Токови историје 2 2012

2/2012.
CURRENTS OF HISTORY
Journal of the Institute for Recent History of Serbia
2/2012
, 2012.

THE INSTITUTE FOR RECENT HISTORY OF SERBIA

Editor-in-chief
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Editorial board

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Editorial secretary

949.71
YU ISSN 0354-6497

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2/2012.

-
( 1966) .......................................................... 15
Dr Dino MUJADEVI
STAVOVI VLADIMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ
OPOZICIJI (19661969) ......................................................... 40
Bojan SIMI, Ph. D.
FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE
1930S, CASES OF POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGRIA .......... 64
M
19411944. ................. 77

19421945.

...................................................................... 92

/ ............................................ 112

:
19451951. .................................. 135

( 1951)
- ? .... 160
.

1956. ............................... 187
5

:
- (19541965) ................................................... 203

A ,
............... 235
Voin BOINOV, Ph. D.

WHY DID YUGOSLAVIA BREAK UP?
A VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE ................................................. 265
, . .

,
............................................................. 272
-
......................................... 294
IN MEMORIAM
.................................................... 315
Prof. dr Mirjana Gross .......................................................... 319
, 19291941,
, , 2011. ( ) ........................... 325
Tito vienja i tumaenja, Zbornik radova, INIS, Arhiv
Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2011. ( ) ........ 328
Mark Mazower, Hitlers Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe,
Penguine books, London, 2009. ( ) ........ 335
6
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War.

Frontline State 19521967, Cass Series: Cold War History,
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2007.
( ) ................................................... 338
Antun Hangi, ivot i obiaji Muslimana,
El-Kelimeh, Novi Pazar, 2010. ( ) ....................... 342

,
,

()
, 2012. .......... 349

Second Joint PhD Symposium on South East Europe
18. 2012, .......................................................... 351

...
, , ,
, 1719. 2012. .............................................. 354

Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in the
Cold War: A True Alternative?, , 2426. 2012. ..... 355

100 ,
, , 12. 13. 2012. ........................ 356
..................................................... 359
CONTENTS
2/2012
ARTICLES
Andrej Borisovi EDEMSKI, Ph. D.
BEHIND THE SCENES OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
(JULYDECEMBER 1966) ........................................................ 15
Dino MUJADEVI, Ph. D.
VLADIMIR BAKARIS STANDS ON CENTRALIST OPPOSITION
(19661969) ....................................................................... 40
Bojan SIMI, Ph. D.
FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE
1930s, CASES OF POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA .......... 64
Nataa MILIEVI, M. A.
NUTRITION IN OCCUPIED BELGRADE 19411944. .................... 77
Dragan CVETKOVI
GERMAN CAMPS IN NORWAY 19421945 A NUMERICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE DEATH TOLL OF YUGOSLAV PRISONERS ........ 92
Aleksandar STOJANOVI
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE SERBIAN
CIVIL/CULTURAL PLAN ......................................................... 112
Slobodan SELINI, Ph. D.
NON-COMMUNIST AMBASSADOR AND PARTY DIPLOMACY:
MARKO RISTI IN PARIS 19451951 ..................................... 135
Aleksandar IVOTI, Ph. D.
WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS (MAYJUNE 1951)
TURNING POINT IN YUGOSLAV-AMERICAN RELATIONS? ........... 160
Vladimir Lj. CVETKOVI, Ph. D.
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEIGHBOURING PEOPLES DEMOCRACY
COUNTIES AT THE BEGINNING OF 1956 ................................. 187
8
Jovan AVOKI, M. A.
THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL STRATEGY: PR CHINA AND
AFRO-ASIA (19541965) ...................................................... 203
SOURCES
Milan PILJAK
A TALK WITH ALEKSANDAR KRAUS, MENAGING DIRECTOR IN
THE YUGOSLAV SELF-MENAGMENT SOCIALIST SYSTEM ............ 235
HISTORIOGRAPHY
Voin BOINOV, Ph. D.
WHY DID YUGOSLAVIA BREAK UP? A VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE . 265
Dejan ZEC, M. A.
MEMOIRS AS SOURCE FOR THE STUDY OF SERBIAN AND
YUGOSLAV FOOTBALL ANALYSIS OF DANILO STOJANOVI,
MIHAILO ANDREJEVI AND JOVAN RUIS MEMOIRS .............. 272
Gordana KRIVOKAPI-JOVI, Ph. D.
OLD AND NEW MEMORY CULTURES ........................................ 294
IN MEMORIAM
Academician edomir Popov .................................................. 315
Prof. Dr. Mirjana Gross ......................................................... 319
REVIEWS
Vladan Jovanovi, Vardarska banovina (The Vardar Banovina)
19291941, INIS, Belgrade, 2011. (Aleksandar LUKI) ............ 325
Tito vienja i tumaenja, Proceedings, (Tito Perceptions and
Interpretations), INIS, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Belgarde, 2011.
(Nikola TOI MALEEVI) ................................................... 328
Mark Mazower, Hitlers Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe,
Penguin books, London, 2009. (Aleksandar STOJANOVI) ......... 335

Frontline State 19521967, Cass Series: Cold War History,
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2007.
(Aleksandar IVOTI) .......................................................... 338
Antun Hangi, ivot i obiaji Muslimana, (Life and Customs of
Muslims) El-Kelimeh, Novi Pazar, 2010. (Milena IKI) ............. 342
SCIENTIFIC EVENTS
Information on workshops,
conferences, symposiums
Milan PILJAK
Colleagues from the Graduate School of Humanities, University
of Groningen, (Holland) visit the Institute for Recent History of
Serbia, May, 2012 ................................................................ 349
Aleksandar STOJANOVI
Second Joint PhD Symposium on South East Europe, London,
18 June, 2012 ..................................................................... 351
International conference Complex sixties Economics,
politics, culture of USSR, and Eastern Europe (
... , ,
), Moscow, 1719 April, 2012 .................... 354
International conference Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in the
Cold War: A True Alternative?, Belgrade, 2426 May 2012 ....... 355
Slobodan SELINI, Ph. D.
International symposium 100 years of Serbian Military Air Force,
V and PVO Headquarters, Zemun, 1213 June 2012 ................. 356
INFORMATION ON AUTHORS ............................................ 359
10

29. 2012.
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Articles
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2. jula povodom IV sednice CK SKJ; Informacija o sadraju telegrama upuenih
drugu Titu 5. jula povodom IV sednice CK SKJ; Informacija o sadraju telegrama
upuenih drugu Titu 8. jula povodom IV sednice CK SKJ; Izvodi iz telegrama i pisama
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(zahtevi, sugestije, ocene i miljenja), Beograd, 20 jul 1966; Spisak primljenih
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38
. .
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( 1966)
Summary
Andrej Borisovi Edemski, Ph. D.
Behind the scenes of Soviet-Yugoslav relations
(JulyDecember 1966)
Key words: 20th century history, foreign policy, Cold War,
Soviet-Yugoslav relations, partocracy, J. B. Tito, L. I. Brezhnev,
A. Rankovi, J. B. Andropov
The 60s of the last century marked for Josip Broz Tito and
his closest associates, who came to power in Yugoslavia during
19441945, a special stage in their battle to keep their leadership
position in the country and Party. They endeavored to build an optimal model of a multinational state that would be different from
the command-administrative Soviet system as well as the Western
democracies. However, the reforms they initiated only sped up the
further disintegration of the country. The removal of A. Rankovi and
the purges carried out among his highly positioned supporters did
not have fundamental bearing on the relations between two countries
but had serious consequences. Apart from having a negative stand
on the events in Yugoslavia in 1966 the Soviet side restrained itself
from reacting by solely stressing the further strengthening of J. B.
Titos position as the guarantee for the further development of SovietYugoslav relations. The Soviet side considered that Yugoslavia would
not become a demoralizing example for the other countries of the
Soviet socialist system as a country where the communists lost power
for the first time. Such a soft reaction was not surprising since a
similar process was taking place within the Soviet leadership: in that
period Brezhnev began to distance from the principles of collective
leadership proclaimed in October 1964 and started concentrating all
the power into his own hands. Soon using the Yugoslav experience of
Rankovics case he dealt harshly with his rivals I. Shelepin and P.
Semichastny.
39
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323(497.1)1966(093.2)
32:929 .(093.2)
342.24:329.15(497.5)1966/1969(093.2)
# Dr Dino MUJADEVI
STAVOVI VLADIMIRA BAKARIA O
CENTRALISTIKOJ OPOZICIJI (19661969)
APSTRAKT: Autor raspravlja o odnosu prvaka SKH i jednog od
najutjecajnijih jugoslavenskih komunista Vladimira Bakaria prema grupi koju je nazivao centralistima tj. prema opoziji samoupravnim reformama koje je zagovarao u razdoblju 19661969.
Bakari je smatrao da je rije o idejno jedinstvenoj skupini, priblino identinoj s pristaama Aleksandra Rankovia, koja uglavnom djeluje u beogradskim bankama, reeksportnim poduzeima
i medijima te raspolae jakim utjecajem na javnost u SR Srbiji.
Glavne toke prijepora izmeu Bakaria i njegovih pristaa i
centralista bile su privredna reforma, bankarski sektor, financiranje velikih infrastrukturnih projekata te Fond za nerazvijene.
Kljune rijei: Vladimir Baraki, stavovi, centaralisti, KPJ,
Aleksandar Rankovi
Uvod
Sukobi i prijepori u jugoslavenskom partijskom vrhu i drutvu
oko pitanja odnosa jugoslavenskog saveznog sredita i republika,
odnosno pitanje decentralizacije i prava republika, u razdoblju nakon
Brijunskog plenuma 1966. koje je svojom djelatnou obiljeio ef
SKH Vladmir Bakari to je po svim pokazateljima zapravo i vrhunac
njegovog politikog utjecaja nisu do sada bili predmetom posebnog
povijesnog istraivanja, a memoarska literatura takoer nije obilna.
Autori koji su pisali posebne studije o samom Brijunskom plenumu,
tj. njegovom odjeku u javnosti, Milan Piljak i Katarina Spehnjak, tek
su se uzgred doticali razdoblja koje je uslijedilo nakon ove prijelomne
sjednice.1 Autori koji su se bavili studentskim nemirima u Jugoslaviji i
1
: 1966. , 1/2010, str.

7395; Katarina Spehnjak: Brionski plenum odjeci IV. sjednice CK SKJ iz srpnja
40
D. MUJADEVI
STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

OPOZICIJI (19661969)
meunarodnim poloajem Jugoslavije, te stanjem u JNA godine 1968,

Hrvoje Klasi i Mile Bjelajac, u znaajnoj se mjeri u svojim radovima
dotiu opih politikih odnosa i unutranje dinamike u tadanjem jugoslavenskom partijskom vrhu, no nisu ih izuavali detaljnije.2 Srpska
memoaristika koja obrauje ovo razdoblja preteito se bavi zbivanjima uoi i tijekom Brijunskog plenuma 1966, dok hrvatska teite
stavlja na zbivanja 19701971. poznata kao Hrvatsko proljee ili
Maspok.3
Temelj ovog rada predstavljaju autorova istraivanja u Osobnom
fondu Vladimir Bakari (OFVB) u Hrvatskom dravnom arhivu (HDA).
OFVB je nastao unutar administracije CK SKH prikupljanjem Bakarievih
istupa i materijala koji su mu dolazili i u sklopu njega se nalaze i
gotovo svi njegovi istupi (inae ne pretjerano esti) na razliitim jugoslavenskim i hrvatskim, dravnim i partijskim tijelima u ovom razdoblju. OFVB sadri dijelom grau dravnih i partijskih organa koja se
nalazi u drugim fondovima, osobito u fondovima CK SKH (HDA) i CK
SKJ (Arhiv Jugoslavije), ali takoer transkripte Bakarievih privatnih
sastanaka i, u manjoj mjeri, privatnu korespond enciju i biljeke. Ovaj
fond donedavno nije bio temeljito istraen te mu znanost, posebno
srpska i hrvatska historiografija, tek trebaju posvetiti veu panju.
Za drugu polovicu 60-ih, period kojim se bavimo u ovom radu, graa
u OFVB je osobito obilna i predstavlja fond koji daje najbolji pregled
za istraivanje Bakarieve politike djelatnosti u ovom razdoblju te
jednu od nadragocjenijih zbirki izvora za jugoslavensku povijest druge
polovice 60-ih uope.4
1966. godine u hrvatskoj politikoj javnosti, asopis za suvremenu povijest, br.

