special Branch at Rushinga. The OP
continued to observe the area. Prinsloo was complimented for a well controlled action.
74
Support Commando seems to have been stood down for a rest but was back in action on 1
April, when Corporal Christopher William Rogers and his section were pinned down by
accurate fire from four insurgents at close range. The insurgents succeeded in wounding
Rogers and another RLI soldier. Ignoring his wounds, Rogers continued to exchange fire
with the insurgents. The exchange was extremely heavy at times but Rogers managed to
kill two of the insurgents. He neutralised the insurgent position, enabling other troops to
close with and eliminate the entire insurgent group. Rogers was awarded a Military Forces
Commendation (Operational) for his deeds.
75
The first majority rule election was approaching and it was known that ZANLA and
ZIPRA would attempt to deter the blacks from voting by sending into Rhodesia a
substantial number of their more experienced men to ensure that the tribesmen did not vote.
Measures were taken to counter them. Later in April 1979 there would be a mass
mobilization of all territorials and army and police reservists. Before then the Fire Forces
went to work. Support Commando, for example, was deployed on Monday 2 April. A small
sub-unit was detached to provide protection for some of the more vulnerable polling
stations and the remainder of the Commando was divided into two Fire Forces, one
stationed at Grand Reef airfield, near Umtali, and the other at Inyanga, further to the north
on the Mozambican border.
76
By 1 p.m., that day, 2 April, Henson and 36 Support Commando men (flying in a K-Car,
three G-Cars, a Lynx and a Dakota) were in action in what would be a four and a half hour
long contact with an unknown number of ZANLA. The ZANLA had been spotted by an
OP, manned by Peter Curley of the Selous Scouts, at VR 923043, just north east of the
Inyanga Downs and close to the Gairezi River on the eastern border with Mozambique.
The area comprised hills which were cut into by thickly bushed riverlines.
The OP had not had a clear sighting. Curley believed that he could see a weapon in the
doorway of a hut but he was not sure that he was right. Henson knew that Fire Force would
not have been summoned without the Selous Scout being confident that there were
ZANLA present. Thus Henson put his stops down, placing Stop One in the south on the
western flank of a long range running northwards. Stop Three was placed in the middle and
Stop Two in the north. The para sticks were dropped to form a sweep line to search three
riverlines which flowed eastwards to a river flowing along the foot of the eastern range.
The southern end of the sweep encountered thirteen insurgents and killed them before
discovering their camp on the side of a spur. Most were killed in the main river valley.
Henson noted that the ZANLA had adopted the tactic of running, hiding and then throwing
grenades. In support of the troops, the K-Car fired eighteen 20mm rounds and the Lynx
dropped three Frantans. Henson praised his troops for their good soldiering, saying the
troopies were complete stars. The troops managed to lose two MAG belts, two sleeping
bags and two pangas and sheaths.
77
After being called to a sighting by an OP, Hensons Fire Force (36 men, a K-Car, 3 G-
Cars, a Lynx and a Dakota) at 9.30 a.m. on the next day, 3 April, contacted an unknown
number of insurgents at VR 168038 on the Wensleydale Estate, a white-owned farm, north
of Headlands. The contact lasted one hour on a thickly bushed rocky ridge. To the north of
the ridge, which ran east-west was a river flowing in the same direction. Between the river
and the ridge was heavy bush. Henson strung out his troops in a sweep line from the river
to south of the ridge. The K-Car killed an insurgent, who was hidden in the heavy bush,
and the sweep line killed another nearby. Just before then two captures had been made. One
AKM and two SKS rifles were recovered.
78
Success came again that day for Henson. At 3 p.m. his Fire Force (still 36 men and a K-
Car, 3 G-Cars, a Lynx and a Dakota), contacted ten ZANLA at VR 058055 on the
Rathcline Estate, north west of Inyanga Village. Again they had been summoned by an
OP. This contact lasted one and a half hours in thick bush in front of a hill which ran south
west to north east. The Inyangombe River flowing north, curved round to the east behind
the hill. The K-Car killed three insurgents while the troops killed four, two in the bush, one
on the hill and one over the hill by the river. Henson summed up :
An excellent action by an extremely well trained and steely-eyed commando.
Four AKs and three SKSs were recovered and handed to the Special Branch at Inyati.
79
Success continued the next morning, on 4 April, but at the cost of the life of Lance
Corporal M. Overbeek. 56 Support Commando men led by Major Henson were called to a
sighting by a Selous Scouts' OP, manned by Sergeant 'Jenks' Jenkinson, of approximately
50 ZANLA in a base camp at VR 345051, again on the Rathcline Estate. At 10.30 a.m.
contact was made with the insurgents and would continue for eight hours in terrain which
Henson described as unreal. He was confronted by a square shaped mountain, crowned by
a series of summits and stretching four kilometres in one direction and two in the other.
The size and importance of the target led Henson to call in an initial strike by a Canberra
bomber. This was precisely on target and the Fire Forces K-Car, three G-Cars, Lynx and
Dakota, arrived exactly on time.
On the summit of the northern hill, a stick, led by Temporary Corporal Peter Malcolm
Binion, approached a clump of rocks and was surprised by point blank rifle fire from two
ZANLA insurgents hidden there. Overbeek was killed instantly. Corporal Binion
immediately returned the fire. Then, while the remainder of his stick put down covering
fire, Binion dashed forward in full view of the ZANLA to a position from where he was
able to kill the two insurgents. Shortly afterwards, Binion received a minor shrapnel wound
from an exploding RPG rocket, fired at short range by a third insurgent. Ignoring his
wound, Binion closed with and killed this man. A further insurgent was killed close by.
Later the sweep killed two ZANLA on the western end of that hill, two on the eastern flank
of the second northern hill, one on the west of its southern flank. Two more insurgents
were killed near the stream that ran to the south east across the feature. The K-Car killed
an insurgent at the southern base of the easternmost summit. In all twelve insurgents,
dressed in the green uniforms of Mozambiques FPLM, were killed and one wounded
escaped. Ten AKMs, two SKSs and an RPG7 were recovered.
Calling the terrain the most difficult he had ever experienced, Henson had high praise for
his troops. He recommended the decoration of Corporal Binion
80
who would be awarded
the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia. Binion had been a stick leader for two years and had been
involved in numerous successful actions.
81
On the way back to base, the K-Car began to
vibrate and the pilot, Luigi Mantovani, landed it. When the blades came to rest, it was clear
they were so badly damaged by ground fire from ZANLA that flying was out of the
question. Mantovani radioed for new blades. The request was relayed to No. 7 Squadron at
New Sarum, outside Salisbury. New blades were promptly placed aboard a Dakota and
flown to Grand Reef. A G-Car brought the blades to the stranded K-Car where Mantovani,
the technician and Henson replaced the damaged blades. The afternoon light was going
when the K-Car lifted off for base. Helicopter blades have to be calibrated and this the
technician had been unable to do in the field. The consequent level of vibrations from the
unbalanced blades worried Mantovani enough for him to keep landing after short
intervals.
82
Other forces were scoring similar successes. For example, on 5 April, a Fire Force from
One Commando, 1RLI, commanded by Major Frederick Watts, contacted two groups of
insurgents totalling 27 men and killed 21 of them. In the next eleven days, until 16 April,
Watts, his men and the aircraft of his Fire Force would eliminate 106 ZANLA.
83
Corporal Binion again scored at 3 p.m. on 7 April, when Hensons Support Commando
men contacted seven insurgents, dressed in green FPLM uniforms and kit, at VR 175003 in
the extreme south of the Weya Tribal Trust Land, just north of the white farming area of
Headlands. One insurgent escaped and six were killed with Binion accounting for four of
them on a low ridge just north east of a high rounded hill.
84
The K-Car killed the fifth
insurgent on the ridge and the sixth at its western end. Rifles, grenades and ammunition
were picked up and handed to the Special Branch at Inyanga.
85
On 11 April, Support and Three Commandos and a detachment from the Rhodesian
African Rifles were sent into Mozambique to attack a complex of five staging camps
which were believed to hold up to 250 ZANLA. The operation was aborted when the
helicopters and Dakotas were circling the camps because ZANLA had already left. Support
Commando returned to Grand Reef where it was reinforced by its Inyanga detachment.
86
That day, Rhodesia mobilised its territorials and reservists to protect the election. They
would be stood down on 24 April.
87
At 10.15 a.m. on the next morning, 12 April, Henson and 28 of his men, supported by a K-
Car, three G- Cars, a Lynx and a Dakota, made contact with an unknown number of
ZANLA at UP 673648, in the Sabi Tribal Trust Land east of Buhera, after a sighting by an
OP. The contact lasted four hours. For once the terrain was favourable and was divided by
converging riverlines, flowing west to east towards the Sabi River. The K-Car killed one
insurgent in the north west, on the central river and at the confluence of the rivers. A G-
Car killed insurgents in a village in the south west. Stop Two was dropped astride the river
in the west and killed an insurgent after advancing a few metres and Eagle One was placed
on the most southerly tributary above the confluence and killed an insurgent again after a
few metres. An insurgent was captured near the northern tributary. Just north of the
confluence, the sweep line killed the remainder of the insurgents. The final score was
fifteen insurgents, all dressed in FPLM kit, killed and one captured. Rifles, machine guns,
grenades, magazines and ammunition were picked up and handed to the Special Branch at
Dorowa. Henson concluded that the contact was Like eating green mealies.
88
Four days later, on 16 April, Henson, a K-Car, two G-Cars, a Dakota, a Lynx and 29 of his
men were summoned to a sighting by an OP of an unknown number of ZANLA at VR
586237 in the Zimbiti Tribal Trust Land, north east of Inyanga. The sighting had been on
the northern flank of a mountain which was crowned by twin peaks. A stream flowed down
from the saddle between the peaks. On the saddle was the OP. Henson put his helicopter-
borne troops down on the eastern flank and dropped his para sticks to the north. He formed
a sweep line on the eastern end of the northern flank. When the sweep reached the stream
at 2 p.m., it encountered fifteen ZANLA in FPLM [Mozambican Army] uniforms, killing
ten of them while five made their escape. Rifles, grenades and ammunition were picked up
and were handed to the Special Branch at Inyanga. Henson was particularly pleased by the
performance of his troops during the six hours of the operation.
89
At 12 noon on 17 April (the day that the four days of voting by all inhabitants over the age
of 18 began), Henson and 27 of his men, supported by a K-Car, two G-Cars, a Lynx and a
Dakota again made contact with the enemy, this time seven ZANLA, at VQ 030056 in the
south of the Chiduku Tribal Trust Land, west of Umtali. The contact lasted four and a half
hours among three and a half kilometres of kraal lines with brick buildings, rubber hedges
and thousands of mango trees stretching along an east- west road, parallel to a river which
also flowed east-west. The K-Car killed insurgents on the road just short of a stream which
flowed south to the river. The sweep line killed insurgents at a house by the stream and in
the houses either side of the road. Trooper M.C. Moore was killed at a pair of houses
across the river in the south east. In all nine green and blue clad insurgents were killed and
two escaped. Ten rifles, grenades and ammunition were picked up and were handed to the
Special Branch at Inyazura. Henson recorded that the contact had taken place in a very
difficult area (virtually FIBUA [Fighting In Built Up Areas]).
90
On 19 April, Support Commandos Fire Force Bravo, commanded by Lieutenant Prinsloo,
responded to a sighting by a Selous Scouts OP of ten ZANLA in a village at VQ 004089,
close to the last contact in the Chiduku. This result was a contact with thirteen insurgents,
starting at 10 a.m. and lasting four hours in a series of kraal complexes along a river. When
the Fire Force was overhead the K-Car threw out a smoke marker. The Selous Scouts OP
callsign One Three Golf indicated the target with smoke and a number people were seen to
run from the kraal. The K-Car fired on them and stops were dropped. Stop Two was placed
in the south on the river. The paras were then dropped in the west and a sweep line went up
the river in a northerly direction and swept east through the kraals. After killing the
majority of the insurgents, Eagle Four was approaching yet another kraal cautiously when
Trooper R.F. Poole was shot through the chest. Corporal Binion, the MAG gunner, ran to
help but Trooper Poole was mortally wounded and died a little while later. The K-Car then
killed the insurgent responsible as he fled from the hut. A feature of the contact was that
the insurgents were wearing civilian clothes over their denims and tried to conceal their
weapons under their clothes. Some left their weapons in the kraals and ran. Four AKs were
handed to the Special Branch and the latter removed four more from burning buildings.
Prinsloo commented that there were obvious dangers in approaching insurgents who were
holed up in kraals. The final tally was ten ZANLA killed, two captured and one escaped.
91
The death of three members of the Mortar Troop of Support Commando reduced it to 13
men. To recover their morale the members were sent on four days of leave in Salisbury.
92
A military spokesman said on 21 April that during the elections 230 guerrillas had been
killed for the loss of 12 regular soldiers and security force auxiliaries. There had been a
total of 13 attacks on polling stations, most of them at night and all, according to officials,
'ineffectual'.
93
The final result of the elections was announced on 24 April, with
Muzorewas UANC winning 67.27% of the votes and securing 51 seats of the 80 seats in
the new Legislative Assembly of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The poll had been over 60 per cent
and ZANLA and ZIPRA were stunned by the tribesmens defiance of their orders not to
vote. As ZANLA and ZIPRA went to ground and their leaders left the country for orders,
the Rhodesian security forces kept up the pressure.
To harass ZANLA on its own ground, Combined Operations Headquarters proposed to
send Support Commando on Sunday, 29 April, fifty kilometres over the southern border
into Gaza Province of Mozambique in Operation Oppress to attack a logistics and transit
base at Chicualacuala called Petulia. The mission was to destroy the base and kill or
capture any ZANLA present. The base comprised three camps, containing a resident
section of 22 ZANLA. Intercepted radio messages indicated that fresh ZANLA were being
brought in. The operation was to comprise an airstrike followed by a ground attack by
Support Commando. The RhAF was to supply two Hunters, two Canberras, seven G-Cars,
three K-Cars, two AB205A Cheetahs, two Lynxes, and 3 Dakotas (including a Command
Dakota equipped with radios and teleprinters to control the operation from the air).
94
At Grand Reef on 28 April, Support Commando, reinforced by the return of the Mortar
Troop, was issued extra light machine-guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers and drew as much
ammunition and grenades as the men could carry. Each rifleman took ten 20-round
magazines and 100 loose rounds in addition to numerous grenades, extra machine-gun belts
for the gunners and spare 40mm RPG-7 rockets. In the evening, the Commando was flown
to Buffalo Range to be briefed by intelligence officers on the importance of the staging
post, which had been monitored by security forces but had hitherto been deliberately left
alone. As an influx of ZANLA into Rhodesia was expected, it was deemed an appropriate
moment to bomb and attack the base. Support Commando was expected to encounter at
least two members of the ZANLA hierarchy, who would be dressed in camouflage
uniforms with hammer and sickle insignia on the collars. Eastern Bloc military advisers
were also believed to be in the area and in the vicinity. High ranking officers were not to
be killed but captured if possible. Combined Operations wanted at very least one ZANLA
guerrilla for interrogation. The operation was being used to test an experimental landmine
of which a stop group would lay a number in the approach road to delay an reaction by
Mozambiques FPLM. In the event, it became clear that the survival of Support
Commandos men had depended on the mines functioning.
95
On 29 April the Hunters attacked the target with Golf bombs and were followed by the
Canberras, dropping 300 Mk II Alpha bombs each. The 50 men of Support Commando,
flying in the eight G-Cars and two AB205A Cheetahs, came in with the escort of two K-
Cars and two Lynxes, landing on the fringes of the camps in the brown fog of dust and
smoke of the airstrikes. Sergeant Frank Terrell, a former British marine commando serving
in Support Commando, recalls the sound of continuous explosions of burning ammunition,
the methodical reply of an anti-aircraft gun to the Hunters repeated attacks. Eventually a
Hunter silenced it. The RLI troops began their advance and first encountered a ZANLA
kitchen littered with dead. They encountered and shot dazed ZANLA while carefully
avoiding unexploded red-painted round Alpha bombs. The camp was burning so fiercely
that the troops could not at first penetrate its lines of bunkers, weapon pits and tents. The
camp was littered with equipment, Soviet Army helmets, abandoned and destroyed anti-
aircraft guns. These guns were dismantled, while the RLI troopers cleared the trenches and
bunkers. The huge haul of rifles and equipment were collected but no further ZANLA were
encountered. It was clear, from the dropped weapons, that the ZANLA had fled before the
attack.
Once the area was secure the Cheetahs flew in to be loaded with AK and SKS rifles,
grenades and three 14.5mm and a 12.7mm machine-guns. Uniforms, packs, web-
equipment, propaganda leaflets and enormous quantities of tinned food were burned. Major
Henson then had the troops search the surrounding bush. The search yielded six empty
pistol holsters and a leather briefcase which contained papers bearing names and weapon
numbers, messages, letters and photographs of uniformed ZANLA in the company of East
German or Soviet military instructors. A follow up was instituted and Terrell believes that
the troops were closing on their quarry - six high-ranking ZANLA officers - but ran out of
time. The day was drawing to a close and the remaining light was needed to airlift the
attacking force out. The Command Dakota, carrying Lieutenant Colonel Brian Robinson
and Group Captain [later Air Vice Marshal] Hugh Slatter called off the pursuit.
During the airlift, FPLM sent in a counter-attacking force in a convoy of trucks which was
brought to a halt by striking the landmines laid by the stop group.
Although Support Commando had not secured a prisoner, Operation Oppress was
pronounced a success because 28 ZANLA had been killed without any RLI casualties. As
had happened so often before in the Rhodesian war, a large number of ZANLA had
vacated the camp on the previous night, 28 April, but Support Commando was to eliminate
many of the escapees within days. On 14 May, it killed or captured 21 ZANLA from a
large group which had recently crossed from Mozambique and which included several high
ranking officials. A follow-up on the border on 16 May resulted in a running, day- long
fight with the survivors of the group. Two of the dead were wearing Ethiopian camouflage
uniforms with hammer-and-sickle insignia on the collar.
96
In a seven-week period in April/May 1979, Support Commando, 1RLI, under the command
of Major Nigel Henson, together with its supporting aircraft, accounted for 165 insurgents
in Fire Force operations and on Operation Oppress, and had seized large amounts of heavy
weapons. Hensons skill, aggression and other qualities as a leader earned him a
recommendation for the award of the Officer of the Order of the Legion of Merit (Military
Division, Combatant).
97
By 20 May The Sunday Mail reported that worn-out, dispirited
insurgents were surrendering. 'Their morale is shattered,' remarked a senior police officer
who claimed that hundreds more were longing to give up but that they feared execution by
the fanatical cadres 'trained in communist Ethiopia by Cubans'.
98
The data collected and collated by Rhodesian military intelligence confirmed that
ZANLAs morale, in particular, was shattered by the defection of the tribesmen to
Muzorewa and by the devastating onslaught by the Fire Forces since February. To exploit
this, what Muzorewa needed was international recognition, but the British Conservatives
went back on their promises to him. Not wishing to defy the British Commonwealth, the
United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, Margaret Thatchers Government
persuaded Muzorewa to accept the settlement negotiated at Lancaster House which brought
Robert Mugabe to power, ending the grim toll of war, to which the helicopter had
contributed so much.
1
The names, G-Car, K-Car were adopted by the Rhodesians for a number of reasons. G
stood for 'General Duties' in military parlance, K was adopted for the cannon-armed
Alouette III. The well-known BBC TV police series, 'Z Cars' was being screened in the
late 1960s and the title 'Z-Car' was given to the South African Police Alouettes after the
South African Police were deployed in Rhodesia in 1967. At that time the Rhodesian
Police, the British South Africa Police, had called their patrol vehicles 'B- Cars'. There
were phonetic reasons. Even when radio reception was poor, the phonetic endings 'ED',
'EE' and 'AY' could not be mistaken. Interview with Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer,
24 March 1992.
2
No 7 Squadron, Rhodesian Air Force, diary, April 1977, cutting, The Star, 15 April 1977.
3
Interview with the late Victor Cook, 13 November 1991. Vic Cook was tragically killed
in a helicopter accident in South Africa on 23 February 1992.
4
The engine was governed to achieve a constant output of 33 500 revolutions per minute.
The tail rotor spun at precisely 2 001 r.p.m.
5
Interview with Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer, 24 March 1992.
6
RLI Papers, Support Commando 1RLI, Contact Reports, 6 January, 1977 to 5 December
1978, contact report by Major N.D. Henson, 14 October 1978.
7
8
Bill Gunston & John Batchelor, Phoebus History of the World Wars, Special, Helicopters
1900-1960, Phoebus Publishing, London, 1977, p. 45; Bill Gunston, Editor, The
Encyclopedia of World Air Power, Hamlyn-Aerospace, London, pp. 65-66.
9
Telephone conversation with Squadron Leader W.E. Brown, 25 March 1992.
10
The air frame was tubular and filled with nitrogen. To detect cracks, soap would be
spread over the airframe before the pressure of the gas was tested. The technician would
look for telltale bubbles. Interview with Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer, 24 March
1992.
11
W.A. Brent, Rhodesian Air Force : A Brief History 1947-1980, Freeworld Publications,
Kwambonambi, 1987, pp. 13-14.
12
J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers : A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, Graham Publishing, Durban, 1983, p. 357.
13
The C4 was a general purpose aircraft which embodied features of the Douglas DC4 and
DC6 aircraft and was called the 'Argonaut' by its civilian operators.
14
Dudley Cowderoy & Roy Nesbit, War in the Air : Rhodesian Air Force 1935-1980,
Galago, Alberton, 1987, pp. 26-27.
15
Cowderoy & Nesbit, op.cit., p. 29.
16
Wood, op.cit., p. 801.
17
David Arnold, draft typescript for Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, David Arnold,
Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies : The Rhodesian Experience, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, 1991), p. 229.
18
Written comments on the author's script by Wing Commander Harold Griffiths, 8-9
April 1992.
19
Frantan was napalm in a frangible container with fins which could be accurately
delivered. The Golf bomb was a 460 kilogram Amatol percussion bomb with a metre long
probe in the nose to detonate the bomb above the ground. The Alpha Mk II bouncing bomb
- a football size round bomb, 300 of which would be carried by a Canberra and when
dropped would devastate an area of one hundred metres wide and a 1 000 metres long. The
Alpha bomb had a double casing with 250 hard rubber balls between the inner and outer
casings. This produced a forward bounce of some 18 metres at a maximum height of four
metres before an ingenious three-way detonator exploded the bomb at three metres above
the ground. Forty-five per cent of the casing - against seven and a half per cent of the
conventional anti- personnel bomb - would saturate the target. These bombs were feared by
ZANLA and ZPRA. Cowderoy & Nesbit, op.cit., pp. 119-124 ; Interview with Group
Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer, 24 March 1992.
20
The North American T26 Trojan was the first post-war primary trainer for the US Air
Force and Navy and also saw service in the Congo and Vietnam as ground attack aircraft.
The French Air Force evaluated the T26 and consequently Sud Aviation modified a
considerable number of ex-USAF T26s. These aircraft, called 'Fennecs' were given 1 425
h.p. Wright R-1820-56S radial air-cooled engines, two 12.5mm machine-guns in a pod
under each wing and four mountings for 300lb bombs. Gunston, op cit., pp. 286.
21
Interview with Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer, 24 March 1992; comments by Wing-
Commander Harold Griffiths, 8-9 April 1992.
22
Conversation on the telephone with Beaver Shaw, 13 November 1991.
23
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Keesing's Publications Ltd, London, 8 February 1980,
Vol. XXVII, p. 30073
24
25
26
Notes faxed to the author by Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer.
27
Interview with Lt Col Ron Reid-Daly, 3 November 1991.
28
J.R.T. Wood, The War Diaries of Andr Dennison, Ashanti Publishing, Gibraltar, 1989,
p. 185 fn 7.
29
Interview with Major Nigel Henson, 3 November 1991.
30
Notes faxed to the author by Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer.
31
RIC Research Report No 30 Examination of Contact Reports Received by RIC by 17th
March 1979.
32
Stiff, Peter, Selous Scouts: A Pictorial Account, Galago Publishing (Pty) Ltd, Alberton,
1984, pp. 23- 24.
33
Lt-Col Ron Reid-Daly, War in Rhodesia, in Al J. Venter (ed), Challenge : Southern
Africa within the African Revolutionary Context, Gibraltar, Ashanti, 1989, p. 149.
34
Interview with Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer, 24 March 1992. The ZANU dead
were : Simon Chimbodza, Christopher Chatambudza, Nathan Charumuka, Godwin
Manyerenyere, Peter, Ephraim Shenjere and David Guzuzu.
35
John Lovett, Contact : Rhodesia at War, Galaxie Press, Salisbury, 1977, p. 177. This
was not a medal but a small silver or bronze pick - denoting acts of bravery, distinguished
service or continuous devotion to duty - which was worn the ribbon of the General Service
Medal.
36
Reid-Daly, War in Rhodesia op.cit., p. 149; Cowderoy & Nesbit, op.cit., pp. 43-48;
Ken Flower, Serving Secretly, Galago, Alberton, 1987, p. 106.
37
Arnold, op.cit., p. 232.
38
39
Scrapbook : No 7 Squadron, Rhodesian Air Force.
40
41
Scrapbook : No 7 Squadron, Rhodesian Air Force.
42
Telephone conversation with Beaver Shaw, 13 November 1991.
43
Interview with Commandant Neal Ellis, 2 November 1991.
44
RLI Papers, Support Commando 1RLI, Contact Reports, 20 October, 1975 to 30
December 1976, contact report by Major P.W. Armstrong, 17 August 1976.
45
46
Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts : Top Secret War, Galago, Alberton,
1982, pp. 84- 85.
47
48
Arnold, op.cit., pp. 236-237.
49
Plasticised OP cards in the authors possession.
50
51
J.R.T. Wood, The War Diaries of Andr Dennison, Ashanti Publishing, Gibraltar, 1989,
p. 191.
52
Hopkins MSS, John Fairey to the author.
53
54
55
56
57
Dos of the Airborne Commander & Donts of the Airborne Commander, List of
DOs and DONTs of K Car Commander by Capt E.F. Evans - RAR, and other photostats
in authors possession.
58
Leroy Thompson, Dirty Wars : Elite Forces vs the Guerrillas, David & Charles, Newton
Abbot, 1988, p. 84.
59
Leroy Thompson, op.cit., p. 116.
60
Leroy Thompson, op.cit., p. 77.
61
The drawing of grid lines on ordnance survey maps was a product of the First World
War to enable the speedy pinpointing of positions for artillery and other purposes. The
grids are labelled with the letters of the alphabet. The map reader finds the lateral and
vertical lines and then calculates the position sought in tenths of the relevant square, taking
the horizontal measurement first. References are given in four or six figures.
62
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Lieutenant V.A. Prinsloo, 22 February 1979.
63
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Major N.D. Henson, 24 February 1979.
64
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Lieutenant V.A. Prinsloo, 6 March 1979.
65
66
RLI Papers, Honours & Awards, Continued.
67
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Major N.D. Henson, 9 March 1979.
68
RLI Papers, A/33 Honours & Awards.
69
RLI, A/33 Honours op.cit.
70
Henson, op.cit.
71
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Major N.D. Henson, 12 March 1979.
72
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Major N.D. Henson, 13 March 1979; Honours & Awards,
Continued.
73
RLI, Honours, op.cit.
74
75
76
Frank Terrell, RLI Support Commando : Support Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry
- Mozambique 1979, The Elite, Orbis Publishing, London, 1987, Vol 10, Issue 113, pp
2241-2247.
77
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Major N.D. Henson, 2 April 1979.
78
79
80
81
Binions citation reads : Corporal Peter Malcolm Binion has been a patrol commander
with Support Commando, 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian Light Infantry, for a period of two
years. During this period, he has been involved in many contacts with the enemy and has
personally accounted for numerous terrorists.
On 4th April 1979, Corporal Binion was the Second-In-Command of a patrol which was
sweeping towards some terrorists. As the patrol approached a clump of rocks, the patrol
commander was killed instantly at point blank range by fire from two terrorists who were
concealed in the rocks. Corporal Binion, immediately put down covering fire himself and
under covering fire from the remainder of the patrol, he manoevred himself into a position
where he was able to kill the two terrorists at considerable danger to himself. Shortly
afterwards, the patrol came under rocket fire at short range from another terrorist who was
using an RPG rocket launcher. Corporal Binion received a minor shrapnel wound. Despite
this he was able to close with and kill this terrorist.
On 7th April 1979 Corporal Binion was again involved in a contact in which six terrorists
were killed. He personally accounted for four of these terrorists.
Throughout these and other engagements, Corporal Binion has shown remarkable courage
and tenacity. His desire to close with and kill the enemy is uppermost in his mind. His
standard of professional soldiering, and dedication to duty are of the highest order. RLI,
Honours, op.cit.
82
Henson, op.cit.
83
84
85
86
- Mozambique 1979, op.cit., p 2243.
87
David Caute, Under the Skin : The Death of White Rhodesia, Allen Lane, London, 1982,
pp. 324- 325.
88
89
90
91
RLI, op.cit., contact report by Lieutenant V.A Prinsloo, 19 April 1979.
92
93
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Keesing's Publications Ltd, London, 10 August 1979,
Vol. XXVI, p. 29757
94
PP/MI/106/37, 'Confirmation Orders : Op Oppress', Salisbury, 26 April 1979.
95
96
- Mozambique 1979, op.cit., pp 2243-2247.
97
RLI, A/33 Honours, op.cit.
98
David Caute, op.cit., pp. 361-362.

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SELOUS SCOUTS
One of the basic aims of a counter-insurgency war is to carry the
fight to the enemy. In an age of undeclared wars, terrorism and
unprovoked aggression, it is an important strategy to attack and
counter-attack terrorist bases in the host countries. An excellent
example of this approach and its success in Rhodesia alone are the
preemptive air strikes, airborne/para assaults, ground and flying
columns conducted by Rhodesian Security Forces and the Selous
Scouts against terrorist bases in Zambia and Mozambique.
Throughout the conflict, the Selous Scouts conducted numerous
operations and raids outside of the countrys borders (see operations
map below). Known in Rhodesian military jargon as External
Operations, simply a cross-border mission. The more important
operations are summarized here which were conducted by the Scouts.
In this respect, the various so-called hot pursuit raids that were
carried out into the northeastern border area of Mozambique during the
beginning of Operation Hurricane are not covered because these
operations were being conducted in a country that at that time was
friendly to Rhodesia and had authorized the raids.
Although the Selous Scouts were originally asked to obtain internal
intelligence on insurgents by posing as guerrillas, they became
increasingly involved in external operations as the conflict escalated.
Some of these operations were of a clandestine nature, to which they
were suited, while others were of a more conventional type.

OPERATIONS MAP: Approximate locations of external targets
**NOTE** Target "letters" are annotated on map.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

1. Kidnapping of (ZIPRA) terrorists from Francistown, Botswana,
March 1974 (target A). An eight-man team comprising four
"PAMWE
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RHODESIAN
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TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
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MANUAL
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European and four African Scouts was clandestinely infiltrated
into Francistown to kidnap several terrorists and bring them
back to Rhodesia for interrogation. The raiders captured four
occupants of the ZIPRA headquarters and drove them back
across the border to Rhodesia without incident.
2. Kidnapping of ZIPRA official from Francistown, Botswana,
September 1974 (target A). Another team of Scouts (two
Europeans and one African) was infiltrated into Francistown to
locate and kidnap a senior ZIPRA official. After several false
leads and some reconnaissance, the team finally located their
man and abducted him after a fierce struggle. He was then
placed in the back of a car and taken across the border to
Rhodesia. However, the team left behind false passports, a
radio transmitter, and weapons in a hotel room, along with an
unpaid bill. One of the European members of the team had to
return to the hotel where he paid the bill, collected the weapons
and radio, and departed for Rhodesia without incident.
3. Raid on Caponda, Mozambique, March 1975 (target B).
Twenty Scouts staged an assault on a ZANLA staging base 55
km north of Rhodesia. They traveled to and from the target on
foot. After a 24-hour march, the unit came upon the terrorist
base only to find it deserted. A cholera epidemic had broken
out among the terrorists and the camp had been evacuated. The
unit returned safely to Rhodesia.
4. Mozambique, January 1967 (target G). This operation involved
a helicopter-borne assault by 15 Scouts against a ZANLA
transit camp that was destroyed.
5. Operation Traveler: Attack on Caponda base, Mozambique,
April 1976 (target B). This operation involved another attack
on the ZANLA staging camp that was plagued by a cholera
epidemic. The attacking force consisted of a 20-man patrol that
marched into Mozambique, attacked and destroyed the camp,
killing seven terrorists and wounding 16 others. The raiding
party returned to Rhodesia on foot, several of them having
been injured.
6. Operation Detachment: Raid on Chigamane, Mozambique,
May 1976 (target C). This operation involved an attack on a
ZANLA base 108 (km) inside Mozambique. Twenty European
and African Scouts dressed in FRELIMO uniforms traveled in
four military vehicles disguised as FRELIMO vehicles. The
ZANLA terrorist base was attacked and destroyed with
rockets, mortars, and machine guns. The raiders returned to
Rhodesia safely.
7. Operation Long John: Attack on Mapai, Mozambique, June
1976 (target D). This operation involved an attack on a
ZANLA base in Mapai, 48 miles inside Mozambique, by 58
Scouts traveling in four trucks and two Scouts cars, all
disguised as FRELIMO vehicles. Along the way, the raiders
disconnected telephone lines and sabotaged the railway line.
The column was allowed to enter the terrorist base by an
unwitting sentry. Once inside, sappers destroyed 13 Mercedes
busses used to transport terrorists to the border (one bus was
spared and was taken back to Rhodesia as a souvenir). In
addition, the insurgents entire armory was seized and brought
back to Rhodesia before an air strike was called in to destroy
the base. Nineteen terrorists were reported killed and 18
wounded; one member of the raiding party was killed and a
few were wounded.
8. Nyadzonya/Pungwe Raid, Mozambique, August 1976 (target
E). This operation involved a raid on a large ZANLA base 60
miles inside of Mozambique by a Scouts column comprising
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ten trucks and four armored cars, again disguised as FRELIMO
vehicles. The Scouts in the first four vehicles were also dressed
in FRELIMO uniforms. They cut the telephone lines leading to
the town where the terrorist base was located, then drove
straight into the camp. They then opened fire on the
unsuspecting insurgent terrorists drilling on the parade ground,
killing at least 1,028. Fourteen important ZANLA insurgents
were captured and taken back to Rhodesia for interrogation.
On their way out of Mozambique, the raiding party blew up the
Pungwe Bridge to prevent any pursuit and returned to
Rhodesia safely. In a separate action, the covering team
deployed to block the columns escape, ambushed a Land
Rover whose six occupants were found to be senior ZANLA
officers; all six were killed.
9. Operation Maradon: Attack on Jorge do Limpopo and
Massengena, Mozambique, October 1976 (target D). This
operation involved an attack against a ZANLA base at Jorge
do Limpopo, 36 miles inside Mozambique. The strike force
traveled a circuitous 350 to 400 km roundtrip route, and two
reconnaissance teams (one of three and one of two men) were
parachuted into Mozambique in advance of the column. Upon
entering Mozambique, the raiding party laid Claymore mines
on roads and booby-trapped the rail line. Telegraph and
telephone lines were also cut. The column then launched a
succession of attacks, destroying a FRELIMO garrison,
derailing a troop train (and killing 36 of the terrorists on
board), and destroying a large water reservoir, along with
railway switching points and several enemy military vehicles.
A senior FRELIMO commander was also killed. On November
2, the Scouts returned to Rhodesia, having destroyed the
terrorists logistical base of support. They disrupted
communications between Jorge de Limpopo, Malvernia, and
Massengena, wrecked two trains, destroyed all motor transport
in the area, and sowed landmines in various spots. This
operation effectively undercut ZANLAs operational capacity
and weakened insurgent morale.
10. Operation Ignition: Attack on ZIPRA, Francistown, Botswana,
November 1976 (target A). This operation involved an attack
on ZIPRAs headquarters in Francistown by a team of Scouts.
Its purpose was to destroy a stockpile of suitcase bombs
intended for use in Rhodesia. The raiding party used previously
captured insurgent suitcase bombs to destroy the headquarters
building and the stockpile of bombs, wounding five insurgents
in the process.
11. Operation Aztec: Attack on Jorge do Limpopo, Mpai, and
Madulo Pan, Mozambique, MayJune 1977 (target D). This
operation involved an attack on several ZANLA bases 138
miles inside Mozambique by a motorized column of 110
Scouts disguised as FRELIMO soldiers. A railway line, the
terrorist bases chief source of supply, was also destroyed. In
addition, military vehicles and equipment were destroyed by
Rhodesian Air Force air strikes flown in support of the raiders.
12. Operation Vodka: Raid on Mboroma ZIPRA camp, Zambia,
December 1979 (target location not known). This operation
involved a raid on a ZIPRA prison camp 96 miles inside
Zambia containing 120 opponents of the terrorist organization
along with some African members of the Rhodesian security

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS GUIDELINES

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
forces. A team of 42 Scouts were parachuted into the camp
after it had been softened up by an air strike. Resistance was
quickly overcome: 18 guards were killed and six were
captured. Only 32 prisoners were freed, because the remainder
were outside the camp on work details. In the evening, the
raiders and freed prisoners were airlifted back to Rhodesia
from a nearby airfield.
13. Operation Petal I: Botswana, Mach 1979 (target F). This
operation involved the kidnapping of Elliot Sibanda, a senior
ZIPRA intelligence operative, by a team of Scouts who crept
across the border into Botswana and laid an ambush. Although
badly wounded, Sibanda was captured and brought back to
Rhodesia alive.
15. Operation Petal II: Francistown, Botswana, April 1979 (target
A). This operation involved an ambitious raid to kidnap the
ZIPRA southern command. The raiding party consisted of a
small column of two armored cars and some other trucks
disguised as Botswanan military vehicles and Scouts dressed in
Botswana military uniforms. The column crossed the border
and drove to the house being used by ZIPRA and arrested its
occupants. Before the victims realized what had happened,
they were back in Rhodesia.

External operations whether raids or recces (the entering of a country to
destroy or snoop n poop the terrorist training or operations base) must have
the following results to be successful:

1. The commando/scout unit is able to completely surprise the terrorist
main unit or base, thereby showing the terrorists they are not safe
anywhere, even outside the country in which they act.
2. The balance of the terrorist strategy is thrown off, causing a delay in
time to formulate new plans to contend with this factor.
3. More terrorists, foreign advisers, ammo, and logistics are tied down to
protect the external bases.
4. Logistics lines from the source of financial aid also suffer because the
terrorists supporters are also placed at peril, and risk exposure to world
publicity.
5. The terrorists bases must be moved farther away from the border to
increase protection from air strikes and armored columns, thus causing a
longer walk-in for the terrorists and increasing their exposure to commando
units.
6. The terrorists military planners and advisers are forced to divide their
attention between the terrorists actions inside the country of conflict and
planning for defense of the base camp.
7. The terrorists security and intelligence groups are forced to divide
their effort to include seeking intelligence agents in the external country.
8. The host country of the terrorists is forced to expend its financial
resources to protect its own people and facilities.
9. The host country begins to rethink its support of the terrorist
movement, thereby delaying complete unison.
10. In the extreme case, the host country considers ousting the terrorist
movement, thereby causing the terrorist HQ to lose its base and forcing a
movement to another country or back into the country of its hostile activity,
exposing it to pressure from commando/scouts and regular army units.
11. The initiative of the terrorist movement is turned against itself,
showing the host country the results of its unfriendly actions.
In the final analysis, the country (like Rhodesia) that plans an external
operation against a terrorist host country must have two things:
1. The courage to withstand world opinion, which in most cases is
against the country which launches the operation (again like Rhodesia).
2. An elite unit (like the Rhodesian Selous Scouts and S.A.S.)
capable of outstanding results against overwhelming numbers of terrorists.
***Source*** This information was obtained from the book: AFRICAN MERC COMBAT MANUAL. By Chris
Pessarra. Printed 1986, Paladin Press.

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MAJOR OPERATIONS
The Rhodesian Security Forces conducted
the following operations between 1972-
1978. They include operations:
HURRICANE, DEC '72
THRESHER, FEB '76
REPULSE, MAY '76
TANGENT, AUG '76
GRAPPLE, AUG '77
SPLINTER, JUN '78

MAP OF MAJOR OPS.

OPERATIONS PATCHES
Here our four selected operation patches made for Rhodesian Security Forces
personnel, to include the Selous Scouts. These patches were unofficial and were made
as novelties for the troops.

OPERATION HURRICANE OPERATION REPULSE
"PAMWE
INTERNAL OPERATIONS
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
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PAMWE CHETE
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PAMWE CHETE:
Sel ous Sc out s c ar ve t hei r name w i t h pr i de!

....A notable exception to the "new fashion trend" in Zimbabwe Rhodesian Security Forces is to be
found where one would expect it: the formidable Selous Scouts. Commonly known as the eyes
and ears of the Fire Forces (hunter-killer groups, normally helicopter-borne) the Selous Scouts
have already amassed a formidable reputation for cool (some say "cold") efficiency. The earnest
desire expressed by the leaders of the Patriotic Front to do away with such units as the Selous
Scouts in any Zimbabwe Rhodesian regime in which said PF would be willing to participate, could
be well understood against the outstanding track record of the elite (and "elite" it is, too, to their
compatriots in the RLI, RAR, Grey's Scouts et al, although no thoroughbred ZR unit will ever
openly bow to the superiority of another!).
After being the guest at the HQ (outside Salisbury, complete with a steadily waxing cemetery)
and then flown up to the Scout's training camp at Lake Kariba (very aptly named "Wafa Wafa",
which roughly translates "if I die/succumb, I die/succumb//: Afrikaans more aptly "kom ek om, s
kom ek om") a measure of the Selous Scouts' young (1973) track record as an independent unit
has rubbed off.
A remarkable gathering of souls, indeed, from the Commanding Officer down to the wafer-thin,
quick-eyed instructors at the Wafa Wafa training camp.
The aura of "being somewhat different" starts right at the top. At 31, Lt Col Pat Armstrong ("the
most handsome man I've ever seen", sighed a Salisbury woman journalist) is the youngest half-
Colonel in the Army. The Selous Scouts' CO is a born leader, captaining the Rhodesian under 20
rugby side as eight man and a certainty for the same berth and post in the senior team, were it
not for war commitments. Pushing 1,90 mm, blue-eyed and fair-haired, this hulk of a man is not
only a qualified pilot as well but also (take note, ladies) a bachelor. According to his friends he has
remarkable resilience, tough as a propeller blade, with a good turn of voice when it comes to
camp-fire revelry.
Lt Col Armstrong heads an outfit more than one thousand strong, volunteers all and completely
integrated: Regular Whites, Blacks and National Servicemen. The unit's motto - PAMWE CHETE
- is, therefore, most apt, spelling out in no uncertain terms the very composition of the Selous
Scouts - ALL TOGETHER.
From humble beginnings (as trackers attached to the School of Infantry at Gwelo) the next
logical development was the establishment of a tracking school at Kariba. As operations
developed the unit eventually came into being in 1973, based on a volunteer/selection principle.
Some nine out of ten volunteers drop out before wearing the coveted green and brown (colours of
the bush). The remainder have, in these short years, scythed a glorious track through countless
operations. Truly, the Selous Scouts are known from Pofadder to Peking. The unit holds the only
Grand Cross of Valor ever awarded in the country (the recipient must remain anonymous). Their
espirit de corps is reflected in differences to "normal" units such as their Standard (not Colour),
"PAMWE
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which embodies the spirit and rles of the Scouts: silverplated osprey; wide oxhorns partially
wrapped round with elephant skin (for toughness) and zebra skin (symbolism the White/Black
relationship); wildebeest tails set in silver and ivory (in keeping with indigenous beliefs about the
warding off of evil spirits).
Although of battalion-plus strength, the Selous Scouts have no regimental band. Instead, they
sing when on parade, at funerals, on the march. All para-trained, the men are trained to provide
targets for Fire Forces but also to annihilate the enemy by themselves as and when required.
Their hitting power is formidable, as any terrorist "returnee" will tell you.
They are now building their own chapel, sloping roof groping Upwards, and seating 268 inside
with room for 800 more outside. Domestically designed, the chapel incorporates a novel glass
dome, thus ensuring contact with the bush even when at prayers.
The nearby cemetery, presently little more than a tract of bushless land, punctuated by a few
flower-covered mounds, is divided into three sections for those who die on active service; those
killed in action; for dependents and for deaths from natural causes. The Selous Scouts' indigenous
espirit de corps permeates this area, too, as members presently hale and hearty, have already
made their "reservations" at choice plots, such as under a sprawling msasa tree.
At the time of our visit to the Selous Scouts only 13 of their number had been killed in action - a
truly remarkable track record for a unit which move, in the words of Mao tse Tung, "with the fish in
the water".
And When I Di e...
Up at Wafa Wafa training camp where the clear (and often not-so-clear) water of the mighty Lake
Kariba laps at the lower regions of the somewhat primitive wood-and-thatch "establishment", mad
dogs and Englishmen (and Shona and Matabele and other Blacks) volunteer to go out in the
midday sun. Here they arrive to be weighed, tried and, if deemed fit for the green and brown,
trained. They arrive on foot, having been debussed some kilometers from the camp just to sort out
the boys from the men even before Training Officer Capt xxx leaps into action with his sets of
courses, all immaculately designed and all funnelled towards an end-product of honed steel.
Capt xxx, a deceptively soft-spoken, mild-mannered, smallish blond man, and his small staff of
equally dedicated men run selection, tracking, COIN and even survival courses (for Airmen). For
the Selous Scouts he has devised programmes bordering on the impossible. Nine out of ten
volunteers drop out, are given a compassionate handshake and may even be invited to try again .
. .if they are insane enough. Their Training Officer hardly promotes the image of home-comforts.
He likes his men to live off the land, carry no water ("a man who cannot find water in his area
should not be a Selous Scout"), report sick only when already dead and lay down his life for any
Government of the Day.
Capt xx also likes his trainees to drink straight out of Lake Kariba ("we have not had a case of
bilharzia for two years"), rough it under primitive shelters and learn to kill in several sophisticated
ways, making use of the instruments at hand. By the same token he does not believe in "heat
fatigue" ("it is all in the mind") as distinct from "heat stroke". Skin off fingers, elbows and knees
after a Tarzan-session in the 10m high tree-tops rope course; buttocks punctuated by craftily-
planted thorn-tree branches in case of a slip off the high rope; a mud-bath in one of the lake's
overgrown inlets after a long, fast slide on a improvised "foofy-slide"; a 25 kilometer hike in
mountainous terrain carrying some 25 kg of deadweight stones; and, above all, the ability to
observe, see and not be seen, kill and not be killed and to be welded into a seamless unit . . .
these are some of the trademarks of Wafa Wafa.
In the pursuit of these aims the men of Selous Scouts accept no compromise. After all, they
are in this together: PAMWE CHETE.

PAMWE CHETE
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[photo captions] The Selous Scouts differ from other Zimbabwe Rhodesian Regiments in
many traditional respects. For instance, they have a Standard (and not a Color), which
is shown here in its full magnificence. PAMWE CHETE means "all together". The
dangling fly-wisks are traditional protectors against evil spirits.

*Unknown. "Pamwe Chete: Selous Scouts carve their name with pride!", Paratus Desember 1979:
18-19.

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RHODESIAN ARMY COIN 1972-79 PART ONE
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THE RHODESIAN ARMY:
COUNTER-INSURGENCY, 1972-1979
By Ian F. W. Beckett
Modern counter-insurgency is rarely a purely military problem for a government and its Security
Forces. Of this basic truism, the experience in Rhodesia between 1966 and 1979 affords a
significant example. Not only were the efforts of the Rhodesian Security Forces frequently
directed towards particular political goals, but their ultimate failure to contain insurgency at an
acceptable level derived to a large extent from external political pressures over which they had
little control.
In a real sense, Rhodesia was the creation of private enterprise rather than the British
government, the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes annexing Mashonaland in 1890
and Matabeleland in 1893. The Company continued to run the administration until, following a
referendum of the white settlers which indicated their long-standing disillusionment with such
control, Southern Rhodesia as it was then known became a self-governing colony in 1923. Far
more prosperous than either Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia effectively
dominated the Central African Federation into which it entered with these neighbours in 1953.
The Federation collapsed in 1963, with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland becoming the
independent black states of Zambia and Malawi respectively in the following year. The larger
white settler population in Southern Rhodesia rejected the concept of majority rule, a
determination reinforced by the spectre of chaos in the Belgian Congo in 1960 and by the urban
unrest in Southern Rhodesia itself which followed the rejection by the growing black nationalist
movement of the proposed 1961 constitution, despite its greater participatory role for the
African.
The nationalist movement had developed in the 1950s with Joshua Nkomos African National
Congress being established in 1957. Banned on a number of occasions, Nkomos group re-
emerged under different titles, becoming the National Democratic Party in 1960 and the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in 1962. The nationalists were moving towards the
advocacy of violence to achieve their political aims at the very time when white resistance was
symbolised by the sweeping electoral victories of Ian Smiths Rhodesian Front Party in
December 1962. The advent of a Labour administration in Britain in 1964, dedicated to majority
rule, catapulted all sides closer to confrontation and, on 11 November 1965, Ian Smith issued a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).
The war that evolved in Rhodesia thereafter has to be seen in the context of continuing political
and diplomatic activity aimed at securing Rhodesian acceptance of majority rule and the end of
rebellion against the Crown. The British rejected the use of force, although they did resort to
largely ineffectual economic sanctions, including the so-called Beira Patrol off the coast of
Portuguese Mozambique from 1965 to 1974, when the latter became independent. Similarly,
British troops were stationed in Bechuanaland (later Botswana) from 1965 to 1967 to guard a
BBC transmitter at Francistown from possible Rhodesian sabotage. In December 1966 Smith
met the British prime minister, Harold Wilson, for talks aboard HMS Tiger and there were more
negotiations aboard HMS Fearless in September 1968. The subsequent Conservative government
sent the abortive Pearce Commission to Rhodesia from January to May 1972 to test the
acceptability of new Anglo-Rhodesian proposals on a constitution.
Following the collapse of Portuguese control in Mozambique, Rhodesia not only became more
exposed to guerrilla infiltration, but also suffered increasing pressure from the South African
prime minister, John Vorster, to reach an accommodation with the guerrillas. A brief ceasefire
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came into effect in December 1974 and, although this failed, Vorster and Zambias president,
Kenneth Kaunda, arranged negotiations between Ian Smith and nationalist leaders on the
Victoria Falls bridge in August 1975. There were further talks between Smith and Nkomo in
early 1976 and in September of that year, under considerable South African pressure, Smith
conceded the principle of majority rule within the context of an overall agreement worked out by
Vorster and the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. A conference at Geneva from
October 1976 to January 1977, however, failed to produce a settlement acceptable to all parties,
and further proposals put forward by the British and US governments in September 1977 also
came to nothing. Ian Smith then reached an internal settlement with three nationalist leaders
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau in March
1978, by which Muzorewa and Sithole entered a transitional government. This did not, however,
rule out further negotiations between Smith and Nkomo in Lusaka in August 1978. In April
1979, as a result of internal elections, Muzorewa became the first black prime minister of
Rhodesia. The republic declared in March 1970 was formally brought to an end in June 1979
with the creation of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The final political turn of events was the Lancaster
House Conference in London between September and December 1979, which resulted in a
British-supervised ceasefire on 28 December 1979 and a transitional British administration under
Lord Soames as governor. Elections were held in February 1980 with Zimbabwe gaining full
legal independence in April.
These complicated political events between 1965 and 1980 inevitably affected the conduct of the
war inside Rhodesia and across its frontiers, although large-scale conflict did not occur before
December 1972. Thus Security Force operations could be undertaken to put direct pressure upon
the guerrillas in order to achieve political results in the wider diplomatic field. In October 1976,
for example, the Rhodesians frustrated guerrilla attempts to launch an offensive coinciding with
the Geneva Conference by themselves striking deep into Mozambique. Similarly, the highly
successful Rhodesian attack on New Chimoio (Operation Miracle) in Mozambique in
September 1979 put pressure on the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)
during the Lancaster House Conference. Moreover, there was a whole series of attacks on
economic targets in both Mozambique and Zambia, designed to compel the guerrillas hosts
Kaunda and Samora Machel, President of Mozambique to ensure that their clients adopted a
more positive approach to the negotiations. In September 1979, for example, Rhodesia
suspended Zambian maize shipments on Rhodesian railways, Zambia having been forced by
economic pressure to reopen its frontiers with Rhodesia in 1978. In October 1979 Zambias own
railway system came under Rhodesian attack, while it has been estimated that Mozambique
suffered over 26 million dollars worth of damage in 1979.1 In February 1979 Angolan targets had
been bombed by the Rhodesian Air Force to frustrate any guerrilla build-up prior to the internal
elections.
The fact that the ZANLA guerrillas and those of the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) operated from sanctuaries in other countries, resulted in further political complications.
In January 1973 Rhodesia closed its frontier with Zambia, with the exception of copper
shipments, as a direct result of the escalation of guerrilla activity in the north-east of Rhodesia.
The Rhodesians subsequently reopened the frontier but, as indicated above, Zambia then declined
to do so until 1978. Similarly, Mozambique closed its frontiers with Rhodesia in March 1976
and by the end of the war only the 222 km (138 mile) frontier with South Africa out of a total
frontier length of 2964 km (1841 miles) was entirely free of infiltration. The Rhodesians had, in
fact, begun operating up to 100 km (62 miles) inside Mozambique in co-operation with the
Portuguese as early as 1969. The first large-scale cross-border raid was not launched, however,
until August 1979 (Operation Eland). Such raids occurred frequently thereafter, often
coinciding with the imminent approach of the rainy season in November and hitting the guerrilla
concentrations that would have attempted to infiltrate under favourable climatic conditions that
restricted Rhodesias monopoly of air power. Physical difficulties as well as political restraint
precluded large-scale raids into Zambia until October 1978, when the first took place in direct
response to the shooting down of a Rhodesian Viscount civil airliner a month previously by
ZIPRA, who had then massacred the survivors. A second airliner was shot down in February
1979, eliciting the air strike into Angola although, as already indicated above, the operation
fulfilled other requirements as well. There was also an attempt to kill Nkomo in Lusaka in April
1979 while, earlier in the same year, Rhodesian forces had sunk the Kasangula ferry which was
Botswanas only link with Zambia. But, just as the neighbouring black states were to some
extent dependent upon Rhodesias railways for their survival, Rhodesia itself after UDI was
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equally dependent upon external sources.
With the withdrawal of the Portuguese, Rhodesias lifeline lay through South Africa, but it is
clear that Vorster sacrificed Rhodesian whites in the cause of wider detente with black states.
Thus although elements of the South African police were committed to assist the Rhodesians in
1967, they were withdrawn by August 1975 to facilitate the attempt by Kaunda to get the
nationalists to negotiate and, equally, to put pressure on Smith to do the same. In fact, a number
of South African pilots and technicians remained in Rhodesia, but they were also recalled
following the first major raid into Mozambique in August 1976 which Vorster feared would
jeopardise relations with Machel. Furthermore, the South African foreign minister then broadcast
his governments support for majority rule in Rhodesia which, as two recent historians of the
war have written, pulled the rug from under Ian Smith.
2
Subsequently, Vorsters successor as
prime minister, P.W. Botha, went some way towards reversing the situation by lending the
Rhodesians military equipment and personnel and committing South African troops to defend
key points such as the Beit Bridge which linked Rhodesia and South Africa across the River
Limpopo.
Vorster had feared the consequences of any escalation in the war between Rhodesia and its
neighbours and there were inevitably clashes between Rhodesian forces and those of the black
states. On one notable occasion in September 1979 during the attack on New Chimoio,
Rhodesian Eland armoured cars, a version of the Panhard, engaged Soviet-supplied T-34 tanks of
the Mozambique Army (FPLM). On such raids the Rhodesians invariably had two Hawker
Hunter jets armed with 68 mm rockets avilable as an anti-tank reaction force.
3
Curiously, the
Rhodesians themselves also had some Soviet T-55 tanks, which had been landed in South Africa
instead of the intended destination of Uganda when Idi Amins regime fell in 1979. But
incursions into neighbouring states also carried the possibility of clashing with the wide variety
of foreign nationals Chinese, Russians, Cubans and so on who advised the guerrillas. In the
case of the struggle for New Chimoio, for example, East German advisers fought with ZANLA
guerrillas. The guerrillas were, of course, also sustained by many other external organisations,
including the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the World Council of Churches and the
Third World lobby in the United Nations.
The involvement of both Chinese and Soviet advisers with the guerrillas is in itself an indication
that the struggle inside Rhodesia was yet further complicated by the existence of deep rivalries
within the nationalist movement. As early as 1963 Sithole had split away from Nkomos ZAPU
to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). To a large extent the split was along
tribal lines, ZAPU being based on the minority Ndebele of western Rhodesia and ZANU on the
majority Shona of eastern Rhodesia. This contributed to the tendency of the two organisations to
operate in what might be termed the area of their natural support. Thus ZAPU and its military
wing, ZIPRA, operated out of Zambia and Botswana, while ZANU and its military wing,
ZANLA, operated out of Mozambique. While the early guerrillas of both organisations had
trained in diverse or even the same countries overseas, ZIPRA came increasingly to reflect
Soviet orthodoxy and ZANLA to reflect Chinese theories of rural guerrilla warfare. Thus a
feature of the war after 1972 was the reluctance of Nkomo to commit large numbers of his
ZIPRA forces to Rhodesia, preferring to retain them in Zambia for a Soviet-style conventional
assault at an appropriate moment. Indeed, a number of Rhodesian spoiling operations in late
1979 were specifically mounted to disrupt the ZIPRA build-up, including the destruction of key
road bridges which might have been used to throw ZIPRA armour across the Zambezi.
ZANLA also briefly considered a conventional assault in 1979 to establish a provisional
government inside Rhodesia, but for the most part the approach of the two groups was markedly
different. This made co-operation between ZANLA and ZIPRA difficult and there were further
break-aways such as that of James Chikerema, who left ZAPU to form the Front for the
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), forcing a hasty and temporary junction of ZIPRA and
ZANLA in a Joint Military Command in 1972. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had emerged
during the Pearce Commission as a nationalist of some authority, and his United African
National Council (UANC) was recognised by the OAU in 1974 as a means of uniting the
disparate guerrilla struggle. Muzorewa joined together with Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema to
form a Zimbabwe Liberation Council in 1975, while ZIPRA and ZANLA were forced by their
black African hosts to create a unified army in the shape of the Zimbabwe Peoples Army
(ZIPA). This unity quickly faded, the subsequent union of ZAPU and ZANU in the so-called
Patriotic Front for the purpose of attending the Geneva Conference in 1976 never resulting in
any actual military unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA. Within ZANU, Sithole was by now being
outmanoeuvred by more radical elements and, after his release from detention inside Rhodesia in
1974, Robert Mugabe became the dominant figure. Thus Sithole, still heading a group he called
ZANU, came together with Muzorewas UANC and Chief Chiraus insignificant Zimbabwe
United Peoples Organisation in aceepting the internal settlement in 1978. Their three parties
contested the internal elections in April 1979, all seeking the Shona vote rathcr than that of the
Ndebele. Subsequently, Chikerema deserted the UANC to form yet another faction the
Zimbabwe Democratic Party. Throughout the war, therefore, there were divisions among the
nationalists that could be successfully exploited by the Rhodesians as the internal settlement
indicated only too clearly. On occasions there were clashes between rival guerrillas and a
number of major internal upheavals such as the Nhari Rebellion in ZANLA in December 1973
and the assassination of one of ZANLAs leaders, Herbert Chitepo, in Lusaka in March 1974
which led to ZANLAs virtual expulsion from Zambia.
At the time when insurgency first began, the complicated nature of the divisions among the
nationalists was not apparent and the nature of the insurgency itself was limited. The first white
man was killed by a so-called ZANU Crocodile Commando in July 1964, but the first
systematic attempt to inifitrate guerrillas into Rhodesia did not occur until April 1966, when a
group of 14 ZANU guerrillas crossed into the country from Zambia. Over the course of the next
two years a variety of guerrilla columns from ZANU, ZAPU and, on occasions, ZAPU guerrillas
cooperating with the South African branch of the African National Congress, were comfortably
contained and successfully eliminated by the Rhodesian Security Forces to such an extent that
virtually all insurgency ceased for the next four years. The ease with which the guerrillas had
been defeated did, however, have subsequent repercussions since it was largely seen as a police
action and was controlled by Rhodesias British South Africa Police (BSAP). The Rhodesian
Army was rarely used, even though the BSAP was frequently operating as a conventional
military force with patrols, sweeps and supported by helicopters.
4
Similarly, the BSAP Special
Branch was especially prominent, its network of informers working well since the local African
population of the Zambezi valley had little sympathy for the guerrillas. In any case the valley
was an inhospitable environment and few guerrillas penetrated beyond it. Where military support
had been required, temporary brigade areas were established with a Joint Operations Centre
(JOC) involving military and police representatives as well as civil commissioners from the
Department of Internal Affairs.
When insurgency developed once more, with the opening of ZANLAs new front in the
Centenary district of the north-east in December 1972, there was a natural tendency to persist
with previous practices. Beyond the local JOCs, the chain of command therefore stretched
upwards through provincial JOCs, a Joint Planning Staff (JPS), and a Deputy Minister in Ian
Smiths office (from 1974), to the Security Council of the Rhodesian Cabinet. In September
1976 a War Council replaced the Security Council and in March 1977 a Combined Operations
Headquarters (Comops) replaced the JPS. In theory the creation of Comops should have enabled
the Security Forces to develop a well coordinated strategy for the prosecution of the war. In
reality, the command and control system failed at a number of levels. For one thing, there was
increasing friction between Army and Police as the escalation of the war led to the replacement
of BSAP personnel by the military in positions of responsibility on JOCs. In 1973 the JOC in the
northeast was converted into a permanent operational brigade area Hurricane. This was
followed by the establishment of Thrasher and Repulse in 1976, Tangent, Grapple and
Splinter in 1977, and Salops in 1978. With the exception of the latter, which remained a
largely administrative creation under BSAP control, the other JOCs were now chaired almost as
a matter of course by the Army.
The Army was also increasingly critical of other civilian government agencies, notably Internal
Affairs which it held responsible for failing to perceive the nature of the growing ZANLA threat
in the northeast prior to its eruption in 1972. Comops offered the possibility of reconciling
differences but it never had effective control over civil affairs and ministries like Internal Affairs
and Law and Order which had a considerable contribution to make to the war effort. Moreover,
Comops became entangled in the day-to-day conduct of the war rather than in planning long-
term strategy. Its commander, LieutenantGeneral Peter Walls, also assumed command of all
offensive and special forces as well as responsibility for all external operations. This left the
Army commander, Lieutenant-General John Hickman, commanding only black troops and white
territorials, while his staff were deprived of any real function at all. One commentator with first-
hand knowledge of the system has claimed that the de facto commander of the Army in these
circumstances was the Brigadier of Comops.5 Walls sought further clarification of his powers
but was to be disappointed, although it has been claimed that by 1979 he was the most powerful
man in Rhodesia
6
and certainly the command structure as a whole was streamlined after the
internal settlement, to exclude Muzorewa and Sithole from effective influence. At the same time
Smiths influence also waned and he was on bad terms with Walls.
With division at the top of the system, it is not unlikely that this will be magnified at lower
levels and such was the case in Rhodesia. There was, for example, an attempt to co-ordinate the
Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) and the Selous Scouts with the establishment of a Special
Forces Headquarters in July 1978. However, this fell foul of inter-unit rivalry and was eventually
confined to administering the black Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) that came into existence
after the internal settlement. The rivalry between the Army and the BSAP was also apparent in
the attempted co-ordination of intelligence. Prior to 1972 intelligence was firmly a BSAP
responsibility and of its Special Branch in particular, as was so frequently the case in British or
former British territories. The Army had no intelligence network of its own, but the lack of real
insurgency simply did not necessitate it. This was to change with the escalation of conflict in
December 1972. In the northeast, which had been generally neglected by the Rhodesian
administration at all levels, Special Branchs traditional reliance upon a handful of picked
informers proved hopelessly inadequate. When the Army subsequently formed its own Military
Intelligence Department in 1973, however, Special Branch regarded it with suspicion. The
Department had no effective access to captured insurgents until 1978 and was generally confined
to gathering external intelligence, largely through its radio interception service. There was also
no Intelligence Corps formed within the Army until July 1975. Similarly, Special Branch
initially controlled the special intelligence-gathering units which were raised by Major Ron Reid-
Daly between November 1973 and January 1974. Subsequently named the Selous Scouts in
March 1974, the regiment came under Comops control in 1977. There is some evidence of
friction between the Selous Scouts and the Army, the attempt by Reid-Daly to recruit black
servicemen from the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) being persistently resisted. Equally, the
blowing of the cover of the Selous Scouts first pseudo operation in January 1974 by a Special
Branch officer led to friction between the BSAP and the Scouts. A further indication of some of
the tensions within the armed forces was the allegation in 1979 that the Selous Scouts were
more intent on ivory poaching than killing guerrillas in areas frozen to operations by other
members of the Security Forces. The Armys Intelligence Department bugged Reid-Dalys
telephone and, amid the reverberations, Hickman was sacked as Army commander and Reid-
Daly court-martialed. Reid-Daly was reprimanded and retired.
The lack of co-ordination of both command and intelligence was an important drawback to the
Security Forces since they would always be stretched numerically, given the view of the
Rhodesian authorities that the effective ceiling on manpower was the available white male
population. Prior to the war, Rhodesias regular forces were small and in 1968 still amounted to
only 4600 men in the armed forces and 6400 in the BSAP, excluding reserves in both cases. By
1978 the whites numbered only 260,000 in a total population of some 6.9 million and, as the war
progressed, white emigration the chicken run outpaced immigration. Between 1960 and 1979
some 180,000 whites entered the country but 202,000 left, a net loss of over 13,000 whites in
1978 being the highest recorded. Under the 1957 Defence Act, young white males were liable to
a six-week period of training in the Rhodesia Regiment, a territorial formation, followed by a
reserve commitment. By 1966 the basic term of national service had increased to 245 days. In
December 1972 national service for all whites as well as Asians and coloureds (who numbered
about 30,000) between the ages of 18 and 25 was increased to a full 12 months, while the period
to be spent in the reserve was increased from four to six years. In February 1974 the size of the
annual intake was doubled and in November restrictions placed on the ability of those liable to
military service to leave the country. In May 1976 the period of liability for territorials was
increased indefinitely and the initial term of national service increased from 12 to 18 months. In
January and February 1977 the net was widened still further with those aged between 24 and 38
compelled to do 190 days service per annum, those aged between 38 and 50 made liable to 70
days service a year, and those aged over 50 encouraged to volunteer for the BSAP reserve,
which required 42 days service per annum for this age bracket. In September student deferments
were cancelled and rewards advertised for those willing to extend their terms of service. It
should be noted that the term of service of the older age groups was not continuous but
completed as a number of tours through the year, such as six weeks on and six weeks off to try
and minimise economic disruption. In January 1978 the deferment of two years for new
immigrants of military age was reduced to just six months, although in October the term of
service for those aged between 18 and 25 was once more reduced to 12 months. The ultimate
measure of white conscription was introduced in January 1979 when those aged between 50 and
59 were made liable to six-weeks service per annum, the new entrants being referred to as
Mashfords Militia after a well-known Salisbury funeral parlour.
Despite the increasing demands made upon white manpower, the great majority of the personnel
of the Security Forces remained black. Until 1979 they were also all volunteers and there was no
shortage of recruits, particularly among the Karanga tribe. Accordingly, the RAR added a second
battalion in 1974, a third in 1977 and a fourth in 1978, the establishment of the latter raising the
proportion of black servicemen from some 66 per cent of the whole to around 70 per cent.
Approximately 75 per cent of the BSAP were also black, including most of the Police Support
Units (PSU), popularly known as Black Boots. Africans were attracted not only by good pay,
housing, educational facilities and health care but also by traditional bonds of family service to
the state. By 1979, too, there were 30 black commissioned officers in the Army. There is little
evidence of disciplinary problems among black service personnel, although it would appear that
some opposed the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals tested by the Pearce Commission and that the
majority of the RAR probably voted solidly for Mugabe in the 1980 elections.
There was therefore no pressure for African conscription until after Muzorewa and Sithole joined
the transitional government in 1978. In October it was announced that conscription would be
introduced for educated Africans between the ages of 18 and 25 in January 1979. The measures
were then extended to all educated Africans between 16 and 60 in August 1979, but there is
evidence of some opposition to conscription among Africans and the scheme had not been fully
implemented by the time the war ended. Somewhere between 1000 and 2000 foreigners also
served with the Rhodesian Security Forces during the war, while the South African presence
between 1967 and 1975 amounted to perhaps 2000 to 3000 men at most. In theory the Security
Forces thus had large numbers of men available by the end of the war, but the requirements of
the economy meant that only a relatively small proportion could be deployed at any one time.
This usually amounted to about 25,000 men, although in the run-up to the internal elections in
April 1979, some 60,000 men were deployed in the field, but only for a short period. It was only
the establishment of the SFAs after the internal settlement that enabled the Rhodesians to reach
even this total.
The lack of manpower tended to imply that there was little administrative tail to the Security
Forces, since traditionally most support functions had been undertaken by African labourers. The
majority of the white national servicemen, especially older age groups, were also placed in a
variety of more or less static roles such as holding units, police reserve units, the Guard Force
created in February 1976 to assist the defence of protected villages (PVs), and the Defence
Regiment formed in 1978 to guard important installations and communications. The principal
strike formations were the regulars of the all-white Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI). the white
SAS, and the mixed-race Selous Scouts. While the RLI and the RAR provided the men for the
Fire Forces inside Rhodesia, the SAS and Scouts were available for external operations. There
were also some other specialist units for counter-insurgency. The BSAP, for example, had Police
Anti-Terrorist Units (PATU) as well as the PSUs, specialist anti-stock theft teams and SWAT
(Special Weapons and Tactics Teams) which were designed to contain urban terrorism. The
latter, however, was relatively limited, the most successful urban guerrilla operations being the
bomb planted in the Salisbury branch of Woolworths in August 1977 and the rocket attack on
the capitals oil storage depot in December 1978. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also fielded
African District Security Assistants (DSAs) from 1976 for security duties in PVs. Another
specialist Army unit was the Greys Scouts, a mixed-race mounted unit often used to patrol
border minefields.
The manpower shortage also had repercussions in terms of strategy in frontier areas and to
prevent guerrilla infiltration into the interior. Ironically, the white urban areas and farms were
surrounded by the African Tribal Trust Lands (ATLs) in a manner approximating to the Maoist
guerrilla theory that the countryside dominated by insurgents should surround the cities. The
need to prevent infiltration was an additional reason for striking at guerrilla concentrations
outside Rhodesia. The Rhodesian forces were, in fact, well suited to counter-insurgency and had
begun a systematic study of the subject in the 1950s. Some 50 per cent of all regular training
was in the form of small-unit operations. There was also a reservoir of expertise from direct
experience of British counter-insurgency operations. The Rhodesian Far East Volunteer Unit had
served in Malaya during the Emergency in the 1950s; the then single battalion of the RAR had
served in Malaya from 1956 to 1958; and Rhodesias SAS had begun life as C (Rhodesia)
Squadron of the Malayan Scouts, later named C (Rhodesia) Squadron of the British SAS, and
had served both in Malaya and in Aden. The Rhodesian Air Force had also sent elements to
Kuwait and Aden between 1958 and 1961. Indeed, it was sometimes alleged that there was a
Malayan clique within the armed forces, Walls having commanded the Rhodesian SAS
squadron in Malaya. More recent experience was also available, the Selous Scouts being
modelled to some extent on Portugals Flechas whom Reid-Daly had studied. There was also
close study of Israeli techniques, particularly in terms of external operations.
7
Yet, despite the expertise available, the crucial lack of coordination in command and control
prevented the development of the kind of distinct overall strategy that had characterised the
British operations with which the Rhodesians were so familiar. Comops appeared after its
creation in 1977 to abandon the generally-defensive reaction to guerrilla infiltration of earlier
years in favour of a strategy of mobile counter-offensive. But, in the absence of sufficient
numbers of men on the ground, the success of the counter-offensive largely depended upon
inflicting high kill ratios. No real attempt could be made to hold cleared areas until the SFAs
became available and it was not until 1979 that an area defence system was adopted, based on
firmly holding Vital Asset Ground corresponding to the white areas of Rhodesia.
8
This did not
mean that some areas were tacitly abandoned to the guerrillas since elite groups such as the
Selous Scouts would make periodic forays and the remaining ground of tactical importance
outside the vital asset ground, primarily the flLs and game parks, became available for locating
and destroying guerrillas at will. It was, however, late in the day before such a co-ordinated
strategy was evolved and it has been suggested that the apolitical nature of the Rhodesian armed
forces prevented them from seriously coming to terms with the political aspects of guerrilla
insurgency.
9
There was never any real attempt at political indoctrination or instruction within the
Rhodesian armed forces and to the end of the war guerrilla insurgency tended to be regarded as a
military rather than a political problem to which military solutions alone should be applied.

