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[G.R. No.147812.

April 6, 2005]
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO vs. LEONORA TIRONA
Facts: Respondent Tirona was a lessee of a land purchased by the petitioner. However, when the area
was declared a priority development, respondent informed petitioner that she will suspend paying the
rentals. The petitioner purchased the said land from the original owner. This prompted the petitioner to file
an action for unlawful detainer and damages against the respondent. The MTC held that Tirona had no
reason to suspend the payment of rents as this made her occupation of the property illegal. Thus, the
petitioner has the right to recover possession. The RTC concurred with this decision.
Issue: Whether or not an action for interpleader is proper in this case
RULING: Yes. Tirona should have filed an interpleader and need not wait for the actual filing of a suit by
petitioner against her. The action is proper when a lessee does not know who to pay to the rentals due to
conflicting claims in the subject property.
This remedy is afforded not to protect anyone against double liabilities but to protect him against double
vexation with respect to one's liability.
When a court orders that claimants litigate among themselves there arises a new action. The pleading
which initiates the action is referred to as the complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
[G.R. No. 193484. January 18, 2012]
HYPTE R. AUJERO vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION
Facts: In his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the CA, the petitioner accused
the NLRC of grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondents belated appeal by
relaxing the application of one of the fundamental requirements of appeal. An appeal, being a mere
statutory right, should be exercised in a manner that strictly conforms to the prescribed procedure. As of
July 3, 2006, or when Philcomsat filed its appeal and posted its surety bond, LA Lustrias Decision had
become final and executory and Philcomsats counsels failure to verify when the copy of said Decision
was actually received does not constitute excusable negligence.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's decision to give due
course to Philcomsat's appeal despite its being belatedly filed
Ruling: This Court rules in Philcomsat's favor. Procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in
absolutely meritorious cases. A review of the cases cited by the petitioner, Rubia v. Government Service
Insurance System22 and Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,23 where this Court adhered
to the strict implementation of the rules and considered them inviolable, shows that the patent lack of
merit of the appeals render liberal interpretation pointless and naught. The contrary obtains in this case
as Philcomsat's case is not entirely unmeritorious. Specifically, Philcomsat alleged that the petitioner's
execution of the subject quitclaim was voluntary and he made no claim that he did so. Philcomsat likewise
argued that the petitioner's educational attainment and the position he occupied in Philcomsat's hierarchy
militate against his claim that he was pressured or coerced into signing the quitclaim.
[G.R. No. 189151. January 25, 2012]
SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and AMADO BRAVO, JR.
Facts: Petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari before this Court asserting the following
arguments: (1) their failure to file their appellants brief was merely due to the fact that they were never
properly served with a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA; (2) Ruel de Tomas, the person
who apparently received the copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA, was not their employee;
and (3) the CA, in the interest of justice and equity, should have decided their appeal on the merits
instead of dismissing the same purely on technical grounds.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners appeal for their failure to file the appellants brief
within the reglementary period
Ruling: Petition is denied. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party
aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order,
resolution or decision he intends to assail.
It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On the other hand, Section
1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case or a particular matter therein.
Concomitant to the foregoing, the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would
depend on whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the Order or Resolution
issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy
would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
[G.R. NO. 178477 - July 16, 2012]
HEIRS OF RAMON B. GAYARES v. PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION
Facts: In February 1998, Ramon B. Gayares (Gayares) was hired by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping
Corporation on behalf of its principal, Kuwait Oil Tanker Co., S.A.K., as an Able Seaman aboard its vessel
M/T A1 Awdah. The contract was for a period of nine months with a monthly salary of US$ 499.00.4 Prior
to his embarkation on March 12, 1998,5 Gayares underwent medical examination and was found "fit to
work" by the examining physician.6 However, on April 22, 1998, he was repatriated to the Philippines for
medical reasons. On December 18, 1998, Gayares filed a complaint for disability/medical benefits, illness
allowance, damages and attorney s fees against herein respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file
petition for certiorari
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The general rule is to file the petition for certiorari within the 60-day
reglementary period. A 15-day extension is the exception to the rule and the request may only be granted
for compelling reason. More important, the discretion to grant or deny said request lies solely in the court.
Hence, the party requesting such extension must not expect that his request will be granted as he has no
inherent right to the same. Petitioners did not cite any compelling reason to justify their request for
extension.
[G.R. No. 193978. February 28, 2012]
JELBERT B. GALICTO vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Facts: On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged
excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of
the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines
(Senate), through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the
increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and
EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a
suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010.
Issue: Whether or not a Prohibition is proper to enjoin the implementation EO No. 7 issued by the Office
of the President