3, 1999, str. 463489. Piljak donosi prikaz zbivanja iz perspektive srpske politike
i historiografske tradicije, Spehnjak pak iz hrvatske. Ocjene Brijunskog plenuma i
pada A. Rankovia iz razliitih perspektiva v. takoer kod: Jovan P. Popovi, etvrta
sednica CK SKJ. Brionski plenum, Beograd, 1999, str. 4750; Branko Petranovi,
Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, sv. 2, Beograd, str. 571572; Povijest Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1985, str. 431432; Duan Bilandi, Hrvatska moderna povijest, Zagreb, 1999, str. 489503; Zdenko Radeli, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji,
Zagreb, 2006. str. 363366; Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska 19182008, Zagreb, 2008, str.
507508.
Hrvoje Klasi, Jugoslavija i svijet 1968, Zagreb, 2012; , 60- , 1968 40 , , 2008.
Kao najznaajnije primjere srpske memoaristike v.: Dobrica osi, Pievi zapisi,
12, Beograd, 2000. i Aleksandar Rankovi, Dnevnike zabeleke, Beograd, 2001.
Hrvatsku memoaristiku zastupaju Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljee, Zagreb, 1990;
Savka Dabevi-Kuar, Sedamdesetprva. Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, sv. 12, Zagreb, 1997.
Dino Mujadevi, Bakari. Politika biografija, Zagreb, 2011, str. 1012. Moja monografija temelji se dobrim dijelom na OFVB i predstavlja prvo temeljito, no nipoto
potpuno i konano istraivanje ove grae.
41
2/2012.
Fokus ovoga rada su prve godine dominacije Kardeljeve i Bakarieve skupine u vrhu SKJ, razdoblje 19661969. Namjeravam dati vrlo detaljan pregled stavova hrvatskog politikog monika Vladimira Bakaria o politikim suparnicima nove vladajue strukture. U
ovom razdoblju Bakarieve izjave, kako na javnim tako i na tajnim
sastancima, posveene su suzbijanju opozicije koje je djelovala u
Beogradu i drugdje, preteito u ekonomskom i medijskom sektoru ali
i u saveznim i srbijanskim partijskim tijelima, protivei se tekovinama
koju je donijela prevlast njegove frakcije: politikoj decentralizaciji i
smanjenju dravnog intervencionizma u gospodarstvu, no ne nuno
i relativnoj drutvenoj i politikoj liberalizaciji koju je ona zastupala.
U oima Vladimira Bakaria bili su to pristae ili ak isti ljudi koji su
bili politiki marginalizirani u vrhu SKJ uoi i tijekom 1966. U brojnim
transkriptima sastanaka Bakaria i njegovih najbliih suradnika sauvanih u OFVB, koji su i glavni izvori za ovaj rad, ti se politiki oponenti
najee nazivaju centralistima. U nekim izvorima iz druge polovice
60-ih Bakari i njegovi suradnici esto govore o birokratizmu i pristaama starog sistema, mislei na priblino istu skupinu oponenata
najnovijim samoupravnim reformama. Vano je napomenuti da to nisu
termini koje su koristili sami Bakarievi oponenti u ovom razdoblju
da bi sebe opisali te da je rije o generaliziranju, esto s vrlo malo
pokria. Sve upuuje da kritiari novog rukovodstva SKJ, ba kao i
sama skupina oko Kardelja i Bakaria, nisu bili heterogena skupina,
ako su uope i bili skupina. Iz vizure Vladimira Bakaria njegovi su
oponenti bili jasno definirana suparnika skupina s jasnim ciljem i
obiljejima, no, ini se, da je stvarno stanje bilo mnogo kompleksnije.
Budua historiografska istraivanja trebala bi dati jasniju strukturu o
Kardeljevim i Bakarievim kritiarima iz ovog razdoblja, a ovaj rad, koji se ograniava na Bakariev doivljaj konflikta, dati poticaj daljnjem
istraivanju.5
Vladimir Bakari i njegova frakcija

Vladimir Bakari je kao osoba od najveeg povjerenja jugoslavenskog dravnog i partijskog efa Josipa Broza Tita od jeseni 1944.
5
Neke openite napomene o samupravnoj reformi u razdoblju 19661979. mogu se

nai u sljedeim monografijama: Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije, sv. 2, str. 569
580; Povijest Saveza komunista, str. 432444; Latinka Perovi, Zatvaranje kruga.
Ishod politikog rascepa u SKJ 19711972, Sarajevo, 1991; Bilandi, Hrvatska
moderna, str. 504507, 528537; Radeli, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji, str. 379381;
Goldstein, Hrvatska 19182008, str. 534536.
42
D. MUJADEVI

bio na elu hrvatskih komunista (u razdoblju 19451953. bio je i

na elu hrvatske vlade). Izmeu 1953. i 1966. obnaao je dunost
sekretara Izvrnog komiteta Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista
Hrvatske (IK CK SKH) te je nakon statutarnih promjena 1966, koje
su predviale uvoenje dunosti predsjednika i predsjednitva CK
SKJ i CK republikih i pokrajinskih partijskih ogranaka, ostao na elu IK CK SKH kao predsjednik, zadravi se na toj dunosti sve do
proljea 1969. godine. Bakarievi su istupi u razdoblju 19661969. bili
ponajvie posveeni gospodarskom stanju u cijeloj Jugoslaviji. irenje
njegovog ekonomsko-teorijskog i komentatorskog interesa na itavu
Jugoslaviju bilo je popraeno ravnomjernim poveanjem njegove moi.
Naime, njegov utjecaj na saveznoj razni, kao jednog od dvojice voa
vladajue hrvatsko-slovenske reformske frakcije u vrhu SKJ, bio je
izrazito znaajan u ovom razdoblju, neposredno nakon pada Aleksandra Rankovia 1966. Napustivi godine 1969. elno mjesto SKH, njegova su javna vidljivost i utjecaj prilino opali, premda je nastavio
djelovati iz sjene sve do velikog povratka na javnu scenu 1974.6
to je omoguilo da razdoblje 19661969. bude vrhunac Bakarieva politikog djelovanja, period koji je tako znaajno obiljeio
djelovanjem u javnosti i iza zatovorenih vrata? Uklanjanje Aleksandra
Rankovia iz vrha SKJ na dramatinom Brijunskom plenumu 1966.
omoguilo je uz potpoporu jugoslavenskog predsjednika i efa SKJ
Josipa Broza Tita konanu uspostavu prevlasti skupine politiara na
elu s Edvardom Kardeljom i Vladimirom Bakariem u jugoslavenskom
partijskom vrhu, poznate u dijelu literature i tadanjeg meunarodnog
tiska kao liberalna, nedogmatska ili reformska frakcija. Ovi nazivi
se trebaju, naravno, uzimati s oprezom budui da je rije o nazivima
koji su koristile osobe koje nisu bile ukljuene u zbivanja u vrhu SKJ
i koji sakrivaju pravu narav samoupravne ideologije koju su zastupali
Kardelj i Bakari. Primjerice pojedini strani novinari ve 1964. nazivaju
Vladimira Bakaria liderom liberalne frakcije unato tome to niti u
jednom trenutku u ovom razdoblju, kao ni ranije ni kasnije Bakari
nije bitnije odstupio od jugoslavenskog autoritarnog jednostranakog
ureenja i kulta linosti Josipa Broza Tita.7
6
7
Za Bakarievu politiku djelatnost v.: Mujadevi, Bakari.

O Bakariu kao predvodniku liberalne struje v. ove strane novinske tekstove:
Jugoslawien nach dem achten Parteikongre, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 22. XII.
43
2/2012.
Naravno, i sam koncept frakcije nalazi se pod upitnikom jer

je rije o skupini politiara koji su inili vrlo labavi i esto ideoloki
nekoherentni savez, okupljen ponekad jedino eljom da se suzbije zajedniki protivnik. Ponekad su se i sami Kardelj i Bakari razilazili oko
vrlo znaajnih pitanja, no ini se da su preteito djelovali kao saveznici
te je, smatram, opravdano govoriti o njima i njihovim pristaama
kao zasebnoj skupini, frakciji. Kardeljeva i Bakarieva skupina je nakon 1966. nastavila s promicanjem korjenitih ustavnih reformi utemeljenih na idejama samoupravljanja i svojim djelovanjem nekad
izravno, ponekad neizravno otvorila prostor znaajnoj politikoj decentralizaciji te odreenoj no ne i korjenitoj gospodarskoj i drutvenoj liberalizaciji u cijeloj Jugoslaviji u razdoblju izmeu 1966. i
1972. godine. Za razliku od razdoblja prije 1966, samoupravljaka anticentralistika ideologija, koju promiu Kardelj i Bakari, sada postaje
jedina norma i na njoj razvijeni novogovor potpuno dominira javnim
diskursom te je oporba takvim procesima, openito gledano, bila u
defenzivi, no ne i bez utjecaja u nekim sferama javnog ivota. U kasnijim godinama reformska frakcija postaje meutim glavni nositelj
pojaane autoritarne represije i drutvene konzervativnosti, a provoenje njenih ideja dovodi do ekonomskog kolapsa krajem 70-ih.8
Glavno obiljeje stavova Vladimira Bakaria o unutarjugoslavenskim odnosima tijekom 60-ih bilo je usmjereno na pokuaj balansiranja izmeu opih jugoslavenskih interesa i partikularnih hrvatskih interesa unutar samoupravne socijalistike ideologije, ijem je
oblikovanju dosta pridonjeo, iako u manjoj mjeri od Edvarda Kardelja.
Smatrao je da su odnosi unutar jugoslavenske zajednice vrlo kompleksni te da svaka pojedina republika poneto dobiva i poneto gubi
u njoj. Bakari se estoko i iskreno protivio hrvatskom nacionalizmu te
je smatrao da je jugoslavenska zajednica najbolje rjeenje za hrvatski
narod, no istodobno nikada nije naputao ulogu borca za posebne interese ponekad vrlo konkretne svoje partijske i drutvene baze,
hrvatskih samoupravljaa. Hrvatski samoupravljai su trebali, naglaavao je u ovom razdoblju, osigurati prvenstveno svoje klasne interese
1964; Yugoslav Scores Party Stalinists. He Says Some Politicians Hinder Decentralization, The New York Times, 22. IX. 1964.
O pitanju karaktera i naziva Kardeljeve i Bakarieve frakcije v.: Dennison Rusinow,
Yugoslav Experiment 19481974, Berkley Los Angeles, 1978, str. 158159; J.
R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 2000, str. 289291; Sabrina P. Ramet, The three
Yugoslavias. State Building and Legitimitation, 19182005, Washington 2006, str.
209212, 218219; Mujadevi, Bakari, str. 214257.
44
D. MUJADEVI