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Tactical considerations also tended to be affected by manpower restraints. Large numbers of men
were required in static positions guarding installations, the vitally important railways, PVs and
white farms. A reflection of this fact was the development of the Fire Force concept which
sought to offset lack of men through the concentration of firepower and mobility. lf guerrillas
were located by ground patrol or other means, a Cessna Lynx carrying fragmentation and
concussion bombs or napalm would attack them. Four helicopters would then be deployed, each
carrying a stick of four or five men to drive the guerrillas back on 15 or 16 paratroopers
dropped at low level from a Dakota C-47 transport. Four Fire Forces were available, two
manned by the RLI and two by the RAR, with the men regularly rotated. Much depended upon
flying time from base and, increasingly, on the number of requests for assistance. By 1978 a
delay of several hours was common when earlier reaction had been almost instantaneous, since
each Fire Force was being used two or three times a day in varying parts of the country. By
mid-1979 the Fire Forces were said to be accounting for three quarters of all guerrilla casualties
inside Rhodesia, but the Selous Scouts equally claimed that they were responsible for 68 per
cent of all guerrilla kills, their early role in pseudo operations having been supplanted steadily by
their deployment in a hunter-killer role. There appears to have been some resentment on the part
of those who did the tracking on the ground only to see the reward of their labour claimed by
other hands in the shape of the Fire Forces, but generally bifurcation was not a significant
problem in the armed forces. The size of the Fire Force sticks was determined by the capacity of
the Alouette helicopters with which the Rhodesians were primarily equipped, some 66 being
available by 1979. It was also the size of sticks deployed in ground operations of a more
conventional kind, companies being divided in this way to cover more ground while keeping in
touch through the liberal distribution of personal radios. Subsequently, 11 or 12 Bell Huey
helicopters with a greater carrying capacity were obtained from Israel, but they were received in
a poor state of repair and the Rhodesians generally had maintenance problems with much of their
equipment. The loss of a Bell Huey to a surface-to-air missile (SAM) inside Mozambique in
September 1979, in which all 12 occupants were killed, was the single greatest disaster in terms
of casualties suffered by the Rhodesians during the war.
The Fire Force concept represented what might be termed vertical envelopment of the
guerrillas and this technique was also utilised in external raids into Zambia and Mozambique in
which the SAS and Selous Scouts often figured prominently. On other occasions, the
Rhodesians drove (often in captured vehicles) or walked to their targets, while there were also
more limited penetrations across frontiers by small groups of Rhodesians to lay mines or set up
ambushes. External operations, however, not only tended to divert manpower from critical areas
inside Rhodesia but also became more and more hazardous. Rhodesian command of the air was
threatened by the deployment of SAMs in Mozambique, while the actual concentration of
Rhodesian airpower in support of major incursions could itself give prior warning to the
guerrillas. There was also a suspicion that the guerrillas were sometimes forewarned of
Rhodesian operations by a source within the Security Forces at a high level. The main airstrike
capacity, apart from the 13 or 14 Cessna Lynx converted to a counter-insurgency role, consisted
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of a squadron of Hawker Hunters. There was also a squadron of Canberra bombers of which four
were used in the bombing raid over Angola in February 1979.
External operations by land could prove equally vulnerable as the guerrilla bases and camps,
particularly in Mozambique, became ever better protected with sophisticated defences. The
Rhodesian attack on New Chimoio in September 1979 is a case in point. A force of 100 Selous
Scouts battled for three days successfully to overcome some 6000 ZANLA guerrillas and their
East German advisers. Although the guerrillas eventually broke and fled, leaving over 3000
dead, they had had the benefit of an extensive trench and bunker system ringed by anti-aircraft,
mortar and recoilless rifle positions. Many such bunker systems were largely immune to the
ageing British 25-pounder field guns which comprised the bulk of Rhodesias artillery.
The nature of the war inside Rhodesia also led to the development of a number of other special
techniques by the Security Forces, the guerrilla penchant for attacking rural buses or civilian
vehicles leading to the use of Q cars heavily armoured and armed decoy vehicles disguised as
civilian traffic. The guerrillas use of mines also led to the development of a large number of
specially designed vehicles such as the Rhino, Hyena, Pookie and Hippo, which all featured a V-
shaped body to deflect blast. Other trucks were sandbagged, while there was official promotion
of a campaign to encourage driving at low speed to minimise the effectiveness of mines.
Inevitably, the guerrillas adjusted to Rhodesian tactics, often proving successful at exposing the
Security Forces observation posts 10 which were utilised to watch native villages for guerrilla
presence. The kill ratio was invariably favourable to the Security Forces and never dropped
below 6 to 1. At times it was as high as 12 or 14 to 1 overall, while individual operations might
result in spectacular results of up to 60 to 1. The problem was that there was not the manpower
to prevent increasing infiltration of Rhodesia. By the Security Forces own estimates, the number
of guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia grew from 350 or 400 in July 1974 to 700 by March
1976, 2350 by April 1977, 5598 by November 1977, 6456 by March 1978, to 11,183 by January
1979 and as many as 12,500 by the end of the war. The escalation of the conflict was also
indicated by the expansion of JOCs from one to seven.
A number of options were available to try and control the extent of infiltration other than by
spoiling attacks into host countries. One such method was the cordon sanitaire of border
minefields established from May 1974 onwards. At a cost of 27,000 Rhodesian dollars per
kilometre, a distance of 179 km (111 miles) between the Musengedzi and Mazoe rivers on the
Mozambique frontier was fitted with a line of two game fences enclosing minefields and an
alarm system. The system lacked depth, the tripwires and even the mines often being exposed by
rainfall, and there were not sufficient numbers of men available for regular patrols along the
fences. Later versions were widened, but enormous difficulties were experienced in maintaining
the minefields. The lack of fencing alone resulted in a 30 per cent rate of replacement due to
wild animals setting off the mines, while it was discovered that the guerrillas often removed
claymore mines and used them as a topping on their own land mines, in all some 864 km (537
miles) were eventually covered by the cordon sanitaire along the Zambian and Mozambique
frontiers at a total cost of 2298 million dollars, but it remained only an impediment to infiltration
and not an impassable barrier. In the process it consumed valuable resources that might have
been utilised more effectively elsewhere. By contrast the Botswana frontier was simply
declared a free-fire zone.
The aim of preventing infiltration is to ensure that the guerrillas are separated from the civil
population. Another common means of ensuring such separation since 1945 has been by
resettling the population in protected areas. In Rhodesia resettlement was also utilised, many
members of the Security Forces having witnessed its apparent success in Malaya. The initial
project arose out of the extension of the no-go area declared along the north-eastern frontier
when insurgency mushroomed in late 1972, although a pilot scheme was first tried in the
Zambezi valley in May 1973 whereby some 8000 Africans were resettled by December 1973.
The main scheme then commenced with Operation Overload in July 1974, by which over
46,000 Africans were removed from the Chiweshe flL into 21 PVs and some 13,500 people
from the Madziwa flL a few weeks later. Resettlement was extended to areas not directly
threatened by guerrillas in June 1975 with the creation of consolidated villages or groups of
kraals lacking the more direct protection afforded or theoretically afforded by PVs, but this was
less successful and was dropped in 1976. Official figures indicate that there were 116 PVs by
August 1976, 178 by September 1977 and 234 planned or built by January 1978. Estimates of
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the total population of PVs range from 350,000 to 750,000 Africans. Too frequently, however,
PVs were regarded purely as a means of population control rather than as a basis for winning
hearts and minds. The fact that the scheme had begun in subverted areas rather than areas
where the administration was sure of African loyalty was in itself an indication of the underlying
motivation. Conditions naturally varied in PVs but too many lacked proper facilities and
sanitation. and it has been alleged that families were allocated as little as 12.5 sq. metres (15 sq.
yards) each.
2
The villages were also inadequately defended with poorer quality Guard Force or
DSAs, who often turned a blind eye to food being smuggled out to the guerrillas by a population
which was, in any case, often insufficiently screened. Urbanisation also struck at the root of
tribal values, especially among the Shona, as did restrictions such as dawn-to-dusk curfews,
while crops cultivated at some distance from PVs were left unprotected by night and subject to
animal depredations. Too often the Security Forces had forcibly removed the Africans to PVs
and it is a measure of the failure of resettlement in Rhodesia that some 70 PVs in areas such as
Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudsi had all restrictions lifted in September 1978 in the wake of the
internal settlement. In almost every case the security situation immediately deteriorated,
indicating how far the authorities had failed to win over the population.
Given the punitive nature of resettlement, it is perhaps little wonder that the winning of hearts
and minds left much to be desired. An idea for a comprehensive scheme to win the loyalty of the
African was in fact developed by Lieutenant Ian Sheppard in late 1973, the so-called Sheppard
Group of six men with marketing or public relations experience aiming to sell the PVs to the
Africans. Sheppard and his colleagues suggested some 38 different projects, including the
establishment of an African Development Bank and granting land titles to resettled natives.
Some suggestions were heeded, such as successfully persuading the Security Forces to
innoculate native cattle against disease in the Masoso and Chinanda TTLs rather than
slaughtering them wholesale. The majority fell foul of opposition from the Ministries of Internal
Affairs and Information and the group folded in November 1974.13 It was not until July 1977 that
a Psychological Operations Unit was established under the direction of Tony Datton, a former
member of the Sheppard Group, but continued rivalry with the Special Branch and resistance
from senior military officers thwarted Dattons efforts. A Directorate of Psychological Warfare
was belatedly established in 1979 but proved ineffectual. Similarly, Operation Manila Interface,
initiated in August 1978 psychologically to prepare the ground for resettlement, was a failure.
Rather than attempting to provide the rural African with more facilities, there was a tendency to
concentrate on broadening the representation of the African in government, but this meant little
to the average African and rarely offered a viable alternative to guerrilla intimidation. Moreover,
with the Security Forces intent on eliminating guerrillas rather than winning hearts and minds,
the latter tended to consist of a carrot and stick approach. Thus rewards for information ranging
from 300 to 1000 dollars were introduced in April 1974 and these were backed by an extensive
aerial propaganda campaign, dropping leaflets and safe conduct passes to guerrillas who might
be willing to surrender. Full-scale amnesties were offered in both December 1977 and March
1979, with only limited success. The reverse of the carrot for cooperation was restriction and
punishment. Collective fines were introduced in January 1973 if the presence of guerrillas was
not reported within 72 hours, the fine being extracted in the form of livestock or, as in the case
of Chiweshe TTL, in the form of enforced closure of African grinding mills and stores. Death
sentences were introduced for harbouring guerrillas in September 1973 and the two pieces of
legislation providing the legal basis for the enforcement of anti-terrorist measures the
Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act were constantly updated. The
former was amended 32 times and the latter 12 times between 1965 and 1977.14 From January
1977 Operation Turkey applied rationing to Africans residing in labourers compounds at
white-owned farms as a measure of food control. There was also the registration card or situpa
for Africans, but this was of little use to the Security Forces as it contained neither photograph,
description nor fingerprints of the holder.
A more successful aspect of Rhodesian psychological warfare was the contest with the guerrillas
for the control of traditional spirit mediums among the Shona. A register of all such mediums
was compiled at an early stage. While, for example, the guerrillas abducted a woman claiming to
be the legs of the Nehanda spin in November 1972, the authorities controlled a number of others
who claimed to be the head. District Commissioners also used psychological tactics such as
demonstrating their power over tame wild animals, but it can be noted that these officials had
wide discretion to conscript native labour and to inflict corporal punishment. The preference for
control rather than concessions was also illustrated by the extension in the use of martial law to
govern, its application increasing over some 70 per cent of the country by September 1978 and
to over 90 per cent by September 1979. Yet further evidence of disregard for the African could
be drawn, too, from the forcible eviction of the Tangwena tribe from their traditional homes in
the Inyanga area under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act in 1969.
Nevertheless, as already indicated, the Rhodesians were heavily dependent upon black
servicemen and police who were forthcoming in sufficient numbers to maintain voluntary enlist-
ment until 1979, at which point black conscription was introduced as a political measure by the
transitional government. Equally noteworthy was the successful use of pseudo forces, by which
members of the Security Forces as well as captured guerrillas turned by the former, were
utiised to infiltrate guerrilla organisations. A pilot scheme was attempted in October 1966 by
Senior Assistant Commissioner Oppenheim of the BSAP CID and others including Lieutenant
Alan Savoury, who had experience of working in the game parks, and Lieutenant Spike Powell
who had worked with British pseudo-gangs in Kenya during the Mau Mau emergency of the
1950s. But, since the guerrillas had such little support in the Zambezi valley and were so easily
contained, there was neither scope nor use for pseudo operations. The idea was only revived with
the escalation of the war by ZANLA in late 1972 and indeed the pseudo-gangs were always
more successful in penetrating ZANLA than ZIPRA since the former had a much looser
discipline. Superintendent Tommy Peterson deployed the first pseudo team in Bushu flL in
January 1973, the concept of frozen areas in which the teams could work without being killed
by the Security Forces being adopted from August 1973. From these beginnings developed Reid-
Dalys Selous Scouts as a combat tracker unit, either observing guerrillas and guiding other units
to the attack or themselves increasingly adopting a hunter-killer role. Employing guerrilla
defectors from the start, the Selous Scouts were sometimes required to call in airstrikes close to
their own positions to avoid disclosing their true identities. Similarly, the Selcfus Scouts appear
to have attacked PVs on occasions to prove their bona fides in the course of seeking to sow
distrust within the insurgent groups. Pseudo operations were always dangerous and required a
constant supply of new defectors in order to enable the Scouts to keep up-to-date on guerrilla
internal security measures. Their reputation was somewhat mixed, many senior military and
police officers doubting the merit of releasing captured insurgents who would otherwise have
faced the full force of the law. The Selous Scouts attracted the nickname of armpits with
eyeballs through their generally unkempt appearance.
5
Other than relying on the Security Forces, there was always the possibility of arming loyal
Africans, but this reached no further than deploying Africa DSAs in the PVs. In 1978, however,
money became available from Oman16 which enabled a pilot scheme to be launched in Msana
flL in March by which 90 local Africans were formed into an Interim Guard Force. With the
internal settlement, the opportunity was available for recruiting more blacks loyal to Muzorewa,
Sithole and Chirau, and the SFAs were quickly established to take over security duties in flLs.
Known in Shona as Pfumo reVanhu and in Ndebele as Umkonto wa Banns (both meaning Spear
of the People), the SFAs were in reality private armies attached to Muzorewas UANC and
Sitholes branch of ZANU. Allegedly guerrillas who had accepted the latest amnesty, the SFAs
were primarily black conscripts or unemployed urban blacks given a hasty four-week crash
course of training. Under Operation Favour some 2000 SFAs were deployed in 80 flLs by the
end of 1978 and their strength grew to some 10,000 in the run-up to the internal election in the
following year. By April 1979 they had responsibility for 22 frozen areas representing some 15
per cent of the country as a whole. In theory the SFAs gave the Security Forces the ability to
hold outlying areas on a permanent basis for the first time, but the SFAs were ill-trained and
poorly disciplined. The situation did not materially improve after the Armys Special Forces
Headquarters took over responsibility for the SFAs in July 1979 and the Army as a whole had
little faith in their abilities. Indeed, one group of SFAs loyal to Sithole had to be eliminated by
the Security Forces in the Gokwe TFL in June 1979. At most their deployment enabled the
Guard Force to be switched to railways and farms, but the brutality of the SFAs in the TTLs did
little to enhance support for the Muzorewa government.
The conditions under which many Africans were living in the TTLs by the end of the war raises
the wider question of the effects of guerrilla conflict upon Rhodesia and its people. For black
civilians the war was immensely disruptive. Many Africans had become refugees crossing to
Zambia or Mozambique voluntarily. Still others had been forcibly abducted by the guerrillas in
July 1973, for example, 273 African schoolchildren were abducted from the St Alberts mission
although most were subsequently recovered by the Security Forces. All the main white urban
areas such as Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali had substantial native refugee populations on their
outskirts while, of course, many Africans had been forcibly relocated by the Security Forces in
PVs. The Africans were caught in the real sense between intimidation by both Security Forces
and guerrillas, the ratio of black civilian casualties caused by the protagonists running at 40:60
by 1978. In rural areas it is clear that local administration had often broken down by the end of
the war. It was reported in May 1977 that over 22,000 Africans in the southeast were refusing to
pay taxes. By the end of 1978 over 900 African primary and secondary schools had closed,
leaving over 230,000 pupils without access to education. Over 90 rural hospitals and clinics had
also closed and rural bus services had been cut by 50 per cent. African agriculture was severely
depressed, the Ministry of Agriculture calculating that 550,000 head of native cattle would perish
in the course of 1978 alone. It is believed that over a third of the native cattle herd died during
the war while, with only 1500 out of 8000 cattle dips still in operation in 1979, diseases
previously extinguished, such as anthrax and tsetse, were again rampant. Prior to the war African
farmers had produced 70 per cent of Rhodesias food requirements, but by 1977 this had already
fallen to only 30 per cent.
17
For the white population there were parallel strains. Not only was there the burden of
conscription but also the economic cost of the war. By December 1978 the war was costing a
million dollars a day, defence expenditure having risen by a staggering 610 per cent between
19712 and 19778. That on police had risen by 232 per cent during the same period, with
expenditure on internal affairs and roads rising by 305 per cent and 257 per cent respectively. It
has been argued that the war was relatively cheap, Rhodesia spending less in 1978 and 1979 than
the sum spent on the annual administration of the University of Berkeley, California18 but, of
course, it did not appear to be so to those experiencing it. South Africa may have subsidised the
Rhodesian war effort by as much as 50 per cent, but there were still fairly constant tax increases
such as the 12 1/2 per cent surcharge on income tax imposed in July 1978. Similarly, the
property market was depressed and tourism declined by some 74 per cent between 1972 and
1978. Coupled with sanctions, the war saw a decline in Rhodesias GNP amounting to 1.1 per
cent in 1975, 3.4 per cent in 1976 and 6.9 per cent in 1977. The physical strain of the war also
resulted in rises in alcoholism, illegitimacy and divorce among white Rhodesians.19 For white
farmers in particular, the war meant constant danger and a life at night of floodlights, wire and
sandbags. In January 1973 insurance firms had pronounced themselves unwilling to compensate
for guerrilla action, leading to a Terrorist Victims Relief Fund in February and a government
Victims of Terrorism (Compensation) Bill in June 1973. Officially the war cost the deaths of
410 white civilians and 954 members of the Security Forces. A total of 691 black civilians are
said to have died and 8250 guerrillas, but these figures are clearly understated and it is possible
that the total deaths exceeded 30,000.20
At the end of the war the Rhodesian Security Forces had surrendered no city or major
communications route and the BSAP had closed no police station, even along the exposed
Mozambique frontier. The guerrillas had not succeeded in establishing any liberated zones,
although clearly large parts of Rhodesia were being actively contested. The guerrillas, indeed,
have been characterised as the worst this century
2
in terms of their military effectiveness and
expertise, the Rhodesians referring to a so-called K factor (for Kaffir) in this regard. The
guerrillas were, however, effective in political subversion and whether the situation could have
been maintained by the Security Forces indefinitely is a moot point. At the time of the ceasefire
an estimated 22,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 ZANLA guerrillas remained uncommitted outside the
country, although not all were trained. Within Rhodesia, even with the dubious addition of the
SFAs, the ratio of the Security Forces to the guerrillas and their supporters reached only 1:1.5 22
Manpower had always been the problem, particularly as the Rhodesians had attempted for far
too long to exert control everywhere rather than consolidating their grasp of key areas. Militarily,
the war was not lost by the end of 1979 despite the frequent lack of co-ordination in command,
control and intelligence. However, Rhodesias resources were stretched dangerously thin while
the general approach of the Security Forces to counter-insurgency was not conducive to
establishing any enduring popular African support. Overall lay the interplay of dominating
political considerations that eventually determined the outcome. The legacy of the war was a
newly-independent state beset by economic and social problems, not least the rivalries of the
nationalists that the war had stimulated and left unresolved.

Notes

1. L.H. Gann and T.H. Henr i ksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (Praeger, New York, 1981), pp. 81
2.
2. P. L. Moor cr af t and P. McLaughl i n, Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia, 19651980
(Sygma/Collins, Marshailtown, 1982), p. 36.
3. J . K. Ci l l i er s, A Cr i t i que on Sel ect ed Aspect s of t he Rhodesi an Secur i t y Forces
Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 19721980 (Unpublished MA, University of South Africa, 1982), p. 272.
4. For accounts of the early campaigns between 1966 and 1970 see J. Boner Bell, The Frustration of Insurgency: The
Rhodesian Example in the Sixties, Military Affairs 35/1, 1971, pp. 15; M. Moths, Terrorism (Howard Tirnmins, Cape
Town, 1971); K. Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe (Rex Collings, London. 1975); A.R. Wilkinson, Insurgency in
Rhodesia, 1957-1973 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 100, London, 1973).
5. R. Rei d- Dal y and P. Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Albertown, 1982), pp. 26074.
6. Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Chimurenga, p. 191.
7. Reid-Daly and Stiff, Selous Scouts, p. 689; Tony Geraghty, Who Dares Wins (2nd edn, Arms and Armour Press,
London, 1983), p.
296
.
8. Cilliers, Critique, pp. 3089.
9. Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Chimurenga, pp. 667.
10. T. Arbuckle, Rhodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: An Assessment, Journal of the Royal United Services
Institute 124/4, 1979, pp. 2732.
11. Cilliers, Critique, pp. 1656.
12. T.J.B. Jokonya, The Effects of the War on the Rural Population of Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Affairs,
5/2, 1980, pp. 13347; R. Marston, Resettlement as a Counter-revolutionary Technique Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute, 124/4, 1979, pp. 469.
13. Cilliers, Critique, p. 200.
14. Jokonya, Effects, pp. 13347.
15. Reid-Daly and Stiff, Selous Scouts, p. 245.
16. Cilliers, Critique, p. 278.
17. Marston, Resettlement, pp. 469.
18. Gann and Henriksen, Struggle for Zimbabwe, p. 72.
19. Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Chimurenga, p. 174.
20. Ibid., p. 222.
21. N. Downi e, Rhodesi a: A St udy i n Mi l i t ar y I ncompet ence , Defence, 10/5, 1979, pp. 342-
5.
22. Ci l l i er s, Cr i t i que , p. 296.
References

Arbuckle, T. thodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: An Assessment, Journal of the Royal United Services
Institute, 124/4, 1979, pp. 2732
Barclay, G. St J. Slotting the floppies: The Rhodesian Response to Sanctions and Insurgency, 19741977,
Australian Journal of Defence Studies, 1/2, 1977, pp. 11020
Blake, R. A History of Rhodesia (Eyre Methuen, London, 1977) Bowyer Bell, J. The Frustration of Insurgency: The
Rhodesian Example in the Sixties, Military Affairs, 35/1, 1971, pp. 15
Bruton, J.K. Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, Military Review, 59/3, 1979, pp. 2639
Cilliers, J.K. A Critique on Selected Aspects of the Rhodesian Security Forces Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 1972-
1980 (Unpublished MA thesis. University of South Africa, 1982)
Cohen, B. The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenters View, African Affairs, 76/ 305, 1977, pp. 48394
Downie, N. Rhodesia: A Study in Military Incompetence, Defence, 10/ 5, 1979, pp. 3425
Gann, L.H. and Henriksen, T.H. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (Praeger, New York, 1981)
Good, R.C. UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Faber and Faber, London, 1973)
Jokonya, T.J.B. The Effects of the War on the Rural Population of Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Affairs,
5/2, 1980, pp. 13347
Lovett, J. Contact (Khenty, Johannesburg, 1977)
Marston, R. Resettlement as a Counter-revolutionary Technique, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute,
124/ 4, 1979, pp. 469
Martin, D. and Johnson, P. The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber, London, 1981)
Maxey, K. The Fight for Zimbabwe (Rex Coffings, London, 1975)
Meredith, M. The Past is Another Country (Andre Deutsch, London, 1979)
Moorcraft, P. A Short Thousand Years (Salisbury, 1979)
Moorcraft, P. Contact II (Sygma, Johannesburg, 1981)
Moorcraft, P. and McLaughlin, P. Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia, 1965-1 980 (Sygma/Collins, Marshalltown,
1982)
Moths, M. Terrorism (Harold Timmins, Cape Town, 1971)
Moths, M. Armed Conflict in Southern Africa (Cape Town, 1974)
Ranger, T. The Death of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, Nationalism and the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, African
Affairs, 81/ 324, 1982, pp. 34969
Reid-Daly, R. and Stiff, P. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Albertown, 1982)
Sobel, L.A. (ed.) Rhodesia, 19711977 ( Checkmar k, New Yor k, 1978)
Venter, A.J. The Zambezi Salient (Hale, London, 1975)
Wilkinson, A.R. Insurgency in Rhodesia, 19571973 ( I nt er nat i onal I nst i t ut e f or Strategic Studies,
London, Adelphi Paper no. 100, 1973)
Wilkinson, A.R. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe in Davidson, B., Slovo, J. and Wilkinson, A.R. (ed.). Southern Africa
(Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1976), pp. 215-340
Wilkinson, A.R. Introduction and Conclusion in Raeburn, M. (ed.), Black Fire (Julian Friedmann, London, 1978),
pp. 152 and 23343
Wilkinson, A.R. The Impact of the War in Moths-Jones, W.H. and Austin, D. (ed), From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe:
Behind and Beyond Lancaster House (Frank Cass, London, 1980), pp. 11023. (This was previously published as
Wilkinson, A.R. The Impact of the War, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 18/ 1, 1980, pp.
110- 23)

(END)


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WEAPONS
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| WEAPONS | UNIFORMS | EQUIPMENT (KIT) | INSIGNIA | VEHICLES | SUMMARY |

FN FAL (Fusil Automatique Leger or SLR; Self-Loading Rifle)
This was the standard service rifle within the Rhodesian Security Forces.
Probably the most successful of the many designs produced by Fabrique Nationale. The
FAL appeared in 1950 and continues to be used by many countries.
This weapon is robust, reliable, and simple to maintain and operate, the FAL set a new
standard when it appeared and it has continued to be a leading design for almost 30
years.
Round: 7.62
Length: 41.50"
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Weight: 9 lbs 8oz (unloaded)
Magazine: 20rds

G3 (Gewehr 3)
This weapon was in smaller quantities within the Scouts and Security Forces, and was
used by many in lieu of the FAL.
The Heckler & Koch G3 is a most reliable and robust system. The rifle is made from
sheet metal stampings with plastic furniture. The resulting weapon is not particularly
pretty, but it is undeniably functional and effective.
The G3 has sold widely throughout the world and is the standard rifle of many armies.
Round: 7.62
Length: 40"
Weight: 9lbs 6oz
Magazine: 20rds
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UNIFORMS
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CAMOUFLAGE SHIRT
This Army pattern shirt is set on a tan / gray
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base color. The material is a durable heavy weight.

CAMOUFLAGE SHIRT TYPE II
The camouflage pattern of the type II shirt
consists of large patches of brown and green streaks on a mustard base.

FIELD JACKET
This was the Rhodesia Security Forces
standard issue camouflage field jacket. It was made from durable material, had padded
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elbows, four large pockets and pen / pencil ribs on the sleeve.

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SELOUS SCOUTS, FOXHOUNDS, BEACONS AND TRANSMITTERS.
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SELOUS SCOUTS, FOXHOUNDS,
BEACONS AND TRANSMITTERS
An interesting experimental foray undertaken by the
Rhodesian Armys tracking unit, the Selous Scouts was that
of using English foxhounds in the tactical tracking role,
which was tried with little success in this case. It was
suggested by a person familiar with canine abilities that a
dogs might be trained to track and hunt terrorist in areas
of thick bush in the same way they hunt foxes in England.
When contact was made, a helicopter-borne fireforce could
be deployed to finish off the job. Being innovative and
progressive, the commanding officer approved the
experiment and subsequently thirty imported hounds
arrived for training.
Essential to the plan was to have a pack
leader fitted with a locating beacon and a voice
activated transmitter so that when the dogs
located their prey, they would bark and activate
the beacon. The fireforce standing by would be
mobilized, home in on the transmission from the
beacon, and engage the guerrilla group, who
would be, so the plan went, cowering under the
assault of thirty yapping dogs.
Although the idea was good (if a little bizarre) in theory, in practice it was a failure.
The dogs responded well to training, and a top dog emerged to lead the pack, but
when tested in the field the whole plan unraveled. Being hunting dogs with many
generations of specialized breeding, the hounds, true to their instincts, preferred to
follow the sent of deer and small furry animals rather than that of Homo sapiens.
There is no doubt, however, that if this experiment had continued over a longer
period of time, something more positive would have evolved.

ENGLISH FOXHOUND

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DETAILS
Group: Hound
Height: 23-27in (58-
69cm)
Weight: 55-75lb (25-
34kg)
Body: Broad skull. Large
eyes. The muzzle is long
and square. Long necked
with a deep chest.
Powerful and muscular
thighs. Legs are thick
boned. Tail has slight
curve.
Coat: Very short, hard
and glossy.
Color: Black, brown and
white or any combination.
Personality: An active
passionate hunter. Gentle
and even tempered with
children, but prefers to be
around other dogs. Needs
a lot of exercise.

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RHODESIAS SELOUS SCOUTS
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RHODESIA'S SELOUS SCOUTS
by Chris Vermaak
(written in 1977)
This in depth report by Chris Vermaak on the Selous Scouts attempts to set the
record straight before the event. Chris Vermaak is one of the most experienced and
respected correspondents in Africa and has a long and deep knowledge of the
turmoil's that have beset the continent over the last 20 years. The report on the Scouts
we feel will surely prove to be of great interest to anyone interested in Terrorist
activities.
Rhodesia's crack Selous Scouts, a tough and highly selected band of
men, White and Black, who are said to be possibly the best and
toughest bush fighters in the world, have been branded as a bunch of
demented killers by terrorists and their Marxist henchmen who have
never hesitated to twist the truth to suit their own sinister ends.
In any case of atrocity, there are those whose interest is served by
publishing the facts, those who seek to prevent publicity being
attracted to those facts, and those who seek to manipulate selected
facts to shift the blame away from the guilty parties. Thus we find that
a number of recent acts of ruthless violence in Rhodesia which were indeed committed by
terrorists belonging either to the Nkomo or Mugabe wing of the so-called Patriotic Front
have been consistently attributed to the Selous Scouts. The lie has been spread abroad by
both Nkomo and Mugabe, perpetuated by a number of misguided church leaders, gullible
journalists guided only by financial preferences and foreign deserters from the Rhodesian
forces who should never have been allowed into the country in the first place.
The underlying motive for these deliberate lies, completely divorced from proven facts,
must seem obvious to those acquainted with terrorist and Marxist strategy - namely, the
creation of an ever-increasing rift between the population and members of the armed
forces, to neutralize the vital battle for the hearts and minds of people enmeshed by the
war. To attempt division and dissension within the army itself. Predictably the Selous
Scouts, Rhodesia's answer to terrorist infiltration, its most battle-hardened unit, has been
selected for this dubious purpose. This superb band of men is being crucified almost daily
as murderers and butchers of innocent people, baby-bashers, blood-crazed maniacs.
As contemporary military correspondents we remember very well a not too distant parallel
- the vilification of the crack Portuguese commando's who bore the brunt of the fighting in
Mozambique and Angola. They fought well and died well. They were the victims of
consistent Frelimo abuse, aimed at alienating them from the population and stigmatizing
them as a band of ruthless killers, intent on systematic genocide. Frelimo's sustained
campaign of hate and suspicion, fanned by the emergent Armed Forces Movement (AFM)
ideology from Lisbon eventually paid off, to such an extent that the commando's were
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despised and ostracized by the thousands of dismal toy soldiers who never ventured near
the front.
Communist strategy seldom differs and another case in point concerns the German
Battalion in former French Indochina. Consisting of men who escaped possible war crimes
trials in Europe after World War II, they joined the French Foreign Legion and shot,
bombed, tortured and bayoneted their way into the Viet Minh. Theirs was a war of reprisals
and vicious counter-reprisals, of criminal violence on both sides, of outrages against
humanity, of war at its rawest, cruelest and most gruesome. Stumped by veterans who gave
even more than they received, the treacherous Viet Minh embarked on a systematic
campaign of denigration, using the Communist press and some Western media.
The French were rebuked for using their erstwhile enemies to further their "imperialistic
designs" and henceforth the German Battalion ceased to exist. The "Battalion of the
Damned" as they preferred to call themselves had lived exactly 1,243 days. during which it
destroyed 7,466 guerillas by body count, 221 Viet Minh bases, supply dumps, and camps; it
liberated 311 military and civilian prisoners from terrorist captivity and covered roughly
11,000 kilometers on foot. They lost 515 men - to them a very heavy loss indeed. The Viet
Minh had scored a resounding victory, to be followed 700 days later by the tragedy of Dien
Bien Phu, the ultimate French humiliation.
I thought of all these things when I interviewed huge Joshua Nkomo in the unkept garden
of Zimbabwe House, ZAPU's headquarters in Conakry Road, Lusaka. He said killings in
Rhodesia by the security forces were becoming as regular as detailed weather reports. He
continued:

When met by the ruthless Selous Scouts our people - men, women and
children - are asked a few questions and shot.'' He claimed he could produce a
witness - there was no sign of him - who could testify to a "particularly
degenerate'' security force atrocity near the southern Botswana border. His
story: ''Six women - three with babies on their backs - had identified
themselves to members of the Selous Scouts before crossing the Shashi River.
They had conspicuous front and back identity tags. When they walked down
towards the river the three mothers were gunned down. They died, but not the
babies on their backs. One of the Scouts asked: "What must we do with the
babies?'' Others answered by slitting their throats with bayonets. They were
buried in a common grave. A son who inquired after his mother was also shot.
Almost humbly, with incredible hypocrisy, he told the world press:

Freedom fighters are told not to molest civilians, to concentrate only on
military targets. Our people are being killed in their hundreds by the Selous
Scouts to make the people hate the freedom movement. The freedom fighters
are under strict instruction not to touch civilians no matter what their color.
These Scouts are beginning to kindle a bitterness in Zimbabwe towards the
White people. The cutting of young children's throats and the shooting of
women returning from their fields are beginning to have a cumulative effect on
the minds of the people against the White people. If these atrocities do not
cease, the Whites will be regarded as part and parcel of Smith. Sustained
genocide by the Scouts will lead to a very serious rift between Whites and
Blacks and it will reach a stage when my people won't distinguish between the
guilty and the innocent.
Only the totally uninformed, the very dumb or the feebly sentimental will be taken in by
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Mr. Nkomo's exaggerated claims which follow a distinct line, traceable to the Lupane
murders on December 5, 1976, when a member of Nkomo's terrorist group, Albert Sumne
Ncube, killed Bishop Adolph Schmitt, Father Possenti Weggarten and Sister Maria Francis,
on a road near Lupane. According to Sister Ermenfried, the only survivor, the terrorist
denounced the missionaries as "enemies of the people" before opening fire. Ncube, who
was later captured by the police, admitted these and other murders as well as undergoing
terrorist training in ZAPU camps in Tanzania. He subsequently escaped from custody,
however, and may have returned to Zambia.
On Sunday, December 19, 1976, a group of Mugabe terrorists from Mozambique
slaughtered 27 defenseless African workers on a tea estate in the Honde Valley in front of
their wives and children. They then withdrew to Mozambique.
On Sunday February 6, 1977 a group of 12 Mugabe terrorists murdered Father Martin
Thomas, SJ, Father Christopher Shepherd-Smith, SJ, Brother John Conway, SJ, Sister
Epiphany Bertha Schneider, OP, Sister Joseph Paulina Wilkinson, OP, Sister Magdala
Christa Lewandoski, OP, and sister Ceslaus Anna Steiger, OP, at St. Paul's Mission,
Musami.
According to Father Dunstan Myerscough, SJ, who survived, together with Sister Anna
Victoria Reggel, OP, the murders were "obviously the result of Russian indoctrination. In
my opinion, if you want proof the Communists are behind this, come to the mission. The
terrorists must have been got at to have that brutality in them." He said he had no doubt of
the terrorists' culpability.
Apart from the fact that all these brutal slayings took place on Sundays, thereby indicating
that they were planned operations rather than irresponsible acts of folly, as has been
claimed by embarrassed terrorist supporters, it is important to note that in all cases the
survivors or witnesses were under no doubt whatsoever that the culprits were terrorists
belonging to either the Nkomo or Mugabe factions.
The terrorists' culpability was proved beyond any doubt when security forces found an
incriminating diary in the possession of a slain terrorist. He described in full how his group
had slain the missionaries and how a number of other civilians had been murdered farther
afield, concluding: "We were very lucky".
These facts have not, however, deterred the terrorist leaders from attempting to blame the
Rhodesian security forces and especially the Selous Scouts, or from attributing these acts of
violence to the "inevitable" consequences of Rhodesian government policies. Thus Mr.
Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe both denied that the Lupane murders could have been the work of
their "Patriotic Front". To quote Mr. Nkomo:

It is a tragedy to be looked at against the background of the whole situation
and the people of the Smith regime who are causing the continuation of the
war. Selous Scouts do this sort of thing to make the guerrilla movement
unpopular.
He did, however, call for an international inquiry into the Honde massacre for which his
uneasy partner, Mr. Mugabe's followers were responsible.
Terrorist comments on the Honde massacre and the Musami murders have combined this
type of accusation with sentimental protestations of innocence. Thus, according to Mr.
Mugabe's interview with the BBC on February 8, 1977:

We are not capable of such inhumanity (as the Musami murders). After all, we
are fighting a progressive war which is aimed at mobilizing all the democratic
forces capable of lending support to the Revolution and all along we have been
working very harmoniously with all the church organizations.
A Similar line has been adopted by Radio Maputo, the Zambian "Daily Mail" and other
channels expressing the views of the "frontline" Presidents.
Coupled with these accusations against the Selous Scouts were "authoritative" reports by
leftist journalist David Martin and a deserter from the Rhodesian forces who peddled his
story in London. Quoting nationalist sources, Martin, based in Lusaka (undesirable in
Rhodesia), reported in The Guardian that "there can be no doubt that the Selous Scouts had
been involved in the recent atrocities''.
The deserter claimed that he had in fact overheard members of the Scouts planning and
discussing the atrocities. Adding to the barrage, Botswana claimed at the beginning of May
that Rhodesia had been linked to the killing of two people and the wounding of 80 others
when a Russian-made hand grenade was tossed on to a crowded dance floor in
Francistown. Stating that a Rhodesian colored had been arrested in connection with the
incident at the Mophane Club and condemning the bombing as an "act of sabotage and
barbarism," the office of the Botswana President said seven Black Rhodesians had been
arrested. The statement said the Rhodesians, in refugee camps in Francistown and Selebi-
Pikwe, had admitted being members of the Selous Scouts sent to spy on refugees. They had
entered the country as refugees but when they were questioned by the police they admitted
that they had been sent by the Rhodesian Government to spy on the situation of the refugee
camps for possible attacks. Later reports said the seven Selous Scouts had asked for
political asylum and that they had been allowed to travel to Zambia.
Without positive proof, Mr. Philip Steenkamp, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the
President, said he believed the explosion was connected with Rhodesia's crack anti-
guerrilla Selous Scouts unit. The seven "defectors" will no doubt be paraded in front of the
world press to add further evidence to mounting Selous Scouts dossiers. Fact or fiction, the
lie is gaining impetus and the impact is bound to be the same. Reading into Marxist
intentions, the Selous Scouts will be hounded ruthlessly to single them out as the best
''horror cast" in the business. The eventual aim of course, is to discredit them in the eyes of
both White and Black Rhodesians with the ultimate hope of sapping them psychologically
and creating a public outcry against their "murderous'' ventures. For it is common
knowledge that the Rhodesian security forces cannot pursue the war successfully without
the unique qualities of the hand-picked Selous Scouts.
In purely military terms the terrorists cannot improve their position and the Selous Scouts
have proved to be their enemies in more ways than one.
Understandably bitter about the terror accusation against its crack unit and lest it should be
accused of attempting to conceal the ''awful truth", the Rhodesian Government recently
reacted by lifting, for the first time, the cloak of secrecy which has surrounded the Scouts
since its inception as a tracking combat unit in October 1974. A small group of
international newsmen were allowed access to their training base where, for the Scouts, it
all begins. Here journalists understood the terrorists' dilemma when they were told that by
March 1977 conservative estimates were that the Selous Scouts had accounted for 1,205
terrorist kills, losing a mere ten of their own men. By any means a remarkable record.
The advanced training base is about an hour's drive
from Kariba, or a 30-minute boat trip on the edge of
the famous man-made lake. It consists of a collection
of grass roofed huts which, at first glance resemble a
prisoner-of war camp like those used by the Japanese
in World War 11. The camp, known as the Wafa
Wafa, takes its name from the Shona words Wafa
Wasara which loosely translated means Those who
die, die - those who stay behind, stay behind.
It is an appropriate motto - because the grueling selection course here "kills off" more
recruits than those who survive to finish successfully. That any of the recruits survive the
training period at all seems a minor miracle, but they do and subsequently become the
Rhodesian answer to terrorist infiltration. Principally they are taught to kill and survive
and, in training, are pushed to their physical limits. Rations are cut to one sixth of that
given to a man on normal active service.
It is therefore appropriate to describe the grassy encampment as the selection and tracker-
training headquarters of one of the most specialized and toughest fighting forces ever seen.
Among the many tests they undergo is one where they are dropped in the bush with a gun,
20 rounds of ammunition, a match and material to strike it, and an egg. Lions, buffalo and
elephant abound and the object is to have the egg hard-boiled and ready for inspection the
following morning.
The Scouts' operational record was sketched briefly by a Rhodesian Journalist:

Shrouded in secrecy with a mystique that spawns a thousand stories, many true
and most mere rumor, the Scouts have in only two years become the most-
decorated outfit in the Rhodesian security forces collecting along the way
amongst many other awards - six Silver Crosses (the highest award for
gallantry yet presented); 11 Bronze Crosses; six orders for Members of the
Legion of Merit for acts of bravery, seldom reported, but which have all
played a major part in fighting the country's terror war.
The Selous Scouts is fully-integrated, with an undisclosed number of soldiers - but the ratio
is eight Blacks to two White troops.
The initial selection procedures last for about 18 days and are probably the most rigorous
in the world. Every man who goes to the camp is a volunteer - and many are highly
experienced, battle-hardened soldiers who find that after a few days they simply cannot
stand the strain. Small wonder that following the most recent selection course, only 14 out
of 126 volunteers made the grade.
The officer commanding the Selous Scouts, and the driving force behind it, is Major Ron
Reid-Daly, a 47 year old regular soldier who was once regimental sergeant- major of the
Rhodesian Light Infantry, known as "The Incredibles." He learned his job with the British
Special Air Service in Malaya after leaving his native Salisbury in 1950 to go to England,
and he served with the SAS during the Communist terror war there in the early 1950's.
The prison camp analogy does not elude Reid-Daly.

I reckon in most armies today I simply wouldn't be allowed to put these poor
bastards through the kind of selection course we give them. They'd think I was
trying to kill the men who volunteer to join us. I agree, there is something of
the prison camp attitude towards our men under selection and training. We take
them to the very threshold of tolerance mentally - and it's here that most of
them crack. You can take almost any fit man and train him to a high standard
of physical ability. But you can't give a man what he hasn't already got inside
him.
Under selection each man is reduced to below a threshold which the average human being
could not endure. He is virtually "dehumanized", forced to live off rats, snakes, baboon
meat and eyes, to survive in hostile surroundings which prove that nature, too, can be as
deadly as any human enemy. And they are taught to live off nature, to drink from the water
in the carcass of a dead animal - a yellowish liquid - and to eat maggot-ridden green meat
which can be cooked only once before becoming deadly poisonous.
Students are not given rations except for water. They are expected to survive off the land,
making their own fires without matches, and making and using bark string - "gusi tambo" -
to help catch food for themselves. They are soon hungry enough to capture any small
creatures they can find - grasshoppers, lizards and squirrels - to stave off the hunger. "And
you do get hungry." said one student who had recently been on the survival course. "We
caught and killed a small leguaan, and before we even had time to skin it, one of the men
was ready to take a bite out of it".
The Selous Scouts have for the first time admitted that they have been used on hot pursuit
raids into Mozambique including the highly spectacular and tactically successful raid on the
Nyadzonya terrorist training camp last August in which over 300, and possibly more than
500, terrorists were killed.
For those who come through the selection course there follows a posting to one of the
small sections on operations, after a short tracking course, initially as a flank tracker. They
work in remote parts of Rhodesia hunting down terrorist spoor and leading the infantry in
for the kill if the invading group is too big for the small two or three man teams to handle
on their own. Each member of the Selous Scouts, down to the lowest ranking White
soldier, speaks at least one African language - necessary for communication with their
Black comrades-in-arms with whom they work in the closest possible context as equals.
Tracking survival and close-combat tactics are high on the list of the Scouts' training
priorities. From what newsmen saw at Wafa Wafa camp it takes a very special kind of man
to qualify for service in what has become Rhodesia's elite and much-envied military unit.
Yet Major Reid-Daly detests the word elite:

We do not consider ourselves an elite group of men, nor do we think we are of
the highest caliber. It could cause the men to imagine themselves better than
they really are and this could in turn lead to recklessness. We are simply just
trackers out to do a job.
About training procedures, Major Reid-Daly, as tough as they come, explained:

We take a chap right down when he first comes here, right to the bottom. And
then we build him up again into what we need in the Selous Scouts. Some
people might say it's a dehumanizing process, and maybe it is. But as far as I'm
concerned, that's the way it has to be if we have to keep this unit up to
standard. I have heard of all sorts of so-called crack outfits becoming nothing
more than shadows of what they were because of a lowering of standards to
increase the numbers of men going through into combat. And I'm determined
not to let that happen here.
You see these men sometimes in town, with their chocolate-brown berets and green belts
with an osprey badge. The osprey is a bird of prey, a fish eater, not common, but found in
small numbers in many parts of the world where there are large stretches of water. The
badge - previously the unofficial badge of Rhodesia's tracking men - was drawn up in
commemoration of Andre Rabie, the first regular instructor of tracking. He was killed on
active service in 1973.
Most of the men who are involved in this anti-terror outfit regard Andre Rabie as having
being the inspiration behind the Selous Scouts.
The Selous Scouts have one of the best stocked aviaries in Rhodesia. They have also added
a snake park. Not as frivolous as it sounds. The emphasis is on bush survival and in order
to survive for many days at a time if necessary, the men must be able to recognize and
make use of whatever vegetation, birds, animals and insects the bush has to offer. They
must also learn to understand and turn to advantage what they see. An instructor said:

Everything is of some use to you in the field. The more you get familiar with
it, the better your chance of survival. The ignorant person bumbles into trouble
wherever he goes. Certain birds give your presence away. Butterflies, which
some people see as nothing but pretty little insects, are a potent indication of
water in the winter months. We aim to make our students at home in the
environment in which they work. Vegetation not only provides them with food
in times of need. It plays one of the basic roles in tracking. And certain trees
are used medically. The marula gives the best anti-histamine you can find.
Many of the men are trained parachutists to enable them to reach an area quickly when
their tracking skills are required.
Their stories of survival in the bush are manifold - like the youngster from Salisbury who
spent 18 days in the bush trying to evade a terrorist gang who were hot after his trail. As
the Scout put it, "a spot of bother when something didn't work out quite right".
He had no rations, no water and a limited supply of ammunition. But his fieldcraft and
survival training at Wafa Wafa helped him win through.
These are the men the terrorists want out of the way, men who are justifiably proud of their
official motto - Pamwe Chete, Together Only.
Editor: The breakdown and build-up training technique used for the training of the Selous
Scouts appears to be very similar to that used by the Portuguese for the training of their
Commandos.

***NOTE*** Source of this article was obtained from the magazine ARMED FORCES, May 1977,Rhodesia's Selous Scouts by Chris Vermaak.

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THE SELOUS SCOUTS
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THE SELOUS SCOUTS
By F. A. Godfrey
The Selous Scouts was a unit of some 1000 men and formed part of the Rhodesian Special Forces which
included the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) and Greys Scouts (a horse-mounted infantry patrol unit of
approximately 200 men). The unit took its name from Frederick Selous, a white hunter and explorer, a friend of
Cecil Rhodes who was involved in much of the exploration and pacification of the territory which became
Rhodesia. Selous remains to this day something of a heroic figure among whites in southern Africa.
The Scouts were formed soon after the black nationalist guerrilla forces began
launching increasingly effective raids into Rhodesian territory from the
sanctuary of neighboring Zambia and Mozambique in the 1970s. The force was
recruited from all races in Rhodesia but as time passed more and more black
soldiers were brought into the organization because of the specialized nature of
the tasks it had to perform.
Colonel Reid-Daly, who had served with the SAS in the Malayan
Emergency, commanded the Selous Scouts and all his officers were white.
Initially, most were Rhodesians but one or two American and British officers
joined the unit bringing with them experience gained in Vietnam and Northern
Ireland. The unit was based in Inkomo Barracks in Salisbury but there was also
a field training camp located at Wafa Wafa near Kamba.
The training that new recruits received was generally considered to be
particularly rigorous, even by SAS standards, and the methods used achieved a
remarkable degree of realism. Much emphasis was placed on preparing men to
survive in small groups in the arduous physical circumstances in which they
would be required to conduct operations.
While the conventional units of the security forces were well-trained and highly-skilled in bringing the enemy
to battle it became crucial that accurate intelligence should be acquired so that these forces, usually air or
helicopter borne, could be deployed in the right place at the right time. The provision of this intelligence was the
task of the Selous Scouts. As a combat-tracker unit their role was to locate the enemy, ascertain his strengths
and intentions and to pass this information back.
In all counter-insurgency operations a major problem for the security forces centers on the question of how to
move into an area of insurgent activity undetected. Unusual transport movement by road or using aircraft
(especially helicopters) always warns the enemy. Even unusual movements of troops on foot are often detected.
The Selous Scouts were trained to live for extended periods without reliance on any form of transport or the need
for resupply. In their reconnaissance role they operated in very small groups (sticks as they were called) of four
to five men which further enhanced their ability to remain undetected.
Sticks would establish observation posts in known areas of enemy activity and they would remain there,
completely self-contained, for long periods of time always reporting back, by radio, information on guerrilla
movements which would be acted on by the more conventional units of the security forces.
Tracking and disguise
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Many of the officers and men of the Selous Scouts, coming as they did from rural surroundings in Rhodesia,
were past masters in the hunting of wild and game animals. It was a comparatively simple matter for them to
switch to tracking groups of enemy and they achieved a high success rate. It was not unknown for the Scouts to
follow the tracks of an enemy group for anything up to a week, moving only in the morning and evening when
the slanting rays of the sun tended to highlight the minute signs of human movement for which they were
looking.
Another method of gleaning intelligence on the enemys activity used by the Selous Scouts was to dispatch
small groups of men into remote and often hostile areas disguised as guerrillas. They would, in this way, make
contact with village communities and attempt to glean snippets of information on enemy movements, intended
targets and rendezvous. This type of clandestine operation was often carried to its logical conclusion when
careful training enabled sticks of men in the guise of guerrillas actually to penetrate enemy camps and thereby
neutralize a complete enemy group.
Counter-measures
Toward the end of the war in the late 1970s, when the guerrillas had succeeded in winning friends or pressuring
unwilling supporters in the villages to provide them with information on security force movements, life for the
Selous Scouts became more and more difficult. Villagers would, themselves, patrol the country around their
homes in an attempt to locate the whereabouts of the security forces. These guerrilla helpers were known as
majubis and many were young boys who would in any case normally be out on the hills tending the herds of
cattle. If in their wandering they discovered an observation post they would deliberately move their herd right
onto the Scouts position and thereby pinpoint the exact location of the security force patrol. These helpers also
gave false information to the patrols in order to conceal the intentions of the guerrilla forces.
Another ploy by the guerrillas designed to fox the Scouts was to change their
clothing whilst out on patrol. A group of guerrillas might be seen to enter a
village carrying weapons and wearing uniforms. By concealing their arms and
exchanging their camouflaged shirts for white or red ones they became
extremely difficult to identify from a distant observation post. On occasion
guerrillas were known to begin an operation wearing several layers of different
colored clothing.
Because of the inevitable secrecy which shrouded their activities the Selous
Scouts became the object of much curiosity during the war. Their enemies
depicted them as a gang of bandits and ruffians while their supporters were
prone to see them as a group of experts providing the eyes and ears of the main
body of the security forces.
(END)
***NOTE*** Source for this article was obtained from the book: WAR IN PEACE: CONVENTIONAL AND GUERRILLA WARFARE SINCE
1945. printed 1982, author Major F. A. Godfrey MC.

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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE SELOUS SCOUTS
By Leroy Thompson
To understand the Selous Scouts methods, one must first understand the Selous Scouts
mission. The Scouts evolved to varying extents from the Tracker Combat Unit of the
Rhodesian Army, the CIO (Central Intelligence Organization), and the Special Branch of
the BSAP (British South Africa Police). When Major Ron Reid Daly was given the
mission of forming the Scouts, Rhodesias borders were becoming less and less secure, as
ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists infiltrated in greater and greater numbers. Though the cover
mission for the Selous Scouts remained the tracking of terrorists, in reality the unit was a
pseudo-terrorist unit, using turned terrorists and Black soldiers from the Rhodesian African
Rifles, as well as White soldiers in black face make-up from the Rhodesian SAS,
Rhodesian Light Infantry and other units. These pseudo groups would infiltrate terrorist
areas of operation, passing themselves off as terrorists and attempting to subvert the
terrorist infrastructure.
In many ways, the Selous Scouts learned
from US counter- insurgency successes in
Vietnam, drawing on the examples of the
Phoenix Program, the Kit Carson Scouts and
the Road Runner Teams. Even more did
they resemble the successful pseudo teams
which had been active earlier in Kenya.
Constantly adding turned terrorists, the
Scouts kept abreast of current terrorist
terminology, identification procedures, and
operations; often they were better informed
about terrorist procedures than the terrorists
themselves.
As the Selous Scouts evolved, they
undertook other missions such as cross-
border raids, assassinations, snatches, raids
on terrorist HQs in Botswana or elsewhere,
long-range reconnaissance, and various
other types of special operations. One early
raid typical of this kind of Scouts mission
was the snatch of a key ZIPRA official from
Francistown, Botswana, in March 1974.
These direct action operations resembled in
many ways the MAC V/SOG operations in
Vietnam. The number of Vietnam veterans
in the Rhodesian security forces, in fact, had
a substantial influence on the conduct of the war and on slang that was used. Terrorists, for
example, were often called gooks.
The Scouts lured terrorists into ambushes, from which few terrorists normally walked
away; captured terrorists and then turned them to serve in one of the Scout pseudo groups;
or turned them over to the BSAP for interrogation. The Scouts were very successful in
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gathering intelligence, at least in part from captured diaries and letters. This is an important
element of counterinsurgency operations. Due to the fragmented nature of their operations,
guerrillas rarely have ready access to communications equipment. As a result, they may
rely on written communication, leaving much open to capture. Few guerrillas are
sophisticated enough to use ciphers, either, so often captured communications are in the
clear. Many politically inspired guerrillas are actually encouraged to keep diaries
documenting their political development, and these also frequently include valuable
intelligence information. Third World insurgents are generally much less security conscious
than organized military forces about documents; hence, captured written material can be an
excellent intelligence source, especially for order of battle data.
The Selous Scouts training and operational doctrine inculcated audacity. At various
times, for example, White Selous Scouts posed as the prisoners of Black Selous Scout
terrorists, and were escorted into terrorist strongholds, where White prisoners were highly
prized. At the appropriate moment, the Selous Scouts turned their weapons on the terrorists,
wreaking havoc from within. The classic example of audacity was the Selous Scouts raid
on the large ZANLA terrorist camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe in August 1976. Using Unimogs
and Ferrets painted in FRELIMO camouflage, eighty-four Selous Scouts penetrated
Mozambique and drove directly into a large terrorist camp. Thousands of terrorists were in
camp preparing for morning formations, when the Scouts opened up with 20mm cannons,
.50 MGs, 12.7mm MGs, 7.62mm MGs and rifles. Estimates of the number of terrorists
killed run as high as 1,000, all for five slightly wounded Selous Scouts. As the Scouts
retreated to Rhodesia they blew up the Pungwe Bridge behind them, frustrating pursuit.
Audacity does not, of course, mean foolhardiness, but the importance of audacious small
unit offensives has been proved again and again in counterinsurgency operations by the
SAS in Malaya, Borneo and Oman; by Special Forces in Vietnam; and by Selous Scouts in
Rhodesia. Reportedly, some of the Soviets best successes against Afghan guerrillas were
achieved by small Spetsnaz units carrying out similar operations. Because guerrillas tend to
think of themselves as the aggressors who take the war to the capitalist fat cats, they are
often themselves extremely complacent in their safe areas. By showing the terrorists that
they were never safe from the Skuzapo (as the terrorists called the Selous Scouts) the
Scouts had a psychologically debilitating effect quite out of proportion to their numbers. It
was not uncommon, for example, for two groups of terrorists to begin shooting at each
other out of fear that the other group was the Selous Scouts.
Various lessons can be learned from this aspect of Selous Scouts operations. First,
calculated audacity will often allow a small counter-insurgency force to inflict casualties
quite out of proportion to the numbers of men involved. Secondly, terrorists, who rely
heavily on fear as a weapon, can themselves be rendered psychologically impotent through
fear when they become the prey of an enemy who appears, hits hard, and then vanishes;
who, in effect, turns their own weapons against them.
Selous Scouts relied heavily on unconventional selection
and training procedures. Unconventional, but they worked
and turned out some of the finest counter-insurgency
warriors of all time. Selous Scouts couldnt count on ready
resupply, for example, so early on the fledgling Selous Scout
had to learn to take his food how and when it came. During
initial selection the Selous Scout was given one ration pack,
but not told what to do with it. As the next days passed, that
transpired to be the only food that would be provided. Some
Scouts foraged around the training area to supplement that
initial ration. Before long, an instructor shot a monkey and
hung it in the middle of camp, where during the next few
days of training it became riper and riper, its smell soon
pervading the camp. Finally, after days of rigorous training
the now ravenous trainee Selous Scouts were treated to the
sight of the maggot-infested carcass being cooked to provide their first meal in days. Most
managed to get it down, in the process learning that if one is hungry enough, protein can be
provided from tainted meat, or even maggots. They also learned that even tainted meat is
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edible if thoroughly boiled, though it should not be reheated a second time. The obvious
lesson here is that those being trained to survive under harsh conditions must be trained
harshly.
Selous Scouts weapons training was intense and practical. Because they operated as
terrorists, the Scouts were normally armed with Eastern Bloc weapons. The AK-47, RPD
light machine gun and SVD snipers rifle were all widely used. Since the Scouts often
concealed pistols about their persons, a substantial amount of handgun training was
included. CZ75s and Beretta 951s were popular, as were Makarovs due to their Warsaw
Pact origins.
Among the very practical training techniques used to make the Scouts proficient with
their weapons was an extremely effective counter-ambush drill. Scouts were trained, when
under fire from ambush, immediately to direct short bursts of fire at all likely places of
concealment for ambushers within their arc of fire. The effectiveness of this maneuver
could only be appreciated after seeing a well-drilled stick of Selous Scouts quickly sterilize
360 degrees of an ambush site. Fire discipline was important in this drill, but the Scouts
had it. One Selous Scouts training officer also developed the technique of using mannequin
targets dressed in terrorist attire and for no shoots- security forces uniforms. These
mannequins incorporated a system of balloons (for head and torso), arranged so that a
critical hit would cause the target to fall, while a non-critical hit had to be followed up to
drop the target. The lesson to be remembered here is that military personnel likely to use
their weapons in quick reaction ambush/anti-ambush situations must be trained to shoot in
such circumstances. Obvious? Not to high-ranking officers in a lot of armies.
Many Selous Scouts operations were actually what might be called sting operations.
The use of European Selous Scouts kidnapped by Black Selous Scouts terrorists to
infiltrate terrorist camps has already been mentioned. The Scouts carried out other classic
stings, such as snatching high-ranking ZIPRA officers in Botswana by posing as Botswana
Defense Force soldiers there to arrest them. To be accepted by terrorist groups the Scouts
often staged fake attacks on farms, or fake hits on Special Branch informers to establish
their credentials. So convincing were they that some Selous Scouts pseudo groups became
legendary among the terrorists for their ferocity against Rhodesia. On the individual level,
Selous Scouts were not above running cons such as convincing a terrorist that a command-
detonated claymore mine was a radio, and sending him into a nest of terrorists to radio a
message. Only pieces got through! Some of the really classic Selous Scouts cons must
remain shrouded in secrecy, but even after Robert Mugabe assumed power and after the
Selous Scouts were supposedly disbanded, a secret Scouts base continued to operate, from
which much equipment and many weapons were evacuated to South Africa. Once again,
the lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts sting operations is that sometimes audacity
is both more deadly to the enemy, and safer for the operators, than caution in
unconventional warfare.
Under Chris Shollenberg, a former Rhodesian SAS officer, a reconnaissance troop was
formed as part of the Selous Scouts. This recon unit proved what has been the case in
virtually every war in history: small, highly-skilled recon units are among the most
efficient and cost-effective intelligence tools in existence. After lying hidden near large
terrorist camps for days, the Selous Scouts recon troops operated ahead of Selous Scouts
raiding columns, or called in air strikes. The lesson here is simple: no matter how effective
electronic intelligence devices become, LRRPs remain an extremely important element in
modern warfare, especially counter-insurgency warfare.
Another important element of the Selous Scouts experience which is less obvious is the
necessity for a degree of egalitarianism in small elite units. Despite the underlying racism
of Rhodesia at that time, the Scouts were a racially mixed unit, each member of which had
to rely on the others, and were aggressively non-racist. Black Scouts were naturally aware
of their differences in color and culture, as were White Scouts, but neither was treated as
superior or inferior. Because of the nature of Scouts operations, all members of the units
had to trust each other implicitly, especially when the added element of turned terrorists
amongst the Scouts was added. Therefore there could be no hints of racism within the
Scouts. Anyone displaying such an attitude did not become or did not stay a Selous Scout.
One method of achieving the closeness and egalitarianism necessary for the Selous
Scouts to function was requiring every aspirant Scout to learn the regimental songs during
the final portion of the selection course. Sung a cappella, these functioned in lieu of a
Selous Scouts band, but also, since the songs were traditional African songs often terrorist
songs at that, the words altered to fit the Selous Scouts - they formed a bond between Black
and White.
The Selous Scouts system worked. The closeness of the members of the unit -even the
tamed terrorists was tested many times but rarely found wanting. In April 1975 a turned
terrorist betrayed a pseudo group, resulting in the deaths of seven of them. This event is
most noteworthy because it was so unusual. The closeness of the Selous Scouts continued
even after the end of the war, when the White Scouts realized the danger their Black
comrades in arms would face in Zimbabwe. When the White Selous Scouts went to South
Africa they took many of the Black Scouts and their families along with them, and fought
to have them incorporated into No. 5 Recce Commando by their sides.
The lesson to be learned here is one that successful special operations units find obvious,
but conventional military commanders can never grasp. Small, close-knit elite units
function best when run in an egalitarian manner. David Stirling made this a precept of the
SAS when he formed it, and it remains a key element in SAS successes today. There is a
chain of command in good special operations units, but no one works hard at wielding
power. Nevertheless, things get done and done right. Thats why the selection course is so
important.
Another important lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts experience can be applied
to police or military covert operations. So successfully did the Selous Scouts pass
themselves off as terrorists that they were frequently in more danger from Rhodesian
security forces than from real terrorists. As a result, when a Selous Scouts pseudo team was
working an area it was frozen and declared off limits to any other security forces
operations. This same lesson can be applied to police undercover operations or military
covert, false flag, sheep dip or deception missions.
Unfortunately, the greatest lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts is that no matter
how competent and effective a military unit is, political considerations can render it
impotent. As Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, the Selous Scouts, though never defeated on the
battlefield, were defeated at the bargaining table. The con men of the Selous Scouts were,
in fact, conned out of existence by the British, the Americans, the UN and Robert Mugabe.
Of course, throughout the history of counter-insurgency warfare, the failure to establish
political goals has rendered military operations ineffective.
(END)
***Source*** This article was obtained from the book: DIRTY WARS- elite forces vs. the guerrillas. By Leroy Thompson. Printed 1988.

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By Peter Stiff
The Selous Scout Regiment had a short operational history, but under the inspired
leadership of Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Ron Reid Daly, its members won a
fearsome reputation as the best bush soldiers on the African continent. The regiment acted
as a combat reconnaissance force; its mission was to infiltrate Rhodesias tribal population
and guerrilla networks, pinpoint rebel groups and relay vital information back to the
conventional forces earmarked to carry out the actual attacks. Scouts were trained to
operate in small under-cover teams capable of working independently in the bush for
weeks on end and to pass themselves off as rebels.
The Scouts were a strictly volunteer
force; only highly motivated men of the
very highest caliber could fulfill the
tasks they had to undertake. A mere 15
per cent of the many that signed up to
join the regiment emerged from the
tough training program with the right to
wear the brown beret of the Selous
Scouts. Reid Daly knew the men he
wanted:
a special force soldier has to be
a certain very special type of man.
In his profile it is necessary to
look for intelligence, fortitude and
guts potential, loyalty, dedication,
a deep sense of professionalism, maturity the ideal age being 24 to 32 years
responsibility and self discipline.
Each man had to be a loner, capable of living alone in the bush, but also able to work as
part of a team. It was essential that basic training weeded out the weak and singled out the
finest, most suitable recruits.
Selection for the Scouts was rigorous and even tougher than the SAS course. As soon as
volunteers arrived at Wafa Wafa, the Scouts training camp on the shores of Lake Kariba,
they were given a taste of the hardships they would have to endure. On reaching the base,
tired and soaked in sweat - the trainers had ordered them to run the final 25kms they saw
no cozy barracks, no welcoming mess tent, but only a few straw huts and the blackened
embers of a dying fire. There was no food issued. From this point instructors set out to
exhaust, starve and antagonize the recruits. They usually proved so successful that 40 or 50
men out of the original 60 regularly dropped out in the first two days.
Seventeen days of pure hell was the basic course. Every morning, from first light until
0700 hours recruits were put through a strength-sapping fitness program and barely had
time to take a rest before having their basic combat skills sharpened. The day ended with
the men having to run a particularly nasty assault course designed to overcome their fear of
heights; and then, as soon as darkness fell, night training began.
No rations were issued for the first five days at the camp and recruits had to live off the
"PAMWE
SCOUTING FOR DANGER
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
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WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
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PSEUDO-
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OPERATIONS
COMBAT
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TACTICAL
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AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
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MANUAL
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RESOURCES
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land. On the third day a dead baboon would be hung up and left to rot in the blazing sun.
Two days later it was cut down, gutted and (maggots and all) cooked. Reid Daly explained
why:
Few people are aware that rotten meat is edible if thoroughly boiled -
although if reheated a deadly botulism could kill you. Scouts on a
reconnaissance mission, where supply might not always be possible, could
survive on a rotting carcass, but they had to be made aware of this by practical
experience, otherwise they would never have eaten it.
The last three days of basic training were given over to an endurance march. Each man
had to carry, apart from his weapons and a few rations (125g of meat and 250g of mealie
meal), a pack loaded with 30kgs of rock over a distance of 100kms, The rocks were
painted green, so they could not be discarded during the march and replaced with others
nearer the finish. To make doubly sure of their stamina, the final l2kms was a speed test.
This section had to be covered in two-and-a-half hours it meant the men had to push
themselves all the way.
The few men who finished the first stages of training were, after a weeks rest, taken to
a special camp to undergo the dark phase. If the Scouts were to be effective it was
recognized that they would need to look, act and talk like real guerrillas. The base was built
and set out as a rebel camp and instructors were on hand to turn recruits into fully-fledged
members of the enemy.
Pseudo-groups Rhodesian troops posing as
rebels were the main active units of the Selous
Scouts. In the dark phase, they were taught to break
with habits like shaving, rising at regular times,
smoking and drinking, and to adopt a guerrilla lifestyle.
Everything from the ritual slaughter of a goat (by
partially slitting its throat before strangulation), to
walking through the bush in single file, was taught.
Vital information on the operational methods of rebel
units in the field (such as their preference for arranging
meetings by letter), uniforms, weapons and equipment
were gathered from killed or captured guerrillas.

Although black soldiers of the Scouts were the
spearhead of any pseudo-group, and had most direct
contact with the enemy, white officers tried to pass
themselves off as black at least at a distance. Blacking-up, using burnt cork or theatrical
make-up, wearing a large floppy hat and growing a beard, were all devices that helped to
hide the more obvious European features. The recruits who survived the training program
had little time for self-congratulation The Rhodesian security forces needed every man
they could muster to combat the growing menace of the nationalist guerrillas and hastily
formed units known as sticks, consisting of one or two white officers and up to 30 black
soldiers, were dispatched into the bush to seek out the enemy.
In such delicate operations it was essential that the rebels did not know of the Scouts
presence. Unusual movement by road, or air would give the game away, and so Scouts
were dropped by covered lorry or helicopter, at night well outside a suspect area, and,
making full use of their bush skills, moved in on foot. Once in position, a camouflaged
observation post would be established on a convenient hill with a good all-round view. It
was at this stage that the Scouts bush skills came into their own. For the men on the ground
there would be no resupply for many weeks; they had to find food, live undetected, track
and make contact with the enemy without revealing their real identity.
The Scouts used information gathered by attached police Special Branch units to make
contact with the guerrillas. While the white officers stayed at the observation post,
emerging only at night to hear reports, give orders and relay any valuable information back
to base, black Scouts would move into a village disguised as rebels and try to meet the
local contact-man. Contact-men gave the guerrillas food, shelter and information. It was
SCOUTING FOR DANGER
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often an easy matter to find the right man; the Scouts always had good intelligence on the
enemy and several of them were turned terrorists former rebels who had been
captured, made an offer they could not refuse and sensibly decided to join the regiment
who had first-hand knowledge.
The usual drill was for the Scout group to be accepted by the contact-man and, once
they were, to arrange meetings with other local guerrilla groups at a particular time and
place. It was not always that easy, as many contacts were suspicious of their unannounced
guests and the Scouts had to go to extreme lengths to prove their loyalty to the rebel cause.
On one occasion the Scouts staged a mock night attack on a white farmhouse to convince
both the security forces, and the rebels they had contact with, that they were guerrillas.
Indeed, they went to the extent of covering the area with blood and dead bodies were
provided by play-acting Scouts whose corpses, poking out from beneath a blood-stained
sheet, convinced everybody of the ferocity of the battle. On another occasion, a white
officer pretended to be a prisoner of his black soldiers and endured several beatings to
convince the rebel troops of his mens commitment to the nationalist cause.
Meetings were often set up, via the contact-men, with local rebels, meetings which were
the opportunity to strike at a band that had infiltrated Rhodesia, but the Scouts themselves
never attacked guerrillas if they could help it. Their firepower and combat skills with
captured equipment were more than a match for that of the enemy, but all their hard work
in getting themselves accepted in a particular area would have been wasted if they took a
hand in any action to destroy a guerrilla force. Reid Daly decided that the killing had to be
done by helicopter-borne units of the regular army. Fireforces, consisting of a helicopter
gunship, three troop-carrying helicopters and a paratrooper Dakota, kept the appointments
set up by the contact-men. They would arrive suddenly and wipe out the enemy.
Many of the officers and men of the regiment came from the rural areas of Rhodesia
and were past masters at tracking, but it was not always an easy matter to switch from
hunting wild animals to stalking the far more dangerous terrorist groups. On cross-border
reconnaissance, Scouts tracked guerrilla units for anything up to a week, searching for
signs of guerrilla activity, especially in the morning or early evening when the suns
slanting rays highlighted even the slightest sign of movement. They paid particular
attention to any evidence of disturbed vegetation and kept a careful watch for the sole
prints of the enemies shoes in the dust.
Any game that was caught or found dead, and plants or roots Scouts had been taught
to distinguish the edible from the poisonous . provided food. Scouts were forbidden to
shoot animals as too much noise in the bush might give their position away. Fires, if lit at
all, were made from bone-dry kindling that did not give off smoke, At night Scouts dug a
300mm-deep pit in the ground to hide the fire even the tiny flickering of a dying ember
can be spotted at up to 800m in the dark, and this could have the most disastrous
consequences By making full use of Reid Dalys ideas the Scouts managed to maintain
their cover and severely damage the African nationalists war effort in Rhodesia. It soon
became clear, however, that bases in neighboring African countries such as Mozambique
and Botswana still posed a major threat to state security. Small units of Selous Scouts,
working in conjunction with elements of the regular army, were ordered to carry out a
series of cross-border raids. Columns of armored cars, troop carriers and buses penetrated
deep into enemy territory.
The most famous raid, carried out with the Scouts
usual skill and daring, was on the rebel base of
Pungwe/Nyadzonyain Mozambique. In August 1976,
72 Scouts, in 10 Unimog trucks and three Ferret
armored cars, attacked over 5000 guerrillas. They
calmly drove into the camp where they were
welcomed by the enemy. Suddenly the rebels realized
their mistake and all hell broke loose. The Scouts
SCOUTING FOR DANGER
opened up with everything they had, and by the end of
the battle some 1200 rebels had been killed, while
only five Scouts were wounded. Many other raids of
this type were carried out before the regiment was
disbanded in 1980.
Reid Dalys unorthodox approach to counter-
insurgency operations made him extremely unpopular
with officers of the regular Rhodesian forces. Several
high-ranking officers believed that the Scouts were
more trouble than they were worth and had, on
occasion, endangered the lives of members of the army. Worse was to follow, on 29
January 1979, all Selous Scout operations were cancelled after a bugging device had been
found in Reid Dalys office. Two days later he launched a personal and public attack on
the army commander, Lieutenant General John Hickman, that resulted in a court-martial.
Although Reid Daly was given only a minor reprimand, he resigned his command.
In their short history the Scouts inflicted great losses on the enemy yet, because of the
inevitable secrecy that surrounded their operations. few Rhodesians knew of their existence:
It was not until the end of the war, when Combined Operations, Rhodesia, issued a
statement that credited the Scouts with responsibility for 68 percent of all rebels killed, that
the scale of their success was publicized. In less than seven years of almost continuous
combat the Selous Scouts lost only 36 men killed in action, but had accounted for several
thousand guerrillas.

THE AUTHOR Peter Stiff was an officer in the Rhodesian Police Force for 20 years, and
has written a number of authoritative books on the Rhodesian War. Two best-sellers,
Selous Scouts Top Secret War and Selous ScoutsA Pictorial Account, are published by
Galago Publishing (Pty) Ltd, P0 Box 404, Alberton 1450, Republic of South Africa.

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WAR IN THE BUSH
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WAR IN THE BUSH
The fighting in Rhodesia arose from black demands for majority rules in a colony
governed buy whites.
by F. A. Godfrey
The genesis of the conflict in Rhodesia may perhaps be traced back to the decision by the British government to
grant responsible government to the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia in 1923. Although legally they could only
govern their own affairs, in practice they were frequently left, as the people on the spot, to interpret and put into
effect laws applicable to the whole population.
In 1923 there were some 35,000 whites and 900,000 blacks living in Southern Rhodesia. Inevitably there grew up a
bitterness on the part of the few educated blacks when they saw, for example, the results of the 1931 Land
Apportionment Act which allocated 28 million acres to 1 million blacks and 48 million acres to 50,000 whites. In
1953 the colonies of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were linked together in what came to
be known as the Central African Federation. From the beginning the white settler government of Southern
Rhodesia dominated the federation politically and economically.
Nkomo and the ANC
By 1957 the blacks in Southern Rhodesia had formed their own political organization, the African National Congress
(ANC) which was led by Joshua Nkomo. The ANC attempted to pursue moderate policies so as not to alarm the white
population: they campaigned for an end to racial discrimination and more economic progress for the blacks. Nkomo was
seen by the whites as a moderate and initially participated in the politics of the federation. But despite its policy of
moderation the ANC was banned in 1959. Nkomo was out of the country when this happened but many of the movements
leaders were detained and the government of Southern Rhodesia introduced a series of measures to control the growth of
black nationalist disaffection.
A new nationalist political group was formed in 1960: the National Democratic Party (NDP) led by Joshua Nkomo, the
Reverend Ndabaninge Sithole and Robert Mugabe. Their supporters hoped that the federation would soon collapse and
majority rule would be forced on the Southern Rhodesian government by the British government. At the constitutional
conference of 1961 (to which the NDP was invited) the existing government in Southern Rhodesia was given almost
"PAMWE
WAR IN THE BUSH
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
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RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
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complete authority over the colonys affairs, however.
Attempts to disrupt elections under the new constitution led to the banning of the NDP, and in December 1961 the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) was formed. Nkomo went abroad to seek support from Britain and the United
Nations, leaving the remainder of the leadership in Southern Rhodesia. Under criticism because of his moderate stance, he
hastened back home and began to campaign for the use of violence, as a last resort, to achieve ZAPUs aims. In
September 1962 ZAPU was, in its turn, banned.
The growing militancy of the nationalists led to a strong reaction on the part of the white population. A new political
party of the right the Rhodesian Front (RF) was swept into power in the 1962 election, mandated to resist any sell out
to the black population. Once in power the RF crushed the nationalist movement and established a strong, often harsh,
system of law and order. As a result, when the Central African Federation collapsed in 1964 and out of the ensuing turmoil
Northern Rhodesia became Zambia and Nyasaland became Malawi, both independent, the only really stable regime in the
area was that presided over by the RF in Southern Rhodesia.
In the early 1960s the black nationalist leaders were in disarray: they could not agree on the best policy. Nkomo wanted to
establish a government in exile while the others, fearful of a loss of internal support for their cause, sought to remain in
Southern Rhodesia. In August 1963 Sithole formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a rival party to ZAPU
but with the same broad aims of majority rule. Gang warfare broke out between the two parties and there were clear signs
of a split based on tribal allegiances, a factor which was to continue to plague the nationalists cause and to restrict the
support for the Zimbabweans from other black southern African states.
The Smith regime
Ian Smith became Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1964 and he immediately promoted the idea of
independence on the basis of the existing constitution. The British government, however, was resolute in its determination
to withhold independence without safeguards for the black population. After the breakdown of negotiations Smith
announced a unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965. Discussions between Smith and Harold Wilson in
1966 and 1968 were unsuccessful and Britain, later followed by the UN, imposed economic sanctions on Southern
Rhodesia. Sanctions were, however, never fully effective, largely because South Africa and the Portuguese
government (the latter still in control of Mozambique) were sympathetic to the Smith regime.
After being banned in 1964 both ZAPU and ZANU moved their headquarters to Zambia and began to build up guerrilla
armies. Initial penetrations into Rhodesia by guerrillas failed completely and attempts to infiltrate in co-operation with
South African National Congress guerrillas met with a similar fate. Indeed, the latter made matters worse for the
nationalists as cooperation with South African guerrillas provided the excuse for the Rhodesian government to invite
South African paramilitary police contingents into the country to bolster the Rhodesian security forces.
In the late 1960s ZAPU and ZANU quarreled incessantly; there were further signs of a breakdown within each
organization on tribal grounds, and the Zambian government grew more and more irritated and then anxious about the
ill disciplined, numerous but ineffective armed guerrillas in its country.
Muzorewas moderate line
In 1971, the Smith government accepted the terms of a British proposal to resolve the crisis and it was agreed that the
settlement should be tested by a British Commission in Rhodesia before it was finally approved. The Salisbury
government was confident of a yes vote and was amazed by the support for a no vote whipped up by a new black
political group the African National Council formed in 1971 and led by a then little known figure, Bishop Abel
Muzorewa. The Methodist bishop had until then always contented himself with moderate criticism of government
policies from his pulpit.
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The 1971 settlement attempt failed, largely as a result of Muzorewas efforts and in 1973 there followed a strong upsurge in
guerrilla activity which forced Rhodesia to close the Zambian frontier. This mounting guerrilla campaign marked the
beginning of the real war between black nationalists and the white government. By now, the guerrillas had gained
access to more and better weapons; they were rather better trained and, of greatest importance, were assured of
more sympathy and support from the black population in Rhodesia whose political awareness had been
sharpened, paradoxically, by the success of Muzorewas non-violent methods.
The next development of critical importance was the end, in 1974, of Portuguese rule in Mozambique. The appearance
on the scene of a black government in Mozambique Favorably inclined towards the aspirations of the Zimbabwe
nationalists had a number of effects on the situation, not only in Rhodesia, but in southern Africa generally. South Africa,
now the only neighboring country friendly to Rhodesia, grew more anxious to disengage from obvious support for the
Smith government. Pressure was brought on the white Rhodesian leader to reach a settlement with the nationalists and all
South African police units were withdrawn in 1975.
Reacting to this South African pressure and fearful that the war might intensify, the Rhodesian government attempted to
negotiate with Bishop Muzorewa. The initiative failed but other nationalists were released from detention and,
following an apparently successful attempt to link Muzorewas ANC with ZAPU and ZANU, Smith conducted
negotiations with the complete group. Nothing came of the talks and a proposed ceasefire arrangement collapsed. The
attempt to unify ANC, ZAPU and ZANU was opposed by some black nationalists, notably Robert Mugabe and also the
guerrilla army leaders of both ZAPU and ZANU. As a result the ZANU faction with its army, the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), established itself in the now friendly territory of Mozambique. In 1976 a renewed
campaign of guerrilla activity was initiated from Mozambique and further attempts by the Smith government to negotiate
with Nkomos ZAPU ended in failure.
Smith under pressure
Mozambique closed its frontier with Rhodesia in 1976 and the country was now effectively reduced to relying on
South Africas goodwill in all matters. South Africa, however, was now anxious to end the war in Rhodesia, and
through the mediation of Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa a meeting was arranged between Ian
Smith and Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. At the meeting the pressure was on Smith, now
effectively facing the world alone, and he was forced to announce that he had at last conceded the principle of
majority rule. Kissinger put forward a joint American/British plan to implement their agreements and it was
arranged to hold a conference to which all factions would be invited.
At the conference which followed in Geneva the nationalists proved to be once more in disarray, in spite of an
agreement merging ZAPU and ZANU into a new alliance called the Patriotic Front. They could agree to nothing
except a bitter dislike of Ian Smith and the rejection of the Kissinger proposals unless they were modified. Smith,
himself, refused to enter into discussion of the Kissinger plan which he would only accept as it stood,
unamended. Stalemate was almost instantly reached and the meeting disintegrated.
Now the Rhodesian government rejected further American or British initiatives and decided to go for an
agreement with Bishop Muzorewa on the basis of one man one vote in what came to be known as the internal
settlement. A mixed white and black transitional government came into being on 3 March 1978 and was bitterly
opposed by Nkomo and Mugabe. Nonetheless elections, held in April 1979, led to Bishop Muzorewa becoming
the first black prime minister of what was now called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia on 1 June. The Muzorewa
government was, however, doomed to failure. By seeming, too readily, to adopt the policies advocated by the
whites, the bishop had left himself wide open to criticism from ZAPU and ZANU who gained increasing
popularity among the black population in the country, partly because they were suspicious of the outcome of
Muzorewas tactics and partly because the guerrilla armies were becoming more and more successful.
WAR IN THE BUSH
The Muzorewa government was, however, doomed to failure. By seeming, too readily, to adopt the policies
advocated by the whites, the bishop had left himself wide open to criticism from ZAPU and ZANU who gained
increasing popularity among the black population in the country, partly because they were suspicious of the
outcome of Muzorewas tactics and partly because the guerrilla armies were becoming more and more
successful.
Zimbabwe is born
Throughout 1977 to 1979the guerrilla attacks, especially out of Mozambique, increased in intensity. Despite
extremely effective, if on occasion over ruthless retaliatory attacks by Rhodesian security forces into
Mozambique, Zambia and even Angola, there was no doubt that the government was finding it increasingly
difficult to maintain its authority throughout the country. Large tracts of land, especially in the northeast, were
dominated without challenge on a permanent basis by the guerrilla organizations.
Recognizing that the Muzorewa government would be faced with a continuing war that it could not win and that
the surrounding black African states were beginning, for political and economic reasons, to weaken in their
resolve to support ZAPU and ZANU, the British government seized the opportunity to promote the idea of a new
conference to resolve the deteriorating situation. By forthright bargaining and persuasion of all the parties
involved, which included seeking support from the interested black African states, a solution was found.
The plan was one of an extremely delicate nature involving the assembly of the guerrilla armies at rendezvous on
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian territory under the supervision of Commonwealth troops while the existing security forces retained
responsibility for law and order. This daring enterprise worked and elections were held under British supervision which
resulted in a government based on one man one vote being formed in March 1980 under the leadership of Robert
Mugabe, who had won a resounding victory. The following month Rhodesia formally became the independent state of
Zimbabwe.
(END)

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ZAPU AND ZANU
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ZAPU AND ZANU
BY F. A. GODFREY
IN THE EARLY STAGES of the confrontation between black nationalist groups and the government of Rhodesia
(Southern Rhodesia until 1965), the aim of the nationalists was to use what political pressure they could muster, inside
and outside Rhodesia, to influence the government, peacefully, to change its policies. As these methods met with little
success they turned in the early 1960s to the use of violence. The campaign in 196062 was restricted to cases of minor
sabotage, arson and intimidation which could be carried out with the use of explosives, stolen from mining companies,
and home-made petrol bombs.
The decision was taken in mid-1962 to go out in search of foreign sources of support in the provision of arms and training
in their use. From 1963 there was increasing evidence of the nationalists success in the pursuit of these policies. February
1964 saw the first attempt at mounting a guerrilla operation by a group of insurgents which called itself the Crocodile
Commando. A police post was attacked and later a white farmer shot dead. However, the group was successfully broken
up by security forces acting with the benefit of good intelligence. In the period 1964 to 1965,just prior to the unilateral
declaration of independence by the Rhodesian government, training for the members of the nationalists embryonic
guerrilla armies got under way on a proper basis. Arrangements were made for training, carried out by foreign experts, in
some African countries and even further a field. Between March and October 1964, courses were organized for ZAPU
guerrillas in the USSR, the Peoples Republic of China and North Korea. Men from ZANU received training in the same
period in Ghana and Tanzania.
In 1966 and 1967 there were many attacks mounted by armed and uniformed groups crossing into Rhodesia from Zambia,
and although the security forces got early warning of the movements and were quickly able to respond it was accepted
that the guerrillas were by then rather better trained and prepared. Perhaps of even more importance, a perceptible rise in
the guerrillas morale was noticed at this time despite the neutralization of the vast majority of their attempted operations.
In early 1968 a major attempt to infiltrate guerrillas was once again foiled and later, in August, a complete group of 28
well-armed men was destroyed by security forces. Details of the weapons and equipment captured from these men were
publicized and they are extremely interesting in providing an insight into the types of equipment the guerrillas were now
able to obtain directly or indirectly from other countries. The list is a formidable one:
3 light machines guns (RP-46) with 9 magazines
3 RPG-2 anti-tank rocket launchers with 24 projectiles
19 Kalashnikov AK47 rifles
6 Simonov carbines
6 automatic pistols
112 grenades
150 slabs of explosive
40,000 rounds of ammunition (most 7.62mm).
The bulk of the weapons were identified by Rhodesian security forces as being of Soviet manufacture.
The war escalates
"PAMWE
ZAPU AND ZANU
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
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RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
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T.A.L. DOZER
From 1969 onwards the guerrillas conducted operations from sanctuary in Zambia across the Zambesi into Rhodesia in
ever increasing numbers. Groups of anything from 30 to 100 uniformed men, armed with PPSh sub-machine guns,
Simonovs and Kalashnikovs, would make their way into the tribal trust lands and game reserves. A new piece of
equipment the land mine was introduced in the 1970s and at first it caught the security forces napping. The mines were
used to disrupt traffic on roads and tracks most frequently used by the army, police and administration. As operations by
the guerrillas became more sophisticated they would use the mines in conjunction with attacks on government offices,
police posts and isolated farms. By placing the mines on roads and tracks leading to the target it was hoped to take the
reacting security forces by surprise. The army and police quickly responded to this threat and approached with caution
but vital minutes, sufficient to allow the guerrillas to escape, were thereby lost.
After 1974, when Mozambique became independent, the guerrillas were provided with another sanctuary from which to
launch their attacks into Rhodesia. From then onwards the ZANU faction of the nationalists made use of Mozambique
and its guerrilla arm, by then known as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), directed operations
in that area. The forces of ZAPU, now known as the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), continued to train
and launch their operations from Zambian territory.
It was from the mid-1970s that Soviet support, in particular, escalated. It is generally accepted that by 1979 there were
some 1400 Russian, 700 East German and 500 Cuban military instructors working in Mozambique and many were
directly supporting the efforts of the guerrilla forces. In the same way in Angola over 19,000 Cuban soldiers, 6000 East
Germans and a few Czechs and Bulgarians provided, via Zambia, the same sort of service. Arms and equipment were
shipped into southern Africa at this time via the ports of Beira in Mozambique and Luanda in Angola.
Such a strong system inevitably tended to take the initiative from the Rhodesian security forces and give it to the
guerrillas. Despite punitive raids by the Rhodesians into Mozambique, Zambia and even Angola to strike at the base
camps of the guerrillas, by the end of the war Rhodesian resources were stretched almost to the limit. Towards the climax
of hostilities, guerrilla capability was enhanced even further by the acquisition of SAM-7 anti-aircraft guided missile
launchers, medium mortars and a new version of the antitank rocket launcher, the RPG-7.
(END)

GUERRILLAS AND 'REGULARS'
ZAPU AND ZANU
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The above picture depicts;
Joshua N'Komo (far left) as ZIPRA (ZAPU) commander in chief in 1977.
In the center a ZIPRA (ZAPU) 'Regular',1978 circa.
A Chinese trained ZANLA (ZANU) Guerrilla.

GUERRILLA:
RHODESIAN
PATRIOTIC
FRONT
Circa 1979
The Rhodesian patriotic front was born from
the unification of the two nationalist
organizations, the ZANU and ZAPU. Note
the mixed matched uniform and weapon
system (H&K G3), scrounged from the
ZAPU AND ZANU
Rhodesians through battlefield recovery.

