Welfare, Happiness,
and Ethics ca
‘The Concept of Welfare
L. W. SUMNER
War is welfare? And how much docs it matte for ethics? These
se the questions ths book sets out t0 explore. We shall say that
4 fully developed answer to ether question will count as a theory
about the nature of welfae or aoout its vale. The philosophical
tradition offers ws many such theories. We will try to determine
‘whether any of them is adequate; if not, then we will ced to look
for something better (or perhaps conclude that a gencral theory ik
just aot to be had in this area)
‘Our concern willbe with wellize in the original meaning still
preserved in the term's etymology the condition of faring oe ding
well It sin this sense that weltere aaches pre-eminently to the
lives of individuals, and a peeson' welfare is more of les the same
a5 her wellbving or interest oF (in one of ts any meanings) hee
ood. Wherein does welfare, in thi senes, consist? What infor
8 life to go well (or badly)? And what isthe practical importance
of welfare? What role should i pay, say, in ethics (or politic)?
These are the questions which wil eccupy us
‘Welfare matters. On this muck we all agree, a the very least
when our own interest is at stake. Although most of us are highly
falible managers of our peesoaal firs, we generally havea fairly
definite sense of when things ae going well or baly for us, and a
setled preference for the former condition over the Iter, When
we face the lage decisions tha shape our lives—what to work
a whom to marry, where to live, whether to have children we
‘ther make them primarily with a view to our own wellbeing of
if nor, come to regret this failing afterwcd. If the failing is pet
sistent then ou lives do not mere go badly, they also cease ina
real sense to be our lve. At that point we need to remind Out
CLARENDON PRESS - OXFORD selves that a certain degre of selteentredness isan indinpensable
condition fr being a person or a subject inthe fst place. Falling
ta9ae below this minimum, having too ie regard for one's own poo2 ‘The Concept of Welfare
is not a vite but 2 pathology, nt aus or sintiness but
Gehosenent or servic,
For most of, especlly Ife ae white, male, and afllvnt,
this nora angen we hae lite diff sing above dhe chek
Cd eel of elf interest necessary in oder to ave an Menity of
Gu own, Ot problem may hen sen ro be avodig the oppose
cxtreme the excuse concen for kis own good which the
Characeistic mack of the epout. However, this tempeation Sms
femarkably cay to esi (ar easier than che sie the ther way
Ino theaniacon af th self The pre epi, nded seems v0
te chutney the creature of textbooks in this oF economics
‘th the pombe exception of prchonaths, the Ope i virally
ton-xstentin real fe What rendre impraciaef rcon
fiona soa Bong Ene ne pce ones ged
vary by ous own well-being, we ean scarcely avoid extending
this contra at vt to some favoured cle of thereat’,
reighbours, ends co-workers loverr—t0 whom we fe ose,
Ceaneed, Now se so manager ake «broader ew, Men
Sting a len inerminently withthe interest of 3 tation oss
tr ethnic grap or ule r race or gender Indeed we go furchet
Stl since een the mont hardearted among us te ike 0 find
fur sympathies aroused when we areconroned by che corrosive
‘flcts of poner or fain of war on the Ives of distant san
fers. We cae about he plight sinply Heese I 0 Ba for
them, as would-be egitewe ate nal floes
‘Weliar, whether our own or tha of others isnot merely a
rasta concen for ue-ometing that we sek simply beste
Ste happen care about ie Iris aso 2 prominent feature of out
SSrmensie neal nosing conta om he pt of
tur projects The general form ofthese constrain shat we mst
show a due concer or respect for others (and for ourselves ab
trl case we ate ot steady moa acne in tha re
Ton othr move spect formulations they oven wal
every asec of our vet decison affecting minor must be made
‘Inthe bet iret of the hl etene decison poet the
invert of he patent tat ste adminteed nthe Best
interest ofthe beneficiary, goverment must manage tee afirs
inthe irre of the govered, and soon. Welle abo ipl
ied in some ofthe undional vine: prance snd benevolence,
of ours, fut alo fendsip and cven joie, which requres
The Concept of Welfare 3
Inter alia that we refrain from -he deliverate infliction of harm on
bothers. Indeed, ware we to surat the notions of hari and bene:
fit from common-sense morality, there would be lie Ife: not
only lite substantive coaten, but few of our thick ethical con
cepts a5 wel.
‘The centrality of welfare in ethics has long been recognized by
‘oral philosophers. It is dificult to think of any major ethical
theory which does not assign em important role o protecting the
interests of some favoured set of welfare subjects. Theories which
share this common commitment may, of couse, go on to differ
in significant ways: which subjects they privilege (the members of
‘one’s society? the members of our species? al sentient being),
what sort of protection they afford (a set of basic rights? «place
atthe bargaining table? inclusion in the genesal welfare?) and 50
fon, One sich dimension will Be of pariculae interest for our i
{quicy: whether welfare ithe orly asic value countenanced By the
theory oF i meely one among phrality of such goods. The view
that Welfare isthe only value which am ethical theory need take
seriously ultimately and for sts Own sake, we shall all welfare
‘Welfaism is one possible answer to the question of hove much
welfare matters for ethics: i counts for everything, Iti 2 highly
contentious answer, largely outof favour these day, Historically,
its principal defenders have hen che atltarians who adopted wel.