kroz samoupravne reforme tj. decentralizaciju svih oblika upravljanja,

ne samo na razini jugoslavenskog centralnog nego i na republikom
nivou. Oekivao je da e i samoupravljai iz redova drugih naroda
doi do identinog zakljuka i suraivati na ravnopravnim osnovama
unutar Jugoslavije. Radi ostvarenja tog cilja bilo je potrebno, drao je,
suzbiti stare snage koje su, tvrdio je, eljele zadrati centraliziranu
saveznu dravu s jakim sreditem u Beogradu, ba kao to je elio
suzbiti istovremeno i partikularne nacionalizme. Jaanje nacionalne
drave tj. republike drao je pogrenim i estoko ga je osuivao, no
u stvarnosti reforme koje je promicao doprinosile su upravo tome.
Bakari je smatrao da e radnika klasa u temeljito decentraliziranom,
samoupravnom drutvu samostalno izabrati junoslavensku suradnju
i povezivanje i odbaciti nacionalizam.
Bakarieva optimistina oekivanja o samoupravljanju su se
ve krajem 60-ih pokazala iluzornim, a nacionalna euforija poetkom
70-ih u Hrvatskoj i neke druge devijacije neeljena posljedica njegovih reformi nagnale su ga da se povno okrene poveanoj autoritarnoj represiji kao obliku provoenja samoupravnih reformi. Borbu za
svojevrsnu hrvatsku emancipaciju od saveznog centra, koju je upravo
Bakari vodio iza zatvorenih vrata, preuzeli su njegovi nasljednici u
Hrvatskoj Savka Dabevi-Kuar i Miko Tripalo i dali joj nacionalo
obojene tonove. Od strane najveeg dijela nacionalno orijentirane,
partijske i izvanpartijske opozicije u Hrvatskoj Bakari je doivljavan
kao izrazito jugoslavenski politiar i glavni neprijatelj istinske hrvatske nacionalne emancipacije, dok je u drugim dijelovima Jugoslavije,
osobito Srbiji, doivljavan vrlo esto kao utjelovljenje hrvatskog partikularizma i demontiranja jake zajednike drave. Paradoks svih
samoupravnih reformi, koje su nominalno teile demokratizaciji drutva, bila je injenica da su se provodile putem autoritarne kontrole
jednostranakog reima ne izgubivi tu osobinu do samoga kraja.9
Otpor centralista Privrednoj reformi

U intervjuu beogradskom listu Borbi u prosincu 1967. Bakari
je pokuao saeti ciljeve nove etape privredne reforme zapoete
1965, glavne tekovine samoupravnih reformi na polju ekonomije u
9
O generalnim stavovima Vladimira Bakaria u ovom razdoblju, osobito o nacionalnom pitanju i ideji Jugoslavije v.: Bilandi, Hrvatska moderna, str. 442, 607;
Mujadevi, Bakari, str. 242252.
45
2/2012.
tom desetljeu. Prema njegovom miljenju trebalo je nastaviti s razvlaivanjem birokracije, tj. dravnoga aparata, koju je prvenstveno
povezivao s centralistikim snagama, i onemoguiti toj skupini da
raspolae s vikom rada. Njime bi u budunosti trebali raspolagati
iskljuivo proizvoai. Birokracija je dotada, tvrdio je Bakari, bila
prilino mona pa joj se dogodilo da gubi u klasnoj svijesti i revolucionarnosti i ne moe shvatiti sljedeu etapu razvitka. Prema
programu CK SKJ, koji je Bakari podrao, do 1970. trebalo je ostvariti da privredi od vika vrijednosti odreenog za materijalnu reprodukciju ostaje na raspolaganju 70%. Ostatak od 30% trebao je
ii dravi i drutveno-politikim zajednicama i moralo ga se upotrijebiti za napredak jugoslavenskoga samoupravljanja. Intervju Borbi
iskoristio je da se osvrne na svoj novi interes: jugoslavensko bankarstvo, preteito skoncentrirano u Beogradu. U intervjuu je diplomatski naznaio da se ta privredna grana vrlo lako moe nai izvan
neposrednog samoupravljanja, tj. pod kontrolom oporbe novoj vladajuoj strukturi u Jugoslaviji.10
Bakari i njegovi pristae su se sada suoavali za po sebe
negativnim posljedicama liberalizacije gospodarstva, koje su sami inicirali putem privredne reforme zapoete 1965. Kao to ukazuje povjesniar Fred Singleton, poduzea ukljuujui i banke bila su vie-manje slobodna od dravnog nadzora na osnovu mjera usvojenih u
sklopu privredne reforme.11 Sustavom se vie nije upravljalo vrstom
rukom. Ako bi poduzea dola u ruke centralistike ili druge oporbe,
bila bi to znaajna opasnost za reformsku frakciju jer vie nije bilo
puno mogunosti da ih izravno nadzire. Bakarieve bojazni u pogledu
bankarskoga sektora ubrzo e se pokazati opravdanima.
Uz prisutnost vie od tisuu delegata od 5. do 7. XII 1968.
odran je VI kongres SKH. Na kongresu je Bakari proitao svoj podui referat u kojem je elio prikazati rezultate privredne reforme u
Jugoslaviji. Bakari je bio oprezan pri prognoziranju budunosti o teaju
dinara koji je, kao to je rekao nekoliko mjeseci prije, bio privremeno
stabilan. Govorei o trajnoj stabilizaciji teaja jugoslavenske monete,
Bakari je rekao da reforma teaja ima mnogo vie izgleda da stabilizira dinar nego to su ga imali raniji slini pokuaji, koji su zavravali
prostom devalvacijom dinara i nastavkom istog privrednog toka koji
10
11
HDA, OFVB, kut. 67, Razgovor Vladimira Bakaria sa urednicima Borbe 17. XII
1967.
Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, New York, 1976, str. 154155.
46
D. MUJADEVI

je neminovno vodio do daljnje stvarne devalvacije. S druge strane,

postojalo je mnogo otpora gospodarskoj liberalizaciji. Bakari je istaknuo da mnogi nisu shvaali da e privredne reforme biti bolne i dalekosene jer taj kurs povlai za sobom itav niz tekoa i problema
koji duboko zadiru u same temelje naeg tadanjeg drutva, da je
neprovediv bez drutvene reforme, odlune, temeljite promjene u
nizu socijalnih odnosa u samoj zemlji. Prema Bakariu privredna je
reforma dovela do korekture cijena tj. poveane su cijene sirovina
te se time pokualo preraivaku industriju natjerati na bolje privreivanje. Preraivaka industrija je prije uz relativno visoke cijene
zbog nerazvijenog trita mogla prihodovati vrlo velika sredstva i
ostati na razini niske produktivnosti. Bakari je tvrdio da je promjena
cijena nakon 1965. u Jugoslaviji vrlo brzo popravila stanje u industriji
sirovina. Reforma je s druge strane dovela do pojave rasta razlika
plaa u razliitim gospodarskim granama a drava je bila nemona
smanjiti ih. Velika sredstva poela su dotjecati bankama i trgovinskim
(reeksportnim) poduzeima, koja su zbog toga mogla postati kreditori
brojnih poduzea i oduzimala im zaradu. Zbog stroge kontrole emisije
novca u svrhu onemoguavanja inflacije zavladala je opa nelikvidnost
u poduzeima. Dolo je do jaanja privatnoga sektora.
Takvi su procesi, prema Bakariu, doveli do pojave zagovornika
povratka na stari sistem, u kojem su razlike plaa bile male te je
drava izdano financirala potrebe poduzea izazivajui inflaciju. Bakari je bio miljenja da samoupravljanje, kojemu je teila njegova
reformska frakcija, ne moe jamiti jednakost primanja jer neka
poduzea daju vie na osobne dohotke, a neka manje. Neka poduzea uslijed monopolskog poloaja i inae pogodovanog poloaja
i konjunkturnog stanja na tritu za njihove proizvode, mogu isplaivati visoke osobne dohotke. Poduzea koja su isplaivala manje
plae inila su to jer su, pritisnuta konkurencijom na svjetskom tritu i svojim velikim kapacitetima, morala odravati niske cijene, a
istovremeno su morala ulagati u razvoj kako bi se odrala na meunarodnom tritu. Smatrao je takoer da drava drutvenu nejednakost ne moe lijeiti izravnim oduzimanjem novca onima koji zarauju vie. Tekoe s kojima se susretalo gospodarstvo trebalo je
prema Bakariu pripisati neprilagoenosti tritu. Mnoga poduzea
bila su ovisna o starom sustavu te je gospodarstvo ostalo zakoeno
u novim uvjetima. Zbog gospodarskih tekoa poela se gubiti vjera u
napredak samoupravljanja te su se u drutvu pojavile konzervativne
47
2/2012.
i reakcionarne tendence, osobito meu mladima koji su smatrali da

im je perspektiva ugroena.12
Jaanje centralista i Bakariev protuudar (1968)

Djelovanje Kardeljeve i Bakarieve struje na reformi federacije
nakon konane pobjede nad Rankoviem u lipnju 1966. isprva nije
nailazilo na mnogo stvarnog otpora, no tijekom 1968. centralistike
oporbene tendencije su, iz Bakarieve vizure, ponovno ojaale. Na
to je upuivao snaan otpor koji su pripadnici reformske struje
doivljavali pri pokuajima ukidanja velikih infrastrukturnih projekata
i reforme bankarskog sustava 1968. Ovi oporbeni elementi koje je
Bakari smatrao jedinstvenenom skupinom (centralisti), premda poraeni u samom vrhu SKJ, djelovali su gotovo bez ikakvih problema u
medijima i gospodarstvu te su uivali veliku javnu podrku, prvenstveno u SR Srbiji, a vrh SK Srbije zastupao je stavove koji su dijelom bili
bliski onome to je Bakari obino smatrao tipinim centralistikim
shvaanjima primjerice obrana saveznih infrastrukturnih projekata. Paradoksalno, razlog ovog ponovnog jaanja bila je stanovita liberalizacija gospodarstva i drutva na temelju samoupravne reforme koju
su gurali Bakari i Kardelj! Dravne, partijske i privredne strukture u
sklopu kojih je najee djelovala oporba vie nije bilo lako nadzirati
jer sredinji dravni i partijski organi slubeno vie nisu imali tako
iroke ingerencije. Obraun s njima bio je gotovo nemogu ako bi se
dosljedno pridravali osnovnih parametara samoupravne ideologije.
Stoga je Bakari morao pribjegavati metodama zaobilaznog pritiska,
prvenstveno preko medija na koje je mogao utjecati.
Bakari je u travnju 1968. u razgovoru s Boom Novakom, direktorom novinsko-izdavake kue Vjesnik, rekao da se u beogradskoj
javnosti pojavila opa tendenca na povratak natrag, na centralizam.
Beogradsko glasilo Ekonomska politika bilo je predvodnik te tendencije. Bakari je opisao ovaj list kao organ aparata i to onoga od zla
oca i gore matere. Ekonomska politika je u posljednje vrijeme zapoela s kampanjom zagovaranja investiranja u velike objekte, to
je Bakari ocijenio kao pisanje direktno usmjereno protiv reforme.
Zbog rasta takve opozicije Boi Novaku sugerirao je da tu moemo
12
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Izlaganje dr Vladimira Bakaria na VI kongresu SK Hrvatske 5.