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Rhodesian Insurgency
by Professor J.R.T. Wood
The Physical Setting
Zimbabwe (once Rhodesia or, more accurately, Southern Rhodesia) is situated in the
southern limits of Africa's inter-tropical zone, between latitudes 15030'S and 22030'S.
Some 450 miles (725 km) long from north to south and 520 miles (835 km) wide, its area
is 150 300 square miles (389 000 sq.km). It is roughly the size of the state of Montana.
The climate comprises two seasons: hot wet summers (October through to March) and dry
mild winters. In the high altitudes there are a number of frosty nights. The long annual
drought means most rivers dry up and therefore are not used for communication.
Boundaries:
1. North: the frontier with Zambia is bounded by the great Zambezi River and Lake
Kariba. Apart from two bridges, at Victoria Falls and Chirundu, and the dam wall at
Kariba, crossing can only be effected by boat.
2. East: the frontier with Mozambique was originally demarcated by a series of surveyors'
pegs and a low wire fence. Much of this border would later be flanked by a fenced anti-
personnel minefield.
3. South: the frontier with South Africa is bounded by the Limpopo River which, being
mostly dry for much of the year, is easily crossed.
4. West: the semi-arid frontier with Botswana. This was open to easy penetration across
the low wire fence linking the surveyors' pegs.
There are four main topographical areas:
Physical Setting
1. The Eastern Highlands: a narrow belt of mountains and high plateaux (the Nyanga and
Vumba Mountains, the Melsetter Uplands and the Chimanimani Mountains, 6000-8500
feet high) along the eastern border, marking the border with Mozambique and the edge of
Africa's great interior tableland. The rainfall here is the highest and the winters the coldest.
2. The Highveld - at altitudes of 4000-5000 feet (1220-1525 m) - provides the watershed
for the rivers which flow north to the Zambezi River and south to the Limpopo River. It
lies in a long belt of land from south and west of Bulawayo to north and east of Harare. It
is the most productive farming area, particularly in the red soils of the arc north of Harare.
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It is hilly with great sweeps of granite hills. The vegetation is tree savannah - with canopies
spreading up to 200 feet and with six foot high dense grass cover both of which make
observation difficult.
3. The Middleveld flanks the Highveld on both sides - at altitudes of 3000-4000 feet (915-
1220 m) - and is narrow in places and wide in others. For example, north of Bulawayo it
provides an extensive plateau bordering on the Zambezi Bassin. The rain is sparser but
vegetation is tree savannah with thorn trees beginning to predominate.
4. The Lowveld - between 1500-3000 feet and flanking the middleveld - comprises, in the
north, the southern flanks of the Zambezi Valley and, in the south, the northern flanks of
the broad Sabi-Limpopo Valley. The vegetation is dominated by thorny species, responding
to the semi-arid conditions.
The Economy and Society
With a population of approximately three million in 1965, Rhodesia had a mixed economy
as well as a mixed and racially segregated society. The economy was based on tobacco,
maize and cattle farming, the mining of asbestos, gold, coal, chrome, copper, cobalt,
lithium and others and some manufacturing which would expand and diversify to meet the
challenges of sanctions, including supplying the Security Forces with modified vehicles
and some weapons. A major weakness was the need to import motor fuel and ammunition.
This would be exploited by South Africa when it suited her. The economy was
sophisticated enough to sustain merchant banks, a stock exchange and the like. Some 7000
white farmers farmed commercially while most other 270,000 whites lived in the towns.
The African population of 2.5+ million mostly lived in the reserved tribal areas, living off
subsistence farming, with approximately 500,000 living in townships surrounding the white
towns. By 1980 the African population was some 6 million while the white population was
rapidly declining through emigration to some 90,000.
Communications
1. Roads: a legacy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was high standard tar
roads on the main trunk routes. Roads elsewhere were dirt and varied in quality. The road
traffic was vulnerable to attack, including mining, and measures such as mine detection
and armed convoys were implemented.
2. Railways: there was a long-established rail network, serving the countries to the north as
well. This was to be supplemented in the 1970s by a new line from Gwelo to South Africa.
The railways were vulnerable to attack.
3. Air: There was a national airline which was supplemented by flights from South Africa
and Mozambique. In the latter part of the war, the SAM-7 was to pose a problem which
local ingenuity attempted to counter.
4. Telecommunications: there was a modern infrastructure.
Realities of the Rhodesian Insurgency
In combating their insurgency, the Rhodesians acquired a fearsome reputation. The former
NATO commander, Sir Walter Walker, in a letter to The Times of London in January
1978, wrote:

'....there is no doubt that Rhodesia now has the most professional and battle
worthy army in the world today for this particular type of warfare.'
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Walker was not entirely deluded - the Rhodesian security forces were battle-hardened,
resourceful and daring. 40 000 of their opponents died at a cost of 1,735 Rhodesian dead -
a ratio of 23:1. With 1 400 men only in the field on the average day, they could not usually
muster the classic 3:1 ratio in attack. After 1976, the Rhodesian security forces were
seriously out-numbered. Time and again, little more than a reinforced company far from
home would take on defensive positions held by hundreds, sometimes thousands of their
opponents. On Operation Dingo, at Chimoio, Mozambique, in November 1977, 165 SAS
and Rhodesian Light Infantry paratroops jumped into a camp complex holding 9 000-10
000 insurgents of whom 5 000 were killed.
However, Rhodesia as a COIN model is an anachronism, simply because the spectacle of a
quarter of a million white people trying to retain political dominance over 5-6 million is
unlikely to reoccur in the near future in Africa. F.W. de Klerk of South Africa had the wit
to realise that he had to concede power before he was faced with a full-blown insurgency.
There is much to be learnt from the history of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency effort.
But, until a political solution was found in 1978-1979, it was only ever a reactive
containment of a rebellion based in the rural areas. Before 1978 the insurgents of the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the Zimbabwe
African People's Union (ZAPU) of his rival, Joshua Nkomo, held the initiative.
Psychological warfare was impossible until there was a means to win the support of the
people. The Rhodesian political structure was obsolete in the era of decolonisation when
self-determination, beloved of President Woodrow Wilson, had become a creed.
In short, before African majority rule was not only conceded but implemented in 1978-
1979, the counter-insurgency could not be won.
The point made by Robert Taber in The War of Flea is that the counter-revolutionary has to
destroy the promise of the revolution by proving that it is unrealistic. In the Rhodesian
case, that was impossible while the totally out-numbered whites denied the African
majority full rights. The Rhodesians adopted bold tactics, opting for a version of the 'US-
preferred' model of counter-insurgency, rather the 'traditional' approach most often
employed in history. The often brutal methods of the 'traditional model' to dissuade the
rural population from supporting the insurgents were unacceptable to the Rhodesians
because their status as outcasts made them cautious about outraging world opinion. The
'traditional model' was also ruled inappropriate because it implies the liberal use of
resources when the Rhodesians had to conserve their scarce assets (unlike their opponents)
and being surrounded by safe havens for their enemies, meant that the Rhodesians could
not employ static defense. The 'US-preferred model' prescribes political development,
social reform, the use of rural self-defense militias and high mobility forces. It also carries
a high financial price which eventually contributed to the pressure on Rhodesia to secure a
political settlement. The Rhodesians developed 'Fire Force' or the use of helicopters as
gunships and troop transports to envelop insurgent groups vertically and eliminate them.
Fire Force was highly successful but too little attention was paid to avoiding injuring the
rural people or of damaging their property. As will be seen, militias were employed at the
end with some success. Before then, however, there was no one to consolidate after Fire
Force had won ground. The essential economic development to sustain the parallel
improvement in the life of the people flagged and political change was delayed too long.
On the revolutionary side, Herbert Chitepo, the assassinated ZANU leader, adopted the
correct strategy in 1974. He and ZANLA had sufficient external finance, aid, weapons and
young men to train to stretch the government's resources by creating sufficient pressure to
force the security forces to deploy over the whole country. To do this the government
would have to mobilize large numbers of civilians, causing serious problems in industry,
commerce and agriculture and thereby psychologically destroying the morale of the whites.
The spreading of the war after 1976, combined with other factors, did create such
conditions, inducing whites to emigrate and forcing them to recognize political realities.
Yet, we must not be misled for, in 1980, the most vulnerable of whites, the farmers, were
still on the land except in the remoter parts of the eastern border.
The moment came with the election of the Muzorewa Government in April 1979 when
African majority rule was a reality and success in the counter-insurgency became possible.
In the event it was a close run thing, I believe. The Rhodesians, using air power, air
mobility and their hardened troops, came nowhere near defeat. They lost at the conference
table. Their opponents in ZANLA had a mass of ill-trained cadres bent really on
politicizing the masses but had no capacity for positional warfare. Nkomo's Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army based its strategy on a last minute thrust by conventional
forces. That thrust never materialized. Instead, by 1979 its forces in Rhodesia were locked
in a civil war with ZANLA which underlay the insurgency and which Mugabe, with North
Korean aid, brutally crushed after independence in the early 1980s.
The real accomplishment of ZANLA was political. Its campaign ensured that Mugabe
would win the first election. At the Lancaster House settlement conference in London in the
second half of 2979, the commander of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) Josiah Tongogara conceded to Ian Smith and Francis Zindoga (a minister in the
Government of Bishop Muzorewa), that the war was a stalemate. After Tongogara's death
in 1980, his successor, Rex Nhongo, went further. Nhongo was a part of the cease-fire
commission and told a fellow member that ZANLA would have been hard pressed to get
through the next dry season because the Rhodesian forces had cut his lines of
communications and, by taking the war into Mozanbique, had so upset his FRELIMO hosts
that they would abandon him. The Rhodesian Fire Force was killing his leaders and trained
men at a rate than he could replace them while the Rhodesian auxiliary forces were
beginning to supplant his men in their refuges amongst the tribes.
We will return to these issues but first it is necessary to establish the roots of the
insurgency.
The African grievances - the underpinning of the insurgency
The governments supplied the fundamentals of the insurgency by creating African
grievances. The main grievances were threefold:
1. Land. Africans' land was invaded and the rights of the invaders confirmed by conquest.
To European eyes the land in 1890 was virtually empty. To the 200,000 Africans,
unoccupied land was reserved for hunting.
The Company proclaimed tribal reserves - where the Africans lived communally under the
loose control of their chiefs. In the 1923 Constitution the rights to the reserves were made
inalienable.
In 1925 the whites were given rights to purchase 31 million acres outside the reserves and
under the 1931 Land Apportionment Act a further 49 million acres, including the urban
areas. The Act offered the one million Africans 7.4 million acres by contrast. There was no
white land hunger - by 1965, whites had purchased only 32 million acres of the designated
land. Yet they came to see the Land Apportionment Act as their Magna Carta - as the
guarantee of their dominance.
In 1931 the Africans had adequate land but not for long. The African population grew by
45 times in the period 1890-1990 - from 200 000 to 9 million by 1990. By contrast the
white population growth of 500 - 275 000 lagged far behind and relied heavily on
immigration (but a selective immigration policy designed to avoid the 'poor white' problem
experienced by South Africa).
Not only were the reserves too small but the age-old cattle culture and farming methods
exhausted the soil. Attempts by the Government to protect the soil, including destocking,
only fostered resentment. Yet, despite the overcrowding, most Africans remained in the
tribal areas until the 1960s - forcing commercial farming, mining and industry to recruit
foreign labor, mainly from Malawi. The hydro-electric dam at Kariba, for example, was
built with foreign labor in the 1950s.
2. Employment: given their late Iron Age status in 1890 all that the Africans could offer
was unskilled labor. This status was not improved by racial legislation which forbade
African workers joining trade unions and excluded them from skilled employment even
when qualified. Change only came in the Federal era when the economy expanded and
segregation laws were progressively repealed.
3. African education. Like employment, education was segregated and much more was
spent on the few white children than on the many Africans. The whites were given classical
British schooling while the Africans enjoyed primary and trade education. Only after 1945
was secondary schooling available to Africans. Thus Mugabe's generation educated
themselves through correspondence schools and then attended Fort Hare University in
South Africa. In the Federal era, multi-racial university education was provided but
education remained segregated until 1979.
The Roots of UDI: Dominion Status or Federation
Having governed Southern Rhodesia successfully for 25 years, in 1947 the whites believed
that they had earned dominion status. They were blissfully unaware that Britain was bent
on retreating from the Empire and not on acquiring another white-led Dominion. The
Southern Rhodesians had a number of choices. They could join South Africa but this had
been rejected in 1922 and few still advocated it. Further-more, the British Labor
Government was unlikely to sanction it. The alternative was to seek dominion status or to
amalgamate or federate with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the expectation creating
a new British dominion.
Unification with the northern territories had often been advanced by: the Southern
Rhodesians had never been enthusiastic; the Africans of all three territories had been
cautiously suspicious and the British Labor Government had begun in March 1946 to
decolonise.
Thus it is surprising that Clement Attlee's Government responded to demands for unity
from the leader of the unofficial members in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council,
Roy Welensky, and from Southern Rhodesia's prime minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins. Both
aspired to create a great new dominion. Welensky rejected direct British rule while
Huggins hoped to share in the north's copper boom. Welensky and Huggins proposed
amalgamation under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution. This was unpalatable to the
British because: in the post-war world, no British Government could abandon Africans in a
protectorate to local white control; Northern African opinion union with the segregated
south and feared perpetual white hegemony.
Nonetheless, under pressure from Welensky and Huggins, in 1946 the British Government
created the inter-governmental Central Africa Council to coordinate migrant labor, civil
aviation and hydro-electric power. In October 1948 it conceded that a federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland was possible. In late 1951 after three conferences, it made a
formal commitment to federation. The distinguished British historian, Lord Blake, has
described the consequent federation of a self-governing colony and two directly ruled and
administered British protectorates as 'an aberration of history - a curious deviation from the
inevitable course of events, a backward eddy in the river of time.'
Why did Attlee's Government do this when African opinion was so opposed? There are
various answers. It was shocked by the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism in the South
African election of 28 May 1948 and saw the Federation as a liberal counterpoise to
Afrikaner-state. Misreading their political mood, it also feared that the Southern Rhodesian
whites might joint South Africa. After the British spy, Klaus Fuchs, had soured Anglo-
American relations in the nuclear field, Britain needed Southern Rhodesia's chrome,
lithium and other minerals for the production of her own atomic bomb. Lastly, Federation
would be economically viable and relieve Britain of the financial burden of Nyasaland.
The Federation had a fatal flaw. The most crucial area of administration, that of the African
affairs, was left in territorial hands because Britain would not relinquish her role as
protector. This meant that Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans were ultimately
ruled by London and Southern Rhodesian Africans by Salisbury. Divergent policies were
guaranteed. In particular, London did not see federation as interrupting the march of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in step with the Empire towards democratic self-
government based on universal adult suffrage. The African nationalists quickly exploited
this anomaly, demanding immediate change.
The Suez debacle of 1956 sounded the knell of Empire, but the new British Prime Minister,
Harold Macmillan, waited to secure his position in the 'never had it so good' election of
1959, then liquidated the Empire as fast as he could. Territories were rushed to
independence after brief experiences of self-government. In the process, Nyasaland (the
least developed territory of the Federation) was allowed to secede in 1962. Northern
Rhodesia's secession terminated the Federation's short life on 31 December 1963. Because
self-determination was an unquestioned creed in the post-war world, the Rhodesias and
Nyasaland simply swung out of Blake's 'backward eddy' into the mainstream of history.
Southern Rhodesia and Independence -The growth of African Nationalism
The African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia came a poor third to Banda of Nyasaland
and Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia in the effort to break the Federation. It was more
difficult for the southern nationalists to influence Britain because she did not directly
govern Southern Rhodesia. Short of suspending the 1923 Constitution, there was little that
she could do for them. The northern Africans had been the vanguard of African nationalism
from the outset, sponsoring trade unionism and raising the levels of political awareness and
agitation within Southern Rhodesia.
The Southern Rhodesian Africans, better provided for by their government than their
northern brothers, were apathetic after the bloody uprisings of 1896-1897 and a brief
armed rebellion by the Shona chief Mapondera in 1900. Thereafter, they eschewed violence
and political protest until the 1950s, misleading the whites into believing that they were
entirely content with their lot. There were only half-hearted attempts to politicize them
before 1939 including the formation of the African National Congress. After 1945 there
were small successes - a strike in 1945 secured African railway workers an increase in pay
and recognition for their union. The feeble African National Congress was resuscitated by
the Reverend Thomson Samkange in Bulawayo. There was a half-hearted general strike in
1948.
Then in 1951 the Government annoyed the rural majority by the rigorous implementation
of soil conservation measures under the Land Husbandry Act. This reaction at last gave the
African nationalists a chance of influence in the tribal reserves where the majority of the
population lived and where hitherto the tribal chiefs and the Native Department held sway.
The reserves became the battleground of the insurgency.
Copying their Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian counterparts, the Southern Rhodesian
African nationalists in 1956 adopted a new militancy and began the struggle which would
end at Lancaster House in 1979. They sought likely supporters (Joshua Nkomo opened
links with the Soviets as early as 1956). they exploited African outrage at the Land
Husbandry Act and created the militant City Youth League in Salisbury (later the African
National Youth League). Their first success was a bus boycott in Salisbury in September
1956 which led to a night of violence, giving Southern Rhodesia her first taste of civil
commotion in almost sixty years. They merged the Youth League in September 1957 with
the African National Congress to create a national movement with Nkomo as its president.
The re-invigorated ANC challenged the authority of the Southern Rhodesian Government
and threatened the internal peace by encouraging the flouting of the law, intimidation,
boycotts, the extortion of money.
The Liberal Response to African militancy
The first response to the African nationalists produced a cabinet revolt in early 1958 against
the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Garfield Todd. A former missionary, Todd began
well, modifying the common roll in October 1957 to attract more African voters in the
hope of securing African members of parliament for the first time. The Africans ignored
him and the African nationalists wanted only universal suffrage.
Although the policy of multiracial partnership had been adopted, Todd then antagonized
the whites by seeking to remove the Immorality Act, by his association with white liberals
assisting the ANC, by his domineering style of leadership and other factors. His Cabinet
rebelled in early 1958. Their removal of Todd shook African belief in white liberalism.
Todd later threw in his lot with Nkomo and supported ZAPU through the coming struggle.
Todd's replacement, Sir Edgar Whitehead, a fellow reformer, was awkward, deaf, poor-
sighted and unmarried, and also soon alarmed the voters. Sensing that the Federation might
be short-lived, he aspired to see Southern Rhodesia gain virtual self-government as a fully
multi-racial democracy, ready for independence. To this end he combined reform with
security measures to curb African unrest. If his policy looked like the carrot and the stick, it
was un-intentional.
Whitehead removed many segregation practices including employment but he could do
nothing about education - because white education was Federal - and when he threatened to
abolish the Land Apportionment Act and promised to have a majority of Africans in his
cabinet, he was voted out in 1962. His voters lacked his confidence in multi-racialism as
the imperial experiments in Africa around them degenerated. The Belgian Congo collapsed
into bloody chaos. They had little confidence in African rule or politicians as they watched
the violence at home in the African townships where the nationalists strove to build support
by fair means and foul. Whitehead's reform could never satisfy the demand for self-
determination. In any case he did not have the opportunity to complete his program of
reform.
Whitehead did achieve a greater measure of autonomy for Southern Rhodesia in his lengthy
negotiations with the British from 1959 to 1961 but he did not secure the quasi-dominion
status he had promised. (Full dominion status, of course, implied the end of Federation.)
By mid-January 1961 a constitutional formula was accepted by everyone, including
Nkomo, but with the exception of the white opposition Dominion Party. The constitution
contained a mechanism, through two rolls and cross-voting, to ensure a growing African
influence in parliament. This formula was accepted by a referendum of the electorate in
1961. If Nkomo had stuck to his promise he could have been Zimbabwe's first president
and the insurgency might not have happened.
Whitehead's effort to reform generated a coalition of white opposition in 1962. The
Dominion Party and individual members from other parties, including Ian Douglas Smith,
came together to form the Rhodesian Front, led by Winston field. The Rhodesian Front
defeated Whitehead in 1962.
The potential popularity of Whitehead's multiracial ideals reforms also provoked violent
African nationalist opposition. He was forced to respond but his actions only deepened the
Africans' sense of grievance. After banning the ANC in February 1959 through declaring
an emergency, he brought in security powers of preventive detention, banning and the like
without the need to resort to emergency powers. His African opponents simply formed
another party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), in December 1959 and demanded
total emancipation. In mid-1960 the NDP's demands for power provoked violence in
Salisbury and Bulawayo and the arrest of leaders. Whitehead's response was to strengthen
his police force, the British South Africa Police (BSAP) and to establish a large multi-
racial volunteer police reserve. Continuing violence bred increased militancy and the NDP,
by then led by Joshua Nkomo, demanded immediate majority rule.
Violence in October 1960 was serious enough for the police to lose their enviable record of
not having killed anyone in the course of their duties that century. Seven Africans died in
prolonged unrest. Whitehead introduced the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill which
greatly increased police powers and laid down heavy penalties for arson, stoning and
intimidation. The Bill's reception was so universally hostile that the Chief Justice of the
Federation, Sir Robert Tredgold, resigned and proposed to head a national government.
Whitehead modified the Bill but it remained draconian. He also accepted the African
nationalists at his negotiations.
Because Whitehead and the British ignored Nkomo's repudiation of the new constitution in
early 1961, the NDP decided to continue its resistance. More disorder provoked Whitehead
to ban the NDP in December, whereupon, Knomo created the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU) pledged to secure majority rule.
A year later, in December 1962, Whitehead was ousted in the first election under the new
constitution. The sense of outrage engendered by the new laws and promises of
Whitehead's opponents, the Rhodesian Front, to defend the Land Apportionment Act, to
reject African domination and to obtain independence, only convinced the nationalists that
the only path to their goals was through violent revolution. Three months before the
election - in early September - a 'General Chedu' of the Zimbabwe Liberation Army
proclaimed the 'Zimbabwe Revolution' and ordered Africans to join his army. There was an
outbreak of sabotage and arson (including setting fire to the BSA Company's forests near
Melsetter). Whitehead banned ZAPU and declared that it would not be allowed to reappear
in another guise. Nkomo, who was out of the country, set up ZAPU as an external party in
Dares Salaam under the care of the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. There followed
detentions, police raids and the first uncovering of stocks of explosives and weapons,
including sub-machine guns and hand-guns. 1 094 persons were arrested. The war of
liberation, or 'Chimurenga', could be said to have dated from this moment.
The Advent of the Rhodesian Front
The Rhodesian Front's first priority in 1963 was to secure independence, arguing with the
British that the 1961 constitution with minor adjustments could serve as a basis for
independence because it did not bar eventual African domination. It was logical, the Front
argued, that, as the northern territories were moving rapidly to independence, Southern
Rhodesia, being the most experienced in self-government, should do likewise. The British,
however, could not contemplate giving a territory independence on any other basis than
adult suffrage. Yet they kept holding out the hope that something slightly less than majority
rule would suffice but would never give Field precise conditions for independence. The
truth was that they regarded white rule, whatever its value, as an anachronism in the brave
new days of independent Africa and they would not hazard offending the Afro-Asian
members of the Commonwealth and the United Nations by sustaining it. Concentrating on
dismantling the Federation and giving independence to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
the British stalled Field with vague insinuations that Southern Rhodesia would be 'looked
after.' Field's failure to make progress brought Ian Smith to power in April 1964. His
opponents presumed that unilateral action was now intended.
Smith's advent was greeted with riots in the African townships over the detention of
Nkomo and others. Prior to that, in 1963, a resurgence of urban violence had been quelled
by mandatory death sentences for petrol bombing. Then in August 1963, the African
nationalist movement split with Sithole leading the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU), leaving Nkomo with the rump which he called the People's Caretaker Council
(ZAPU in internal guise) until it, too, was banned. ZANU promptly dispatched young men
for guerrilla training in China. The first of the terror killings was the murder at Melsetter of
P.J.A. Oberholzer in July 1964. There was minor urban unrest but the new Government
sought to secure the rural areas by enhancing the image of the tribal leaders and rural
councils.
There was no progress on the independence issue. A British general election was due in
1964 and Macmillan's replacement as prime minister, Sir Alex Douglas-Home, was
reluctant to take a decision which might break the Commonwealth. The British Labor Party
was even more hostile to Rhodesian Front aspirations, leaving Smith with only the prospect
of unilateral action on independence or constitutional change to bring in African majority
rule. The idea of UDI was not new. It had been threatened by Huggins and Welensky in the
recent past when the British had thwarted them.
The political uncertainty made a settlement imperative but Smith faced only rebuff. For the
first time since its inception, Southern Rhodesia was not invited to the annual
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference where the Afro-Asians began to dictate terms.
This drew more threats of UDI. In September 1964 Douglas-Home said he would accept
the 1961 Constitution as a formula for independence if Smith could prove that the majority
of the inhabitants of Rhodesia were in favor of it. Smith's response was to hold a
referendum on the issue and to convene an indaba of tribal chiefs and headmen, arguing
that, as eight of ten Africans lived in the tribal areas and as the membership of the African
nationalist parties had been concentrated in the towns, the chiefs reflected tribal opinion.
Both produced results favorable to Smith but were rejected by the new Labor Government
of Harold Wilson which was elected on the 15 October. Wilson would not, and perhaps
(given his narrow majority in the Commons) could not, allow the perpetuation of white
rule. Stiff warnings from Wilson, half-hearted negotiations, the failure of the British to
offer anything beyond six basic principles for independence offered Smith nothing to sell
to his electorate. By 11 November 1965 Smith and Wilson were so far apart that Smith had
nothing left to do but to declare UDI.
The Consequences of UDI
Britain recoiled in angers at this first rebellion by a British territory since the American
revolution. Wilson dared not risk the use of force, despite vociferous demands from the
Africans, because of his small majority and the possibility that his forces would not fight.
Instead, Wilson applied sanctions and backed them by deploying two carrier task forces to
cut off Rhodesia's supply of oil. Later, to secure international co-operation, Wilson secured
selective United Nations' mandatory sanctions in 1966 and made them total in 1968.
On the surface the world co-operated with Wilson, but underneath its trade with Rhodesia
continued through false bills of lading, barter and other means. The effects of sanctions
were reduced by tight management of the economy. Tobacco growing continued, often
subsidized, but the farmers diversified and fed the growing population. Local substitutes
replaced imports where possible. Rhodesia had abundant coal but no motor fuel so
imported supplies were eked out with sugar-derived ethanol. Rifle and other ammunition
was not manufactured but aircraft bombs were. Small arms began to be made but most
weapons had to be purchased abroad or captured. Fuel, arms and ammunition constituted
Rhodesia's Achilles' heel and would be exploited when South Africa's prime minister, B.J.
Vorster, wanted his way. Sanctions were also neutralized by the co-operation of Rhodesia's
neighbors, Portuguese-ruled Mozambique and South Africa. Neither recognized Rhodesia
but both kept her routes open to the sea, and, in South Africa's case, supplied many of her
wants and later provided her with aid to keep her armies in the field.
Rhodesia's economy even grew until the mid-seventies when crippling drought, world
depression, high oil prices, the cost of war and the loss of Mozambique as an ally, imposed
severe strains. Never severe enough, nonetheless, to force a surrender.
If Rhodesia could weather sanctions, there had to be a political settlement. The Rhodesians
clearly understood the constitutional issue could not be resolved on a battlefield. UDI was
unacceptable to the world and any settlement would be invalid in international law until
Britain sanctioned it. Britain would not shift her ground on majority rule. Anything less
was unacceptable at home and, in addition she would not hazard the Commonwealth for
Rhodesia or her standing with the United Nations.
Accordingly from 1966 to 1979 there were almost continual political negotiations. There
were talks in 1966 and 1968 between Smith and the British on the warships, Tiger and
Fearless, and even a settlement in 1972 which was thwarted by the African nationalists, led
by Bishop Muzorewa, rejecting it. The British lost interest but the South Africans, worried
by the consequences of the coup in Portugal in 1974, pressed Smith into futile negotiations
with the African nationalists in 1974 and 1975. The introduction of pressure from the
United States, in the person of Henry Kissinger, combined with growing economic
problems and a widening of the war, both consequences of Mozambique's hostility, led
Smith to accept majority rule as an immediate prospect. To persuade him, South Africa cut
his fuel and ammunition supplies and removed vial helicopter pilots. All-party talks
followed in Geneva in December 1976 but failed because of mutual intransigence. Smith
then drew Muzorewa, Sithole (by then ousted from ZANU by Mugabe) and a tribal party
into a settlement on the basis of majority rule. South Africa supported Smith's settlement of
3 March 1978 but the world refused to recognize the new constitution or the new prime
minister, Muzorewa, and his government which was elected in April 1979. Margaret
Thatcher was the key to such recognition but she allowed herself to be persuaded to offer
instead a further attempt at settlement. Such a settlement was forthcoming from the
conference at Lancaster House. The British hoped that it would produce a coalition of
internal parties and the revolutionary movements but instead it allowed Mugabe to win.
The African Nationalist Insurgents
The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of ZANU and the
Zimbabwe People's Liberation Amy (ZIPRA) of ZAPU based their campaigns on their
interpretations of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory of bloody revolution. ZIPRA took
advice from their Soviet instructors in formulating its version. ZANLA had Chinese
instructors but never actually progressed very far through the Maoist phases of revolution.
Unlike ZIPRA, ZANLA was incapable of mounting a conventional threat. It had masses of
ill-disciplined and barely trained guerrillas and was unable to seize and retain an objective.
Training standards were so low that many cadres did not clean their rifles.
Neither movement was able to engender real support amongst the urban populations,
sparing the Rhodesian security forces an urban insurgency. Good police work, based on
intelligence, stamped out any urban threat. The insurgency was a rural one with both
movements attempting to secure peasant support and to recruit fighters while harassing the
administration and the white inhabitants. Unlike the town-dwellers, the rural whites faced
danger and many were killed but in 1979 there were still 6 000 white farmers on the land
even though it was simple enough to drive them off it. They were vulnerable every time
they left the homestead. ZANLA, in the end, was present on a more or less permanent basis
in over half the country and in addition was fighting a civil war against ZIPRA despite the
union of their political parties after 1978. It was ZANLA's intention to occupy the ground,
supplant the administration in rural areas and then mount the final conventional campaign.
ZIPRA, on the advice of Moscow, built up its conventional forces - motorized with Soviet
armoured vehicles - in Zambia, intending to tear the prize of victory from ZANLA's grasp.
ZIPRA's conventional threat in the event was to distract the Rhodesians from the primary
task of drastically setting back, if not defeating, ZANLA's ambitions. So ZIPRA kept a
light presence within Rhodesia, reconnoitering, keeping contact with the peasants (and
sparring with ZANLA when they met).
ZANLA, aided by its FRELIMO Allies, bore the brunt of the Fire Force and the external
camp attacks while establishing themselves amongst the rural people. Because Mugabe and
his party won the election it has been assumed that he had universal support among the
Shona. ZANLA concentrated on the politicization of the rural areas using force, persuasion,
ties of kinship and even the influence of the spirit mediums.
Nonetheless, the relief when ZANLA elements departed or were driven out was palpable.
And modern research - by Norma Kriger, for example - has shown that in areas, to survive,
ZANLA had to terrorize. This was certainly true after the Muzorewa election in April 1979
when the rural people defied ZANLA's orders to the contrary and turned out in great
numbers to vote. The result of the election stunned the cadres until Thatcher's refusal to
recognize its outcome enheartened them. To regain control, ZANLA returned to terrorism.
None of this implies that the Rhodesian Front Government had any chance of retaining
even the passive acceptance of the tribal people. Muzozewa, however, given international
recognition, had every prospect of engendering support and loyalty.
The Rhodesian Security Forces
The security forces, including the police, had as early as 1956 recognized that the major
problem confronting them was African unrest. Thus the security forces trained and
prepared for counter-insurgency at home as well as reinforcing British efforts in Malaya
and studying the counter-insurgency effort against the Mau Mau in Kenya. The Army
devoted half its training to counter-insurgency, while the Air Force formed a counter-
insurgency squadron. Because insurgency essentially challenges the law, the police took
the lead with the military in support. Thus the counter-insurgency campaign began on a
low key, led by the BSAP. But incursions of relatively large armed groups (initially from
Zambia) into unpopulated areas, required military not police reaction.
To fight the counter-insurgency war, Rhodesia employed professional servicemen of all
races and reinforced them with conscripted national servicemen (serving six months
initially) and territorial and reserve forces drawn from the white, colored (mixed race) and
Asian populations.
There was an eight-squadron Air Force with a dozen Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers, a
handful of de Haviland Vampire fighter-bombers, English Electric Canberra bombers, a
dozen or so transport aircraft, numbers of light support aircraft and 50-odd Alouette III and
Agusta-Bell 206 helicopters.
The Army comprised an armored car regiment, an artillery regiment, a regular white
infantry battalion (the Rhodesian Light Infantry), a regular black regiment (the Rhodesian
African Rifles) which would grow to three over-strength battalions. There was a squadron,
and later a regiment, of Special Air Service and the unorthodox and controversial, if highly
successful, 1 800 Selous Scouts. Another experimental regiment, the Grey Scouts, revived
the art of using horses in bush warfare. There were engineering, signals, service,
intelligence, psychological action, military police and medical units in support of the front-
line troops. The administrative tail was commendably lean. The white, colored and Asian
national servicemen were to be found in all these units as well as in a series of independent
infantry companies. The territorial and reserve troops provided eight battalions of the
Rhodesia Regiment as well as serving in a variety of other corps.
Apart from their normal complement of uniformed and plain-clothes personnel serving I
police stations throughout Rhodesia, the BSAP supplied the Special Branch (SB) which
came under the Central Intelligence Organization which had been created in 1963 to
coordinate intelligence gathering and to supply evaluation through its Branch 1 which dealt
with internal matters and Branch 2 which dealt with external affairs including running
agents. The intelligence gathering was assisted by the BSAP ground coverage. To reinforce
the military, the BSAP deployed a battalion-sized para-military support unit and small anti-
terrorist units (PATU). Civilian volunteers, both black and white, served in the Police
Reserve, manning road blocks, guarding farms, bridges etc. and providing escorts for
civilian convoys.
The district administration, Internal Affairs, armed their staff and undertook similar
functions while continuing to govern the tribal areas. The military role was eventually taken
over by the Guard Force.
The white part-time servicemen were deployed by company rather than battalion but this
did not lessen the disruption of their lives. This, plus boredom, discomfort, some danger
and above all the lack of a certain political future, swelled the ranks of the young whites
emigrating. By 1979 the dispersion of their manpower meant that some reserve infantry
companies could muster less than thirty whites for a deployment (the numbers being made
up by African professional soldiers). The performance in the field was undiminished by and
large and being never defeated in the field, morale remained high. The Rhodesian forces
believed themselves to be an elite force and, perhaps, they were. And it is worth
remembering that eighty per cent of military and police manpower was African.
From 1967-1974 the Rhodesian forces were reinforced by the equivalent of a battalion of
South African policemen deployed as infantrymen, helicopter and other pilots and later by
Recce commandos and paratroopers.

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Rhodesian Insurgency
by Professor J.R.T. Wood
The war divided into phases roughly aligned to the political events.
Phase I: 1966-1972.
By this time Zambia was independent and offered a safe haven to both ZAPU and ZANU.
The movements sought to send in groups to propagate the revolution on the unsophisticated
assumption that the African people were ready to rise and assist them in driving out the
whites. ZAPU in particular was dealt an almost fatal blow by making the mistake of
seeking to create base areas in wild country from which to sally out. In transit to these
areas, the infiltrators had to cross the harsh Zambezi Valley where the Tonga people were
inhospitable to them. Their tracks and their bases were found and attacked or the
infiltrators intercepted by the Rhodesian security forces.
The completeness of their defeat depressed the insurgents' morale while it gave the
Rhodesian security forces solid grounding in joint-service operations through the JOC
system of command and control which maximized local effort even if there was more
incoherence at higher levels. It also allowed the honing of small unit tactics with the four
man 'stick' or half-section being adopted as the basic formation. One reason was that four
was the number that the Alouette III helicopter could carry. Each 'stick' was commanded by
a corporal carrying a VHF radio and an FN 7.62mm rifle (NATO). The corporal had under
him an MAG general purpose machine-gunner and two riflemen, one of whom trained as a
medic. Out in the bush, the corporal had an autonomy and responsibilities not known in
many armies at that level. It was a 'Corporal's War' for he had immediate command on the
ground and took the initiative in many instances. The Rhodesians developed tracking skills,
devising the tracker combat units of four to five men. They improved their air-to-ground
co-operation and communication - in the process abandoning the plodding Army radio
procedure. They went over the border to assist the Portuguese with FRELIMO and to stop
ZANLA infiltration south of the Zambezi.
The Rhodesian Government made the mistake in this initial phase of the war of failing to
expand the Army with additional African infantry battalions. By 1979 there were only three
and the last one had barely been formed. There were always more African recruits than
could be accommodated, and the additional battalions could have lessened the call-up
factor on white morale. These battalions would have needed white officers but there was
much unused white leadership potential in the white units. The Rhodesian security forces
were also lulled into thinking that their opponents would always conduct the insurgency in
such a direct manner. Thus they were ill-prepared in that respect for what was to come.
These were good years for Rhodesians, however. They were winning all the battles and
countering sanctions.
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Phase 2. 1972-1974.
Exploiting the atmosphere of heightened political agitation after the African rejection of the
Anglo-Rhodesian settlement of 1972 and FRELIMO's success against the Portuguese south
of the Zambezi, ZANLA penetrated the north-eastern area where the tribal reserves were
close to the border. FRELIMO gave ZANLA what logistical support it could and had
offered the same to ZIPRA but Nkomo was not interested.
ZANLA made careful preparation for their coming campaign: politicizing the rural people
in their Maoist fashion, establishing local committees, contact men, feeders, security
procedures, and infiltration and exit routes. They recruited porters, cached arms and the
like. They divided the country into provinces, named after the adjacent Mozambique
provinces, and sectors named after tribal heroic figures. Their basic unit was a section of
ten to twelve men, including a political commissar, who would establish a dozen or more
base camps in an area in order to keep on the move. The units, assembling in nearby
Mozambique in groups of 20-30, would only infiltrate when the subverted area had been
prepared and contact men were in place. ZANLA eschewed centralization of command,
perhaps, because it was impractical. The unit commanders were chosen and dismissed by
popular vote at section, detachment, sector and provincial level. Communications were by
courier and letter (a system which the Rhodesians would exploit). A section would have a
wide area to exploit, visiting a circle of base camps in turn to politicize the nearby
population, to feed, and to plan attacks on local targets. In order not to frighten recruits,
Rhodesian firepower was not discussed. Thus a first contact could be traumatic to the new
cadres and contributed to their poor performance in fire fights.
Having established a presence, the ZANU cadres (led by Rex Nhongo) attacked a white
farm, Altena Farm, on 23 December 1972. The Rhodesians were now confronted with the
problem of their enemy living among their own kind. The response had many facets. The
system of joint command was tested and improved by psychological warfare was
neglected. Perhaps this was because the war could not be won while the whites were in
political control. In addition, the Rhodesians did not understand just how serious ZANLA's
penetration of the north-east was and were slow to evolve a counter-insurgency strategy.
Nevertheless, Rhodesians had fought in Malaya and adopted a lesson learnt there and in
Kenya. The rural people were moved into protected villages, designed to cut the insurgents
off from their supplies of food and comfort and to encourage the loyalty of the rural people
by protecting them and providing them with new services. These villages were never
adequately policed or protected and the people were not involved in their management or
persuaded of their necessity. The chronic shortage of finance precluded proper
development of the villages. They were often constructed too far from the peasants' fields
and most important of all took the people away from the burial sites of their ancestors
which they venerated. A key factor which was ignored was that in Malaya the concept had
worked because it protected a Malayan majority against a Chinese minority, whereas in
Rhodesia the insurgents were sons of the village. A further mistake was not to start by
establishing the PVs in the less affected areas rather than the most subverted. Attempts at
food control were by and large ineffective and in later years would include the use of
defoliants on crops in areas from which the peasants had been removed. So inadequate was
the administration of the PVs that ZANLA often used them as places of safe haven. The
PV system was dismantled in 1978 as a political move designed to boost the reputation of
Bishop Muzorewa.
Entrusted with the intelligence function the police, with the assistance of Internal Affairs,
sought to uncover the identity of the insurgents, using uniformed and plain-clothed men.
The Army cross-grained the countryside looking for tracks; ambushed infiltration routes;
and evolved the concept of Fire Force in 1974. Fire Force, using helicopters, back-up
vehicles and support troops, was an expensive tool but it soon yielded impressive results.
The special forces had two initial roles: the SAS went over the border to find incoming
groups and supplies; while the new and highly secret Selous Scouts began to develop the
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art of pseudo warfare, using disguises to penetrate ZANLA groups and eliminate them or to
guide Fire Force to them.
The Army began to lay a barrier of mines along the border to deter infiltration or at least to
channel it. At fist it laid a classical border minefield 25 meters wide but, because there
were not enough troops to dominate it or at least monitor it, the concept was changed to a
width of anything between 8 - 30 kilometers with pressure mines supplementing
ploughshares. Eventually the length was 1 400 kilometers, the longest military obstacle in
the world outside the Great Wall of China. The minefield had its critics and has left a
terrible legacy to Zimbabwe but ZANLA was to estimate that it had suffered 8 000
casualties in transit across the mines.
ZANLA (and ZIPRA to a certain extent), tried to paralyze the Rhodesian effort and
economy by planting Soviet anti-tank landmines in the roads. From 1972-1980 there were 2
504 vehicle detonations of landmines (mainly Soviet TM46s), killing 632 people and
injuring 4 410. The mining of roads increased as the war intensified; indeed the increase
from 1978 (894 mines or 2.44 mines were detonated or recovered a day) by 233.7% in
1979 (2 089 mines or 5.72 mines a day). In response, the Rhodesians co-operated with the
South Africans to develop a range of mine protected vehicles. They began by replacing air
in tires with water which absorbed some of the blast and reduced the heat of the explosion.
They protected the bodies with steel deflector plates, sandbags and mine conveyor belting.
V shapes dispersed blast. Deaths in such vehicles became unusual events. The development
has led to the remarkable South African Mamba and Nyala wheeled light troop carriers. A
Rhodesian engineer invented the Pookie mine detection vehicle - a word first. The Pookie
was built out of VW parts and used wide Formula One racing tires (giving light ground
pressure) and Milton electronic metal detectors. It traveled ahead of a convoy, detecting
mines at speed. In all the Pookie set off only nine mines (some of them command
detonated). One operator was killed. 550 mines were detected and disarmed in the open
roads. A bicycle mounted version of the Pookie was made for clearing bush airstrips after
aircraft hit mines when taxiing. The Soviet advisers sought for nullify the Pookie by
switching to non-metallic mines (TMBA 111 bakelite mines). The Rhodesians countered
with disinformation claiming that new cylindrically shaped metal detectors could analyze
the density of the soil and find the TMBA. The Soviets seemed to be taken in. In fact, the
cylindrical shape was designed to reduce vibration.
The Air Force refined and improved its cooperation with ground forces - including
tracking from the air, spotting camps by tell-tale 'crapping patterns.' It sponsored the
production of a singularly lethal range of aircraft weapons - the Frantan, Alpha and Golf
bombs and the under-used flechette, and other devices such as radio-activated target
markers and the 'road runner' or a bugged portable commercial transistor radio receiver.
These were left where the insurgents would acquire them. When the radio as switched off,
to listen to aircraft or other noise, the radio transmitted a signal on which Fire Force could
home in on.
Phase 3: 1974-1977
Although by the end of 1974, the Rhodesians and their South African police allies had
reduced the number of insurgents to 60 and has confined them to a remote corner in the
north-east, the South African Government decided that the game was up and that Smith
must be forced into a settlement. The reason was that the military coup in Portugal in April
1974 had brought FRELIMO to power and thereby had given ZANLA the whole of
Mozambique as a safe haven. FRELIMO also threatened to cut half of Rhodesia's supply
lines to the sea.
The South African-driven peace talks and cease-fire in December 1974 failed, the South
Africans withdrew their police and the war intensified with ZANLA increasingly using the
safe haven of Mozambique which meant they could penetrate the whole of the eastern
border. In 1976, after Mozambique had thrown in its lot openly with Mugabe and ZANU,
Rhodesia was forced to increase the service commitments of its citizens and to open new
brigade operational areas - Operations Thrasher (in the east), Repulse (in the south-east)
and to deal with the lesser threat of ZIPRA, now using Botswana, Tangent (in the west).
ZANLA spread out among the Shona people attempting to politicise them by fair means or
foul. ZIPRA, on the other hand, preferred to recruit fighters and would only exert serious
pressure out of Botswana and Zambia in 1977.
The increased threat provoked the Rhodesians, in the form of the SAS, Selous Scouts, and,
on occasions, other units, to begin raiding guerrilla camps and communications despite
South African pressure to keep the war out of Mozambique. The first major raid in August
1976 was on Nyadzonia, a ZANLA camp, where the Selous Scouts in vehicles used
subterfuge to penetrate the camp and killed 1 200 inmates. This brought a world outcry and
gave Vorster an excuse to pull-out his helicopter pilots and to put pressure on Smith
through Kissinger to concede majority rule.
External missions, on a lesser scale, continued. Internally, various established techniques
were refined. By early 1977 Fire Force had been reinforced by newly trained paratroopers
carried in C47 Dakotas to supplement the heliborne troops. New units came into being. The
Rhodesian Intelligence Corps, formed in 1975, supplemented the intelligence effort.
Included in its accomplishments was the production of up-to-the-minute combat maps
using overlays. The intelligence effort, however, remained too fragmented and too police
oriented. A Psychological Warfare Unit was formed, but faced an impossible task until
political change had been wrought. The Grey Scouts brought back the mounted infantry
tactics of the Boer War which were effective in flat bush country. The Guard Force was
formed to defend the spreading protected villages.
The economic, political and security difficulties led Smith to attempt to improve the joint
service command and control, and to eliminate some of the jealousies therein, by forming
in March 1977 a Ministry of Combined Operations placing the civilian and military war
effort under a single commander, Lieutenant General Walls. This, and the increasing
declaration of martial law in affected districts, did tighten up the war effort. But the move
was more a compromise than a rationalization and its success was limited. Supreme
command of a counter-insurgency effort in a colony with an executive governor is one
thing but in a country with a democratic system is another. Can a military supremo coexist
with an elected prime minister? The Rhodesian war effort remained reactive and lacking in
a coherent strategy. But then again, the military could only contain the war - any solution
had to be a political one.
Phase 4: 1977-1979.
In this period Smith sought and secured the internal political settlement which brought in
majority rule, votes for all, and Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister.
The response from ZANU and ZAPU was an attempt at political and military unity which
ended in bitter inter-faction fighting. In addition, ZANLA intensified the war at great cost
to themselves. Nkomo's ZIPRA posed the greatest threat in a conventional sense but their
base was in Zambia across the Zambezi River. They lacked a bridgehead across the river
and had long vulnerable lines of communication. ZANLA had severe logistical problems
and lacked the morale, the discipline and the training for positional warfare. Neither force
had adequate reserves or air support and, being rivals, when they met in Rhodesia they
fought. Within the country, ZIPRA was more difficult to find in the more sparsely
populated west. ZIPRA infiltrators, unlike ZANLA, traveled in small groups and carried
food, covering great distances without attracting attention because they did not have to visit
villages en routes.
The Rhodesians suffered not only from the increased fighting but from the loss of
manpower as whites began to emigrate at the rate of 2 000 a month. The early failure to
expand the African battalions was being rectified but the Security Forces could not expand
at a rate to match the growth of the numbers of insurgents and would soon be outnumbered
in the field except at times of total mobilization.
Even so the war effort improved with enthusiastic South African support and, perhaps
because there was some prospect of success in the political field, at last, in 1978, the
Rhodesians produced a strategy which involved

1. Protecting 'Vital Asset Ground' containing economic assets such as mines, fuel
dumps, factories, key farming areas, bridges, railways and the like.

2. Denying ZANLA the 'Ground of Tactical Importance' (in other words the tribal
lands) as a base from which to mount attacks on crucial assets by

inserting large numbers of auxiliaries into this area to assist in the re-
establishment of the civil administration and to destroy the links between the
insurgents and their political supporters. They would deny the ground to
ZANLA.

using the crucial strategic mobility of Fire Force and high density troop
operations against ZANLA infested areas.

3. preventing incursions through border control.

4. raiding neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique and Zambia, to disrupt
ZANLA's and ZIPRA's command and control, to destroy base facilities, ammunition
and food supplies, to harass the reinforcements, and to hamper movement by aerial
bombardment, mining and ambushing of routes.

The innovation of auxiliary forces loyal to the internal African national parties was a
formula for success, a germ of an idea which most of the Rhodesian security establishment
did not have the imagination to grasp and instead recoiled at their ill-discipline. The 10 000
auxiliaries, using identical tactics to ZANLA and living amongst the tribesmen, began to
deny the insurgents the bush. For the first time the Rhodesians had forces to occupy the
ground that the Fire Force was winning.
Fire Force became more deadly but the operational demands on the forces were excessive.
Paratroopers found themselves jumping operationally every day, with three operational
jumps as a record - something no other paratroopers had ever done. When external camps
were attacked, the shortage of suitable aircraft, pilots and trained personnel often meant
that the attacking forces were seriously outnumbered as has already been mentioned. Many
attacks were mounted, even on the outskirts of Lusaka in Zambia. The raiding forces were
not yet allowed to strike at economic targets because the Government was loathe to excite
the outside world. Most of the external effort was, naturally, reconnaissance by the SAS
and two-man teams from the Selous Scouts. But an addendum to these efforts was the
sponsoring by the CIO of the anti-FRELIMO resistance movement, the Resistencia
National Moambique (RENAMO), which began to weaken FRELIMO and allow the
Rhodesians greater freedom of action.
Phase 5: 1979 April - March 1980
The election of Muzorewa was a stunning defeat for ZANLA and ZIPRA who had ordered
the population not to vote only to be defied by a 62% poll of the newly enfranchised
population. The Rhodesian security forces mobilized 60 000 men (every man they could
muster) to protect the election and to eradicate the threat to it. With the help of South
African reinforcements, 230 insurgents were killed in the three days of the election and 650
in all in April. The insurgents went to ground or surrendered. The ZANLA commanders
left the country for orders and for six weeks their men did nothing. The war virtually
stopped.
If, after being elected in May, Margaret Thatcher had stuck to her party's election promise
to recognize Muzorewa's election and to support him (as she would Mugabe in 1980),
history could have been very different. With popular support at home and legitimacy in
international law, Muzorewa's Government might have defeated Mugabe and Nkomo.
Thatcher changed her mind, the murders in the tribal areas increased as the insurgents
sought to reassert their influence, and the morale of the security forces and the public sank.
By this time Mugabe and Nkomo had entered a marriage of convenience for the purposes
of the conference and to overthrow Muzorewa. Their unity had long been pressed on them
by the OAU and the aid donors. Yet their armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA, would not train
together and, when they met in the field, they fought even more bitterly. Their strategies
also differed markedly. ZIPRA's strategy, as has been discussed, was to rob ZANLA of
victory at a decisive moment. ZIPRA deployed three thousand men in Rhodesia as a
vanguard preparing the way for the conventional army. ZANLA responded with an
offensive into Matabeleland which ZIPRA countered by penetrating the tribal areas in
north-west Mashonaland, threatening Salisbury from the north. ZIPRA was confident that it
could recover any ground lost in Matabeleland when the time was ripe. Nkomo hoped, in
addition, to dominate the partnership with Mugabe. However, the Rhodesian security
forces, using their air power and paratrooper assets in 1979, destroyed ZIPRA's munitions
and stores in Zambia, and, by blowing bridges, limited its ability to move and deploy.
ZANLA, with some 10 000 trained men within Rhodesia, persisted in its effort to secure
political control of the Shona tribes. Despite those numbers, by September 1979 ZANLA
was in dire straits in the opinion of its commander, Rex Nhongo, because of Fire Force, the
external raids, the unease of the host country, and the effect of the deployment of the
auxiliaries. Nhongo believed that ZANLA would have found it difficult to get through the
next dry seasons of mid-1980. Peace came none too soon for ZANLA.
To complement the war effort after the internal settlement of 1978, the Rhodesian
politicians had to present a united front to the world and attain international recognition
and the raising of sanctions. They failed. The Rhodesian approach to strategy lacked
essential flexibility. While the security forces strove to contain the situation in expectation
of a political solution, their military strategy was not tied in closely enough with the
political effort.
The Rhodesian politicians by 1979 had divided openly, while the Patriotic Front appeared
united. Everything on Thatcher's promise of recognition. Once she chose the Lancaster
House solution, Muzorewa's Government had few political options left and it was essential
for it to improve its position by military means, using the strategic mobility of the security
forces to exploit the situation in the neighboring countries. Perhaps because of British
persuasion, this did not happen.
In Zambia, President Kaunda was host to some 25 000 fighting men from ZIPRA, SWAPO
and the South African ANC. His army was outnumbered and these foreign armies
threatened Zambia's political stability. ZIPRA's conventionally-trained army was growing
in size but, to succeed in an invasion of Rhodesia, ZIPRA had to establish a bridgehead
across the Zambezi. They also needed air support to allow their armor and infantry to
survive and to keep their supply line open. Nkomo was having pilots trained but Kaunda
knew that their appearance would lead to the destruction of his airfields. The Rhodesians
forestalled ZIPRA. They sank the ferry across the Zambezi at Kazangula and destroyed
boats along the river and in Lake Kariba. Later in 1979 they mounted a coordinated attack
on the secondary bridges in southern Zambia and cut Kaunda's railway line to Tanganyika
by blowing the Chambeshi River bridge. They left the two bridges over the Zambeziat
Victoria Falls and Chirundu. Left with only lines of communication running through
Rhodesia, Kaunda was at Muzorewa's mercy. Zambia was truly a front-line state, right in
the firing line.
By mid-1979, FRELIMO in Mozambique was totally committed to supporting ZANLA.
ZANLA used FPLM supplies while FPLM rotated 300 men into Rhodesia to bolster
ZANLA. The storing of ZANLA arms brought a switch by the Rhodesians from attacking
the transit camps, as they had done since in 1976 with deadly effect, to their Air Force
destroying FRELIMO armories. The success of this effort forced FRELIMO to move their
bulk stocks back out of reach to the coast, knowing that even the Rhodesians would hesitate
to bomb Maputo. Mozambique, fearful of South African intervention, had to put up with a
continuous Rhodesian presence in her provinces. The Rhodesians mined the roads to slow
up the resupply of the ZANLA forces within Rhodesia and thereby caused numerous
civilians casualties. By this means they forced ZANLA to curtail their operations because
of difficulties of bringing in reinforcements, ammunition, weapons and supplies. The
Rhodesian effort, however, failed to deter FPLM from supporting and reinforcing ZANLA.
In September 1979, when the conference at Lancaster House was underway, the Rhodesian
forces enjoyed a change of fortune which allowed them to add to the pressure on
Mozambique being applied by RENAMO which was operating effectively in the Manica,
Sofala and Tete Provinces, attracting many recruits from within FRELIMO. RENAMO,
greatly assisted by the Rhodesians, scored a number of successes, attacking the Revue
Dam, the Beira fuel farm and cutting road and rail links. The new pressure came out of
reaction to a threat to Rhodesia's lifeline to South Africa - the Ruttenga-to-Beit Bridge
railway line.
Fearing that FPLM/ZANLA forces massing at Mapai just south of Rhodesia's southern
border would be used to assist ZANLA in establishing a 'liberated zone', the Rhodesian and
South African raiders on 'Operation Uric' cut five major bridges deep in Mozambique,
including the rail bridge across the Limpopo River at Barragem. The main FPLM bases in
the area were subjected to air strikes. At the cost of some casualties, Operation Uric drove
FPLM further onto the defensive, severely damaged their communications and supplies,
and prevented ZANLA from consolidating their hold on the tribal areas on the border. The
aim was not to damage the Moambican economy but the raid, as well as delaying the
movement of war material forward, also cut the main food growing area off from its
markets. The upshot was that Samora Machel was desperately keen to see a settlement in
Rhodesia and he persuaded a somewhat reluctant Mugabe to attend the Lancaster House
conference.
The combination of political and military pressures had worked but Muzorewa's
Government failed to pursue this strategy. In November, Operation Manacle was cancelled
when the troops were on the start line. Manacle would have destroyed every major bridge
in the Tete, Sofala, and Manica Provinces, cutting ZANLA's supply lines. As well as
further upsetting Machel, it would have gravely weakened ZANLA and therefore Mugabe.
The political strategists, though, were out of step with the military and Manacle was
aborted on the advice of Ken Flower, the Rhodesian chief of intelligence, leaving the
military doubting the loyalty of Flower.
The British worked hard and skillfully at the Lancaster House Conference to divide
Muzorewa's delegation and succeeded. Muzorewa offered concessions to appear reasonable
and to get the conference over fast in order to have an early election before ZANU and
ZAPU could establish their support amongst the electorate. Instead, he should have copied
the Patriotic Front and delayed to allow his forces to strengthen his hand.
The Patriotic Front prolonged the conference to enable their internal parties to emerge
legitimately and to build up their support. Delay also was used to prevent the Rhodesian
forces from gaining the strategic ascendancy. As they dallied, political pressure from the
British meant that the program of external raids was curtailed and eventually cancelled.
Delay also allowed ZANLA and ZIPRA to recoup their losses. Russia intruded and began
to supply ZIPRA with war supplies in bulk. The strategy of delay perfectly suited the
conditions and fatally weakened Muzorewa's position. The Patriotic Front used the threat of
withdrawal to gain concessions but, with Zambia and Mozambique insisting that they
settle, these threats sounded hollow. The Patriotic Front's gain was that it retained its
freedom of action which Muzorewa did not.
The British drove through their solution. Most difficult to arrange was a cease-fire, but in
the end a plan for the gathering of the insurgents into assembly points and the monitoring
of them by a British-led and dominated Commonwealth force was accepted. Until a
government had been elected, a governor, Lord Soames, was to exercise executive and
legislative power. Smith predicted that the outcome would be a transference of power to
Mugabe. The British and everyone else pinned their hopes on a hung election and a
coalition which would feature Muzorewa, Nkomo and Smith.
It is curious that the Muzorewa Government accepted the cease-fire arrangement without
any adequate mechanism to prevent the inevitable violations. Furthermore, the assembly
point arrangements favored the Patriotic Front. ZIPRA used the cease-fire to establish a
series of heavily defended strong points to constitute the bridgehead for the force with
which they hoped to recover the initiative from Mugabe. ZANLA ignored the restraints
imposed by the cease-fire. They kept a significantly large proportion of their forces outside
the assembly points while sending in mujibas (young supporters) to make up the numbers
expected. ZANLA infiltrated 8 000 guerrillas into the eastern border area alone. They
brought in large quantities of arms and ammunition and cached them near the assembly
points. Inside the assembly points the mujibas were given intensive training. Thus ZANLA
managed to re-stock with arms and ammunition and to treble the strength of its forces
inside the country. The guerrillas outside the assembly points went to work on the
population to ensure victory at the polls.
The plan worked. The Commonwealth forces were too weak to intervene and there was
nothing that Muzorewa's Government could do but protest to the British Governor, Lord
Soames, after he arrived in early December. Soames rejected demands for the
disqualification of Mugabe's ZANU(PF) or the declaration of the result as null and void.
General Walls approached Mrs. Thatcher but was ignored. The signs of what was going to
happen were clear even if few of Jugabe's opponents wanted to believe them. Neither
Mozorewa's UANC nor Knomo's PF(ZAPU) could hold meetings in the Victoria Province
or in Mashonaland East. The British, however, had come so far that they were not prepared
to turn back. They would pretend that what had happened was for the best. Mugabe's trump
card was to threaten to continue the war.
When the election was held Mugabe, to his evident surprise and the dismay of his
opponents, was the outright winner with 57 seats. Securing only three seats, Muzorewa was
eclipsed, Sithole was eliminated, gaining none, and Nkomo only secured 20 in his
traditional areas of support.
The whites were taken aback because they had thought that Muzorewa stood as good a
chance as any. Furthermore, the white males, called up to protect the election, had been
assured by General Walls and his senior officers that Mugabe would not be allowed to take
power even if he won the election. He would be eliminated, it was hinted, in a coup. As has
since been revealed the demise of the ZANLA/ZIPRA command was plotted with precision
and assaults on the assembly points planned and, in one case, rehearsed.
On the day the election result was announced, 4 March 1980, key points were seized by
Rhodesian forces but the order to act never came. Whether 'good sense' prevailed or
doubters hesitated, is not known. Officers trained in the British tradition, and from British
stock, are virtually programmed against illegal action. It is something that they never
contemplate. The consequences of a coup, of course, are incalculable. Even with the
elimination of the leadership would a replacement African leader have been found? And
the world was hardly likely to accept him.
Instead, Soames embraced Mugabe as the winner and the Commonwealth Monitoring
Force extricated itself rapidly from its exposed and dangerous position in the middle. The
whites were left to vote with their feet, leaving the Africans to endure Mugabe's bungling
'scientific socialism' and all that it entails.
Lessons Learned
Command and Control: There was a political failure to provide the services with a
properly unified and integrated command of all the nation's resources. The higher levels of
joint command were never properly reorganised but on the ground the JOC system ensured
tight co-ordination of effort between the variety of forces and agencies.
Intelligence: Time and resources are never wasted on the gathering and exploitation of
intelligence. There was not enough exploitation of intelligence gained or enough effort put
into the gathering of intelligence. The gathering of intelligence was handled by too many
agencies and its analysis was not centered in Comops's hands but in those of the CIO who
were essentially policemen. Crucial intelligence often did to reach the right people. On the
other hand, intelligence operators were in the field and would examine a field of action
immediately.
Leadership: The regular army had begun as a staff corps established by the police force
and had retained, until Federal days, one unfortunate characteristic - anyone joining it,
joined as a corporal and then rose through the ranks. This stultified the intellectual
development of the army. Only in 1955 did the Federal Army sent 19-year-olds to
Sandhurst. Thus the higher echelons of the army in the sixties comprised former corporals,
including General Walls. The result was that the leadership was undistinguished and
unimaginative in contrast with the junior leaders from the rank of major down. Ian Smith
made the mistake of not understanding this and intruding to promote on merit rather than
on time served. The decentralization of command, even to the corporals, however, was
commendable because it saved unnecessary delays. The local commander could act and
then report.
There is the obvious failure to provide early a political system which could unite the people
of the land and this inhibited psychological operations.
A crucial failure was not to take into account the needs and feelings of the African
population in the prosecution of the war, particularly when implementing civic action
programs such as the protected villages and food control. Too often military action not
only alienated the rural people from the Government but also put them in jeopardy, facing
reprisals from the insurgents. This made it difficult to win over the people when the right to
vote was finally given to them.
In attempting to adopt the 'US preferred model', the Rhodesians demonstrated that, in the
end, a system of government will only survive if it has the support of the governed. They
showed also that a successful COIN campaign equally has to have that support. What is
needed is clarity in the political aim, including the ability to win the support of the people.
A national aim is needed and a clear strategy to obtain it.
Success in COIN does not depend on unlimited finances. The Rhodesians maximized the
resources they had. It was rare that an asset was wasted.
Ground gained, by Fire Force action, for example, needs thereafter a security force
presence which the auxiliaries supplied towards the end to a limited extent. The auxiliaries
were an initial success and maintained a sufficient level of threat to worry seriously the
ZANLA hierarchy. The mistake made was not to continue to recruit in the tribal areas, train
the recruits and send them back to their areas to provide protection. Instead, the
unemployed from the towns were increasingly recruited and then deployed where they had
no local affinities.
When weapons are used, they have to maximize the enemy's casualties and minimize those
of civilians so that the population is not alienated. Thus training should emphasize
marksmanship with all weapons - including the delivery of weapons like napalm. The
Rhodesian Frantan could be delivered precisely, for example.
The Pookie, the pseudo groups, the Grey Scouts prove that lessons from other eras can be
valuable.
In the area of special operations, the Rhodesians proved themselves more than equal to the
task with combined air and ground forces working up a close rapport. Yet the special
forces were too often diverted from the tasks which are properly theirs to supplying strike
forces for camp attacks, for example, and the like.
By concentrating on tactics and surprise - at which they showed brilliance - the Rhodesians
forgot strategy. Yet they still came close to winning.
J.R.T. Wood
Durban
South Africa
24 May 1995

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GALLERY ONE.
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GALLERY
ONE

The Selous Scouts as a regiment did
not have a traditional Color, but a
Standard. The dangling fly-wisks on
the Standard are traditional
protectors against evil spirits.
During bushcraft / survival training
Selous Scouts are made to drink the
innards of gutted game animals. Due
to the many valuable nutrients that
may be drunken to supplement ones
diet in extreme situations.
Two Selous Scouts conducting night
SCUBA training perform the back-
roll method of entry into the water.
They are training with open-circuit
"PAMWE
GALLERY ONE.
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
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SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
rigs, which emit the tell-tail bubbles.
A rubber raiding craft loaded with
Selous Scouts performing night
training operations. Which will
encompass boat handling and
SCUBA diving.
A Selous Scout being inserted by
helicopter with a tracking dog, to
close the gap on a follow-up
operation.
Selous Scouts rapidly exiting an
aging DC-3, via static-line
parachute.
GALLERY ONE.
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All Selous Scouts were trained
static-line parachutist, with many
also being free-fall trained.
Learning to gut and quarter game
was an essential skill taught to all
Selous Scouts during there time at
the Tracking and Bushcraft course.
Here two Selous Scouts remove the
innards of what appears to be a
antelope. Scouts were also trained to
eat rotten carcasses by boiling. This
technique would only work once, if
the scout reheated the meat a second
time it would poison through a
chemical change in the meat.
Here a Selous Scout instructor is
teaching the finer points of botany.
By describing signs to look for to
retrieve water from vines and not
poisons or irritants.
GALLERY ONE.
Selous Scout instructor
demonstrating how to retrieve water
from a vine.
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GALLERY TWO.
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/gallery_two.htm[2012-05-28 11:46:43]

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GALLERY
TWO
A rag-tag bunch of hopeful Selous
Scouts on a tactical march during
selection.
Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, the
man who envisioned, formed and
first commanded the Selous Scouts.
This picture is of Reid-Daly during
an interview on the capabilities of
the Scouts.
Here a Selous Scout candidate is
made to paint rocks to correspond
with his class roster number. These
are the rocks he will carry on his
marches. The paint prevents him
from dumping them out and
replacing them at a later time.
"PAMWE
GALLERY TWO.
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
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GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
Instructors inspect the painting of the
rocks and conduct a weigh in of the
loads to be carried by the candidates.
The gutting and preparing of the
rotten baboon the candidates are
made to eat. The candidates are not
fed for days and made to observe the
rotten decomposing baboon all week,
till they are told to eat it. At this
point must are quite willing.
The infamous decomposing Baboon.
GALLERY TWO.
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A candidate working the rope
obstacles, here he is conducting a
"commando traverse".
More of the dreaded rope obstacles
which were famous for shredding
hands.
A candidate on the "Tarzan".
During Selous Scouts Regimental
basic training, they greet the officer
of the day.
GALLERY TWO.

A platoon of Selous Scouts basic
trainees at the quick-time.
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GALLERY THREE.
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/gallery_three.htm[2012-05-28 11:46:50]

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GALLERY
THREE
Selous Scouts conducting static-line
non-tactical proficiency jump.
Out on patrol. Two Selous Scouts
looking for an appropriate
observation post.
Out on patrol Selous Scouts maintain
appropriate distances between team
mates.
"PAMWE
GALLERY THREE.
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
Here two exhausted troopies have
successfully completed the selection
course. The first step to a long
process of becoming a Selous Scout.
A troopie who successfully
completed the last hump (tactical
march) of selection, takes swig of
shine with fellow selecties.
The grueling long-distance sandbag
hump. A very uncomfortable event
of many.
GALLERY THREE.
Selous Scouts
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During selection a fellow troopie
refreshes an exhausted troopie.
A long-distance cross country
navigational exercise, conducted as a
team event during selection.
Selous Scout basic trainees
performing parade drills under the
watchful eye of a black Selous
Scout.
Basic trainees conducting rifle PT
under the tutelage of a black Selous
Scout.
GALLERY THREE.
A blacked-up Selous Scout makes a
body search of a dead terrorist for
possible intelligence, which is
valuable information for follow on
missions.
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GALLERY FOUR.
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/gallery_four.htm[2012-05-28 11:46:57]

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SELOUS SCOUTS
GALLERY
FOUR
Selous Scout basic trainee being spot
corrected by a black Selous Scout.
Selous Scout takes up a position in
low scrub.
Candidates laden down with heavy
packs during selection.
"PAMWE
GALLERY FOUR.
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
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SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
Selous Scouts moving cross-country.
The sandbag carry with load bearing
kit and weapon.
Here two Selous Scouts drag a dead
terrorist from the bush to make a
detailed body search.
GALLERY FOUR.
Selous Scouts
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The sandbag carry event is
conducted with ever present
instructors, who will gladly offer a
candidate a lift in the "quitters"
truck.
A black Selous Scout takes aim with
a FN FAL.
A Selous Scout employing a
MAG58 machine gun.
Selous Scout fading away into the
bush.
GALLERY FOUR.
A Selous Scout during a contact in
the bush.
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GALLERY AUDIO / VIDEO
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/gallery_audio__video.htm[2012-05-28 11:47:03]

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GALLERY
AUDIO AND VIDEO
NOTE: Currently all links are dead. I'm looking for more room.
VIDEO CLIPS DESCRIPTION
FIREFORCE IN ACTION
Clip shows FireForce deploying into action
by static-line parachute and air land via
helo, in support of a Selous Scout
operation.
SELOUS SCOUTS BOAT OPS
Selous Scouts training at night with small
rubber raiding craft and conducting open-
circuit SCUBA.
DOG TEAM DISPATCHED
A Selous Scout air landed via helicopter
with tracking dog, hot on fresh spoor.
SCOUTS CONDUCTING FREE-FALL
OPS
Advanced training for Selous Scouts in
military free-fall operations.
SCOUTS LEARNING BUSHCRAFT
Scouts getting instruction on gutting game
during their bushcraft training.
SCOUTS PERFORMING AIRBORNE
OPS
Scouts in training during the basic static-
line parachute course, which all scouts
received.
BUSHCRAFT TRAINING
Selous Scouts learning to make fire by
friction, improvised cordage and clean
game.

AUDIO CLIPS DESCRIPTION

"PAMWE
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
MANUAL
OTHER
RHODESIAN
ELITES
RESOURCES
RELATED LINKS
VIEW
GUESTBOOK
SIGN GUESTBOOK
SITE INDEX
T.A.L. DOZER
TO SELOUS SCOUTS GALLERIES

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EQUIPMENT
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/EQUIPMENT.htm[2012-05-28 11:47:11]

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JACKET WEBBING
The Jacket webbing was made from camouflage or olive drab material. The pouches were
generally fastened with press studs and the jacket front and rear pouches were secured
with straps and 'D' rings.
Key to Jacket webbing;
A. grenade pouch
"PAMWE
EQUIPMENT
TRAINING
POLITICAL
OVERVIEW
GALLERY
OPERATIONS
WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT
RHODESIAN
EXPERIENCE
PSEUDO-
TERRORIST
OPERATIONS
COMBAT
TRACKING
TACTICAL
BUSHCRAFT
AWARD
RECIPIENTS AND
K.I.A.
RHODESIAN
SECURITY
FORCES
RHODESIAN COIN
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RHODESIAN
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B. magazine pouch
C. water pouch
D. miscellaneous pouches
E. light weight patrol bag
F. web belt
G. Holstered pistol
The below picture is a rear view of the Rhodesian jacket webbing, with light weight
patrol bag fixed underneath the top pouches. Since the Rhodesian war, assault vest-type
webbing has become popular with many Special Forces units and many versions are now
available.

BELT ORDER
The belt order could consist of virtually any combination of assorted pouches. Here we
have a pair of British G7098 side pouches for magazines, a couple of Rhodesian water
bottles and carriers, and a Chinese or East German ammunition / grenade pouches which
round out this kit.

GUN / CHEST WEBBING
EQUIPMENT
Selous Scouts
Ron Reid-Daly
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The gun webbing and jacket webbing shown here were manufactured in a shop called
'Feredays' in Salisbury. The A63 field radio could be carried in its own back pack, in the
back pouch of the jacket webbing or in the belt order side pouch. The handset was
usually secured to the webbing shoulder strap. There was an infinite variety of webbing
used during the Rhodesian war, it all depended on what you liked and what was available.
Captured Chinese issue water bottles could be slung or worn on the belt. Yokes were
usually attached too, along with a knife and a holster for whatever type of pistol the scout
carried. Many Rhodesians preferred captured SKS or AK slings to the issue variety if
even used.
Key to Gun webbing and chest webbing;
A. grenade pouch
B. magazine pouch
C. water bottles
D. lightweight patrol bag
E. 'gook' webbing 3 mag pouches secured with wooden toggles
G. dog tags, morphine/sosegan phial around neck
H. antenna
I. radio handset

'LIBERATED' CHEST WEBBING
EQUIPMENT
A favorite of the Selous Scouts. The dress in the Scouts was governed by its effectiveness
rather than its regulation uniformity. Shop-bought or 'liberated' chest webbing was a
common supplement to regular issue; it came in two weights, of which this webbing is
the heavier.

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INSIGNIA
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PARA BADGE (Metal pin-on version)
The Parachutist badge of the Selous Scouts was the mark of a selected and qualified
Scout. Among the Scouts this is referred to as being badged. The PARA badges were
numbered on the back. from #1 to #500+. The founder of the Scouts, Reid-Daly was
issued wings #1.
During some correspondence between David Scott-Donelan, he told me a story about his
wing number; Scott-Donelan was 38 years old when he passed the Selous Scouts
selection course and Colonel Reid-Daly wanted to give him wing # 338 to commemorate
the occasion. Unfortunately # 338 had already been issued so he gave him the next best, #
348.

PARA BADGE (Subdued cloth version)
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The subdued cloth patch was made to be worn
on field type uniforms. But more often than not it was really worn due to the nature of the
clandestine type missions employed by the scouts.

SHOULDER BOARDS (DRESS)
The Selous Scouts shoulder
boards were worn on more formal attire, much like the rest of the security forces with
there own specific regimental fixings and rank.

DRESS BUTTON (COAT)
Example of a typical regimental dress button, this one being a Selous Scout type.

OSPREY CAP/BERET BADGE
The badge, a stylized design of an Osprey bird of prey
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dropping to strike a fish, was designed by Major General Andy Rawlins. Truly a fitting
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VEHICLES
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VEHICLE SECTION

THE PIG APC (Armored Personnel
Carrier)
During external operations the
scouts employed many modes
and models of transportation,
from helos to klepper kayaks
(used by Reconnaissance
troop). One of the main ground
mobility support vehicles being
used by the Scouts was the
Ferrets.
It was decided for an
upcoming mission (Operation
Mardon) that the Ferrets were
to old and mechanically
unreliable to use on further
external raids.
The Scouts requested the
South African manufactured
Eland armored cars as a
substitute to the Ferrets. But
South Africa refused
permission on the grounds that
(Above) The Selous Scouts homemade PIG (APC) for
external operations, cross-border escapades.

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if any were captured it would
severely embarrass their
country.
Options being limited the
Scout opted to construct there
own APC from plans acquired
by the Motor Transport Officer
of the Selous Scouts, Captain
Mally. He discovered some
plans of a West German APC
built on a Unimog chassis and
powered by a Mercedes
engine.
Major Reid-Daly gave his
final approval to start the
project, with that a hand full of
Scouts who were mechanically
inclined and regular
mechanics, worked day and
night in continuous shifts for
three weeks, finishing the last
of the home-made APCs only
days before the commence of
operation Mardon, the PIGs
maiden mission.
Each PIG was armed with a
20mm Hispano cannon from
old Vampires of the Rhodesian
Air Force. The finished product
turned out to be far superior to
the old British Ferret scout
cars. The new vehicle was
called the PIG, so
affectionately named after what
they closely resemble.

(Above) The PIG prepares to form up in a fighting
column in Ruda.

(Above) Selous Scouts conduct pre-mission rehearsals
at Inkomo barracks prior to Operation Miracle.

(Above) The PIG on its first operational employment
during Operation Mardon.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/psychological_operations.htm[2012-05-28 11:47:29]

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PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS
DESTABILIZATION AND DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS
In addition to intelligence gathering, Special Branch, Branch II, and the Selous Scouts
were actively involved in covert destabilization and disinformation operations. The exact
extent of these has not been fully revealed, but the few operations for which there is
some information available provides some idea of their nature and success.
During the early sixties, the split between ZAPU and ZANU had an extremely
detrimental effect on the nationalist struggle. It is assumed, though inconclusively proven,
that Special Branch may have exploited the rivalry between these two movements
whenever possible, using agents of influence strategically placed in both organizations
combined with various disinformation tactics. These tactics were certainly used in
Zambia after UDI to help foment the rivalry between ZANLA and ZIPRA. Peter Stiff,
for example, recounts the sabotage activities in Lusaka of two British veterans of the
British SAS who worked for CIO and were assisted by a white Zambian farmer and his
wife.

This foursome conducted several attacks against both ZANLA and ZIPRA targets
that were made to appear as if they had been staged by the rival insurgent organization.
The most successful of these operations was the assassination of the ZANUs national
chairman in Zambia, Herbert Chitepo, done in such a way as to suggest that his death by
a car bomb was due to factional fighting within that organization. This incident provoked
the anger of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, who had allowed the nationalist
organizations to operate in his country only on the express condition that there was no
internecine violence. When Kaunda learned that dissident ZANLA elements were
suspected in Chitepos murder, he ordered the arrest of all senior ZANLA officials
(including military commander Joseph Tongogara), the expulsion of the organizations
fighters, and the suspension of all ZANLA activities in Zambia. The arrested officials
were brutally interrogated until they falsely confessed to involvement in Chitepos
murder, while other alleged conspirators were shot. The overall result was a severe
setback for ZANLA operations that, according to Ken Flower, the head of the CIO, cost
ZANLA an estimated two years in its war against Rhodesia.
Rhodesias most ambitious external destabilization operation was the formation of the
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR, later to be called RENAMO).

The
Rhodesians hoped in the long term to undermine and ultimately overthrow FRELIMO
and replace it with a pro-Western government and, in the short term, simply to use the
MNR both to further disrupt ZANLA operations in Mozambique and to provide
intelligence about the insurgents and their bases. The genesis behind the MNR idea lay in
the Mozambican populations increasing discontent with FRELIMO. That insurgent
organization had been completely surprised by the Portuguese decision to withdraw from
Mozambique and thus was unprepared to assume power in 1974. FRELIMO rule,
accordingly, was generally inept and quickly alienated the population. As increasing
numbers of Mozambicans fled their country, the CIO decided to launch a disinformation
campaign using a large, powerful, and impossible to jam transmitter that the Portuguese
had given to the Rhodesians when they left Mozambique. These broadcasts described the
fictitious activities of a nonexistent resistance movement in Mozambique that the
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Rhodesians called the MNR.
The ruse worked only too well. Shortly after the broadcasts began, FRELIMO deserters
began crossing in droves, seeking to join the resistance movement. The CIO was
therefore forced to create a real organization to preserve its ruse. Because. Rhodesia itself
lacked the resources needed to supply a clandestine army, the CIO turned to other
countries, primarily in Southern Africa, for the funds and weapons the MNR required.
Training was provided at first by former Portuguese soldiers, but the black recruits
distrusted their former colonial masters and responded better when the Portuguese
trainers were replaced by former Rhodesian SAS troopers now working for the CIO. In
their search for a leader for the movement, the CIO found Andre Matangaidze, a former
FRELIMO platoon commander, who had fled to Rhodesia in 1978 after escaping from a
FRELIMO re-education camp. The CIO tested Matangaidzes leadership ability by
sending him with a small band of men to free the inmates at the camp from which he had
escaped. Matangaidze succeeded and was appointed the commander of the MNR.
Subsequent MNR operations were equally successful, and support or the movement grew
rapidly in both Mozambique and Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Army in particular was
impressed by the MNRs successes and threw its full support behind the movement. In
1979, the MNR began to work very closely with the Rhodesian SAS. They carried out
several joint raids, including the attack on an oil storage arm in Beira, Mozambique; the
sinking of ships and subsequent blocking of a harbor in a Mozambican port; and the
disabling of a FRELMO tropospheric scatter station. Unfortunately for the Rhodesians,
the MNR was formed only toward the end of the war and thus had little effect on
ZANLA, although it did destabilize the FRELIMO regime and later was exploited by the
South Africans as a bargaining tool against Mozambican support of the African National
Congress (ANC). Although the MNR did not achieve the objectives for which it was
originally established and had little effect on the outcome of the Rhodesian conflict,
some of the Rhodesian intelligence officers and special operations personnel involved in
the formation of the MNR and the attendant disinformation campaign in Mozambique
claim that had these efforts been initiated earlier in the conflict, the FRELIMO
government might well have been overthrown and the insurgents deprived of their
operational bases in that country.
Disinformation operations were carried out within Rhodesia as well. Perhaps the most
controversial were atrocities against civilians allegedly undertaken by the Selous Scouts
disguised to appear as, and thereby to discredit, the insurgents. Among the crimes that the
Scouts allegedly committed were the murders of white missionaries, attacks on tribal
villages, and the murders of insurgent contacts, whom the Scouts had accused in front of
witnesses of being government collaborators. Although both Special Branch and Selous
Scout officers categorically deny these allegations, some former police officers maintain
that many of the Scouts disinformation attempts were in any event amateurish and did
more harm than good.

The aim in Rhodesia was to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population. A
guerrilla army cannot be defeated by military means alone: you have to be able to
isolate the terrorist from the host population with the minimum amount of damage
to innocent parties. The Rhodesian forces recognized the importance of winning the
propaganda battle, and maximum use was made of any enemy they managed to
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turn around, in this case in the leaflet above a ZANLA detachment commander.
These leaflets were air dropped.

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SPEC. OPS. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
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SPEC. OPS. - INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

As police difficulties in obtaining information from the rural population increased in the
early 1970s, the Rhodesians began to investigate alternative intelligence-gathering
techniques and sources. By 1973, their attention had fastened on so-called pseudo (or
counter-gang) operations. This technique, whereby security force personnel (Selous
Scouts) posing as insurgents circulate among the population gathering information on
guerrilla movement and activities as well as on local sympathies, had been pioneered by
the British during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya nearly two decades before.

The
Rhodesians experimented with pseudo units as early as 1966, but this inchoate effort
was both unsophisticated and unnecessary, given that the vast majority of rural blacks at
the time were either politically indifferent or opposed to the insurgents.
In the rapidly deteriorating security conditions of the 1970s, however, the idea was
resurrected. With the encouragement of the Prime Minister and senior CIO and Special
Branch officials, a new unit known as the Selous Scouts was established in November
1973. For administrative purposes, the Scouts were placed within the Rhodesian Armys
command structure, though the Special Branch commander coordinated and directed the
units intelligence-gathering function. Some of the original pseudo operatives joined the
new force, and additional personnel were recruited from the Army and Special Branch.
Captured or surrendered insurgents were also enlisted. Their inclusion provided for the
constant flow of up-to-date information on insurgent operations and behavior necessary
for the Scouts successful charade.
The Rhodesians spent a great deal of time and effort on turning insurgentsthat is,
persuading them to switch allegiance and serve with the government forces. Their
approach was patterned on the methods that had been used so successfully in Kenya.
Prospective candidates were thoroughly screened and then given the choice of joining the
Scouts or facing prosecution under Rhodesian law for terrorist crimes (conviction for
which carried the death penalty or long prison terms). Those who chose to join the Scouts
were formally absolved of any crimes they may have committed while serving in the
insurgent ranks, were paid an attractive salary, and had their families relocated to special,
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protected, and comparatively luxurious Selous Scouts encampments. Previously turned
insurgentswho provided living proof of the benefits of service with the Scoutswere
often used to persuade their recently captured or surrendered former comrades to join the
unit. Selous Scouts recruiters also looked for prospective candidates among wounded
insurgents. These casualties would be earmarked for special treatment. They would be
quickly evacuated from the battlefield, given excellent medical care and recuperative
attention, and thus encouraged to come over to the Rhodesian side.
The first Selous Scouts unit was ready for operational duty in January 1974 and was
deployed in the Operation Hurricane area. The units generally operated in eight-man
sections (a number selected because it was the size of the typical insurgent unit), dressed
in insurgent uniforms or clothing, and carried the same weapons the insurgents did. The
Scouts missions, it should be emphasized, was not to engage the insurgents in combat
but to determine their size and location and then report this information either to
Fireforce teams or ground combat units, which would take over. To avoid confusion
and prevent other government forces from mistaking the Scouts for actual insurgents, any
area that they were operating in was frozenthat is, no other security forces were
allowed in its vicinity. The Selous Scouts proved extremely effective in providing the
security forces with useful and timely intelligence. According to one internal assessment
undertaken by the Directorate of Military Operations, the Selous Scouts were responsible
for a staggering 68 percent of all the insurgent kills and captures in their areas of
operation.