Ruling: Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question
judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
[G.R. No. 156142, March 23 : 2011]
SPOUSES ALVIN GUERRERO AND MERCURY M. GUERRERO vs. HON. LORNA NAVARRO
DOMINGO
Facts: On February 5, 2002, PDC filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the spouses Guerrero.
The Complaint alleged that the spouses Guerrero made no further payment beyond June 1, 2000 despite
repeated demands, prompting PDC to cancel the Contract to Sell on November 19, 2001 by sending a
Notice of Cancellation to the spouses Guerrero dated November 23, 2001. The Complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 6293 filed with the MeTC of Las Pias City. The spouses Guerrero responded with a
pleading captioned Answer with Reservation alleging that it is impermissible to blend "causes of action
such as 'cancellation, extinguishment or rescission of contract' (which are beyond pecuniary estimation)
and 'ejectment (unlawful detainer).
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in denying the Petition for Prohibition of the spouses
Guerrero
Ruling: Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. "The function of the Writ
of Prohibition is to prevent the doing of some act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a
remedy for acts already accomplished. In this case the Contract to Sell has already been cancelled
before the filing of the complaint for Unlawful Detainer, hence the Prohibition will no longer lie. The rest of
the allegations are within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court as the case filed is for Unlawful
Detainer.
[G.R. No. 156684. April 6, 2011]
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCILOF
MANDALUYONG CITY,
FACTS: The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between
Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their
land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land
was their only property and only source of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City
adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take
the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing
it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in adopting Resolution No.
552.
Ruling: No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is a law that
is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is
nothing but an embodiment of what the law making body has to say in the light of attendant
circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a law making body on a specific matter.

An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. In simply expressing
its sentiment or opinion through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way
abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally
protected right.
[G.R. No. 168523. March 9, 2011]
Spouses FERNANDO and ANGELINA EDRALIN vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
Facts: Petitioners narrate the relevant dates that allegedly show the belatedness and impropriety of the
petition for mandamus. Veterans Bank received the Order dated November 8, 2004 on November 18,
2004, thus it had until December 3, 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Since December 3, 2004
was declared a non-working holiday, Veterans Bank filed its motion for reconsideration on the next
working day, December 6, 2004. With the said dates, it had only one day left from receipt of the January
28, 2005 Order, or until February 10, 2005, to file an appeal (citing Section 2, Rule 22) of the Rules of
Court. Since Veterans Bank did not file an appeal on the following day, it had lost its right to appeal and
the assailed orders allegedly attained finality.
Respondent counters that the issuance of a writ of possession is not an ordinary action for which the
rules on appeal apply. The writ being a mere motion or an order of execution, appeal is not the proper
remedy to question the trial courts ruling. In fact, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that
no appeal may be taken from an order of execution, but Rule 65 special civil actions are available.
Issue: Whether mandamus was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal
Ruling: We rule that mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the issuance of a writ of possession. The
purpose of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A ministerial act is "one which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done."
[G.R. No. 151911 July 25, 2011]
EDGAR PAYUMO vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident that
occurred on February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta.
Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National
Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing one and wounding several others.
The accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not prayer for the issuance of mandamus should be granted
Ruling: The Court finds the petition for mandamus to be bereft of merit. Petitioners failed to adduce clear
and convincing proof to substantiate their submission that the Ombudsman and the OSP unlawfully
neglected the performance of their duty. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to
be exercised and not that of the court.
G.R. No. 141019 November 23, 2011
MERCADO v. VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES EXPLORATION, INC.