XII 1968. god.
48
D. MUJADEVI

otvoriti jednu diskusiju, ime je dao Novaku zeleno svjetlo da Vjesnik

i VUS ponu pisati protiv tih strujanja u Beogradu. Trebalo je paziti
da u tome budemo konstruktivni u smislu izgradnje sistema te je
savjetovao da bi trebalo izbjegavati kritini stil hrvatske novinarke
Nede Krmpoti.13 Tijekom protucentralistike kampanje trebalo je takoer precizirati da hrvatsko rukovodstvo s Bakariem na elu ipak
zagovora izvjesni centralizam tj. da Jugoslavija bude stvarna federacija, a ne konfederacija republika. Prema Bakariu trenutna situacija je bila da o svemu odluuju republike, to treba ukinuti. U
nekim stvarima republike bi trebale odluivati suvereno bez federacije, a u nekim uope ne bi trebale imati rijei.14
U sklopu neizravne medijske kampanje protiv centralistikih
snaga u Srbiji zagrebako novinstvo je esto pisalo i o loem stanju
Albanaca na Kosovu. Novak je Bakariu priopio kako je VUS planirao
pisati o loem poloaju Albanaca na Kosovu na osnovu materijala
koji su dobili od novinara pritinskoga lista Rilindija, no uslijedile su
intervencije od strane srbijanskoga partijskoga rukovodstva da se o
tome ne pie. Bakari je sugerirao Novaku da ne objavljuju sporne
tekstove, no da ne odustanu od usputnoga kritiziranja Beograda zbog
stanja na Kosovu. Rekao mu je da se dri nekakvog dentlemenskog
sporazuma sa Beogradom pa o tome ne piete direktno, ali otvorite
odozdola druge stvari. Zakljuio je da moemo pisati, recimo, o toj
nacionalnoj renesansi dolje, tj. na Kosovu.15
U razgovoru s predstavnicima hrvatskih medija poetkom oujka 1969. Bakari im je obeao da e hrvatsko rukovodstvo i njegovi
predstavnici u Beogradu podrati njihovo pisanje u sluaju cenzure
i da ih se nee odrei. Bakari se tijekom razgovora retoriki upitao:
na koncu konca, tko e vas cenzurirati? I prije je bilo pritisaka iz
Sekretarijata za inostrane poslove ali smo se ipak dogovorili ta treba
njih sluati i gdje ih ne treba sluati. I u budunosti dogovoriti emo
se tako o svemu drugome i tu ne bi trebalo poputati. Sebi je pripisao
zasluge za relativno slobodno djelovanje tiska u Hrvatskoj: inicirao
sam jednu politiku da budete nezavisni i prilino sam se angairao da
je sprovedete.16
13
14
15
16
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Nekorigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora Dr Vladimira Bakaria sa Boom Novakom dana 11. IV 1968. god.
Isto.
Isto.
HDA, OFVB, kut. 69, Neredigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora dr V.
Bakaria sa predstavnicima tampe i RTV dana 5. III 1969 god.
49
2/2012.
Kao to je nagovijestio u intervjuu Borbi 1967, Bakaria je sve

vie zanimalo pitanje jugoslavenskog bankarstva. Tijekom 1968. to
je pitanje zaotrio u svojim javnim istupima. Bakari je sada traio
reformu jugoslavenskog bankarskog sustava jer su neke banke i izvozna trgovinska (reeksportna) poduzea, preteito sa sjeditem u Beogradu, putem kredita koje su mnoga poduzea zbog rairene nelikvidnosti morala uzimati postali vjerovnici dobrom dijelu gospodarstva
i, umjesto radnika, stvarni korisnici dohodaka koje su ostvarivala poduzea. Time su osobito bila pogoena hrvatska turistika poduzea
koja su privreivala lavovski dio jugoslavenskih deviza, no morala su ih
davati za otplatu kredita bankama i reeksportnim poduzeima. Prema
Bakariu to nije bilo samo pitanje gospodarske neravnopravnosti, nego i raspodjele politike moi. Bakari je u razgovoru s Boom Novakom u travnju 1968. upozorio da centralistika struja sada ima uporite u bankama i velikim reeksportnim poduzeima te bi to treblo sprijeiti (to bi morali da rasepusamo). Prema Bakariu beogradskim
bankama i reeksportnim poduzeima sada komanduje nekoliko dripaca tamo ustvari udbovaca starih, oito aludirajui na Rankovie
pristae koji su bili donedavno jaki u saveznoj UDB-i. Za njega je
njihovo ponaanje bilo ista pljaka Jugoslavije i to beogradska
pljaka. Strukture koje su dominirale u bankama kontrolirale su sada
putem svojih kredita jugoslavenske investicije tj. ukupan drutveni
razvoj, a to im je upravo omoguila privredna reforma zapoeta 1965.
za koju se, paradoksalno, izborio upravo Bakari. Upravni odbori
banaka i reeksportnih poduzea bili su samostalni u odluivanju o investicijama. Bakari je smatrao da to nije bilo u skladu sa samoupravnim idealima jer privreda od ijih su kamata ivjeli na to nikakvog
uticaja nema, a ive ustvari od drutvenog monopola koji imaju, alio
se Bakari. elio je to to prije promijeniti.17
U drugoj polovici godine Bakari je preao u javnu ofenzivu
protiv beogradskih banaka i reeksportnih poduzea. U listopadu 1968,
u govoru jednoj manjoj skupini lanova SKH podsjetio je da beogradske
banke sada raspolau sredstvima koja su se nekad nalazila u saveznim
fondovima. Iako je drava uvela upravne odbore u bankama kako bi
bankovne investicije i krediti bili pravednije rasporeeni, Bakari je
17
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Nekorigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora Dr Vladimira Bakaria sa Boom Novakom dana 11. IV 1968. god.
50
D. MUJADEVI

javno izrazio bojazan zbog prevelikog utjecaja direktora banaka koji

su sada rapolagali s izuzetnom moi.18
Uskoro je uslijedila i njihova osuda pred jo veim auditorijem.
Naime, u referatu na VI kongresu SKH u prosincu 1968. Bakari je jo
jasnije javnosti progovorio o ulozi beogradskih banaka i izvoznih trgovinskih (reeksportnih) poduzea u iskoritavanju hrvatskih poduzea.
Oni su davali kredite poduzeima pod uvjetima koji oduzimaju praktiki sav viak rada te su kolektivi esto pritisnuti na golo pokrivanje
trokova poslovanja i osobnih prihoda. Osobito teko su bila pogoena turistika poduzea u Hrvatskoj, koja rade na granici rentabilnosti
zbog visokih kamata i visokih anuiteta otplate duga. Bakari je takvo
kreditiranje smatrao protivnim samoupravnom socijalizmu jer ima
u sebi mnogo kapitalistikih elemenata i ide putem /bankovnog/
kapitala koji trai najbolje podruje za svoje oploivanje. U konanici
takav kredit pridonosi rjeavanju niza razvojnih problema ali konzervira neke drutvene odnose.19 Pitanje deviza koje su iz hrvatskih
poduzea odlazile bankama i reeksportnim poduzeima, koje je javno
tijekom 1968. pokrenuo upravo Bakari, postat e 197071. jedna
od glavnih, emocionalno najnabijenijih, tema tijekom Hrvatskog proljea. U oima pristaa nacionalnog buenja bio je to moan simbol
iskoritavanja Hrvatske od strane Beograda, no tada je Bakarieva
uloga u pokretanju ovoga pitanja ve bila zaboravljena!
Sukobi izbijaju na vidjelo: prijepori oko bilanca federacije

U ovom razdoblju Bakari se javno i otro protivio izgradnji
novih velikih infrastrukturnih objekata iz saveznoga prorauna, koje su
osobito zagovarali predstavnici SR Srbije. Ti su projekti iziskivali velika
sredstva, to je prema Bakariu koilo jugoslavensko gospodarstvo.
Od tih projekata najee je spominjana hidorelektrana erdap, pruga
BeogradBar i kanal DunavTisaDunav. U razgovoru s predstavnicima
RTV Zagreb Bakari je u rujnu 1968. izjavio da bi trebalo dovriti tek
neke od tih projekata, poput hidroelektrane erdap, a druge stopirati.
Smatrao je da tih velikih infrastrukturnih projekata ima previe u ovom
18
19
HDA, OFVB, kut. 25, Aktuelni problemi daljeg razvoja ekonomskog sustava, neredigovano izdanje, Razgovor druga V. Bakaria, predsednika CK SKH, s aktivom
DSNO-a 25. 10. 1968. godine.
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Izlaganje dr Vladimira Bakaria na VI kongresu SK Hrvatske 5.
XII 1968. god.
51
2/2012.
trenutku. Ti projekti nisu poeljni jer dugo ne donose nita i potiu

iskljuivo graevinsku industriju, to je smatrao djelatnou koja ne
vue napred, nego je na klasinoj bazi i koja nam onda niz godina
prei dalji razvoj.20
Bakari je ovaj problem u javnosti predstavljao kao ope jugoslavenski, no sve upuuje da je bio uvjeren da Hrvatska (kao i
Slovenija) ima vie razloga od drugih republika da se prekine s ovim
projektima. Bakari i njegovi hrvatski istomiljenici iz vladajue frakcije u vrhu SKJ smatrali su da je Hrvatska kao razvijena republika posebno oteena ovom praksom jer obilno mora potpomagati zaraenim
novcem, koji bi joj samoj dobro doao, financiranje infrastrukturalnih projekata u manje razvijenim republikama. Prema samupravnoj
ideologiji koju su zastupali, proizvoaima tj. poduzeima bi trebao
ostajati na raspolaganju njihov dohodak i ne prelijevati se putem
izdvajanja za dravnu, u ovom sluaju saveznu kasu te, posredno,
u manje razvijene republike. Bakari je raspolagao informacijama
da su hrvatska (i slovenska) poduzea privreivala relativno najvie
sredstava te su najvie gubila preraspodjelom. Primjerice, tijekom
spomenutog razgovora s urednicima novinsko-izdavake kue Vjesnik
i RTV Zagreb poetkom oujka 1969. Bakari je okupljenima izjavio
da se Hrvatska od 1945. na ovamo eksploatira. Ipak, Bakari je
smatrao da puko prozivanje Beograda te neprestano aljenje ne moe
rijeti problem, nego samo hraniti meunacionalnu i meurepubliku
nesnoljivost i ojaati nacionaliste. O ovoj tematici je elio oprezno i
obazrivo raspravljati, po mogunosti iza zatvorenih vrata.21
Bez obzira na Bakarieve elje, prijepor oko financiranja spomenutih velikih infrastrukturnih projekata iz saveznog prorauna,
postavi poznat u tadanjoj javnosti kao debata o bilancama federacije, prodro je poetkom 1968. u jugoslavensku i hrvatsku javnost.
Bio je to najozbiljniji sukob vladajue frakcije (u ovom sluaju njenih
hrvatskih predstavnika) s, uvjetno reeno, centralistima nakon Brijunskoga plenuma 1966. godine. Bakari i drugi vodei ljudi SKJ su
se u tu raspravu ukljuili protiv svoje volje plaei se, kao to je ve
reeno, posljedica po meunacionalne i meurepublike odnose. Ta
20
21
HDA, OFVB, kut. 25, neredigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora dr Vladimira Bakaria sa predstavnicima RTV Zagreb i Vjesnika dana 28. XI 1968.
O prijeporima reformske i centralistike frakcije, odnosno predstavnika Hrvatske i
Srbije, u vrhu SKJ 1968. v.: Bilandi, Hrvatska moderna, str. 522525.
HDA, OFVB, kut. 69, Neredigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora dr V
Bakaria sa predstavnicima tampe i RTV dana 5. III 1969 god.
52
D. MUJADEVI