For more information on pseudo ops employed by the Selous Scouts,
check out the following section;

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/countering_landmines.htm[2012-05-28 11:47:40]

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One of the most serious threats to Rhodesia, for example, was the landmines laid by
guerrillas on roads throughout the countrys principal farming areas. Like many Third
World countries, Rhodesias economy was based on agricultural exports. Hence, it was
vital that the roads and communications links criss-crossing the countrys farm region be
kept open to both commercial traffic and security force patrols. The threat was not only
economic but political and psychological as well. The Rhodesian governmental
apparatus, for example, was breaking down in many areas as officials found it
increasingly difficult to travel in areas with heavy insurgent activity. More serious,
however, were the potential effects that the mining could have on security force mobility.
The Rhodesians had been horrified to discover that similarly widespread insurgent mining
of roads in Mozambique had reduced the mobility of their Portuguese counterparts in that
country and had turned them virtually into a garrison army whose personnel feared
leaving their fortified barracks and posts to go out on patrol.
Engineers in the Rhodesian police force and Army devised several innovative and
inexpensive modifications to ordinary military and commercial vehicles that dramatically
reduced the deaths and injuries suffered by passengers when these protected vehicles
struck mines. Undeniably, mine-related casualties were reduced by 90 percent and
injuries by 20 percent.

These simple measures included filling tires with water and air to
dissipate explosive force, designing wheels that would blow clear of the vehicle and thus
not damage the axle, and mounting special, V-shaped capsules on chassis to deflect the
blast. Not only were they effective in keeping the roads open to traffic and bolstering
security force morale, but they also enabled the Rhodesians to take back and retain
control of the countryside and thereby deprived the guerrillas of the freedom of
movement essential to their operations.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/fireforce_operations.htm[2012-05-28 11:47:46]

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Perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency tactic used by the Rhodesians was the joint
Air Force and Army Fireforce, a heliborne reaction team developed in the early stages of
Operation Hurricane.
Using helicopters provided by South Africa, the Rhodesian Air Force devised this
particularly effective means of vertical envelopment. Original Fireforce typically consisted
of four Alouette III helicopters, each manned by a pilot and technician/gunner. Three of
the helicopters, referred to as G-cars, were used to transport four fully quipped troops,
while a fourth helicopter, called the K (for kill)-car, carried a pilot who was the senior
Air Force officer, a gunner- technician, and the Army unit commander, who directed the
operations below. The K-car could also be used as a gunship when required (hence, its
appellation).
The four helicopters were supported by a fixed-wing aircraft equipped with rockets and
machineguns. In the early stages of the conflict, this was usually a single-engine
Aermacchi-Lockheed AL-60 Trojan. A particularly noisy aircraft, the AL-60 generally
preceded the helicopters, effectively blotting out the noise of their engines and helping to
maintain at least a modicum of surprise about the impending ground attack. The initial
helicopter-deployed contingent of 12 Rhodesian Light Infantry or LRI, the Rhodesian
Armys commandos, or paratroops would be supported by additional ground troops, who
also carried fuel for the helicopters.
Later in the conflict, the regular Fireforce unit was expanded to six helicopters and was
referred to as a Jumbo Fireforce. This number of helicopters and troops was about as
large as a single commander could effectively control. Other variations consisted of a
heliborne mortar unit that would be deployed from the G-car, which would then act as
the units aerial spotter. The lack of helicopters prevented the creation of more Fireforce
units as the insurgents increased their area of operations. To relieve the situation, a stick of
paratroopers was added to each Fireforce complement. The paratroopers were transported
over the targeted area in a World War II-era DC-3 Dakota fixed-wing transport plane and
then dropped to support the smaller heliborne-deployed force already on the ground.
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The Fireforce was used most successfully in tandem with information on insurgent
locations obtained from static observation posts, Selous Scouts pseudo-operations, and
other ground intelligence sources. As an immediate reaction force, it could be also
scrambled whenever any ground forces required support. This was a great morale builder
for the average soldier, who knew that assistance was only 30 minutes away at the most.
Demands on the Fireforce continued to increase during the closing years of the conflict, to
the point where it was not unusual for it to be deployed as often as three times a day in
certain heavily contested areas.

FIRE FORCE (PART ONE): This is the definitive look at helicopter warfare in
Rhodesia from 1962-1980. This work is extensive and fascinating.
FIRE FORCE (PART TWO): This work by professor J. R. T. Wood makes various
references through out article about the Selous Scouts.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/overcoming_tracking_problems.htm[2012-05-28 11:47:52]

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OVERCOMING
TRACKING PROBLEMS

The security forces were similarly successful in overcoming some of he difficulties
inherent in tracking small guerrilla units and bands of infiltrators through rough country
in harsh climatic conditions. Within the Army, special four-man (sticks) tracking teams
(Selous Scouts/TCU) were organized and trained for extended operations in the bush.
The tracking teams worked in threes: one group in pursuit of the guerrillas, one following
the trail backward in hopes of encountering other guerrillas or discovering a hidden arms
cache or valuable insurgent documents, and one leap-frogging ahead to try to pick up the
trail more quickly. The teams were supported by a larger section of troops (Fireforce),
who would move forward and engage the insurgents once they were located by the
trackers.
Botanists, recruited from local universities, taught the trackers how to live off the land (as
the guerrillas did), recognize changes in an areas natural ecology that would indicate a
guerrilla presence, and identify from broken brush or faintly trampled grass the tell-tale
signs of movement. Instead of fatigues and combat boots, the trackers wore tennis shoes
and shorts. Increased comfort while operating in the often intense midday heat was not
the only reason for this attire. Tennis shoes made less noise than boots, were lighter, and
made less of an imprint on the ground, thus making it more difficult for the trackers
themselves to be tracked. Similarly, by wearing shorts, the trackers were forced to walk
around the brush, rather than through it, reducing both noise and physical signs of
movement. There is perhaps no better example of the Rhodesians commonsense
approach to complex problems than the special communications gear used by the trackers
to maintain contact with one another: ordinary, inexpensive dog whistles. Though
inaudible to the untrained human ear, the whistles were an effective means of
communication Between persons attuned to its distinctive pitch.

For an exclusive in depth look at combat tracking skills employed by
the Selous Scouts, check out the following section;

THE FORERUNNER TO THE SELOUS SCOUTS, IN THE COMBAT TRACKING
ARENA.
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SMALL UNIT TACTICS AND SPEC. OPS.
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SMALL UNIT TACTICS
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SPEC. OPS.

The Rhodesians emphasis on special operations for both tactical objectives and
intelligence gathering

stands in stark contrast to the prevailing military view of special
operations as an adjunct to conventional operations and not as a viable and independent
instrument of war. The Rhodesians heavy reliance on small, elite special operations units
(Selous Scouts/S.A.S.) admittedly was dictated by manpower shortages and the overall
strain imposed on the countrys already outnumbered and over committed security forces.
Indeed, approximately 50 percent of all regular training was in the form of small-unit
tactics.

Nonetheless, the weaknesses that necessitated this approach actually proved to be
a source of strength in prosecuting an effective counterinsurgency and reemphasizes the
ineluctable axiom that small, lightly armed and highly mobile guerrilla bands are best
fought by similarly small, lightly armed and highly mobile government forces.
Rhodesian special operations units, for example, carried
out 42 cross-border raids (and provided information
crucial to the success of five Rhodesian Air Force
attacks) of which all but five were complete successes.
Two of the five failures resulted from poor intelligence,
including the April 1979 attempt to kidnap ZIPRA
leader Joshua Nkomo. More than 4,000 insurgents were
killed in the 23 operations that specifically targeted the
enemy units whereas total security force casualties were
only 19 killed or wounded. Of the remaining 19
operations, 15 involved the destruction of insurgent
assets and four the kidnapping of enemy commanders or
senior political officials. The Rhodesians also used these
raids as a means to exploit rivalries within insurgent
organizations, upset relations between the organizations
and their host governments, and dissuade those
governments from providing assistance to and supporting the insurgents struggle.
Certainly, the most successful operation was the 1975 assassination of Herbert Chitepo,
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head of ZANLAs political department, in Lusaka, Zambia.

SPECIAL FORCES FLASH AS WORN BY THE RHODESIAN ELITE:
SELOUS SCOUTS
SPECIAL AIR SERVICE (S.A.S.)
GREYS SCOUTS
THE FLASH WAS BLACK EMBROIDERED ON WHITE MATERIAL BASE.

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DRAKE SHOOT
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DRAKE SHOOT
The Drake shooting (also known as the cover shoot) is a very effective
method for improving the shot-to-hit ratio. It was devised and used by the Selous
Scouts to deal with and counter ambushes set by guerrillas in bush country were
the enemy had ample concealment and was difficult to locate. This useful technique
is based on the fact that in a close-quarters firefight, 99 percent of combatants seek
to hide from incoming fire by hitting the ground and rolling into the nearest cover.
Accepting this fact, the Drake/cover shoot concept requires that two rounds be fired
into positions of likely cover until all positions are neutralized.
Each man of the patrol would concentrate on his assigned arc of
responsibility to his immediate front and systematically analyzed it.
While the scout analyzed his arc he would think if I was the enemy, which
position within my arc would I chosen for cover? The scout would look at the
base of large trees, rocks and thickets, and double-tap two controlled shots into
each side of the suspected location close to ground level. By placing the shots low
into the position, dirt and stones will spray up into the face of anyone hiding there,
causing them to take rapid evasive movements and thus exposing them to aimed
fire. The trick is to try to place the bullets just above the ground, because a man
lying down is no more than 12 inches high. To shoot any higher will result in the
bullet winging harmlessly overhead. A four-man tracking team of scouts could
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quickly and effectively clear 40 potential firing positions, assuming that each man
uses a 20-round magazine on a semiautomatic weapon. In the case of trees, the
scout was trained to fire right into them at almost ground level, as bullets fired
from modern high-velocity weapons can easily and completely penetrate most
trees. As the scout observed his arc he would start close up, then systematically
progress further and further back, widening the arc of fire, until all likely and
suspected positions have been engaged. This technique is effective in flushing
hidden adversaries and is economical in ammunition expenditure.
For training, areas were chosen at random by the instructors for these
purposes and small targets concealed in all likely positions in which an enemy
might take cover. After some practice and coaching, it was quite remarkable at
how many targets were successfully engaged without the firer ever having sight of
the target.
David Scott-Donelan at the Tactical Tracking Operations School is currently
still teaching the Drake/cover shoot to military, police, and special operations
personnel. The technique is taught during the live fire portions of his courses.

DRAKE SHOOT
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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/pseudo_operations_and_the_selous.htm[2012-05-28 11:48:12]

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By J. K. Cilliers

CONTENTS
1. The Concept
2. The Formation of the Selous Scouts
3. Pseudo Modus Operandi
4. Conclusion
5. Notes

PSEUDO DRESS 1966 STYLE
Depicted in this picture is a front view of a Selous Scout
modeling pseudo dress, typical attire of the terrorist, 1966 style. Note Com Block SKS,
modified and makeshift kit.
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Depicted here is the rear view. Note makeshift kit and K-bar
knife.

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PSEUDO-TERRORIST GANGS
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Pseudo-Terrorist Gangs
Pseudo-terrorist gangs are formed from commando/scout units to act the part of real
terrorist groups in operational areas to attain these objectives:
1. To locate the terrorist group in a particular area, by
pretending to be part of its force.
2. To obtain information from the terrorist group on how
it operates in command and political structure.
3. To find out how it enters or is formed inside the
country.
4. To locate the terrorist group to destroy its force.
5. To locate the terrorist group, and if it is of a large size,
to call in a strike by the larger commando unit.
Pseudo-terrorist gangs are the most dangerous and
unrewarding jobs in the new type of guerrilla warfare
during the last thirty years. The trooper involved must be
better than the regular NATO soldier, the paratrooper, the
commando, or the elite special unit soldier.
The man should not be all of these, but a small part of each.
He should be able to operate completely by himself. Many
elite forces speak of operating in this manner, but in reality
they depend on some contact, resupply, or fall-back area. In
pseudo-terrorist gangs, there is none.
The trooper must be solely responsible for himself and his
pseudo-terrorist gang. He must become that terrorist group.
The pseudo-terrorist (PT) gang members must be masters
of surprise tactics.
The PT gang must conform to nothing in the mission except the objective.
The PT gang must press the terrorist group until there is no avenue of retreat except into
the PT hide.
The PT gang must operate without the support of any regular army unit. It must realize
this.
The PT gang must kill or be killed.
The PT gang must dodge, counterstrike, and pressure increasingly.
The PT gang must always move toward the terrorists main command structure.
The PT gang must always strain the terrorist group it is dealing with to the breaking point
"PAMWE
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of point-to-point contact, in most cases fifteen feet or less.
The PT gang must be superior at the point of contact even at the risk of danger of
encirclement by other terrorist groups.
The PT gang must always move as though it has nothing to lose, or the terrorist group
will see that it is guarded and reluctant in its operations.
The PT gang must always have maximum irregularity to throw the terrorist group off its
belief that the PT gang is false. Yet the gang must be articulate in its ambushes of
terrorists.
The pseudo-terrorist gang trooper must possess these qualities:
1. A fertile imagination in schemes, ruses, counter-ruses, plots, and resources.
2. A shrewd intelligence, to orchestrate every incident to his gangs benefit.
(Demonstrate loyalty to fellow troopers.)
3. A steady confidence, unmoved by anxiety, and a continuous sense of humor.
4. An apt memory to remember all the customs, cut-signs, and tricks that the terrorists
use to detect him.
5. An alert, sturdy, and tireless constitution, to endure all physical obstacles as part of
a job without a light at the end.
6. A rapid and accurate glance, which grasps immediately the defects and advantages,
obstacles and risks presented by terrain, objective, or surprise contact with terrorists.
7. No sentiments regarding the political situation at any time.
8. An unquestionable ability to lie, even in the face of death, to protect the gang.
9. The ability to act the part of the savage to the extreme, but not to let the
circumstances turn him from decency.
Lacking such aptitudes, success in this profession is impossible. It is useless for anyone
to rely on some other talent such as prior regular army experience, police or security
work, or elite unit service, or to flatter himself that, by taking pains or good fortune, he
may expect to win the confidence of the turned terrorists in his gang. Reason and the
facts deny such a presumption without fail.
The trooper cannot rely on previous military experience because the deeper the discipline,
the lower the efficiency and average performance. The pseudo-terrorist must be a savage.
He must make do with less food, and exercise greater economy of thought and action. He
must not let heat or cold or any ailment affect him. The terrorist group will see that. What
the pseudo-terrorist wants is to lower himself into the terrorists bowels and become the
terrorists worst fear: a man more savage and ruthless than himself.
(END)
***Source*** This information was obtained from the book: AFRICAN MERC COMBAT MANUAL. By Chris Pessarra. Printed 1986,
Paladin Press.

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THE USE OF PSEUDO GANGS AGAINST THE MAU MAU
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By Leroy Thompson
Particularly in the later stages of the Kenyan counter-insurgency campaign, use by Special Branch of pseudo
gangs to infiltrate and then kill or capture roving bands of terrorists proved particularly effective. Initially, these
pseudo gangs had been formed to gain intelligence within the Reserves but they evolved into fighting groups as
well. Led by European officers in black face make-up, they were able to get close enough to the enemy to kill or
capture them. Such pseudo groups were composed of loyal Kikuyu, sometimes drawn from tribal police or
regular constables, white officers, and turned Mau Mau. The latter were most important for lending credibility,
since they knew the latest secret signs, finger snaps, oaths, etc., with which to convince the Mau Mau of their
authenticity.
Their white officers trained turned Mau Mau in the use of small arms and grenades and in close combat, and in
return learned about the Mau Mau and bushcraft. When operating with the pseudos, the European officers used
potassium permanganate solution to give their skin the right colors. Eventually, as the Mau Mau learned of the
existence of these pseudo gangs, it was often necessary for European officers to paint their entire bodies, in case
a shirt was suddenly jerked up to look for white skin. A weaker potassium permanganate solution was also used
to give their eyes the proper yellow coloration. The hair was normally the most obvious giveaway for white
pseudos and though they tried using floppy hats, eventually many used wigs, often obtained from the hair of dead
terrorists. So they would not give away their group, Europeans had to learn to squat, eat, take snuff, and in
general act as genuine Mau Mau. To get the proper look and smell they wore captured Mau Mau clothing, and
did not wash. Even so, each white in a pseudo group had a cover man or bodyguard, whose primary job was to
draw attention away from him.
Like the gangs, the pseudos would call at villages at night for food, but in the process would gain information.
The night hours offered the advantage of making it easier for the Europeans to escape notice, but it was also the
time when the real Mau Mau came. Often the information they gained about Mau Mau gangs would be passed to
tracker-combat teams consisting of three Europeans, fifteen African constables, and a Wanderobo tracker, but in
some cases the pseudo gangs would follow up their own leads by merging with other gangs before arresting or
ambushing them. As might be expected, the pseudo gangs had to be very careful not to get into firefights with
the security forces.
The system of using turned Mau Mau in this way worked, and throughout the pseudo operations there were
virtually no instances of converts going back over to the Mau Mau. Normally, pseudo gangs consisted of eight to
ten, often with one or two women members, since real Mau Mau gangs had female members. In general, pseudos
did not receive pay, but many shared rewards for the terrorists they had accounted for. Such pseudo operations
were not new, but it was in Kenya that they were formalized into a highly successful counter-insurgent tactic.
Later in Rhodesia, the Selous Scouts would perfect the technique.
(END)
***Source*** This article was obtained from the book: DIRTY WARS- elite forces vs. the guerrillas. By leroy Thompson. Printed 1988.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/combat_tracking_techniques.htm[2012-05-28 11:48:29]

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COMBAT TRACKING TECHNIQUES:
HOW TO TRACK YOUR ENEMY.
BY JOHN EARLY (CAPTAIN)
Sweat stings tired, dust-filled eyes. Adrenaline throbs like an electric river through your body as you search
the near by bush. Every nerve feels for the enemy you know is there somewhere.
Your unit has been ambushed and the guerrillas have broken contact and fled. At least, thats what you think.
If your unit is lucky or well-trained or both, you may have few or no casualties and your blood is up to get the
bastards.
The problem: how to track your enemy.
Todays mercenary soldier is usually the product of NATO-styled, technologically-oriented armies and as such has
had little experience in tracking people. He is usually a foreigner, brought in to stabilize a desperate situation or to bail
out some well-heeled bigwig, and is operating on strange terrain, under difficult conditions with marginal troops.
Perhaps you should think back to a few months earlier when you first began this operation and lets assume
you are operating on a fairly long-term contract.
Your first concern is the terrain. You cant track in it, if you dont have a rudimentary knowledge of the Lay
of the land. Prior to operating in the area, you should, ideally, have spent a few days acclimating your troops,
if they are not local boys. During this period, thorough map studies with available maps, air photos, and even
touring guides can be helpful. Extract detailed briefings from the local police, military officials, and
population. Talk to local farmers, natives, anyone who has been in the area in which you will be operating.
Your equipment should be organized during this period as well, and any remedial training necessary conducted. Pay
special attention to camouflage. Secure all your gear, discard the inessentials, and inspect the troops for the same.
Carry food, water, and ammunition and go as light as possible. Some trackers dress like the enemy and use captured
weapons. This is helpful if you are tracking outside your own country and into enemy-dominated countries.
Exercise caution. A large number of people, dressed in the correct
uniform, have been shot in error by their own troops. Weigh the pros
and cons carefully. Also try to learn as much about native fieldcraft as
possible. How do they use the terrain to survive? Where do they get
food and water, and what do they use for expedient tools and
weapons?
Study all information on local weather. It will have a definite effect on
your operations and hence your tracking. By enlisting the natives, if
possible, to teach you about local vegetation, you will gain excellent
survival information which may help you make decisions as to enemy
movements. If he is far from his supply bases, he will attempt to live off the land to sustain or even expand
his operations, especially if native assistance is denied him.
How ever, do not assume that the enemy is an excellent bushman just because he is indigenous to that
continent. In Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, terrorists have been found wandering, lost and starving,
because they were also strangers.
My tracking instructor in Selous Scouts once related that he could track and live most anywhere but that his
effectiveness would be greatly reduced outside his native area and consequently his confidence in his ability would
suffer. And he was considered to be the best tracker in Rhodesia. If you know the ground and are comfortable in it,
you already have a 30 percent edge on the enemy.
Also, during your terrain study, note native customs and attempt to learn some of the language and folklore. This
takes time and effort and on short-term jobs will be nearly impossible, but if you have the time, it will pay big
dividends. It may give you the necessary edge to come out of the next contact as the champ rather than the chump.
"PAMWE
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Glean as much information as possible about animal wildlife in the area, It will be invaluable in tracking and
if your next supply column is ambushed or the quartermaster sells it and retires to the south of France you can
still feed your troops.
KNOW THE ENEMY
Secondly, know your enemy. The better you understand him, his motives, aspirations, traits, habits, tactics,
and attitudes, the greater your tactical edge on him. As a result, you will be able to run him to ground sooner.
Once you understand the enemy, your task will become much easier.
If possible, keep notes on tactics employed against your unit and other police and para-military groups. Look
for patterns of the enemy in general and specific commanders in particular. Watch his standard operating
procedures and record his responses to your tactics. Intelligence is usually extremely limited to a mercenary,
so be your own S-2. Absorb every piece of information available to you.
Now that you have some idea as to the enemy and the situation, you may investigate the feasibility of using
native trackers. Seek out local authorities as to who the headman, local chief or Kraal head is and his
location. Then with one of the officials, who is known to the chief, approach him for the assistance of the
most reliable, efficient trackers in the area. You may have difficulty since he may be in sympathy with the
guerrillas or just plain scared. Allay his fears if possible, and be prepared to offer top wages and protection for
the trackers and their families. This is the only way to assure some semblance of loyalty. Investigate any
native male of military age who might be seeking revenge against the terrorists. Use this to your advantage.
When dealing with native troops, be firm, fair, and honest. Be friendly but not familiar and treat them with respect
and accord them the dignity due their station in the tribe; Treat them well but not lavishly. Make sure they understand
exactly what is expected of them and guide them adequately in the field. Never assume anything and always be
decisive. Never promise them anything unless you can deliver immediately and never lie to them. In many situations
only mutual trust and respect will keep them loyal to you.
Once you have employed your trackers, you may be puzzled as to how to gauge their effectiveness. Probably
the most positive way is to see how often they track into contact. If they are constantly being fired on first,
then your troops are only marginal types. Good trackers will be able to tell how far ahead the enemy is and
alert you to this fact so you can request air cover or more follow-up troops to reinforce your patrol.
One of the premier trackers in Rhodesia, an African NCO in Selous Scouts, has personally tracked into and
killed 80-plus terrorists since the war began. What is even more remarkable and clearly demonstrates his
prowess is the fact that he has tracked and located twice that number of terrorists without the enemy realizing
his presence until the follow-up troops attacked. He is so valuable that he is now responsible for training
tracking personnel for the entire Rhodesian Army and is only called out when specific terrorist commanders
are suspected of operating in the area.
This article has been written to help you if you wish to become a better tracker or to know enough to properly
employ and command tracking teams. This knowledge will not make you a tracker: Only practice, practice,
and more practice, under expert supervision, will do that.

HOW TO TRACK
Now, for the most important aspect: How to track. First, psychologically and physically prepare for the hunt. You
should be in good physical condition with excellent reserves of stamina, alert, reasonably well fed and above all
confident in yourself and your men. You may be forced to travel for days under adverse conditions, without food and
with little water, at a fast pace and tinder tremendous mental stress. Tracking requires intense concentration, stamina
and an eye for detail.
Secondly, you must know what to look for when reading spoor (tracks). When you begin tracking, try
spooring large groups in easy terrain for short distances. Usually soft ground with knee-high grass is best.
Send out three or four people with instructions to walk for about five to 10 minutes, depending on the bush
growth, and then rest until you find them. Your attention span at first will be short and you will tend to
discourage quickly. You will lose the spoor often, but dont worry. No-one is a born bushman. Be patient and
concentrate on the spoor. As you become more aware of what to look for, the legs of spoor can be lengthened
until your spoor layers are given a 30-minute head start. This can be extended to hours until they are laying
spoor in the morning and you are tracking later in the day.
As you are tracking, look for evidence (track signs) of disturbed grass; bent blades will reveal the direction of
travel. The top of the grass will point in the direction the person is walking. if the enemy has passed through
after sunrise the dew will be disturbed and a faint darkened area will reveal his trail. Watch for broken spider
webs or cobwebs. When examining spoor always keep your head slightly up and look 15 to 20 yards ahead of
you. It will enable you to see the spoor better, determine the direction of movement, and keep alert for likely
ambush areas, If the terrorist knows or suspects he is being followed, he will try to set you up.
Be alert, patient, and careful. Watch for rocks that have been overturned. The dark side will be up or you will
see the impression on the ground where it once rested. Although mid-day heat will dry the rock quickly, it
tells you the terrorist is only hours ahead of you. If you find it in the morning, then he has been moving prior
to sunrise. The darker and wetter the rock, the closer your quarry.
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Much of tracking means noting what is out of context in nature and realizing the cause. Move from sign to sign and
always be sure of your last confirmed sign before you move on to the next. There are, of course, the obvious:
footprints in the mud near streams and water holes and along sandy rivers; leaves on plants that have been broken,
knocked off, or turned so that the light underside contrasts with the surroundings; scuffed tree bark or mud scraped
from passing boots and the impression of rifle butts being used as crutches or canes up steep slopes. Of course, there is
the old favorite, blood on the vegetation and trail.
Watch for discarded ration packages, food tins, and even dropped or discarded documents. U.S. troops in Vietnam
were easily tracked, not by recently cut jungle foliage but by their inevitable trail of Kool-Aid packages. Once you
have identified the spoor, try to identify the type of foot gear. Often different guerrilla groups wear different type
boots. Terrorists in Rhodesia have been killed and captured carrying two or three types of shoes and wearing two or
three shirts and pants, at the same time! Make sure the print is not one of your own people or security forces and keep
a record of the different type prints you encounter. Plaster impressions, drawings, photos or even a copy of the soles
themselves should be on record with local intelligence people. The Rhodesians and South Africans make copies of all
terrorist footwear and distribute these drawings to the local population. Village police, hunters, and farmers walking in
the bush have often discovered the trail of terrorist gangs who have crossed from Zambia or Mozambique and have
alerted the security forces.
The depth and space of the tracks will also tell you something about your foe. Women take smaller steps, as
do heavily laden men. People running will leave more space between tracks and men walking in each others
tracks will make deeper impressions. Also, they will cause the edges of the tracks to be less distinct. Drag
marks could indicate wounded. Once you have identified your particular track, follow it even if the group
splits. Sometimes guerrillas will split up or bombshell, until you are left following one set of tracks.
TRACKING TEAMS
If you have the personnel, you can assign tracking teams to each set of tracks. If not, pick one and run him to
ground, then pick another. Try to stay with the main body, if possible. You may get lucky and nail the
commander or political officer or you may end up following the spoor to the RV point where you can ambush
the entire gang.
Sunlight will also have some effect on reading spoor. If you are tracking into the sun and are experiencing
difficulty in seeing the sign, look back over your shoulder every few yards to confirm your spoor. Never walk
on your spoor and caution the follow-up troops behind you also to walk to one side of the tracks.
If you lose the spoor, it is imperative that you go back to the last positive sign, confirm it, and then begin a
search pattern to relocate the tracks. Watch for the absence of insects or wildlife. Most wild creatures are shy
of man and will seek shelter if he has been in the area. Birds are great indicators of men as are baboon,
impala, and many types of deer. Listen for animals snorting or running and note the direction. Something is
there.
If you lose the trail, there are a number of search patterns used to relocate spoor. The most common are the cross
grain, the box search and the 360-degree sweep. Go back to the last positive spoor and mark it. Then look up to about
25 to 30 meters in front of you and sweep from center to left out about to 45 degrees and then sweep back to center.
Repeat the process to the right, each time coming back to your feet and the last confirmed spoor. Look carefully and
slowly and most times you will pick up the spoor again.
If not, brief the troop commander to alert his men to the fact that your trackers will be circling to the front
and flanks and possibly to the rear.
CROSS GRAIN METHOD
To use the cross grain method the tracker moves laterally from the spoor either left or right about 100 meters and then
doubles back toward his original line of march. Each time he turns, the tracker should advance about 50 to 75 meters
forward before doubling back. (See the accompanying diagram.) If you have moved approximately 500 meters ahead
of the last spoor and still cannot find the tracks, resort to the 360-degree method, gradually expanding your circle until
you find your spoor.
360-DEGREE METHOD
In the 360-degree method, the tracker makes ever increasing circles from his last confirmed tracks back to his
point of origin. When you lose spoor, be patient and keep looking. Some trackers have been known to circle
as far as five kilometers from the last confirmed spoor until they cut the trail of their prey. (See accompanying
diagram.)
BOX METHOD
Sometimes used is the box method of search in which each half of the area is boxed off and examined on the
two sides of the spoor. This time-consuming method is confusing and is not frequently used today. (See
accompanying diagram.)
Another important point is to determine the age of the spoor and the number of personnel involved. To
determine age, note the way in which vegetation is disturbed. Grass blades will remain green for about a day
after being broken. Prints in mud will usually take about an hour to fill with water, depending on the amount
of moisture in the earth. Disturbed dew drops on grass and plants will indicate passage of something within
the last few hours. Dew usually stays on for about four hours after sunrise. Overturned rocks take a couple of
hours to dry in direct sun. Cobwebs and spider webs usually take about an hour to be replaced by the insects.
Rain can also be used to your advantage to indicate age of spoor. if you know the last time it rained in the area, you
can tell how old tracks are. Animal prints superimposed on the spoor will tell you that the spoor was made prior to
nightfall, since most animals move at night. The reverse is applicable. If you see the spoor on the animal prints, the
spoor was made sometime after sunrise.
Broken twigs and vines are also good gauges of time since it requires about 10 hours for the pulp inside to
begin to turn brown. If you discover a resting area, check the campfires heat. Look for cigarette butts, ration
tins, documents, letters, or diaries. If your terrorist is communist oriented, he will usually be carrying a diary.
Look for human feces near the camp. Interrogate all the locals you meet. They may be hiding the guerrillas,
feeding them, or know where they are camped. The trail itself can be used to tell age. If it is erratic or
circuitous, your enemy may be walking in the dark.

U.S. RANGER AND AFRICAN COUNTS
The second most important factor is the number of people you are tracking. There are two methods I have
seen used. The first is taught to Special Forces and Ranger graduates and is used by the U.S. Army; the other
is popular with Rhodesian and South African Defense Forces. In the U.S. method, take the length of an
average pace and measure it on the ground next to the tracks. Now lay out a space about 18 inches wide
across the tracks so that the prints are enclosed in a box that is 36 inches by 18 inches. Count all the whole and
partial prints in this box and then divide by a constant of two. If you count 10 prints inside the box, your
answer is five people.
The Rhodesian method uses the length of the FN rifle or G-3 rifle and the same 18 inch (45cm) width. Using this
method, count only the whole prints you see inside the box. If the answer is four or less, that is what you report to
the team leader or headquarters. If the answer is five prints, then add two to the number and report that number. If
you read six, add two and report eight. This is a safety factor that seems to be right most of the time.
Should you discover a resting place, count the places on the ground and no matter what the number, add two
and report that number. Should you be operating more conventionally, call in periodic tracking reports to your
headquarters. These can be plotted on a map and a general pattern determined. It will also allow different
terrorist groups to be plotted together to determine if this is some sort of coordinated action. It will also
establish what routes are being used to funnel enemy troops into and out of the area.
A sample of a tracking report might follow the following format. Use the code word NDAT. First give your location
using the standard military grid system. The N is the number you believe to be in the enemy unit as determined by
your print count. D is the general direction of spoor expressed by magnetic bearing. A is age of spoor, if possible.
And T equals type of spoor followed, boots, shoes, bare feet, etc.
TRACKING TEAMS
Next, lets discuss tracking team assignments and duties. First, the team leader: He is responsible for the
control of the team and all follow-up troops until the time of contact, when control of the follow-up units
reverts to the ground commander. Once the trackers have found the enemy, conventional tactics can be used
to close with and kill him. The team leader relays information to the CO follow-up troops and the next higher
headquarters. He is responsible for briefing the troops in the team operation and what duties he will expect of
the ground follow-up unit. On contact, he extracts the team, if possible, and allows the infantry to engage the
enemy. Trackers are too valuable to risk in a fire fight and should not engage unless there is a serious
manpower shortage. He is also the tail gunner, if the team is working alone.
The tracker: He is responsible for reading the spoor and interpreting it to the team leader.
The flankers: These two men, who are also trained trackers, are responsible for the forward and flank security
of the tracker. As the tracker becomes fatigued, they rotate duties with him so that all the trackers remain
fresh and alert. The team leader does not pull tracker or flanker duty. The flankers function is most
important; he will probably see and engage the enemy first. He must be alert and ready for instant action.
Follow-up troops: These men are under the control of the team leader until contact is made or the enemy
pointed out to the CO of the follow-up unit. Follow-up troops should be in close proximity to the trackers,
although reinforcements can be vehicle or airborne and on call.
RULES
Now for general rules concerning tracking teams:
1. All members of the tracking team should be trained, experienced trackers.
2. Four men seems to be the best number for team size.
3. If possible, never separate a team once formed. Teamwork saves lives and gets results.
4. Get the trackers on the spoor as soon as possible.
5. Once the tracking team commander is on the ground, be he private, lance corporal or general, he is in charge.
More tracking scenes have been blown by operations-room signal officers and helicopter pilots with Napoleon
complexes than I can count. Until contact with the enemy is made or spoor is lost, the team leader is boss! If this
rule cannot be adhered to, have no qualms about packing up and going home.
6. Rotate tracker and flanker often. Tracking requires exacting concentration and the pressure is terrific. The team
leader should watch for these signs always.
7. When operating, use hand signals at all times. If you must confer, take cover and whisper. You can devise your
own signals but use the same ones consistently.
8. Rest your teams as often as possible. Once on the spoor, they may be forced to travel for many days.
Tired people make mistakes.
9. If a general pattern is discernible by the intell chaps, you may wish to try to leap-frog to get ahead of the
guerrillas. While one team is tracking, have another check a few kilometers ahead for the same spoor. If
found, up-lift your team and continue the trail there. Use this technique carefully and dont try to hurry.
10. If you have the teams, you can saturate the area being tracked.
Just about all standard infantry tactics apply to tracking teams with the exception of the crossing of obstacles such as
rivers, streams, roads, trails, or rail lines. Instead of the flankers crossing to recon the other side and then calling the
rest of the unit over, the team, after carefully observing the far side, crosses together under the cover of the follow-up
troops. This is done to keep any spoor on the other side intact and undisturbed. The risk imposed upon the team by use
of this tactic is less important than staying on the tracks of what could prove to be an important guerrilla leader.
FORMATIONS
The standard tracking formation is Y shaped, with the flankers forming the open legs of the Y and the tracker at the
junction, with the team leader directly behind him. The team leader remains about five meters behind the tracker, and
the flankers remain forward of the tracker and to the side as much as terrain and vegetation will allow. (See diagram
4.) Usually the follow-up troops will be in file behind the team; however, 4 Battalion, The Rhodesia Regiment, has
developed a unique formation that seems to work well in African bush. (See diagram 5.)
Once contact is imminent, troops can move to a skirmish line behind and to the flanks of the tracking team.
This allows the troops to move forward at once and leaves the trackers a gap to fall back through. If you are
short of men, the trackers can maintain their place in the sweep line and reinforce the infantry (the trackers
seem to prefer this idea so they can get a few shots off as well).
I have also seen an off-set formation used as well. On contact, the troops swing out and up on the flanks
until you have a complete sweep line and then all move forward together. (See diagram 6.)

ANTI-TRACKING
The techniques for anti-tracking are as varied as your imagination. You may be the one being tracked some
day, so give some thought to covering your trail. Here are some possibilities:
1. Wear the same boots as the enemy, if you are operating in his territory. If he goes barefoot you could be in for
some tough going.
2. Use animals or cattle to cover your tracks.
3. Move in the rain if possible.
4. Use streams and rivers, roads and railways to cover your spoor.
5. Walk on rocky or hard ground.
6. Move through villages to get lost in the tracks. (Note: If you are desperate enough to try to penetrate a village, do
so very carefully at night and only as a last resort.)
7. Split up or bombshell and circle back and RV (rendezvous).
8. Brush out your tracks with bushes, hats, or neck scarves.
9. If dogs are after you, try using CS or tear gas powder or pepper laced with ammonia on your tracks.
10. If you can, booby trap and ambush your trail.
SCOUT DOG TEAMS
Finally, we come to an aspect of tracking that has been used extensively by NATO-style armies in Europe
and Asia:
scout dog teams.
If you have the use of scout dog teams, by all means , employ them. They are there to support the ground troops in
locating the enemy and to provide silent warning. They may also be used as listening and observation posts. Once you
know you are going to use dogs, have them assigned to the unit as far ahead of the mission as possible. This gives the
team and the dogs time to adjust to each other. The handler should let each member of the patrol touch the dog to
eliminate fears the men might have. Scout dogs have limitations which should be borne in mind. Dogs have acute
senses of smell, good hearing, and are attracted quickly to movement. Dogs are subject to periodic retraining and are
as sensitive to the elements as humans.
The best position for the dog team is directly in front of the patrol. Wind conditions may require that the
team move to windward to take advantage of the dogs sense of smell. Some dogs can, depending on weather
and wind, sense the enemy 200 meters away.
The dog can be used to locate sentries and determine the extent of positions and emplacements and may assist
the patrol leader in setting up his men without being detected by the enemy.
The following are some general rules for dog teams:
1. If the handler is killed, leave the dog with him and report it to your HQ.
2. If the handler is a casualty, try to lure the dog away so you can treat him. If you must evacuate one, send
the other as well.
3. Treat the team as one of the unit. Support them and keep the handler informed of all tactical moves.
4. Let the handler select the dogs position in the line of march.
5. Seek the handlers advice in employing the team.
6. Do not expect the team to perform miracles and do not relax your alertness because they are with you.
7. Do not feed or play with the dog.
Although the information in this article will not make you an ace tracker, it will give you a better awareness
of tracking and the tactics employed by tracking teams and the Selous Scouts.
The only way to become a competent, reliable tracker is to use the method of the natives: practice, practice,
practice. It is a skill that can stand you in good stead on your next operation, enhance your combat
effectiveness, and perhaps save your life.
(END)
Tracking was among the skills that Capt. John Early, SOF contributing editor for military affairs, learned in
his 12 years with the U.S. Army and three years with the Rhodesian air force and army. In the Army, Early
spent 4 years in Vietnam as a Special Forces NCO and officer with the 5th and 10th SFGA. His Rhodesian
tour included service with the elite Selous Scouts.
**NOTE** The source for this article was from SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, July 1979, page 52.


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With common sense and a degree of experience, you can track terrorists. You must
develop the following traits and qualities to be successful and to lead your stick to
contact.
- Be patient and steady.
- Be able to move slowly and quietly, yet steadily, while detecting and interpreting
signs.
- Avoid fast movement that may cause you to overlook signs, lose the spoor, or
blunder into a terrorist unit that is counter tracking.
- Be persistent and have the skill and desire to continue the mission even though
signs are scarce or bad weather or terrain is destroying the spoor.
- Be determined and persistent when trying to find a spoor you have lost.
- Be observant and try to see things that are not obvious at first glance.
- Use your sense of smell and hearing to supplement your sight and intuition.
- Develop a feel for things that do not look right. It may help you regain a lost trail
or discover additional spoor.
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- Know the terrorist, his habits, equipment, and capability.
- Trust your stick to back you up and your other troops to protect you.
TECHNIQUES
The ability to track a terrorist after he has broken contact also helps you regain contact
with him, which is more important in the African bush than in any other theater of
war.
Visual tracking is following the paths of men or animals by the signs they leave,
primarily on the ground or vegetation. Scent tracking is following men or animals by
their smell.
Tracking is a precise art. You need a lot of practice to achieve and maintain a high
level of tracking skill. You should be familiar with the general techniques of tracking
to enable you to detect the presence of a hidden enemy and to follow him, to find and
avoid mines or booby traps, and to give early warning of ambush.
Perhaps you should think back to when you first began this operation. Lets assume
you are operating on a fairly long-term contract.
Your first concern is the terrain. You cant track in it if you dont have a rudimentary
knowledge of the lay of the land. Prior to operating in the area, you should ideally
have spent a few days acclimating your troops, if they are not local civilians. During
this period, thorough study of available maps, air photos, and even tour guides can be
helpful. Extract detailed briefings from the local police, military officials, and
population. Talk to local farmers, natives, police units, anyone who has been in the
area in which you will be operating.
Your equipment should be organized during this period as well , and any remedial
training conducted. Pay special attention to camouflage. Secure all your gear, discard
inessentials, and inspect the troops for the same. Carry food, water, and ammunition
and go as light as possible. Some trackers dress like the terrorists and use captured
weapons. This is helpful if you are tracking outside your own country into enemy-
dominated countries.
Exercise caution. A large number of people, dressed in the correct uniform, have been
shot in error by their own troops. Weigh the pros and cons carefully. Also try to learn
as much about native fieldcraft as possible. How do they use the terrain to survive?
Where do they get food and water, and what do they use for expedient tools and
weapons?
Study all information on local weather. It will have a definite effect on your operations
and hence your tracking. By enlisting the natives, if possible, to teach you about local
vegetation, you will gain excellent survival information which may help you make
decisions about terrorist movements. If he is far from his supply bases, he will attempt
to live off the land to sustain or even expand his operations, especially if native
assistance is denied him.
However, do not assume that the enemy is an excellent bushman just because he is
indigenous to that continent. In Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, terrorists have
been found wandering, lost and starving, because they were also strangers. If you
know the ground and are comfortable in it, you already have a 30-percent edge on the
enemy.
Also, during your terrain study, note native customs and attempt to learn some of the
language and folklore. This takes time and effort and on short-term jobs will be nearly
impossible, but if you have the time, it will pay big dividends. It may give you the
necessary edge to come out of the next contact standing up instead of lying down.
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Learn as much information as possible about wildlife in the area. It will be invaluable
in tracking.
When tracking a terrorist, you should build a picture of him in your mind. Ask
yourself, How many persons am I following? How well are they trained? How are
they equipped? Are they healthy? How is their morale? Do they know they are being
followed? You should ask questions of the survivors of a terrorist attack and find out
as much about the leader as possible and how he thinks.
Know the terrorist. The better you understand him, his motives, aspirations, traits,
habits, tactics, and attitudes, the greater your tactical edge. As a result, you will be
able to run him to ground sooner. Once you understand the terrorist, your task will
become much easier.
If possible, keep notes on tactics employed against your stick and other police and
paramilitary groups. Look for patterns of the terrorist group in general and of specific
commanders in particular. Watch his standard operating procedures and record his
responses to your tactics. Intelligence is usually extremely limited to a mercenary, so
be your own second in charge (2 IC). Absorb every piece of information available to
you.
Now that you have some idea as to the terrorist group and the situation, you may
investigate the feasibility of using native trackers. Ask local authorities who the
headman, local chief, or kraal head is and his location. Then with one of the officials,
who is known to the chief, approach him for the assistance of the most reliable,
efficient trackers in the area. You may have difficulty since he may be in sympathy
with the terrorist group or just plain scared. Allay his fears if possible, and be prepared
to offer top wages and protection for the trackers and their families. This is the only
way to ensure some semblance of loyalty. Investigate any native male of military age
who might be seeking revenge against the terrorists. Use this to your advantage.
When dealing with native troops, be firm, fair, and honest. Be friendly but not
familiar; treat them with respect and accord them the dignity due their station in the
tribe. Treat them well but not lavishly. Make sure they understand exactly what is
expected of them and guide them adequately in the field. Never assume anything
unless you can deliver, and never lie to them. In many situations only mutual trust
and respect will keep them loyal to you.
Once you have employed your trackers, you may wonder how to gauge their
effectiveness. Probably the most positive way is to see how often they track into
contact. If they are constantly being fired on first, then your trackers are of only
marginal ability. Good trackers will be able to tell how far ahead the enemy is and
alert you to this so you can request air cover or more follow-up troops to reinforce
your patrol.
This chapter has been written to help you if you wish to become a better tracker or to
know enough to properly employ and command tracking teams. This knowledge will
not make you a tracker. Only practice, practice, and more practice, under expert
supervision, will do that.
How to Track
Now for the most important aspect: How to track. First, psychologically and
physically prepare for the hunt. You should be in good physical condition with
excellent reserves of stamina, alert, reasonably well-fed, and above all confident in
yourself and your men. You may be forced to travel for days under adverse
conditions, without food and with little water, at a fast pace, and under tremendous
mental stress. Tracking requires intense concentration, stamina, and an eye for detail.
Secondly, you must know what to look for when reading spoor (tracks). When you
begin tracking, try spooring large groups in easy terrain for short distances.
Usually soft ground with knee-high grass is best. Send out three or four people with
instructions to walk for about five to ten minutes, depending on the bush growth, and
then track until you find them. Your attention span at first will be short and you will
tend to become discouraged quickly. You will lose the spoor often, but dont worry.
No one is a born bushman. Be patient and concentrate on the spoor. As you become
more aware of what to look for, the legs of spoor can be lengthened until spoor layers
are given a thirty-minute head start. This can be extended to hours, until they are
laying spoor in the morning and you are tracking later in the day.
As you are tracking, look for evidence of disturbed grass; bent blades will reveal the
direction of travel. The top of the grass will point in the direction the person is
walking. If the enemy has passed through after sunrise, the dew will be disturbed and
a faint darkened area will reveal his trail. Watch for broken spider webs or cobwebs.
When examining spoor always keep your head slightly up and look fifteen to twenty
yards ahead of you. It will enable you to see the spoor better, determine the direction
of movement, and keep alert for likely ambush areas. If the terrorist knows or
suspects he is being followed, he will try to set you up.
Be alert, patient, and careful. Watch for rocks that have been overturned. The dark
side will be up or you will see the impression on the ground where it once rested.
Although midday heat will dry the rock quickly, it tells you the terrorist is only hours
ahead of you. If you find it in the morning, then he has been moving prior to sunrise.
The darker and wetter the rock, the closer your quarry.
Much of tracking means noting what is out of context in nature and realizing the
cause. Move from sign to sign and always be sure of your last confirmed sign before
you move on to the next. There are, of course, the obvious: footprints in the mud
near streams and water holes and along sandy rivers; leaves on plants that have been
broken, knocked off, or turned so that the light underside contrasts with the
surroundings; scuffed tree bark or mud scraped from passing boots and the impression
of rifle butts being used as crutches or canes up steep slopes. Of course, there is the
old favorite, blood on the trail.
Watch for discarded ration packages, food tins, and even dropped or discarded
documents. U.S. troops in Vietnam were easily tracked, not by recently cut jungle
foliage but by their inevitable trail of Kool-Aid packages and junk. Once you have
identified the spoor, try to identify the type of footgear. Often different guerrilla
groups wear different types of boots. Terrorists in Africa have been killed and
captured carrying two or three types of shoes and wearing two or three shirts and pants
at the same time! Make sure the print is not one of your own people or a regular army
unit, and keep a record of the different types of prints you encounter. Plaster
impressions, drawings, photos or even a copy of the soles themselves should be on
record with local intelligence people. The military intelligence unit makes copies of
all terrorist footwear and distributes these drawings to local population. Village police,
hunters, and farmers walking in the bush have often discovered the trails of terrorist
gangs who have crossed from one border to another and have alerted the security
forces.
The depth and space of the tracks will also tell you something about your foe. Women
take smaller steps, as do heavily laden men. People running will leave more space
between tracks, and men walking in each others tracks will make deeper impressions.
Also, they will cause the edges of the tracks to be less distinct. Drag marks could
indicate wounded. Once you have identified your particular track, follow it even if the
group splits. Sometimes guerrillas will split up or bombshell until you are left
following one set of tracks.
Tracking Teams
If you have the personnel, you can assign tracking teams to each terrorists tracks. If
not, pick one and run him to ground, then pick another. Try to stay with the main
body, if possible. You may get lucky and nail the commander or political officer or
you may end up following the spoor to the RV point where you can ambush the entire
gang.
Sunlight will also have some effect on reading spoor. If you are tracking into the sun
and are experiencing difficulty in seeing the sign, look back over your shoulder every
few yards to confirm your spoor. Never walk on the spoor and caution the follow-up
troops behind you to also walk to one side of the tracks.
If you lose the spoor, it is imperative that you go back to the last positive sign,
confirm it, and then begin a search pattern to relocate the tracks. Watch for the
absence of insects or wildlife. Most wild creatures are shy of man and will seek
shelter if he has been in the area. Birds are great indicators of men, as are baboon,
impala, and many types of gazelle. Listen for animals snorting or running and note the
direction. Something is there.
If you lose the trail, there are a number of search patterns used to relocate spoor. The
most common are the cross-grain, the box search, and the 360-degree sweep. Go back
to the last positive spoor and mark it. Then look up to about twenty-five to thirty
meters in front of you and sweep from the center to the left out about to 45 degrees
and then sweep back to center. Repeat the process to the right, each time coming back
to your feet and the last confirmed spoor. Look carefully and slowly and most times
you will pick up the spoor again. If not, brief the troop commander to alert his men
that your trackers will be circling to the front and flanks and possibly to the rear.
Team Duties
Next, lets discuss tracking team assignments and duties. First, the stick leader. He is
responsible for the control of the team and all follow-up troops until the time of
contact, when control of the follow-up units reverts to the ground commander. Once
the trackers have found the terrorist group, conventional tactics can be used to close
with and kill them. The stick leader relays information to the commando unit follow-
up troops and the next higher headquarters. He is responsible for briefing the troops in
the team operation and what duties he will expect of the ground follow-up unit. On
contact, he extracts the tracking team, if possible, and allows the infantry to engage
the terrorist group. Trackers are too valuable to risk in a firefight and should not
engage unless there is a serious manpower shortage. He is also the tail trooper, if the
team is working alone.
The tracker. He is responsible for reading the spoor and interpreting it to the stick
leader.
The flankers. These two troopers, who are also trained trackers, are responsible for
the forward and flank security of the tracker. As the tracker becomes fatigued, they
rotate duties with him so that all the trackers remain fresh and alert. The stick leader
does not pull tracker or flanker duty. The flankers function is most important; he will
probably see and engage the enemy first. He must be alert and ready for instant action.
Follow-up troops. These troopers are under the control of the stick leader until contact
is made or the terrorists pointed out to the commander of the follow-up unit. Follow-
up troops should be in close proximity to the trackers, although reinforcements can be
vehicles or airborne and on call.
Generally just about all standard infantry tactics apply to tracking sticks with the
exception of crossing obstacles such as rivers, streams, roads, trails, or rail lines.
Instead of the flankers crossing to recon the other side and then calling the rest of the
unit over, the stick, after carefully observing the far side, crosses together under the
cover of the follow-up troops. This is done to keep any spoor on the other side intact
and undisturbed. The risk imposed upon the stick by use of this tactic is less important
than staying on the tracks of what could prove to be an important terrorist leader.
Formations
The standard tracking formation is V-shaped, with the flankers forming the open legs
of the V and the tracker at the junction, with the stick leader directly behind him. The
stick leader remains about five meters behind the tracker, and the flankers remain
forward of the tracker and to the side as much as terrain and vegetation will allow.
Spoor Age
Another important point is to determine the age of the spoor and the number of
personnel involved. To determine age, note the way in which vegetation is disturbed.
Grass blades will remain green for about a day after being broken. Prints in mud will
usually take about an hour to fill with water, depending on the amount of moisture in
the earth. Disturbed dew drops on grass and plants will indicate passage of something
within the last few hours. Dew usually stays on for about four hours after sunrise.
Overturned rocks take a couple of hours to dry in direct sun. Cobwebs and spider
webs usually take about an hour to be replaced by the insects.
Rain can also be used to your advantage to indicate age of spoor. If you know the last
time it rained in the area, you can tell how old the tracks are. Animal prints
superimposed on the spoor will tell you that the spoor was made prior to nightfall,
since most animals move at night. The reverse is also applicable; if you see the spoor
on the animal prints, the spoor was made sometime after sunrise.
Broken twigs and vines are also good gauges of time since it requires about ten hours
for the pulp inside to begin to turn brown. If you discover a resting area, check the
campfires heat. Look for cigarette butts, ration tins, documents, letters, or diaries. If
your terrorist is communistoriented, he will usually be carrying a diary. Look for
human feces near the camp. Interrogate all the locals you meet. They may be hiding
the terrorists, feeding them, or know where they are camped. The trail itself can be
used to tell age. If it is erratic or circuitous, your terrorist may be walking in the dark.
Displacement
Displacement takes place when something is moved from its original position. An
example is a footprint in soft, moist ground. The foot of the person that left the print
displaced the soil, leaving an indentation in the ground. By studying the print, you can
determine many facts. For example, a print that was left by a barefooted person or one
with worn or frayed footgear indicates that he may have poor equipment.
Footprints show the following:
1. The direction and rate of movement of the terrorist group.
2. The number of terrorists in the group.
3. Whether or not heavy loads are carried.
4. The sex of the terrorist group.
5. Whether the terrorists know they are being tracked.
If the footprints are deep and the pace is long, the group is moving rapidly. Very long
strides and deep prints indicate that the group is running. If the prints are deep, short,
and widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, a heavy load is probably being
carried by the group who left the prints.
You can also determine a terrorists sex by studying the size and position of the
footprints. Women generally tend to be pigeon-toed, while men usually walk with
their feet pointed straight ahead or slightly to the outside. Womens prints are usually
smaller than mens and their strides are usually shorter.
If the terrorist group knows that it is being followed, it may attempt to hide its tracks.
Men walking backward have a short, irregular stride. The prints have an unusually
deep toe. The soil will be kicked in the direction of movement.
The last terrorist walking in a group usually leaves the clearest footprints. Therefore,
use his prints as the key set. Cut a stick the length of each key print and notch the
stick to show the print width at the widest part of the sole. Study the angle of the key
prints to determine the direction of march. Look for an identifying mark or feature
on the prints, such as a worn or frayed part of the footwear. (Refer to the
paragraph about different types of footwear.) If the spoor becomes vague or
obliterated, or if the trail being followed merges with another, use the stick to help
identify the key prints. That will help you stay on the trail of the group being followed.
Use the box method to count the number of terrorists in the group. There are two ways
to use the box method- the stride as a unit of measure method and the 36-inch box
method.
The stride as a unit of measure method is the most accurate of the two. Twenty to
twenty-five persons can be counted using this method. Use it when the key prints can
be determined. To use this method, identify a key print on a trail and draw a line from
its heel across the trail. Then move forward to the key print of the opposite foot and
draw a line through its instep. This should form a box with the edges of the trail
forming two sides, and the drawn lines forming the other two sides. Next, count every
print or partial print inside the box to determine the number of persons. Any person
walking normally would have stepped in the box at least one time. Count the key
prints as one.
To use the 36-inch box method, mark off a 30- to 36-inch cross-section of a trail,
count the prints in the box, then divide by two to determine the number of persons that
used the trail. (Your R-4 rifle is 39 inches long and may be used as a measuring
device.)
Should you discover a resting place, count the places on the ground and no matter
what the number, add two and report that number. Should you be operating more
conventionally, call in periodic tracking reports to your commando. These can be
plotted on a map and a general pattern determined. It will also allow different terrorist
groups to be plotted together to determine if this is some sort of coordinated action. It
will also establish what routes are being used to funnel terrorist groups into and out of
the country.
A sample of a tracking report might follow the following format. First give your
location using the standard military grid system. The N is the number you believe to
be in the enemy unit as determined by your print count. "D" is the general direction of
spoor expressed by magnetic bearing. A is age of spoor, if possible, and T equals
the type of spoor followed, boots, shoes, bare feet, etc.
Footprints are only one example of displacement. Displacement occurs when anything
is moved from its original position. Other examples are foliage, moss, vines, sticks, or
rocks that are moved from their original places; dew droplets brushed from leaves;
stones and sticks that are turned over and show a different color underneath; and grass
or other vegetation that is bent or broken in the direction of movement.
Bits of cloth may be torn from a uniform and left on thorns, snags, or the ground, and
dirt from boots may make marks on the ground.
Another example of displacement is the movement of wild animals and birds that are
flushed from their habitats. You may hear the cries of birds that are excited by strange
movements. The movement of tall grass or brush on a windless day indicates that
something is moving the vegetation from its original position.
When you clear a trail by either breaking or cutting your way through heavy
vegetation, you displace the vegetation. Displacement signs can be made while you
stop to rest with heavy loads. The prints made by the equipment you carry can help to
identify its type. When loads are set down at a rest halt or campsite, grass and twigs
may be crushed. A sleeping man may also flatten the vegetation.
In most areas, there will be insects. Any changes in the normal life of these insects
may be a sign that someone has recently passed through the area. Bees that are stirred
up, holes that are covered by someone moving over them, or spider webs that are torn
down are good clues.
If a person uses a stream to cover his trail, algae and water plants may be displaced in
slippery footing or in places where he walks carelessly. Rocks may be displaced from
their original position, or turned over to show a lighter or darker color on their
opposite side. A person entering or leaving a stream may create slide marks, wet
banks, or footprints, or he may scuff bark off roots or sticks. Normally, a person or
animal will seek the path of least resistance. Therefore, when you search a stream for
exit signs, look for open places on the banks or other places where it would be easy to
leave the stream.
Spoor
A good example of spoor is the mark left by blood from a wound. Bloodstains often
will be in the form of drops left by a wounded terrorist. Blood signs are found on the
ground and smeared on leaves or twigs.
You can determine the location of a wound on the terrorist being followed by studying
the bloodstains. If the blood seems to be dripping steadily, it probably came from a
wound on his trunk. A wound in the lungs will deposit bloodstains that are pink,
bubbly, and frothy. A bloodstain deposited from a head wound will appear heavy, wet,
and slimy, like gelatin. Abdominal wounds often mix blood with digestive juices so
that the deposit will have an odor. The spoor will be light in cal or.
Spoor can also occur when a person walks over grass, stones, and shrubs with muddy
boots. Thus, spoor and displacement together may give evidence of movement and
indicate the direction taken. Crushed leaves may stain rocky ground that is too hard
for footprints.
Roots, stones, and vines may be stained by crushed leaves or berries when walked on.
Yellow stains in snow may be urine marks left by personnel in the area.
In some cases, it may be hard to determine the difference between spoor and
displacement. Both terms can be applied to some signs. For example, water that has
been muddied may indicate recent movement. The mud has been displaced and is
staining the water. Stones in streams may be stained by mud from boots. Algae can be
displaced from stones in streams and can stain other stones or bark.
Water in footprints in swampy ground may be muddy if the tracks are recent. In time,
however, the mud will settle and the water will clear. The clarity of the water can be
used to estimate the age of the prints. Normally, the mud will clear in one hour. This
will vary with terrain.
Weathering
Weather may either aid or hinder tracking. It affects signs in ways that help determine
how old they are, but wind, snow, rain, and sunlight can also obliterate signs
completely.
By studying the effects of weather on signs, you can determine the age of the
sign. For example, when bloodstains are fresh, they may be bright red. Air and
sunlight will change the appearance of blood first to a deep ruby-red color, and
then to a dark brown crust when the moisture evaporates. Scuff marks on trees or
bushes darken with time. Sap oozes from fresh cuts on trees but hardens when
exposed to the air.
Footprints
Footprints are greatly affected by weather. When a foot displaces soft, moist soil to
form a print, the moisture holds the edges of the print intact and sharp. As
sunlight and air dry the edges of the print, small particles that were held in place by
the moisture fall into the print. If particles are just beginning to fall into a print, it is
probably fresh. If the edges of the print are dried and crusty, the prints are probably at
least an hour old. The effects of weather will vary with the terrain, so this information
is furnished as a guide only.
A light rain may round out the edges of a print. Try to remember when the last rain
occurred in order to put prints into the proper time frame. A heavy rain may erase all
signs.
Wind also affects prints. Besides drying out a print the wind may blow litter, sticks, or
leaves into it. Try to remember the wind activity in order to help determine the age of
a print. For example, you may think, It is calm now, but the wind blew hard an hour
ago. These prints have litter blown into them, so they must be over an hour old. You
must be sure, however, that the litter was blown into the prints, and was not crushed
into them when the prints were made.
Trails leaving streams may appear to be weathered by rain because of water running
into the footprints from wet clothing or equipment. This is particularly true if a group
leaves a stream in a file. From this formation, each person drips water into the prints.
A wet trail slowly fading into a dry trail indicates that the trail is fresh.
Wind, Sound, and Odors
Wind affects sounds and odors. If the wind is blowing from the direction of a trail you
are following, sounds and odors are carried to you. If the wind is blowing in the same
direction as the trail you are following, you must be cautious as the wind will carry
your sounds toward the terrorist group. To find the wind direction, drop a handful of
dry dirt or grass from shoulder height.
To help you decide where a sound is coming from, cup your hands behind your ears
and slowly turn. When the sound is loudest, you are probably facing its origin. When
moving, try to keep the wind in your face.
Sun
You must also consider the effects of the sun. It is hard to look or aim directly into the
sun. If possible, keep the sun at your back.
Littering
Poorly trained terrorist groups may leave trails of litter as they move. Gum or candy
wrappers, ration cans, cigarette butts, remains of fires, or human feces are
unmistakable signs of recent movement.
Weather affects litter. Rain may flatten or wash litter away, or turn paper into pulp.
Winds may blow litter away from its original location. Ration cans exposed to
weather will rust. Rust begins at the exposed edge where the cans were opened, then
moves in toward the center. Use your memory to determine the age of litter. The last
rain or strong wind can be the basis of a time frame.
Camouflage
If a terrorist group knows that you are tracking them, they will probably use
camouflage to conceal their movement and to slow and confuse you. Doing so,
however, will slow them down. Walking backward, brushing out trails, and moving
over rocky ground or through streams are examples of camouflage that can be used to
confuse you.
The terrorist may move on hard surfaced, frequently traveled roads or try to merge
with traveling civilians. Examine such routes with extreme care, because a
well defined approach that leads to the enemy will probably be mined, ambushed, or
covered by snipers.
The terrorist group may try to avoid leaving a trail. Its terrorists may wrap rags around
their boots, or wear soft soled shoes to make the edges of their footprints rounder and
less distinct. The party may exit a stream in a column or line to reduce the chance of
leaving a well defined exit.
If the terrorist group walks backward to leave a confusing trail, the footprints will be
deepened at the toe, and the soil will be scuffed or dragged in the direction of
movement.
If a trail leads across rocky or hard ground, try to work around that ground to pick up
the exit trail. This process works in streams as well. On rocky ground, moss or lichens
growing on the stones could be displaced by even the most careful evader. If you lose
the trail, return to the last visible sign. From there, head in the direction of the
terrorists movement. Move in ever widening circles until you find some signs to
follow.
USE OF INTELLIGENCE
When reporting, do not report your interpretations as facts. Report that you have seen
signs of certain things, not that those things actually exist.
Report all information quickly. The term immediate use intelligence includes
information of the terrorist that can be put to use at once to gain surprise, to keep the
terrorist off balance, or to keep him from escaping an area. A commander has many
sources of intelligence. He puts the information from those sources together to help
determine where a terrorist is, what he may be planning, and where he may be going.
Do what you are there to do- track.
Information you report gives your stick leader definite information on which he can
act at once. For example, you may report that your stick leader is thirty minutes
behind a terrorist group, that the group is moving north, and that it is now at a certain
place. That gives your stick leader information on which he can act at once. He could
then have you keep on tracking and move another stick to attack the terrorist group. If
a spoor is found that has signs of recent terrorist activity, your stick leader can set up
an ambush or have a regular army or police unit follow up.
TRACKER DOGS
Tracker dogs may be used to help track a terrorist group. Tracker dogs are trained and
used by their handlers. A dog tracks human scent and the scent of disturbed vegetation
caused by mans passing.
Tracker dogs should be used with tracker sticks. The stick can track visually, and the
dog and handler can follow. If the stick loses the signs, then the dog can take over. A
dog can track faster than a man, and it can track at night.
A tracker dog is trained not to bark and give away the stick. It is also trained to avoid
baits, cover odors, and deodorants used to throw it off the track. The tracker dog
stick leader should let each trooper of the stick touch the dog to eliminate fears the
trooper might have.
Scout dogs have limitations which should be borne in mind. Dogs have acute senses
of smell, good hearing, and are attracted quickly to movement. Dogs are subject to
periodic retraining and are as sensitive to the elements as humans.
The best position for the dog stick is directly in front of the patrol. Wind conditions
may require that the stick move to windward to take advantage of the dogs sense of
smell. Some dogs can, depending on weather and wind, sense the terrorist two hundred
meters away.
The dog can be used to locate sentries and determine the extent of positions and
emplacements, and may assist the stick leader in setting up his troopers without being
detected by the terrorist group.
The following are some general rules for dog sticks:
1. If the handler is killed, leave the dog with him and report it to your HQ.
2. If the handler is a casualty, try to lure the dog away so you can treat him. If you
must evacuate one, send the other as well.
3. Treat the stick as one of the unit. Support it and keep the handler informed of all
tactical moves.
4. Let the handler select the dogs position in the line of march.
5. Seek the handlers advice in employing the stick.
6. Do not expect the tracker dog stick to perform miracles and do not relax your
alertness because they are with you.
7. Do not feed or play with the dog.
Use of Tracker Dogs In Ambush Contacts
A great many insurgents wounded in ambush get away. In many cases they escape by
running into the undergrowth and lying low until the hue and cry has died down and
they can crawl away. The employment of tracker groups will quite often lead to their
capture or elimination.
Experience has shown that the blood trail left by wounded insurgents is not always an
aid to a tracker dog and is sometimes more useful as a visual aid to the human tracker.
The tracker group should not form part of the ambush party, but should stand by at
some convenient RV ready to move when shooting indicates that the ambush has been
sprung.
Under certain circumstances, patrol dogs may form part of the ambush group. They
may be most profitably employed where several alternative routes lead into the am-
bush position and it is not known which route the insurgents will take. It must be
borne in mind, however, that their presence may give the ambush position away to the
insurgents as they pant, make other noises, and are smelly. However, when used they
will invariably be alert before any human being.
TRACKING
Although the information in this chapter will not make you an ace tracker, it will give
you a better awareness of tracking and the tactics employed by sticks.
The only way to become a competent, reliable tracker is to use the method of the
natives: practice, practice, practice. It is a skill that can stand you in good stead on
your next operation, enhance your combat effectiveness, and perhaps save your life.
Since terrorists in Africa operate in the same areas as the local population such as
bush veldt areas in tribal trust lands, national parks, and game reserves, their pursuit
requires abundant use of mans oldest skill: tracking. Man was first a hunter, gatherer,
and tracker, having to approach game closely enough to kill it or to follow it when
wounded, despite its superior speed and senses of sight, smell, and hearing.
Native Trackers
Fortunately, Africa has an abundant supply of superb trackers among the African
population, to whom game hunting is. still important as a means of sustenance, though
illegal. African whites include some of the finest hunters and trackers in the world,
but their numbers are small, so the skills of native poachers have now become a
national resource employed to combat terrorism.
It is soon realized that the number of trackers available to units of the army is usually
inadequate as soon as commando sticks come on the scene, because of the greater
demand for manpower. This manpower shortage causes many operations to fail due
simply to insufficient or poor tracking. Most trackers come from the most primitive
tribes, and their skill is often proportionate to their lack of education and dependence
on subsistence agriculture.
Throughout Africa, in the areas still hunted, trackers and hunters are in great
demand by professional hunters. They are often employed as farm labor solely to have
their skills available when hunting season rolls around. Native trackers are also
popular in the military and the police because of their stalwart martial tradition and
almost arrogant martial spirit.
However, the supply of tribal trackers available to the army and police rarely equals
the demand, because most of those possessing such skills are illiterate, and
therefore unqualified for recruitment into the regular army or police units. Some were
too old at fifty although lean as panthers and in the prime of their physical
and mental faculties. Sooner or later, such a valuable, if primitive, resource has to be
tapped and your commando unit should not pass up such an untapped reserve.
Although tracking is not taught to African recruits, if the candidate is a natural tracker,
his tracking skills are joined to military tactics, and basic military training is given to
assist his service when attached to regular units of the army or to commando units.
Each qualified tracker is selected from applicants by putting him through various tests
by master trackers, who use every subterfuge to foil his best efforts. First he tracks
game and then humans, first with, and then without, boots on his prey. The pseudo-
terrorist employs such anti-tracking devices as walking backwards or on stones, both
on land and across streams. Walking on stones in a riverbed and crossing some
distance from ones original arrival point foils all but the top trackers- but not the
African unit tracker. Although top trackers may be temporarily slowed by such
methods, they will eventually pick up the spoor.
Tracker Unit Prcis
The preamble to the tracker unit prcis is worth repeating:
Civilian African Tracker Unit is a unit which has been formed primarily to promote
and utilize more of the inherent tracking potential so abundant in our many African
Lands. These men are unsophisticated and would normally not avail themselves for
army conscription, but they are quite prepared to offer their services on a professional
basis if along uncomplicated lines.
Generally speaking, the primitive African has a natural instinct for tracking and is
either a born hunter or has spent most of his life herding and tracking down livestock.
This instinct has, however, got to be motivated and then married to common military
tactics, and it is with this aim in mind that this unit has carefully formulated ways and
means of promoting this important auxiliary (commando unit) of the regular army
forces. Having said this, it cannot be emphasized enough that you as the commando
should both understand and appreciate the primitive, voluntary nature of his service
when dealing with him, and it is essential that you do not overwhelm him with
sophisticated military regimentation. Allow him to do his job. Dont bind in unless
discipline is necessary. Be precise in where he stands. Let him do the job or you
will find someone else.
The tracker retains civilian status during service but is required to complete terms of
service unless found unsuitable when he is returned to base. Trackers are under full
army regulations while on duty and carry an identity card. Trackers do not expect
special food on service but if available his traditional diet is utilized. The men are
drawn from various tribes, and full sticks (four men) are made up of one tribal stock to
avoid friction. Such sticks are employed only in areas of different tribal stock than
their own to insure their affiliation doesnt dampen their zeal. Such trackers work
harder to insure defeat of terrorists of other tribal affiliation and will be more
difficult to compromise by identification. At any stage extreme care must be
maintained to avoid compromising identity since this would cause removal from
duty and risk that the supreme price of being termed a sellout would be a fatal
consequence.
Other Considerations
Incentive bonuses are offered in addition to their normal high pay which must
remain confidential. Bonuses are paid for confirmed terrorist (Charley Tango) kills as
a direct result of trackers follow-up and for outstanding performance, e.g.,
exceptional follow-up, in which, despite the trackers skill, the exercise resulted in no
CT kills, contact, or discovery of arms caches. Reports are filled out by the stick
leader who assesses the trackers performance at end of camp. These are analyzed by
the unit commander and a payout is made on this basis according to government scale
if a reward is officially offered.
Tracker sticks number from four at full strength, to four with a stick leader, and under
him a second in command. No rank structure exists in the unit but the stick leader and
his number two are given corporal stripes. Trackers are normally used on three-day
patrols to ensure that one stick of the team is at base at all times, rested, ready, and
alert, so as to react instantly in emergencies. Since their main function is to follow and
locate spoor, these men are not strongly trained or depended upon for combat or
general soldiering, and once their efforts result in a contact they normally fade into
the background. However, these men, during their service, have become outstanding
fighting men in many cases, with outstanding successes during contacts with terrorist
groups.
Two sticks of three trackers each can be used with one commando stick leader as
controller attached to each section. In this case, one tracker follows spoor and the
others flank him for his protection and to cut for lost spoor. Three groups of two
trackers each can be used with two commando troopers attached to each
section. One trooper is controller and the other assists in a flanking role.
These commando troops should be experienced, and so time in country with close
knowledge of both the bush and the African, his language, and customs are important.
This vitally necessary close communication keeps efficiency from being lost. In
addition, the stick leader must stay with his sticks so the trackers get to know, respect,
and understand him. Trackers are also not employed for guard duty or shotgun
riding except in extreme emergencies. Trackers are sometimes used in the role of
interrogator after capture of suspected mujibas or terrorists, but controllers must
keep a good grip on them to prevent cruelty or heavy-handedness caused by tribal
instincts. Keep the objective in the minds of all at all times. Do not digress into any
cruelty at all or allow it. Trackers can also be used for clandestine purposes in tribal
lands other than their own, if they volunteer and are given adequate protection from
compromise and retribution.
Stick leaders must have the trackers full confidence and feel free to discuss problems
with them, whether personal or military in nature, to preclude an information gap.
Likewise, the stick leader should be aware of the primitive nature of his pseudo-
terrorists or trackers and have their security and welfare first in his mind. He must
ensure that backup is available when contact is made and that trackers must not be
used as feelers or be allowed to wander off alone without support when a large 360-
degree search is called for. Trackers quickly detect any falling back of protection units
and this causes them to lose momentum on follow-ups. After a patrol, contact, or stand
down, the stick leader checks all weapons for safety to avoid accidents or
compromises.
During a contact, the stick leader keeps a close check on his troops so as to fade them
out of the scene quickly. He ensures that trackers are not used as general fire and
movement forces since their training is not intense in this area and it subjects them
to more risks than necessary, both of which could cost valuable trackers or
lost Charley Tangos.
Endurance tracking, consisting of as much as 50 klicks in two days, brings bonuses, as
does a foray into enemy territory or base camps. The tracker has an eye for
camouflaged base camps, arms caches, etc., plus an ability to detect abnormal
demeanor in locals which may indicate tension due to terrorist presence.
All of these are important, and when you find a tracker such as this, you and your
stick must continually keep the trackers in good shape. Let the tracker know that your
troops are behind him and will not let any harm come to him. In turn, the tighter the
bonds get, the better your own security will become in the African bush.
COUNTERTRACKING
In addition to knowing how to track, you must know how to counter a terrorist
trackers efforts to track you.
1. While moving from close terrain to open terrain, walk past a big tree (30 cm
in diameter or larger) toward the open area for three to five paces. Then walk
backward to the forward side of the tree and make a 90-degree change of direction,
passing the tree on its forward side. Step carefully and leave as little sign as
possible. If this is not the direction that you want to go, change direction again
about fifty meters away using the same technique. The purpose of this is to
draw the terrorist tracker into the open area where it is harder for him to track.
That also exposes him and causes him to search the wrong area.
2. When approaching a trail (about one hundred meters from it), change your
direction of movement and approach it at a 45-degree angle. When arriving at the
trail, move along it for about twenty to thirty meters. Leave several signs of your
presence. Then walk backward along the trail to the point where you joined it. At that
point, cross the trail and leave no sign of your leaving it. Then move about one
hundred meters at an angle of 45 degrees, but this time on the other side of the trail
and in the reverse of your approach. When changing direction back to your original
line of march, the big tree technique is used to draw the enemy tracker along the easier
trail. You have, by changing direction before reaching the trail, indicated that the trail
is your new line of march.
3. To leave a false trail and to get an enemy tracker to look in the wrong direction,
walk backward over soft ground. Continue this deception for about twenty to thirty
meters or until you are on hard ground. Use this technique when leaving a stream. To
further confuse the terrorist tracker, use this technique several times before actually
leaving the stream.
4. When moving toward a stream, change direction about one hundred meters
before reaching the stream and approach it at a 45-degree angle. Enter the stream and
proceed down it for at least twenty to thirty meters. Then move back upstream and
leave the stream in your initial direction. Changing direction before entering the
stream may confuse the terrorist tracker. When he enters the stream, he should follow
the false trail until the trail is lost. That will put him well away from you.
5. When your direction of movement parallels a stream, use the stream to deceive
a terrorist tracker. Some tactics that will help elude a tracker are as follows:
- Stay in the stream for one hundred to two hundred meters.
- Stay in the center of the stream and in deep water.
- Watch for rocks or roots near the banks that are not covered with moss or vegetation
and leave the stream at that point.
- Walk out backward on soft ground.
- Walk up a small, vegetation covered tributary and exit from it.
6. When being tracked by a terrorist group, the best bet is to either try to
outdistance it or to double back and ambush the group.
(END)
***Source*** This information was obtained from the book: AFRICAN MERC COMBAT MANUAL. By Chris Pessarra. Printed 1986, Paladin
Press.