Facts: Several parcels of land situated at Barangay Sungay, Iruhin, Tagaytay City declared under the
name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Heirs of Juan Desengao were sold by the City Government of
Tagaytay in a public auction held on November 28, 1983, for failure to pay the real property taxes for
several years. The subject lots were sold in favor of Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc. By virtue of
the purchase at the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City Government of Tagaytay, the tax
declarations covering the subject properties are now in the name of VMMEI as the present owner.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that the correction sought in the 1974 tax declaration to
add the words et al. to the named owners Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada was a purely ministerial function
and can be compelled by a mandamus
Ruling: Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The action lies to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty. A purely ministerial act, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. Well-settled is the rule that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise
of either.
[G.R. No. 191560. March 29, 2011]
HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL vs HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO
Facts: On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C.
Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector. On January
25, 2006, PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. When Roces died in
September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 20085 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner
in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to file a petition for quo warranto since he
was merely appointed in an acting capacity and could be validly removed from office at anytime.
Ruling: An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee. While a
quo warranto is a special civil action, the existence of a cause of action is not any less required since both
special and ordinary civil actions are governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions subject only to the
rules prescribed specifically for a particular special civil action.
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo
warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be
entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another.
[G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012]
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the
2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections
this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Soon thereafter, private
respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all

registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners
eligibility before the RTC.
Issue: Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner
Ruling: The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of
candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto
before the RTC. If a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the
petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for
whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to
raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo
warranto petition under Section 253.
[G.R. No. 168053 September 21, 2011]
REBECCA T. ARQUERO vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of Palawan against public and private
respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3854. Petitioner argued that the designation of
private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of
her right to security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was appointed in a permanent capacity, she
insisted that private respondents designation as OIC of the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy
to the position. Petitioner thus prayed that the RTC issue an order granting the writ of quo warranto
enjoining private respondent from assuming the position of OIC of the PNS, declaring the questioned
designation null and void and without operative effect, and declaring petitioner to be entitled to the office
of the principal of the PNS.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a right to institute this quo warranto proceeding as to the contested
public office and oust private respondent from enjoyment thereof
Ruling: A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is
alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought
by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject
public office. In other words, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested position.
Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo
warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by
virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.
[G.R. No 179579, February 1, 2012]
Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation
Facts: The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1) importer or consignee;
(2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these factors, wheat would be classified
further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%. The regulation
also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation was issued without following
the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified them to be a feed
grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal protection clause of the
Constitution was violated when the regulation treated the non-flour millers differently from flour millers for

no reason at all, and (4) the retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory. The petitioners
thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that an action for declaratory relief was improper.
Issue: Whether or not action for declaratory relief in this case is proper
Ruling: The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be
ripe for judicial determination. We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets
these requirements.
[G.R. No. 167391 June 8, 2011]
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION vs MAXIMO BONIFACIO
Facts: In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after it was served a notice to
vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties. Notably, the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria
Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. And although petitioners complaint is
captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for is for the court to uphold the
validity of its titles as against that of respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the CA judgement is consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for
declaratory relief
Ruling: Yes, since judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay
damages or to perform any act. An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under
a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to
a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
[G.R. No. 193007 July 19, 2011]
RENATO V. DIAZ vs THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Facts: On August 24, 2010 the Court issued a resolution, treating the petition as one for prohibition rather
than one for declaratory relief, the characterization that petitioners Diaz and Timbol gave their action. The
government has sought reconsideration of the Courts resolution, however, arguing that petitioners
allegations clearly made out a case for declaratory relief, an action over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. The government adds, moreover, that the petition does not meet the requirements of Rule 65
for actions for prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions
when it sought to impose VAT on toll fees. Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbol has a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR action in the form of an appeal to the
Secretary of Finance.
Issue: Whether or not the Court may treat the petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition
Ruling: To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT has been imposed,
could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the government. A belated declaration of
nullity of the BIR action would make any attempt to refund to the motorists what they paid an
administrative nightmare with no solution. Consequently, it is not only the right, but the duty of the Court
to take cognizance of and resolve the issues that the petition raises.

Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court has ample
power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions to be resolved are of great
importance to the public. The same may be said of the requirement of locus standi which is a mere
procedural requisite.
[G.R. No. 177611 April 18, 2012]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO L. LEGASPI
Facts: On 8 August 1991, petitioner, thru UPV, filed against respondents the complaint for eminent
domain docketed before the RTC as Civil Case No. 19921. Petitioner alleged, among other matters, that
the subject parcel is within the approved and delineated campus of the UPV which had well-established
its presence in the area by building its laboratories, classrooms, faculty and student centers, among other
facilities; and, that it had been constrained to resort to expropriation in view of the failure of its efforts to
negotiate with respondents for the retention of the property on which it constructed considerable
improvements already being used for academic purposes. Maintaining that the fair market value of the
property at the time of its entry was P49,298.00, UPV sought confirmation of its right of condemnation as
well as the fixing of the just compensation for the property.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred on a question of law in denying the petition for certiorari and affirming
the order of the RTC which did not state the facts and the law on which it is based
Ruling: We find the petition impressed with merit. Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent
domain is the inherent right of the state and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully
delegated to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings be it an
order of expropriation or an order of dismissal finally disposes of the case and is, for said reason, final.
The same is true of the second phase that ends with an order determining the amount of just
compensation which, while essential for the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, is but the last
stage of the expropriation proceedings and the outcome of the initial finding by the court that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint.
[G.R. No. 169957 July 11, 2012]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPS. FLORIMON V. ILETO
Facts: On October 7, 1997, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint, which was
subsequently amended, seeking to expropriate certain parcels of land in Bulacan, in connection with its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line project. As a consequence, the Court hereby allows the National
Power Corporation to remain in possession of the aforementioned areas which it had entered on
December 16, 1997 and further orders it to pay the respective owners thereof the following just
compensation, with legal interest from the taking of possession (Sec. 10, Rule 67 of [the] 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure), and after deducting the sums due the Government for unpaid real estate taxes and
other charges.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation purportedly for the
acquisition of the property despite the fact that the NPC acquired only an aerial easement of right of way
over the agricultural lands of respondents
Ruling: The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the
discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. We
already established in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay that any valuation for just compensation
laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the courts' own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
and how to arrive at such amount.

G.R. No. 185124. January 25, 2012


Republic of the Philippines vs. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc.
Facts: NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao
Irrigation Project. Consequently, it filed with a Regional Trial Court a Complaint for the expropriation of a
portion of 3 parcels of land. Among the affected parcels of land was Lot No.3080 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan (RBK). In its
answer, RBK alleged, inter alia, that it no longer owned Lot No.3080. Subsequently thereafter, in
response to the expropriation complaint, Margarita Tabaoda, Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda
Ortiz, Mario Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas (Intervenors) filed their Answer-in-Intervention. They
essentially pointed out that Tabaoda and Portia were the new owners of Lot No. 3080, which the two
acquired from RBK.
Issue: Was the just compensation awarded correct?
Ruling: Just compensation was the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It is measured not by takers gain, but the owners loss. The equivalent to be rendered to the
property should be real, substantial, full and ample.
The RTC followed the procedure under 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 67 in forming a committee to
determine just compensations. The first committee conducted an ocular inspection and determined the
exact areas affected, as well as the improvements. When the members couldnt agree on valuation, the
RTC selected anew committee to do so. The second committee also conducted an ocular inspection; it
obtained data from the BIR, interviewed adjacent property owners and considered Provincial Ordinance
173 providing the value of the properties and improvements for tax purposes.
[G.R. No. 168770 February 9, 2011]
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano
Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision[1] dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027, affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 57 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, a suit to compel the Republic of the
Philippines and/or the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a
parcel of land.
Issue: Whether abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties were expropriated
entitles petitioners to reacquire them
Ruling: If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course, when the
purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, upon
the contrary, however the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the
land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator and in that case the non-user does not have the
effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
[G.R. No. 169263 September 21, 2011]
CITY OF MANILA vs. MELBA TAN TE
Facts: The records bear that respondent had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda
Dimayuga Reyes in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by a number of families whose leasehold
rights had long expired even prior to said sale. In 1998, respondent had sought before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15 the ejectment of these occupants from the premises. The favorable
ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a
Writ of Demolition at respondents instance. It appears that in the interim between the issuance of the writ
of execution and the order of demolition, the City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case affecting

the same property. Respondent had moved for the dismissal of that first expropriation case for lack of
cause of action, lack of showing of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation, and non-compliance with
the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992. The trial court found merit in the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Issue: Whether or not the local government has the authority to exercise eminent domain
Ruling: Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an
order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of the
just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated.
Expropriation proceedings are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court of
1940 and 1964, where the defendant in an expropriation case conceded to the plaintiffs right to
expropriate (or where the trial court affirms the existence of such right), the court-appointed
commissioners would then proceed to determine the just compensation to be paid. Otherwise, where the
defendant had objections to and defenses against the expropriation of his property, he was required to file
a single motion to dismiss containing all such objections and defenses.

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