je rasprava prijetila da se pretvori i u javni sukob izmeu Hrvatske i

Srbije, pa je vrh SKJ pokuao sve da rasprava ostane iza zatvorenih
vrata. Debata je dola u novine, no zbog pritiska partijskoga vrha
o njoj nije puno raspravljano. Na sjednici Predsjednitva CK SKJ 4.
travnja 1968. Bakari je pokuao objasniti razvoj toga prijepora i
svoju ulogu u njemu. Rekao je da se ve tijekom 1967. pojavio veliki
pritisak unutar SKJ da se o tome raspravlja te je Predsjednitvo CK
SKJ naelno prihvatilo da se diskutira o bilancama federacije. I meu
hrvatskim komunistima bilo je puno elje da se ovo pitanje pretrese.
Na Konferenciji GK SKH Zagreba 22. oujka 1968. Bakari je
bio, ustvrdio je, izloen pritisku da o tome govori, no izbjegao je.
Istovremeno se i u hrvatskim poduzeima pojavio veliki pritisak da
se ide na javnu diskusiju. IK CK SKH je potom ipak odluio iznijeti
tu temu kao sporednu toku na sjednici Predsjednitva CK SKJ, no
istodobno je zakljueno da ne treba da insistira na javnoj raspravi
o bilancama federacije. Za taj su stav imali potporu Predsjednitva
CK SKJ koje je takoer bilo za to da se o bilancama federacije ne
raspravlja u javnosti. GK SKH za Zagreb podrao je taj stav hrvatskoga
partijskoga vrha, no novine su sutradan prenijele izjavu lana toga
tijela Marinka Grujia koji je ponovio izjavu da treba ii na javnu
diskusiju. Hrvatsko rukovodstvo je interveniralo i sprijeilo da se ta
izjava ponovi u drugom izdanju novina. No, i drugi hrvatski novinari su
poeli pisati o tome, pa je itava stvar ipak prodrla u javnost. Oglasile
su se i srbijanske novine.22 Bakari je 11. travnja 1968. u razgovoru
s Boom Novakom spomenuo kako je Predsjednitvo CK SKJ, bojei
se velike diskusije, odluilo utiati tampu i ne davati nikakve slubene izjave o tom pitanju.23
U razgovoru s novinarom Marinkom Grujiem 11. travnja 1968.
Bakari je dao svoje objanjenje osnove pitanja bilanca federacije.
Rije je bila o investicijama koje su na razini jugoslavenske federacije
isplanirane jo prije provoenja privredne reforme 1965. U vrijeme
poetka reforme SIV je pod vodstvom Borisa Krajgera, odluio da,
usprkos reformi koja je smanjivala federalne investicije, federacija nastavi s preuzetim obvezama do 1970. godine. U meuvremenu je u
SIV-u prevladalo miljenje da zbog ekonomske situacije nije mogue izvriti obveze te da one gue daljnji razvoj gospodarstva. Najave
22
23
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, 4. IV 1968, Diskusija dr. V. Bakaria na sjednici Predsjednitva SKJ.
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Nekorigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora dr Vladimira Bakaria sa Boom Novakom dana 11. IV 1968. god.
53
2/2012.
ukidanja investicijskih programa su, tvrdi Bakari, izazvale buru negodovanja u Srbiji jer se itava politika temeljila u Srbiji na
ispunjavanju tih obaveza. Rije je bila o velikim infrastrukturnim
projektima. Srbijanski partijski vrh angairao je strunjake koji su
dokazivali da se obaveze mogu ispuniti. Prema Bakariu, obveze federacije iznosile su 500 milijardi dinara, dok su u Srbiji tvrdili da su
samo 270 milijardi. U Srbiji su takoer traili da, ako ne bude dovoljno
sredstava, prioritet dobiju obveze na teritoriju nerazvijenih republika,
protiv ega su se pobunili predstavnici razvijenih republika. Bakari
je podravao zabranu javne rasprave o tom pitanju bojei se da hrvatski i srpski nacionalisti to ne iskoriste za svoje ciljeve. Negirao je s
druge strane da je sam spor nacionalne prirode, premda ga hrpa nacionalista takvim pokuava prikazati. Ako se dopusti irenje te raprave, ona e nas u prvom redu jo jae posvaati. Bakariu su predstavnici SR Bosne i Hercegovine kazali da je spor zapravo srpsko-hrvatski i da se njih ne tie. Prema Bakariu, bila je to potpuna
neistina jer se rasprava o bilancama federacije odnosila na budunost
samoupravne reforme koju je zagovarao. Smatrao je da takve tvrdnje
koriste centralistima iz Srbije jer oni isto tvrde da je to srpsko-hrvatski spor, jer im to treba da prikau kao nacionalistiki napad na
Srbiju.24
Meutim tijekom travnja i svibnja 1968. kontroverza oko bilanca federacije nije se smirila. Bakari je u meuvremenu odluio vrsto
stati iza zahtjeva da se pitanje bilanca rijei, iako iza zatovrenih vrata,
te se radi toga, uz najblie suradnike Miku Tripala i Savku DabeviKuar, osobno angairao u Beogradu. Ipak, predstavnici drugih republika u vrhu SKJ nisu eljeli sudjelovati u tome elei ostati neutralni
ili ak nastupajui otvoreno neprijateljski prema hrvatskom zahtjevu.
estoga lipnja 1968. odran je informativni sastanak jednog dijela IK
i Predsjednitva CK SKH. Miko Tripalo informirao je prisutne, meu
kojima se nalazio Bakari, o sastancima na kojima je prisustvovao u
Beogradu. Tripalo je ondje zastupao stavove hrvatskoga rukovodstva
o raiavanju bilanca federacije na sjednici SIV-a, zajednikoj sjednici IK i Predsjednitva CK SKJ te na zajednikoj sjednici Predsjednitva i Izvrnog biroa Predsjednitva CK SKJ. Zakljuke SIV-a o rjeenju problema bilanca federacije, koje je prezentirao Tripalo, hrvatsko
24
HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Neredigirani tekst magnetofonskog snimka razgovora dr Vladimira Bakaria i Marinka Gruia dana 11. IV 1968. god. O raspravi o bilanci federacije
1968. v.: Bilandi, Hrvatska moderna.
54
D. MUJADEVI

je rukovodstvo ocijenilo apsolutno nedovoljnim jer bi postojei odnosi u raspodjeli ostali ustvari isti, to ni politiki ni ekonomski jo
dugo to izdrati ne moemo. Tripalo je takoer rekao da je hrvatsko
partijsko rukovodstvo, nakon to ni IK SKJ nije prihvatio hrvatska
upozorenja, odluilo jo jednom ukazati na problem platne bilance, pa
je Bakari o tome razgovarao s Titom u Karaorevu.
Na zajednikoj sjednici Predsjednitva CK SKJ i Izvrnog biroa
Predsjednitva CK SKJ koja je uskoro uslijedila odlueno je da se
hrvatski prigovori privremeno gurnu pod tepih pa se nije raspravljalo
o bilancama federacije. Formirana je komisija iji su lanovi bili Edvard
Kardelj, Mika piljak i Bakari, koja je trebala koordinirati sistemska
rjeenja kako bi se ubudue izbjegli nesporazumi takve vrste. Tripalo
je bio svjestan da predstavnici drugih republika nisu rado gledali na
hrvatske zahtjeve te i osnivanje spomenute komisije nije prihvaeno
rado, iako nitko nije oponirao. Prema Tripalu, ostali su eljeli preglasati
hrvatske predstavnike i optuiti vrh SKH za izazivanje politike krize u
zemlji i pokuaj da kao iako smo samo jedna republika nametnemo
svoje miljenje drugima. Na istom se sastanku Savka Dabevi-Kuar
osvrnula na recentne napise u beogradskim listovima NIN i Veernje
novosti, u kojima se tvrdilo da raspodjela prihoda meu federalnim
jedinicama nije bitna te da je Hrvatska zastupajui poseban interes
iskljuivo koncentrirana na pitanju raspodjele. Njihove je lanke nazvala kampanjom dezinformacija.
Bakari je govorei nakon Dabevi-Kuar rekao da su Srbi (tj.
predstavnici CK SK Srbije) traili od Tita da se o hrvatskim stavovima
raspravlja bilo na plenumu CK SKJ, bilo na sjednici Predsjednitva CK
SKJ. Prema Bakariu Tito je pristao na sjednicu Predsjednitva, ali
je predstavnicima partijskoga vrha Srbije rekao kako je bar jedan
dio toga usmjeren na njega a ne na nas, mislei oito da je otpor
hrvatskim stavovima u Srbiji takoer i prikrivena kritika samog Tita,
koji je inae vrsto podupirao hrvatsko partijsko vodstvo. Bakari je
takoer opisao i negativne reakcije predstavnika drugih republika na
hrvatsku elju da se raspravi pitanje bilanca federacije, koje su izraene na zajednikoj sjednici Predsjednitva i IK CK SKJ na Brijunima
koja je odrana poetkom lipnja 1968. godine. Predstavnici drugih
republika su Bakariu kazali da se mi svaamo sa Srbima i da od toga
strada cijela Jugoslavija. Hrvatsko rukovodstvo bi trebalo imati vie
razumjevanja i ne bi smjelo nastupati tako otro protiv predstavnika
Srbije budui da je srpsko rukovodstvo u tekoj situaciji jer je moralo
55
2/2012.
da progura Rankovia, moralo je da proguta svinjarije na Kosovu, treba da proguta sporove sa Vojvodinom, treba da proguta makedonsku
crkvu, savjetovali su Bakariu. On je odbacio njihove optube na svoj
raun te je predloio da se sastanemo sa Srbima i s bilo kim tko hoe,
da nam je to sasvim svejedno. Predsjednik Josip Broz Tito je pristao
i sazvao je sastanak za slijedei dan, no zbog studetskih prosvjeda
sastanak nije odran. Bez obzira na otpore i privremeni neuspjeh,
Bakari je bio zadovoljan s postignutim u ovoj bitki koja se zapoela s
debatom oko bilanca federacije. Hrvatsko rukovodstvo postiglo je sve
to se u ovom momentu moglo postii. Uspjelo se upozoriti da obaveze
federacije nemaju vrste izvore svojih sredstava te da je nemogue
da se financiranje tih stvari rjeava dalje onako lako emo. Primijetio
je da su se dosada ti problemi rjeavali prikrivanjem pravoga stanja
bilanci. Ipak, bio je protiv da ovi sukobi dospiju kod irih partijskih
foruma jer se takvim pritiskom nita ne moe postii. Bio je svjestan
da se reforma federacije ne moe nametnuti. Hrvatsko rukovodstvo
je trebalo voditi rauna da je Jugoslavija mnogonacionalna zemlja
s mnogo kompliciranim stvarima. Naglasio je da nudi razgovore i
pokazuje dobru volju. Odbio je na sastanku imenovati protivnike reforme jer su oni istomiljenici i saveznici u nekim stvarima, a u nekim
protivnici hrvatskoga rukovodstva, pa bi ih otvorena konfrontacija
zauvijek otuila.25
Epilog
Bakari, Savka Dabevi-Kuar i Miko Tripalo sastali su se naposljetku 29. lipnja 1968. u Beogradu s najviim predstavnicima CK
Srbije Petrom Stamboliem, Stevanom Doronjskim i drugima. Bakari
je svoje izlaganje na tom sastanku zapoeo s tvrdnjom da ne postoji
duboki spor izmeu nas kao to je raireno miljenje, nego da je
rije o gradaciji u stavovima hrvatskoga i srbijanskoga rukovodstva.
Porekao je da hrvatsko rukovodstvo eli optuiti CK SK Srbije za
centralizam. Najvei dio svoga izlaganja posvetio je razlikama u
stavovima oko saveznih organa te je pokuao prikazati hrvatsku stranu. Naglasio je da je hrvatsko rukovodstvo zahtijevalo neke promje25
HDA, OFVB, kut. 25, Stenografski zapisnik sa sastanka jednog dijela Predsjednitva
i Izvrnog komiteta CK SK Hrvatske, odranog 6. lipnja 1968. g., str. 2. O sastanku
vrha SKJ poetkom lipnja 1968. v.: Ivo Banac, Raspad Jugoslavije, Zagreb, 2001,
str. 30.
56
D. MUJADEVI