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Tracking
SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. Tracking plays a special and very important part in maintaining contact with the
enemy, in locating their camps and hides, and in following up after a contact or an
incident.
2. Without considerable practical experience no man can become an expert, but with a
little basic knowledge, well applied, most men can become "bush minded." As
bushcraft, which includes the ability to track, is essentially a practical subject, no
amount of theorizing can make an expert. Practice in the field is essential. As with
most skills, bushcraft must become an automatic action which will be of the greatest
value in actual operations.
3. The aim of this chapter is to give some guidance to troops employed in ATOPS in
the techniques of tracking.
SECTION 2: TRACKING TECHNIQUES
1. To assist troops in the tracking of individuals or bands of enemy, some suggested
techniques are listed below.
2. Action on finding tracks.
a. Unless it is possible to follow the spoor with either a civilian tracker or a
tracker team, anyone finding spoor should isolate the scene and keep that area
free of military forces until the arrival of trackers. An immediate report should
be made to higher headquarters giving the following information:
i. Estimated number of terrorists.
ii. Estimated age of spoor.
iii. Direction.
iv. Any other useful information such as location, terrain, type of tracks,
etc.
b. It is absolutely essential that the spoor is not obliterated or disturbed by the
discoverers. The spoor and surrounding area must remain untouched until the
arrival of a tracker or tracker team. It is not possible to follow one preserved
spoor when the remainder of the area has been trampled flat by military forces.
c. It frequently pays to backtrack when very fresh tracks are found, particularly
early in the morning when they may lead from a camp.
3. Action when tracking.
a. Work in pairs when possible.
b. Use a pointer to indicate the tracks. This can be a stick or even a rifle.
c. When a trail is faint, leapfrog the trackers.
d. The tracker who has the run of a track must keep on it and only change when
the run is broken.
e. In the interests of speed, track ahead where possible and not at your feet.
f. Depending on conditions, use ground or aerial tracking, but if possible, use
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aerial tracking for speed.
g. Think ahead and listen for bird and game alarms which could indicate
movement or presence of humans ahead.
h. Bear in mind minor details which aid tracking, e.g., sand on rocks, overturned
leaves, etc.
i. Patrol members not employed with the actual tracking will adopt an open
formation and be on the alert for enemy action.
j. The person or persons doing the tracking most at all times be protected by
members of the patrol.
k. Tracking in overcast weather and around midday will be difficult due to lack
of shadow which gives depth.
l. Track by "feeling" over dead leaves on damp ground for indentations if all else
fails.
m. Do not talk -- communicate by means of hand signals.
n. To ascertain whether gangs are in the area, look for signs at fruit- bearing
trees, water holes, trapping sites, beehives or observation points. Also watch
for signs of fires, particularly in the early morning or late evening.
o. If the track suddenly becomes well-hidden but not lost, circle downwind and
try to pick up scent, smoke or firelight, especially at night.
p. Be constantly aware of the possibility of trickery or deception; for example,
men turning towards water, then going from tree to tree in the opposite
direction; hiding underwater or underground in a wild animals burrow; shoes
tied on backwards; grass bent back; walking backwards or on the side of the
feet; or tying cattle hooves onto the shoes or feet.
q. Study the enemy's habits at every opportunity.
4. Action should the trail split. Trackers must be trained to report immediately to the
patrol commander any attempt by the enemy to split up. The patrol commander then
decides, on the advice of the tracker, which track will be followed. The splitting point
should be marked so that the trackers can return to it and, if necessary, start again.
To assist the trackers in picking up the tracks again a few hints are listed below:
a. Examine any logs, stones, etc., in the immediate vicinity of the track for sign
of disturbance.
b. Examine leaves and grass on either side of the track for signs of disturbance.
c. Attempts at deception, unless done by an expert, will often give a clearer
indication of where the track is located.
5. Action when the track is lost.
When the track is lost, the leading tracker should indicate that he has reached the last
visible sign of the track he is following. Trackers must be trained never to pass
beyond this point without first informing the patrol commander of its exact location.
A simple drill for the search is:
a. Leading tracker halts the patrol and indicates the position of the last visible
sign to the patrol commander.
b. The sign is marked for future reference.
c. Flank trackers do a circular cast working towards one another in the hope of
picking up the spoor again.
d. While the flank trackers are carrying out the search as described above, the
tracker who was on the spoor carries out a 360-degree search up to
approximately 15 meters to his immediate front.
e. Once the spoor has been relocated, the tracker who found the spoor then takes
over as main tracker. The remainder of the team fall into an appropriate tracker
formation.
6. Use of aircraft for tracking.
a. a. Light aircraft and/or helicopters can actively assist patrols during the
tracking of terrorist groups by:
i. Spotting terrorists from the air, bearing in mind that the terrorists are
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likely to take cover on hearing aircraft. Aircraft may also break security
and indicate to terrorists that they are being followed.
ii. Slowing down the terrorists as they attempt to keep under cover, thereby
enabling the trackers to close with them.
b. Visual air reconnaissance will provide valuable information concerning the
nature of the country ahead of the follow-up group. This information should
enable the patrol to assess:
a. Likely routes taken by terrorists.
b. Ambush positions.
c. Camps.
c. Helicopters may be used to uplift trackers in the leapfrog role (explained in
greater detail in Section 4 of Chapter 8: Follow-up Operations).
SECTION 3: ANTI-TRACKING MEASURES
1. Detailed below are a number of points which should be taken into consideration:
a. Think when moving. Do not relax.
b. Do not become regular in habit.
c. Avoid the obvious.
d. Watch the nature of the country carefully and use types of ground which are
difficult to track in.
e. Use weather to advantage, that is, move in rain.
f. Carry a stick with which to bend grass and branches back.
g. On special operations, to increase deception, wear smooth-soled shoes which
leave less distinctive prints, or go barefoot or use motor-tire sandals.
h. Walk on the side of the foot when necessary as this leaves no heel or toe
marks.
i. Cross tracks, roads or streams by crossing in trees or on rocks. if this is not
possible when crossing a wide sandy track or road, cross at one place, each
man stepping carefully on the footprints of the leading man, thereby leaving
only one set of prints.
j. Be careful with Smokey fires, tobacco smell, soap in streams or rivers, bird
and game alarms or insect or frog silences.
k. Do not be too tempted to use water as a line of movement, as this is where the
enemy will probably search or look for signs of security forces in the area.
l. With a large party, where possible, avoid moving in single file as this will
leave definite signs and a track. move in open formation instead.
SECTION 4: HINTS ON TRAILS AND TRACKING
1. General.
a. It is extremely difficult to move silently and quickly in most parts of the bush
and consequently this requires a lot of practice and concentration.
b. There are many paths in the bush made by game during their nightly or
seasonal movements. These animals avoid steep or slippery slopes, and
therefore game paths will normally provide easy going. Terrorists and military
patrols use these trails when quick silent movement is required. Troops should
therefore exercise extreme caution when using these trails as they might well
be ambushed.
2. Tracking spoor.
TRACKING
a. There are two distinct types of spoor, ground spoor and aerial spoor. The
ground sign is normally made by a boot- or footprint, and aerial spoor is in the
form of trampled grass, broken bushes, broken cobwebs, etc.
b. The following are signs the experienced tracker looks for when tracking spoor:
i. Crushed and bent grass and vegetation.
ii. Broken twigs and leaves.
iii. Overturned leaves and stones.
iv. Mud displaced from streams.
v. Broken cobwebs.
vi. The state of the dew on a trail.
vii. Mud or scratches on stones and logs.
c. Man. Barefoot prints are soft rounded impressions formed by the heel, ball of
foot, or toes. Women's tracks are generally smaller and have on the whole two
characteristics. Firstly, they tend to be pigeon-toed, and secondly, their toes are
more splayed out than men's.
d. Running men. Points to observe are skid marks, depth of impression, running
on balls of feet and toes, splayed out toes and badly damaged vegetation, with
resultant lack of concealment of trail.
e. Loaded men. Short footsteps, deeper impressions than normal in soft ground,
and toes splayed out.
f. Animals. Due to the fact that most animals have cloven hooves, the
impressions formed on the ground have sharp, clear-cut edges.
3. Judging the age of tracks.
a. Weather. The state of the weather -- rain, wind, sunshine -- should always be
borne in mind as it is one of the most important points in deciding the age of a
track.
b. Obliteration by rain or light rain. By remembering when it last rained, more
accurate judgment of the age of tracks is possible. If the tracks are pock-
marked, obviously they were made before the rain, and if they are not pock-
marked they were made after the rain. Similarly, by looking to see if the tracks
have been pock-marked by light rain dripping from trees, the age can be
established.
c. The state and position of trodden vegetation. Various grasses have different
grades of resilience, and only practice and experience will enable a tracker to
use this factor to judge accurately the age of the spoor.
d. Bent grass or leaves. An indication of the age of a track may be gained by its
dryness. Bent grass will be green initially but after a few days will turn a
brown color. Again, the amount of sunshine and rain during the last few days
should be taken into account.
e. Impression in mud. Always note the state of dryness of a track in mud or soft
ground. if the track is very fresh, water will not have run back into the
depression made by a foot. Later the water runs back, and later still the mud
which has been pushed up around the depression, and the mud kicked forward
by the food leaving the ground, begins to dry.
f. Game tracks. Remember that most animals lie up during the day and move
about at night. Therefore, if human prints on main forest game trails have at
least a double set of animal spoor superimposed and these spoor show that the
game has moved in both directions, any human prints are probably at least one
night old. If the animal spoor show that game has moved in one direction only,
then the human prints were probably made during the night, after the game had
moved down to water but before the game moved back.
4. Information regarding terrorist methods of concealing tracks and camps should also
be sought.
5. Factors affecting tracking. There are certain factors which affect tracking.
a. Whether the ground is hard or soft, stony or muddy.
b. The type of country.
c. The weather -- things lack depth in overcast weather.
TRACKING
d. The position of the sun relative to the direction of travel. The most suitable
position is when one has to track towards the sun.
e. The footwear of the human quarry. A distinct boot pattern is obviously easier
to follow than a plain-soled spoor.
f. The extent to which other similar tracks may confuse and possibly blur the
spoor. g. Concentration and the effect of weariness.
6. Things the tracker must look for.
a. Footprints and impressions of footwear: the rhythm of the spoor or the length
of stride of the quarry. This is a guide to where the next footprint may be
found.
b. Trampled grass. soil, and marks in the soil where indirect pressure may have
left no impression
c. Disturbed stones, sticks or so .
d. Leaves which have been turned, crushed, kicked or pulled off trees; branches
and twigs bent or broken and vegetation pushed aside; the reflection of light
from grass or leaves displaced at an angle; the color of bent and broken
vegetation; and scratched or chipped bark.
e. Discarded wrapping and masticated vegetation.
f. f. Cobwebs broken or wiped off onto a nearby tree or bush.
g. Urine and excrement, frequently indicated by house flies and yellow
butterflies, and dung beetles during the rains.
h. Snares and traps, robbed bees' nests and smoke.
i. The state of dew on the spoor.
j. Mud displaced from streams or mud on stones and logs.
k. Squashed animal or insect life, and whether it has been attacked by ants.
7. A tracker has many things to consider while tracking. He must possess certain
qualities, such as above average eyesight, memory, intelligence, fitness, anticipation
and understanding of nature. Patience, persistence acute observation and natural
instinct are the basis of good tracking There are times when pure instinct alone will
draw a tracker in the correct direction. All units should ensure that training in
aggressive bushcraft is maintained at the highest possible standard.
SECTION 5: USE OF DOGS IN ATOPS
General
1. Aim. The aim of this section is not to instruct on the handling and training of dogs,
but to provide an infantry commander with sufficient background information to
enable him to usefully deploy any dogs and dog handlers that may be placed at his
disposal.
2. Under no circumstances will a dog be attached to an army formation without the
service of a handler also being provided. The dog and handler are a highly trained
team, and a dog cannot be handled by another person.
3. The handler is an expert in his own field and can give advice on the capability of his
dog and the conditions under which it can be used to best effect. He is not, however,
responsible for the tactical deployment of his dog. The decision, how and when to
use the animal and its handler, rests with the local army commander.
4. To obtain the maximum value from trained war dogs, it is essential to have an
understanding of the conditions best suited for their employment. Dogs, like the rest
of the animal kingdom, are subject to outside influences which have a direct bearing
on their behavior. It follows, therefore, that the performance of any dog, no matter
how highly trained, is not constant and it cannot be expected to work efficiently
under every type of condition. This is often not fully appreciated, and instances have
occurred where adverse criticism has been leveled against a dog simply because the
person responsible for its employment was ignorant of its limitations. Full value will
only stem from a full knowledge and better understanding of the capabilities and
TRACKING
characteristics of the dogs. It must be remembered that a dog tires easily and
consequently must be used sparingly and to the best possible advantage.
5. The efficiency of a dog is in direct ratio to that of its handler. It is, therefore, most
important to select suitable men for training as handlers. Handlers must, therefore,
only be changed if absolutely essential.
6. War dogs are a valuable weapon which, when properly used, provide an advantage
over the enemy. The fullest use should therefore be made of them.
7. The types of war dogs that are in common use are:
a. Patrol dog.
b. Tracking dog.
c. Mine detection dog.
d. Guard dog.
e. Dogs for use in crowd control purposes will not be discussed in this section.
8. Limitations. Certain limitations must be stressed:
a. The dog is apt to become perplexed when large numbers of people are in a
small area, e.g., when opposing forces are in close contact.
b. The dog is apt to become bewildered when the magnitude and number of
extraneous sounds are abnormal, e.g., when the battle is intense.
c. The dog cannot differentiate between enemy and its own troops. Full briefing
to a patrol is essential to prevent "pointing" on scattered elements or groups of
troops.
The Patrol Dog
1. General. A patrol dog works by "air scent" and hearing, and is trained to give silent
warning of any individual or group of individuals by pointing. He is not taught to
attack and cannot be used as a tracker. The patrol dog is therefore useful for giving
silent warning of ambushes, attempts at infiltration, and the presence of any "foreign
body," before such presence can be detected by a human. He can be worked either by
day or by night, in most kinds of weather and country.
2. The distance at which warning is given depends upon the following factors:
a. Ability of the handler to "read" his dog.
b. Wind direction and velocity.
c. Concentration of scent.
d. Humidity.
e. Density of vegetation.
f. Volume of noise in the vicinity.
g. Condition and fitness of dog.
h. Individual inherent ability.
3. Operational employment. The patrol dog can be employed in two ways:
a. On a lead.
b. Loose in front.
In both cases, the dog is controlled by a handler.
4. When moving to an operational area, the dog is kept at heel -- while in this position,
the dog knows he is off duty and is not on the alert. When on duty, the collar is
removed and either the "pilot rope" is put on and the dog is told to seek, or the dog
works loose and the command "seek" is given.
5. Both handler and dog have to be more highly trained to work with the dog loose.
6. The dog points by one or a combination of the following signs:
a. Raising of head and pricking-up of ears.
b. Tensing of body.
c. Tail wagging.
d. Keenness to investigate.
7. Uses. The patrol dog can be used:
a. On reconnaissance patrols.
TRACKING
b. On fighting patrols. c. As a sentry outpost.
c. Guarding forward dumps.
d. With static security groups.
e. In isolated positions.
8. On patrol. The handler and the dog will normally lead. However, if the dog is being
worked loose, it may be possible for the dog to lead followed by the armed scout of
the "recce group" with the handler (who is constantly in sight and in control of the
dog) next. This makes the handler's job a trifle less hazardous. In any case, close
contact must be maintained between handler and patrol leader. The normal procedure
is:
a. The patrol commander indicates to the handler the mission, disposition of own
troops, the general direction of advance and any special location instructions.
b. The patrol is ordered to move out.
c. The patrol dog and handler with one escort precedes the patrol at a distance
which will permit immediate communication with the patrol commander. At
night this would be about an arm's length. In daylight the distance will be
greater, but within easy visual signaling distance.
d. The patrol dog and handler move off, keeping generally in the indicated
direction. He must be allowed to take advantage of wind and other conditions
favoring the dog's scenting powers without endangering the patrol.
e. When the dog points, the handler indicates by silent hand signal "enemy in
sight."
f. The patrol halts and takes cover.
9. Patrol commander proceeds quietly, utilizing available cover, to the handler and dog,
and makes his plan.
10. Sentry outposts. The main value of the dog is to give timely warning of approach of,
or attempts at infiltration by, the enemy. The handler and dog are placed a short
distance from the sentries: this distance will be within easy visual signal range in
daylight, but much closer at night. A simple means of communication between
handler and patrol commander at night is a piece of cord or string, which is jerked to
alert everyone. When alerted, the patrol commander proceeds immediately to the
handler to receive any information concerning the distance and direction of the
enemy.
11. Guarding forward dumps, static security groups and isolated positions. The use of
patrol dogs on these rare occasions is the same as for a sentry outpost with local
modifications. In all cases the local commander should take the advice of the handler
as to the best employment of the dog or dogs.
The Tracking Dog
1. General. Tracking dogs are trained to follow human ground scent. The principle on
which the dogs are trained is one of reward by food. The dog is never fed in kennels
but only after work, i.e., a successful track.
2. Tracking conditions. The ideal tracking conditions may be listed as follows:
a. Air and ground temperatures approximately equal.
b. A mild dull day with a certain amount of moisture in the air with slow
evaporation.
c. Damp ground and vegetation.
d. Ground overshadowed by trees.
e. Blood spilled on trail.
f. A running enemy who gives off more body odor than one who has walked
away calmly.
g. An unclean enemy.
3. Factors which adversely affect tracking include:
a. Hot sun.
b. Strong wind.
c. Heavy rain.
TRACKING
d. Roads (tarmac) on which cars travel.
e. Running water.
f. Bush fires.
g. Animal scent.
4. Heavy growth of vegetation helps to combat the heat and retains more scent.
Furthermore, a greater amount of vegetation is damaged by a running enemy, thus
producing an increased aroma.
5. Operational employment. The most important single factor in the successful
employment of a tracking dog is time. The dog must be brought to the scene of the
incident with all possible speed and not used as a last resort. it is suggested that
tracking dogs be held at a base or some central point until a call for their services is
made and then taken as near as possible to the scene of the incident by transport or
helicopter in order that they may arrive fresh. The degree of fatigue a tracking dog
has reached will determine its usefulness.
6. Once it has been decided to use a tracking dog, the less fouling of the area with
extraneous scent the better. Objects liable to have been in contact with the person to
be tracked should not be touched and movement over the area restricted to a
minimum.
7. Great care must be taken to keep the use of tracking dogs as secret as possible. If the
enemy know they are likely to be tracked by a dog, they will very probably take
counter-measures.
8. Use of tracker dogs on night follow-up. Tracking dogs have successfully worked
night trails and have shown that they are capable of working night trails in fairly
difficult terrain. There are, however, certain facts which detract from the use of dogs
on a night follow-up; they are:
a. The dog, when on a trail, moves at a brisk pace and while military forces can
maintain this pace during the hours of daylight, it is most difficult to maintain
the formation and contact with one another when moving at this pace at night.
There are certain inherent difficulties attached to a night follow-up, all of
which are aggravated if one has to move at a fast pace.
b. In daylight hours the handler can see his dog and very often from its behavior
can determine whether or not it has left the human trail. When this happens the
handler is in a position to correct the dog and put it back on the trail it should
be following. At night it is more difficult for the handler to establish whether
the dog has left the trail and therefore it will be necessary for the handler to
more frequently check the trail being followed. The use of a torch or naked
light is undesirable, but this can possibly be overcome by the use of infrared
equipment. An additional assurance would be the use of an expert tracker in
conjunction with the dog.
c. In thick bush it is very difficult for military forces to maintain contact with
each other and a great deal of noise is also made.
d. The greatest danger of this type of follow-up is the fact that the chances of
walking into a prepared ambush are very much increased. The points raised in
the paragraphs above can be overcome with constant practice.
9. In the event of a terrorist attack during hours of darkness, tracking dogs can be of
great assistance in locating the trail and being permitted to follow this trail for
approximately half an hour or so to establish clearly the line of flight of the terrorists.
It is suggested that in this case the dog and handler be backed by a small number of
men merely for local protection and not as a follow-up group in the true sense. once
this has been established, the controlling headquarters can plan stop lines and
follow-up action.
Mine Detection Dog
1. This animal is trained to detect mines, booby traps, tunnels, hides or ammunition
caches. The scout dog is trained to detect and sit within two feet of any hostile
artifact hidden below or above ground, to discover tripwires, caches, tunnels and
TRACKING
"punji pits," and to clear a safe lane approximately eight to ten meters wide.
2. A commander who properly employs a scout dog team can rely on the dog to safely
discover approximately 90 percent of all hostile artifacts along his line of march.
This depends, naturally, on the state of training of the animal.
3. Since this animal is a specialist in its own right, it is vitally important that this team
be provided with adequate protection while working. It may be necessary to make
use of the patrol dog to give this added protection.
Guard Dog
1. General. The role of the guard dog is to give greater security to guarded installations.
Because the dog's senses are more acute during hours of darkness and when
distracting influences during these hours are reduced to a minimum, its use should be
directed towards the replacement or supplementing of night sentries or guards.
2. Employment. They can be used to protect sensitive points and other installations.
When on duty these dogs can:
a. Be on a leash under direct control of a handler and used as a prowler guard
within the installation or along the perimeter of the installation being
protected.
b. Be allowed to run loose within a building or fenced-in area.
c. Be attached to a "run wire" whereby the animal can move freely within the
area of its beat. d. Run loose in dog runs on the perimeter of the key point or
installation.
3. They can alert the guards or dog handler by barking, or the more vicious type is
taught to attack any intruder immediately.
Conclusions
1. Dogs may be transported by helicopters or other types of light aircraft. The animals
travel well and do not suffer any discomfort. Do not expect too much of a dog; it
must be borne in mind that the dog can be defeated easily by the ingenuity of man.
2. A very important point to remember is to ensure that the right type of dog is
requested when required. Do not ask for a patrol dog when a tracking dog is
required.

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Follow-up Operations

SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. The aim of the follow-up or pursuit is to track down, attack and destroy an enemy
group that may or may not have had contact with the military forces.
2. From the above paragraph it is apparent that a follow-up is mounted when the enemy
has been detected by the security forces or the population, or through tracks, and an
operation has to be planned to make contact with the enemy and to destroy him. It
will also be obvious that the enemy will eventually become aware of this follow-up
and will do everything possible to conceal his tracks and to disrupt and delay the
follow-up by employing delaying tactics such as ambushes, snipers and perhaps
booby traps.
3. Maximum use must be made of expert trackers, tracking teams and tracker dog
teams. Helicopters and light reconnaissance aircraft can be and must be effectively
employed during the operation. Helicopters can be employed to leapfrog follow-up
teams, thereby keeping the follow-up troops relatively fresh. Once the general
direction of the enemy's movement has been determined, helicopters can be used to
deploy troops ahead of the fleeing enemy to ambush and cut him off.
4. Although it may be difficult to determine the enemy's movement pattern beforehand,
the follow-up force must endeavor to establish this pattern as soon as possible to be
able to cut the enemy off, close with him and destroy him within the shortest possible
time.
5. The main factor to remember is that the enemy must not be given a chance to rest up
or to organize a well-defended position/ambush. Pressure must be applied
relentlessly and every opportunity of harassing and inflicting casualties on the enemy
must be taken.
SECTION 2: METHOD OF OPERATION
1. It is difficult to lay down in this manual exactly how the operation must be
conducted. It is basically a tracking operation to seek the enemy out and, once he has
been located, to then attack and destroy him.
2. The first requirement is to locate the enemy's tracks and try to determine the age and
direction of the tracks and the strength of the enemy.
3. As soon as the tracks are located, the patrol is to indicate the age and direction of the
tracks and the estimated strength of the enemy. If the patrol has no tracker and a
tracker team is available, they are to report the tracks and await the arrival of a
tracker team. The patrol must not attempt to follow the tracks and must confine its
search to the immediate vicinity so as not to inhibit the work of the trackers.
However, when a tracker team is not available, immediate follow-up action must be
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taken by the patrol.
4. Depending on the strength of the terrorists, a platoon or more is to be deployed for
the follow-up. If the tracks are at a distance from the operational headquarters, it may
be necessary to establish a field headquarters with army/air force and police
representation at a nearby landing zone, airfield or road head. The field headquarters
is then tasked with the control of the follow-up, and is allocated the required troops,
police and aircraft.
5. The force adopts the follow-up formation incorporating the tracker team and moves
at best tracking speed. As soon as possible after the follow-up has commenced, the
follow-up group is to confirm the age, direction and strength of the tracks and report
progress as often as possible. Changes in direction, the splitting of the tracks, hides
and resting places are to be reported immediately.
6. During daylight, the follow-up group will, if possible, be supported by an armed
light aircraft which is also to operate in the reconnaissance and communications role.
However, if the tracks are over 48 hours old, an unarmed light aircraft can be used,
but should be replaced when a contact is considered reasonably imminent. When
tasking the supporting aircraft, commanders must assess whether it should remain
behind the follow-up group in the hope of achieving surprise or whether it can range
ahead in order to slow down terrorist movement and to spot likely marching points,
water holes and routes through escarpments, rivers, etc.
7. Depending on the age and direction of the tracks, the following procedures can be
adopted;
a. Leapfrogging.
i. If the tracks are assessed as being several or more days old, the follow-
up group can be helicoptered from 1,000 to 5,000 meters forward
(depending on the terrain and the estimated line of movement) and then
fanned out to relocate the tracks. if successful, leapfrogging is repeated
until the tracks are considered to be fresh enough to follow on foot (from
24 to 48 hours old).
ii. The procedure for the search for tracks after leapfrogging is similar to
airborne tracking (detailed below). That is, on landing, troops cast up to
several hundred meters on either side of the landing zone. if the tracks
are relocated, their age and direction are assessed and, if necessary,
another leapfrog is made; if not, the helicopter repositions the troops in
another search arc until the tracks are found.
iii. When possible, leapfrogging should always be supplemented by keeping
an additional force on the original trail so that a marked change in
direction, the splitting of tracks or a hide can be spotted. This force is
also conveniently placed to reinforce the follow-up groups in a contact.
This force will also be able to determine whether any reinforcements
may have joined the enemy.
b. Stop groups.
i. As many stop groups of patrol (section) strength as possible should be
placed astride the estimated line of advance, at a distance ahead of the
follow-up group dictated by the terrain and the age of the tracks. Should
time allow it and there be sufficient troops available, the stop groups
should be double banked, thereby ensuring greater depth to the stop line.
These stop groups should be allocated specific areas with well-defined
boundaries. Depending on the situation, the commander should be
prepared to continuously readjust his stop positions.
ii. Immediately on positioning, the stop groups may patrol, if directed, to
the area of the next stop position, i.e., a sidestep, to check whether or not
the terrorists have crossed the stop line. (This precaution may be
necessary as the estimation of the age of the tracks could be wrong.)
a. If tracks similar to those being followed are found, a leap-frog is
made and the follow-up continues from the last spoor. Again, the
bound covered by the leapfrog should be followed on foot for the
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reasons given in paragraph a.3. above.
b. If no tracks are found, the stop groups either remain in ambush
until contact is made, or a sidestep back to their original positions
is ordered, or the stop line is readjusted on information received.
iii. When the stop groups remain in position for any time, they may be
directed to sidestep at first light, just before last light and more
frequently if necessary. When static, particularly at night, they are to
ambush the most likely route in their area. 4. When all stop groups have
been positioned and if a helicopter is available, it may be possible to
mine or booby trap other routes. The following considerations must be
taken into account:
1. Coordination between the mine-laying teams and follow-up group.
2. Availability of specialists and equipment.
3. Provision to lift the mines as soon as possible or when necessary.
c. Backtracking. As soon as possible after the follow-up starts, an additional
force should be tasked with back-tracking from the original point where the
tracks were found. Their mission is to check that no other gangs/groups have
split before the follow-up started and that the terrorists have not left stay-
behind parties in bases along their route. This force may also fulfill an
important intelligence-gathering role such as the location of the crossing point
(if not already known), hides, resting places, etc., which may help establish a
movement pattern, and the recovery of abandoned documents, kit and
equipment.
8. The follow-up will normally take place during daylight with the follow-up group
basing up on the tracks at last light. Although the terrorists may move at night, it is
hoped that they will either contact the stop line or their movement will be slow
enough and their tracks less concealed for them to be overhauled on foot or by
leapfrogging.
SECTION 3: AIRBORNE TRACKING
1. This system of tracking is used when quick results are important or when a large area
must be checked with few troops. Naturally, the use of helicopters is desirable, but
their availability may restrict the use of airborne tracking to essential occasions only.
2. The method adopted depends on the area to be covered and the number of helicopters
tasked. In a reasonably safe area a single helicopter can be used, but it is preferable
to use two, one of which should be armed.
3. Each helicopter carries four men: two trackers and two tracker guards. If, however,
one of the helicopters is a "gunship" (20mm or heavier), only one helicopter should
provide top cover.
4. Ground is covered by cross-graining, with one helicopter landing at each likely route,
e.g., game trail, clearing, pan, river bank, ridge line, etc. The other helicopter should
provide top cover.
5. On landing, a tracker and guard deplane on each side of the aircraft and cast for
spoor right and left for 100 to 500 meters depending on the nature of the ground.
6. If no tracks are found, the process is repeated until the area is covered, with the
helicopters landing alternately so that the trackers are rested.
7. If tracks are located, the second stick is deplaned (resulting in a tracker combat team
of four and four guards) to either start the follow-up or await the arrival of
reinforcements.
8. Each stick is to carry at least one radio to maintain contact with the helicopter and
for use in the follow-up action.
SECTION 4: MOVEMENT
1. It is important that the fleeing enemy be given no respite and chance to consolidate.
Movement of the follow-up force, therefore, becomes important and it must be
carefully controlled and executed so that the follow-up troops are not unnecessarily
worn out and that casualties to own troops are kept to an absolute minimum.
2. During the follow-up it is imperative that the follow-up force commander continually
study the ground ahead, using his eyes and map, and making a careful appreciation
of the terrain. This will assist him in deciding on the best formation to use and the
possible route followed by the enemy. It may also indicate to him natural obstacles to
be avoided and likely places where the enemy may decide to make a final stand or
site ambushes.
3. Movement during the follow-up is done at the best tracking speed or fastest speed
that the terrain and enemy delaying tactics will allow. Precautions must be taken
against blundering into an enemy ambush, but the follow-up force must not be over-
cautious, because every minute lost gives the enemy more time and a better chance
to conceal his tracks and make good his escape.
4. The follow-up will invariably be done during daylight hours because it will be
extremely difficult or even impossible to do tracking at night, especially in difficult
terrain. This means that the follow-up will commence as soon as possible after first
light when the tracks or signs become discernible, until it is too dark to follow or
pick up any signs.
5. During the day it will be necessary for the troops to rest up for a while and have
something to eat. Should the force be large enough, the leapfrog system will be
introduced so that, while a group is resting or having a quick meal, another continues
the follow-up, thereby maintaining the pressure. The group that has rested will then
have to catch up later with the rest of the follow-up force. At section or patrol level,
rests and breaks for meals will have to be restricted to the absolute minimum, if at
all, so that the pressure can be maintained. Should the follow-up operation continue
over a number of days, it will be necessary to rotate the troops, thereby ensuring that
fresh troops are always on the enemy's tracks.
6. Formations during the move will be determined by the nature of the terrain, best or
safest traveling speed and enemy tactics or delaying methods. Scouts and trackers
will probably work in pairs, relieving each other. The protection group will most
probably have to move abreast of each other to be able to give maximum protection
to the scouts and trackers and also prevent the main body from walking into an
ambush.
7. Probably the most difficult aspect of the follow-up operation is that the troops may
have to carry all their equipment and kit. As the follow-up may last several days and
cover a considerable distance, it will not be feasible to dump the kit and equipment
'somewhere and then return at a later stage to collect it. It is therefore important to
ensure that a follow-up force is equipped as lightly as possible, carrying only the
bare necessities, sufficient ammunition, water and rations, and perhaps a lightweight
blanket. In order to maintain the momentum and to prevent unnecessary delays, it
may be necessary to resupply the follow-up force.
8. Should the follow-up force lose the enemy's tracks or contact altogether, the
suggested action is as follows:
a. Establish a temporary base, adopt all-around observation and provide all-
around protection. The enemy may be very close.
b. Determine an effective patrol pattern and warn two or three reconnaissance
patrols, with trackers, if they are available, to stand by for immediate
patrolling.
c. Having issued orders, send out two or three reconnaissance patrols to patrol
forward and laterally, according to the patrol pattern, with the aim of finding
the enemy's tracks or to look for signs and sounds of the enemy. These patrols
should be restricted in the distance that they move away from the temporary
base, probably a thousand meters at the most.
d. Should they find signs, the patrols will return as quickly as possible to the
temporary base, inform the commander and resume the follow-up as soon as
possible.
e. Should no further signs of the enemy be found, the force commander could
either remain in his present position and start on a deliberate patrol program to
search the area more thoroughly, or he could move his temporary base forward
in the original direction of movement for approximately a thousand meters,
and repeat the searching and casting forward system with small reconnaissance
patrols. In this case the decision could be made for him by his next higher
headquarters, depending on how close he was behind the enemy.
f. The important point to remember is not to cast about aimlessly with a lot of
troops when the enemy tracks are lost. This will create additional tracks and
signs, confusing the entire issue and probably obliterating traces of the enemy.
SECTION 5: CONTACT PROCEDURE
1. As soon as it is assessed that the tracks are fresh and a contact imminent:
a. Available helicopters are concentrated at the nearest troop concentration, e.g.,
field headquarters.
b. An armed aircraft is tasked to replace any reconnaissance aircraft supporting
the follow-up group.
2. Depending on the situation and the number of helicopters available, one helicopter
may be tasked for airborne control. It is essential that this aircraft be fitted with an
extra headset, and has the means for the army controller to communicate with ground
forces and supporting aircraft.
3. Any remaining helicopters are tasked for reinforcement or the positioning of stop
groups. The force is broken down into sticks, stick commanders appointed and all are
placed on immediate standby. Again it is essential to have the extra headset so that
stick commanders can be briefed by the pilot or controller in flight. One of the
helicopters tasked to fly in reinforcements/stops will also carry ammunition for
resupply to the contact group, if necessary.
4. On contact, the follow-up commander must relay "contact, contact" to the pilot of the
supporting aircraft and as soon as possible give a brief SITREP. The pilot relays the
information to the control headquarters and then stands by to give air support. He is
to try to pinpoint the contact area, the positions of own troops and likely escape
routes, landing zones, etc.
5. The situation will determine whether it is necessary to deploy an airborne controller
(ABC). The backup helicopters could be called forward immediately, depending on
the urgency and the magnitude of the contact.
6. There are certain problems associated with airborne controlling which should be
taken into account by the local army commander, i.e., disorientation, air sickness,
aircraft noises associated with airborne radios and maps being blown around in the
helicopter. Subject to these considerations, and should an ABC be considered
necessary and practical, the following procedure should apply:
a. In flight to the contact area, the ABC is to receive a brief from the supporting
pilot and then the contact commander and obtain the latest SITREP. This is to
include the need for reinforcement and, if so, the direction of the approach of
the reinforcements and/or the need for stop groups. In addition, an ammunition
state should be given.
b. Once overhead, the ABC, the pilot and gunner must try to visually pinpoint the
terrorist and own troop positions as quickly as possible. This may be difficult
in thick bush, in which case the ABC is to call for FLOT and target indication.
c. During orbit of the contact area, the ABC is to select a suitable landing zone
for reinforcements, if required, and select stop positions and adjacent landing
zones. He will then give an in-flight briefing to the stick commanders in the
backup helicopters and direct their deployment.
d. While orbiting the contact area, the ABC helicopter may well be able to
influence the battle with supporting fire or engage escaping terrorists. The
decision to fire the helicopter-mounted weapon is the prerogative of the pilot,
but no fire is to be opened until the ABC is satisfied with the target in relation
to own troops.
e. The ABC helicopter should, if possible, remain over the contact area until the
contact has ended. This may necessitate changing helicopters at a nearby
landing zone if the original aircraft runs out of flying time. Alternatively, in a
large-scale contact, when more troops are needed as reinforcements/stops, the
ABC should deplane and assume command of the ground forces.
f. Once the backup helicopters have positioned their sticks, they are to return to
the control base for more troops, if required, or are to remain on standby for
further deployments and/or casualty/terrorist evacuation.
g. Depending on the situation, a light aircraft may be used for ABC.
7. Air strikes are employed as follows:
a. If the contact commander considers that an air strike is needed before the
arrival of the ABC and reinforcements, he is to communicate his request
directly to the supporting aircraft. The laid down procedure is then effected,
but in addition the pilot of the supporting aircraft is to inform the control base
or, if in flight, the ABC, that a strike has been called for.
b. However, once the ABC is overhead the contact area and has established
communications with the contact commander, the ABC assumes responsibility
for requesting an air strike. The procedure is then the same as laid down for
requesting air strikes, and the ABC will monitor communications between the
pilot and the contact commander.
8. The following post-contact action is necessary:
a. Immediately after the contact, the contact commander is to split his force
(including reinforcements and/or stop groups) and detail one group to
thoroughly search the contact area. The other group is to move out from 500 to
1,000 meters and conduct a 360 degree search around the contact area. This
group is to search for the tracks of escaped terrorists and for secondary hides
and rendezvous.
b. Unless the whole terrorist gang was eliminated, an area ambush is to be set on
the contact area in the hope that some terrorists may return in search of kit or
food, or to reorientate themselves if lost.
9. As already mentioned, the enemy will employ various tactics and ruses to delay the
follow-up force once he becomes aware of it. The follow-up troops must be well
drilled in their immediate action drills, and the follow-up force commander must be
able to decide almost instantaneously whether his force has walked into a deliberate
ambush, is being sniped at by an individual or two, or has encountered booby traps.
Quick decisions of this nature will enable the commander to give the necessary
commands to counter the enemy action immediately.
10. The point to remember is that, by means of his delaying tactics and harassing of the
follow-up force, the enemy is trying to buy time to make good his escape.
Consequently, the follow-up force's reactions to these delaying tactics must be
immediate and executed as well-rehearsed drills, thereby only losing minimum time.
The encounter drills as described in Chapter 6 could, under certain circumstances, be
used. Remember that time must not be wasted.
11. Immediate actions executed boldly but with a certain amount of caution will unsettle
the enemy and force him to abandon his delaying positions more quickly. It is the
commander on the spot who will have to decide what the best course of action will
be and, having decided, to react immediately.
SECTION 6: COMMUNICATIONS
1. The controlling headquarters must have and maintain good communications with the
follow-up forces. This is essential for planning purposes. if necessary, relay facilities
should be provided.
2. The follow-up force will also have to be provided with good ground-to-air
communications, as the air arm can play an important role and can only be used
effectively if there are good communications with the ground forces.
SECTION 7: CONCLUSION
1. The follow-up operation is essentially a practical application of tracking techniques,
but with the force so organized that it is well balanced, relentless and determined to
come to grips with the enemy and to attack and destroy the enemy once he has been
contacted. Main factors leading to a successful conclusion of such an operation are
as follows:
a. Correction grouping of the force.
b. Determination and maintenance of pressure.
c. A high degree of physical fitness.
d. A high standard of bushcraft.
e. Good communications.
f. Effective employment of the air arm.
g. Well-planned and coordinated movement.
h. Careful appreciation and route planning of terrain which the force must move
over.
i. A high standard of battle drills that will stand the force in good stead and
minimize casualties when contact is made with the enemy.
j. Aggression and flexibility in the planning and execution of the follow-up.

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Trackers may not be necessary in an African unit or those units which have become
proficient in bushcraft. Other units may have to have police, civilians or African soldiers
attached to patrols for tracking duties.
As terrorists are likely to become masters of bushcraft, they will probably rely on
superior ability to out see and out walk security forces. Their ability to track and read
tracks naturally will make them more proficient in hiding their own. This will necessitate
members of the Security Forces being expert trackers themselves, or being able to work
with and understand loyal African trackers.
Using surrendered terrorists. So far as ex-terrorist trackers are concerned, the fact that
they have surrendered and led security forces to a good kill does not indicate that they have
changed their loyalty. The mere fact that they are prepared to cooperate with the Security
Forces against their fellow terrorists demonstrates their lack of loyalty. They should be
used whenever appropriate. They should be continually reminded in one way or another
that they are exceptionally fortunate not to have been shot before their surrender, that they
are on probation and have a score which can only be settled by continuous and satisfactory
service. Extreme care should be taken to avoid surrendered terrorists leading our patrols
into ambushes.
Tracker Combat Teams
General. The ideal Tracker Combat Team consists of four men, all of whom are expert
trackers. This four man team should not be split down unless it is of vital operational
necessity to do so.
Role.
a. Locating spoor.
b. Tracking and destroying small groups of terrorists.
c. To provide a tracker group as part of a larger follow-up group.
d. To locate terrorists who are still undetected.
Organization. A Tracker Combat Team consists of the following combinations:
a. The tracker on the spoor.
b. Two flank trackers.
c. The tracker control.
Tracker Combat Team Capabilities.
a. The ability to locate spoor quickly should it deviate.
b. The ability to search for and locate spoor quickly when it is temporarily lost.
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c. The ability to rotate duties within itself so as not to tire the person actually tracking.
d. To be self contained in tracking, observation and protection.
Individual Tracker Tasks.
a. The tracker follows the spoor.
b. The flank trackers perform the following tasks:
(1) The main task of the flank trackers is to provide protection for the tracker on the spoor.
(2) They pick up the spoor if it veers to the left or the right.
(3) They carry out a circular cast if the spoor is lost.
(4) When advancing, they swing towards one another and out again to the flank position
in an effort to locate the spoor ahead of the tracker and speed up tracking. Great care is
exercised to ensure the spoor is not obliterated or disturbed by the flank trackers.

c. Trackers Control carries out the following functions:
(1) He controls the teams activities by the use of signs and signals.
(2) He is additional tracker protection.
(3) He reports progress to the commander of the follow-up troops.
(4) He is the eyes and ears of the tracker team.
(5) When the spoor is lost, he marks the last positive sign while the remainder of the
team search the area for the spoor.
Action on Finding Tracks.
a. Unless it is possible to follow the spoor with either a civilian tracker or a Combat
Tracker Team, anyone finding spoor should isolate the scene and keep that area free of
security forces until the arrival of trackers. An immediate report should be made to higher
headquarters giving the following information:
(1) Estimated number of terrorists.
(2) Age of spoors.
(3) Direction.
(4) Any other useful information such as location, terrain, etc.
b. It is absolutely essential that the spoor is not obliterated or disturbed by the
discoverers. The spoor and the surrounding area must remain untouched until the arrival of
a tracker or tracker team. It is not possible to follow one preserved spoor when the
remainder of the area has been trampled flat by security forces.
It frequently pays to back track when very fresh tracks are found, particularly early in
the morning when they may lead to a camp.
Tracker Combat Team Formations. There are two essential formations used:
a. Open formation for fairly open country.
b. Single file for very thick bush.
(Both formations are shown in Annex)
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Tracker Combat Team Follow-Up Tactics. Annex shows Tracker Combat Team
formations. These are superimposed on to follow-up formations normally adopted by
Rhodesian troops in operations. (See Appendices to Annex ).
a. Open Country.
(1) Flank trackers remain slightly ahead of the main tracker who is in visual contact.
(2) If the spoor veers off to the left or right, it should be picked up by either of the flank
trackers. The flank tracker who picks up the spoor continues as main tracker on the spoor.
The remainder of the team conform with the standard patrolling formation with the last
main tracker filling in the vacant flank position.
(3) If the spoor is lost, flank trackers do a circular cast working towards one another in
the hope of picking up the spoor again. By this method, a 360 degree circle is completed in
the area where it was lost.
(4) While the flank trackers are carrying out the search as described above, the tracker
who was on the spoor carries out a 360 degree search approximately 15 yards to his
immediate front.
(5) Tracker control marks the last positive spoor and provides protection for the trackers.
(6) At this stage the team is particularly vulnerable and the team relies completely on
the alert state of Tracker Control.
b. Thick Country.
(1) The main tracker follows the spoor with Tracker Control within ten yards of him as
protection man. Tracker Control does not attempt to follow the spoor as he observes and
listens for the tracker team.
(2) If the spoor is temporarily lost, Tracker Control marks the last positive spoor and the
flank trackers now in single file behind Tracker Control cast around in an enveloping 360
degree circle in an effort to find the spoor (See Annex , Appendix 1 and 5)
(3) The main tracker completes a 360 degree circle approximately 15 yards to his
immediate front.
(4) Once the spoor has been relocated, the tracker who found the spoor then takes over
as main tracker. The remainder of the team fall into an appropriate tracker formation.
Tracker Combat Team and Follow-up Troops Combinations.
a. It must be appreciated that all formations are subject to variations depending on the type
of country and the appreciation of the commander of the patrol.
b. There are a number of formation permutations in current use in the Rhodesia Army (See
Annex and Appendices).
c. There is considerable variation in the Rhodesian bush between the summer and winter
months, and these formations are adaptable to either open country or thick bush.
Use of Dogs
The only tracker dogs at present available to Security Forces in Rhodesia are those used
by the Police. Both dogs and handlers are extremely well trained for Police requirements.
These dogs have been used in COIN Operations but have achieved only limited success.
It is doubtful whether these dogs would be made available for general operations but the
occasion may arise when a dog is again attached to a patrol for tracking purposes.
The dog will normally follow the freshest track, but he will, if given the scent from
personal clothing or belongings, discriminate and follow the scent of that particular quarry.
It should be realized that dogs tire easily, and therefore they should only be used for
tracking when visual tracking becomes very difficult or impossible. If the tracks become
visible once more visual tracking should be resumed to conserve the dogs strength and
concentration.
Apart from obvious factors which cause the quarry to leave a strong scent, e.g. blood,
dirty body and clothes, sweat or panic, there are certain climatic factors which influence
scenting conditions:
a. Favorable.
(1) Air and ground temperatures approximately the same.
(2) Dull, damp weather.
b. Adverse.
(1) Hot sun.
(2) Strong winds.
(3) Heavy rains.
(4) Tarmac roads, rock and other hard surfaces.
(5) Dust.
(6) Running water.
From this can be deduced the following facts regarding scenting conditions:
a. The dogs will track well at night, in the early mornings and late evenings.
b. The periods of the rainy season will be favorable for tracking except during heavy rain
and immediately afterwards.
c. The bush should nearly always produce good conditions, but here the presence of
game may cause confusion.
d. The employment of tracker dogs in towns and villages is very rarely worthwhile.
e. Under the most favorable conditions, it will be quite feasible to follow tracks up to 12
hours old.
f. Under unfavorable conditions, there may be no scent at all even if the quarry is only a
few minutes ahead.
Dogs should not be used as a last resort and once the decision is made to use a dog, the
area must not be fouled. Therefore, all unnecessary movement in the area by troops,
police or civilians must be rigidly controlled until the dog has picked up the scent. Dogs
may be transported by helicopters as the animals travel well and do not suffer any
discomfort. The following points should be remembered:
a. The down draft from the helicopter can very easily destroy any scent. Hence, the
helicopter should not fly low over a known, or suspected, trail.
b. When a dog is tracking, the presence of a helicopter flying nearby often distracts the
animal and so the aircraft should be kept well away.
Use of Aircraft for Tracking. Light aircraft and /or helicopters can be of great
assistance to patrols in tracking gangs of insurgents. It is essential that the insurgents are
kept on the move by the ground forces as a stationary man, under even light cover, is
difficult to spot from the air. Patrol leaders should also remember that helicopter noise can
break security and indicate to the terrorists what the Security Forces are planning.
HINTS ON TRAILS AND TRACKING
General. It is extremely difficult to move silently and quickly in most parts of the
Rhodesian bush and consequently this requires much practice and concentration.
There are many paths in the bush made by game during their nightly or seasonal
movements. These animals avoid steep or slippery slopes and therefore game paths will
normally provide easy going. Insurgents and our own patrols use these trails when quick,
silent movement is required. Troops should exercise extreme caution when using these
trails as Security Forces might well be ambushed.
There are two distinct types of spoor; ground spoor and aerial spoor. The ground sign is
normally made by a boot or foot print and aerial spoor is in the form of trampled grass,
broken bushes, broken cobwebs, etc.
Man. Barefoot prints are soft, rounded impressions formed by the heel, ball of the foot
or toes. Womens tracks are generally smaller and usually have two characteristics; firstly,
they tend to be pigeon-toed and, secondly, their toes are more splayed out than the males.
Animals. As most animals have cloven hooves, the impressions formed on the ground
have sharp, clear cut edges.
Tracking
The following are signs that the experienced tracker seeks when following spoor:
a. Crushed and bent grass and vegetation.
b. Broken twigs and leaves.
c. Overturned leaves.
d. Mud displaced from streams.
e. Broken cobwebs.
f. The state of the dew on a trail.
g. Mud or scratches on stones and logs.
Running men. Points to observe are skid marks, depth of impression, running on balls
of feet and toes, splayed out toes and badly damaged vegetation with resultant lack of
concealment of the trail.
Loaded men. Short footsteps, deeper impressions than normal in soft ground, toes
splayed out.
Judging the Age of Tracks.
a. Weather. The state of the weather - rain, wind, sunshine - should always be on ones mind
as it is one of the most important points in deciding the age of a track.
b. Vegetation. The state and position of trodden vegetation; various grasses have different
grades of resilience and only practice and experience can enable a tracker to use this factor
to accurately judge the age of the spoor.
c. Impression in mud. Always note the state of dryness of a track in mud or soft ground.
If the track is very fresh, water will not have run back into the depression made by a foot.
The water will run back later and later still the mud pushed up around the depression and
kicked forward by the foot leaving the ground will begin to dry.
d. Obliteration by rain or guti. By remembering when it last rained, more accurate
judgment of the age of tracks is possible. If the tracks are pockmarked, they were
obviously made before the rain and, if not pock-marked, they were made after the rain.
Similarly, by looking to see if the tracks have been pock-marked by gutidripping from
trees, the age can be established.
e. Bent Grass or Leaves. An indication of the age of a track may be gained by the state of
dryness of the bent grass is still green but after a few days turns a brown color. Again, the
amount of sunshine and rain during the last few days should be taken into account.
f. Game Tracks. Remember that most animals lie up during the day and move about at
night. Therefore, if human prints on main forest game trails have at least a double set of
animal spoor superimposed and these spoor show that the game has moved in both
directions, any human prints are probably at least one night old. If the animal spoor show
that game has moved in one direction only, then the human prints were probably made
during the night after the game had moved down to water but before the game moved back.
Information regarding insurgents methods of concealing tracks and camps should also
be sought.
Factors affecting Tracking. There are certain factors which affect tracking:
a. Whether the ground is hard or soft, stony or muddy.
b. The type of country - Savannah or Mopani forest.
c. The weather - things lack depth in overcast weather.
d. The position of the sun relative to the direction of travel. The most suitable position
is when one has to track towards the sun.
e. The footwear of the human quarry. A distinct boot pattern is obviously easier to follow
than a plain soled spoor.
f. The extent to which other similar tracks may confuse and possibly blur the spoor.
g. Concentration and the effects of weariness.
Things the tracker must look for:
a. Footprints and impressions of footwear; the rhythm of the spoor or length of stride of
the quarry. This is a guide to where the next footprint can be found.
b. Trampled grass.
c. Disturbed stones, sticks or soil. Marks in the soil where indirect pressure may have left
no impression.
d. Leaves - turned, crushed, kicked or pulled off trees. Branches and twigs bent or
broken. Vegetation pushed aside and the reflection of light from grass or leaves displaced
at an angle. The color of bent and broken vegetation, scratched or chipped bark.
e. Discarded wrapping and masticated vegetation.
f. Cobwebs broken or wiped off onto a nearby tree or bush.
g. Urine and excrement, frequently indicated by house flies, mopani bees, yellow
butterflies and, during the rains, dung beetles.
h. Snares and traps, robbed bees nests and smoke.
I. The state of dew on the spoor.
J. Mud displaced from streams or mud on stones and logs.
K. Squashed animal or insect life and whether it has been attacked by ants.
Bush Danger Signs.
a. The Grey Loerie when disturbed will utter a loud and drawn out g-way call, and
often follows the intruder, thus alarming the quarry or warning the tracker.
b. The honey guide bird and ox-pecker both have the same give away effect on both
quarry and tracker.
Conclusion
A tracker has many things to consider while tracking. He must possess certain qualities
such as above average eyesight, memory, intelligence, fitness, anticipation and
understanding of nature. Patience, persistence, acute observation and natural instinct are the
basis of good tracking. There are times when pure instinct alone will draw a tracker in the
correct direction. All units should ensure that training in Aggressive Bushcraft is
maintained at the highest possible standard.
Annex to Rural Tracking Operations
Tracker Team and Patrol Formations
General
Experience gained by Rhodesian Security Forces in the past few years has resulted in
basic principles on which operational units now base tracker team and patrol formations.
These principles have evolved from normal border control duties, minor operations and
major operations. Contacts have occurred as a result of deliberate follow-up patrolling and
from chance contacts during frame-work patrolling in operations.
In all cases, the commander of the patrol decides how best to move through the
particular type of country in which his patrol is operating. There are only two main patrol
formations; the Single File and Open Formation, both of which adequately cater for thick
bush and open country. The tracker team and normal patrol, or both if they are working
together, are able to adopt these formations to cover the ground being searched and provide
good protection.
Formations
Only the outline requirements can be given in the following diagrams. Each regular unit
has developed its own ideas on the best detail within each formation. However, it is
generally accepted that the ideal tracker team works as a four man group while patrol
formations should be based on three main groups plus a control or headquarters group.
Within each group actual formations adopted could vary depending on personalities in
command, unit training, likes or dislikes and the type of country or terrorist confronting the
members of the patrol.
The following appendices give formation details of Tracker Team, Patrol and a
combination of both. Leaders should rehearse their own maneuvering in the bush using the
following ideas as a guide. During rehearsals, practice or basic training, finer details can be
developed to the satisfaction of all who will make practical use of the formations in actual
operations.
Annex to Rural Tracking Operations Notes
a. The four group system has, in all cases, Flank and Reserve groups with the command
element located centrally. Each group could adopt any one of several formations to cover
the ground efficiently. There may even be occasions when the commander prefers to keep
two thirds of his strength in reserve (one up, two back). This is the commanders
prerogative and he must decide after considering all relevant factors. The size of the patrol
dictates the number of men in each group; if the patrol is only four man strength, the
Tracker Team Single File or Open Formation can be adopted (see A and B above). As the
strength increases, so can the number of men in each group.
b. Distances between individuals will vary according to visibility, but five yards is the
most convenient guide. Distance between groups is tactical but certainly within visual
distance for silent signals and control.
c. The patrol moves behind the trackers and must avoid interfering with the Tracker Team
duties and tactics. The patrol commander commands the whole follow-up patrol, including
trackers, but he should discuss formations, distances and personal preferences with the
Control Tracker before moving out on a patrol. This should eliminate any
misunderstandings and avoid unnecessary confusion. It will also allow coordination
between trackers and patrols which may have special requirements.
d. The allocated position of patrol personnel within groups is not rigid. Each
commander has his personal preferences and factors can influence this detail. The
positioning of various types of fire support available is also flexible and personal
preferences override any attempt to dictate rigid drills, e.g. 32Zs fitted to rifles, position of
heavy barreled FNs, positioning of the MAGs or radios.
Appendices to annex
Appendix 1 to annex.
(END)
***NOTE*** Source - Rural operations Course notes / hand-outs from Rhodesian S.A.S. (C Squadron).

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Tracker Combat Unit (TCU) Trails Terrs
By David Scott-Donelan
Rhodesia was hardly a nurturing environment for an experimental
military unit. Most soldiers were concerned with simple survival,
particularly in the earlier days of the countrys no-holds-barred bush
war against communist guerrillas. In those times, the governments
troop strength was low and resources to patrol a 1,000-mile border and
150,000 square miles of hinterland were severely limited.
But history demonstrates some of the toughest life forms spring from harsh environments. In
Rhodesia, when you talked tough, you talked about the Armys Tracker Combat Unit.
From TCUs small nucleus of original members came an impressive roster of military leaders
including Andre Rabie and Allan Franklin, founding members of another innovative and deadly
organization, the Selous Scouts. Other original TCU members included Brian Robinson, who
later commanded Rhodesias Tracking School and Special Air Services at the height of
battlefield commitment of that unit. TCU plankowner Joe Conway was decorated for tackling
four terrorists while armed only with a bayonet. And T.C. Woods survived an underwater
battle with a crocodile, even after the man-eater chewed off one of his balls. The original
members of the Tracker Combat Unit were veterans and genuine hard-cases. They had to be.
TCU soldiers also had to be innovative. They formed their unit out of not much more than a
concept and an urgent necessity. Short on resources but long on initiative, the Rhodesians
waged a campaign of extreme professional competence that will deserve a place in the worlds
Staff College courses for many years to come, according to John Keegans World Armies.
Rhodesias problem was engaging
hostile guerrillas in a large area with
limited manpower. And as important a
part of military field operations as it is,
patrolling was often an ineffective
means of contacting the enemy in the
vast bush of southern Africa. Without
luck Or adequate military intelligence
there was generally no contact,
particularly if the insurgents had the
assistance of the local population.
Fighting terrorists when they
could be forced to fight was easy.
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Finding them is another story and the
genesis of the TCU. In 1965,
foreseeing the fundamental problem of covering large areas with limited troops in heat that often
exceeded 110 degrees, the Rhodesian Army adopted a solution suggested by ex-game ranger
turned ecologist, Allen Savory. They began experimenting with trained tracking teams which
could react to any incident or reported presence of terrorist groups. That may seem simple
enough. American Indians have tracked human and animal quarry for centuries and the British
used Iban trackers in the Malayan Campaign. But the Rhodesians developed the basic fieldcraft
into a tactical science that later accounted for the deaths of many terrorists who mistakenly
thought there was no danger in leaving a track of communist-supplied boots across the African
veldt.
Savorys concept took native tracking and turned it into a military discipline. He argued that
a soldier already skilled in patrols, ambushes and tactical maneuvering could better almost
anyone in the man tracking game once trained in the necessary techniques. From Rhodesias
SAS he selected eight men which he felt had demonstrated special potential to form a test group.
Savory put them through a Spartan, rigorous training program in the Sabie Valley adjacent to
the Mozambique border. Eight weeks in the field, two weeks back in town and another eight
weeks back in the bush was just enough to bring his men to what he felt was the required
standard.
It was just in time. The insurgency situation projected by Rhodesian military commanders
soon became a reality. In 1966 the war began with the infiltration of a combined Rhodesian and
South African terrorist gang into the Wankie National Park in the northwestern corner of the
country.
The Rhodesian Army made initial mistakes in reacting to the threat but field soldiers quickly
learned some vital lessons. Government troops took several casualties but all 40 terrorists were
killed or captured. The need to track and locate similar guerrilla bands became obvious.
Military authorities approved the TCU as a permanent unit. Savory began looking outside the
Army to avoid the charge that his priority tended to strip units of their best men. Since hed
served several years in Rhodesias Game Department, he already knew the type of man he
wanted. Over the next few months he contacted former colleagues and his fledgling unit began
to take shape. He selected 12 bush veterans who were excellent marksmen and trained soldiers.
TCU was officially born.
The early lessons learned by the pioneer SAS trackers were
strictly applied to the vast font of bush knowledge most men brought
into TCU and a rigorous training schedule was designed to teach
tactical application. They began their training by tracking in pairs;
one tracking the other over increasing distances.
Bushcraft and survival skills were perfected and much time was
spent on jungle ranges to improve reflexes and instinctive shooting.
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Great care was taken to practice silent movement. All
communications were by hand signals. Silent dog whistles were also
employed. When blown in a certain way they produced a sound
similar to that of a local beetle, recognizable to a trained ear but
meaningless to the uninitiated.
Once individual tracking was learned, the trainees were
introduced to team tracking. This involved a four-man team: a
controller, a primary tracker and two flank trackers. The team was
deployed on the spoor in a V-formation with the two guard trackers placed slightly forward and
to each flank to protect the main man whose concentration would be locked onto following the
spoor. The controller was placed in the rear of the team to coordinate and control tactical
movement. Team members were trained in all four positions and periodically rotated to prevent
fatigue.
Some of the most effective training was accomplished when one team would lay a spoor of a
fairly long distance and then prepare an ambush for the tracking team. They would ambush their
pursuers with slingshots. This method enabled trackers to spot likely ambush sites and also
helped develop a good eye for the selection and concealment of ambush positions. A painful welt
from a slingshot missile was the motivation to avoid carelessness. Longer and longer reaches
were worked by TCU teams until they could hold on a spoor for several days with comparative
ease.
After a training segment which taught them how to cover their own track and avoid detection,
the trainees were ready for the final tactical exercise: a competition between three four-man
teams. Wearing only shirts, shorts, boots and hats each team member was given rations
consisting of four tea bags and a four-ounce packet of shelled rice. They were assigned a series
of map coordinates to follow over a seven-day period. The exercise was planned so that routes
would cross and the objective was for each team to track and hunt down the other two groups.
The rules were simple. If a team caught another team, they were
allowed to confiscate anything from their prisoners. It was not
unusual to see naked trackers slinking through the bush in pursuit
of their confiscated uniforms. In the final phase of training, live
ammunition was used to accustom trackers to the realities of
combat.
Once training was completed, the TCU members returned to
their homes or other duties until there was a need for their
specialized services. Generally, it was not a long wait.
The first real operation for Rhodesias TCU was in 1967.
Zambian-based terrorists made a significant incursion into northern
Mashonaland. Several guerrilla base camps across the Zambezi Valley floor were set up by 110
terrorists who had infiltrated Rhodesia undetected. A game ranger David Scammel who later
became a tracker team member found their spoor wruie checking disturbed wildlife patterns.
The newly-formed and trained TCU was mustered and given the task of locating the guerrillas.
After some significant reconnaissance, an attack was mounted on the primary terrorist base camp
and many of the gang were killed in the ensuing action. Some managed to escape the Armys
attack, but they were not home free.
A second phase of the assault was opened including a series of pursuits by trackers. In this
operation, TCU member Joe Conway tracked four guerrillas 60 miles over three days across
broken terrain. The chase ended when the thoroughly demoralized terrorists raised their hands
and surrendered. The captured commies complained profusely at their Rhodesian government
trial about having been tracked down like wild animals. Conway and the other TCU trackers just
beamed at that.
In December 1969, the terrorists struck again in attacks on Victoria Falls Airport and a police
base while using explosives to cut the Rhodesian/Zambian rail line. Within eight hours, two
TCU teams were on the trail and they discovered that 22 guerrillas had been involved in the
three-pronged strike. Before they could run the terrs to ground, a heavy thunderstorm washed
away the spoor. Several days later, after police found suspicious tracks, a second TCU team was
choppered in to investigate. They followed the trail for several miles to a place where a
deliberate effort had been made to obliterate the tracks.
The spoor seemed to be the same one that had been washed out earlier and indications were
that the terrorists had moved into a heavily wooded ravine. The TCU members skirmished
forward. Not 30 yards into the bush, one tracker found a Russian-made pack hastily concealed in
a hole. A thorough search of the area revealed 22 sleeping spaces and 20 more packs containing
ammunition, grenades, food and clothing. The signs clearly indicated the terrorists had fled when
they discovered skilled trackers were on their trail. Despite the lack of contact, the TCU had
managed a victory. The guerrillas lost their base camp and were forced to split into smaller
groups which made them vulnerable to Rhodesian patrols.
More heavy rains prevented the TCU from staying on the track but at first light the next
morning an Army patrol discovered fresh spoor and called the unit into action. The trail
appeared to be leading to an abandoned stone quarry several miles away which was a likely
location of a terrorist rendezvous. A TCU team was inserted along the anticipated route and they
quickly spotted three terrorists squatting under a tree to escape the rain. Using their bush skills,
the TCU members crept to within 20 yards, and counted coup: three shots, three confirmed terr
KIAs. The entire guerrilla unit was ultimately located and liquidated.
The TCU was involved in virtually every incident of insurgent infiltration over the next few
years. Hundreds of successful pursuits were launched based on TCU information and
intelligence. Large numbers of terrorists were killed with only one TCU combat death.
In one of the worlds classic
military ironies, the TCUs success
ultimately led to the units demise.
The tactics and techniques which the
Tracker Combat Unit pioneered and
proved led the Rhodesian government
to decide that similar training should
be mandated throughout the Army. As
a first step, the TCU was ordered into
the ranks of the Selous Scouts while
some veterans were seconded off to
form Rhodesias widely-acclaimed
Tracking and Bushcraft School on the
shores of Lake Kariba (the famed
Wafa Wafa).
Hundreds of soldiers, both black and white, were trained there, including several from
friendly Western countries. Much of the Rhodesian Armys success against insurgents from the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) can be directly attributed to the school and Allen Savorys foresight and wisdom.
TERR TRACKER
This was Capt. David Scott-Donelan first appearance in SOF magazine. Scott currently owns
and runs the Tactical Tracking Operations School (TTOS) in United States. His military service
spans two-and-a-half decades and several countries. From 1961 until 1980. when the government
was turned over to Marxist insurgents, he served in Rhodesias most outstanding military units,
including the Special Air Service, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Selous Scouts and the
Tracker Combat Unit. Among other duties, the British citizen has served as an SAS troop
commander, intelligence advisor, manager of counter-insurgency operations, commandant of the
Rhodesian Army Bushcraft and Tracking School. and as a training officer and group commander
for the Selous Scouts.
(END)
***NOTE*** The source of this article was obtained from; Solider of Fortune magazine, March 1985, page 70.

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As a Scout, your knowledge of tracking will enhance your awareness, increases your ability to gather
intelligence, and sharpen your bushcraft. If you are in command during extended border operations, a tracking
capability will enable you to build an accurate map of the localized enemy movement with out having to send
out large amounts of patrols.
Good trackers are rare. When they are needed for military purposes, commanders usually employ hunters from
the local indigenous population. But this does not mean that soldiers cannot track; some of them are among the
worlds best trackers. A tracker is a reader of sign. He takes a few faint pieces of information and, by the
process of deduction and comparison with previous experience, puts the puzzle together.
The more experience the tracker has, the better able he is to do the job. But he must still beware the following:
1 Lack of confidence
Even the best trackers use intuition, and a tracker must know when to trust a hunch. With lives at stake, lack of
confidence can cloud your ability to think straight. Experience is the only solution.
2 Bad weather
Sign does not last for ever. Wind, rain and fresh snowfall will all obliterate it: many a trail has gone cold
because the tracker has not paid enough attention to the weather forecast. With unfavorable weather imminent,
short cuts may need to be taken to speed the follow-up.
3 Non-track conscious personnel
By the time trackers are called in to follow a trail, the clues at the proposed start have usually been destroyed
by clumsy feet. If you are fortunate enough to work with a team that can recognize sign, even though they
cannot read it, you will have extra pairs of eyes to help you find the vital clues.
4 Unsympathetic commander
Tracking is a solitary business, requiring great concentration. A tracker must have the trust of the commander,
and must be able to trust his cover group. Tracking often seems to be painfully slow, but the tracker will be
moving as fast as he can: never rush him. The more intelligence he has at his disposal, the better, so tell him
what is going on: your knowledge of enemy movement may make sense of an otherwise meaningless clue.
Try to allow the tracker time to impart a rudimentary knowledge of tracking to his cover group, and make sure
the cover group are all patient men: the tracker has the challenge of the trail to hold his attention, but the cover
and support group does not. If they make any noise, it is the tracker who is at greatest risk.
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Learning to track
Tracking is not a particularly difficult skill to learn, but it needs dedication and much practice. Once you have
learned the basic principles and techniques you can practice in your own time. If you want to reach a high
standard, it will help if you have a team mate who can lay trails for you. Make sure you keep a log: this must
include the duration of the track, the time of the day, the ground conditions, and the level of difficulty.
Teaching yourself is not easy. The biggest mistake you can make is to run before you can walk: for at least
your first 50 hours, follow simple trails, concentrating on accurately interpreting the sign. Then gradually
increase the difficulty of the trails. When you have 100 hours under your belt, you should be following fairly
difficult trails.

Becoming sign-conscious
The first skill of a tracker is the most important one you will learn: becoming sign-conscious. There is no
quick way to achieve this. As you go about your everyday business, try to notice footprints, tracks, fingerprints,
hair and other signs.
At first this will be a contrived activity, but with perseverance you will begin to notice these fine details in the
overall pattern around you without thinking about it. When this happens, you are ready to start tracking.

Reading sign
Youre unlikely ever to find a string of Man Friday footprints. Instead you will have to follow a trail of
scuffs, creased leaves, bruised grass stems, hairs and occasionally part of a footprint.
If you are lucky enough to find a clear print, study it carefully to glean as much information as possible about
the target. Compare it with your own to determine the targets size, sex, age, weight (load or no load), speed of
travel, and whether he is fit or exhausted.
You must also be able to read animal signs, even when tracking people. For example, a human track with a
badger print on top of it will show that the track was made before the badger was active at night. If you know the
habits of the local wildlife, you will have gained a clue to the age of the track.
Animal tracks may also lead you to a rubbish or food cache, providing you with crucial information regarding
the targets state of mental, moral and physical well-being.

Attributes of a tracker
Tracking is mainly a visual skill. Your eyesight, whether you wear glasses or not, must be 20/20. Shortsighted
people often seem to make good trackers once their eyesight is corrected.
A general ability to observe is not enough for tracking: you have to piece information together, like Sherlock
Holmes. You must also be patient, persistent and constantly questioning your own theories, especially if you are
solo tracking.
Very often, you will trail your target to within touching distance. To reduce risks, self-defense and close-
quarter battle skills are vital.
Although modern equipment plays an important role in the task of tracking, remember that it does not replace
your tracking ability: it just makes life easier.

Clothing and equipment
A tracking team must be totally self-sufficient and capable of operating as an independent unit. Communica-
tions equipment and plenty of supplies and ammunition must be carried. Tracking can often be a slow process, so
everyone must be warm, windproof and waterproof.
The trackers load is normally carried by the support team, leaving him with only his belt kit. Make
arrangements for his kit to be dropped where he can reach it at the first sign of trouble.
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Using the Light
Now that you have become more sign-conscious, you must learn to maximize your chances of seeing sign. To
see the greatest detail in a clear print you need contrast: this means the light striking the ground at a low angle.
Normally, this means that you are limited to tracking when the sun is low in the sky, during the morning hours
and in late afternoon/early evening. Around midday the light is almost directly overhead and casts a flat light,
which makes ground features disappear. However, time will usually be against you in most live tracking
situations, forcing you to continue through the midday and sometimes even into the night. In this case you will
need to make use of techniques that have been devised to control the light conditions to your advantage.

Daylight tracking
When the sun is low in the sky, you can take advantage of the light just by positioning yourself correctly:
make sure the track is between yourself and the light source by watching the shadows cast by your tracking stick.
Probably the most common error of novice trackers is to align themselves incorrectly. Once you are in the
correct position, it is often an advantage to lower your line of sight, sometimes even right down to the ground.
As you become more proficient you will do this mainly for seeing the finer details or when the light is bad. If
you are not used to squatting on your haunches for long periods, include exercise for this in your fitness
program: novice trackers on their first extended follow-up often miss sign due to a reluctance to squat down.
When you are sign-cutting (searching for sign, normally aiming to cross the target at 900), getting into the
correct position relative to the sun is vital, but can pose problems. If the target is moving directly away from the
sun, to follow up you will have to look back over your shoulder. This must be practiced, as it takes some
getting used to.
If you have to follow up through the mid-day period, you will have to slow down and be more careful, which
is more tiring. Ideally your commander will use several trackers and rotate them at point duty.
You may be able to gain some lighting advantage by using your torch. A torch is also the best answer when
you are tracking in woodland where the light conditions can be very confusing, especially under dappled
shadowing.

Night tracking
Night tracking is not always possible; it depends on the local ground conditions. Because you will be using
artificial light you can precisely control the light angle. Wherever possible, try to position your light source low
and with the track between yourself and the light. A torch with a variable focus beam can be advantage. If you
are using vehicles on dirt roads fit them with tracking lights, set to point sideways, crating contrast lighting.
Night tracking should play an important part in your training program as it helps to reinforce your use of light
and enhances your ability to notice sign. Study clear prints as well as faint sign, and experiment with the light
angle and beam focus until you feel you have the correct combination.
At night your ability is servely handicapped by the change of colors to monochrome. In tactical situations
follow-ups usually only continue at night when a life is at risk or there is a high probability of changing of
changing weather conditions obliterating the sign.
Light is vital to the tracker. The best times to track are early morning or late afternoons, where the low angle
of the sun brings up the track. It is possible to track using artificial light by securing a torch to the end of your
tracking stick and holding the torch on one side of the track while you read it from the other. Here, poor lighting
could result in the target being lost. This position is know as the LPC (last point of contact).

Tracking on a slope
Many novice trackers fail to notice that the ground conditions are changing from flat to slope because they are
too wrapped up in the sign: even the very gentlest slope will dramatically affect the lighting conditions,
sometimes not. There is little you can do except to be aware of the situation.
Moisture can often make tracking easy. Dew that collects on surfaces, particularly plant foliage, will normally
reflect light well. Places where a target has stepped will usually show as dark patches if he flattened down the
vegetation before the dew settled, because the light will reflect off these patches at a different angle from the
surrounding vegetation. However, if he passed by after the dew settled it will have been wiped off the vegetation.
On hard, flat surfaces such as rock, moisture can reveal the prints of the target as light patches. The dust on the
surface will darken with moisture, but he will have removed dust by treading and so the moisture will not collect
so easily.
Remember, dont just watch the ground. Sign can be left by any part of the body: for instance moisture
missing on a shrub may give you an accurate indication of the targets height.

Tracking by feel
You will usually be tracking by sight, but you may find yourself in situations when a track cannot be seen
although this does not mean that it cant be detected.
A track in short grass is an example. When a foot treads on grass, the grass is flattened and sometimes broken,
bruised or torn, Greater damage is caused when the target is traveling at speed or under a load. If not too badly
damaged, the grass slowly recovers, to stand upright again. The time it takes for the grass to untangle itself and
recover will depend on the local weather conditions and the variety of grass. It does not usually take long for the
track to become invisible to the eye, but some blades of grass will remain depressed.
By very light and careful probing with the tips of your two little fingers, you will be able to detect these blades
of grass by a resistance to your probing. Compare this with the surrounding area. With care, you should be able
to discern the overall shape of the track.
Tracking through low cover
Tracking through low cover requires attention to detail at two levels: the ground, for vegetation crushed and
disturbed by the feet, and waist height for damage caused by the equipment the target is carrying.
Other signs
Do not make the mistake of looking only at the ground. Search also for other signs such as bruised vegetation,
scuffed roots, broken cobwebs, pebbles turned to expose their darker, damp underside, and the smallest of details
such as grains of sand deposited on large pebbles by the targets boot.
To become a successful tracker you must pay attention to all of these factors all of the time. These signs
combine with the tracks to fill in the missing details in the mental picture you are building of your target. In a
tactical situation, your life and those of your teammates may depend on your noticing a few grains of sand.
(END)
***NOTE*** Source for this was obtained from The Handbook of the S.A.S.-How Professionals Fight and Win, by Jon E. Lewis.

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http://selousscouts.tripod.com/advance_tracking_techniques.htm[2012-05-28 11:49:17]

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Tracking involves more than just following a
string of clues. You must constantly update and
enhance your mental picture of the target until you
can begin to predict his next move. This skill needs
great concentration and attention to detail, and
comes only with many hundreds of hours practice.
If you have been practicing the techniques
already shown, you should now be following
simple trails with some success. But there will still
be questions: how old is the sign how do I know the
target wasnt walking backwards or with his shoes
tied on back to front?
To answer any such questions when you are
learning to track, you must return to ideal
conditions. In your mind, build a picture of how the
target you are following makes tracks under many varied circumstances. You can then adapt this to the more
difficult conditions you face 90 percent of the time. You will also need to experiment with the different soil
and vegetation types in your locality to understand how they register the impression of a foot, and how they
weather under different climatic conditions.
Reading a clear print
By now you know that clear prints are not the norm but occur sporadically along the trail, in places where
the ground will accept a clear impression. These areas are known by trackers as track traps, and can be either
natural track traps such as puddles and cowpats or man-made track traps: deliberately prepared patches of
ground where the target or enemy troops have to pass or are likely to pass. Such ideal spots often contain a
wealth of information, so get into the habit of using them.
The following are major features you will need to be aware of. To practice reading these signs, set yourself
some problems under ideal conditions.
1 Lines of force
These show as ripples or fracture lines within the track. They radiate from the major point of contact in
exactly the opposite direction to the direction of movement. The faster the target is traveling, the more force
produced, the greater the lines of force, and the further back they occur. When a target is moving very fast,
sprinting for example, the whole track impression can be thrown backwards, very often breaking up. Pay
careful attention to these lines for both speed and direction.
2 Soil scatter
Soil is sometimes thrown out of tracks by being kicked or picked up by the foot. It is usually to be seen in
front of the track, in line with the direction of travel. This is especially true of tracks in snow.
3 Risings
These are where the ground has risen outside the track in response to pressure generated within the track.
They are caused by forces in a downward and horizontal direction often sudden braking and acceleration.
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4 Deep impressions
These indicate where the target has placed its whole weight within the track. Each represents a separate
movement. By carrying out a comparison with your own tracks you will be able to determine whether or not
the target is carrying a load. If so, and you are following the track for any length of time, you should expect to
see the put down marks of Bergens or rifles.
There are many more signs to learn, such as twists and slides, but these are best learned by field practice. If
the target decides to employ counter-tracking procedures, it is your attention to fine details that will win the
day. When a target tries something devious most trackers sense that something is wrong, and then test their
hunch by studying the fine nuances in the track.

Make plaster casts
To develop this sense for detail, make plaster casts of tracks; this will teach you to notice the finest sign. As
an experiment, ask a team-mate to lay some clear tracks, imagining he has come to a path junction, and briefly
cannot decide which path to take, before finally choosing one. Then carefully study the tracks. You should be
able to detect the indecisions as a series of fine lines around walls of the relevant tracks.

Is he walking backwards?
One of the commonest problems a tracker faces is how to tell if the target is walking backwards or has tied
his shoes on back to front. The simple answer here is that a tracker does not determine the direction of travel
by the direction in which the tracks are pointing: instead he reads the sign within the track to determine the
direction. Regardless of which way the prints point, the direction of travel must be directly opposite to the
lines of force; and this is usually corroborated by a soil scatter.

Has he changed shoes?
This is very difficult. Unless you find the signs of where the target changed his shoes, all you can do is to
refer to your careful measurements of his stride and your appreciation of how he walks. If he tries to alter his
gait, you may be able to detect this as an unnaturalness in the overall appearance of the trail, although this can
be very difficult to determine.
If the target discovers that he is being trailed, he may. take evasive action such as walking down roads, rock
hopping or walking down the course of a stream, This should not pose too great a problem: cut for sign along
both sides of the obstacle, and beware of a possible ambush.

Ageing
Determining the age of a set of tracks is a skill which is often neglected, even by good trackers. With
practice and dedication you should be able to determine the age of a fresh track to within 15 minutes.
Tracks can last for years under the right circumstances. There are parts of the world where dinosaur tracks
can be seen, perfectly preserved by fossilisation. But in general terms, a track begins to deteriorate as soon as
it has been formed. The wind and other climatic factors gradually cause the prominent features to collapse
until no fine detail remains: in fact, a track with very defined features, such as a heavily-soled boot, will
collapse and disappear faster than the track of a smooth-soled shoe.
Tracks with well-defined features always appear to be fresher than smooth tracks. Make an impression with
your thumb in the ground alongside the track so that you can see how the soil behaves.
Each soil type behaves in its own individual way, so you will need to experiment with the local soil before
following up a trail. Also, some soils can give a false impression of the size of the track: for example, tracks
appear larger than life in sand and smaller than life in heavy clay.
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Practice
Putting all this information together is actually much easier than it appears. The secret is constant practice:
once you have used and learned a technique, you will never forget it.
The next stage in your training program is to go back to the beginning and practice the skills we have shown
you again, but paying much greater attention to detail and constantly estimating the tracks age.
(END)

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TRACKING THE FOLLOW UP
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TRACKING: THE FOLLOW UP

The rotor blades clatter above, imposing an unnatural silence on your team-mates and giving you the chance
for mental preparation. As a tracker, the success or failure of the operation will be on your shoulders. You think
through the devious ploys you have encountered and remember the many mistakes you made in training.
After what seems like an eternity the chopper banks. The side door slides to the rear, reveling the perfect
tracking light of dawn.
The 'point of last contact'
On arrival at the PLC you will be under pressure to begin the follow up immediately. But without the correct
preparation this can prove disastrous. If the track is 'very hot' (fresh), it may be feasible to follow up straight
away if there are several tracking teams: while one team follows up, the other teams can gather relevant
intelligence. But solo tracking without preparation is suicidal: do so only under what you judge to be exceptional
circumstances.
Basic pre-follow up preparations
Time spent gathering information is never wasted. But remember that the weather will not wait for you: it is
already at work, smoothing away the 'sign'.
1 Secure the vicinity of PLC
The greatest technical problem you are likely to face is finding the trail. Normally by the time you arrive, the
area has been flattened by the fleet of 'friendly forces'! As soon as you get there, the PLC area and its
surroundings should be made off-limits to all but the trackers and there cover groups.
2 Set up an operational HQ
Commanders using tracking teams should establish a forward support HQ, near the area of operation to reduce
transportation delays. Apart from normal military considerations, the HQ must provide the following tracker
support: Radio communications. Transportation, capable of inserting tracker teams ahead of the target, ideally
helicopters. Photocopiers or Polaroid cameras, to distribute photos or drawing of target tracks.
3 Gather intelligence
The usual difficulty is not in finding sign, but in distinguishing your targets sign from normal disturbances.
Even in remote areas paths are used regularly by the local population. The more you know about the target, the
easier this task will be.
Develop close liaison with the Intelligence Officer. He will be able to give you valuable information, such as
what the enemy ration wrappers look like, what footwear they use, and so on. When the operation is over you
will hold a debrief to enhance the picture of the enemy.
The I0s information is invaluable, but more up-to-date information can be obtained by interviewing the
troops or civilians who have had the most recent contact with the target/s. Take care: if you ask leading questions
you run the risk of influencing the subjects reply. If you ask a village about jungle terrorists, for example, you
should ask: What was their footwear? You are likely to receive an accurate answer, ranging from none to
jungle boots. But if you ask, What boots were they wearing? you are influencing the answer, and if they
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cannot remember you may even fool yourself into believing they are wearing boots.
The fast follow up
As soon as possible, organize a search for the trail. If you are the only tracker, you will have to follow the trail
faster than it was made. Most teams begin by dividing the tasks: one or two teams may cut for sign in a circle
around the PLC, while others might cut along the edges of paths, roads or rivers in the area.
Once the trail has been found, the clock really begins to tick. With the general direction of the targets move-
ment identified, the search teams can concentrate their effort in a narrow corridor. The team that has the trail
tapes their start point and begins following up.
Meanwhile, the other teams begin to cut across the search corridor some distance ahead of the follow-up team.
If one of these teams discovers the trail they begin following up, and the first follow-up team leap frogs past them
to cut ahead. In this way the distance between trackers and target is reduced very rapidly.
Live tracking
As you round the bend in the track, something catches your eye: there is some darkness around the base of a
rock, perhaps, showing that it has been moved. Carefully examining the surrounding area, you find the trail.
There is no room for mistakes now. First of all, radio in your position and the details of the trail as you see it:
number the targets, speed of travel etc. HQ will be able to tell you whether your information corresponds to
previous info. It may be that the enemy group have split up or joined a larger force.
Next, mark the trail using colored tape so that another tracker team will know the trail has been discovered, or
so that you can easily resume tracking the next day.
Estimate the age of the trail, and keeping an eye on this factor: it will enable you to judge whether or not you
are gaining ground. Your life may well hang on this thin thread of data.
From now on you must be alert to all that is going on around you. Make sure the cover group understand that
they are your eyes and ears while you are concentrating on the trail. Be as silent as possible, use hand signals to
communicate, and at all costs keep the radio from bursting out or crackling. Tracking is tiring, so its not a bad
idea to take a rest ever 10 minutes or, better still, rotate point duty with another tracker.
As you close the distance, make sure to keep your cover group informed, otherwise they may not be alert,
which will put all your lives at risk. Tracking is like reeling in a fish: you have to be careful not to move too fast.
Gradually close in on the target until you establish visual contact (binoculars can be useful here), and radio in
their exact location. It is here that your task will normally end, with the deployment of a fire force.
When the operation is over there will be a debrief: You may be able to shed some light on the enemys SOP,
and the tracking team will hopefully be allowed some rest. Expect no glory for tracking!
Successful tracking
It is not enough just to follow the clues left behind by the target. you must interpret those signs to gain an
understanding of the targets movements so that you can predict his movements or his aim.
If the target is expecting to be tracked, he may be planning to ambush you or lay a booby-trap. Only your
tracking skill can help you here. Caution, careful interpretation and a steady tracking pace are your allies:
tiredness, carelessly taking signs at face value, and undue haste along the trail can be fatal enemies.
As you follow the trail, pay attention to all types of sign, not just the tracks. Stop to look around and listen
every few tracking stick to help you, and make sure that the track has not been obliterated because of freak
conditions. If you still cannot find the next sign, check left or right of the trail. If that doesnt work, read the
pattern of the last few tracks: do they indicate any change in pace or paces: trackers are frequently shot because
they spend too long looking at the ground! By looking up and studying the direction in which the target is
moving you will gain a better appreciation of why the tracks are being made the way they are.
Try to pay equal attention to the ground on each side of the trail: you may detect sign that indicates the target
is aware of your presence. Suspect everything. If you come across evidence such as dropped or discarded
equipment, treat it as a probable booby-trap.
Try to avoid destroying the sign you have just followed, and never pass beyond a sign until you can see the
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next sign. If you cannot find the next track, pay careful attention to the last visible sign: the lines of force should
indicate where a track lies. Use your direction?
The last resort before cutting ahead is to check near and far from the last sign. If you are using a tracking
stick and are positioned to make the best use of available light, you will not often lose the trail. Remember: the
key to successful tracking is practice.
Other uses of trackers
Trackers have a unique balance of skills and they can prove ideal scouts for raiding parties and long-range
recce patrols. If theyre good shots they can be first-class snipers.
In a training capacity, trackers will prove very useful in highlighting mistakes in camouflage and sloppy
bushcraft, generally uplifting a whole units ability.
(END)

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BUSH TRACKING AND COUNTERTRACKING
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Trooper Reed, at point position on the patrol, was kneeling by the side of a cross-track in
the thick woodland when the stick leader caught up with him He barred the way with a stick
to stop the young trooper stumbling all over the spoor (track), then pointed with the stick.
Four of them. Early yesterday, by the look of it; there are animal tracks coming and going
over the top. Three wearing plain-soled boots and the other with car-tire sandals on. Ive seen
his tracks before. He was part of that band that got away from Fire force two weeks ago.
Well, what are we waiting around for? asked the trooper, and started off up the track.
Reed began to laugh.
What the hells so funny?
Youre going the wrong way. The bastards had their boots tied on backwards.
The Selous Scouts use airborne surveillance and intelligence to gather information about the
movement of terrorist bands, but they often have to fall back on the oldest of hunting skills -
Tracking
You dont have to be born to it to be a good tracker. This section, based on the Rhodesian
Anti-Terrorist Operations, sets out how to find tracks, read them, and follow them in an effort
to come to grips with insurgents.
Common sense and careful observation
The operations usually starts with two trackers going off to left and right along a base line,
and then making a wide circle around the area. When they find the track, their first action is
to keep everyone else well away from it too much information can be lost by friendly
forces trampling all over vital signs.
The trackers try to estimate the number of terrorists, the age of the spoor, and the direction
theyve taken. These details are relayed back to central headquarters so that it can be used
with information from other sources, and so widen the overall intelligence picture.
The man who first found the track will lead the hunt that follows, and he wont give up that
position until he loses the trail. Then the casting-about operation will begin again until contact
is reestablished, and a new lead tracker takes over.
Trackers work in pairs whenever they can but in silence. This is a very vulnerable
operation that could easily be the subject of an ambush. Talking and smoking are not allowed,
and noise must always be kept to a minimum.
The signs that a tracker looks for footprints and broken or disturbed vegetation are the
most important tell him the direction the quarry took, their numbers, how long ago they
passed, whether they were carrying loads or were empty-handed, how fast they were moving,
their ages (or at least their size), their sex, and perhaps even something about their morale.
footprints
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Footprints are the most important tell-tale. You cant always assume that the people
youre following are walking in the direction that the toes point- they could have their boots
tied on backwards (even when theyre barefoot, they may be walking backwards!). But you
can tell their direction of travel by checking which part of the indentation is the deepest
the deepest part shows the direction of march. The depth of the indentations will tell you
whether they were carrying heavy loads or not, and so will the length of their stride. Heavily
laden men take short paces.
The difference between the depths at the front and back will give you an idea of their
speed a running man, for example, leaves a deep toe print but little or nothing at the heel.
How well youll be able to gauge the age of tracks depends a lot on weather conditions and
even the time of day. Tracks in muddy ground that have no water standing in them are very
fresh; soon after theyre made, water will start to fall back into it.
If there has been recent rain, and you can see splatter marks inside the track marks, thats a
sure sign that they date from before the rain.
If its an animal track youre on, look for signs that animals have walked on top of the
human trail youre following. Most animals move back and forth along these tracks, which
usually lead from their daytime lairs to water holes, at night. If there is a double set of animal
tracks, one in each direction, over the top of the human footprints, then they are at least a
night old.
Disturbed vegetation
Its very difficult to move through the African bush without leaving signs. Bent and broken
grass, twigs and other vegetation can tell you not only which way the enemy went, but also
how long ago he passed. Bent and broken grass will stay green to start with, but will turn
brown after a day or so. Harder vegetation will take longer to change color. Bear in mind that
full sunlight will speed up the process, and shade will slow it down. Rain will affect the time-
scale too.
Beware of ambush
If a track that has been quite distinct suddenly becomes much more difficult to follow,
without any particular reason such as a change in the nature of the ground, the most likely
conclusion is that the enemy has become extra careful and is preparing to go to ground, either
in a lying-up place or perhaps in ambush.
If this happens, the strategy is to move in a wide circle around the area, stay downwind,
and look for signs the usual trail signs, but also human scent, the smoke from fires and
cigarettes, and cooking smells. Listen hard, too, for the sound of weapons being prepared and
other signs of an enemy presence.
hard going
Many factors affect the efficiency of a tracking operation. The type of ground, the character
of the country, he weather and the direction of the sun (well-defined shadows help the tracker
considerably), the sort of shoes the quarry is wearing, how much other traffic there is in the
area, and the alertness of the trackers, can ill make the job more or less difficult.
A smart enemy will use all the features of the country hes crossing to make the trackers
job more difficult. Hard or rocky ground, streams and water courses, irregular habits,
backtracking, changing shoes, even swinging from tree to tree . . . These can all throw you off
the scent. Be patient. If you lose the spoor, circle around and try to pick it up again. If that
doesnt work, cast a wider circle. Look for things like broken spiders webs; any sign that
someone has passed by recently.
Look out for scavenging and food gathering
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The enemy has to eat. If hes not been prepared for a long operation, hell have to try to
live off the land, or else beg, steal or buy food from people he encounters. Even if local
inhabitants claim that food has been stolen from them, they could be lying to protect the
terrorists. Dont follow their directions without checking independently.
Surer signs are fruit trees and edible plants that have been raided, disturbed bee hives, and
traps and snares. Look out for discarded foodstuff unripe fruit doesnt fall from trees of its
own accord.
Insect clues
Look out for other signs, too, like recent fire sites, and urine and excrement which you
can often spot by a gathering of flies, yellow butterflies or dung beetles. The enemy may even
be stupid enough to leave food wrappers lying about.
Look for freshly turned earth, and dig down to find out if anything has been buried.
Remember to preserve material intact for examination, but dont handle it with your bare
fingers it may have enemy prints on it.
The advantage is yours
Remember, above all, that the enemy is bound to leave some signs of his passage, no
matter how small. Fresh scratches on rock and stones or logs overturned, tiny sprays of sand
or loose dry earth, any signs of disturbance can give you valuable information. Covering his
tracks will cost the enemy precious time, and he knows this. If you can press him hard, hes
more likely to make mistakes, but if youre in hot pursuit you may miss them. Take some
time. Examine all the signs carefully.
If you have dogs to help you, your job will be considerably easier. But that is the subject of
a separate section on anti-terrorist tactics.
(END)

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RHODESIAN AWARDS AND DECORATIONS DESCRIPTIONS
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AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
The full description of the Rhodesian awards and decorations is as follows:
Top Row (L-R):
1. Grand Commander of the Legion of Merit (G.C.L.M.) - for outstanding service to
Rhodesia. A gold star on silver with 8 emeralds set around a Zimbabwe bird.
2. Grand Commander of the Legion of Merit (G.C.L.M.) (Military Division) - for
outstanding service to Rhodesia. The cross is gold on silver.
3. Grand Officer of the Legion of Merit (G.L.M.) - for outstanding service to Rhodesia. A
silver star.
4. Grand Officer of the Legion of Merit (G.L.M.) (Military Division) - for outstanding
service to Rhodesia. A gold on silver cross.
5. Independence Decoration (I.D.) - for persons who played a notable and significant part
before or at the time of, or immediately succeeding the Declaration of Independence. A silver
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medal.
6. Independence Commemorative Decoration (I.C.D.) - for persons who have rendered
valuable service to Rhodesia up to 2nd March 1970. A bronze medal.
7. Commander of the Legion of Merit (C.L.M.) - for distinguished service to Rhodesia. A
gold on silver cross.
8. Commander of the Legion of Merit (C.L.M.) (Military Division) - for distinguished
service to Rhodesia. A gold on silver cross. (A red rosette for combatant service).
9. Officer of the Legion of Merit (O.L.M.) - for distinguished service to Rhodesia. A gold
on silver cross.
10. Officer of the Legion of Merit (O.L.M.) (Military Division) - for distinguished service to
Rhodesia. A gold on silver cross. (A silver rosette for combatant service).
2nd Row (L-R):
11. Member of the Legion of Merit (M.L.M.) - for distinguished service to Rhodesia. A
silver on bronze cross.
12. Member of the Legion of Merit (M.L.M.) - for distinguished service to Rhodesia. A
silver on bronze cross.
13. Police Cross for Distinguished Service (P.C.D.) - for distinguished service. A gold on
silver cross.
14. Defense Cross for Distinguished Service (P.S.C.) - for distinguished service. A silver
cross.
15. Prison Cross for Distinguished Service (P.S.C.) - for distinguished service. A silver
cross.
16. Medal for Meritorious Service (M.S.M.) (Civil Division) - for resource and devotion to
duty or exemplary voluntary service to the community. A silver medal.
17. Medal for Meritorious Service (M.S.M.) (Military Division) - for resource and devotion
to duty. Used only for territorial, volunteer and reserve forces. A silver medal.
18. Police Medal for Meritorious Service (P.M.M.) - for meritorious service. A silver
medal.
3rd Row (L-R)
19. Defense Force's Medal for Meritorious Service (D.M.M.) - for meritorious service. A
silver medal.
20. Prison Medal for Meritorious Service (P.M.S.) - for meritorious service. A silver medal.
21. Presidents Medal for Chiefs - for chiefs who have rendered conspicuous service in the
interest of their people. A silver medal.
22. Presidents Medal for Headmen - for headmen who have rendered conspicuous service
to their communities over and above the call of duty. A bronze medal.
23. Rhodesia Badge of Honor - for long service and devotion to duty in Government,
Municipal or Private Service. A bronze medal.
24. Grand Cross of valor (G.C.V.) - for conspicuous valor by members of the security forces
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in combat. This is the highest award for gallantry and as such will head the order of
precedence. a 9ct gold medal.
25. Conspicuous Gallantry Decoration (C.G.D.) - for acts of the highest gallantry and brave
conduct of an outstanding order in a non-combatant capacity. This award may be made to
civilians and members of the Security Forces and as the second highest award for gallantry,
will rank next to the Grand Cross of Valor in the order of precedence. A silver medal with
gold inlay.
26. Police Cross for Conspicuous Gallantry (P.C.G.) - for conspicuous gallantry. A gold on
silver cross.
27. Silver Cross of Rhodesia (S.C.R.) - for conspicuous gallantry. A silver cross.
4th Row (L-R)
28.Prison Cross for Gallantry (R.P.C.) - for conspicuous gallantry. A silver cross.
29. Police Decoration for Gallantry (P.D.G.) - for gallantry. A Silver medal.
30. Bronze Cross of Rhodesia (B.C.R.) (Army) - for gallantry. A bronze cross.
31. Bronze Cross of Rhodesia (B.C.R.) (Air Force) - for gallantry. A bronze cross.
32. Bronze Cross of Rhodesia (B.C.R.) (Guard Force) - for gallantry. A bronze cross.
33. Meritorious Conduct Medal (M.C.M.) - for brave and gallant conduct over and above
the call of duty in a non-combatant capacity. This award may be made to both civilians and
members of the Security Forces. A bronze medal.
34. Prison Medal for Gallantry (R.P.M.) - for gallantry. A silver medal.
35. Rhodesia General Service Medal (R.G.S.M.) - for service on operations undertaken for
the purpose of combating terrorists or enemy incursions into Rhodesia. A cupro-nickel medal.
36. District Service Medal (D.S.M.) (Internal Affairs) - for service on operations undertaken
for the purpose of combating terrorists or enemy incursions into Rhodesia. A cupro-nickel
medal.
37. Prison Service Medal For the part played in maintaining law and order, 1965 to 1968
only. A cupro-nickel medal
38. Prison General Service Medal For the part played in maintaining law and order,
subsequent to 1968. A cupro-nickel medal.
39. Police Long Service Medal (P.L.S.M.) - for long service. A silver medal.
40. Exemplary Service Medal - for long and exemplary service. A silver medal.
41. Prison Long Service Medal - for long and exemplary service. A silver medal.
42. Police Reserve Long Service Medal - for nine years service in the "A" reserve or 15
years' service in the Field Reserve. A silver medal.
43. Medal for Territorial or Reserve Service - for 12 years service in the Territorial,
Volunteer and Reserve Forces. A silver plated medal.
44. Fire Brigade Long Service and Good Conduct Medal - for long service in a fire
brigade. A silver medal.
45. President's Medal for Shooting - awarded to the champion shot of the Security Forces.
NOT ILLUSTRATED - Military Forces Commendation - a silver or bronze pick emblem
that denotes an act of bravery, distinguished service, or continuous devotion to duty in the
operational area or non-operational sphere. This emblem will be displayed either on the
ribbon of the appropriate General Service or campaign medal.