farismas thei cheory ofthe good. Buta commitment to welfaism
is not necessarily a commitment to tilcarianism a wellaist may
ccqually bea natural law theorit or deontoogist. Being a utliar
fan requires being a wells, hut not vice versa, Besides its wel
farism,utlitarianism is composed of te further ingredients, cach
fof them highly contentious in is own right consequential, he
view thatthe right consists ia nasimizing the general goody and
aggregation, che view that the general good isthe sum total of
individual goods. The ethical ehsory which results from combining
all three ingredients is very much out of favour these days, and
this fact may partially account for the unpopularity of welfarism,
However this may be, it would be quite wrong to reject welfarism
simply because of ies traditional connections wth uiitaranisan,
if there is something seiously amiss with the later, it might ie
im one (or both) of its other dining features. The adequacy of4 The Concept of Welfare
weltsism asa theory of value for ethics isan issue which merits
tention on is vin, fee of all uit by association. Giving this
attention will be one of ose aims.
‘We will be concerned hoth with the nature of welfare (what is
it for lifero he going wel?) and with i value (what role should
vwelbeing playin an ethical theory). tm principle these questions
Could be acdresied in ether oder. Ihave chosen to begin by ask-
ing what wellae const in while peescinding a= much as possible
fom the cole iemight play in our moral thinking. This oxder seems
| natural ene, since i general we expost the value of 4 thing £9
‘depend om ie nature, rather than vice versa,
However, it does have one significant drawback. Questions about
the value of welfare are, by and large, more familar to common
sense than questions about is nature. Most of us manage our
‘ordinary lives on the unreflctive assumption that well-being is
‘worth pursuing or promoting and that ll-being(f we may calli
that) is equally worth avoiding or preventing, that it 2 good
thing for lives to go well and a bad thing for them to go badly,
thar it counts in favour of some activity of condition that it Is
beneficial and against tht it harmful, and soon. In all of this
wwe are taking for granted the postive value of welfze (and che
negative value of ilfael. Furthermore, we generally think and act
fs chough welfare were valuable for is own sake, or i is own
‘ight, rather than merely asa means to some further, deeper good
In doing so we assign it basic or itimate values we would there
fore be puszed f someone asked why welfare s valuable or de
sanded to be shown what itis valuable for. Surly welfare 1s
Waluable in itself anything is.
“Tis is oe to say that questions about the value of welfare are
straightforward o thatthe righ answers to them are obvious on
the contrary, they are some of the deepest and most difficult issues
in philosopbical ethics. At every sage, however, thse issues can
reallly be connected tothe concerns of our everyday lives. In this
Fespect, though intricate and even abstract, they remaia intelligible
and accessible. Furthermore, i seems obvious why tackling them
will reuite specially philosophical skills, The sciences, includ-
ing the socialsciences, have attempred to expel all questions of
‘alu fromm thee territory. Whether oe not they have succeeded ia
this purge, the upshot hasbeen to relegate these issues tthe do-
main of philosophy. Of course it may be thar evaluative questions
The Concept of Welfare 5
ae inherently undecdable, rus that no methodology seientitic or
otherwise is adequate to then, But if they are resolvable, the teh
nigues needed for solving them are, by commen consent, philoso
pica ones. Where the value of welfaze is concerned, thevelote, it
Is easy to see why our ingury must be 4 philosophical one.
‘The boundary between scence and philosophy is harder 10 lo
cate when out aim isto discover not how or why welfare matters
bur what itis. In general when we want to understand what some
thing is, or what iis ike, the sciences seem the obvious place to
tum. Iris a mysterious matter, therefore, how there cou be oom
for a peculiacly philosophical inguiey into the nature of welfare,
Worse, the question itself is mysterious, Am answer ta it will ll
us what welfare consists in, or what is constittive of it. But surely
we must already know what welfare iy since we al seck it in out
everyday lives, How, then, could philosophical inguicy into the
natuze of welfare ever yield any nove results? Indeed, if we do not
already agree om what counts as were how could it ever yield
‘any results ac all?
Lut THE NATURE OF THINGS
These puzls may not be geected by any fares pce co
welae They might ely perplex os were we undewaing an
inary into the satce of che things which have wadoall
inetd plospher, sch as mental sats pean oF Pop.
‘ic, or uber. The tesigations wo fall win he
Alma of metapiy whic tela aero snes, Coe
‘er, for ita, powpheal theories abou the ate ofc
toton Soch there ae planiy no empial or scenic They
do not report causal comets beween parla ere of
sts ofthe worl, and if we ah fo lam about suc come
tome do no ons he orks of phitwopbers On the eer
hand, however they abo so mort Be mevey analy or ee
pel When te austin alco of cat dos
alice iss rw ee o's a
Sonsin This ott yea hee nothing oF apres
he esne fom exploring and clang or concep, mon"
inary langage” pilesophy has had ths modes bat wore
fim. But no amotnt of expt of or conepalfaeerk