ne u Saveznom sekretarijatu za vanjske poslove jer Hrvatska ima

najveu emigraciju, no baratanje s tom emigracijom od strane jugoslavenske diplomacije je kriminalno. Hrvatsko rukovodstvo je trailo od Saveznog sekretarijata za vanjske poslove da politiki rad sa
novijom emigracijom uzmemo mi, tj. da uvedemo socijalne ataee u
konzulatima koji bi se bavili tim poslom, to je prihvaeno. Bakari
je napomenuo da hrvatsko rukovodstvo ima i probleme sa saveznim
vojnim vrhom u kojem su se nalazili generali koji su bili u sukobu sa
hrvatskim komunistikim vrhom. Zalagao se i za veu ulogu Vijea
naroda u Saveznoj skuptini zato to uloga republika raste i to
elementi sporazuma meu republikama rastu.26
Bez obzira na ope smirenje tenzija koje su dominirale 1968,
Bakari je i kasnije nastavljao povremeno kritizirati centralistike
tendencije, a ak je naeo neke nove teme. Snaga Bakarieve pozicije
u vrhu SKJ ogledala se i u tome to je pred predsjednikom republike i
efom SKJ Josipom Brozom Titom govorio bez rukavica o frakcijskim
borbama okrivljujui itava republika rukovodstva za nepodoptine i
odstupanja od slubene partijske linije. Tijekom razgovora hrvatskoga
rukovodstva s Josipom Brozom Titom u Zagrebu 2. sijenja 1969.
Bakari se osvrnuo na probleme u upravljanju saveznim sredstvima.
Izjavio je da je Fond za nerazvijene doao u krizu pred godinu dana
te da su sada oko njega zakulisne jako velike borbe. Prema
Bakariu, Fond za nerazvijene, iji je nastanak upravo Bakari branio
prije nekoliko godina, openito je bio u krizi. Djelovao je potpuno
destimulativno na razvijanje bilo ega novoga te tovie podrava
jedan birokratizam na nekoliko centara u Jugoslaviji. Jedan od takvih
centara birokratizama bilo je bosansko-hercegovako rukovodstvo
iji lanovi kradu pare svojoj vlastitoj industriji i upuuju ga u Fond
za nerazvijene, odakle im se vraa. Prema Bakariu to su inili da bi
bosansko-hercegovaka vlada mogla raspolagati parama, a ne da bi
razvijala industriju. Obziri prema nerazvijenim jugoslavenskim republikama koili su, prema Bakariu, gospodarstvo. Spomenuo je da su
ulaganja u profitabilno stoarstvo onemoguili zahtjevi nerazvijenih
koji su i dalje traili ulaganje u tvornice, rafinerije i eljezare. Nadalje,
proizvodnja elika u jugoslavenskim eljezarama bila je optereena
injenicom to su morale kupovati eljezo iz jugoslavenskih rudnika
iz nerazvijenih republika koje je bilo i tri puta skuplje od eljeza
26
HDA, OFVB, kut. 25, 29. VI. 1968, Razgovor u CK Srbije (tj. s Petrom Stamboliem,
Stevanom Doronjskim i dr. uz prisustvo Savke Dapevi-Kuar i Mike Tripala).
57
2/2012.
iz Brazila ili istone Afrike. Primijetio je da se unutar vrha SKJ lako

sloiti o sistemskim pitanjima, no im ponu u ovo dirati, onda se
vie neemo sloiti.27
I u javnim nastupima je Bakari, koji je poetkom 1969. odluio otii iz prvog plana, nastavio kritizirati opoziciju samoupravnim
reformama. Govorei na Plenumu CK SKH 21. veljae 1969. Bakari
se osvrnuo na fenomen opeg straha od trita u Jugoslaviji koji je
usporavao privrednu reformu i jaao opoziciju unutar SKJ. Bakari je
bio miljenja da u Jugoslaviji nema pravoga trita ak ni slobodnog
socijalistikog trita te da strahovi o ukidanju prava radnicima
i otputanju nemaju osnova. Prema Bakariu istinski su strahovali
zapravo oni koji ele nametnuti drutvu zastarjeli sistem rada, neki
zastarjeli monopol i sline stvari.28
Vladimir Bakari je kormilo SKH poetkom 1969. prepustio svojoj dotadanjoj najblioj suradnici Savki Dabevi-Kuar te je preao
na rad u Izvrni biro Predsjednitva SKJ u Beograd. Dabevi-Kuar
i njeni suradnici nastavili su voditi SKH prema anticentralistikim naelima koje je inaugurirao Bakari u prethodnom razdoblju, no postepeno su napustili Bakarievu opreznost i balansiranost u traenju
emancipacije Hrvatske prvenstveno na gospodarskom planu - unutar samoupravnog poretka SFRJ. Tijekom 1970. novo hrvatsko rukovodstvo iniciralo je masovni javni pokret (Hrvatsko proljee, Maspok)
koji je podravao njihove zahtjeve. Ova je atmosfera ohrabrila nacionalistiku opozciju unutar i izvan SKH koja je poela u Hrvatskoj
nastupati u javnosti. Vladmir Bakari, sada bez mogunosti da izravno
dirigira politiku SKH, sve do proljea 1971. podravao je novi politiki
kurs u Hrvatskoj, protiv kojega tada nije istupao ni sam predsjednik
Josip Broz Tito. U ovom razdoblju Bakari je kao mentor i saveznik
novog hrvatskog partijskog rukovodstva nastavio doivljavati napade
iz krugova savezne diplomacije, od skupine koju je u prethodnom
razdoblju nazivao centralistima. Hrvatsko rukovodstvo je tijekom
1970. tvrdilo da ima saznanja da se u emigrantskim krugovima i
jugoslavenskoj diplomaciji ire vijesti o navodnim dodirima vrha SKH
s hrvatskom ekstremnom nacionalistikom emigrantskom skupinom
Branimira Jelia te da iza tih pria stoje centralistiki krugovi u saveznoj administraciji. Naime, vrh SKH je bio obavijeten da se u nekim
27
28
HDA, OFVB, kut. 33, Magnetofonski snimak sastanka odranog dana 2. I 1969. god.
HDA, OFVB, kut. 69, Diskusija dr. V. Bakaria na III sjednici CK SKH 21. II 1969.
god.
58
D. MUJADEVI

dokumentima saveznih organa prenose obavjetajni podaci o tome

da Branimir Jeli tvrdi kako posreduje izmeu hrvatskih komunista i
SSSR-a radi stvaranja neovisne Hrvatske pod sovjetskim patronatom.
Jeli je navodno tvrdio da je izmeu ostalih stupio u kontakt s Bakariem, Jakovom Blaeviem i jo tri lana CK SKH. Kolale su informacije
da neki dunosnici Matice hrvatske, SSRNH i grada Zagreba kontaktiraju s proustakom emigracijom.29
Na Bakarievu inicijativu predsjednik Izvrnog vijea SRH Dragutin Haramija je u pismu SIV-u od 2. prosinca 1970. traio istragu o tim informacijama, koje su objanjavali zavjerom protiv hrvatskog rukovodstva. Oformljeno je partijsko povjerenstvo na elu sa
Stanetom Dolancom koje je trebalo ispitati sluaj. O tom se sluaju
raspravljalo na sjednici Predsjednitva CK SKJ 23. oujka 1971, no
bez Titova prisustva. Stane Dolanc je izvijestio da je njegova komisija
zakljuila da je doista postojala organizirana kampanja s ciljem kompromitiranja vrha SKH izmiljenim vezama s emigracijom, no komisija je zakljuila da je izvor kampanje u inozemstvu. Bakari se
na sastanku nije sloio s ovim posljednjim zakljukom komisije. Rekao je da je upravo on pokrenuo to pitanje te da se za njega ne
bi zanimao da kampanja protiv hrvatskoga rukovodstva nije imala
izvor u Jugoslaviji. Prema sjeanjima Savke Dabevi-Kuar, Bakari
je na sastanku jugoslavenski izvor te kampanje nazvao politikim
podzemljem. Publicist Slavoljub uki tvrdi da je Bakari na sastanku
krugove koji su organizirali kampanju nazvao beogradskom arijom,
no da je poslije uspio postii da se izbrie ta formulacija iz zapisnika.
Savka Dabevi-Kuar i Miko Tripalo podrali su Bakarieve stavove.
Tripalo je ak ukazao da su itavu kampanju organizirali jugoslavenski
obavjetajni krugovi koji su imali svoje ljude oko Jelia. Predstavnici
Srbije su, s druge strane, pokuavali minorizirati sluaj i tvrdili da je
rije o greci. Sastanak je zavrio zakljukom da je doista postojala
organizirana kampanja protiv hrvatskoga rukovodstva, no nita nije
reeno o njenim organizatorima.30
Savka Dabevi-Kuar je na ovom sastanku Predsjednitva CK
SKJ spominjala i kampanju protiv hrvatskoga komunistikoga vodstva
koju vode beogradski listovi Je, Ekonomska politika i Veernje no29
30
O ovom sluaju v.: Radeli, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji, str. 445446; Bilandi, Hrvatska
moderna, str. 587588.
Dabevi-Kuar, 71, str. 504513; Slavoljub uki, Slom srpskih liberala. Tehnologija politikih obrauna Josipa Broza, Beograd, 1990, str. 4147.
59
2/2012.
vosti.31 Primjerice, beogradski satiriki list Je ismijavao je hrvatsko