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THE RHODESIAN ARMY
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THE RHODESI AN ARMY
1977 CI RCA

Thi s i s a basi c t abl e of or gani zat i on or or der of bat t l e, of t he Rhodesi an Ar my as
i t appear ed i n 1977. i t l i st s t he maj or pl ayer /uni t s i n t he Ar my and gi ves you an
i dea of manpow er and et hni c br eak up. Not e t hat t he Sel ous Sc out s ar e w el l
seat ed and hi ghl y r ec ogni zed w i t hi n t he Ar my.
Regul ar s
Rhodesi a Regi ment : 8 bat t al i ons (600 700 men, al l w hi t e) w i t h r ec ent addi t i on
of c ol or ed and Asi an r eser ve .
Rhodesi an Li ght I nf ant r y : 3 c ommando uni t s and 1 w eapons suppor t gr oup (about
1000 men, al l w hi t e); bet w een one -quar t er and one -t hi r d mer c enar i es .
Rhodesi an Af r i c an Ri f l es : 3 bat t al i ons (600700 men, al l bl ac k ) w i t h w hi t e
of f i c er s .
Rhodesi an Ar t i l l er y (1st Fi el d Regi ment ) : 1 r egul ar bat t er y of 105mm how i t zer s
and 1 r eser ve bat t er y of 25 -pounder s; w hi t e of f i c er ed.
Suppor t and admi ni st r at i ve t r oops: (si gnal s, engi neer s, pay c or ps et c ) al l w hi t e
of f i c er ed.
Rhodesi an Ar mor ed Car Regi ment : About 400 men, bl ac k and w hi t e; dut i es
i nc l ude r ec onnai ssanc e, pat r ol l i ng, c onvoy esc or t , c r ow d c ont r ol and manni ng
"PAMWE
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r oad bl oc k s .
I r r egul ar s
Spec i al Ai r Ser vi c e : 3 squadr ons (60 men eac h, al l w hi t e); spec i al i ze i n l ayi ng
c ount er -i nsur genc y ambushes and r ai ds.
Sel ous Sc out s : About 1000 men, l ar ge maj or i t y of bl ac k s; some mer c enar i es ;
spec i al i ze i n pseudo oper at i ons, mant r ac k i ng and abduc t i on (snat c h ) mi ssi ons.
Gr eys Sc out s : 150200 men, bl ac k and w hi t e; hor se-mount ed i nf ant r y f or
t r ac k i ng, pur sui t and pat r ol l i ng.

ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY
CIRCA 1991

The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) has 47,000 personnel. It is built around seven
brigades, including a Presidential Guard Brigade and an armored regiment. Other units include
26 maneuver battalions (three Presidential Guard, one mechanized, one commando, two
paratroop, one mounted, and 18 infantry). Support units include an artillery regiment that
includes two air-defense batteries, and an engineer support regiment. The force is maintained
partly through conscription.
The ZNA is characterized by a number of quality units as well as an overall high quality of
personnel. This is due to an emphasis on training that reflects British military assistance in the
1980s, as well as the ZNAs once heavy involvement in Mozambiques insurgent war,
maintaining the Beira rail and road corridor that is landlocked Zimbabwes main trade lifeline.

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AFRICAN / RHODESIAN TRACK COUNT
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AMBUSHING OF TERRORISTS
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Ambushing of Terrorists
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
1. Aim. The aim of an ambush is to surprise and eliminate the enemy on ground t and
in circumstances of the military forces' own choosing.
2. I ntelligence. The majority of ambushes are laid as a result of:
a. a. Intelligence gained through direct or indirect information from
surrendered or captured terrorists, agents and informers.
b. Chance information.
c. An appreciation of likely terrorist movement and activity based on
familiarity with an area, coupled with the pattern of terrorist movement in
the area concerned.
3. Purpose. An ambush may be designed to eliminate either individuals or groups of
the enemy. Enemy movement may not take place at the time anticipated, and the
enemy may use civilians to watch for signs of military forces activity and ambush
positions. Commanders must always remember this and not become discouraged if
a carefully laid ambush fails to achieve its objects. A clear distinction must,
however, be drawn between such failures and ambushes that are in the right place
at the right time, but fail because of mismanagement.
4. Composition.
a. Ambushes may vary in size from a small four-man affair laid as part of a
patrol operation, to a major operation involving a platoon/company group.
The guiding principle will be economy of force. The smaller the force, the
easier it will be to introduce it into the ambush area, to control the operation
and to extricate the ambush force after contact.
b. It is essential that the best possible team is chosen for each ambush. This
may frequently entail a troop/company commander commanding an ambush
group, although it may only consist of a handful of men. Men especially
selected for their marksmanship or other particular qualities should be drawn
from any element of the unit. The overriding consideration in selecting the
ambush party should be to choose the troop most likely to succeed in that
particular case.
5. The principles of ambushing. Instantaneous coordinated action against a surprised
enemy held within a well-covered killing ground is essential for success. This
requires fulfillment of the following conditions:
a. A high standard of training in ambush techniques.
b. Careful planning and execution.
c. First-class security in all stages.
d. Concealment of all signs of the occupation of the position.
e. An intelligent layout and siting.
f. A high standard of battle discipline, particularly by night.
g. Determination by all troopers of the ambush party to wait and kill.
h. A simple clear-cut plan for springing the ambush.
"PAMWE
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i. Good shooting from all positions: kneeling, sitting, standing, lying and from
behind cover.
j. Surprise, the key to successful ambushes.
k. Safety of own forces.
SECTION 2: THE LAYOUT OF AMBUSHES
General
1. Principles. There are three fundamental principles of general layout:
a. All possible approaches should be covered.
b. A killing ground must be carefully selected.
c. The ambush must have depth.
2. Approaches. Information may frequently give the destination of the terrorists, but
will rarely give the exact route they will take. However good information may be,
terrorists may well arrive from an unexpected direction. It is therefore essential
that all possible approaches be covered.
3. Killing ground. A carefully selected killing ground is the key to the ambush and
must permit spontaneous and coordinated action on a surprised enemy, thereby
ensuring that maximum casualties are inflicted.
4. Depth. At the first burst of fire, terrorists scatter with remarkable rapidity and the
chances of getting a second burst from the same position are small. It is important,
therefore, that groups should be so sited that when the terrorists scatter after the
first burst, subsequent groups take a progressive toll of any survivors.
Composition of the Ambush Force
1. Groups. On each occasion when an ambush is planned there is a requirement for
the military force to be broken down into a number of groups. Ideally, the ambush
force should consist of the following groups:
a. a. Command group.
b. b. Killing group.
c. c. Stop/cover groups.
d. d. Reserve.
e. e. Lookout groups.

Legend
1. Direction of enemy group approach.
2. Command group - attached to stop group #3.
3. Stop/cover groups - depending on position in ambush.
4. Areas or cone of fire.
5. Killing group and assault groups.
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6. Look-out group to prevent reinforcement of enemy.
7. Direction of expected enemy reaction.
8. Alternative position for stop group.
9. Reserve - centrally located to assist any group in its mission.

2. Siting. In siting, the commander must:
a. Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area must be
kept to a minimum, even at the expense of indifferent fire positions. Each
man should enter his position from the rear. The group commander must
ensure that all traces of movement into the position are removed or
concealed.
b. Ensure that the man detailed to spring the ambush has a good view of the
killing ground.
c. Ensure that other men of the group will have good fire positions when they
break through their concealment, i.e., stand up to engage moving terrorists.
d. Site his men in a position of all-around defense.
e. Choose his own position for maximum control of his group. f. Ensure the
safety of own troops.
SECTION 3: TYPES OF AMBUSH
1. Employment. Groups may be employed in two ways, bearing in mind the
principles of layout:
a. Limited ambush. When definite information indicates that the enemy will
be coming to a specific point, for example, a waterhole or food dump, or
using a specific track or crossing place, then a limited ambush is sited to
cover this specific point. Cut-off groups may be employed to give depth to
the ambush and to take a progressive toll of the fleeing enemy.
b. Area ambush. When definite information indicates that the enemy will be
moving to an area but the exact spot is not known, or that the enemy will be
moving through a definite area but the exact route is not known, then an area
ambush is laid to cover all possible approaches or routes, bearing in mind
depth. An area ambush, in fact, consists of a series of limited ambushes in a
certain area with an overall ambush commander.
2. Duration. The duration of an ambush will determine whether it is classified as
short or long term.
a. Short term. An ambush of less than nine hours' duration which requires no
administration other than arrangements for rest within the groups is a short-
term ambush.
b. Long term. If ambushes are set for longer periods, they become long-term
ambushes and administrative arrangements are necessary for the relief of
groups for feeding and sleeping. Such ambushes may be placed on the
approaches to a cultivated area which is ready for harvesting, or to a known
enemy camp. A rest area must be set up and should be sited far enough
away to avoid noises and smells disclosing the presence of troops.
Communication routes may have to be cleared so that silent relief's can be
carried out. The problem of relief's must be carefully considered,
particularly in the case of the area ambush. The following points are
applicable:
i. Normally, relief's will come from the administrative area along the
communication route. Although the whole party in the ambush will
eventually be relieved, only one member of the party should be
changed at a time in case the enemy arrives during this period.
ii. The ideal is that ambushes should be divided into three parties, one in
the ambush position, the reserve, and the party at rest. On relief, the
party in reserve takes over the ambush position, the men in the
ambush position go into rest and the party resting goes into reserve.
iii. if a party is less than six and the ambush has to be in position for a
long time, the whole party should be withdrawn during set periods to
rest. Parties are responsible for their own security when resting. Their
food must be precooked and they will not be able to smoke. Adequate
water must always be available.
iv. When a party is over six, but not large enough to carry out the three-
group ambush, sufficient men for all-around observation should man
the ambush. The others should move away from the ambush position,
post sentries and rest. Those resting will act as a reserve and should
not, therefore, go far away. They will not be able to smoke and their
food must be precooked. Adequate water must always be available.
3. Night ambushes. Ambushes can be laid both by day and by night. Night ambushes
are often the most successful because enemy parties tend to move during the hours
of darkness. In darkness, concealment is easy, but shooting is obviously less
accurate. Much therefore depends on good siting of weapons so that the killing
ground is interlaced with fire. The doctrine for any ambush also applies to night
ambush; however, the following are to be noted.
a. Factors. If an ambush is to be maintained during the hours of darkness, the
following conditions must be observed:
i. Automatic weapons must fire on fixed lines; the left and right of arcs
of personal weapons should be fixed by means of sticks to avoid
danger to friendly troops.
ii. The killing ground must be adequately illuminated.
iii. The system of relief's for sentries and those manning the position must
be modified.
iv. Alternative means of silent communication are required.
b. Occupation and orders.
i. Where possible, the position should be occupied before last light.
ii. Men and groups must be sited closer together than by day so that they
can be properly controlled.
iii. The ambush party must remain absolutely still. All movement can
then be assumed to be that of the enemy. No movement from outside
to contact an established ambush must ever take place.
iv. Clear orders, precise fire control instructions, and clear rendezvous
and signals are essential.
c. Illumination. As a general rule, all night ambushes should be provided with
some sort of artificial illumination. This should be sited to light up the
killing ground without blinding the ambush party.
SECTION 4: PLANNING AND PREPARATION
Planning.
Many factors affect a plan for ambush. The following are common to all ambushes:
1. Enemy.
a. Nature and strength.
b. Routes.
c. Method of movement.
d. Security measures.
e. Normal reaction.
f. Likely assistance.
2. Terrain. Information on the ambush area can be obtained from maps,, previous
patrol reports, police, surrendered or captured terrorists and air photographs. All
possible enemy approaches should be considered. When considering likely ambush
sites, the obvious should be avoided.
3. Clearance. Movement of other troops in the area must be considered.
4. Time factor. The necessity of being unseen, coupled with knowledge of local
population habits, will dictate a safe time and method for moving into the ambush
area.
5. Security. Intentions of the government troops must be disguised from the start; for
example, by moving out to the ambush position during the hours of darkness
and/or making a circumspect/indirect approach. The telephone should not be used
when discussing plans for an ambush. A cover plan should always be made when
time is available.
6. Plan.
a. Location.
b. Time occupation completed.
c. Routes, including return.
d. Strength and special equipment.
e. Dispositions.
f. Method of stopping enemy within the killing zone.
7. Preparation.
a. Success depends on adequate preparation. The time available for preparation
is often limited. Certain items must therefore be kept in a state of constant
readiness. For example:
i. Weapons must be kept zeroed and tested.
ii. Ammunition, magazines and charges must be kept clean and
frequently emptied and refilled.
b. Preparation on receipt of information should include:
i. Thorough briefing.
ii. Rehearsal when time allows.
iii. Firing practice, if time allows.
iv. Final checking of weapons.
8. Briefing. All members of the ambush party must be fully briefed. It is suggested
that briefing be divided into two parts:
a. Preliminary briefing at a static location. This should include the items shown
in Section 8 of this chapter.
b. Final briefing in the area of actual ambush by the commander of the
ambush. This is to be kept to the minimum, but must include:
i. General area of each group, including direction of fire.
ii. The pointing out of prominent features on the ground, including
rendezvous.
iii. Location of the commander.
iv. Any change of plan.
9. Rehearsal.
a. The more time that can be devoted to rehearsal, the greater will be the
chance of success. Rehearsals should not be carried out at the ambush site,
as security will be prejudiced immediately. It should usually be possible to
select a site for rehearsal closely resembling the actual ambush position. All
possible and likely terrorist action should be simulated and the ambush
groups practiced in springing the ambush under a variety of circumstances,
including the unexpected eventuality.
b. Rehearsals for night ambushes should be done at night, and where it is
proposed to make use of night illumination aids, these should also be
employed.
10. Siting.
a. Area ambush.
i. The ambush commander is first to choose the killing ground and the
general area of each group from his personal knowledge of the area,
aided by maps and photographs. He is to lay down the directions of
the fire for each group in order to obtain the maximum fire effect
from the weapons at his disposal, and to ensure the safety of his ops.
He is to nominate the rendezvous and give the administrative plan.
ii. The ambush party moves to a dispersal point from which groups then
move by carefully selected routes to their various group positions. The
ambush commander may only be able to site one position in detail,
leaving the remainder to be sited by group commanders.
iii. Each group commander is then to carry out his reconnaissance, siting
and issue of orders.
b. Limited ambush. On reaching the ambush area, the commander is to:
i. Carry out his reconnaissance to choose a killing ground and consider
the extent of his position, bearing in mind the distance between
terrorists. The ambush position should avoid the obvious, if possible.
ii. Ensure that the man nominated to spring the ambush has a good view
of the killing ground.
11. Occupation. The occupation of an ambush position should be carried out with
great care. All traces made by the ambush party must be carefully concealed.
Remember that suspicious signs such as paper scraps, footprints and bruised
vegetation will put the enemy on his guard and it is essential that all items with a
distinctive smell which will betray the presence of the ambush party be left behind.
Men's hair should be washed free of hair oils and hair creams, and cigarettes,
sweets, chewing gum and other scented food must not be carried. It is frequently
necessary to wear civilian-type shoes or to disguise the tell-tale marks of military
footwear.
12. Locals. Any local inhabitants seen to observe the approach of the ambush party
must be detained until the ambush is discontinued.
13. Lying in ambush. Once a group is in position, there must be no sound or
movement. This is a test of training and battle discipline. Men must be trained to
get into a comfortable position and remain still for long periods. During the wait,
weapons must be cocked and ready to fire. As it is not possible for men to remain
alert for six to eight hours, arrangements must be made for rest. One or two men
in the group will be listening and watching while the others rest in the ambush
position. By rest it is meant that a man relaxes in his position, resting his eyes and
ears.
14. Springing the ambush. The ambush should be sprung when all possible terrorists
are in the killing ground and the range has been reduced to the minimum. There
must be no half-heartedness or premature action. All men must clearly understand
the orders and drill for opening fire.
a. The principle to be observed when springing an ambush is that fire should
not be opened so long as terrorists are moving towards someone in a better
position to kill. A limited ambush will normally be sprung by the machine
gunner on a prearranged signal from the commander or by the commander
activating a claymore mine.
b. Should a terrorist act as though he has spotted the ambush, any man who
sees this should spring the ambush.
c. All shots must be aimed to kill. Once fire has been opened, targets become
more difficult, and to cope with moving targets men may have to stand up.
15. Follow-up action. A signal must be arranged to stop firing, so that immediate
follow-up action and search can start as soon as terrorists become impossible to
engage. After the ambush has been sprung, men who have been previously
detailed are to search the immediate area under cover of ambush weapons and
covering each other. They will:
a. Check terrorists in the killing area and secure any who are still living.
b. Search the area, including trees, holes, etc., thoroughly for terrorists.
c. Collect arms, ammunition and equipment and any other clues which may
materially assist investigation.
16. Tracker groups and war dogs.
a. A great many terrorists wounded in ambush get away. In many cases they
probably escape by rushing into the undergrowth and lying low until the hue
and cry has died down, when they can crawl away. The employment of
tracker groups will quite often lead to their capture or elimination.
b. Experience has shown that the blood trail left by wounded terrorists is not
always an aid to a tracker dog, and is sometimes more useful as a visual aid
to the human tracker.
c. The tracker group should not form part of the ambush party, but should
stand by at some convenient rendezvous ready to move when shooting
indicates that the ambush has been sprung.
d. Under certain circumstances patrol dogs may form part of the ambush
group. They may be most profitably employed where several alternative
routes lead into the ambush position and it is not known which route the
terrorists will take. It must be borne in mind, however, that their presence
may give the ambush positions away to the terrorists due to panting, other
noises and the smell. However, when used, dogs will invariably be alerted
before any human being.
17. Calling off the ambush. A definite signal for calling off the ambush must be
arranged. This is particularly important in area ambushes and night ambushes in
order to avoid the possibility of an individual or group being left behind. This
point must be stressed as officers and men have been killed when returning to
collect a man or group left in ambush.
18. Rendezvous (RV). An easily found RV with, where possible, an alternative, must
be selected at which troops will rally at the end of the action on receipt of the
prearranged signal.
SECTION 5: TRAINING
1. As ambushing is a most successful means of killing terrorists, time must be given
to training for it. This is particularly important for group leaders. Training must be
aimed at eliminating common faults and improving techniques. Its objects are to:
a. Achieve silence and stillness in ambush.
b. Train troops to occupy ambush positions without advertising their presence.
c. Ensure good siting of weapons and positioning of commanders.
d. Improve fire control and particularly the even distribution of fire.
e. Practice clear, well-understood drills for springing ambushes, search and
follow-up.
f. Ensure accurate shooting at difficult moving targets.
g. Improve care of weapons and eliminate stoppages.
h. Place special emphasis on silent signals to achieve surprise.
SECTION 6: PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS
1. Cases have occurred where soldiers and police were shot by parties of military
forces waiting to ambush terrorists as a result of information received.
2. The primary cause is that the ambush party is keyed up to expect the arrival of the
terrorists in the area of the ambush, and, on seeing any movement, fire is opened.
often conditions are such that it is not possible for the ambush group to recognize
the identity of the people entering the ambush area.
3. Once an ambush has been set, there should be no movement of any kind by
security forces anywhere near the ambush position, unless it is unavoidable. Where
it is necessary for such movement to take place, it must be carefully planned and
rehearsed. In all other cases, once clearance has been given for the ambush to take
place, no movement of any kind is to be allowed. This is of particular importance
to the night ambush when no movement from outside to contact an established
ambush must ever take place.
4. It is important to ensure that fire discipline is observed.
SECTION 7: WISDOM IN RETROSPECT
1. The following are some reasons for failures which have been reported by ambush
commanders. These may help in the training for, and mounting of, ambushes:
a. "Disclosure of the ambush by the noise made by cocking weapons and
moving safety catches or change levers. Check your weapons, practice men
in their silent handling and ensure that all weapons are ready to fire."
b. "There was a tendency to shoot high. This must be corrected on the jungle
range."
c. "Disclosure of the ambush position by footprints made by the ambush party
moving into position and by movement of individuals at the crucial time,
when terrorists were approaching."
d. "There was a lack of fire control and commanders were unable to stop the
firing and start the immediate follow-up."
e. "Commanders were badly sited, with consequent lack of control."
f. "There was a lack of all-around observation, resulting in terrorists arriving in
the area of the ambush unannounced."
g. "There were misfires and stoppages through failure to clean, inspect and test
weapons and magazines."
h. "There was a lack of a clearly defined drill for opening fire and orders were
contradictory."
i. "There was a tendency for all to fire at the same target."
j. "Fire was opened prematurely."
k. "It has been found that, provided you achieve surprise, the disadvantage of
being outnumbered can be overcome."
2. A higher proportion of enemy eliminations are achieved in ambushes, and better
opportunities exist to obtain kills, than in any other form of contact. Particularly
when chances of contact are remote, it is essential that full advantage be taken of
every chance offered, and that ambushes laid as a result of direct high-grade
information be based on sound and detailed planning, executed by specially
selected troops.
SECTION 8: AMBUSH ORDERS -- AIDE MEMOIRE
1. Security.
a. Do not use the telephone.
b. Do not allow men out after briefing.
2. Situation.
a. Topography. Use of air photographs, maps and local knowledge; consider
use of a guide.
b. Terrorists.
i. Expected strength.
ii. Names and anticipated order of march. Photographs.
iii. Dress and weapons of individuals.
iv. Which is the VIP?
v. What are the habits of party concerned?
c. Local population.
i. Locations.
ii. Habits.
iii. Appearance.
d. Security forces.
i. Guides or surrendered terrorists to accompany.
ii. What other security forces are doing.
3. Mission. This must be clear in the mind of every man, especially when a particular
terrorist is to be killed.
4. Execution.
a. Type of layout.
b. Duration of the operation.
c. Position and direction of fire of groups.
d. Dispersal point.
e. Weapons to be carried, including special weapons, e.g., shotguns.
f. Composition of groups.
g. Timing and routes.
h. Formations during move in.
i. Orders to spring the ambush.
j. Distribution of fire.
k. Use of grenades.
l. Action on ambush being discovered.
m. Orders on immediate follow-up.
n. Orders for search.
o. Deliberate follow-up.
p. Rendezvous.
q. Trackers and auxiliaries.
r. Dogs, if any.
s. Deception plan.
t. Alerting.
5. Administration and logistics.
a. Use of transport to area.
b. Equipment and dress -- footwear for moving in.
c. Rations, if any.
d. Special equipment:
i. Night-lighting equipment.
ii. Cameras.
iii. Fingerprint equipment.
e. Medical.
i. First field dressings, first-aid packs and identity discs.
ii. Medical orderly.
iii. stretcher and ambulance.
f. Relief's.
g. Administrative area, if required, and orders concerning cooking and
smoking.
h. Transport for return Journey.
i. Inspection of personnel and equipment:
i. Men with colds not to be taken.
ii. Is zeroing of weapons correct?
iii. Is ammunition fresh?
iv. Are magazines properly filled?
6. Command and signal.
a. Position of commander/second-in-command.
b. Signals:
i. Open fire.
ii. Cease fire.
iii. Call off ambush.
iv. Success.
v. Silent signals.
c. Radio:
i. Allocation of radios.
ii. Frequencies, schedules, nicknames, etc.
iii. Radio silence.
d. Password and identification.
7. Remember final check and inspection.

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Attacks on Terrorist Camps
General
1. It is difficult to lay down a uniform drill for a preplanned attack which will apply
on all occasions, because terrorist tactics and the type of location used vary
considerably from area to area. On the other hand, the suggested drills can easily
be amended to suit different circumstances and can be used as a basis for initial
planning.
2. Deliberate attacks are prepared from information gained from air photographs,
prisoners, informers or patrols. There are occasions, however, when a deliberate
attack can be art immediate reaction to an unexpected favorable situation.
Deliberate attacks may therefore be preplanned or immediate.
3. The main considerations to be borne in mind are surprise and speed.
a. Surprise can be achieved by:
i. Security in all stages of planning.
ii. Detailed planning and preparation.
iii. Preparing an alternative method of execution.
iv. Concealment of approach and positioning of forces.
v. A well-executed plan with maximum aggression.
b. Speed is essential to obtain surprise and can be achieved by:
i. Avoiding unnecessary delay in the planning stage.
ii. Rapid deployment of troops. (It may be necessary to use helicopters,
but alerting the enemy by such movement should be avoided.)
4. The probability of eliminating large numbers of terrorists by means of a deliberate
attack is fairly small. Their mobility, the lack of information concerning their
combat and resting positions, which are essentially flexible, and the aid which
they receive from the population, make it difficult to plan in detail. Their efficient
system of intelligence also makes it extremely difficult to achieve surprise.
5. Although the example outlined below is concerned with a daylight attack on a
terrorist camp, this does not preclude the possibility of attacking at night. The
basic principles remain the same, although follow-up actions are normally only
feasible during daylight hours.
Terrorist Tactics
1. It cannot be assumed that terrorists will automatically abandon their camp.
Experience has shown that on occasions terrorists have opposed attacks in an
aggressive manner from well-prepared positions.
2. The main factor to be borne in mind is that terrorist sentries will be alert and will
give warning of any suspicious movement. By day it will be difficult to get past
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them. A study of terrorist habits has revealed that they position their sentries as
follows:
i. Usually, sentries are posted on likely approaches to the camp.
ii. At night, sentries are posted in close proximity to or within the perimeter of
the camp.
The terrorists have been known to mine and booby trap possible approaches as an
additional precaution.
SECTION 2: PLANNING AND PREPARATION
1. I ntroduction. To ensure a successful operation, the planning and preparation for
such an operation are most important. When speed is essential for success, it may
be necessary to sacrifice security to a certain extent. The commander concerned
must carefully consider this aspect when making his appreciation.
2. Appreciation. Depending on the time available, the commander responsible for the
operation must make a careful, detailed appreciation based on the task. This
appreciation must include such factors as the enemy, the local population, the
terrain and own forces.
3. Enemy. in the appreciation, points regarding the enemy which must be taken into
consideration are the following:
a. Nature and strength.
b. Routes both in and out normally used by the enemy.
c. In and out timings normally used by the enemy for his movement to and
from the objective.
d. security measures such as location and routine of sentries, defensive system,
patrols, sighting of weapons, alert and alarm systems, etc.
e. Normal reactions to security force presence.
f. Possible additional or external support that may be provided.
4. Local population. When considering the local population, the following aspects
must be considered:
a. Density and concentration.
b. The nature and type of the village or settlement and its location in relation to
the objective.
c. The attitude of the local population towards both the enemy and security
forces.
d. The daily routing of the local population and routes or paths normally used
by them to their cultivations and water points.
5. Terrain. when considering terrain, the following aspects must be borne in mind:
1. Nature and size and exact location of the objective.
2. Nature of the terrain around the objective, this to include:
i. Position in relation to the objective.
ii. observation and fields of fire.
iii. Obstacles, either natural or man-made.
iv. Cover and concealment.
v. Approaches and exit/escape routes.
vi. Check points.
6. Sources of information. The above information about the terrain can be obtained
by the following means:
a. Patrolling.
b. Air and ground reconnaissance.
c. Maps and air photographs.
d. Local population, police, informers or captured enemy, etc.
7. Timings. In determining H-hour, the following aspects must be considered:
1. Time available in which to carry out the operation.
2. Distances to be covered by attacking force.
3. Using cover of darkness for approach march for maximum security.
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4. Enemy sentry routine, i.e., early morning when sentries may not yet have
been posted or are still sleepy from the night before, or at last light when
sentries may be withdrawn.
5. Taking advantage of bad weather conditions, rest and meal times.
6. The possibility of attacking during the hours of darkness, bearing in mind
the attendant advantages and disadvantages.
8. Routes. When considering the approach and withdrawal routes, the following
should be borne in mind:
1. Distances to be covered by the various groups.
2. Secrecy and security.
3. Nature of the route, i.e., easy or difficult going.
9. Own forces. In dealing with own forces, the following must be considered:
1. Aim and nature of operation.
2. Enemy strength, security measures and possible external support.
3. Nature and size of objective.
4. Forces available, their experience and standard of training.
10. Plan. As a result of this appreciation, the plan could include the following:
a. Employment of troops.
b. Timings.
c. Approach and withdrawal routes.
d. Strength, equipment and additional support which may be required.
11. Standard of planning and preparation. only with good planning and preparation
can the success of the operation be ensured.
12. Security. These activities must be carried out under strict discipline in order to
maintain secrecy and to provide the force involved with a detailed knowledge of
the operation.
13. Training, leadership and initiative. Notwithstanding the fact that an operation
may be well planned in all its detail, the unexpected may often occur and then the
standard of training, leadership and initiative are of prime importance. Should the
presence of the military forces be discovered before all groups are in position and
the assault is ready to commence, then clear direction must be given to each group
as to what actions it should take.
SECTION 3: COMPOSITION: ATTACK FORCE
1. Groups. On each occasion when a deliberate attack is being planned, there is a
requirement for the military forces to be broken down into a number of groups.
Ideally the attacking force should consist of the following groups, which can,
normally, be found in a rifle company:
a. Stop groups.
b. Fire/cover groups.
c. Assault group.
d. Command group.
e. Follow-up group.
f. Reserve.
2. Essential/combined groups. It may not always be possible to achieve this
breakdown with the troops available. The command and assault groups will always
be necessary. Through necessity other groups can combine certain of their roles,
e.g., the fire group could also be detailed as the follow-up group.
3. Employment of groups. All plans should be based on the correct use of these
groups. Examples of their employment and handling are as follows:
a. Stop groups.
i. Task. To prevent the enemy from escaping.
ii. Deployment.
A. They must be deployed at such a distance from the camp so as
not to prejudice the secrecy of the operation.
B. The strength and number of stop groups to be deployed is
dictated by the terrain, the enemy and circumstances prevailing
at the time, but, if possible, they should be based on sticks of
four or five men covering all likely escape routes from the
objective.
C. Careful briefing is necessary and the following should be borne
in mind:
I. If possible, before a target is engaged it should be
identified.
II. Stops should be in concealed positions.
III. Each stop group should know the position of its
neighbors.
IV. Individual stops should not move from their positions
until ordered to do so. However, should this, for some
reason, become necessary, the stop or stops must ensure
that those on their flanks know what is happening.
V. Stop groups should be equipped with radios.
VI. The stop groups should always be positioned before the
assault takes place. If this is not possible, simultaneous
positioning is acceptable.
VII. The best position for the stop groups will normally dictate
the direction of assault.
b. The fire/cover group.
i. Tasks.
A. To open fire on the objective with every available weapon.
B. To give fire support to the assault group. c. If necessary, to
prevent interference from external reinforcements.
ii. Deployment.
A. The fire group should approach as near as possible to the camp,
undetected.
B. The principle of bringing maximum fire to bear on the camp
must be balanced against the difficulty of moving too large a
body of men through the bush without alerting the enemy, and it
may, on occasions, be necessary to reduce the strength of this
group and increase the ratio of automatic weapons.
c. The assault group. A proportion of the enemy will normally survive and it
is therefore essential to have an assault group, which has not been tied down
by the initial firefight, for the assault. Its tasks and Organization are as
follows:
i. Tasks.
A. To eliminate the sentries who guard the objective.
B. To skirmish forward and penetrate the objective to kill or
capture terrorists, and, if necessary, conduct an immediate
limited follow-up to maintain contact with, and pressure on,
escaping enemy. In this event careful control and coordination
with stop groups is essential.
C. To search for hidden personnel, documents or material.
D. To ascertain by a 360-degree search of the perimeter whether
any terrorists have escaped.
E. To demolish, if necessary, enemy explosives and booby traps.
ii. Organization. Bearing in mind the above tasks, the assault group
should be organized into the following teams:
A. Sentry eliminating team.
B. Assault team (the strength depends upon the nature of the
objective).
C. Support teams.
D. Demolition teams.
E. Search team (including trackers).
The above Organization is temporary and may not be necessary
in every case. one team, having accomplished its task, can
reinforce another team or receive another task.
d. The command group. A small command group should be positioned so as to
control the attack. This group will consist of the commander accompanied
by an escort, his radio operator, medical orderly and interrogator, if one can
be made available. It may be necessary at some stage of the battle for the
commander to get airborne in order to assess and control the overall
situation.
e. Follow-up group. The task of the follow-up group is self-explanatory.
However, before any follow-up is commenced, sufficient time must be
allowed for the assault group to complete its 360-degree search for tracks
and for any terrorists who escape to reach the stop positions. Any follow-up
should be carefully coordinated and the stop troops warned of the direction.
This group may well be found from the assault group, fire group or reserve.
This group should not be less than one section in strength. It must have a
radio, tracker and responsible commander.
f. Reserve. A reserve is desirable and, if possible, should be positioned nearby
to enable a rapid deployment by any means including the use of helicopters.
Tasks are as follows:
i. Reinforce the assault group, if necessary.
ii. Reinforce any of the stop groups who may become involved in a
prolonged engagement.
iii. Act as a follow-up group.
iv. Cover the withdrawal of the attacking force, if necessary.
v. Act as additional stop or fire groups.
vi. Collect and escort prisoners.
Legend
1. Objective terrorist camp in heavy bush.
2. Enemy sentries (assault group closes as close as possible).
3. Direction of possible enemy reinforcements.
4. Platoon commander and observation team.
5. Assault group - two or more teams.
6. Stop groups.
7. Fire cover groups - to stop reinforcements.
8. Reserve group - to assist assault group or stop group.
9. Follow-up group.
Any of the groups to also secure rear of command.

4. Air support. When planning a deliberate attack, cognizance must be taken of the
air support which is available. However, it must be remembered that the use of air
support, prior to the attack, may prejudice surprise.
a. Light aircraft. This type of aircraft is particularly useful and can be
employed in the following roles:
i. Armed air support. In certain circumstances, the initial assault on the
objective may be more effectively carried out by aerial attacks using
guns and/or rockets, bombing or, at a later stage, in support of stops or
follow-up groups.
ii. Reconnaissance.
iii. Radio relay.
iv. Airborne control.
b. b. Helicopters. Roles to be considered are:
i. Aircraft and stick(s) of troops on immediate standby as a mobile
reserve for redeployment to counter unexpected moves by terrorists or
to reinforce, deploy or redeploy stops.
ii. Airborne control.
iii. Evacuation of casualties, terrorists and material.
iv. Fire support.
v. Preventing the enemy from escaping in selected area.
c. Fighter ground attack or bombers. In certain circumstances, the initial
assault on the objective may be more effectively carried out by aerial attack
using front guns and/or rockets or bombing. An attack of this nature requires
detailed coordination, particularly regarding timing and safety distances. All
groups should be equipped with ground-to-air communications.
5. Fire support. If available, artillery and mortar support should be considered. In the
event of their being used, fire controllers should accompany the command group.
Safety and loss of surprise are, however, limiting factors.
SECTION 4: SEQUENCE OF ACTION
1. Sequence and timings. In ideal circumstances the following sequence of action
and timing is recommended:
a. The force commander issues detailed orders to all participants, ensuring that
every man knows precisely what his task or tasks will be, as well as those of
other groups.
b. Night D-l/D. During the night the force moves to a waiting area preselected
at a suitably secure distance from the objective. The stops move off and take
up their positions; in some cases this might be difficult and final
adjustments might have to be made to their positions just after first light.
c. D-day.
i. Stops use the fifteen minutes (or more if necessary) just after first
light to adjust their final positions. All other groups move forward to
their selected positions before first light.
ii. At H-hour, fire is opened on the objective on the order of the force
commander.
iii. The assault group skirmishes forward and clears the camp area. They
carry out a thorough search and also try to ascertain whether any
terrorists have escaped and in which direction.
iv. The stops engage any escaping terrorists who approach their positions.
v. Immediate interrogation of captured enemy and local population must
be carried out.
vi. The force commander must then decide from the available information
to:
A. Start following up tracks from the camp while the stops remain
in position.
B. Withdraw the stops to a prearranged rendezvous and then start
the follow-up.
C. Order the stops to patrol either left or right to the next stop
position to check whether the terrorists have crossed the stop
line. If tracks are found, to start an immediate follow-up.
vii. The force commander should, if necessary, plan an area ambush on
the camp area.
2. Platoon attack. manpower limitations within the platoon will normally prohibit the
formation of all the groups detailed above. Nevertheless, at times it may be
necessary to carry out a deliberate attack at platoon level.
3. Platoon follow-up. If a follow-up becomes necessary, this should, in the average
case, be undertaken by the entire platoon. Further troops would then be required
for ambushing the objective, if necessary.
SECTION 5: DELIBERATE ATTACKS AIDE
MEMOIRE
Situation
1. Terrain.
a. Nature of ground.
b. Details regarding the objective.
2. Enemy forces.
1. Expected strength.
2. Weapons carried and possible fields or arcs of fire. Include light machine-
gun positions if known.
3. Objective routine and location of sentries, if known.
4. Possible escape routes.
5. Names of key enemy personnel., if known.
3. Local inhabitants.
a. Location of villages, settlements, etc.
b. Attitude towards security forces or enemy.
c. Habits and movements.
4. Friendly forces.
1. Other troop movements in the area, if applicable.
2. Tasks of other forces engaged in the operation, if on a large scale.
5. Attachments and detachments (if applicable). Attached to the attacking force for
the duration of the operations, e.g.:
a. Helicopter or light aircraft in support.
b. Special trackers or tracking teams, including dogs, for the follow-up, etc.
Mission
1. To kill or capture all the terrorists occupying the camp at grid reference.
Execution
1. General outline. A brief outline or general description as to how the plan is to be
executed.
2. Detailed tasks.
a. Positions of groups.
b. The specific task of each group.
c. Direction of fire, and arcs of fire of each group.
3. Coordinating instructions.
a. Timings. Including:
i. H-hour.
ii. Waking time.
iii. Time to assemble for last minute check/briefing.
iv. Departure times for each group.
v. Time when groups must occupy final positions.
b. Assembly area for the force, if necessary.
c. Dispersal point (frequently in the assembly area).
d. Assembly area for the assault group.
e. Routes for whole force and for each group to its final position.
f. Formations and order of march from assembly area to dispersal point and to
final position.
g. Final actions and instructions at dispersal point.
h. Security and deception plan.
i. Action should local inhabitants be encountered during move in.
j. Orders to commence firing, to fire cover group, stop groups and assault
group.
k. Orders for cease firing.
l. Action if discovered by enemy sentries and warning is given.
m. Orders for follow-up.
n. Details regarding search of areas of enemy camp.
o. Rendezvous for assault force after completion of attack.
p. Action should enemy resistance be stronger than anticipated.
q. Posting of sentries after attack during mopping up and search phase.
r. Immediate interrogation of captured terrorists. (Interpreters should be
available.)
s. Use of air.
t. Limit of follow-up.
Administration and Logistics
1. Dress, equipment, weapons and ammunition to be carried.
2. Use of transport, if applicable.
3. Rations and water.
4. Medical.
a. Treatment and handling of own and enemy casualties.
b. Evacuation of own and enemy casualties.
c. Medical personnel and stretchers to assaulting force.
5. Handling of enemy captured and killed, including method of evacuation.
6. Handling of all enemy equipment, weapons and documents captured.
7. Establishing an administration area, if necessary, for extra equipment and kit and
members who may not be required for the actual assault.
8. Final inspection and checking of personnel, weapons and equipment.
Command and Signals
1. Radio communications.
a. Frequencies, establishing contact and switching on.
b. Call signs, including air.
c. Final test of radios and check of radio net.
2. Location of commander or headquarters.
1. Prior to the assault.
2. During the assault.
3. After the assault.
3. Signals. Signals for the:
a. Attack.
b. Cease-fire.
c. End of operation; all close in to rendezvous.
4. Identifications for follow-up group.
5. Nickname and/or code words.

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RHODESIAN C.O.I.N. MANUAL INTRODUCTION ( I-VI )
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Preface

Anti-terrorist operations (ATOPS) are fought on a wide front: the army forces, various
government departments and the civilian population all have a role to play. In
implementing the anti-terrorist action contained herein, members of the army forces
must appreciate the vital need for cooperation and the under-standing of each other's
characteristics and capabilities.
ATOPS warfare probably places a greater burden of responsibility on the individual than
does any other form of conflict. It connotes small groups and light scales. Catch-words
are: thorough training, self-discipline, skill at arms, initiative, guile, endurance and
above all, the will to win.
Definitions
1. Insurgent: An indigenous or foreign national not recognized as a belligerent by
international law, aiming to overthrow a government by force. In revolutionary
war the terms "guerrilla, 'I "revolutionary," "terrorist" or "insurgent" are used on
occasion to indicate differences in the opposition. When it is not necessary to
indicate specific differences, however, "insurgent" is used to cover all the roles
implied by the foregoing terms. It is also taken to include such additional terms as
"saboteur," "enemy" "insurrectionist" or "rebel," where applicable.
2. Terrorist: A supporter of a dissident faction (in fact, an insurgent), who is trained
for or resorts to organized violence for political ends.
3. Insurgency: A form of rebellion in which a dissident faction instigates the
commission of acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages
irregular warfare in order to overthrow a government. In its ultimate stages it
could escalate to a conflict on conventional lines. Although insurgency often starts
internally, it has seldom been known to succeed without outside assistance,
support and encouragement.
4. Counter-insurgency (COIN): All measures, both civil and military, undertaken
by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to
prevent or defeat insurgency. (Refers to the Rhodesian Security Forces)
5. Counter-insurgency operations (COIN Ops). Counter-insurgency operations are
the military aspects of counter-insurgency. These consist of: Anti-terrorist
operations (ATOPS), Psychological operations (PSYOPS), operations in support of
civil authorities (OSCA).
6. Anti-terrorist operations (ATOPS): Any military operation against terrorists.
7. Psychological operations (PSYOPS): An action conducted over a predetermined
period of time and consisting of the application of various coordinated measures,
directed at the population in general or the inhabitants of a specific area or social
group, own armed forces, or at the enemy in accordance with determined doctrines
and techniques. They are conducted by military forces, civil authorities or by both
in conjunction with each other, to achieve an objective of psychological action.
8. operations in support of civil authorities (OSCA): Any military operation in
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support of civil authorities, which involves primarily the maintenance of law and
order and essential services, in the face of civil disturbance and disobedience.
9. Military forces (MF): All military, paramilitary and police forces engaged in
counter-insurgency operations.
10. Contact: Any form of encounter between military forces and terrorists, other than
a mere sighting.
11. Incident: A terrorist act resulting in a criminal offence being committed, or
interference with the rights of others.
12. Border control operations: Border control or counter-penetration operations
conducted with the aim of securing our own borders and preventing the enemy
from crossing, or preventing supplies, reinforcements, etc. from crossing to
support enemy elements that may have succeeded in penetrating. This includes the
elimination of the enemy and the destruction of his transit facilities in border
areas.
13. Area operations: Operations carried out with the aim of covering an area with a
framework of military organizations, working in close cooperation with the civil
authorities, in order to eliminate the enemy who may have established himself in
the area, or who may have infiltrated the area.'
14. Military forces: The forces of the army, air force and navy.
15. Auxiliaries: Individuals or groups of the local population who are organized and
controlled by the military forces, to assist with and support counter-insurgency
operations.
16. Frozen area: A clearly defined area, in which military forces are precluded from
operating for a fixed period of time. Any military force already operating in the
area to be declared frozen will be withdrawn from such an area at least four hours
before the set period.
17. No-go area: An area from which all civilians are excluded by an order of the
protecting-authority, to ensure that they do not become involved in operations
conducted by military forces against terrorists. Only authorized members of the
military forces will move in no-go areas. No action may be instituted against them
for any death or injury caused to any person within the area by any act performed
in good faith in the course of operations conducted during the time while the order
is in force.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL
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Command and Control
1. A principal requirement of success against terrorists is the ability to coordinate the
actions of all the civil and military forces of the government. An adequate system
is required to achieve concerted action. No standard Organization would be
suitable for all situations. Any system of command and control must take into
account the constitution of the country, the personalities of its leaders, the size and
effectiveness of its security forces and many other factors. The system should
ensure:
a. That a common aim is determined and adhered to.
b. That timely and accurate intelligence is produced on which sound decisions
can be taken.
c. That mutual consultations and sound planning occur among those concerned
at all levels and at all times to effectively counter enemy action in all areas.
d. That the economic life of the country continues.
SECTION 2: COMMAND
1. Command is defined as the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces
for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.
2. The general principles of command and control are applicable to the conduct of
ATOPS but the application thereof must be adjusted to suit different
circumstances and situations.
3. The most important aspects, however, regarding command during ATOPS are
leadership, good discipline and the maintenance of control to ensure that all
planned action is accomplished in order to achieve a given mission.
4. The responsibilities of commanders and their immediate associates and the
relationship between senior commanders and their subordinates remain the same,
whether conventional or anti-terrorist operations are conducted. However, during
ATOPS the following are important:
a. Detailed planning of tactical operations at a low level and where possible
decentralized to compianders/units actually involved, including the
deployment of reserves.
b. Detailed coordination in the effort to obtain information.
c. Detailed planning and coordination of all activities related to the civilian
population.
d. Integration of psychosocial activities into operational planning.
e. Detailed planning and coordination of all logistic support in accordance with
the tactical plan. This is to include air supply.
f. Very careful and continual attention to standards and condition of men,
equipment and weapons.
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5. To further ensure that command is exercised efficiently at all levels and with the
minimum delay the following are also necessary requirements:
a. Good channels of command, good liaison and good communications. This
implies that provision must be made for first class telecommunications and,
if possible, for rapid air, road or rail movement.
b. Good standard operational procedures at all levels.
c. Good cooperation between military forces and between military forces and
civil organizations and representatives.
d. A high standard of leadership with command being decentralized, therefore
allowing maximum flexibility and initiative.
e. A good Organization and balanced forces for the conduct of ATOPS.
f. The selection and careful allocation of areas of tactical responsibility to
units and commanders.
g. The maintenance of high morale.
h. The issuance of clear, concise and unambiguous orders.
6. In the event of military elements from one national force participating directly in
the operations of another nation, or operating in concert therewith although
remaining in their own country, this military involvement will take one or more of
the following forms:
a. Coordinated operations. No combined command and control Organization
will be required since national forces will operate independently under their
own organizations.
b. Supported operations. The supporting forces will remain under the
command of their own national commanders, but be under the operational
control of the commander being supported.
c. Combined operations. For combined operations, a Combined Forces
Commander (CFC) will be appointed and will be provided with a staff for a
Combined HQ. The CFC will have operational command of all forces
allocated to the operation, and may be assisted by a Combined Air Forces
Commander (CAFC).
SECTION 3: LEADERSHIP AND DISCIPLINE
Leadership
1. Because of the very nature of ATOPS and because of the many problems peculiar
to these types of operations, very much more is expected from the junior leader
than during conventional operations.
2. The enemy very seldom presents a good target to the military forces because he
avoids contact but strikes violently, unexpectedly and at a time and place of his
own choice.
3. To seek out and destroy this elusive enemy, the conduct of ATOPS is based on a
pattern of small units or elements, i.e., patrols, who have the task of locating and
subsequently eliminating the enemy. This results in the major share of operations
being conducted and led by junior leaders.
4. Frequently these small elements or patrols are required to operate on their own
away from their main bases for long periods, or to man isolated lookouts or
observation posts. This means that these junior leaders very often have to make
rapid decisions, on-the-spot planning, and execute the task with whatever is
available in the way of men, weapons and material.
5. Because of the nature of operations as described above, it frequently happens that
the junior commander is the only authority representing the military forces in a
large area. Thus the junior leader is not only a commander, but may also, because
of his position, liaise with civil authorities, local population, etc. This is an
additional responsibility and calls for a high standard of tact, understanding,
diplomacy and sound judgment on the part of the junior leader.
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6. For these junior leaders to be successful and to be able to successfully lead their
men under these very trying conditions, the following are essential for good
leaders and leadership:
a. A very high standard of training and self-confidence.
b. Rapid acclimatization to local conditions and circumstances.
c. A high sense of responsibility and the ability to cooperate and communicate
with other services, arms and civil authorities.
d. The ability to think clearly and logically and a sound knowledge of
procedures and battle drills at the appropriate level.
e. The ability to instill confidence in subordinates.
f. Sound initiative and flexible mind which will stand them in good stead under
all conditions.
7. The ability to maintain a high standard of discipline and morale at all times under
all conditions.
Discipline
1. This is an important aspect and must at all times be given very careful
consideration. Because of the nature of ATOPS and because, very often, the
military forces may operate under extreme provocation, a very high degree of self-
discipline is essential at all levels. If of a high standard, it will guarantee the
correct relationship between commanders and their subordinates and between the
military forces and the population.
2. A high degree of discipline must also be exercised in respect to the following:
a. Security. This includes the safeguarding of plans, orders, maps, future
intentions, the correct use of radio, telephone and other means of
telecommunications.
b. Movement. Classification of roads, protection of military as well as civilian
convoys and of airfields, railways, harbors and docks, etc.
c. Operational discipline. Correct drills and procedures regarding men and
commanders being adhered to in operational areas, i.e., during patrolling or
ambushing or in tile temporary or patrol base, etc. All personnel must be
armed at all times and good spoor (track) discipline must be enforced.
SECTION 4: LOGISTICS IN ATOPS
Introduction
1. Sound logistics are vital for the successful conduct of any operation. Effective
logistical planning can only be achieved if the logistic staffs have an intimate
knowledge of operational thinking. Therefore, continuous and close liaison
between operational and logistic staffs is essential.
2. This section of the ATOPS Manual is designed to give unit and sub-unit
commanders a general understanding of some aspects of logistics in ATOPS
operations, and to list responsibilities. The aspects covered are:
a. Supply, which includes all commodities required by a unit to live and fight
while deployed on ATOPS operations (rations, ammunition, POL, etc.).
b. Maintenance and recovery.
c. Casualty evacuation and hospitalization.
d. Transportation.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
3. ATOPS operations demand flexibility in logistics as well as a clear delegation of
responsibilities because of:
a. The wider dispersion of units and sub-units, which results in greater
responsibilities being placed on commanders.
b. The increased vulnerability of logistical units and lines of communication,
which creates a need for stronger security measures.
c. The high cost of supplying widely dispersed units, which creates the need to
exploit local resources.
d. The unsuitability of a system which provides supplies on a single
commodity basis, and thus the need for a method which employs the
principle of composite supplies.
e. The vulnerability of and limitations to ground movement, which could result
in the increased use of air transportation.
f. The lack of immediate medical facilities for casualties, which could result in
the increased use of air evacuation.
g. The difficulties in replacement of defective items, which demand the
meticulous maintenance of all stores and equipment.
h. The mobile nature of ATOPS operations, which creates the need for
elements to be self-sufficient for longer periods.
4. Unit and sub-unit commanders will be advised of logistics arrangements by means
of administrative orders. During ATOPS operations units and sub-units will have
logistics elements attached for immediate support, where such attachment is
considered necessary.
Supply
1. A clear division of responsibilities is important if supply in the field is to function
effectively.
2. The logistic staffs are responsible for determining:
a. The means of distributing unit requirements.
b. The frequency of resupply.
c. The level of reserves to be held.
d. The location and type of storage, including the establishment of dumps if
required.
e. The degree of local purchase possible or necessary.
f. The source from which stocks are to be acquired.
3. The unit or sub-unit commander is responsible for ensuring that:
a. He understands where and from whom the unit or sub-unit will be supplied.
b. His unit or sub-unit holds sufficient reserves, bearing in mind the frequency
of resupply. He provides adequate protected storage facilities to prevent loss
of or
c. Damage to supplies.
d. He determines the extent to which local resources can be utilized.
4. Resupply during ATOPS operations may become difficult, therefore the maximum
conservation of all supplies must be exercised.
Maintenance and Recovery
1. Maintenance in the field includes both preventive measures against damage, and
the repair of all unit and personal equipment. Due to replacement difficulties in
ATOPS operations, every effort must be made to prevent damage and deterioration
of equipment. Furthermore, defective vehicles and equipment should be repaired
in situations wherever possible.
2. Recovery is the term applied to the back loading of defective vehicles and
equipment which cannot be repaired "in situ." In certain cases where recovery is
not practicable, consideration should be given to cannibalization and destruction
so as to deny the enemy use of any abandoned material. An effort should be made
COMMAND AND CONTROL
to leave the "battlefield" clean, as damaged components may be of use to the
enemy, even to the extent of gaining a psychological advantage from the
knowledge of his own successes and also to deny public knowledge through the
press media.
3. In addition to the foregoing, the logistic staffs are responsible for:
a. Sending repair teams forward if first line resources are not capable of
rectifying the defective items.
b. The recovery of all vehicles and equipment that cannot be repaired "in situ."
c. The back loading of unserviceable vehicles and equipment to the nearest
repair agency.
4. In addition to the general responsibilities outlined, the unit or sub-unit
commanders are to:
a. Ensure that they are aware of the various repair channels and agencies
available, including civilian contractors, and the procedures to be followed.
b. Provide protection for repair and recovery teams when necessary.
Casualty Evacuation and Hospitalization
1. In ATOPS operations the wide dispersion of units and sub-units will make the
immediate treatment of casualties difficult. It will be rarely possible to
decentralize available medical personnel to provide the requisite staff at sub-unit
level..
2. The logistic staffs are responsible for:
a. The general medical policy.
b. The designation of evacuation routes and means.
c. Hospitalization.
3. Unit or sub-unit commanders are to be fully conversant with:
a. The procedure for the evacuation of casualties both by air and ground.
b. The procedure for the resupply of medical stores.
Transportation
1. The replacement of transport during ATOPS operations may be a difficult as well
as time-consuming process and one which may affect operational planning. The
efficient maintenance of all modes of transport is therefore essential for ensuring
maximum availability and efficiency.
2. It must be borne in mind that route classification and enemy obstacles may limit
the use of road transport.
3. Where practicable, consideration is to be given to the use of inland waterways.
This method of transport may, at times, be more economical and secure.
4. Logistic staffs are responsible for determining and providing transport
requirements which units and sub-units need over and above their normal
establishment. This could include:
a. Road and rail transport.
b. Air transport, including the necessary ground facilities.
c. Sea and inland water transport.
5. Unit and sub-unit commanders are responsible for:
a. The efficient maintenance of all modes of transport at their disposal.
b. Understanding the procedures for requisitioning/hiring non-military
vehicles.
c. Providing route clearing and escort parties for the protection of resupply
convoys.
d. Understanding the procedure for requesting all forms of air transport. This
includes being conversant with the preparation of landing zones (LZs),
dropping zones (DZs) and airstrips. Further information is contained in this
manual.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
During all ATOPS, the junior leader plays a very important role. The success of all
ATOPS depends upon a high standard of leadership and a very efficient command and
control system. Commanders at all levels carry heavy responsibilities, especially at the
lower levels. Consequently, commanders and leaders must be specialists in their own
right and must be very carefully prepared.

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4. CONCLUSION

The major problem touched on above, that of the widespread use of pseudo operations and the illegal nature of
some of these practices, relates to a much wider problem, namely that of legitimate political authority. Without a
legitimate claim to authority in the eyes of a substantial portion of its population, a government would have to
rely on coercion alone to enforce compliance to its laws.
Legitimacy is a political necessity, for it reduces ... dependence on naked power by allowing (the
government) ... to rely on authority. (9)
Furthermore, Claude E. Welch points to an important factor in relation to government resorting to force
inconsistent use of coercion can both speedily alienate individuals and focus their discontent upon
political institutions. (10)
As a legitimate institution, authorities lay down and enforce compliance to laws that govern human activity in
any country. Should this same government provide evidence of not abiding by these same laws, it stands to lose
much of its legitimacy in the eyes of those affected. Such loss of legitimacy of necessity focuses on the political
structures and institutions of the country. Within rural areas such dissatisfaction is aimed at the manifestations of
government, i.e. local administration, the police and other government institutions and agencies.
In the following quotation Frank Kitson addresses the same problem, if more directly relevant to pseudo
operations
...there is absolutely no need for special operations to be carried out in an illegal or immoral way
and indeed there is every reason to ensure that they are not, because they are just as much part of
the governments program as any of its other measures and the government must be prepared to
take responsibility for them. (11)
Pseudo operations were used extensively in Rhodesia and in the long term proved to be counter-productive. In
such operations the population inevitably become the battleground. If adequate protection from the insurgents is
not provided, pseudo operations cause the local population to be yet further alienated from the Security Forces.
In fact, the widespread use of such operations in Rhodesia trapped the local population between the two opposing
sides: the insurgents on the one hand and the Security Forces posing as insurgents on the other. Both sides were
ready to exact retribution should the local inhabitants assist the enemy. Yet, purely as a military measure pseudo
operations were probably the most effective means of effecting insurgent casualties. According to a study by the
Directorate of Military Intelligence in 1978 a full sixty eight percent of all insurgent fatalities inside Rhodesia
could be attributed to the Selous Scouts.
Casualty figures in themselves, however, are not a sure indication either of success or failure in a counter-
insurgency campaign. This is particularly true in pseudo operations: although numerous insurgents were killed,
Security Forces failed to gain any permanent hold over rural areas. Such operations did succeed in creating
distrust and confusion both amongst the insurgents themselves and between the insurgent forces and the local
population. At the same time the punitive approach to subverted and potentially subverted rural people led to the
simultaneous creation of distrust and confusion between the rural population and Security Forces. Security
Forces completely lacked a strategy by which they could steadily gain control over increasingly subverted rural
areas. Therefore, the Selous Scouts were merely the instruments of an overly aggressive and punitive strategy,
simply directed at killing as many insurgents as possible and punishing the rural black population to force them
to desist from support for the insurgent forces.
Security Forces should not have attempted to exert an uncertain control over all contested areas. The most
seriously subverted Tribal Trust Lands should have been temporarily abandoned. Those areas securely under
government control should have been identified. Working outwards from these secure bases, Security Forces
would then have been able to concentrate their resources on adjoining areas which were as yet only partially
subverted. These threatened areas could have been consolidated by means of strict population control and by
involving the local population in their own defense and development.
Within the structure of the Rhodesian Security Force apparatus the affiliation of the Selous Scouts presented
problems of its own. Army control of the unit was initially vested in the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant-
General Walls. When appointed as General Officer Commanding, Combined Operations, General Walls retained
"PAMWE
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this relationship. COMOPS involvement in the planning of special force operations has been discussed in
Chapter 2, Command and Control. In addition friction developed between the Selous Scouts and the Special
Air Service each vying for the status as primary special forces unit.
A particular problem resulting from Special Branchs control over all pseudo intelligence activities was the
almost total absence of co-operation with the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The Selous Scouts were in fact
under specific Special Branch instructions not to divulge any information to the Directorate of Military
Intelligence. It would seem that professional jealousy and personal animosity played a major role in these co-
ordination problems. When the concept of pseudo operations was initially put into practice, military intelligence
organizations were by their own admission, incapable of controlling them.
Selous Scouts liaison with brigades also left much to be desired. An area would be frozen, pseudo teams would
move in, complete their task and be withdrawn with very little intelligence passed on to the brigade headquarters
in whose area it had taken place. Again Frank Kitson has very definite ideas on the subject
...special operations must be organized and implemented under the auspices of the normal
machine for directing the campaign and the advantages to be gained from them weighed against
the psychological implications of them becoming known. Furthermore normal Security Force
units should be informed as to the nature and purpose of special operations as far as it is
consistent with the requirements of security so that they come to regard Special Forces as helpful
colleagues and not as wild, irresponsible people whose one purpose is to steal the credit from
those who carry out more humdrum, but necessary roles. (12)
In the final analysis the technique of pseudo operations in Rhodesia proved highly successful and reemphasized
its value as a method of gathering intelligence. The problems encountered and deviations from the concept were
less the result of the Selous Scouts and Special Branch than they were the result of the absence of a coherent
Security Force counterinsurgency strategy and a punitive approach to the whole problem of the insurgency.

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DEFENCE
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Defense/Protection of sensitive points
1. Military forces will be required to undertake the defense/protection of sensitive
points. These may be considered vital points which, if damaged or secured by the
enemy, represent great disadvantage to the government military forces and the
population, i.e.:
a. Installations with a political, administrative, economic and military interest
such as:
i. Essential services, e.g.,, water, gas, electricity, etc.
ii. Fuel and industrial installations.
iii. Vital points of communication, e.g., bridges, tunnels, railways, etc.
b. Centers of population which must be protected from any contact with the
enemy.
2. The protection of sensitive points is a tactical problem and will vary according to the
nature of the installation, location, probable enemy action and the troops available for
the task. Commanders must strike a balance between the military need to retain
mobile forces for offensive tasks and the military or civilian requirement for security.
A satisfactory and sound solution will only be found by close cooperation and
discussion with the police and civil authorities.
3. A list of sensitive points should, if possible, be drawn up by the local government
officials, military and police commanders to establish priorities. The classification of
sensitive points should be frequently reviewed in relation to the situation and the
consequent possible shift in emphasis. Some sensitive points may only be classified
as such for limited periods, e.g., railway siding during the unloading of ammunition.
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE AND
SECURITY
1. General. This mission of a unit tasked with defending or protecting a sensitive point
would normally be to guarantee at any cost from terrorist action, the installation,
together with the people who serve it. In certain cases this may not be possible and it
will be necessary to accept that the defense can only be undertaken for limited
periods unless external reserves are committed.
2. Appreciation. In making his appreciation, the commander should consider the
following basic factors:
a. The importance and nature of the sensitive point.
b. The available force, including reserves, and their location in relation to the
sensitive point.
c. The enemy threat.
3. Plan. During his planning, the commander should bear in mind the normal principles
of defense. The following points will require particular attention:
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a. Careful siting of weapons.
b. Good fields of fire.
c. Protection and concealment of fire positions.
d. Efficient system of communications (internal and external).
e. Control.
f. Deception.
g. Security.
h. Reserve.
i. Alarm scheme.
4. Siting of weapons. Weapons should be carefully sited to ensure the best use of their
characteristics. Positions should be mutually supporting and provide all-around
defense and depth. Positions should be changed frequently and, if possible, day and
night positions should not be the same.
5. Fields of fire. In certain circumstances it will be necessary to clear fields of fire.
Thick bush and other obstacles which make fire and observation difficult should be
cleared from the immediate vicinity of the defended area.
6. Protection and concealment. Fire positions should be concealed and protection
obtained by the best use of buildings suitably sand-bagged and developed into strong
points.
7. Communications. All sub-units involved in the protection or defense of the sensitive
point should be linked with an efficient system of communication. This should be
duplicated. External communications are also essential.
8. Control. This is achieved through:
a. Good communications.
b. Good observation. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to build towers
to achieve this.
9. Deception. This may be achieved with alternative positions. However, when the
topography does not provide adequate concealment for alternative positions and the
deployment of the reserve, it may be necessary to dig communication trenches.
10. Security. In addition to the defense of a sensitive point, it will be necessary to
organize an efficient security system, thus:
a. Reducing the chances of a surprise attack.
b. Permitting adequate time for troops to occupy defensive/alarm positions.
11. Security of a sensitive point may be organized in the following manner:
a. Internally.
b. In close proximity.
12. Internal security. This is obtained through:
a. An efficient system of sentries.
b. Night illumination.
c. Obstacles.
d. Alarm system.
e. Identification system.
13. An efficient system of sentries may be achieved through these points:
a. Sentry posts should be sited so as to ensure all-around observation with the
minimum number of posts. If necessary, towers should be built to achieve this.
b. Sentry posts should frequently be changed and should, if possible, be varied by
night.
c. At night, sentries should be doubled and simultaneous changing of sentries
should be avoided.
d. War dogs could be used to increase the efficiency of sentries.
e. Reserves should be located in relation to sentry posts for quick reaction.
14. The illumination of likely approaches should be planned and may include
conventional flares or the use of improvised means such as kerosene flare drums or
the lights of vehicles.
15. Obstacles should be sited to cover likely enemy approaches. Wherever possible, best
use should be made of natural obstacles which may require some improvement.
Obstacles serve to prevent a successful quick attack, slow down the enemy and
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enable casualties to be inflicted. Where observation is more difficult, the obstacles
should be supplemented with alarm devices, e.g., anti-personnel mines, tins,
electrified wires, etc.
16. The alarm scheme should, where possible, provide warning of the approach of the
enemy without disclosing this fact, thus enabling the commander to issue the
necessary orders for deployment and to achieve maximum surprise. However, should
time not permit, a general alarm scheme should exist, thereby enabling alarm
positions to be occupied with the minimum of delay.
17. An identification system is necessary to ensure the identity of:
a. Patrols and detachments operating in close proximity to the sensitive point.
b. Civilian elements who may be required to enter the sensitive point for their
normal functions and activities.
18. The password system of identification is generally used for military personnel while,
in the case of civilians, it is normal to issue permits, or only permit entry at
predetermined times and places, during which careful screening is carried out.
19. Close proximity security. This is the security of the immediate vicinity of the
sensitive point and is achieved by:
a. Patrols.
b. Observation posts.
c. Ambushes, obstacles and booby traps covering likely approaches.
20. Patrols have the task of extending the security of a sensitive point and will be
particularly useful when it is not possible to cover all approaches by observation.
Their patrol program should be irregular, in both time and routes, to prevent being
surprised. The use of dogs should also be considered.
21. Observation posts should be established to cover likely routes to the sensitive point.
In all cases these posts must be well concealed, well protected and provided with
radio communications.
22. If considered necessary, it may be possible to establish ambushes, obstacles, etc., to
cover the most likely concealed approaches of the enemy.
23. Important aspects. When planning the defense and security of a sensitive point, the
following points should be borne in mind:
a. The enemy will always aim to achieve surprise and may even attempt to
penetrate the inner security of the sensitive point before initiating the attack.
b. The enemy will always carry out a reconnaissance, in an attempt to establish
the layout of the defense, before attacking. Consequently, fire discipline is
essential and fire should only be opened when maximum casualties are
ensured. Vigorous patrolling by day will help to prevent enemy
reconnaissance.
c. Counterattack plans should be made and any favorable situation should be
rapidly exploited.
d. Frequent checks, especially before last light, should be made to ensure the
following are known:
i. Arcs of fire and observation.
ii. Fire positions.
iii. Location of the commander.
iv. Location of adjoining sub-units.
v. Action in the event of an alarm.
vi. Sentry duties.
vii. Time out and in of friendly force patrols.
viii. Weapons and equipment are available for immediate use.
24. In certain cases it must be accepted that it is impossible to organize the defense of a
DEFENCE
sensitive point in secrecy. On these occasions it may be preferable to establish the
defense openly, thus indicating our strength and efficiency to the local population
and possibly the enemy. Obviously, detailed planning will not be disclosed, as
security will be vital to the defense of the installation.

