This document examines how local participation affects productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment in Romania. It reviews literature on spillover channels at the industry and firm level. The study uses data on over 74,000 Romanian firms to estimate the relationship between foreign ownership proxies and total factor productivity. Baseline results show that vertical spillovers are positive for shared foreign affiliates but negative for wholly-owned, while horizontal spillovers are negative for both. Extensions look at different firm types, trade orientation, regions, and sectors. The conclusion compares spillovers from wholly-owned and partially-owned foreign firms and considers the implications for restrictions on foreign investment.
Description originale:
case study "to share or not to share ; does local participation helps in the spillover from FDI"
This document examines how local participation affects productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment in Romania. It reviews literature on spillover channels at the industry and firm level. The study uses data on over 74,000 Romanian firms to estimate the relationship between foreign ownership proxies and total factor productivity. Baseline results show that vertical spillovers are positive for shared foreign affiliates but negative for wholly-owned, while horizontal spillovers are negative for both. Extensions look at different firm types, trade orientation, regions, and sectors. The conclusion compares spillovers from wholly-owned and partially-owned foreign firms and considers the implications for restrictions on foreign investment.
This document examines how local participation affects productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment in Romania. It reviews literature on spillover channels at the industry and firm level. The study uses data on over 74,000 Romanian firms to estimate the relationship between foreign ownership proxies and total factor productivity. Baseline results show that vertical spillovers are positive for shared foreign affiliates but negative for wholly-owned, while horizontal spillovers are negative for both. Extensions look at different firm types, trade orientation, regions, and sectors. The conclusion compares spillovers from wholly-owned and partially-owned foreign firms and considers the implications for restrictions on foreign investment.
MATTERS IN THE SPILLOVER FROM FDI INTRODUCTION AIM OF THE RESEARCH AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC TYPES OF INDUSTY STRUCTURE OF FIRM PROBLEM STATEMENT TYPE OF RESEARCH QUANTITATIVE REASONS LITERATURE REVIEW SPILLOVER CHANNELS INDUSTRY LEVEL DATA BLOMSTRON (1989) FIRM LEVEL DATA HADDAD & HARRISON (1993) MOROCCO AITKEN & HARRISON (1999) VENEZUELA DJANKOV & HOEKMAN (2004) KONINGS (2001) POLAND, ROMANIA JAVORCIK (2004) LITHUANIA
CONTD HOW CAN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AFFECT FDI SPILLOVER UNCTAD 2003, BLOMSTROM & SJOHOLM RAMACHARANDRAN UNCTC 2001 VARIABLES INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY (DV) WHOLLY OWNED FOREIGN AFFILIATES (IV) JOINTLY OWNED FOREIGN AFFILIATED (IV) KNOWLEDGE SPILL OVER (IVV)
MODEL WHOLLY OWNED FOREIGN AFFILIATES (IV) JOINTLY OWNED FOREIGN AFFILIATES (IV) PRODUCTIVITY OF FIRMS (HORIZONTAL/VERTICAL) (DV) KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER (IVV) METHODOLOGY FDI IN ROMANIA DATA DESCRIPTION AMADEUS COMPILED BY BUREAU VAN DIJK ROMANIAN CHAMBER OF COMERCE INPUT OUTPUT MATRICES (IO MATRICES) UN COMTRADE DATABASE
RESEARCH DESIGN SAMPLING INITIALLY 74177 FIRMS DATA COLLECTION 3 STEP PROCESS
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS TWO STEP PROCESS TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATION (TFP) COBB- DOUGLAS LOG LINEAR TRANSFORMATION ln Yit = + K ln Kit + L ln Lit + M Mit + it TRANSLOG SPECIFICATION ln Yit = a + K ln Kit + L ln Lit + M Mit + KK ln Kit^2+ LL ln Lit^2 + MM Mit^2+ KL ln Kit ln Lit+ KM ln Kit ln Mit + LM ln Lit Mit + it SEMI PARAMETRIC APPROACH TO RELATE FOREIGN PROXIES WITH ESTIMATED TFP ln TFPit = 0 + 1 Horizontal_sharedjt+ 2 Horizontal_100%_foreignjt + 3Vertical_sharedjt+ 4Vertical _100%_foreignjt + 5Concentrationjt+ 5ln Importsjt + j + r + t + uit BASELINE RESULTS OLS Trans- log LP OLS
Trans- log LP OLS
Trans- log LP Vertical shared 0.650
0.746
0.814 - - - 0.684
0.783
0.850
Vertical 100% foreign -0.115
-0.049
0.007
- - - -0.154
-0.091
-0.035
Horizontal shared - - - -0.220
-0.238
-0.236
-0.243
-0.263
-0.263
Horizontal 100% foreign -0.442
-0.478
-0.476
-0.466
-0.504
-0.502
Concentration -1.277 -1.131 -1.202 -0.940 -0.741 -0.792 -0.959 -0.788 -0.861 ln Imports -0.082 -0.084 -0.100 -0.061 -0.060 -0.074 -0.078 -0.079 -0.095 Extensions and Robustness Checks TYPES FIRM PERFORMANCE TRADE ORIENTATION Sector leaders Other firms Dynamic export growth Domestic market oriented Vertical shared 1.114 0.626 0.210 1.342 Vertical 100% foreign -0.292 0.028 0.042 -0.839 Horizontal shared -0.118 -0.257 0.177 -0.546 Horizontal 100% foreign -0.204 -0.557 0.156 -1.426 Regional-level Spillover Proxies TYPES Other regions Own regions Both Vertical shared other regions 0.742 0.765 0.730 0.749 Vertical 100% foreign other regions 0.032 0.007 0.033 0.011 Vertical shared own region 0.160 0.172 0.072 0.078 Vertical 100% foreign own region -0.141 -0.151 -0.16 -0.165 Horizontal shared other regions -0.073 -0.09 -.070 -0.088 Horizontal 100% foreign other regions -0.327 -0.34 -0.32 -0.343 Horizontal shared own region -0.006 -0.008 -.011 -0.013 Horizontal 100% foreign own region -0.067 -0.075 -.067 -0.071 CONCLUSION COMPARISSON OF HORIZONTAL &VERTICAL SPILLOVER WITH WHOLLY AND PARTIALLY OWNED FIRMS TWO REASONS FOR EXPECTATION HYPOTHESIS FINDING RESTRICTION ON FDI ?? THANKYOU