rukovodstvo i njihove zahtjeve za jaanje ovlasti republika u odnosu
na federaciju. Bakari je tako 26. veljae 1971. u tom listu bio meta
ismijavanja novinara Brane Crnevia. Komentirajui taj lanak novinar Drago Tovi je u zagrebakom VUS-u 10. oujka 1971. primjetio
da se Je u posljednje vrijeme ruga samo s onim to ima veze s
ravnopravnou, osobito emancipacijom naroda, a posebno je bilo
vulgarno ono obraanje dru Vladimiru Bakariu.32
Uplaen rastom nacionalizma kod dijela pristaa novog hrvatskog rukovodstva, ba kao i negativnim reakcijama na zbivanja u
Hrvatskoj koje su dolazile iz drugih jugoslavenskih republika, Bakari
se naposljetku u proljee 1971. distancirao od Savke Dabevi-Kuar
i njenih najbliih suradnika te je uz podrku Josipa Broza Tita poeo
okupljati nezdovoljnike njihovom politikom. Pritisak Josipa Broza Tita i
jugoslavenskog partijskog vrha omoguio je Bakariu da krajem 1971.
osigura smjenu Savke Dabevi-Kuar i njenog kruga te da ponovno,
ovoga puta neizravno i zakulisno, stekne kontrolu nad SKH i zadri je
do svoje smrti. Smjena hrvatskog rukovodstva i eskalacija represije
nad nacionalno orijentiranom opozicijom, kao i smjene nacionalo i/
ili liberalno orijentiranih rukovodstava u drugim jugoslavenskim republikama tijekom 1972. imale su za cilj da osiguraju opstanak utjecaja
frakcije koja je promicala samoupravne reforme i koja se sada nala
u neugodnoj situaciji jer su njene reforme iz 60-ih dovele do bujanja
neeljenih pokreta i ideja (nacionalizam, liberalizam), ali i osnaile
pozicije centralistikih kritiara. Bakarieva i Kardeljeva frakcija morala se represijom distancirati od neeljenih ideja i osoba i pokazati da
samupravna reforma nije nuno povezana s tim zastranjenjima kao
to su implicirali neki kritiari.33
31
32
33
Slavoljub uki, Slom srpskih liberala. Tehnologija politikih obrauna Josipa Broza,
Beograd, 1990, str. 4147.
Drago Tovi, Je bez bodljikave maske, VUS, 10. III. 1971. (pretiskano u:
Preporod hrvatskih sveuilitaraca, Zagreb, 1971, str. 209210)
O zbivanjima u Hrvatskoj 19701971. i Bakarievoj ulozi v.: Lampe, Yugoslavia
as History, str. 305311; Hrvoje Klasi, Hrvatsko proljee u Sisku, Zagreb, 2006;
Radeli, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji, str. 434451; Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, str.
22762; Goldstein, Hrvatska 19182008, str. 543550; Mujadevi, Bakari,
str. 277298; Tvrtko Jakovina (ur.), Hrvatsko proljee 40 godina poslije, Zagreb,
2012.
60
D. MUJADEVI

Zakljuak
U razdoblju izmeu 1966. i 1969. Vladimir Bakari je kao elna
osoba SKH prenio teite svoga djelovanja na saveznu razinu. U vrhu
SKJ promicao je nastavak samoupravne reforme koja prema njegovom
shvaanju nije bila dovrena. Savezne institucije i s njima povezani
interesi jo uvijek su prema njegovom miljenju oduzimali preveliki
dio prihoda od neposrednih proizvoaa. Bakari je u svojim istupima
ponajvie predstavljao interese hrvatskih graana, za koje je smatrao da su posebno ugroeni jugoslavenskim bankarskim sustavom i
prevelikim izdvajanjima za Fond za nerazvijene i velike infrastrukturne projekte. Takoer je neprestano ukazivao da je potrebno osnaiti
trine elemente u jugoslavenskom gospodarstvu i suzbiti umjetnu
i neekonominu privredu koja se oslanjala na dravnu zatitu. Kao
glavnog oponenta interesima samoupravne reforme smatrao je idejno nekoherentnu skupinu koje je nazivao centralistima, pristaama
starog sistema ili birokratizma, koja je preteito djelovala u prijestolnici SFRJ i SR Srbije, Beogradu. Ova je skupina djelovala u
saveznim i republikim tijelima te u privredi i medijima. Bakari je
koristio svoj utjecaj u jugoslavenskom vrhu te u strukturama SRH da
tijekom razdoblja 19661969. iza zatvorenih vrata i unutar partijskih
foruma vodi kampanju protiv onoga to je nazivao centralistikim
snagama, istovremeno preferirajui opreznu i balansiranu polemiku s
njima preko medija pod njegovom kontrolom u SRH. Nakon Bakarieva
odlaska sa ela SKH 1969. novo hrvatsko rukovodstvo napustilo je
njegovu opreznu politiku i upustilo se u estoku javnu kampanju protiv
stvarnog i izmiljenog centralizma.
61
2/2012.
Summary
Dino Mujadevi, Ph. D.
Vladimir Bakaris Stand on the Centralist Opposition
(19661969)
Key words: Vladimir Bakari, stands, centralists, Communist
Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), Aleksandar Rankovi
Between 19661969, Vladimir Bakari top party leader of SKH

(League of Communist of Croatia) shifted the focus of his attention
to the federal level. The reform of the self-management system passed unnoticed by the top leadership of SKJ (Communist League of
Yugoslavia) but according to him it was not yet completed. In his
opinion, the federal institutions and the vested interest of those connected with them were still taking away the larger part of the income
earned by direct producers. It was Bakari who mostly advocated
the interests of Croatian citizens who he considered to be specially
threatened by the Yugoslav banking system, excessive giving to the
Fond for the Undeveloped and the large infrastructure projects. He
also kept pointing out that it was necessary to strengthen the market
elements in the Yugoslav economy and put an end to the artificial and
ineffective economy that relied on state protection. He considered the
main opponents of the self-management reform to be an ideologically
non coherent group he called the centralists who supported the
old system or bureaucratism that was mostly active in the capital
of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Socialist
Republic of Serbia in Belgrade. This group was active in the federal
and republic organs as well as in the economy and the media. Bakari
used his influence in the top Yugoslav leadership and in SKH structures
from 19661969 to lead a campaign behind closed doors and inside
the party forms against what he called centralist forces while at the
62
D. MUJADEVI

same time preferred a cautious and balanced discussion with them

in the media that was under his control in SRH (Socialist Republic of
Croatia). After Bakari left the top leadership position in SKH in 1969
the new leadership abandoned his cautious policy and engaged in a
fierce public campaign against the real and imagined centralism.
63
791.43:32.019.52(497.1+497.2+438)193
316.75:791.4(4)193
# Bojan SIMI, Ph. D.

FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA
DURING THE 1930s, CASES OF POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA
AND BULGARIA*
ABSTRACT: Based on primary sources and relevant literature
the development of film and its role in the state propaganda of
Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930s will be analyzed
in this study.
Key words: Film, Propaganda, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria
Film was probably the most powerful propaganda tool between

two world wars. The film industry was more advanced in America than
in Europe during the interwar period. The USA had 17,000 cinemas in
1937, the Soviet Union had 6,337 while the situation in the leading
European countries was: Germany 5,395, UK 5,000, France 3,700 and
Italy 3,600 cinemas.1 The widespread use of film as a propaganda tool
began in Bolshevic Soviet Union2 and it quickly spread all over the
world. Propagandistic film was especially popular in Fascist Italy and
Nazi Germany.3 The three countries reviewed (Poland, Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria) also used film and cinema in state propaganda purposes but
. 20 , ( 47019),
.
Maly Rocznik Statysticzny [A Small Statistical Yearbook], (Warsaw, 1938), p. 336. Data
was taken from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, (Washington, 1938).
From various literature on the topic see: D. Gillespie, Early Soviet Cinema, Innovation, Ideology and Propaganda, (London, 2005); P. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State (Soviet media and mass mobilization), (Cambridge, 1986).
From various literature see: D. Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933
1945, (New York, 1983); N. Reevs, The Power of Film Propaganda, (New York,
2003); S. Ricci, Italian Film and Society, 19221943, (Los Angeles, 2008).
64
B. SIMI
FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE 1930s,

CASES OF POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA
they were was limited by the existing technical advancement and the
prevailing economic climate.
General situation in the film industry in the three countries

Comparing the number of citizens and number of cinemas with
other European nations, Poland was third from the bottom, ahead of
only Yugoslavia and Albania. In 1939, the total number of cinemas
was 789, only 300 of which operated every day. The statistical data of
that year stated that 98% of the films in Polish cinemas were imported
(62% from the USA, 13.4% from Germany, 10.8% from France).4 On
average, each Polish citizen only went to the cinema 1.5 times in 1938
while citizens of some towns attended the cinema more frequently
than the national average, e.g. each citizen in Lvov went to the cinema
13 times on average in 1938 and this figure was 12 for both Warsaw
and Poznan.5
Films from the United States were the most popular imported
films into Poland during the 1930s with Germany in second place and
France way back in third. The share of US films imported into Poland
was always around 60% but in 1935, this figure rose to 77%.6 The
number of Polish films varied during the years as illustrated in the
following table:
Polish films in the 1930s

Year
Polish films
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
198
146
157
142
113
124
123
Polish films
(per thousand
meters long)
100
92
83
68
64
82
94
Total number of
Polish films %
10.5
12.3
10.7
11.0
9.7
13.4
13.4
Source: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538

4
5
6
Polska Niepodlegla, (Warsaw, 2008), p.469.

Ibid.
Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive, CAW), Gab. MSWojsk
(Cabinet of Minister of War), I.300.1.538.
65
2/2012.
This data illustrated that the number of films was decreasing,

but that the share of Polish films released in Poland grew slightly in
percentage terms from 1931-1937, but government officials were not
impressed with these figures, even the increase of more than 30%
from 1935-1937 as well the increase of 78% in the production of full
length feature films. In total, out of the 24 of these types of films
produced in 1937, 10 were comedies, 11 were dramas, two were
melodramas and one was a review with the total costs of those films
being 5,750,000 zlotys.7
It was clear that a figure of around 10% Polish films being
released in Poland was not satisfactory both for state propaganda and
for the people that worked in the culture industry and there were lively
discussions over the years about the future development of the film
industry in Poland. Something had to be done.
A new organization was formed called the Movie Section (Sekcja
Filmova), which consisted of members of important ministries and they
met several times to discuss the way forward. These members included
representatives of the: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior Ministry,
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Religious Affairs and
Public Education, members of Military Institute of Research and Education (WINO)8, Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT)9 and government party
Camp of National Unity (OZN)10 and on some occasions, they had
invited some guest participants to their meetings like script writers
and legal experts.11
During those meetings, plans and actual problems were discussed and one of the key problems that emerged in these meetings
was a lack of financial recourses for the development of domestic
cinematography. This was mainly due to a low level of trade and capital
which was being invested in film production. A representative of the
PAT, Tadeusz Katelbach underlined that the Ministry of Industry and
7
8
10
11
CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538.