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Employment of Forces
Table of Contents
1. Section 1: General
2. Section 2: Infantry
3. Section 3: Armour
4. Section 4: Cavalry
5. Section 5: Artillery
6. Section 6: Engineers
7. Section 7: Telecommunications
8. Section 8: Logistics
9. Section 9: Air force
10. Section 10: Paratroops
11. Section 11: Navy
12. Section 12: Police
13. Section 13: Auxiliaries

SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. Military success in ATOPS is dependent on the correct use of well-balanced (but
predominantly infantry) ground forces against the enemy. This force will need the
support of the air force to fulfill its task, and, when applicable, that of the navy.
2. The primary role of the army is to seek out and destroy the enemy. This is done by
isolating him from the rest of the community, and be preventing him from taking
sanctuary in neighboring areas, thus forcing him out into the open and into battle.
3. In the initial stages of. ATOPS, the army must be prepared to operate in sub-unit and
smaller groups. This calls for good junior leadership, high morale and proper
training. Success at platoon level will invariably determine the success of the whole
operation.
SECTION 2: INFANTRY
1. Infantry will invariably be the dominant arm during ATOPS because:
a. The inherent characteristics of infantry make them ideally suited for
employment on any unconventional task, under any circumstances, with or
without the support of other arms.
b. The nature of the operations, terrain, climate and the characteristics and tactics
of an irregular enemy will often make the employment of other arms tactically
impracticable and uneconomical.
2. The roles in which infantry are employed are described in detail in the following
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chapters of this manual.
SECTION 3: ARMOUR
General
1. Because of their characteristics, tanks are generally unsuitable for employment in
ATOPS. Therefore this manual deals only with armored cars and infantry combat
vehicles. It should be noted, however, that some of the tasks mentioned could equally
well be carried out by tanks, especially in urban areas.
2. Restrictions. The use of armored vehicles in ATOPS is restricted by the following
factors:
a. Vulnerability. The nature of the terrain normally favors the use of even
homemade weapons against armor. This calls for increased infantry protection.
b. Dispersed deployment of units. This factor causes a heavy burden on the
supply of fuel and complicates the proper maintenance of armored vehicles.
c. Lack of mobility. In parts of the country, the vegetation is so dense that
armored vehicles are restricted to roads and tracks. If forced to go cross-
country, they have a very limited field of vision and movement will be very
slow.
Armored Care
1. Tasks. Armored cars have been used successfully in ATOPS in various countries.
Their tasks may include:
a. Show of force. Armored cars can be used to show force in a certain area, or to
make a sudden appearance at a trouble spot.
b. Protection of sensitive points. Armored cars in cooperation with infantry can
be used to protect sensitive points. Thorough coordination between infantry
and armor is essential.
c. Road escort duties:
i. Armored cars are suitable for escorting convoys.
ii. Armored cars used for this task provide protection and support.
d. Patrolling. The following can be included:
i. Road patrols to keep roads open.
ii. Patrols in certain areas to carry out specific tasks, for example, control of
the population of an isolated community.
iii. Boundary or area isolation patrols, including mobile patrols during
border control operations.
iv. Patrolling of certain areas as part of an encircling cordon, curfew, or
controlled area operation.
e. Road blocks. Armored cars will normally establish emergency road blocks, and
road blocks which prohibit or control entrance, during a specific operation.
f. Offensive action. Armored car weapons can be used for neutralizing or
destructive fire when offensive action is required. They can be used
independently or in support of the infantry. Normal fire and movement tactics
are used. The direct fire capabilities of armored car weapons are ideal to
support infantry in close proximity to the enemy.
g. Illumination. Armored cars are provided with flexible and/or coupled spotlights
and could also be fitted with other illuminating equipment, including infrared,
if so desired.
2. Additional tasks. The following tasks can also be carried out where sufficient
armored cars are available:
a. The provision or supplementation of the communication systems.
b. Traffic control.
c. Reinforcement of threatened areas.
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d. Encircling operations.
1. Form part of the encircling force.
2. Be employed as stops.
3. Patrol the area behind the main encirclement positions.
e. Provision of a mobile reserve.
f. Provision of fire support for infantry attacks and destruction of enemy
strongholds.
Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)/Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV)
1. Tasks. Mechanized infantry can be used to carry out all of the tasks required of
normal infantry in ATOPS when dismounted. Due to their vulnerability in close
country the employment of APCs/ICVs should be restricted. However, their
characteristics permit them to operate as follows:
a. Rapid movement into, through or near objectives or trouble spots. APCs/ICVs
enable troops to be moved speedily and with comparative immunity from
distant assembly or forming-up places and be delivered, fit and fresh, in or
near the trouble spot.
b. Use as a fire support base. When in close contact with the enemy and when the
infantry have debused, the APCs/ICVs could be used to provide supporting
fire to the infantry.
c. Roving operations (mobile columns). During ATOPS, units will often be
responsible for security duties over large areas in which disorders may break
out simultaneously in several centers. Mechanized infantry can be used to
provide mobile columns to:
i. Show the flag and advertise the presence of troops in certain areas.
ii. Suppress, by prompt offensive action, any disturbances beyond the
control of the local civil authority.
iii. Control an area in which troops are not normally stationed.
iv. Be a reserve.
v. Patrol an area or given stretch of road.
d. Protection of sensitive points. For this task the infantry will be debussed and
deployed while available APCs/ICVs can be used as follows:
i. By day.
a. To cover the sensitive point and/or approaches with fire.
b. To patrol certain areas or stretches of road around the sensitive
point.
ii. By night. Sited in positions to illuminate the sensitive point, or certain
approaches to it, with headlights and to cover these approaches with
machine-gun fire.
e. Road escort duties. In large scale ATOPS, convoys, administrative echelons,
or vehicles will invariably require some form of armored escort. APCs/ICVs
fully or partially manned are suitable for the task.
f. Shock action. The appearance of mechanized infantry with their APCs/ICVs
on the scene of a disorder may in itself have the necessary salutary effect on
terrorists or rioters.
SECTION 4: CAVALRY
General
1. Characteristics. Experience has taught us that cavalry can be effectively used in
fairly open country to reach inaccessible and remote areas. The characteristics of
cavalry are:
a. Radius of action. An increased radius of action for patrols, especially where
units have large areas of responsibility.
b. Speed. Mounted patrols have greater speed than normal foot patrols.
c. Surprise. The speed at which mounted patrols can move may lead to the
achievement of surprise.
d. Shock effect. Speed of movement and surprise may have a shock effect on the
enemy. This will also result in a psychological effect on the enemy, especially
if the mounted men are able to engage the enemy with fire while on the move.
e. Ability to follow up. Because of greater speed, mobility and endurance,
mounted units have a better follow-up capability than troops on foot.
f. Endurance. Mounted patrols, with the addition of pack animals, can be self-
supporting for periods of up to ten days. It must be borne in mind, however,
that the addition of pack animals will reduce the speed and mobility of the
mounted patrols.
g. Psychological effect on local population. It is a generally accepted fact that a
mounted man has a psychological advantage over a dismounted man.
h. Dual role. Depending on terrain and local conditions and the tactical
requirement, cavalry units can be employed in the dismounted role. For
example, the mounted unit can reach an area which is inaccessible to vehicles,
etc., dismount and then carry out operations as a dismounted force.
i. Adaptability to terrain. The movement of mounted patrols need not necessarily
be confined to roads, tracts, etc. They have the capability of moving rapidly
over open terrain and with ease over most other types of terrain.
j. Ability to sense danger. The horses instinct will often provide the rider with
early warning of danger or anything unusual.
k. Carrying capabilities. The horse is capable of carrying loads that are not
usually carried by a man.
2. Capabilities. The capabilities of mounted patrols are as follows:
a. Mounted patrols can operate up to distances of 150 to 250 kilometers with
relative ease in most types of terrain.
b. These patrols can move at an average speed of six to seven kilometers per
hour in most types of terrain.
c. Mounted patrols can be on the move for six to eight hours daily, giving a daily
operational radius of approximately 30 to 50 kilometers. For maximum
performance they should rest one day in four.
d. They can be self-supporting for periods of up to five days. This period can be
increased up to ten days by making use of pack animals.
e. They are useful in capturing and/or rounding up scattered elements of the
enemy or population.
3. Limitations. These are as follows:
a. . Difficulty in moving through dense bush.
b. Difficulty in moving through marshy areas, swamps or muddy areas.
c. Slowness in crossing major water obstacles, e.g., large rivers.
d. Increased logistic support of cavalry units because of the quantities of fodder
and water that have to be carried to provide for the horses.
e. Difficulty in maintaining silence. Natural horse noises, such as blowing
through their nostrils and the jingle of equipment, make a silent approach
difficult.
f. Certain geographical areas may be denied to horse-mounted patrols because of
certain animal diseases or sicknesses, e.g., areas of tsetse fly infestation.
Tactical Employment
1. From experience gained it has been found that mounted units can be employed on
the following tasks:
a. Patrolling. This can be in the form of long-range or short-distance patrols
either as fighting or reconnaissance patrols.
b. Follow-up operations. Because of its characteristics, the horse can be
effectively employed in the follow-up role.
c. In support of other units. mounted patrols can be used to support other units
either as additional patrols in the normal patrol program or by patrolling
normally distant and inaccessible areas.
d. Control of population. Because of their characteristics, mounted patrols may be
used for certain aspects of population control and for visiting populated areas
to maintain contact with the locals.
2. Troops employed as mounted patrols must be trained to fire their weapons while
mounted. This will assist, should the enemy appear suddenly, in having a shock
effect on the enemy and in gaining the initiative. In this case, elements not actually
involved in the action can rapidly react and surround or pursue the enemy.
3. It must be generally accepted, however, that the horse is merely a means of
conveyance and that normally the troops will dismount and fight on foot. In this case,
adequate precautionary measures must be taken to safeguard the horses and men
detailed to remain with them against possible enemy action.
4. Movement of mounted patrols must not be limited or restricted to roads, paths, etc.
The commander must select his own routes, direction, etc., for normal patrolling.
While moving, the patrol should not be bunched but spread out, the formation being
dictated by the nature of the terrain. This will reduce the effect of ambushes, mines
and booby traps.
5. Mounted patrols should always operate over a large front and in depth. it may often
be necessary to superimpose their patrol program over that of the normal foot
patrols, thereby ensuring better coverage and a greater area.
SECTION 5: ARTILLERY
1. Advantages. Field artillery offers certain distinct advantages over air support. These
are as follows:
a. The use of guns is not restricted by bad weather.
b. Artillery can operate equally well by day or night.
c. Artillery is capable of a more sustained effort, and when required, can give
round-the-clock support over several days.
2. Limitations. The employment of field artillery in its conventional role will often be
restricted by:
a. The nature of the operations which:
i. May render the employment of artillery impractical owing to the
difficulty of locating suitable targets.
ii. For legal reasons (minimum force), may preclude the use of artillery
altogether.
b. The lack of suitable roads and deployment areas. In difficult terrain this will
prevent the placing of the weapon within firing range of the target, unless the
weapon is air-transportable by helicopter.
c. The problem of observation. The control of fire by means of ground
observation will always prove difficult in bushy terrain. Therefore. more use
would have to be made of air observation posts. Predicted shooting would
become the rule and not the exception.
d. The proximity of own troops to the target, as infantry contact with the enemy
is invariably made at distances within the danger zone of the weapon.
3. Tasks. Artillery can be employed in its conventional role to carry out the following
tasks:
a. Flushing. In difficult terrain the enemy can be flushed by artillery fire.
b. Harassing. Harassing fire can be used to keep terrorists on the move when
their whereabouts are known, or to harass them generally by methodically
searching an area.
c. Blocking escape routes. When troops are engaged in follow-up operations
after a contact or incident, artillery fire can be used to dissuade the enemy
from using certain likely escape routes.
d. Deception. Artillery fire into an area away from that in which troops are
operating may deceive the enemy as to army intentions, giving them a false
sense of security and covering the noise of movement made by troops.
e. Destructive shoots. Artillery fire can be used to destroy located enemy bases,
hideouts, barricades, houses or huts.
f. Counter-bombardment. Artillery fire directed against enemy mortar and
artillery positions.
g. I llumination. By firing illuminating shells at night, areas can be illuminated
for short periods.
h. Target indication. Colored smoke can be employed to indicate targets to strike
aircraft.
i. Show of force. The value of artillery in this role must not be forgotten. Guns
located in populated areas and firing in full view of the inhabitants may have a
marked effect on civilian morale.
j. Protection of convoys. Artillery units can be employed to provide convoy
protection by providing fire support to the convoy covering the whole route
from a static position, or from preselected positions should it be a long route,
or by accompanying the convoy. An artillery officer with the necessary
communications and assistance will accompany the convoy, acting as a
forward observation officer. His task will be to call for the required artillery
supporting fire. This fire support can either be preplanned or impromptu.
k. Border control. In certain cases and certain areas it may be possible to use
artillery fire to cover possible crossing places or known areas through which
the enemy normally moves once he has crossed the border. This type of task
does create certain problems for the artillery such as finding suitable
observation posts or accidentally firing across the border into the other
territory. With the introduction of sensory devices to detect enemy movement,
it is possible to have the artillery fire units linked to these sensory devices and
providing responsive fire should movement be detected.
l. Weapon locating. Mortar locating radar could be employed in the more
advanced stages of ATOPS.
m. Leaflet dropping. The carrier shell can be used for the distribution of
propaganda leaflets.
n. Covering fire. Under certain special and unusual circumstances for ATOPS,
covering fire from field artillery may be possible. Particular consideration
must be given to the need for security (e.g., ranging shots) and the proximity
of stop groups.
4. Local protection. Security arrangements for the protection and security of gun
positions, command posts, observation posts and wagon lines must always be made.
Artillery personnel must be trained to undertake their own local protection.
SECTION 6: ENGINEERS
1. As in all other forms of warfare, the engineers will be in great demand, particularly
as enemy activities expand.
2. Tasks. The primary tasks for the engineers are:
a. Construction, improvement and maintenance of roads, bridges, and military
bases.
b. Construction and improvement of defensive works including minefields in and
around sensitive points, including booby traps.
c. Repair of damage caused by enemy sabotage.
d. Water supply.
e. Construction and maintenance of temporary landing grounds and strips.
f. Assistance in crossing water obstacles.
g. Clearing and neutralizing enemy mines and booby traps.
3. The engineers may also be called upon to repair and maintain public utility services
such as waterworks, power stations, etc., and assist the civil administration in tribal
areas to provide basic amenities to the local population.
SECTION 7: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Units deployed over large areas, and the vulnerability of line communications, make
the radio an essential means of communicating.
2. Dispersed deployment and the type of terrain call for great ingenuity on the part of
the radio operator, and relay stations on vantage points (including aircraft) must be
regarded as common practice.
3. Deployment of bases and headquarters are often dictated by communication
requirements, and commanders at all levels must seek the advice of their signals
representatives on this matter.
4. Climatic extremes adversely affect the life of radio batteries, and require proper
planning and replenishing arrangements.
5. Voice procedure and security cannot be ignored in this type of operation. It is known
that terrorists have been using standard commercial radios for interception purposes,
and might very well be monitoring army transmissions.
SECTION 8: LOGISTICS
1. The logistic support of widely dispersed units in small groups cannot be done by
conventional resupply systems, and the points listed below should be considered in
planning operations against terrorists.
2. Each isolated unit, regardless of its size, must be made as self-sufficient as possible.
This includes resupply, medical and maintenance aspects.
3. When possible, maximum use must be made of local resources, but not at the
expense of the civilian population of the area.
4. All logistic moves in an area of operations will call for protection and escorts -- this
may heavily tax a commander's combat resources.
5. The air force may be called upon to replenish supplies (air-landed or dropped) on a
permanent basis to units deployed in inaccessible areas. Casualty evacuation by air
will also receive a high priority.
SECTION 9: AIR FORCE
1. It should be the constant aim in all ATOPS to make full use of the advantages that
stem from the ability to use air power with little enemy interference. During ATOPS
the air force can provide a quick reaction to requests for offensive air operations,
casualty evacuation and logistic support.
SECTION 10: PARATROOPS
1. Paratroops are basically infantry troops, but have the special capability of being
deployed to their area of operation or onto their objective by means of the parachute.
There are, however, a number of advantages and disadvantages when deployed by
parachute.
a. Advantages
i. Surprise.
ii. Shock action.
iii. Mobility provided by the aircraft to reach distant objectives.
b. Disadvantages
i. Delay in regrouping and vulnerability during this phase.
ii. Very limited transport; consequently all movement will be on foot and
all stores and equipment manpacked. This immediately results in a
limitation on equipment and ammunition carried.
iii. Limit of duration of action unless immediate, and, if necessary,
prolonged air support is available.
iv. Employment subject to weather conditions and availability of air
transport aircraft.
v. Fire effectiveness almost entirely confined to small arms and mortar fire.
2. Tasks. Bearing in mind their limitations and that they are specialists in their own
right, paratroops will be tasked at the highest level to gain maximum benefit and
results from their capabilities. Possible tasks could be the following:
a. Securing special points of tactical or strategic value prior to major troop
movements, e.g., passes, bridges, crossing places.
b. Relieving or reinforcing pinned-down or surrounded military forces that may
be difficult to reach in time or because of strong enemy opposition.
c. Acting as stops or cut-off groups in positions that cannot be reached in time by
ground forces.
d. Employment as a force reserve.
3. It is considered that the dropping of parachute troops by parachute will be very rare,
being used only when normal infantry cannot be deployed by helicopter.
SECTION 11: NAVY
1. General. The role of the navy during ATOPS assumes greater importance when it is
possible to employ naval elements. Nevertheless the navy will carry out missions that
may have a direct or indirect effect on ATOPS.
2. Tasks. During ATOPS, naval tasks can be:
a. Security and coastal maritime defense by patrolling, and coast guard duties in
coastal waters to prevent disembarking, resupply or evacuation of the terrorists
by sea.
b. Security and defense of coastal and inland shipping through control and
protection.
c. General transport and logistic support to the armed forces and civilian
authorities by maritime or inland shipping.
d. Amphibious operations, both primary and secondary, employing sea borne
forces and appropriate naval means.
e. Cooperation with the other services in land operations, employing sea borne
forces, when the situation requires it.
f. Supporting naval gun fire to land operations conducted adjacent to the coast. g.
Psychological and socioeconomic actions in coastal and inland waters.
SECTION 12: POLICE
1. General. In both counter-insurgency and internal military operations, police
essentially remain responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for the
investigation of crime. The conduct of military operations against an armed enemy is
outside this function.
2. Roles. In ATOPS, police functions will take the form of:
a. Obtaining, collating and disseminating intelligence which is vital to the success
of ATOPS.
b. Detailed interrogation of terrorists to obtain maximum intelligence.
c. Regular briefing of force commanders in regard to the terrorist threat, in
particular, the presence and intention of terrorists.
d. Patrolling the fringes of the operational areas with the aim of:
i. Checking reports of terrorist activity.
ii. Checking movements, i.e., the establishment of road blocks and
checking vehicles, tracks and public transport.
iii. Dissemination of propaganda.
iv. Allaying fears on the part of the civilian population.
e. Prevention or detection of unauthorized entry of persons through ports, airports
and across the borders. Also to establish counter-sabotage measures to prevent
the transmission or carriage of adverse information and/or subversive literature
and propaganda and the smuggling of arms and explosives.
f. Investigation of crimes committed by terrorists.
g. Provision of guides and interpreters in support of the military forces.
SECTION 13: AUXILIARIES
1. Depending on their loyalty to the government, and degree of terrorist influence and
control, the local population, could be of great assistance to the military, either as
individuals or in groups:
a. Individually
i. Guides/trackers.
ii. Interpreters.
iii. Translators.
iv. Intelligence agents or informers.
v. Propaganda agents.
vi. Workers.
b. Collectively
i. Labor units.
ii. Units for self defense (militia).
iii. Combat units.
2. It must be borne in mind that the training and arming of selected members of the
local population for the defense of their own villages and other key points is not to
be initiated at unit level, but is subject to military or government policy.

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5. END NOTES

1. See for example A.R. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Department
of the Army Pamphlet No 550-104, Washington DC, 1965).
2. See F. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs (Barrie and Rockcliff, London, 1960); Bunch of Five (Faber and
Faber, London 1977 and Low Intensity Operations, (Faber and Faber, London, 1971).
3. Rhodesian Army, Military Support to the Civil Power (MCP), (restricted, as amended, dated 1 May 1976), p.
xvi.
4. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War, (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 84.
5. To the Point, (1 Apr. 1977), p. 53.
6. Stiff and ReidDaly, Selous Scouts, p. 76.
7. Africa Confidential (20 Oct. 1978) , p. 3. For an earlier example see Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, pp.
90-94.
8. Ibid., pp. 125129.
9. R.M. Momboise, Blueprint of Revolution, (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, 1970), pp. 67.
10. C.E. Welch Jr. and M.B. Taunter (eds.) Revolution and Political Change (Duxbury Press, Belmont, 1972), p.
11.
11. F. Kitson, Bunch of Fives, p. 298.
12. Ibid.

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Foot Patrols
SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. A common feature of rural operations is that, irrespective of whether an operation
has been planned at brigade or at troop level, or whether it has been designed to:
a. search an area of bush;
b. disrupt terrorist food supplies;
c. keep terrorists on the move;
d. pursue a specific gang with the aid of trackers; or
e. sweep progressively a large area of bush with a large number of troops,
the troops taking part in it will almost invariably find themselves functioning in the
role of a patrol which is out of visual contact with other troops and will have a local
aim of contacting and eliminating terrorists.
2. The ability to carry out skillful patrolling, which will result in contacting and
eliminating the terrorists, is the prime requirement for all troops engaged in rural
operations. In this respect, therefore, commanders at all levels should consider patrol
planning carefully and base this on a realistic appreciation, whether the situation be
simple or complex.
Basic Aspects of Patrolling
1. Characteristics. A patrol must be small enough to move silently and yet have
sufficient effective fire power. The strength of the patrol will be determined by the
size of terrorist gangs known to be operating in the area. Patrols must almost
invariably be "all purpose" operations, prepared to fight, ambush, pursue and
reconnoiter.
2. Leadership and morale. Since patrolling is frequently done by patrols of
approximately platoon and section strength, they will often be commanded by junior
officers or non-commissioned officers. These junior leaders must be well trained and
their leadership qualities developed to the full before they can command. Their
leadership must be of the highest standard to achieve the aim of the patrol, thus
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instilling confidence and high morale.
3. Patrol areas. Whenever possible, a patrol commander must be given the limit and
boundaries of his patrol area so that he knows the exact area of his responsibility,
thereby minimizing the risk of patrol clashes. These boundaries must, wherever
possible, follow clear natural features; for example, ridges, rivers, roads or tracks. if
this is not possible, it is essential that all military forces are aware that operations are
taking place in the area.
4. It should be made clear to patrol commanders what latitude is to be allowed
regarding boundaries in the event of a patrol encountering fresh terrorist tracks
leading out of its area.
5. Whenever possible, the maximum freedom should be given to patrols to follow up
unexpected encounters rather than risk losing the chance of engagement. In practice,
it is almost impossible for a patrol in the bush to pinpoint its position sufficiently
accurately to hand over to another unit, and in any case the delay which such a
course would involve would almost certainly result in the loss of contact with the
terrorists.
6. If, at the start of any operations, it is possible that a patrol may have to cross the unit
or sub-unit boundaries, clearance should be arranged before the patrol leaves base.
7. If, during an operation, a patrol needs to cross any unit or sub-unit boundaries,
clearance will be obtained.
SECTION 2: PLANNING, PREPARATION AND
BRIEFING
Planning and Preparation
1. Strength. The strength of the patrol depends on the following:
a. The mission.
b. The nature of the area to be patrolled.
c. All available information about the enemy in the area.
d. Attitude of the population.
e. Distance to be covered.
f. Duration.
2. Routes and timing.
a. Only in exceptional circumstances should a patrol return by its outward route.
b. "Time in" as understood in normal military patrolling must be elastic, as speed
of movement is very difficult to estimate and the possibility of a contact makes
it necessary to allow extreme latitude in this matter.
3. Security. This is an essential factor to consider when planning a patrol, as the
introduction of patrols into an operation area without the loss of security is a major
problem. Every means of avoiding observation by civilians must be used; for
example, movement by night, the use of indirect routes and deception. Deception
could include the use of civilian vehicles, watercraft and trains.
4. Casualty evacuation. The problem of casualty evacuation when troops are committed
to thick bush in remote areas must always receive prior consideration by all
concerned.
5. To obtain the maximum benefit from any patrol it is essential that:
a. All patrols be sent out with a clearly defined mission. In a reconnaissance
patrol this should take the form of a question or series of questions posed to
the patrol commander. Fighting patrols will have tasks such as the search for
and destruction of a party of terrorists or the prevention of contact between
terrorists and civilians in a fixed area, e.g., in food control operations. The
mission must be clearly stated and understood by the patrol commander and
his men.
b. Adequate preparation and planning be made by the patrol commander. c. The
patrol is carefully and thoroughly briefed with all available information.
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6. I nformation. The following must always be studied and passed on to a patrol
commander before his patrol is sent out:
a. Topography. Full use should be made of maps, air photographs, air
reconnaissance and local knowledge. A patrol "going map" should be kept up
to date and information should be handed over to relief patrols and passed
back to superior headquarters at regular intervals. Whenever possible the patrol
commander should be given the opportunity of prior meetings with military
personnel having local knowledge of the patrol area.
b. Terrorists. Information may be available from a number of sources; for
example, captured/surrendered terrorists, air reconnaissance both visual and
photographic, captured documents, informers, etc. The past history of terrorist
activities in the area should also be studied.
c. Military forces. Boundaries and movements of all military forces in the area
should be considered. If applicable, patrols should be advised of defense-force
tasks and the whereabouts of minefields, booby traps and restricted area.
d. Population. Movement and habits of the population must be studied if
movement by troops is to remain secure. The relationship between the local
population and the terrorists should be established.
SECTION 3: FORMATIONS AND MOVEMENT
Patrol Formations
1. In operations so far, the patrol formation found to be most satisfactory is the four or
five group pattern with the command group centrally placed. However, formations
adopted by a patrol will vary and the patrol leader should constantly vary the
information to meet the requirements of the terrain and the tactical situation.
2. The patrol should consist of four or five groups:
a. The patrol commander and his command group are positioned where control
can best be maintained at all levels. The other groups are positioned to the
front, flanks and rear. Each of the groups should be given their areas of
responsibility for observation before the patrol moves out. In all cases the
group system provides for flank and reserve groups, with a command group
centrally situated.
b. Ideally each group should have a radio for control while either on the move or
to deploy tactically on a contact.
c. No distances between groups are laid down as this will depend on the terrain.
They should be sufficiently far apart to prevent an ambush of the entire patrol,
but sufficiently close to be able to support each other with fire in the event of a
contact.
d. With this grouping system the commander has the capability of maneuvering
part or parts of his patrol in the event of a contact, depending on the tactics
being employed by the terrorists.
e. Open or close formation are used depending entirely on the condition of the
bush and ground being covered. Distances between individuals will vary
according to visibility.
f. The group commanders must continually appreciate the ground and vary the
formation of their group to suit it. Similarly the patrol commander must
continuously appreciate the tactical position of the patrol. in relation to the
ground to be able to take considered immediate action in the event of a
FOOT PATROLS
contact. For example, there may even be occasions when the commander
prefers to keep two-thirds of his patrol strength in reserve.
g. The allocation of positions to patrol personnel within groups is not rigid. Each
commander has personal preferences, and factors of the various types of fire
support available are also flexible; circumstances, together with personal
preferences, override any attempt to dictate rigid drills. Leaders should
therefore rehearse their own maneuvering in the bush.
h. The size of the patrol dictates the number of men in each group. As the
strength increases, so the number of men in each group can be increased.
BASIC PATROL FORMATIONS
Movement of Patrols
1. Silence. This is essential at all times. Control is exercised by means of silent signals.
2. Tracks and track discipline.
a. Circumstances may dictate the use of tracks, but patrols must realize that by
doing so, they run the risk of being ambushed.
b. When moving on tracks, leaving footprints in soft or sandy patches should be
avoided.
c. Stick track discipline must be enforced.
3. Halts.
a. When halted, positions for all-around defense must be adopted.
b. The usual halt of ten minutes in the hour should be observed.
4. The success of any patrol depends on good observation. Men must be taught to
observe every movement, sign of tracks, broken foliage, smoke, noise, etc.
5. Troops must be trained to disregard the general pattern of the foliage and to look
through, instead of at, the vegetation.
6. Positions of patrol members.
a. Commanders. The patrol commander will normally be positioned to enable
him to control his patrol and to influence a battle by using his reserve, which
he should normally control himself. He must not become so involved in the
forward elements during contact that he cannot control the battle.
b. Guides.
i. The word "guide" as used here means somebody with an intimate
knowledge of an area or someone who can lead the military forces to a
known terrorist location. These may be surrendered or captured terrorists
or loyal Africans.
ii. The correct position for a guide is with the patrol commander. The patrol
commander will make decisions as to direction and tactics, using the
FOOT PATROLS
guide's advice as he wishes.
c. Trackers. The tracker team is so positioned that no trails will be obliterated by
members of the patrol, but also to allow proper link up with the follow-up
patrol.
7. Maintaining contact between groups.
a. Although the attention of the leading elements is to the front, responsibility for
maintaining contact between groups should be from front to rear and rear to
front.
b. If contact is lost, both portions of the patrol halt.
c. The rear portion of the patrol casts forward trying to following the trail of the
leading element.
8. Conclusion. Sound patrol formations are necessary in order that:
a. Control is exercised.
b. Movement is facilitated.
c. The patrol is ready for immediate action.
SECTION 4: METHODS OF PATROLLING
1. The troop commander, or force commander, while planning his patrol program, must
bear certain factors in mind which will help him in arriving at the best or most
effective method that he should use to effectively patrol his allotted area. The factors
that he should consider are:
a. The nature of the terrain.
b. The type of patrol, i.e., fighting or reconnaissance.
c. The type of operation.
d. The tactics or habits of the enemy, should they be known.
e. The presence and attitude of the local population. f. Standard of training and
combat efficiency of his own troops.
2. Having given careful consideration to the above-mentioned factors, the platoon or
force commander has the following methods of patrolling which he may use:
a. Fan method. In this case the patrols radiate outward from the patrol base or
center point on a specific bearing for a specific distance, all turn in the same
direction at right angles to the outward route and move for a specific distance,
then turn again at right angles in the direction of the point of origin and return
to the point of origin, i.e., patrols based on a specific bearing. This method is
very useful when searching for specific enemy signs or when conducting
search operations in very dense bush or forests. The diagram below illustrates
this method.
b. Baseline method. In this method, patrols operate from a baseline which could
be a path, track, river or feature. The patrols start from the baseline and all
move in the same direction on a compass bearing parallel to each other for a
specific distance and turn again at right angles in the direction of point of
origin and move back to the baseline on a compass bearing. This method is
FOOT PATROLS
useful when endeavoring to "cut" across possible enemy movement or tracks
or when searching fairly dense bush or forests. Distances between patrols will
be determined by the terrain. The diagram below illustrates this method.
c. Stream or river line method. In this method, the patrols follow the rivers or
streams in the area. On the outward journey, the patrol moves on one side of
the river/stream, and on the return journey, covers the other side of the
river/stream, thus ensuring that both sides have been covered. The enemy, just
like the military forces, requires water and this type of patrol should discover
where the enemy's water point is or where he probably crossed the river or
stream.
d. Area method. This is probably the more common method of patrolling that will
be used. In this case the patrol is given an area and boundaries and a
limitation, this being the furthest point to which it must patrol. It may also be
given certain points of interest which it must have a look at. Further, the patrol
commander is entirely responsible for planning very carefully and selecting a
route that will be the best for him to enable him to carry out his task. He must
plan to search all possible enemy hideouts, routes followed by the enemy,
possible water holes or springs in his area and at the same time plan to avoid
possible enemy ambush positions and difficult areas to traverse such as deep
ravines or cliffs. Although the patrol commander carefully plans his route prior
to commencing his patrolling, he need not rigidly adhere to his planned route.
He must be prepared to break away from his planned route should he see or
notice something that looks interesting or suspicious some distance away. The
secret of the success of this method of patrolling is making the best use of the
terrain, i.e., contours, spurs, ridges, rivers, etc., without unnecessarily tiring the
men, and yet covering the maximum amount of ground in the time laid down.
This is a far-ranging patrol and covers a greater distance and area than the
other methods.
SECTION 5: DRILL ON RETURN
1. Debriefing.
a. Whatever the time of day or night, the troop commander or briefing officer
must be available to debrief the patrol commander. The commander may
require the information urgently to plan the next operation. b. Debriefing must
be thorough and reports must be clear.
2. Drills for reception on return. A sound drill must be followed for the reception of
patrols on their return to base. Points to be considered are:
a. A hot meal and drink should be provided.
b. Weapons must be cleaned.
c. A bath, if possible.
d. Clean clothes, if possible.
e. Rest must be arranged.
f. Discussion should be held on mistakes made and lessons learned.
FOOT PATROLS
3. Additional requirements are left to the discretion of the commander.
SECTION 6: ENCOUNTER ACTIONS
General
1. Encounters with terrorists are sudden, short, and often so unexpected that the
opportunity to inflict casualties is lost. What is required is immediate, positive and
offensive action.
2. For this reason it is essential for simple encounter actions to be taught and
thoroughly practiced. It is impractical to attempt to cover every contingency by
committing to paper numerous "drills," because not only would they tend to cramp
initiative but they would not be read or digested or remembered in the stress of
action. It is, however, important to teach an action to cope with any situation
commonly met. The principles underlying the action must be simplicity, aggression,
s peed and flexibility.
3. Before a patrol leaves its base, the commander in his briefing should include
directions for encounter action. This is necessary each time because patrols vary in
strength and Organization according to the nature of their tasks. In addition, the
mention of the encounter actions applicable to the operation will act as a reminder to
the troops taking part and so help them to avoid being surprised.
4. A high standard of weapons training, marksmanship and a thorough understanding
and instinctive awareness of weapon capabilities and limitations will ensure that
encounter actions are successfully executed.
The Encounter Actions
1. It is important to note that although encounter actions are usually taught on a section
basis, they can be adopted for use by a platoon. These actions are applicable to the
varied forms of terrain and in all cases normal infantry minor tactics or section and
platoon battle drills usually apply after the initial contact. These encounter actions
are a sound framework on which leaders at all levels should build as their experience
dictates. it should be remembered, however, that no action, drill or order will achieve
success unless the leader and men have practiced them to a stage of instinctive
action, reflex and immediate reaction to firm and confident initiative on the part of
the leader.
2. If a patrol is accompanied by persons who have little or no knowledge of encounter
actions, e.g., guides, informers, surrendered terrorists, etc., the patrol leader should
keep them strictly under control and in his view. These persons should be briefed as
thoroughly as possible before the patrol starts. It may prove as well to rehearse
encounter actions for these persons or even for inexperienced troops before a patrol
moves out on operations.
3. Encounters with enemy could fall under one of the following headings:
a. Situation A. The initiative is with the military forces (terrorists seen first).
Reaction: Immediate ambush.
b. Situation B. The initiative is split between the military forces and the enemy
(simultaneous sighting). Reaction: Immediate offensive action.
c. Situation C. The initiative is with the terrorist (military forces are fired on with
small arms or are ambushed). Reaction: Immediate offensive action to an
enemy ambush.
4. Action for Situation A.
a. This will be used for situations when terrorists are seen first by the military
forces.
b. Explanation of action.
i. Leading elements give silent signals.
ii. Depending on the cover and distance, military forces make any
FOOT PATROLS
reasonably silent attempt to go to ground in the best possible fire
position. Minimum movement and silence may prove vital. Fire will be
opened only on the orders of the patrol commander or in the event of the
position being detected by the enemy.
iii. The commander now makes a quick assessment and issues silent
signals/orders accordingly. His aim must be to eliminate as many
terrorists as possible using the closest range and the best selected killing
ground.
Note: The above actions are in effect a minor ambush. At troop level it is not
normally possible to deploy into a particular area. At section level it may be
possible to move everyone into specific positions if movement is acceptable and
the terrorists are approaching along a definite route, i.e., a track, river bed or
game trail.
5. Action for Situation B.
a. a. Immediate offensive action may be taken when military forces:
i. Encounter sentries outside a terrorist base perimeter;
ii. Encounter part of the terrorist base perimeter;
iii. Encounter a moving terrorist group;
iv. Encounter a visible static terrorist group (in a base, at a resting place,
drawing water).
b. Explanation of the action.
i. Elements in contact or in close proximity put down a heavy volume of
controlled fire with the aim of winning the firefight and eliminating
terrorists. It may be possible for these elements to execute immediate
skirmishing. The maximum use of grenades and light mortars should be
made.
ii. Patrol commander makes a quick appreciation and plan and issues
orders for the required action.
iii. If an assault is to take place, the route taken for deployment and assault
depends on the ground. Consideration must be given to the deployment
of cut-off groups, possibly using the patrol reserve. The assault plan
must include covering fire.
iv. Throughout the preliminary stages of this action, the patrol commander
must ensure that the firefight is won and the cut-off groups are moved
into positions if at all possible.
v. Normal reorganization should take p the assault i.e., face after all-around
defense, clearance/security patrols, thorough search of the area, reporting
the contact. But, if at all possible, contact with the enemy should be
maintained with immediate follow-up action.
FOOT PATROLS
6. Action for Situation C.
a. This action may be used when military forces are ambushed and in situations
where part of the military force patrol is pinned down.
Note: In the case of most situations detailed below, the military forces will not
be able to confirm, until much later in the resulting action, the strength of the
enemy.
b. Explanation of the action.
i. Elements under fire or in close proximity go to ground and put down a
heavy volume of controlled fire with the aim of winning the fire-fight
and eliminating terrorists. It may be possible for these elements to
execute immediate skirmishing. The maximum use of grenades and light
mortars should be made.
ii. Patrol commander makes a quick appreciation and plan and issues
orders for the required action.
iii. If an assault is to take place, the route taken for deployment and assault
depends on the ground. Consideration must be given to the deployment
of cut-off groups, possibly using the patrol reserve. The assault plan
must include covering fire.
iv. Throughout the preliminary stages of this action, the patrol commander
must ensure that the firefight is won and the cut-off groups are moved
into positions if at all possible.
v. Normal reorganization should take place after the assault, i.e., all-around
defense, clearance/security patrols, thorough search of the area, reporting
the contact. However, contact with the enemy should be maintained with
immediate follow-up action.
c. However, where the whole patrol is pinned down, the group will have to
extricate itself by maximum fire and maneuvering. Only then can subsequent
action be taken as a result of an appreciation and plan, which may be either
offensive action, or a withdrawal, depending on the casualties sustained and
the strength of the enemy.
7. When a battle is at close range, the side that opens fire and applies the heavier and
more accurate weight of fire will win. Skirmishing movement will consolidate the
firefight. The encounter actions, therefore, are normally "Go to ground, win the
firefight.
8. Subsequent action is based on the commander's initiative.
9. To some extent, the application of the actions explained above is affected by a patrol
formation. If the formation has a leading element of approximately one-third of the
local strength and the patrol commander moves into a position from which he can
command and control any battle, the normal principles of fire and maneuver can be
FOOT PATROLS
successfully applied. In all cases, the basic principles of a platoon in battle must be
applied by the commander to the circumstances of the situation.
10. It is most important to emphasize that there are three main actions that take place:
a. Go to ground.
b. Win the firefight.
c. Concurrent with a. and b. above, the commander must quickly assess the
situation and give appropriate orders. Whenever possible, the patrol
Commander is to keep his superior headquarters fully informed about the
contact, i.e., what has happened, where it is, what the terrorists are doing and
what the military forces are intending to do.
Reorganization
1. After an encounter action, reorganization should be carried out as in normal battle
drills. However, in ATOPS some actions are needed in addition to normal
reorganization procedures. The following sequence of action should be adopted for
the reorganization phase after encounter actions:
a. Take up all-around defense.
b. Attend to own casualties.
c. Sweep and search the immediate area for terrorist casualties.
d. Secure live terrorists and ensure no terrorists are feigning death.
e. Submit immediate radio report on the contact.
f. Trackers should carry out a 360-degree security patrol about 200-300 meters
from the scene of contact to establish three requirements:
i. Secure the area from counter-attack and establish sentries.
ii. Find out what direction was taken by fleeing terrorists.
iii. Select a landing zone for helicopter requirements.
g. Organize the follow-up, if required.
h. Organize a sweep of the target area to look for hiding terrorists, arms,
documents,-caches, caves, etc.
i. Consolidate all actions taken and plan an ambush of area after a full
appreciation.
j. Report by radio all action being taken. k. During f. (above) it may be possible
to:
i. Submit the initial contact report to cover the rough outline of the contact
and situation.
ii. Call in specialists, e.g., interrogators/interpreters.
iii. Evacuate casualties and resupply ammunition.
iv. Interrogate captured terrorists and compare numbers of bodies, packs,
sleeping places, if any, to estimate terrorists' strength.
SECTION 7: PATROL BASES
General
1. It is seldom that a rural patrol can be finished in one day. Basing up, by day or night,
is therefore a part of most patrols. Provided there is a drill for establishing and
breaking a base, there should be no waste of time or confusion.
2. The bases may be patrol, troop or company bases, and the general principles to be
followed are the same. Irrespective of size, a base is a secret camp from which
patrols operate. It may be in existence for one night or for months, depending on the
size and tasks of the forces occupying it. It is difficult to keep the presence of a base
secret for any length of time due to the normal base noises such as radios and
vehicles. It must, however, be secure against attack at all times.
Siting a Base
FOOT PATROLS
1. Well-trained and hardened troops can make a base practically anywhere, but
obviously some places are better than others. The following are the main factors
involved in siting a base:
a. Position.
b. Security.
c. Radio communications.
d. Resupply.
e. Hard standing.
f. Availability of water.
g. Avoidance of game tracks.
2. Position. The base must be so sited that the operational task may be carried out. No
difficulty should be experienced by a patrol in leaving or returning to base in order
to accomplish its aim.
3. Security.
a. Deception. This should always be planned. Some suggestions are as follows:
i. The hours of darkness should, when possible, be used to cover the
approach march.
ii. It may sometimes be necessary to detain local inhabitants who have
blundered into patrols during the approach march.
iii. During the approach march, centers of population should be avoided.
iv. False airdrops can be made to give the impression that troops are present
in an area where in fact there are none.
v. Do not use the obvious place for a base.
vi. No more than one track should lead into a base. A suggested manner in
which to lay a deceptive track is to allow it to pass the base at an angle.
This would allow the occupants of a base to hear persons approaching
and so act as a warning.
b. Silence. The base must be established silently, and the use of machetes,
entrenchment tools, etc., must be kept to a minimum. On occasions, in thick
bush, it may be necessary to clear a perimeter path or internal paths to permit
quick and silent movement within the base.
c. Fires. The use of cookers should be limited as they can be smelled for some
considerable distance. Fires should be smokeless, and it is desirable that they
be extinguished before last light.
d. Dress and equipment. Members of a patrol base should not be allowed to
leave items of dress and equipment lying around, nor should they be allowed
to lounge around in a state of undress. A white towel or t-shirt, or even the
whiteness of a person's body can be seen from a considerable distance and
prejudice the security of the base. All items of clothing and equipment should
be colored jungle green, khaki or black. White articles must be covered or
splashed with mud.
e. Stand-to. It is essential in operations against terrorists for all men to be alert
when initially basing up and just before first and last light. During these
periods, the commander satisfies himself that all precautions have been taken
to ensure the security of the base. (See paragraph h. below.) Additional reasons
for this stand-to procedure are:
i. It enables every man to check that he knows exactly the disposition of
his neighbors to the flanks, front and rear. This is the best safeguard
against confusion should the base be attacked.
ii. It ensures that every man rises in the morning, retires for the night and
goes on sentry duty properly equipped and with all items of arms,
ammunition and equipment ready at hand.
iii. Evening stand-to may be conveniently used by the commander to check
arms, equipment and stores.
iv. Sub-unit commanders detail day and night sentries and can check at
stand-to that every man knows his tour of duty and his orders.
v. Commanders can check that each man knows what to do in case of
FOOT PATROLS
alarm, and knows what troops, if any, are outside the patrol base and
their expected time of return.
vi. Commanders are able to ensure the strict observance of medical
precautions, and to inspect men and weapons.
f. Sentries by day.
i. Sentries must be posted, particularly to observe tracks leading past or
into the base.
ii. Their positioning should be such that a timely warning may be given to
the base on the approach of any person(s).
iii. Sentries should also be posted near latrines and water points when in
use.
g. Sentries by night.
i. Double sentries should always be posted if the patrol has sufficient men.
ii. Sentries must have some means of waking their commander silently.
iii. Timings for sentry duty for double sentries should overlap, e.g., one man
on from 0100 to 0300 hours and his colleague on from 0200 to 0400
hours. If there are only single sentry arrangements, the sentry coming on
duty should arrive 30 minutes early to adjust to night vision and get
accustomed to salient features in the vicinity of the base.
h. Patrols.
i. Security patrols. A security patrol must be sent out to ensure that the
area surrounding the selected site for a base camp is clear of terrorists.
This patrol should go out each day at first light and last light. Stand-to
should be maintained until the patrol returns to report the area clear or
otherwise. This patrol is vital to avoid any chance of surprise attack by
terrorists, and could pick up spoor laid during the night.
ii. Normal patrols. Patrolling must be carefully controlled by the
commander so that tracks in the area of the base are kept to a minimum.
i. Carrying of weapons. Every man must be armed at all times. The reason is
obvious, but only strict discipline will ensure that this rule is observed.
j. Alarm scheme.
i. When firing starts, or the alarm signal is given, every man moves
silently to his stand-to position. There must be no further movement in
the base until stand-down is given. This system ensures that anyone
moving during the period of the alarm must be a terrorist and can be
dealt with accordingly. It is essential that the alarm scheme be practiced
by day and by night.
ii. There should be no firing at night until the terrorists are a certain target.
iii. Shell scrapes should be dug whenever possible and should serve the dual
purpose of being the alarm position and sleeping position.
k. Leaving a base. When leaving a base, every effort must be made to obliterate
any signs of occupation and in particular any tell-tale marks of the time of
occupation. Any shelters should be destroyed before the base is vacated.
4. Radio communications. A base must have good facilities for radio communication.
Although it would be preferable for good communications to site a base on high
ground, this will not always be possible from a tactical point of view, and therefore
the commander of a base must compromise in the selection of his base site.
5. Resupply. When operating in remote areas, the only method of resupply may be air.
Air supply, with the incumbent selection of a dropping zone, must not be allowed to
affect the tactical siting of the base. The proximity of the dropping zone to a base is
prejudicial to the security of a base. Therefore, a long carry is preferable to forfeiting
security. An alternative is to vacate the base and move on after taking an airdrop.
6. Hard standing. The base must allow men to sleep in comfort. Do not select an area
which is wet underfoot and do not expect to sleep comfortably on steep slopes. Flat
and dry ground that drains quickly is the best.
7. Availability of water. The base should be sited near water. Excessive movement
from the base to the water-point may well prejudice the security of the base unless
FOOT PATROLS
there is an extremely well-covered route. The decision as to whether to site the base
close to water or some distance away will be influenced by the local situation.
Terrorists, for example, frequently site their bases some distance away from water in
order to obtain maximum security.
8. Avoiding game tracks. As these tracks are not only used by game, but may well be
utilized by terrorists, a base should not be sited across or in the vicinity of such
tracks. Should game use such a track and scent humans, they are likely to leave the
track and create a new track, so giving an indication to the terrorists that humans are
in the vicinity.
Sequence of Establishing a Base
1. A suggested sequence for the establishment of a base is as follows:
a. The patrol commander and escort will move to the area where he considers he
will site his base.
b. When he has selected his site, he calls forward the remainder of the patrol. The
patrol, in coming forward, is to exercise caution in using the track and route
used by the patrol commander.
c. When the patrol arrives, the patrol commander indicates on the ground 12
o'clock and 6 o'clock positions for the base and details positions for each
group.
d. Groups, under their commanders, move into their indicated positions according
to the clock system, and make contact with the groups on their left and right.
e. At the same time the patrol commander orders stand-to and sends out local
security patrols to ensure that the area within hearing distance is clear of stray
local population and terrorists. These patrols should circle the base about 400
meters out searching for spoor and listening for foreign sounds.
f. While the local security patrols are searching the area, the patrol commander
quickly goes around making adjustments to group positions to ensure all-
around defense is established and the men are alert.
g. The patrol is to remain at stand-to until the local security patrols return.
h. On return of the local security patrols, and before stand-down, the patrol
commander holds an order group and orders are issued. The following points
may be covered:
i. Sentries, passwords, stand-to, stand-down and alarm scheme.
ii. Base security and search patrols.
iii. Routing for next day.
iv. Maintenance of weapons.
v. Water.
vi. Cooking, fires and smoking.
vii. Latrines.
i. No matter how tired the men may he or what the situation, the sequence
suggested above should be followed as near as possible. Appropriate security
arrangements listed in this section should also be taken for semi-permanent
base camps.
j. Should a temporary base be occupied in daylight, it may be desirable to p first
secure the area by means of patrols to minimize the chance of enemy
interference during occupation.
Administration of a Base
1. If base administration is not of a high standard, patrolling from the base will
deteriorate, because living in it will be unpleasant and tiring. Some of the points
which require attention are:
a. Latrines. These are normally outside the base and will be protected by the
sentry layout.
b. Disposal of refuse. Refuse must be disposed of in such a manner that
FOOT PATROLS
scavengers (e.g., baboons, jackals, hyenas, etc.) will not dig it up. it is
suggested that a likely method of disposal is to dig the latrine pits deep enough
to accommodate excreta and refuse. This will usually deter wild animals and
scavengers from digging up the pits.
c. Tins. All tins should be punctured before burial so as to render them useless.
d. Water purification. The patrol commander is responsible for ensuring that all
water is sterilized before use.
e. Cooking. Arrangements for cooking will depend on the situation and the
instructions of the patrol commander. Experience has shown that cooking in
pairs has many advantages. However, this is not the only method and
depending on the situation it may even be necessary to cook away from the
base and then bring the food to the base for consumption. Alternatively, the
situation may permit centralized cooking in the base.
f. Duties. Under normal conditions, when a patrol of platoon strength is
committed for a long period, it has been found that two section patrols
deployed and one in base is the most efficient method of rotating duties. The
sections rotate on a daily basis with the one in base responsible for the security
of the base and fatigues.
Conclusion
1. A patrol commander must appreciate not only the importance of establishing a base,
but also of establishing an efficient one, whether it be a framework deployment base
or a semi-permanent base. An efficient base is one in which:
a. The security arrangements are sound and known to all.
b. Duties are evenly distributed and rest is organized.
c. Strict hygiene rules and water discipline are laid down and observed.
d. A high all-around standard of discipline and routine is maintained.
SECTION 8: POACHING PROCEDURE IN
FRIENDLY FORCES AREA
General
1. During operations, there will be occasions when a patrol following up a terrorist
party, e.g., after a contact or by tracking, reaches the limit of its boundary and
wishes to continue the follow-up in another unit's or sub-unit's area.
2. 61. To avoid delay in the follow-up, quick clearance for a patrol to operate in another
unit's area is necessary.
Principles
1. When clearance is required, the following principles will be observed as far as
possible:
a. Within a battalion. Should a company request clearance to operate in the area
of another' company of the same battalion, authority to do so may be given by
battalion headquarters. Battalion headquarters must inform the second
company of the extent of the clearance, and that company must in turn inform
the platoon(s) involved.
b. I nter-battalion. When a battalion wishes to operate in another battalion's area,
prior clearance from the second battalion must be obtained, either direct or
through formation headquarters. If clearance is obtained direct, the formation
headquarters must be advised as soon as possible.
c. I nter-formation. Under no circumstances will a patrol cross into the area of
another formation without the authority of that formation. Clearance in these
FOOT PATROLS
cases will be obtained at formation level.
d. Boundaries. Whenever clearance is granted, the cleared area will be bounded
by easily recognizable natural features. Grid lines will not be used to define a
cleared area.
Emergency Poaching
1. In an emergency, when communications are impossible, a patrol commander must
decide whether the target is worth the risk of a clash with the military's own forces.
Should he decide to cross, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that:
a. Any terrorists seen are positively identified as such before fire is opened.
b. He is confident that he can identify himself to any friendly forces encountered
before fire is opened by them.
2. When entry into another unit or sub-unit's area has been made, full particulars of the
reason for and extent of the entry will be given to the appropriate headquarters as
soon as possible.
SECTION 9: PATROL ORDERS AIDE MEMOIRE
1. Situation
2. Terrain.
a. Any information about ground.
b. Use of maps, air photos, visual reconnaissance and patrol "going" maps.
3. Enemy.
a. Strength.
b. Weapons and dress.
c. Known or likely locations, activities, habits and background.
d. Threat and capabilities.
4. Population.
a. Attitude towards own troops and enemy.
b. Relationship with the enemy.
c. Daily routine.
d. Traditional authorities.
5. Own forces.
a. Activities of other patrols.
b. Air and artillery tasks, if any.
c. Fire support available.
6. Mission. The mission must be specific and clearly defined. It takes the following
forms:
a. Reconnaissance patrol -- question.
b. Fighting patrol -- definite aim.
7. Execution
a. Strength and composition of patrol.
b. Individual tasks.
c. Time of leaving and anticipated time of return.
d. Routes out and in. If helicopters are to be used, location of landing points.
e. Specific area of interest.
f. Boundaries.
g. Probable bounds and rendezvous.
h. Formations.
i. Fire discipline.
j. Deception and cover plan.
k. Authority to enter another unit's or sub-unit's area of responsibility.
l. Action to be taken on meeting terrorists.
m. Action to be taken on meeting local population.
n. Action if ambushed.
FOOT PATROLS
o. Action if lost.
p. Do not:
i. Move in file in open country.
ii. Move through defiles.
iii. Return by the same route as that used for outward move.
iv. Relax because you are nearing base.
8. Security measures during halts.
9. Administration and Logistics
a. Rations and water.
i. Type and number of days to be carried.
ii. Cooking and eating arrangements.
iii. Water discipline and quantity.
b. Equipment and dress.
i. Change of clothing, if required.
ii. Large or small pack.
iii. Important items such as maps, compasses, binoculars and air photos.
iv. Footwear.
v. Poncho capes.
vi. Torches, etc.
10. Weapons.
a. Type.
b. Proportion and distribution.
11. Ammunition.
a. Type and distribution.
b. Signal cartridges.
c. Explosives and booby traps.
d. Illuminating aids.
12. Medical.
a. a. Medical arrangements.
i. First field dressing and first-aid kits.
ii. Medical orderly and haversack.
iii. Water-sterilizing tablets.
iv. Salt tablets. Han,
v. Anti-malaria prophylactics.
vi. Snakebite outfits. 102
vii. Insect repellent.
viii. Foot power.
ix. Use of medicines.
b. Casualty evacuation arrangements.
i. Friendly forces -- wounded/killed.
ii. Enemy -- wounded/killed.
13. Special equipment.
a. Camera.
b. Fingerprint outfits.
c. Electronic direction-finding equipment.
d. etc
14. Inspect all equipment and men (avoid rattles and coughs).
15. Prisoners. Handling of enemy captives.
16. Resupply.
a. Preplanned.
b. Emergency.
17. Command and Signals
a. General instructions.
i. Radio net and frequencies (including air).
ii. Schedules.
iii. Special instructions.
b. Codes.
FOOT PATROLS
i. Net identification signs.
ii. Codes.
iii. Passwords.
iv. Authentication tables.
c. Check and test sets.
i. Antennae.
ii. CW keys.
iii. Spare batteries.
d. Ground/air communications.

i. DZ panels and DZ letter
ii. Ground/air signal code.
iii. Steel mirrors/ lamps.
18. Location of commander and second in command.
19. Final check. Check thoroughly that all points have been understood by patrol
members.
20. Hand Signals
These signals are in addition to the normal conventional signals, that is, advance,
halt, close in, turn around, run, etc.:
a. Enemy seen or suspected. Thumb pointed towards the ground from a clenched
fist.
b. No enemy in sight (or All clear). Thumb pointed upwards from a clenched fist.
c. Light machine-gun group. Clenched fist.
d. Rifle group. Two fingers pointed upwards.
e. Section commander. Two fingers held against arm.
f. Platoon commander. Two fingers held on shoulder.
g. You. Point at man concerned.
h. Me. Indicate at own chest.
i. Give covering fire. Weapon brought into the aim, indicating direction. Be
prepared to give covering fire, if necessary.
j. Track junction. Arms crossed.
k. House, hut or building. Hand formed into an inverted "V' indicating the shape
of roof.
l. Reconnaissance. Hands held up to the eyes as if using binoculars.
m. Attack. Clenched fist swung vigorously over shoulder and point to direction
attack is required.
n. Immediate ambush. Open hand placed over the face followed by pointing to
the ambush position.
o. Reconnaissance group. Clenched fist with forefinger upright.
p. Water (river, stream, etc.). Give the sign for waves with the hand.
SECTION 10: PATROL DEBRIEFING PRO-FORMA
1. General.
a. Area.
b. Aim.
c. Strength and composition.
d. Duration (with times and dates).
e. Routes followed.
2. Terrain.
a. Was the information accurate? if not, what inaccuracies were discovered?
b. Was the map accurate? If not, what were the inaccuracies?
c. If air photos were used, were they helpful?
FOOT PATROLS
d. What was the condition of the tracks followed?
e. Did the tracks show signs of recent use?
f. Where rivers were crossed, or followed, were there:
i. Any bridges (including type)?
ii. Fords?
iii. Any recent tracks near crossing places?
g. Crops and cultivation -- old and new?
3. Population. If any local inhabitants were contacted outside their normal areas:
a. What was their physical condition?
b. Were they friendly?
c. Why were they in that area?
d. Tribal affiliation?
e. What information did they provide?
f. Influence of political groups?
g. Influence of chiefs/village headmen?
h. Influence of spirit mediums?
4. Hides or camps found.
a. Grid reference?
b. Was it occupied? If so, by how many? If not, how long evacuated?
c. Number of huts/shelters and estimated number of occupants?
d. Installations of a temporary or permanent nature?
e. Any sentry posts? If so, how were they sited?
f. Any warning signals or booby traps?
g. Details of entry and exit tracks.
h. Any food dumps in or near the camp?
i. Any arms or ammunition found? If so, what condition and quantity?
j. Were there any radio or press facilities?
k. Any documents found? If so,
i. Where were they found?
ii. Has the place of finding been indicated on each document?
iii. Where are they now?
l. Any indication of direction taken by terrorists when leaving the camp?
5. Contacts.
a. Where was contact made?
b. How many were there and of what race?
c. How were they dressed? If in uniform, give details.
d. Details and condition of arms.
e. Estimate of quantity of ammunition.
f. Indication of condition of ammunition. e g. Indication which could lead to the
identification of the leader.
g.
h. How were the orders given and how was liaison maintained?
i. What formation did they adopt in:
i. Attack?
ii. Defense?
j. Snipers?
k. Any automatic weapons or weapons manned by a team?
l. Did they appear healthy?
m. What was their morale like?
n. Was language spoken identified?
o. Did they use any system of signals (including radio)?
p. Any casualties:
i. Own troops?
ii. Enemy?
q. Any captured enemy?
r. Any surrendered enemy?
s. Have the enemy dead been identified? If not:
FOOT PATROLS
i. Were photographs taken?
ii. Were there any recognizable identification marks?
t. When engagement was broken off:
i. In which direction did the enemy disappear?
ii. Did they use known tracks?
iii. Where were you when the enemy's tracks could no longer be followed?
6. Comments.

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SELECTION AND

General Elements
SECTION 1: THE ENEMY
1. General. The insurgent threat to southern Africa is a real and complex one, aimed at
removing the white man's influence on the sub-continent at all costs. Insurgents are
trained, indoctrinated and equipped mainly by communist countries. This manual is
only concerned with one aspect of this threat, namely the rural terrorists.
2. Characteristics. The enemy is usually careless of death. He has no mental doubts, is
little troubled by humanitarian sentiments, and is not moved by slaughter and
mutilation., His upbringing and standard of living make him well fitted to hardships.
He requires little sustenance and comfort, and can look after himself. His standard of
bushcraft is usually of a high order and he has a keen practiced eye for the country
and the ability to move across it at speed on foot. He is usually physically fit, being
able to cover long distances rapidly carrying a heavy load. He is capable of being
trained to use modern and complicated weapons to good effect. He is taught to read a
map, use radios and voice procedure and effectively employ simple but deadly booby
traps.
3. Tactics. Enemy tactics are based on the following:
i. Flexible, imaginative and unorthodox operations, relying above all on surprise.
ii. Offensive action, even when temporarily on the defensive.
iii. A high degree of foot mobility.
iv. The ability to exploit the advantages of night operations.
v. Detailed preparations before any attack; local superior strength and favorable
conditions being a prerequisite.
vi. Frequent use of all types of ambush.
vii. Extensive use of booby traps. improvised mines, obstacles and field works
using locally available material.
viii. Evading decisive engagements.
4. Arms. The terrorists are normally well armed with modern automatic or
semiautomatic rifles, submachine guns and machine guns. Hand grenades are in
abundance. More sophisticated arms are in use on an ever increasing scale, e.g.,
grenade launchers, mortars, guns and even anti-aircraft machine guns. The use of
mines is a favorite terrorist tactic. Most arms originate from communist countries,
but the terrorists are also trained to use the military forces I own weapons against
them, be they stolen or captured in combat. When forced to, he can revert to
primitive weapons such as muzzle loaders, spears and bows and arrows.
5. Equipment. The terrorists are well equipped with modern items such as radio sets,
plastic explosives, map reading aids, first-aid kits and rations. However, when forced
to, his training allows him to fall back on primitive means in order to improvise and
survive.
6. Vulnerability of the terrorist. The most important factors are the need for the
support of the local population and external assistance. These should be exploited by
all concerned when countering the terrorist threat. if he is cut off from outside
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assistance, and finds no comfort or aid from the local population, his war will be
over. It is also important to remember that the terrorist is normally disciplined by
indoctrination to accept an ideology foreign to his own tribal background.
Furthermore, the group is normally held together more by strong leadership than by
common cause. Physical or psychological action aimed at these sources could easily
undermine his discipline, and break his morale.
SECTION 2: TERRAIN AND CLIMATE
1. Theatres of operation in southern Africa are characterized by terrain and climatic
conditions that adversely affect the deployment of modern armies.
2. Geographically, the terrain ranges from semi-desert to mountainous areas, and many
areas are thickly vegetated. This causes the following restrictions:
a. Mobility.
i. Vehicle movement is normally restricted to an underdeveloped road
network, paths and tracks.
ii. Rivers in flood hamper mobility.
b. Observation of the enemy and of support weapons fire is difficult, if not
impossible, and may require increased air effort.
c. Radio transmission and reception ranges are greatly reduced.
d. Navigation is difficult and calls for improvised methods.
e. Employment of arms is often restricted to infantry on foot.
f. Liaison and control are difficult.
3. Southern Africa is known for its extreme climatic conditions and this calls for:
a. A high degree of physical fitness and a period of acclimatization for all troops.
b. Proper medical cover against tropical diseases and a high standard of personal
hygiene.
c. Protective measures and proper maintenance of all weapons and equipment.
d. The rainy season reduces vehicle movement considerably, as roads and tracks
become impassable in places, thus placing greater emphasis on air support.
4. operational areas will cover vast areas and are normally remote from permanent base
facilities. This causes long lines of communications and complicates logistical.
support.
5. Because of the large areas to be covered, units and sub-units are normally far apart.
This calls for delegation of powers of command, and freedom of action to lower
levels, necessitating good communications and liaison at all levels.
6. Wildlife, insects and reptiles are in abundance and call for proper training and
precautionary measures.
SECTION 3: OTHER FACTORS
1. General. This section emphasizes those factors which have a special
application to successful anti-terrorist operations.
2. Cooperation. The military must never lose sight of the paramount importance
of close understanding and cooperation with civilian counterparts. This
principle must be followed at all levels of cooperation, e.g., army/air force,
military/police, etc.
3. Hearts and minds. Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are
won by the government and the military forces, the chance of success is
greatly reduced. If the, people support the government and the military forces,
the enemy becomes isolated and cut off from its supplies, shelter and
intelligence.
4. Intelligence. Successful ATOPS depend upon an efficient integrated
intelligence Organization, planned and controlled on a national or theatre of
operations basis. Good intelligence is the key to successful operations. Very
little of value will be achieved without timely and accurate intelligence, and
commanders will often have to plan special operations and take considerable
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risks to obtain valuable intelligence. Before undertaking military operations
against terrorists, the district in which they are operating should be thoroughly
studied and a dossier prepared by the police or civilian intelligence unit,
working in conjunction with the local civil authorities where necessary.
5. Security of bases. It is fundamental to the success of ATOPS that all bases are
secure, whether it be a major base, mobilization center, installation, airfield,
police post or patrol base. All members of the military forces, whatever their
tasks, must be trained to take an effective and active part in the defense and
protection of installations.
6. Planned pattern of operations. Operations must be planned on the basis of
systematically gaining and maintaining control of the country or area
concerned, by the establishment and constant expansion of controlled areas. By
establishing controlled or safe areas, enemy freedom of movement is curtailed
and a safe place is provided for the local indigenous people away from the
influence and intimidation of the enemy.
7. Seizing and holding the initiative. A clear-cut political policy and offensive
action by the military forces are essential for seizing and holding the initiative.
Every effort must be made to dominate any area in which the military forces
are operating.
8. Speed, mobility and flexibility. Military forces must be equipped, trained and
accustomed to operating for long periods under the same conditions as the
enemy, while full use must be made of air support to provide additional
mobility, reconnaissance, air strike capability and a flexible administrative
system.
9. Surprise and security. The strictest security in planning is essential if surprise
is to be achieved. Loss of surprise probably means an unsuccessful operation
and at least a temporary loss of initiative.
10. Ground forces. If success is to be achieved, it is essential that sufficient
infantry, together with armor and other supporting arms, are deployed on the
ground. The infantry must be highly trained, acclimatized and masters of
modern techniques. Air mobility, modern weapons, good communications and
fire support, as well as first class foot mobility are also essential.
11. Training. Success in ATOPS is only possible if troops are highly trained,
supremely fit and sufficiently tough, cunning and skillful to outfight the enemy
on his own ground. While full use must be made of technical superiority in
firepower, mobility and equipment, all troops must nevertheless be trained to
such a pitch that they are fully confident that man for man they are better
fighters than the enemy. The two most important training requirements are
supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot accurately at fleeting targets at
short and medium ranges.
12. Air support. Although air power in itself does not guarantee success in
ATOPS, the tactical concept relies primarily on it for strategic and tactical
movement, fire support and logistic support, with particular emphasis on the
use of helicopters and light aircraft in reconnaissance, armed and support roles.
13. offensive action. The tactical concept is essentially offensive from the
beginning. The commander must, however, bear in mind the protracted nature
of operations, the great boost to morale of success and the corresponding
danger of failure. He must avoid acting on too great a scale prematurely and he
must ensure that his initial offensive operations are within the capabilities of
the military forces he has available.
14. Conclusion. The outstanding lesson from recent revolutionary wars is that no
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single program --political, social, psychological, economic or military -will in
itself succeed. It is a combination of all these elements, together with a joint
government/police/military approach to the problem, which will counter the
efforts of the enemy, and restore lawful authority.

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Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence

SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. This chapter deals with the more important aspects of intelligence and counter-
intelligence during ATOPS.
Importance of Intelligence
1. During conventional operations the enemy is clearly defined and easily identifiable.
The nature of his Organization and equipment, together with the relative ease of
identification, facilitates the intelligence personnel's' task of predicting future enemy
actions. A major characteristic of ATOPS, however, is that the terrorist merges with
or may be part of a local population. Enemy action is likely to be characterized by
guerrilla tactics employing equipment requiring virtually no large-scale identifiable
preparation.
2. During ATOPS therefore, a more intensive intelligence effort is demanded in order to
provide commanders with the detailed and timely intelligence required. Intelligence
concerning the local population becomes a prime requirement. An efficient
intelligence system is essential to ensure that ATOPS are successful and there is no
waste of time, manpower or resources.
Importance of Counter-Intelligence
1. The value of effective counter-intelligence cannot be overemphasized. To offset his
inferiority in manpower, equipment and resources, the enemy relies on surprise to
achieve success. The degree of surprise he attains is in direct proportion to the
amount of intelligence he is able to collect. Unless the enemy's intelligence collection
is countered, he will be able to concentrate his limited means with impunity against
vulnerable areas and where reaction by forces will be weakest.
2. Effective counter-intelligence during ATOPS is again complicated by the enemy
infiltrating the local population. This can facilitate his collection efforts and
prejudice the counter-intelligence task. Sound cooperation between all affected
forces, services and civil authorities assumes even greater importance.
Responsibility Of Commanders
1. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the coordination and processing of
intelligence required for the planning and conduct of operations. This responsibility
embraces the following:
a. The collection of information.
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b. The collation of information.
c. The dissemination of intelligence to all levels.
d. Those counter-intelligence measures required to ensure military security within
a commander's sphere of responsibility.
2. Commanders must decide whether to react immediately upon
information/intelligence received, or whether to delay reaction until additional
information is obtained. Commanders must ensure that their actions do not
prematurely betray the information they have at their disposal, as untimely action
could compromise the success of future operations. Successful utilization of
intelligence requires experience and a thorough knowledge of the enemy in the area.
3. Coordination. The successful conduct of ATOPS dictates close cooperation and
interaction between security forces, civil authorities and the local population. It also
demands the coordination of the efforts of the various organizations and agencies
contributing to the overall intelligence effort in the area. Duplication of gaps in the
intelligence effort resulting from poor coordination could neutralize the effectiveness
of the whole intelligence effort. Military forces are unable to collect all the
information they require; on the other hand, they may acquire information which
does not directly concern them. This emphasizes the need for the centralization and
coordination of the entire intelligence effort.
SECTION 2: INTELLIGENCE
Nature of Information
1. In ATOPS the collection of information should concentrate on:
a. The internal enemy and, if possible, the external support.
b. Other important factors such as:
i. Population.
ii. Terrain.
iii. Climatic and meteorological conditions.
2. I nternal enemy. It is essential to know:
a. a. Military Characteristics.
i. 1. Organization and strength.
ii. 2. Means at his disposal.
iii. 3. Tactical doctrine and procedure.
iv. 4. Operational capabilities.
v. 5. Combat efficiency and morale.
vi. 6. Intelligence and liaison systems. The means used, e.g., couriers, post
office, etc.
vii. 7. Standard of training.
b. Leaders, their personalities, operational effectiveness, normal hideouts/bases,
relatives, friends and lovers.
c. Political, psychological and social objectives and activities; propaganda
methods and infiltration into various organizations.
d. Economic means and availability of food.
e. Physical condition and standard of health.
f. Professed or proclaimed ideology.
g. Secret organizations.
h. Bases which are, or could possibly be, used.
3. External support.
a. External aid its nature, importance and scope.
b. Training bases, their location and strength.
c. Procedures and routes used.
d. Contact and links with local population (personalities and method of
communication).
4. Population. A thorough knowledge of the population, with emphasis on the
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following points, is necessary:
a. Customs and dress.
b. Tribes, languages and dialects.
c. Religious, social and tribal organizations, including chiefs, advisers and
organizers.
d. Political tendencies.
e. Causes of discontent and antagonism. Hopes and desires, fears and
frustrations.
f. Existing relations with the authorities, and with the enemy.
g. Economic resources and limitations.
h. Standard of health.
5. Terrain. In order to neutralize any initial advantages the enemy may have resulting
from his "perfect identification with the terrain," it is vital to obtain, as soon as
possible, a thorough knowledge of the terrain. Points which should receive
consideration are:
a. Areas most likely to be used as bases which would usually have the following
characteristics:
i. Difficult access.
ii. Cover from aerial reconnaissance.
iii. Locations favoring defense and offering covered withdrawal routes.
iv. Availability of water.
b. Most likely enemy target areas, e.g.. installations.
c. Roads, tracks and paths, including those leading out of the area with special
reference to areas bordering on hostile countries.
d. Location and capabilities of bridges, ferries and obligatory crossing points.
e. Areas where troop movement will be difficult.
f. Location of villages, farms and other settlements.
g. Crops, their cycles and the possibility of being advantageously used by the
enemy or by government forces.
h. Possible sources of water. Suitable locations for military bases.
6. Climatic and environmental conditions. It is of importance to gather data concerning
conditions which may restrict the mobility of troops or which may enable the enemy
to carry out surprise actions. Information should therefore be collected on the
following:
a. Rainfall and its possible consequences.
b. Temperature variations.
c. Occurrence of fog -- normal times and locations.
d. Occurrence of thunderstorms, high winds, etc.
e. Infected and unhealthy areas, e.g., tsetse, bilharzia, etc.
Sources of Information
1. There are numerous sources of information. Some of the more significant are:
a. Population. The enemy will often live among the population, and thus these
people (provided their confidence and trust is won through adequate and
efficient protection) will be one of the best sources of information.
b. Discontented elements. Civil servants, former chiefs or tribesmen who, for
political or personal reasons, appear to be discontented or disillusioned with
the subversive movement.
c. Captured personnel, documents and material. These form vital sources of
information. It is therefore essential that the circumstances of the capture
should be recorded. Details of the record should include when, where, how,
and by whom interrogated, as well as the gist of initial or combat
interrogation. These sources of information should be handled as follows:
i. Captured personnel. Personnel who surrender, or who are captured, are
one of the most important sources of information in ATOPS, not only
because of the knowledge they have, but also because of the documents
or material they may have in their possession. It is important that
prisoners be retained for the shortest possible time by the capturing unit
before being sent back to undergo more detailed interrogation. Care
should be taken that captured terrorists are not given an opportunity to
communicate with each other.
ii. Captured documents. These will not normally provide information for
immediate exploitation by the troops who capture them. They may,
however, be of great value to higher headquarters. Therefore, after a
brief perusal they should be sent, as quickly as possible, to the next
higher headquarters.
iii. Captured material. Is generally of tactical and technical value, either of
immediate or future interest. It is important to verify origin and
manufacture.
d. Maps and aerial photography. These are useful for obtaining knowledge of the
terrain. Air photographs taken at periodic intervals are particularly useful for
the detection of new tracks and changes in cultivation or settlements.
e. Radio transmissions. These constitute another source of information of
considerable value. Sophisticated equipment and well-trained specialists are
necessary to exploit this source. in addition, radio intercepts from hostile
neighboring countries may well provide information regarding terrorist
activity.
f. Local authorities. These may be a valuable source of information by virtue of
their detailed and intimate knowledge of an area.
Collecting Agencies
1. The collection and exploitation of information should be centralized at the level at
which the ATOPS are planned and directed. Commanders at all levels must
vigorously pursue an active policy of collecting information. Information will not be
exclusively obtained by the military forces and should be acquired from all available
collecting agencies. Some of these are:
a. Reconnaissance patrols.
b. Special agents.
c. Local authorities.
d. Observation posts (OP's).
2. Reconnaissance patrols. Reconnaissance is an excellent way of gaining information.
The entire area of interest should be covered by means of land and air patrols.
Special emphasis should be given to roads, tracks, possible areas for base camps, and
supply/arms caches. Patrolling must be undertaken by day and by night and should
be intensified not reduced, during periods of bad weather (rain, fog, etc.). All patrols
should be in radio contact with the local population to gain information.
3. Special agents. The employment and control of special agents is normally a police
function. The use of agents by military forces should be in full and constant
cooperation and coordination with the police. Agents are infiltrated into or obtained
from the enemy or from the population. Information gained from agents should be
carefully compared with that received from other source. It is extremely important
that the activities of specialized agencies be supplemented by units operating in the
field, who would be trained to regard the collection and prompt reporting of
information as one of their prime duties.
4. Local authorities. The knowledge which they possess of the terrain and population
should be fully exploited. In addition they could be tasked with gaining specific
information.
5. Observation posts (OP's).
a. One method of operating clandestinely which has evolved from operations has
been the use of observation posts. During the dry season, when the operational
area is almost entirely burnt out, the use of OP's is difficult due to the lack of
cover. During this period the use of OP's is reduced while the searching of
kraals and isolated thick areas is increased. To do this effectively, African
soldiers should be used to supplement European units wherever possible. This
overcomes the communication problem when searching villages, questioning
locals, and when doing listening patrols at night. Apart from this, the African
soldier understands the local inhabitants better and is therefore more likely to
pick up any unusual or suspicious actions.
b. Because of the extensive use of OP's by military forces (14F), all locals and
terrorists soon become aware of MF using high ground for OP's. Every effort
should therefore be made to remain clandestine and effective. To achieve this:
i. Choose unlikely op Positions (i.e.-, thick cover instead of high ground).
ii. When occupying OP's, walk in by night.
iii. Do not debus within 5,000 meters of OP positions to be occupied.
iv. Take precautions to ensure no tracks are left, i.e., use civilian footwear,
wear socks over footwear, don't move over cultivated land or on well-
used paths.
v. Do not stay in one OP for too long.
vi. Use small, lightly equipped groups. Only two men should occupy the OP
while the remainder of the stick is concealed nearby.
vii. Restrict movement on OP's to a bare minimum.
viii. Observe something specific, e.g., suspect kraal.
ix. Where necessary, use two-man OP's in immediate proximity to kraals.
x. Use night-viewing equipment where possible.
xi. All listening OP's should have an African element, where possible.
6. Maximum advantage must be taken of a unit's detailed knowledge of an area. To
achieve this it will be necessary for a unit to maintain detailed records of all
information it has gained concerning its area. This will ensure continuity and will
provide a valuable source of information when units are rotated.
Conclusion
1. One of the greatest difficulties that intelligence staff have to contend with during
operations is incomplete and vague, and sometimes inaccurate and contradictory,
reports on incidents or enemy activity. on other occasions reports are considerably
delayed. Therefore, it cannot be too strongly stressed that the speedy and accurate
passage of information from all levels can be vital to an operation.
SECTION 3: COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
Introduction
1. In the field of counterintelligence, military security is of the greatest interest and
importance to the military forces. The security of the borders, harbors, airports,
travelers and baggage, which also has great importance, is the responsibility of the
police.
2. Security is a subject that is not purely the concern of experts, but that of everyone.
The expert will make a specialist contribution to security, but the success of his work
will depend largely upon the efficiency, alertness and common sense of the average
officer and soldier.
3. It is not a practicable proposition to station specialists in every place where classified
information is held, where vital equipment or stores are located, or where people are
susceptible to subversion. Great reliance is therefore placed on the cooperation of
individuals who must perfectly understand the importance of counter-intelligence
with respect to security.
Military Security
1. Military security, which is one of the facets of counter- intelligence, is concerned
with the imposition of controls by the military within the military. These controls
take the form of:
a. Orders and instructions.
b. Physical security means.
c. Screening of service, personnel, when necessary.
2. Constant vigilance is necessary if security is to be preserved. The terrorist with his
numerous informers will be quick to exploit any breaches by security forces. Thus
the education of all ranks in the dangers of the indirect attack and in the reasons for
security orders and physical security measures is essential. Certain measures are
therefore necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining information:
a. Denial measures. These are measures aimed at denying the enemy the
opportunity of obtaining information. Some examples of denial measures, and
circumstances which may lead to a breach of security, are:
i. Every military person is responsible to his commander for the
safeguarding of information.
ii. Conversations on classified subjects which may be overheard in public
places, or on the telephone or radio. Some of the worst examples have
taken place in messes and bars within the hearing of barmen and other
unauthorized persons. Individuals often boast of their position,
achievements and knowledge.
iii. Discussions of operational or classified matters with wives, relatives and
friends are not permitted. All these are unauthorized persons and such
matters are not their concern.
iv. Routine should often be changed, e.g., relief of guards.
v. The techniques and procedures in the mounting and execution of
operations should periodically be modified, thus avoiding repetition
which may facilitate the identification of military force activities.
vi. The number of persons involved in the planning of an operation should
be restricted. The "need to know" and "need to hold" principles with
regard to classified material should be applied; this applies particularly
to operation orders.
vii. Avoid holding extraordinary conferences/orders which may reveal that
an operation is to be mounted.
viii. Prior abnormal air and land reconnaissance should be avoided.
ix. Ensure that personnel participating in an operation do not carry any
personal or official documents besides identification papers.
x. Detain all persons encountered in the objective area, or its immediate
vicinity until after the operation.
xi. Containers of classified documents should never be left unlocked and
unattended.
xii. Classified documents should not be left unattended, thus permitting them
to be read, stolen or photographed by unauthorized persons.
xiii. Classified documents should be controlled through an efficient registry
system.
xiv. Classified documents should only be held in places where their security
is guaranteed.
xv. Classified waste should be safeguarded prior to destruction.
xvi. The access to military establishments and buildings should be strictly
controlled. All persons working within military installations should be
security vetted and issued with identification cards. A visitors' registry
should be maintained.
xvii. Keys to offices in which classified material is held or displayed should
be strictly controlled.
xviii. Security clearance should be obtained for lectures and articles before
their delivery or publication.
xix. No classified letters should be included in "Daily Files" which are
circulated.
b. Deception measures. These are measures designed to mislead the enemy.
Some of the steps which may be taken during the planning and execution of an
operation are:
i. Start rumors, giving the enemy false information concerning your plans,
which may justify preparations for the intended operation.
ii. Information concerning areas of interest should not be restricted to the
area of immediate concern. Simultaneous gathering of information will
help to conceal the real intentions.
iii. Guides or local trackers should be obtained as late as possible and
should not be restricted to those who come from, or have knowledge of
the objective area.
iv. Advantage should be taken of the night and unfavorable weather
conditions to mount operations.
v. Deployments in false directions should be initiated. These could
coincide with the deployment of the force which is to undertake the
operation.
vi. Openly simulate the unloading of vehicles and secretly continue with the
deployment.
vii. Carry out reconnaissance in areas other than the area of interest.
viii. Artillery or air force preparatory fire may be laid down in areas other
than, but in close proximity to, the chosen objectives.
3. Press. Because of public desire for news, the presence or intrusion of the press must
be expected. In the interests of security it is therefore necessary to control their
activities. Detailed below is a guide for handling members of the press:
a. Whatever their level, commanders are to adhere to the directives issued by
higher authority.
b. Press members should always present their credentials in the execution of their
duty. The purpose of their visit should always be made known by their higher
authority. In all cases press representatives must be accompanied by a duly
qualified officer or non-commissioned officer.
c. They should only be granted freedom of action compatible with security.
d. Relations with the press should be cordial without, however, divulging
information on subjects which, for security reasons, should not be discussed.
e. Unless authorized, press conferences should not be held. Questions asked
should be written down and answers only provided after approval.
f. Films and photographs should be strictly controlled. Restricted items and
installations which should not be photographed should be predetermined.
4. Censorship Measures.
a. Censorship of correspondence of military personnel will only be implemented
after a government decision.
b. Personnel should be constantly reminded that they should not include details of
a classified nature in their personal correspondence.

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Mines and Booby Traps
SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. The enemy has found that the use of mines and booby traps as a means of waging
war has been particularly profitable. The nature of the terrain and the climate, the
limited and undeveloped road network, the enemy's sound knowledge of the bush
and inherent qualities of hunting techniques have enabled him to inflict considerable
casualties to security forces at minimum risk or expense to himself.
2. The very success of his efforts has resulted in a general increase of activity in this
direction, and security forces will be faced with the problem of mine warfare
throughout any ATOPS campaign.
3. The aim of this chapter is to give the basic requirements for all ranks to be mine-
conscious and to use a sensible approach to respond to another means of waging war.
4. To counter this threat and to reduce the security forces' casualties to an absolute
minimum, every man should be trained in the following:
a. To use his eyes to spot anything unusual on a track or path.
b. To recognize basic explosives and types of mines in use. C. To use mine
detectors and mine-lifting equipment issued to his unit. d. Finally, and perhaps
most important of all, he should know when to leave objects alone and call for
an explosives expert.
SECTION 2: TYPES OF DEVICES
1. The types of devices used by the enemy can be divided into two main categories.
a. Non-explosive.
b. Explosive.
2. Non-explosive. In the absence of explosive materials the enemy may resort to non-
explosive booby-trap techniques. These may include vehicle pits, lassoes, nets, etc.
As a rule, these traps in themselves are not lethal or completely destructive, and as a
result may be accompanied by ambushes.
3. Explosive. This type of device is widely used and may include the use of all
conventional materials. These materials may be acquired from external or internal
sources, and frequently include commercial explosives which, through the lack of
control, are more readily available. There are two main categories:
a. Mines.
b. Explosive booby traps.
5. Mines. The most common types of mines used are:
a. Anti-vehicle or anti-tank (AV). Their function is to damage or destroy vehicles, affect
morale, restrict movement and inflict casualties. They normally detonate under a minimum
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pressure of 60 kilograms. However, because they are frequently connected to anti-
personnel mines, or to a booby-trap device, they often operate on a much lower pressure.
b. Anti-personnel (AP). These mines are intended to kill or wound personnel and cause
injuries with shrapnel or blast, thereby severely lowering morale. There are numerous
varieties and they are designed to operate on the lowest pressures.
c. Improvised mines. These mines are often used by the terrorists, especially when
manufactured mines are not available. They can be AV or AP and are normally made from
any explosive materials available at the time.
6. General composition of mines. Most mines consist of the following components:
a. Initiating action. This can be mechanical or electrical and operates by pressure,
decompression, pull or release.
b. Trigger mechanism. This is the device which activates the detonator.
c. Detonator. This is a small sensitive explosive charge.
d. Primer. This is an intermediate charge which is initiated by the detonator, and the
explosion of the primer in the center of the principal charge causes the mine to blow up.
e. Principal charge. This is the basic element of the mine and designed to produce its
destructive effects.
7. Basic operating procedures. The initiating action can be set off in a number of ways.
However, the most common are by pressure and pull:
a. Pressure. The explosive device is normally buried underground, and the principal
charge may or may not be beside the detonator set. The most common ignition process is
electric. The pressure exerted completes a circuit, thus initiating the explosion. This system
is particularly sensitive and permits the operation of the mine at insignificant pressures. In
some cases the ignition process is mechanical and the application of pressure causes the
release of a striker which initiates the detonator. This process is usually less sensitive than
the electric ignition process and because of this is easier to neutralize.
b. Pull. In this case the explosive device operates when a pull is exerted, normally upon
a tripwire, protruding stake, etc. Once activated by the pull, the explosive device can
operate either through an electrical system or by mechanical means, all similar to the
systems described above.
c. Mixed methods. Sometimes mixed methods are used. For example, pressure can be
exerted on a stretched wire or plank, which is buried in very soft earth or a crater, thus
initiating the explosive device by a process of pulling due to the ground giving way under
the pressure exerted.
8. Anti-lifting devices. Any of the processes described above can be connected to anti-
lifting devices. Normally these devices operate by decompression, but are frequently found
with other activating devices. Because of this, whenever it is intended to remove an
explosive device from the position in which it is found, the job must be done by a man
working from cover and using a rope of sufficient length. Only after the explosive device's
removal and a minimum wait of five minutes, in case of delay mechanisms, should the
device be approached.
9. Explosive booby traps.
a. General description. Usually the devices which serve to make up booby traps are hand
grenades, shells or bombs and mines, especially the AP variety. The ignition processes are
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extremely varied and make full use of pressure, decompression, pull release, friction or
time-trigger mechanisms.
b. Basic operating procedures. These are very similar to the techniques described in
paragraph 7 above. Nevertheless their diversity is a fundamental characteristic, as operating
procedures will simply depend upon the imagination and resources of the users.
SECTION 3: USE BY THE ENEMY
Aims
1. Explosive devices are frequently used by the enemy with the following aims:
a. offensive action.
1. To inflict casualties on security force troops.
2. To lower morale by the creation of a sense of insecurity.
3. To destroy equipment, namely vehicles, with the dual purpose of reducing material
and burdening the war effort.
4. To deny, hinder and impede tactical or logistical movements.
5. To channel the movement of troops into areas which might be favorable to the
enemy.
6. To substantially increase enemy areas of influence without maintaining a permanent
presence.
7. To destroy installations essential to the requirements of the troops and local
population.
b. Defensive action.
1. To defend enemy installations, bases and sanctuaries.
2. As alarm systems to give him more time and/or space to maneuver.
3. To save manpower.
Method of Employment
2. Types of explosive devices most frequently used by the enemy.
a. The most common types of explosive devices used are AP and AV mines of Russian
and Chinese origin. These may include the most modern types of mines which are
designed to prevent detection by mine detectors.
b. Improvised mines, i.e., wooden or cardboard boxes packed with explosive
supplemented with stones, nails and pieces of metal. The quantity of explosive is variable
and is, in many cases, larger than that of the conventional mine. The improvised mine is
usually detonated with a booby-trapped grenade.
3. Most common areas of laying. The scope is unlimited. However, the most common areas
are described below:
a. AV mines. These are generally placed:
1. On rises on hills so that vehicles, on detonating the mine, will roll backwards onto
other vehicles, thus increasing the damage and number of casualties.
2. In rocky areas which will hinder prodding and increase shrapnel effect.
3. Next to fords or on tracks running by a river or gorge so that, on detonating the
mine, the vehicle will fall into the river or gorge.
4. On narrow roads and defiles with the aim of blocking certain routes.
5. On detours.
6. On roads where water has accumulated, making detection difficult.
7. In sandy areas where laying and concealment is less difficult.
b. AP mines. These are generally placed:
1. On tracks frequently used by military forces.
2. Beside trees and other attractive spots which are likely to be used by troops as
resting places.
3. Beside trees and other natural cover near the verges of roads which might be used
as cover by troops. This type of mine laying is frequently used in conjunction with AV
mines or an ambush, thus causing troops to leave the road in search of cover.
4. On new tracks made by troops due to the tendency in thick bush to return by the
same route.
5. On tracks recently cleared by troops, which leads them to suppose that they are
cleared for the return.
c. In general, tracks frequently used by the local population are not mined.
4. Common techniques employed by the enemy.
a. In most cases, the enemy is well-trained in the art of concealment and deception.
Explosive devices are frequently laid with the aim of defeating detection techniques.
b. The enemy will always attempt to exploit the natural reaction of military forces. Thus
tiredness, instinctive curiosity, rashness, aggressiveness,, excessive confidence, etc., are
reactions which are generally exploited.
c. It is impossible to give examples of every technique. However, some of the more
common methods are detailed below:
1. Pamphlets and subversive material scattered within a mined area in an attempt to
disorganize planned movement. The pamphlets may well be the initiating device.
2. Repetition of a number of unbooby-trapped explosive devices, leading troops to
suppose that the remainder detected will be in an identical condition.
3. Small objects, such as money, documents and equipment, left where they are
visible will be sufficient for anyone, reacting instinctively, to initiate a device.
4. The mining of unlikely areas, such as tarred roads.
5. The placing in the road of the occasional small object which is instinctively
avoided, thus diverting traffic into a mined area. Examples are: a dead animal, old vehicle
wheel, pool of water, pieces of glass, an area of ground deliberately disturbed so as to look
suspicious, or even a small mine, real or dummy, partially exposed.
6. A tripwire exposed as bait and so sited that to reach it one has to cross a mined or
booby-trapped area.
7. Booby-trapped booby traps. For example, the booby trapping of a mine with a hand
grenade which in turn is booby-trapped by another concealed a short distance away.
8. Planting mines in areas which offer good concealment. For example, recently
repaired roads or roads under repair. There have been cases of staged "official" repairs with
appropriate traffic signs.
9. Two-way devices.
10. The planting of improvised mines, without their container box, thus making
detection by prodding extremely difficult.
11. Empty tins (normally discarded by security troops) buried with other metal objects
to mislead and confuse magnetic mine-detecting devices.
12. The use of easily dislodged stones placed on booby traps designed to be activated
by decompression; for example, hand grenades with safety pins removed.
13. Main charges buried very deep in the ground, or off the actual road or track, and
connected by detonating cord to a small activating device difficult to detect,
5. Methods of laying. It is impossible to lay down rigid patterns of mine laying. Detailed
below are some of the methods more frequently used:
a. Anti-vehicle mines.
1. Three interconnected mines are connected by detonating cord, activated by a taut
wire leading to a hand grenade. Two of the mines are placed in the center of the road and
the third on one of the sides where the vehicle wheel tracks pass. Activation occurs by the
pulling of a wire leading through the safety pin holes of a hand grenade and connected to a
plank covering a concealed hole. Pressure on the plank by a vehicle or man causes the
plank to sink into the hole, thereby pulling the wire from the grenade which then goes off
and activates the main charges.
2. A mine is placed in the center of the road with its activating mechanism, operated
by the pulling of a buried wire, under a wheel track. Under one of the wheel tracks a hole
is made and covered with sticks, grass and earth so as to give way under the weight of a
vehicle or man. Buried in the center of the road is an upturned clay or wooden pot
containing several band grenades, nails, glass and slabs of TNT. One of the grenades is
well pinned down with a stake and a wire passed through its safety pin holes with the other
end passing across the top of the concealed hole to a stake on the far side of the hole. The
wire is pulled by a wheel or man sinking into the hole which pulls the wire out of the
grenade and activates the device. Sometimes artillery or mortar bombs are placed above the
pot, almost at the surface of the road, to give greater effect to the mine.
3. The planting of a minefield along the length of a road generally beings with a pair
of mines (one on each wheel track) and then isolated mines separated by three to four
kilometers alternating on each track (or simply laid at random) over a distance of 20 to 30
kilometers. However, the enemy will not always lay single mines and may place a number
of mines in close proximity to ensure best results.
Legend
V empty spaces
M explosive charges
T wooden boards/planks
F taut wires
G hand grenades
C detonating cord
Legend
P clay or wooden pot
G hand grenade
E stakes
F taut wire
T twigs, grass and earth covering wire and stake
V wheel track
R reinforcing grenade(s)
NOTE: Section 3 is incomplete it will be added at a later date (web master:
TALDOZER).
SECTION 4: COUNTER-MEASURES AND
PRECAUTIONS
Action by Troops
1. Dismounted troops. The best protection against mines and explosive devices is a high
standard of training and a keenly developed sense of mine awareness. However, listed
below are a few simple rules to assist in minimizing the dangers of these devices to
personnel:
a. Only one man at a time should work on a device while the remainder remain under
cover.
b. When in doubt, always call in the services of a specialist.
c. Redouble precautions when tired or nearing the base on the return.
d. Keep your eyes on the ground when in a suspicious area.
e. Do not rush; time saved is paid for in lives.
f. Expect continuous changes in techniques used by the enemy and be prepared for
them.
g. In dangerous ground be extremely cautious and be very careful with any suspicious-
looking object.
h. The man who proceeds incautiously will cause the death of his comrades.
i. Maintain concentration and strict discipline when working with mines or other
devices.
j. Never move over suspected ground without good reason and don't ever be careless or
overconfident.
k. Do not be misled or jump to conclusions when the first mines found are not activated
or are simulated.
l. Never:
1. Cut or pull taut wires or cord.
2. Pull a slack wire or cord.
3. Simultaneously cut through two metallic strands.
4. Move in compact groups...
m. Treat every mine or device as being booby-trapped.
n. Do not use the easiest or best sign-posted route without careful examination.
o. Whenever possible, avoid moving along paths or tracks and avoid the obvious.
p. Be extremely cautious in the selection of return routes and the use of newly made
paths and/or tracks.
q. Keep up to date with new devices and techniques.
r. Look upon mines as a normal risk of war.
2. Mounted troops.
a. In addition to the above-mentioned precautions, the following also apply:
1. Move at a minimum distance of approximately 50 meters between vehicles.
2. The vehicle should be sandbagged, in particular the cab, over the wheels and under
the seating.
3. If possible, make use of the side boards of the load-carrying part of the vehicle,
opening them outwards to a 45-degree angle and reinforcing them with sandbags.
4. Leading vehicles must carry the minimum of personnel.
5. All vehicles must carry serviceable fire extinguishers. The use of petrol-driven
vehicles will increase the fire hazard.
6. Vehicles must be properly prepared, which may entail the removing of certain parts
and the reinforcing of others either by means of steel plates or sandbags.
7. Exercise extreme caution when moving to the scene of an incident or when moving
to reinforce own forces.
8. Vehicles must endeavor to keep in the tracks of the preceding vehicles.
b. Clearing drills. If a mine is seen or suspected, the suggested drill is:
1. Movement is halted and troops debus and establish all-around protection while the
vehicle reverses in its own tracks to at least 100 meters away from the device.
2. Two men, each with detection devices and one carrying the grappling iron and
nylon cord, then move forward walking in the tracks already made by the vehicle. A
protection party, which should be positioned according to the terrain, will move with the
detection elements to provide them with close protection.
3. From the point where the vehicle originally stopped they carefully prod their way
forward, searching as explained in this chapter.
4. When a mine is encountered, the finder should notify his companion and then
proceed with one of the methods described in paragraph 7 below.
Detection
3. Detection aids. The enemy is very adept at laying mines and explosive devices and as his
skill and cunning improve he makes the detection of these mines and explosive devices
difficult and complicated. However, to detect whatever he has laid, the following aids and
methods may be used:
a. Mine detectors. These vary from the type used to detect any metallic object buried
below the surface of the ground to the more modern and sophisticated type that will detect
any foreign matter buried below the ground's surface. The effectiveness and efficiency of
these detectors will depend on the standard of operating, type and model and the enemy's
efforts to counter their effectiveness. When used by correctly trained technical personnel,
they can be most effective, but because of their limitations they should be used in
conjunction with other detection methods.
b. Mechanical detectors. This type can vary from the flail type to a type of remote-
controlled vehicle or device moving in front of a vehicle with the intention of detonating
any mine or other type of explosive device that the enemy may have planted in the road or
track. Its effectiveness will be determined by the enemy's mine-laying techniques.
c. Improvised means. This is probably the most expedient method, bearing in mind the
effectiveness and availability of the above-mentioned equipment. This method can be
carried out by making use of a prodder or a rake:
1. Prodder. This can be the standard prodder or an improvised type which is used to
prod the ground at an angle or to scratch the surface to detect any hidden object.
Experience in the use of the prodder will improve its effectiveness.
2. Rake. This is the standard type of rake, but with a longer handle It is used to scrape
the ground's surface to detect any possible hidden device. To facilitate its handling, it may
be equipped with two small wheels.
d. Users or operators of the above-mentioned equipment must be relieved frequently to
avoid the strain placed on them while operating the various types of detectors.
4. Detection techniques. The following are the suggested techniques that may be applied
when searching for or endeavoring to detect any concealed devices:
a. Visual search. Whatever aid is being used, as an added means, a visual search will
improve its effectiveness. The degree of effectiveness of a visual search will be determined
by the experience of the person or persons concerned, their concentration, patience, powers
of observation and keen sense of awareness. All soldiers must be made conscious of this
awareness and not leave the detection to the operators of the various devices only.
Although it will not be possible to mention all the points in this chapter, listed below are a
few examples of what to look for which may indicate the presence of a buried or concealed
device:
1. Disturbed soil or soil with a varying degree of dampness.
2. Stones loosened or moved from their apparent original or normal position.
3. Smoothed-over soil between tracks and footprints.
4. Soil with suspicious-looking debris such as grass, leaves and sticks scattered over
the surface.
5. Footprints converging at a point in the road.
6. Knee-, hand- or footprints in the soil indicating kneeling persons. In this case toe-
cap prints will be most pronounced.
7. Vegetation not conforming to its surroundings.
8. Presence of apparent unnecessary cutting of vegetation.
9. Wire or nylon cords, taut or slack.
10. Any type of metallic reflection.
11. Leaves or sticks partially cleaned of normal dirt.
12. Scattered damp soil near wells or drops of water.
b. Dismounted detection. This method is time-consuming and should it be necessary to
cover long distances, a careful appreciation must be made, bearing in mind the enemy
activity and techniques and terrain, to select the best route that would require the minimum
of this type of detection. Best speed with this method is one and a half to two kilometers
per hour. For maximum effect a mine detector should be used in conjunction with a
prodder. The diagrams below give a suggested technique. For a normal width road two
searchers must move abreast of each other with their search patterns overlapping.
c. Mounted detection. This method can employ the mechanical-type equipment already
mentioned, or visual means whereby a minimum of two men, placed as far forward as
possible on both sides of a vehicle, search the road for any possible hidden device while
the vehicle moves. The vehicles move slowly and will halt immediately at the slightest
suspicious- looking sign. This method is slow and places great strain on the observers.
Consequently they should be relieved frequently.
5. Due to the complexity and unlimited number of devices employed by the enemy and the
enemy's improving skill in the use of explosive devices, it is advisable that, whenever
possible, units have readily available trained technical experts and specialist equipment to
assist in the detection and neutralization of the various explosive devices. This is of
particular importance when it is anticipated that a unit will be moving through an area that
is suspected of being mined by the enemy. Basic mine-clearing equipment (rope, grapple
and prodders) should be standard issue to sub-units engaged in ATOPS. It is essential that
all sub-units receive training in the use of this equipment prior to being committed to
operations.
6. To develop and improve the awareness previously mentioned, a system must be adopted
whereby all personnel are kept informed as to new techniques and lessons learned.
Marking and Destruction
7. Once a device has been detected, the following are possible courses of action:
a. The device is marked and reported.
b. The device is destroyed immediately.
8. Device marked and reported.
a. Once a device has been detected, should there not be a qualified technical expert
present, somebody with more experience must carefully inspect the device to ascertain its
type, possible trigger mechanism and whether it is booby-trapped. This inspection must be
visual so as not to disturb the device, which may result in an explosion. The device must
then be marked in a suitable manner and its location reported to higher headquarters. This
report is to include:
1. Its location and how implanted, suspended, etc.
2. Type of device.
3. If possible, trigger mechanism.
4. Whether it appears to be booby-trapped.
5. Any trip wires or cord in close proximity of device.
6. Method used to mark it.
b. After marking and reporting, the device can either be destroyed or, if it is a new
device, neutralized. Under no circumstances will a device be neutralized and removed other
than by an expert. Once removed, the device may be destroyed or retained for further
examination, depending on instructions from higher headquarters.
9. Device destroyed.
a. In this event, after the device has been detected and a careful examination has been
carried out to determine its nature, the decision is made to destroy it. Whenever possible, a
qualified technical expert should perform this task. However, members with practical
experience in this respect could also carry out this task. Once the decision has been made
to destroy the device where it has been located, the following will apply:
1. Without disturbing the device and immediate vicinity too much, select the principal
charge of the device.
2. Ensure that all other troops are safely under cover or a safe distance away.
3. The minimum number of men must be used for the task, preferably only one man.
4. Endeavor to ensure that the explosion will not cause sympathetic detonation of
other devices in the same area that may endanger the lives of own troops.
5. Clear the area of dry grass and leaves, etc., to prevent the start of a fire.
6. Place the prepared charge, ensuring maximum destruction results. This could be
TNT slabs, plastic explosive or hand grenades.
7. Initiate the charge and retire along a preplanned route to safe cover. Prior to
initiation ensure area is clear of own troops When using hand grenades, a long wire or cord
will have to be used to pull out the safety pins. The grenades must be fixed to a stake to
ensure positive action.
b. It may, under certain circumstances, be possible to destroy the device by its own
system. In this case it may be possible to cause self- destruction by activating the trigger
mechanism from a safe distance, e.g., pulling out the retaining stakes or pulling the
tripwire from a safe place with a long cord or wire.
c. Under certain circumstances a trained man may remove the device to a safe place for
destruction. Extreme caution must be exercised, however, to ensure that anti-lifting devices
and/or booby traps are first neutralized or are not present. Anti-lifting devices invariably
have a delay fuse, and provision must be made for this when attempting to lift or remove a
device. In this case the best method for removing the device is to use a grapple and rope to
pull it from its position.
SECTION 5: EMPLOYMENT BY MILITARY
FORCES
10. Where and when the opportunity presents itself and should the circumstances permit,
military forces may make use of mines and/or booby traps. possible reasons for use could
be the following:
a. Protective measures. To protect military bases, camps and installations and possibly
certain key installations against possible enemy actions
b. Nuisance role. To mine or booby-trap possible enemy routes and/or crossing places, in
particular across the border from countries giving assistance to the enemy.
c. Denial role. To deny certain routes or areas to the enemy, e.g. possible fire base
positions that the enemy may use or approaches to villages, cultivations, etc.
11. Authority. Before any mines or booby traps are laid, authority must be granted by the
highest appropriate headquarters. However, this authority could be delegated to lower
levels.
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Movement Security
SECTION 1: GENERAL
1. During ATOPS there is the ever-present danger of vehicles being ambushed by
terrorists. The risk of ambushes varies depending on the nature of the terrain and
enemy activity.
2. The various aims of terrorist ambushes are to:
a. Inflict damage to security force vehicles.
b. Obtain much-needed supplies such as ammunition, weapons and/or equipment.
c. Inflict casualties and lower the morale of the military forces.
d. Create a feeling of insecurity and disrupt the normal routine in an area.
e. Prevent the tactical and/or logistical movement by security forces.
f. Improve own morale and sense of achievement.
g. Acquire support for their cause locally and internationally.
3. The effectiveness of enemy ambushes is dependent on the following:
a. Selection of a site providing good cover and safe escape routes.
b. The gaining, from various sources, of information regarding the movement of
military forces, thereby giving themselves the opportunity to plan in great
detail and, if possible, even rehearse the operation, thereby also achieving
surprise.
c. If necessary, blocking the road with craters, trees, vehicles or other obstacles.
Mines and booby traps may also be used.
d. Vulnerability of soft-skinned vehicles.
e. Armaments and/or weapons at their disposal.
f. The importance of routes necessary for the logistical support or tactical
movement of military forces.
4. To a degree, the effectiveness of enemy ambushes can be countered, or at least
reduced, by a high standard of training, good convoy discipline, good immediate
action drills, good security, and the classification of routes and roads.
SECTION 2: ROAD CLASSIFICATION
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1. General. It may be necessary to introduce a road classification system in the event of
terrorist activity in the ambushing of convoys and/or vehicles reaching serious
proportions. Roads are classified into three main categories:
a. Unrestricted (green roads).
b. Conditional (yellow roads).
c. Restricted (red roads).
2. Unrestricted roads (green). Road which are free of enemy threat or activity and
require no special precautionary measures. Movement of military as well as civilian
vehicles or persons is unrestricted and military personnel may travel unarmed, and in
any type of vehicle. This classification will be laid down by the appropriate senior
headquarters or civil authority. However, a local civil military authority may impose
certain restrictions of a temporary nature, if considered necessary.
3. Conditional roads (yellow). Roads along which limited enemy activity can be
expected. Consequently movement is permitted with certain precautionary measures
being necessary. These are:
a. All military personnel transported in military or civilian vehicles must be
armed.
b. Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the
driver, and under certain conditions, military vehicles may not be allowed to
move individually.
c. Military personnel may travel alone in civilian vehicles but must be armed.
d. Under certain conditions it may be necessary to restrict all movement to
daylight only and to packets of vehicles.
e. Tighter control of all convoy movements.
4. Restricted roads (red). Roads on which enemy activity is an ever-present risk in any
form. For this reason, these roads can only be used by escorted or guarded convoys.
Conditions governing movement on these roads are:
a. All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one
other armed man besides the driver.
b. Travel at night will be restricted to moves of operational necessity.
c. Movement of single military vehicles is not permitted.
d. Troop convoys of operational units will be primarily responsible for their own
protection, but the fullest use will be made of available armored vehicles as
escort.
e. Administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored
vehicles whenever possible.
f. It is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render
mutual assistance in case of an emergency, but not so close that an ambush is
likely to involve several vehicles.
g. Intervals between vehicles will normally depend on the type of terrain, but
visual contact between vehicles must be maintained (50-150m). Armored
escort vehicles are to move within this overall density so as to position
themselves where they are best able to give protection.
h. Non-operational convoys and civilian vehicles are not to be moved without the
authority of the formation headquarters responsible for the area concerned, to
ensure that adequate arrangements are made for escorts.
i. Restricted roads may be further subdivided into sections, and special
precautions for each section of road may be laid down. Whenever possible,
helicopters or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance
duties and to assist in controlling convoys.
SECTION 3: TYPES OF MOVEMENT PROTECTION
General
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1. The safety of a route depends on certain aspects such as enemy activity, terrain and
resources (e.g., vehicles and manpower). There are certain measures which may be
taken to ensure safe movement. These are:
a. Fixed defense. This is based on a series of strong points such as villages,
bridges, crossings and areas of likely enemy ambushes, normally linked by
patrols. It may be either permanent or temporary.
b. Mobile protection. This consists of mobile patrols that move out from
defended posts or military bases to clear the routes, in particular just prior to
convoys using them.
c. Picquetting. This is essentially a preventive tactic and aims at ensuring the
unmolested passage of a convoy or patrol along a selected route.
d. Escorts. Either on or accompanying the convoy.
2. Fixed Defense
Permanent nature. This system is gradually developed by first establishing strong
points at places such as villages and important installations and developing from
there to include bridges, crossings, etc. The selection of the points will be governed
by the degree of protection that each may require and the degree of enemy influence
in the area. It is hoped that these measures in due course result in unrestricted travel.
In the permanent concept, the following is applicable:
a. Troops are deployed and operate as described in Chapter 12.
b. It is mainly an infantry task. Additional support may be provided, when
necessary.
3. Temporary nature. This system entails the utilization of small units of infantry
tactically prepositioned at vulnerable points along the route, to be used prior to the
commencement of the movement and remaining in their positions until the convoy
has passed. The strength and positioning of these groups will be determined by:
a. Enemy activity and possible enemy strength and assistance.
b. The nature of the point, i.e., bridge, crossing, cutting, etc.
c. The nature of the surrounding terrain because patrol action may be necessary
to clear the areas.
4. The two above-mentioned methods require careful planning and execution. The
disadvantage of this system is the requirement of many troops.
5. Mobile Protection
Mobile patrols. This task would normally be given to reconnaissance units and
armored and/or scout cars. In their absence, infantry units can also carry out these
tasks using infantry combat vehicles or armored personnel carriers. The composition
and strength of these patrols will be determined by the following:
a. The task of the patrol.
b. Enemy tactics, e.g., the use of mines, booby traps, obstacles such as ditches,
felled trees or ambushes. At times, engineer elements will have to be included.
c. The type and number of routes to be patrolled.
d. The nature of the terrain.
e. The availability of own resources.
6. When making use of mobile patrols, the responsible headquarters or commander
must determine the best patrol program to ensure that all main routes are patrolled
and that enemy activity is reduced to the minimum by making best use of the forces
available.
7. Precautions against possible mining and action to be taken on encountering mines
MOVEMENT SECURITY
are laid down in Chapter 14 of this manual. Regular routes and timings should be
avoided and strict security must be maintained to minimize possible enemy reaction.
8. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary to send a mobile patrol along a
route or into an area that may have been under enemy influence for some time. The
composition of the force will vary, but will normally consist of a reconnaissance
element reinforced with infantry and with attached engineer elements. In this case
the suggested grouping and tasks are as follows:
a. A clearing group moving in front with flank protection with the task of
clearing the road.
b. Search groups working on both sides of the route up to a depth of 300 to 400
meters, depending on the terrain. Their task is to search the verges and adjacent
terrain to clear any possible enemy ambushes. They should move well forward,
and, if necessary, provide flank protection to the clearing group and mutually
support each other.
c. Command group, which is vehicle-borne and moves just to the rear of the
clearing group.
d. Fire support group with the task of providing immediate fire support to any of
the groups. This can consist of an armored car or other suitable mobile weapon
system and should move in the rear of the command group.
e. Reserve group moving mounted and at the rear of the patrol. This group must
be able to go to the assistance of any group immediately.
f. The above-described type of patrol is time-consuming and requires a lot of
effort; consequently it should not be used to clear a long route and should be
used only when absolutely necessary.
9. If available, air support should also be provided for this type of patrol, and artillery
fire support, preplanned and prepositioned, will give added protection against
possible enemy reaction.
10. Picquetting
Picquetting is a very effective method of ensuring safe passage over selected routes
either by determining that there are no terrorists along the route or, if there are, by
preventing them from interfering with the movement of the column. Picquets may
also be used to secure a route which has been cleared of mines.
11. Picquetting is expensive in manpower, time-consuming, and requires thorough
training and preparation. Small groups of men, up to section strength, are placed at
strategic points along the route, normally on high ground. Helicopters greatly
facilitate deployment.
12. Types. Picquets can be either static or mobile, depending on the number of troops
available and the characteristics of the selected route (length, terrain, etc.).
a. Static. Static picquets are deployed along the entire length of the selected route
and afford maximum security for movement.
b. Mobile. Mobile picquets surround and move with the column, acting as a
protective cocoon. They are not as effective as static picquets in that they do
not secure the entire route. Mobile picquets can be either vehicle-borne or foot
patrols. Their prime object is to check all high ground and likely ambush
positions. moving under mobile picquet protection slows down the column,
and to attain maximum speed a comprehensive picquet drill is essential.
Picquetting headquarters must be established to best advantage in the column,
preferably closest to the column headquarters, with which it must have radio
communication. Picquet areas must be selected quickly. Previous study of
maps and air photographs assist in this. As picquets are posted, the next troops
for picquettinq must take their place in readiness. Rear picquets are withdrawn
by the picquetting headquarters on orders from the column headquarters.
c. Command and control. Picquets should be within visual distance of each other
and must be in radio communication with each other, and with the picquetting
headquarters column. Units should have operational standing orders to cover
picquetting drill and be trained in it. Standing orders should cover posting of
MOVEMENT SECURITY
picquets and the use of picquetting logs, orders to picquet commanders, action
of the picquet on arrival in its area and the procedure for withdrawing picquets.
13. Escorts
In the event of other systems not proving adequate in the protection of movement
against enemy action, an escort system will have to be used to give the added
protection. Escorts may also be used in lieu of the other systems mentioned. This
protection may be necessary for military and civilian movement.
14. To facilitate the protection to be given by the escorts, convoys should not be too
large and very strict standing orders should be laid down.
15. The composition, grouping and strength of escorts will be determined by the
following:
a. Nature and size of the convoy.
b. Expected enemy activity, possible strength and tactics.
c. Nature of route and terrain to be passed through.
d. own resources available.
16. The escorting force with an appointed escort commander must be interspersed in the
convoy, providing for front, internal and rear protection. it is usual to lead with an
armored reconnaissance element with the necessary infantry and engineer backup
elements, and to bring up the rear with armored reconnaissance elements. These may
consist of only one armored or scout car.
17. It is preferable that the convoy and escort commanders move close to each other. In
the event of encountering the enemy, the escort commander assumes overall
command for the conduct of any counter-measures.
18. Distances between vehicles will be determined by the terrain and the nature of the
route. However, contact must be from front to rear and rear to front and vehicles
must move close enough to each other to be able to provide mutual support, if
necessary. Leading vehicles must only proceed when it is ascertained that rear
vehicles are following.
19. In the event of there being no armored vehicles available, the escort will be made up
of infantry elements, the strength depending on the size of the convoy. In this case
the leading vehicle should be a heavy type adequately prepared against possible mine
blasts and, if possible, equipped with mine- detecting equipment.
20. When only an infantry escort is used, the escort commander should be responsible
for the following:
a. Visual contact must be maintained between vehicles.
b. Each vehicle must carry an armed escort in the cab with the driver to be able
to apply the brakes and turn off the engine if necessary.
c. Each vehicle should have armed escorts in the rear and, if possible, at least one
automatic weapon to each vehicle. Smoke and normal grenades should also be
carried by the escorting troops.
d. If possible, a prior air reconnaissance of the route concerned should be made,
but care must be taken not to alert' the enemy of possible future moves.
e. Air cover while the move is being conducted.
f. Good radio communications throughout the length of the convoy and with the
convoy commander. 3
21. Escorts are there to provide protection to convoys and therefore detailed planning
and briefing are vital to the success of their actions. They may be drawn from any
unit or even from within the unit concerned. Thus all troops must have a high
standard of training in escort duties and immediate action drills in the event of
encountering enemy action.
SECTION 4: MILITARY CONVOYS
1. For the purpose of this manual a convoy is defined as a group of two or more vehicles.
MOVEMENT SECURITY
2. Principles. For the planning, movement and Organization of military convoys, the
following principles will apply:
a. Troop convoys of tactical units will provide their own protection and use may be
made of armored vehicles should they be available.
b. Since the enemy is liable to attack any part of the convoy, protection must be evenly
distributed throughout the convoy.
c. Contact between vehicles must be visual from front to rear.
d. Basic organizations must be maintained to ensure an even distribution of fire support
and firepower throughout the convoy.
e. Radio contact must at all times be maintained between the convoy 3 commander,
escort commander, and sub-units and/or units under command and, in addition, with the
superior headquarters and units en route.
f. A high standard of security at all times.
g. Good convoy standing orders.

3. Unit standing orders for convoys. Every unit should have comprehensive orders
covering movement by road based on the classification system described above. These
orders should state clearly who is authorized to put a convoy on the road and should cover
in detail the following points:
a. The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.
b. The Organization of the convoy.
c. The weapons and ammunition to be carried. Automatic weapons should be included.
d. The state of vehicles, e.g., detailed instructions regarding canopies, tailboards and
windscreens and their protection against land mines.
e. Immediate action drills.
f. Security measures, including arrangements for destruction of classified material or
documents, it necessary.
4. Security. It is essential that the movement of convoys should never become a routine
matter and that the maximum precautions are taken to prevent the terrorists gaining advance
information of vehicle movement. in this connection it should be remembered that:
a. The telephone system is not secure.
b. Radio messages in clear can be picked up on an ordinary civilian-type receiver.
c. The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed, although they are subjected to
screening.
d. Troops tend to be talkative both inside and outside their lines. In short, the fewer
people who know about the timing, route and composition of a convoy before it sets out,
the better. Generally, drivers and escorts should be warned as late as possible and the use
of alternative routes and other deception measures should be planned.
5. The convoy commander. The convoy commander is not necessarily the senior officer
MOVEMENT SECURITY
or non-commissioned officer traveling in a convoy. He should position himself where he
considers he can best control the convoy. He should inspect and check the vehicles when
they are loaded and prepared. Should there be an escort, he should liaise with the escort
commander prior to his briefing.
6. Briefing. Briefing by the convoy commander before moving off must be detailed and
explicit. All drivers, including civilians, vehicle commanders and men traveling in the
convoy should be present at the briefing. The briefing should include:
a. Details of timings, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact and what to
do should contact be broken or vehicles breakdown.
b. The distribution of any extra weapons.
c. The allocation of men to vehicles and their duties en route.
d. The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and sentries, and details of action
to be taken in the event of contact with the enemy.
e. Communications.
A comprehensive example of road movement orders is given in Section 7 of this chapter.
7. Alertness.
a. It must be impressed on all that a high degree of alertness is absolutely essential when
moving along routes where enemy ambush is likely.
b. Vehicle commanders. A commander must be detailed by name for each vehicle. His
tasks will be to post sentries, ensure that all personnel are alert and assist in convoy control.
He must travel in the rear of the vehicle and not with the driver. He will indicate to the
troops traveling in the vehicle which side to debus by giving the command "Debus left or
right."
c. Vehicle sentries. With the exception of smaller vehicles, four sentries should be posted
in the back of each troop-carrying vehicle. The two sentries at the front must observe to the
front and to their respective sides, the two in the rear must observe to the rear and to their
respective sides. Where possible, these sentries should be armed with automatic weapons
and smoke grenades. It is the task of the sentries to take immediate action in the event of
an ambush and to cover troops dismounting from the vehicle, should it be brought to a halt.
Light machine guns and heavy barrel rifles should be evenly distributed throughout the
convoy.
d. The sentry system can be adopted to suit the different types of vehicles.
8. Preparation of vehicles.
a. Men traveling in vehicles must be able to see in all directions, be able to use their
weapons or throw grenades over vehicle sides without hindrance, and debus quickly. For
these reasons a vehicle such as a three-tonner or one-tonner should have its canopy and
canopy-framework removed and the tailboard down. Alternatively, the canopy-framework
can be left on and canopies rolled up to give protection against weather conditions. The
framework must not, however, restrict the speed of debussing.
b. All vehicles should be sandbagged. Should this not be possible, the leading three or
four vehicles and all vehicles carrying gas, fuel, ammunition etc., must be sandbagged. The
areas to be covered are the floors of the driving compartment and the areas over the rear
wheels. Sand-filled maize bags should be used whenever space permits, as these provide
greater protection than the conventional sandbag.
MOVEMENT SECURITY
c. Folded down or removed windscreens will eliminate the danger of glass splinters
causing injury to driver and passenger; however, bearing in mind the wind and dust, it is
advisable to retain the windscreens.
d. Should windscreens be removed or folded down, a metal bar or some device must be
erected on the front end of the vehicle to protect the driver and other personnel against
wires strung across the road.
e. The rear flap must be removed or put down to facilitate rapid debussing.
f. If possible, automatic weapons must be placed on the roof of the cab of the leading
vehicle to be able to fire immediately to the front or flanks. Automatic weapons mounted
'on following vehicles must cover alternate sides of the route.
g. Several vehicles must be equipped with false antennae to prevent the enemy from
identifying which are actual command vehicles.
h. Any damaged vehicle that cannot be immediately repaired must either be taken along
with the convoy or left with a sufficiently strong protection party. Should this not be
possible, it must be rendered useless to the enemy and abandoned. Only under exceptional
circumstances will it be destroyed, e.g., when there will be no possible chance of
recovering it.
9. The loading of personnel-carrying vehicles.
a. Next to the driver there must be a man ready to protect him; he should also be able to
drive or at least apply the brake, cut off the engine and stop the vehicle properly.
b. The number of troops carried in vehicles must be restricted in order to ensure freedom
of movement.
c. If possible, troops should be seated in the middle of the vehicle, facing outward.
d. The kit of troops traveling in the vehicle must be neatly stacked in a line down the
middle of the vehicle. Where the vehicle has the seats down the middle, the kit will be
packed away neatly under the seats.
10. Smoke. Phosphorous smoke grenades, besides producing an immediate, effective
smoke screen, can inflict painful phosphorous burns and are useful anti-ambush weapons.
11. Alarm system. An alarm system must be arranged beforehand so that all the vehicles
in the convoy, especially those without radio, can be warned immediately.
12. Precautionary measures. Convoys should stop when approaching a likely ambush area
and personnel should move forward on foot to clear the area.
SECTION 5: ACTION ON CONTACT
1. Whatever precautions are taken and preparations made, the ambush, when it is s rung,
will always be an unexpected encounter. Immediate action drills are simple courses of
action designed to deal with this type of problem. They aim at immediate, positive and
offensive action.
2. The terrorist will spring his ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and
converted into a position from which he can kill security forces by firing at them, normally
from above, often at point-blank range. The principle behind the immediate action drill
dealt with in this section is that it is incorrect to halt in the area which the terrorist has
chosen as a killing ground and so covered by fire -- unless forced to do so. The drill,
MOVEMENT SECURITY
therefore, is to endeavor to drive on when fired upon, to halt only when through the ambush
area or before running into it, and to counter-attack immediately from flank to rear.
Immediate Action Techniques
3. The killing ground. This is the area in which effective terrorist fire can be brought to
bear. In order that the terrorists may not have the advantage of opening fire on ground of
their own choosing, every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the killing ground.
Thus when vehicles are fired upon:
a. Drivers are not to stop, but are to attempt to drive on out of the killing ground.
b. Sentries are to fire immediately to keep the terrorists down.
c. When vehicles are clear of the killing ground, they are to be stopped to allow their
occupants to debus and carry out offensive action.
d. Following vehicles approaching the killing ground are not to attempt to run the
gauntlet of the ambush, but are to halt clear of the area to allow their occupants to take
offensive action.
4. Where vehicles have not been able to drive clear of the area under fire, troops are to
debus under the covering fire of the lookout men, which should include smoke if possible,
and are to make for cover on the side of the road. The actual bailing out drill is dealt with
in greater detail later in this section.
Counter-Attack
5. Action when no troops have entered the killing ground. The escort commander or
convoy commander, or in his absence the senior vehicle commander present, is to launch
an immediate flanking attack on the terrorist position, leaving on the ground as supporting
fire such weapons as light machine guns and light mortars.
6. Action when all troops are clear ahead of the killing ground. In this case it will be
difficult to put in an attack as quickly as in paragraph 5 above, because troops will be
moving away from the scene of action. Nevertheless, an encircling attack must be mounted
as quickly as troops can be marshaled and brought back to a starting point. It is difficult to
preplan who should take the initiative in these circumstances and it must be made clear, at
the convoy commander's briefing, whether the rearmost vehicle commanders are to act on
their own initiative in this type of situation.
7. Action when some troops are clear ahead of the killing ground and others are halted
short of it. With two parties on each side of the ambush, confusion may arise as to which
group should put in the attack against the insurgents and time may be wasted in getting the
attack under way. If both parties attack at the same time without coordination, an inter-unit
clash may result. It is suggested, therefore, that the party which has not yet entered the
ambush make the attack as in paragraph 5 above.
8. Scout car tactics. Usually the best way in which a scout car can assist in counter-ambush
action is by driving right up to the killing ground to engage the terrorists at short range. In
this way it will probably be able:
a. To give good covering fire to the flanking attack.
b. To afford protection to any of the troops caught in the terrorist killing ground. It is
vital for a prearranged signal to have been agreed upon between the armored and
dismounted troops, so that the supporting fire can be stopped before the actual assault.
9. Command and control. It is always possible that the escort or convoy commander may
MOVEMENT SECURITY
be killed or wounded by the terrorists' initial burst of fire. He may be pinned down in the
killing ground or be on the wrong side of it when the ambush is sprung. In order to ensure
that there is always a nominated commander on the spot, whatever the situation, it is
essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a
counter-attack. This should be clearly laid down in unit convoy orders and stressed at the
briefing before moving off.
10. Debussing drill. The enemy will attempt to stop the vehicles in his killing ground by the
use of mines or obstacles. He then tries to inflict maximum 6 casualties before the troops
can debus. When a vehicle is forced to stop in an ambush, the troops must debus instantly.
a. The vehicle commander is to shout "Debus right" or "Debus left" to indicate the
direction in which troops are to muster.
b. Sentries are to throw grenades and open fire immediately on the terrorist position.
c. Troops are to debus over both sides of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated.
d. As soon as troops are clear of the vehicle, sentries are to debus and join the
remainder.
e. At this stage of the battle the aim must be to collect the fit men to e form a body for
counter-action. Wounded troops must be dealt with after counter-action has been taken.
11. Training. Debussing drills must be practiced often by vehicle loads, e.g., infantry
sections and platoons. When miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a journey,
two or three practices must be held before the convoy moves off.
12. Logistical convoys. In the case of purely logistical convoys the protective measures
detailed in Section 3 of this chapter will be applicable.
SECTION 6: PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS AND
TRAINS
1. As for road movement, railway and train protection can be achieved by means of a fixed
defense system whereby bridges, tunnels, junctions, workshops, shunting yards and
engineering works are protected.
2. Added to the above, mobile patrols and train escorts will provide additional protection.
3. Mobile patrols may take the following form:
a. Armed escorts transported in light armored wagons that precede the train. These
elements act as a deterrent to possible enemy ambushes and may also serve to detect any
possible mines that may have been laid by the enemy.
b. Patrols, either moving on foot or traveling in light wagons or armored type of self-
driven railway vehicles, with the aim of constantly patrolling the railway line, thereby
denying the enemy the opportunity of mining or damaging the railway line or setting up
ambushes.
4. Additional precautions are the possible checking of freight and passengers and their
luggage, and the clearance of a restricted zone extending up to 400 meters on both sides of
the railway line. It may even be necessary to relocate packets of the local population that
may be situated adjacent to or near the railway line.
5. The protection of railways presents a particularly different type of problem because the
train moves on a pair of steel rails along a set route. This makes it extremely easy for the
MOVEMENT SECURITY
enemy either to impede all movement by damaging either one or both rails or by
ambushing the line. Usually there is no alternative route.
6. For the above-mentioned reasons a very carefully planned and executed scheme n is vital
for the protection of railway or trains.

SECTION 7: ORDERS FOR ROAD MOVEMENT
1. The following is a comprehensive layout of a road movement order and would rarely be
used in its entirety. Furthermore, a great deal of the contents would normally be included in
unit standing orders. Unit/sub-unit commanders are to take this example as a guide and use
only those portions that apply to any particular situation.
Situation
2. Terrain.
a. General characteristics of route. Classification of various sections.
b. Road sections and critical places:
1. Possible enemy actions.
2. Movement difficulties.
c. Enemy infiltration points and their relation to the route to be utilized.
d. Suitable places for fixed defense.
e. Zones which, by their nature, make it possible for our troops to be hit by their own
fire, e.g., "S" bends.
f. Meteorological conditions pertaining to the route (tides, rain, fog, etc.).
g. Alternative routes.
h. Use of charts, photographs or maps.
3. Enemy forces.
a. Organization and possible strength in the area.
b. Individual characteristics of the leader or leaders.
c. Normal operational techniques (places, times, etc.).
4. Local population.
a. Attitude towards the enemy and towards military forces.
b. Settlements to be passed through or in close proximity to the route. Tribal authorities.
c. Habits and movements.
5. Friendly forces.
a. Allocated technical maintenance or support elements or sub-units (sappers, mine
detectors, etc.).
MOVEMENT SECURITY
b. Support Organization or other installations existing along the route.
Mission
6. As determined by higher authority.
Execution
7. Task, composition and deployment of the escort if applicable.
8. Composition and grouping of the column (including the position of each vehicle).
9. Distribution of personnel and weapons in the vehicles. Appointment of vehicle
commanders and sentries.
10. Tasks of sub-units during the movement, if applicable.
11. Individual tasks during the movement.
12. Immediate actions, security measures.
a. As a whole.
b. Per vehicle; preparation of vehicle; protection against mines and fire.
c. Individual.
d. Alarm systems.
13. Traveling discipline.
a. Speed (day and night).
b. Timings to be maintained.
c. Point of departure and intermediate points (control points).
d. Use of guides.
e. Driving discipline.
f. Use of lights.
14. Halts.
a. Place and duration.
b. Security measures to be taken. Use of vehicle lights, if necessary.
15. Crossing of streams/rivers.
a. Bridges and points.
b. Various unconventional means. Rules and precautions to be taken.
16. Action to be taken in emergencies.
a. Allocation of tasks.
b. Fire discipline and replenishment.
MOVEMENT SECURITY
17. Attitudes towards and relationship with the local inhabitants.
18. Orders regarding the transport of civilians.
19. Orders for the inclusion of civilian vehicles in the column. Legal aspects.
Logistics and Administration
20. Rations and water.
a. Type and number of days to be carried.
b. Preparation of food. Support/assistance available along the route.
c. Water resources and precautions to be taken.
21. Ammunition.
a. Initial issue.
b. Distribution.
c. Levels to be maintained.
22. Fuel and lubricants.
a. Initial issue.
b. Levels to be maintained.
c. Existing support Organization or other installations along the route.
23. Medical.
a. Preventive measures.
b. Treatment and evacuation of casualties.
c. Existing support organizations and other installations along the route.
d. Sanitary measures during halts.
24. Special equipment.
a. Special support vehicles and equipment.
b. Equipment for the removal of obstacles.
25. Breakdowns. Orders and actions with regard to vehicles bogged down and/or broken
down.
26. Refueling.
a. Halts.
b. Refueling discipline.
c. Existing organizations and other installations along the route.
d. Emergency refueling.
MOVEMENT SECURITY
27. Embussing and debussing drills.
28. Loading and unloading vehicles.
a. Separation of classes of supplies.
b. Load for vehicle type.
Command and Signals
29. Position of the commander and second in command.
a. During traveling.
b. During stops.
30. Maintaining contact.
a. Visual.
1. By signals.
2. Distances to be maintained.
b. Radio.
1. Frequencies and schedules.
2. Call signs including ground to air.
3. Special instructions.
4. Deception measures.
c. Movement control points.
d. Nicknames and/or code words.

SECTION 8: ROUTE CARD DETAILS
1. The route card should include a sketch of the route showing:
a. Distance in kilometers.
b. Settlements.
c. Local resources of:
1. Water.
2. Fuel and lubricants.
3. Food.
4. Accommodation.
5. Location of friendly units.
MOVEMENT SECURITY
6. Location of critical contact or possible contact.

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3. PSEUDO MODUS OPERANDI

Depending on the specific circumstances that enabled a pseudo team to enter an area as insurgent forces, pseudo
methods and the deception employed varied widely from one area to the next.
According to then Major Reid-Daly the role of the Selous Scouts was to infiltrate the tribal population and the
terrorist networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct conventional forces in to carry out the
actual attacks. Then depending on the skill of the particular Selous Scouts pseudo group concerned, their cover
should remain intact which would enable them to continue operating in a particular area ... perhaps indefinitely.
(6)
As already indicated, validification was a prerequisite for success. Detailed operational intelligence was required
to enable a team to enter an area without arousing suspicion. The next step was to establish contact with the local
population, and specifically with the insurgent agents within local villages. As a final step these agents or contact
men were used as go-betweens with the pseudo team and any other insurgent team in the area. Having made
contact a meeting was arranged which would be used finally to establish the credentials of the pseudo team.
Patience is essential in almost all types of pseudo operations. Arranging a meeting with a real insurgent group
could entail several weeks during which numerous letters were passed back and forth via mujibas (insurgents
youth supporters) and contact men. If successful, a meeting would be arranged between the two groups at a
neutral spot in which the senior group was approached by the juniors. Following this, the members of the two
groups met and mingled. Information would be exchanged, beer drunk and possibly some revolutionary songs
sung. Information gleaned at such meetings, as well as from other sources was then passed back to Special
Branch or directly to Fire Force, the helicopter-borne reaction force, for action. One such specific type of
operation that proved to be highly effective, was termed the Observation Post tactic.
For obvious reasons white pseudo team members could not come into direct contact with members of the local
population or insurgents. When a pseudo team thus entered a village, the white(s) remained outside and as close
as possible. After contact had been made between village members and a pseudo team, for example, the village
would be kept under close observation. The reaction of villagers very often gave a good indication of the
presence and location of other insurgent groups. Upon confirmation of such suspicion, the Selous Scouts team
leader would call in an air strike or Fire Force on the insurgent group. To facilitate this, observation posts were
manned on high ground close to the village. Former insurgent members with a detailed knowledge of both local
customs and insurgent practices proved invaluable in picking up the most minute indications of insurgent
presence. The use of observation posts was especially suited to the rugged terrain in the Northeast of Rhodesia
and proved highly successful in these areas.
The modus operandi of the Selous Scouts was particularly well suited for engaging the services of captured or
wounded insurgents. It often happened that Fire Force attacked an insurgent group, eliminating most of them and
capturing the remainder.
Immediately following capture and the traumatic memory of the preceding fire-fight, these insurgents would be
turned by promise and threat. Along with a number of Scouts these prisoners would adopt the identity of the
former insurgent group and function as they had done in an adjacent area sufficiently far enough from the local
population who could identify them. In this instance the newly-turned insurgents would introduce the group to
contact men and in general establish their bona fides with the local population. This method, however, relied
upon total security, specifically in the area of the contact. But even where a prisoner had become compromised
he could still be used as advisor or source of detailed local information.
A further variation of pseudo work entailed what were termed hunterkiller groups. In contrast to a purely
defensive, intelligence-gathering role, these teams were used aggressively. Having located a specific insurgent
infiltration route, pseudo teams were dispatched along it on the pretext of returning from Rhodesia for resupply
and retraining after an extensive operation. En route further information was collected while the group, in
contrast to its normal intelligence function, eliminated all insurgents on the way.
Hunter-killer groups were first used north of Mount Darwin in the Mavuradonha area where the rugged terrain
inhibited normal Security Force operations.
In relation to their numbers, the success of the Selous Scouts became an important element in Rhodesian counter-
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insurgency operations. Both senior Army and Special Branch officers continuously called for the further
expansion of the unit. Once the Selous Scouts had two platoons trained for deployment, their tactical
headquarters shifted to Bindura. As the war spread across the country, deployment of Selous Scouts was no
longer limited to the Northeast. The first Scouts troops moved to Inkamo Barracks on 12 July 1974, which
became the regimental rear base. During January 1977 it was renamed the Andr Rabie Barracks.
In general, the Selous Scouts achieved less success in penetrating the tighter, more disciplined ranks of ZPRA
than was the case in the unstructured command and control groupings of ZANLA. Three Group did, however,
achieve considerable success in a process of validification could entail extraordinary measures. It could entail
calling in an air strike by Security Forces on their own position or close to it. Alternatively it could consist of
select aggression against Security Forces or civilians. One such example was documented in Africa Confidential
After a white farmstead about forty miles north-west of Salisbury had been attacked, it was
discovered that one of the two groups in the assault were Selous Scouts ... (7)
In some cases attempts at validification did more harm than good, as was the case with the first attack on a
Protected Village. This was carried out by a pseudo team in the Mount Darwin area in Kandeya Tribal Trust
Land during 1974 and precipitated a rash of similar attacks by real insurgent groups. A second example occurred
in Nyanga North where a resident pseudo team trained and briefed the local population so well in aiding them
that by the time real insurgents penetrated the area, a clandestine organization had been firmly established for
them.
Especially during the initial years, many pseudo operations were conducted to sow distrust between members of
the local population and the insurgents. Rudimentary attempts towards achieving this objective consisted for
instance of theft or offending local customs. Numerous further refinements were added. One such practice
entailed calling in an air strike or Fire Force on the insurgent group after they had left a specific kraal. After two
or three such occurrences the insurgents invariably suspected the kraal members of informing Security Forces of
their presence. In revenge, and to forestall any repetition, innocent kraal members were executed. This would
normally put an end to any voluntary support that the insurgents could expect from the kraal. (At the same time
such punishment could also intimidate the inhabitants from helping the Security Forces).
A second method used relatively widely once an insurgent contact man had been identified, was for a pseudo
team to eliminate him publicly after labeling him a traitor to the insurgent cause. Since the rest of the kraal
members knew the contact man to be a loyal and staunch insurgent supporter, such a death would lead to
considerable disillusionment and bewilderment. This practice had become so common by the end of the war that
the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department had opened a number of murder dossiers on Selous Scouts and
Special Branch members. Invariably poor security led to a general knowledge of these measures. As the war
progressed and Selous Scouts operations increased and intensified, this knowledge also spread to the local
population and insurgent forces in the field.
Although the short term benefits that were achieved by such illegal actions were substantial, once the local
population became aware of these practices, it could only have had a distinctly negative effect on their attitude
toward the government in general. The task of government, i.e. judicious law enforcement and maintenance of
law and order, is incompatible with substantial transgression of the law. Under these circumstances it becomes
extremely difficult for any such regime to claim legitimacy.
Once insurgent forces and their supporters became aware of pseudo activities, various measures were instituted
to identify any such teams. Specific bangles and pieces of clothing were worn which would provide positive
proof of identification. On specific instruction, members of the local population changed their method of aiding
insurgent forces. Instead of leaving nightly food parcels at predetermined spots, each insurgent received his food
individually during daylight. Any white member of such a team would thus be identified. It was only during 1979
that the Selous Scouts succeeded in fielding all-black teams to eliminate this problem.
In reaction to these changing means of identification, the Selous Scouts launched an intensive intelligence effort
to remain constantly aware of what these entailed in any specific area.
A major success that did result from these operations was the mutual suspicion and distrust between insurgent
forces in the field. Contact between such groups was increasingly preceded by lengthy exchanges of oral and
written messages and coordination of forces for a single operation presented acute problems. This was even more
so in those areas where both ZANLA and ZPRA forces were operating. Within ZANLA, groups frequently
attacked one another. To increase this breach even further, pseudo ZANLA teams began attacking ZPRA
insurgents, thus ensuring that the next encounter between ZANLA and ZPRA would turn into an armed clash.
During the period between 1976 and 1978 when ZANLA attempted to encroach on Matabeleland, the success of
this method was such that a captured ZANLA commander confessed to having been shocked by the fact that his
first eight contacts were with ZPRA forces. He was captured by the Security Forces in the ninth.
A further method employed in the Mount Darwin area entailed the intimidation of known contact men to aid the
Selous Scouts. Shortly after having called in Fire Force on a group of insurgents in the area, the pseudo team
visited the contact man. It was made clear to him that failure to cooperate with Security Forces would lead to his
death. Thereafter his kraal was kept under constant surveillance from an observation post. Each time an
insurgent group entered the area, the contact man would, for example, hang up a certain blanket after which he
would meet the Selous Scouts at a predetermined spot to exchange information. Fire Force would then normally
eliminate the insurgent group.
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The contact men recruited in this manner were codenamed Lemon and Orange and collectively known as
Fruit Salad. Since they were also paid for their services, the sudden appearance of riches in both cases led to
insurgent suspicion and retribution. In his book Selous Scouts Top Secret War Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly
describes a similar operation codenamed Market Garden with the two compromised contact men known as
Apple and Banana. This incident occurred at the foot of the Mavuradanha mountains in the Northeast. (8)
As stated above, the Selous Scouts eventually could claim the highest kill ratio of all Rhodesian Security Forces.
Although Fire Force, and First Battalion Rhodesian Light Infantry, which constituted the quick deployment
troops of Fire Force, were physically responsible for most of these insurgent casualties, the intelligence that had
led them to the insurgents originated from the Selous Scouts.
Yet, the very success of pseudo operations led to constant demands for the further expansion of the unit.
Originally a single platoon of highly skilled men, the Selous Scouts grew into a disproportionately large unit of 1
800 men. A substantive portion were, however, territorial soldiers and thus not permanently attached to the unit.
The rapid increase in numbers in itself led to a number of problems. In the first instance the unit was forced to
lower its entry standards to obtain enough personnel to comply with Combined Operation demands. This led to a
general lowering of operational standards in the pseudo role as did the widespread use of the less-demanding
observation post tactic. The latter did not require as high a standard of training and experience as did normal
pseudo operations. On the other hand, these recruits were not all suitable for pseudotype operations, while
their training could not be as thorough.
As a result pseudo operations again shifted in emphasis away from that of gathering intelligence to a more
aggressive role where insurgent casualty figures became all-important. This process was aided initially when
substantial bonuses were paid for insurgent casualties.

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SWEEPS
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Sweeps
1. Aim. The aim of a sweep is to search an area thoroughly and to ensure that no enemy
remains undetected, or is able to escape.
2. Value. Because of the difficulties involved in control and direction keeping, sweeps
are very rarely successful in the bush. Their value has usually been very small in
comparison with the number of troops required.
3. Principles. The following principles must be observed if the sweep is to have any
chance of success:
a. Good security (secrecy in preparation and secrecy of movement).
b. Sufficient troops for the task.
c. The area to be swept must be limited. A very common error is to sweep an
area too large for the force available.
d. Good control, which also implies good communication, e.g., use of report
lines.
e. Clear orders.
f. A rate of advance slow enough to ensure a thorough search of the area.
4. Reconnaissance. This may not be possible as it will often be an indication of
subsequent operations.
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION
1. Groups. The available forces must be divided into three groups:
a. Stop groups.
b. Sweep group.
c. Reserves.
2. Stop groups. Stop groups must be able to provide a high rate of accurate fire.
a. Composition. Stops will be small and each should therefore include one or
more automatic weapons. Each stop should be commanded by at least a non-
commissioned officer.
b. Siting.
i. Stops should be within visual distance of each other, but must be
concealed from anyone flushed by the sweeping party.
ii. It must be possible for the area between stops to be covered by fire.
iii. Stops will normally be placed on three sides of the area to be swept.
iv. Stop lines must be denoted by clear, unmistakable features and known to
the sweep party and reserve.
c. Method of operation.
i. Stops must move to their positions by a covered route to avoid being
seen arriving, and must remain concealed on arrival. Any person met en
route to stop positions must be detained until the end of the operation.
ii. To avoid disclosing the position of stops, stray individuals who try and
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break the stop line should, if possible, be detained silently.
iii. on arrival of the sweeping party, stops should stand up and give the
prearranged recognition signal.
d. Discipline. This must be strict, particularly as stops will be spread out and
often out of sight and hearing of an officer. Stops must be ready for instant
action throughout the operation, and all noise, smoking and fires forbidden.
3. Sweep group.
a. Aim. The aim of the sweep group is to search an area and to ensure that all the
enemy elements are located.
b. The following points must be noted:
i. Flexibility.
A. The density of the vegetation in the sweep area will vary from
open country, requiring relatively few searchers, to dense bush,
built-up areas, outcrops, cultivated lands and settlements,
necessitating the use of more troops to complete the task
efficiently. It is therefore essential that a commander be able to
concentrate or spread out his troops in accordance with the terrain.
B. It follows that the sweep should not merely consist of an evenly
spaced line of individuals, but rather of a line of sub-units, each
carrying out a specific task. Report lines, in particular, will
indicate the progress of each and will allow for any reallocation of
tasks, should the situation warrant this. Report lines are especially
necessary if the sweep is to cover a large area.
ii. Strict supervision at all levels must be ensured so that the ground is
covered.
iii. Every possible hiding place must be searched.
iv. The rate of advance must be slow enough to ensure that a proper search
is conducted.
v. The sweep party must be ready to engage a fleeing target should the
need arise.
4. Reserve. A reserve must be available to carry out the following tasks:
a. To engage and destroy any terrorists who offer organized resistance inside the
area being swept. The commander should, whenever possible, have a reserve
force, well-armed with automatic weapons and rifles, under his personal
command and located near him, to deal with any gang which may give serious
and prolonged resistance. The size of this force will depend on the size of the
total force taking part, and on the degree of resistance expected.
b. To follow up and destroy any parties of terrorists which break through the stop
line. The ideal is to have in the stop parties a patrol in the middle of each side
of the area being swept, to follow up and destroy any gangs which may escape
from the area. If there are insufficient troops to permit the commander to cover
every side of the swept area in this fashion, he should deploy his follow-up
troops to cover the most likely escape routes.
SECTION 3: CONDUCT OF SWEEPS
1. There are many variations to this type of operation and the conduct will be
dependent on a number of factors. For example:
a. Nature of the ground.
b. Time available.
c. Forces available.
2. The conduct may vary from a simple linear sweep in fairly open country to a
complex systematic search by a carefully controlled and coordinated series of patrols
in dense bush or forests. In some cases it may become necessary to conduct a sweep
of a village.
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SECTION 4: GENERAL
1. Aircraft. A spotter aircraft or helicopter is invaluable and may be available. It helps
the forces to maintain direction as well as spot terrorist movement. It must be in
radio communication with the commander of the operation, with both sweep and stop
parties, and with the reserve when deployed. The use of an aircraft does tend to give
away positions to the terrorists.
2. Recognition.
a. A recognition signal must be decided upon beforehand and known to everyone
taking part.
b. All civilians participating must wear distinctive headdress and armband.
3. Radio. If the sweep is a battalion operation, control may be in the form of a normal
battalion radio net to companies, each company having its own forward net. In some
cases it may be more satisfactory to control all the platoons on the battalion net, the
battalion's forward control set being r sited on a prominent feature which can
dominate the whole area of operation.
4. Trackers. In thick bush, due to restricted visibility, patrols must concentrate more on
searching for terrorist signs and tracks than on the hope of seeing them in person. A
high standard of fieldcraft is therefore required and every tracker available must be
allocated to the platoons taking part in the operation. Patrol dogs may also be used to
great advantage to locate hidden terrorists, or to follow fresh tracks. They may even
be let loose by their handlers to flush terrorists.

Legend
1. Limit of sweep.
2. Direction of sweep.
3. Command element.
4. Sweep parties.
5. Stops and follow-up groups.
6. Reserve.
7. Fire support.
8. Start line.
9. It may be necessary to subdivide the area into unit/subunit areas of responsibility.

Legend
SWEEPS
1. Limit of sweep.
2. Command element.
3. 3. Stop groups.
4. Sweep parties.
5. Fire support.
Legend
1. Limit of sweep.
2. Command element. 3. Sweep parties. 4. Inter-unit/sub-unit boundaries. 5. Stop and
follow-up groups. s of 6. Reserve. 7. Fire support.

Legend
1. Command element.
2. Inner stop groups.
3. Outer stop groups.
4. Sweep parties.
5. Reserve.
6. Inter-unit/sub-unit boundaries.

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THE CONCEPT
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1. THE CONCEPT
The concept of pseudo insurgents, i.e. members of the counter-insurgency forces posing as insurgents, is a well
established, if lesser known, method of gathering intelligence and one often used by police units involved in
crime detection.
In practice, select members of the Security Forces are trained in the habits and modus operandi of their enemy
down to the smallest detail. Groups then infiltrate known insurgent areas, attempting to establish themselves as
genuine insurgents. In counter-insurgency terminology this phase of the operation is known as validification
and is aimed both at convincing insurgents and members of the local population of the authenticity of the group.
Once a pseudo team has established its credentials as insurgent forces, the focus shifts to gathering all available
information on insurgents and local support for them in the area. In this way pseudo operations can contribute
substantially to the total Security Force intelligence picture. In an area where insurgent presence has already
been established, as was the case in north-eastern Rhodesia in 1973, and where traditional Security Force
intelligence sources have been eliminated through popular support for the insurgent cause, pseudo operations
may prove to be the only reliable source of intelligence.
Within the cycle of any pseudo operation, validification and the acceptance of both local population and
insurgents of the pseudo team, invariably proves to be the most difficult. To succeed, pseudo teams need to
emulate insurgent forces in every respect. Furthermore, the insertion of these teams into an area is in itself a very
delicate operation.
In most cases success is only possible if the pseudo team contains a number of former insurgents, recently
captured by Security Forces and persuaded to change sides (turned, in counter-insurgency jargon).
Again, this need not go hand-in-hand with physical intimidation as might seem necessary. Numerous studies on
the motivation of revolutionary forces indicate that ideological commitment to the cause of liberation plays a
far less important role in motivation than is generally believed. (1)
Research has substantiated that there is a willingness among captured insurgent personnel to change sides in the
traumatic post-contact and initial period of capture. Should a captured insurgent not be presented with obvious
means of escape and be physically involved in counter-insurgency operations on the side of Government forces
he, in effect, becomes committed to the latter cause.
With the aid of these former insurgents, pseudo teams are able to establish contact with the established insurgent
support structures within local communities. Through the local population, further contact with insurgent groups
could also follow. Information gleaned in this way is passed on to the traditional elements of the Security Forces
for action. Only in very exceptional circumstances would a pseudo team itself use intelligence obtained to
eliminate insurgent forces. For, if in the latter case, the operation is not entirely successful, the pseudo team
would immediately risk being exposed as government forces and thus lose all prospect of gaining intelligence.
But pseudo operations are not exclusively aimed at obtaining intelligence leading to insurgent casualties. The
aim of these operations can also be much less subtle. By passing themselves off as insurgents, pseudo teams
could sow distrust between the local population and insurgent forces in general. Such actions could include acts
of indiscretion towards property, women and cattle, or local customs and tribal beliefs. If, as was the case in
Rhodesia, competing insurgent forces (ZANLA and ZPRA) are vying for local support, pseudo practices could
fan any friction between such forces into open armed hostility. Ethnic affiliation could aid in this regard.
However, if the strategy is to survive, it needs to be tightly controlled and limited in practice. Once members of
the local population and insurgents become aware of the strategy, their security becomes stricter and further
validification and establishment of pseudo teams becomes increasingly difficult. There is the danger, also, that
pseudo operations may be used as license for transgression of the law. If the two factors are combined and
members of the local population become aware of Security Forces posing as insurgents and committing crimes in
this guise, the real insurgent forces are presented with an ideal propaganda weapon. At such time both Security
Forces and the Government are likely to lose some of their claim to legitimacy that seems a natural product of
their position as enforcers of, and compliers with, the law.
In recent counter-insurgency history, pseudo operations were first conducted by Special Branch in Malaya. Since
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the concept was only introduced towards the latter stages of the campaign, the impact was limited. The idea was,
however, regenerated and expanded during the Mau-Mau emergency in Kenya under the driving leadership of
Capt (later General Sir) Frank Kitson. (2) It was from these experiences that Rhodesian pseudo operations were
born.

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2. THE FORMATION OF THE SELOUS
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In the period after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence Special Branch was the first to employ methods of
gathering intelligence that could be termed as pseudo operations. These were first conducted in the Zwimba and
Chirau Tribal Trust Lands during 1966 and were continued in these areas on an informal basis up to 1973. These
first attempts were unsophisticated and mainly aimed at determining the loyalties of members of the local
population.
Within Rhodesian Army circles pseudo operations were apparently first suggested by the second in command of
the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Major John Hickman. Sometime before 1966 he forwarded a paper to Army
headquarters outlining the possible implementation of such a scheme. Subsequently after much delay, a pilot
scheme was jointly run during 1966 by the Army, Special Branch and the British South Africa Police. This met
with little success, for, at the time, the vast majority of the local population could still be considered passive, if
not hostile to the insurgent cause. Little intelligence could thus be gained by posing as insurgents. Moreover,
pseudo modus operandi was at an early and rudimentary stage of development. For the time being serious Army
interest abated.
While the traditional sources of Security Force intelligence had been functioning adequately inside Rhodesia up
to 1971, a drastic change resulted from ZANLA penetration into the North-east during 1972. Security Forces
suddenly found themselves in an actively hostile environment late in 1972.
By the end of that year Rhodesian authorities were fast becoming aware that the security situation in the North-
east was deteriorating rapidly. What had seemed to be an effective and sound network of informers dried up in a
matter of weeks. Although aware of insurgent presence and intimidation, lack of operational intelligence
forestalled effective counter-measures. This lack of detailed and accurate information now led to the regeneration
of the concept of pseudo insurgents.
The former second-in-command of the Rhodesian Light Infantry was by this stage Officer Commanding 2
Brigade. Against the background of an almost total lack of operational intelligence and declining Army morale,
Brigadier Hickman obtained permission to restart a pilot pseudo scheme. Similar interest had been revived in
Special Branch.
With the approval of Joint Operation Center Hurricane, Superintendent Peterson of Special Branch Harare
formed an allblack pseudo team on 26 January 1973. The team of six men, two African Detective Constables
and four former insurgents were placed under the command of the Special Branch officer at Bindura. Following
rudimentary training the team was alternatively deployed in Bushu and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands, near Saint
Alberts Mission and in Chinamora Tribal Trust Land near Harare. While some useful information was gathered,
these operations led to no insurgent casualties. At the time the lack of white leadership and expertise in the team
was identified as the major problem. For a few months the team was disbanded, but eventually reorganized this
time to include white members.
A few weeks after the formation of the Special Branch team, the Army commenced with two pseudo teams of
their own. These consisted of two Special Air Service non-commissioned officers who had been attached to the
Army Tracking Wing at Lake Kariba and a number of black soldiers from the Rhodesia African Rifles. Finally,
former insurgents were added to the teams.
With the benefit of some weeks of operational deployment with their own pseudo team, Special Branch could
train the Army teams in much greater detail - as well as provide them with vital and detailed intelligence.
Subsequently a third Army team was deployed with the result that operations could be conducted in the
Mtepatepa farming area and in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. However, Army disillusionment soon reduced the
number of teams to two. By this stage effective control of all teams had passed to Special Branch.
The first tangible success attributed to these teams occurred during August 1973 when a ZANLA insurgent was
captured along the Ruya River. During the same operation the concept of frozen areas was developed to
minimize the chances of a clash between members of the Security Forces and a pseudo team. The official
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definition of such areas read as follows:
A Frozen Area is a clearly defined area, in which Security Forces are precluded from operating,
other than along main roads. Army Security Forces already in an area to be declared Frozen
will be withdrawn from such an area by the time stipulated in the signal intimating that such an
area is to be Frozen. This signal must be acknowledged by the recipient. The above ruling also
applies to all armed members of the Services and Government Departments with the exception of:
a. Those personnel tasked to operate exclusively along the Cordon Sanitaire.
b. Those personnel stationed at Protective or Consolidated Villages and establishments
provided with a permanent guard in which case they are restricted to 1000 meters from the
perimeter of such establishments.
c. In the event of a vehicle breakdown, ambush or mine deterioration on the main road within a
Frozen Area those personnel involved are to remain in close proximity of their transport. (3)

On 31 August 1973, a pseudo team effected the first ZANLA casualty to result from these operations.
Within both the Army and Special Branch these pseudo operations were being conducted under the tightest
security. Coordination between pseudo and regular Army units was achieved on an informal basis. As a result, a
map reading error led to a clash between the pseudo team and an Army patrol during which the pseudo team
commander, Sergeant Rabie, was killed. Temporarily all pseudo operations were halted.
By this stage the senior Army and Special Branch members involved were convinced of the use of pseudo
operations. The death of Andr Rabie had, however, indicated that pseudo operations had to be conducted within
a formalized structure and coordinated with other Security Force actions in an area.
During November 1973 a former Regimental Sergeant Major of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Captain Ron Reid-
Daly, was recruited and promoted to Major as Officer Commanding the pseudo insurgent unit to become known
as the Selous Scouts. The personal involvement of Lieutenant-General Walls in this appointment suggests that
pseudo operations had received official blessing. Henceforth pseudo operations fell directly under the control of
Special Branch. Officially part of Army Tracker Wing, the training camp moved to a secluded venue at Makuti
near Lake Kariba where a number of vigorous selection courses were conducted, eventually swelling the unit to
about 25 members. The regimental base eventually came to be situated at Inkomo near Darwendale.
When the first troop of pseudo operators was ready in January 1974, they were deployed from Bindura, where
their Special Branch officer was located, into Chiweshe, Madziwa and Bindura Tribal Trust Lands. By the end of
February a second troop became operational and a third during March. All three troops operated in Shona
speaking areas against ZANLA. Each troop was divided into three operating sections of nine to twelve men, a
number of whom were former insurgents. Depending on their number, however, sections increased in strength to
twenty and thirty men strong in sate cases. Although the unit was mainly under Army control, control of
intelligence, deployment and in some instances training was in the hands of Special Branch. At no stage were
even the military intelligence organizations allowed to exert any influence over the unit.
Security, however, remained a problem, for even at this early stage it was becoming common knowledge in the
operational area that the Security Forces were masquerading as insurgents. (4)
Following operations in Omay Tribal Trust Land bordering Lake Kariba during December 1974 the need for
Matabele pseudo teams to operate against ZPRA within Matabeleland became apparent. These operations
coincided with the discovery that ZPRA had started using rubber dingies to cross the lake and enter the
neighboring areas. For the first time Security Forces also encountered insurgent forces using radios inside
Rhodesia. As a result a ZPRA orientated pseudo troop was formed and stationed near Bulawayo.
During the first half of 1974 the success of the Selous Scouts had reached such proportions that Lieutenant-
General Walls instructed the unit during May to double its strength from three to six troops. By December this
had been achieved with an addition of about 50 former insurgents.
Although the existence of the unit, and to a lesser extent its type of operations had by now become an open
secret, official notification of the Selous Scouts was only served during 1977. During April of that year the
magazine To the Point reported that:
Rhodesian army chiefs have taken the wraps off a legendary anti-terrorist unit that for two years
has played a vital and almost totally secret role in the war ... According to their commanding
officer, Major Ron Reid-Daly, they have been directly and indirectly responsible for the
elimination of 1203 of the 2500 terrorists who have died in the four-year-old war. (5)
In fact, the majority of insurgent casualties inside Rhodesia were the direct result of intelligence obtained during
pseudo operations.

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TYPES OF OPERATIONS
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1. The aim of this chapter is to give guidance on the tactics and techniques to be used
by military forces when conducting operations in rural areas against an enemy
employing unconventional methods and tactics.
2. Once a unit has been mobilized and committed to its operational area and
responsibilities, the commander of such a unit will find, on arrival, that he is required
to:
a. Provide for the security of his own base.
b. Guard key installation's.
c. When legally authorized, ensure control of the local population, perhaps by
curfews, checkpoints, patrols, etc.
d. Provide protection for movement of all kinds.
e. Conduct area operations.
f. Maintain a reserve to meet minor contingencies throughout his area and also
possibly to react to the requirements of another force, operation or
headquarters.
3. The commander's appreciation will establish the priorities for the above tasks should
it not be possible to conduct them simultaneously. It is most important that a reverse
not be inflicted on the military forces soon after their arrival, not only because of the
serious effect it would have on civilian morale, but also on the unit's morale.
4. The desire to do everything at once with minimum resources must be balanced
against the risk of defeat. The problem for the military force commander will be to
decide what proportion of his resources he can afford to allot to the various tasks
confronting him. He must decide his priority tasks and allocate his forces accordingly
although, as operations develop, he will need to revise his priorities.
5. It should be remembered that the enemy will seldom present a static target.
Consequently the commander, in his planning, must not expect to conduct operations
against fixed objectives. Bearing in mind the enemy's characteristics, he must be
flexible enough to cater for all situations.
6. The four main requirements for success are:
a. Encounter actions. The absolute necessity for the adoption of the actions set
out in Chapter 6. Experience shows they ensure maximum success against
terrorists in contacts or incidents and, equally as important, they save
casualties.
b. Snap shooting. The vital importance of accurate and quick shooting from all
positions and all types of cover.
c. Offensive action. The need for immediate offensive action, both in planning at
all levels and also in tactical engagements.
d. Discipline. The necessity in operations of discipline and all that it stands for.
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Terrorists will avoid action with disciplined troops but they can expect a
measure of success against troops whose discipline is poor.
SECTION 2: BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS
General
1. Aim. The aim of border control operations or counter-penetration operations is to
make the border as secure as possible, thereby preventing enemy groups from
crossing; or preventing supplies or reinforcements from crossing to support enemy
groups that may have succeeded in crossing.
2. It is a known fact that part of the enemy's tactics and characteristics is to establish
safe bases in neighboring countries from which they can launch their attacks across
the border and to which they can return should the pressure applied against them by
the military forces be too great. The very success of their operations is dependent
upon these safe bases.
3. The enemy has no respect for international boundaries and is able to cross the
boundary, whether it be an imaginary line through the bush, a river, a rugged bit of
coastline or even a fence, at preselected crossing places.
4. There are thousands of kilometers of border which may have to be protected.
Because of these vast distances, it will be impossible to cover every meter with
troops. Bearing this in mind and making maximum efficient use of the manpower
which is available, a very well-thought-out plan, Organization and system for border
control must be determined and vigorously and effectively applied. In those areas
where the enemy is more active, or where external support is more significant, higher
priority of troop allocation should be given.
Factors Affecting Success
1. Factors affecting the success of this type of operation are as follows:
a. Cooperation with the local inhabitants and also the local government
administrative organizations.
b. Maximum use of informers, particularly on the other side of the border. These
informers are normally controlled by the security police and/or military forces.
c. Flexibility in the planning and execution of all operations.
d. Security.
e. Cooperation between all participating forces, i.e., military and police.
f. A high standard of training, patrolling and physical fitness.
g. The entire operation must have depth to it, therefore making it more difficult
for the enemy to penetrate.
h. Ability to be unorthodox and original in the planning and execution of
operations. Avoid being stereotyped.
i. Well organized and flexible logistical support.
j. Simplicity in planning and economical use of manpower.
k. A readily available reserve to be deployed either by air, road or on foot to
assist wherever and whenever required.
Patterns of Operations
1. The following factors will determine the allocation of tasks and responsibilities:
a. Nature of terrain.
b. Extent of border.
c. Enemy threat and activity.
d. External support to the enemy.
e. Availability of forces.
f. Local population.
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2. Areas are divided into unit and sub-unit areas of tactical responsibility. Boundaries
between these areas must be well defined with no gaps. These boundaries must be
changed from time to time to prevent the enemy from discovering the border
protection plan. Troop density in these areas will be determined by enemy activity.
3. Headquarters. The main headquarters for such an operation will be located at a
position from which effective command and control can be exercised and where all
the necessary communication requirements exist, i.e., airfield, rail- and road head
and communication centers, etc.
4. Unit headquarters. This should be centrally situated in the unit's area of
responsibility, preferably where good or reasonable communication facilities exist
such as an airfield, a rail- or road head and helicopter landing facilities. They should
also be located close to or at the local administrative/police post, should there be one
in the area. The main requirements remain, however, effective command and control
of all forces concerned, accessibility and good communications.
5. Patrol bases and patrols. Permanent patrol bases should be established along the
border and in depth. These bases can either be company or platoon bases. They
should be so spaced and sited that patrols operating from them can effectively patrol
the area, without having to cover long distances. These bases must be tactically sited
and well protected against possible enemy attacks. Accessibility and natural water
supplies must be considered when siting such bases. Patrolling from these bases can
be done as follows:
a. Border patrols. Strong, well-balanced patrols move on foot, their task or aim
being to patrol the border to prevent penetration or to search for signs of recent
enemy crossings and possible crossing places. They must be prepared to fight
should they encounter any enemy. These patrols must have good
communications with their bases and must be prepared to spend several days
away from their bases. They must make contact with the local inhabitants in
their areas in order to build up the confidence, cooperation and friendly
relationship with the locals. This is vitally important because every local who
is friendly towards the military forces is a potential informer who can or may
be able to provide valuable information regarding the enemy. Although
operating to a well-coordinated patrol program, these patrols must also be
prepared to use their own initiative, e.g., to ambush possible crossing places
which were not foreseen.
b. Standing patrols. Should the availability of troops and the terrain allow it, a
series of small standing patrols can be used to maintain observation during the
day over possible crossing places, or stores, that may be sources of supplies for
the enemy. During the hours of darkness, these standing patrols could become
listening posts with the dual purpose of ambushing likely crossing places.
These patrols should be provided with communications. They must operate
with the utmost stealth and frequently change their positions to avoid
detection. They must be prepared to spend several days away from their base.
if possible, they should contact any friendly forces moving through their area.
c. Motorized patrols. Should the terrain allow it, or should there be reasonable
roads or tracks in the area, motorized patrols could be used. Use can be made
of normal battalion, company, and platoon transport or armored cars. This type
of patrol will normally not be very successful but it does serve as a deterrent
and does afford the local commander and military forces the opportunity of
visiting settlements in the area, therefore maintaining contact and building up
good relation- ships. With this type of patrol, regular routes and timings must
be avoided because of the possibility of enemy ambushes. It is also a means
TYPES OF OPERATIONS
whereby a commander can make contact with his foot patrols or standing
patrols that may be operating some distance away from his patrol base.
d. Patrols in depth. These patrols operate from bases sited in depth to the actual
border patrol bases. Their task is to search for and destroy enemy elements or
groups that may have succeeded in penetrating inland. They may react to
information passed on to them by the border patrols or to indications they may
have discovered as a result of their own vigorous patrol program, or to
information passed on to them by higher headquarters, security police or local
informers. These are strong, well-balanced patrols that may be assisted by
special trackers, tracking teams, or dog teams, with good communications to
the patrol base and ground-to-air, because they may frequently call for air
support when contact with the enemy has been made. They must be aggressive
and must be prepared to spend several days away from the patrol base and,
should contact be made with the enemy, to maintain contact until the enemy is
eliminated.
e. The patrol program and pattern for the patrols operating in depth must be
carefully coordinated and well planned. These patrols can either operate from
a base line or natural features such as rivers, ridges, spurs, etc., patrolling
laterally, forward and inward or radiating outward in all directions from a
central point which is the patrol base.
f. Whichever system is used, regular patterns, routes and timing must be
avoided.
6. Aids to border control. The physical protection of a long border with troops is not
always possible because of the problem of manpower. There are, however, certain
aids that could be considered:
a. a. Aircraft patrols. These serve as a deterrent, and regular visual and photo
reconnaissance of the border area could indicate the crossing of groups of
terrorists.
b. b. Boat patrols. When the border is defined by a river, boat patrols could be
used in much the same way as motorized patrols.
c. Sensory devices. Limited areas could be covered by using sensory devices,
giving warning and approximate position of suspect movement in the area. d.
Restricted areas. When possible, certain areas of the border could be cleared of
local inhabitants (if any) and all presence in that well-defined area restricted to
the military forces only. Routine checking out of the area may indicate enemy
activities. These areas provide complete freedom of action by military forces,
e.g., bombing, artillery engagements, and the erection of barriers including
minefields, barbed wire and booby traps.
Conclusion
1. Border control operations are long-term operations that require careful planning and
coordination and the vigorous application of such plans. Invariably the border patrols
are more of a deterrent than anything else, because it is normally the patrols in depth
that physically get involved in action with the enemy; but the most effective measure
for controlling the border is an active, well-planned patrol program executed by
well-led, well-trained and well-armed patrols.
SECTION 3: AREA OPERATIONS
Method
1. A systematic approach is necessary to counter terrorists already established in an
area. The territory should be divided into sectors and troops allocated according to
requirements. Commanders of these sectors will be given their tasks in broad outline
by the appropriate headquarters. Thereafter these commanders must determine their
TYPES OF OPERATIONS
own objectives within their areas of tactical responsibility. They will be responsible
for the planning and conduct of operations in these sectors, which implies that the
decentralization of command is of utmost importance, allowing for greater flexibility.
The aim should be to cover the area concerned with a framework of military
organizations working in close cooperation with the civilian authorities.
2. Aim of area operations. The basic aim of this type of operation is to eliminate
terrorists. In its simplest form it means searching for a small band of enemy who
might have infiltrated into an area, while it could also indicate operations against
numerous groups, well established in the area, with a certain degree of control over
the local population. in this case it will be necessary to neutralize the enemy's
influence, destroy their presence, regain the local population's trust and support for
the government and prevent the recurrence of enemy presence and influence.
Scope of Operations
1. Depending on the degree of the enemy's progress in establishing himself, the aim of
area operations will not be achieved overnight and will call for a progressive
approach over a period of time, in the following pattern:
a. Establish a military presence in the area, and gain information concerning the
enemy, local population and terrain, etc.
b. Ensure that key points, villages and lines of communication are protected
against enemy interference.
c. Conduct PSYOPS aimed at the local population and the enemy.
d. Conduct operations against known enemy bases and areas in order to break his
military potential.
e. Search for and destroy the remainder of the enemy.
f. Maintain permanent contact with the population and dominate the area until
the civil administration can do without military support.
g. Conduct operations in support of civil authorities (OSCA) as required.
Employment of Forces
1. Area operations call for the employment of an infantry force capable of achieving its
aim by making use of the necessary supporting arms and services. Armored fighting
vehicles, artillery and engineers can all be used with great success in this type of
operation. Air support is indispensable.
2. Forces allocated to an area must be sufficient to achieve the aim of the operation. A
high degree of mobility under all conditions, and flexibility in the planning and
execution of operations will assist in attaining better results. The presence of a large
enemy group will sometimes necessitate the use of additional troops, allocated by
higher headquarters for this specific operation.
Area Allocation and Subdivision
1. Deciding on or locating operational areas, or even sub-dividing a unit area, will
always require an appreciation of the situation. The following paragraph includes the
important factors to be considered in making this appreciation.
2. Factors.
a. a. Characteristics of the operational area.
i. Terrain. Mobility, observation and concealment are more favorable to
the terrorist, and the use of arms and services other than infantry is
directly dictated by the type of terrain.
ii. Climatic conditions. The rainy season may restrict road movement
considerably, and extreme temperatures will dictate the size of an area
that can effectively be controlled by troops on foot.
iii. Communication network.
I. Roads and railway lines are necessary for logistical support.
TYPES OF OPERATIONS
II. Roads and tracks help in deploying troops and committing
reserves quickly.
III. Airfields determine supply bases and headquarter sites.
iv. Local resources. Availability of water, local purchase facilities, hospitals
and clinics, accommodation and recreational facilities all have a bearing
on allocating areas and siting of headquarters.
v. Local population. The presence of the local population is one of the
most important factors in this type of operation:
I. The number of troops required for the protection of the locals
(when required) will restrict their area of responsibility.
II. It is advisable to let military areas coincide with the ethnological
grouping of the population.
III. The density of the population may restrict the employment of
artillery and the air force in certain of their roles. d. The degree of
terrorist influence over the local population dictates the attitude,
security and psychological action of the military forces.
3. Built-up areas. The presence of built-up areas will call for military forces to be
committed on non-rural tasks, e.g., protection of key points and OSCA.
4. Enemy. When the enemy is well established in an area, the following points require
consideration:
a. The strength of the enemy and his Organization will determine the military
requirement.
b. If his own area division is know, it may be better to try and fit that of the
military accordingly. It is much easier to collect information and operate
against one enemy group, than having elements of two or more to deal with.
c. Areas (countries) providing sanctuary or assistance and his logistical and
intelligence systems are also to be considered.
d. Measure of support by local population.
5. Friendly forces.
a. The number of troops available, their standard of training and the availability
of supporting elements (with any restrictions on their use) will determine the
size of areas allocated.
b. For ease of cooperation and coordinated action, it is advisable to have military
boundaries coinciding with that - of the civil administration and police.
Conclusion
1. Area operations can only be successfully concluded if there is intimate cooperation
between the civil administration, the police and the military. All actions should be
jointly planned, pooling all available information.
2. An excellent joint intelligence system is a prerequisite for success and should be
developed at all levels.
3. The support of the local population is vital and the greater part of our psychological
action plan should be directed at achieving this aim.
4. Military success can only be achieved by well-trained and well-motivated troops,
inspired with an offensive spirit that reflects itself by constantly dominating the area
with patrols, ambushes, road blocks and similar aggressive tactics.

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The Selous Scouts - Pamwe Chete

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