More about WINO see in: L. Wyszczelski, Oswiata, propaganda, kultura Wojsku
Polskim w latach 19181945 [Education, Propaganda, Culture in Polish Army 1918
1945], (Warsaw, 2004).
More about PAT see in: W. Grabowski, Polska Agencja Telegraficzna 19181991
[Polish Telegraph Agency 19181991], (Warsaw, 2005).
About OZN see in: Wynot, E. D, Polish Politics in Transition, The Camp of National
Unity and the Struggle for Power, 19351939, (Athens, 1974).
CAW, Gab. MSWojsk. I.300.1.531. At the meeting on 25th February 1938, Antoni
Cwojdzinski, a script writer and Andrzej Ruszkowski, a legal expert in the film industry were also invited.
66
B. SIMI

Commerce allocated a symbolic figure of 100,000 zlotys in its budget

for the film industry during the period of 1936-1937. This figure was
very low compared with 1,000,000 zlotys in 1931.12 These meetings
also underlined the importance of short films for propaganda purposes
in Poland and several suggestions were made to increase the financing
of the Polish film industry.
The film industry in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had always
served the propaganda purposes of the ruling circles, especially the
royal family of Karadjordjevic. When one considered the lack of education and general knowledge amongst the majority of citizens in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, it is safe to conclude that this
technological miracle had an important political influence on these
citizens.
The number of cinemas and seats in the Kingdome

of Yugoslavia (19351938)*
Year
Sound
cinema
Silent
cinema
1935
1936
1937
1938
262
301
330
357
33
17
13
13
Total number of Total number of

cinema
seats
295
318
343
370
92,905
106,014
113,971
121,120
This number included travelling silent cinemas: for 1935 at 22, 1936 at 31, 1937
at 40 and cinemas 1938 at 14. Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdome of
Yugoslavia (19341939)
In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the existing cinemas had different

programs. For example, 108 cinemas showed films every day while
110 cinemas only showed films twice a week. Out of the biggest cities,
Belgrade had 18 cinemas and Zagreb 1613 and American films were
dominant in those cinemas. During 1935, 678 films were imported
and from this list, 436 came from the United States (64%), 144 from
Germany (21%), 30 from Austria (4%) and 27 from France (3%).14
12
13
14
CAW, Gab. MSWojsk. I.300.1.538. The specific meeting was held on 13th January
1938.
All data from 1938. Statistiki godinjak [Statictical Yearbooks of the Kingdome of
Yugoslavia for 19381939], p. 396.
Centralen Darzaven Istoricheski Arhiv (Central State Historical Archive), Sofia,
CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izvetaj Dravne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju
kinematografa u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1935. godine [The Report of State Film Cen-
67
2/2012.
Using the Section for Film and Tourism, the Central Press Bureau
that was the unofficial Ministry for Propaganda15, showed propaganda
films that were primarily political. The main task of this section was to
record all important political events, make films about them and then
distribute those films to a wider audience. According to its data in 1936,
the CPB produced 7,065 meters of film and all the other producers
only 6,67516, so it is safe to conclude that the Central Bureau was the
biggest producer of films in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In addition to
the procurement of modern equipment for the Section for Film and
Tourism, the CPB also established good relations with foreign producers, especially those from Germany.17 Apart from making and distributing films, the Section for Film and Tourism dealt with the censorship of
films and other products that were to be shown in the country as well
as with the censorship of foreign films that were imported, together
with the official CPBs section for the implementation of the press law.
These joint activities meant that the CPB had almost complete control
over the development of the film industry in Yugoslavia.
According to the chief of the Cultural Section of the Bulgarian
propaganda institution Renewal,18 cinema was unknown to around
80% of the population in Bulgaria,19 but statistical data shows otherwise. The number of cinemas in Bulgaria was indeed the lowest of the
three countries reviewed according to statistics that number during
the following years was:
15
16
17
18
19
ter on the distribution of films and the state of cinemas in Kingdome of Yugoslavia
for 1935].
More about CPB see in: . , (Milan Stojadinovics Propaganda), Belgrade, 2007, pp. 79103.
Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Izvetaj o radu za 1936. godinu
[Annual Report for 1936], p. 66.
Leni Rifenstal visited Belgrade while filming Olympia what CPB used for improving
relations with the leader of German film.
More about Renewal see in: . , (19341935).
(Towards Institutionalization of Bulgarian National Propaganda), ,
3/2012, pp. 8796.
CDA, 232k-1-20/22. Undated document, probably from FebruaryMarch 1935.
68
B. SIMI

Number of Cinemas in Bulgaria During the 1930s

Year
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
Number of Cinemas
114
121
114
116
120
142
155
Source: Statisticheski godishnaci na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 19371940 [Annual

Statistical Surveys of the Bulgarian Kingdome 19371939], (Sofia, 19371940).
As seen, the number of cinemas constantly grew, except in

1935 due to the economic crisis and this year was also critical due to
the difficult economic climate in both Poland and Yugoslavia. Sofia had
the most cinemas in 1936, it had 32 of the 116 existing cinemas.
The most complete data, in the existing statistics, can be found
for the year 1939. Of the 155 cinemas in Bulgaria, only 32 were in
the villages and 123 in the cities. Judging by the country they were
produced in the films showed in Bulgaria were more balanced than
in Poland and Yugoslavia. Of 10,524 films showed, only 3,775 showed films in English (35.9%). Of the others film showings, 2,833
were French speaking (26.9%), 2,622 were in German (24.9%) and
interestingly, 608 films came from the Soviet Union (5.8%). As one
could see, films from the first communist country in the world were
not imported or mentioned in the other two states under review. That
could be due to the historical connections between Bulgaria and Russia
and the fact that the Russian language and culture were closer to the
ordinary Bulgarian citizen. On the other hand, only 117 film showings
were Bulgarian films (around 1%).20
20
Statisticheksi godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey

on the Bulgarian Kingdome 1937], (Sofia, 1940), p. 736.
69
2/2012.
Film Legislation in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria

During the 1930s
It is very important to understand the legislation that regulated
the movie industry and how the three states understood and used this
powerful propaganda weapon. The most important document regarding
legislation referring to the cinema in Poland during the 1930s was the
law passed in March 1934. It regulated various matters such as office
rent, records and laboratories, import of films, promotion of domestic
production, position of cinema, theatre and their technical personnel
and censorship.
The examination of films and advertisements was supposed to
have been carried out by committees, whose membership, methods
of appointment and dismissal, duties and powers were supposed to
be specified by a regulation issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs
and the Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education (Art.18).
One later article, specified various reasons why some films should be
banned: The authority can refuse permission to release the movie if
the test shows that the public showing would either jeopardize the vital
interests of the Republic, security, tranquility and public order, damage
the reputation of the Republic, or its relations abroad, damage the
national honor or insult religious feelings, invoke a call to war, invoke
savagery which affects the viewer or which has a demoralizing affect
on them.21
The film industries of these countries were also under the
censorship of the state apparatus and when it came to making films in
Yugoslavia, state intervention began in 1928. That year the financial
legislation proscribed that not one movie could be shown until it had
been checked by the censors from the Ministry of Education.22 During
the 1930s, the film industry was governed by the State Film Center
( ) and a special censors committee,
which consisted of twelve members and their deputies. The members
of this committee were three representatives from the Ministry of
Education, one representative from the Ministry of Army and Navy,
two representatives of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Public Health
21
22
Ustawa o filmach i ich wywietlaniu [The Law About Films and Their Display], Dzienik Ustaw. Poz. 323, Nr. 36, p. 586.
. , 19181941, [Cultural
Policy of Kingdome of Yugoslavia], III, (Belgrade, 1997), p. 332.
70
B. SIMI

(one member was a representative of the national womens educational

organizations), two representatives of the Ministry of Interior Affairs,
one representative of the Ministry of Trade and one from the Central
Press-Bureau.23 The law set the tasks of this organization as follows:
a) to arange and oversee the import, production and distribution of films;
b) to develop the domestic film industry;
c) to help educational and useful film propaganda.24
The valid law in this area in Bulgaria during the 1930s was legalized in April 1930.25 The first article underlined that cinematography
was under the supreme control of the Ministry of Peoples Education.
Members of the censors committee were as follows: The chief of
Department of cultural institutions and funds in the Ministry of Peoples
Education, the prosecutor from the Sofia district or his deputy, one
representative of Interior Ministry, one representative of Ministry
for Health, one representative from the Educational Committee and
two special members delegated by the Minister of Peoples Education
(article 12). Representatives of other Ministries or institutions were
only invited if the nature of the film requested their presence.
Censorship and Film Production

At this point, it is important to mention some data about
censorship, which was present and established by the law in these
countries. Accordingly, the statistical data in Poland is as follows:
Number of censored film in Poland 19341937

Year
1934
1935
1936
1937
Censored films
780
714
652
619
Cleared films
769
699
638
605
Source: Maly Rocznik Statysticzny [A Small Statistical Yearbook], (Warsaw, 1938),

p. 336.
23
24
25
Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of Yugoslavia, AY), Ministry for Education (66), folder no.
383, The Book of Regulations of the Censorship of Films of 22 February 1932.
The Law on the Distribution of Films from 5th December 1931 with changes and appendixes according to the article 57/7 of the Financial Law from 1933/34.
The Law for Cinematography was published on 29th April in the States Journal.
71
2/2012.
As one can see, most of the films that came to the censors
attention were cleared for broadcasting. This was due to the fact that
most of the films were already made with the standards that would
have been considered acceptable.
The State Film Center in Yugoslavia was a very busy institution.
Only in 1935, they sent 779 films to the censors and of these, 100
were domestic and 678 foreign. Only 14 films were banned, all of
them foreign.26
One of the most important institutions for film propaganda
of the Second Polish Republic was the Film Department of the PAT
(Wydzia Filmowy PAT). This department was formed in 1929 for the
production of silent short films. After acquiring modernized equipment
in 1933, they started with the regular chronicles PATs Weekly Film
Magazine (Tygodnik Filmowy PAT). Besides political films, other films
included other genres like the musical, cultural, artistic etc
Short films had the greatest propaganda significance in the
Polish film industry and these consisted of a weekly newsreel produced
by PAT. That production started in 1927 and until the outbreak of
Second World War, around 600 of them were produced and broadcast.
Those films were about 10 minutes long and only consisted of current news. It is crucial to mention that the PATs newsreels were
broadcast in every cinema before the regular film were shown and
in this instance, the propaganda impact was very strong and some
serious results could have been achieved. Even the people who did not
share the governments point of view could have been consciously or
subconsciously influenced by those journals.
There were also some special films dedicated to some specific
topics. Sometimes, these were cultural and educational but on some
occasions, they were pure political propaganda. In 1936, such films
were: Long Live the Army (Niech Zyje Armia), Journey of General
Edward Rydz Smigly to France (Podr Gen.Edwarda Smigego Rydza
do Francji) and Long Live Polish Marshal Edward Rydz Smigly (Niech
Zyje Marszaek Polski Edward Smigy Rydz).27 The first film about
26
27
CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izvetaj Dravne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju

kinematografa u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1935. godine [The Report from the State Film
Center about distribution of films and the state of cinemas in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia for 1935].
Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Documents, AAN), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 8-21II.
72
B. SIMI

the second Polish marshal was 200 meters and the other was 180
meters long.28 In the same year, personnel of the PATs film section
(Wydzia Filmowy, founded in 1928) consisted of only 17 editors,
eight technicians and four janitors and messengers.29
With the establishment of the Central Bureau of Film (Centralne
Biuro Filmowe, founded in 1928) at the Interior Ministry the ruling
circles in Poland showed more interest in film. However the films in
the propaganda sector were very small and ineffective. Only in 1937,
the newly formed Polish Film Company (Polska Spka Filmowa) made
a patriotic and propaganda film Hearts Aflame (Pomienne serca) directed by Romuald Gantkowski.30 The film was well received by the
authorities, received awards at the Film Fair in Lvov and prizes from the
War and Interior Ministries. Much less successful was the label OrionFilm whose film The Commander (Komendant) directed by Henryk
Bigoszta31 had not been approved by the censors for broadcast.32
As one could see earlier, twenty films had already been made
by the CPB in Yugoslavia during 1936 and all of these were broadcast
in cinemas all over the country. Amongst the most interesting film
titles, one could choose either:
- Travel of the Prime Minister through Montenegro (broadcast for
247 days with a total of 741 broadcasts in 55 cinemas in 46
different places);
- Meeting of Little Antanta in Bled (broadcast for 252 days with a
total of 765 broadcasts in 70 cinemas in 54 different places);
- The Opening of the Railroad Veles Bitola (broadcast for 137
days with a total of 411 broadcasts in 28 cinemas in 26 different
places);
- Celebrations in Zenica (broadcast for 83 days with a total of
249 broadcasts in 18 cinemas in 17 different places)33
28
29
30
31
32
33
CAW, General Inspector of the Armed Forces - GISZ 302.4.1634.

CAW, General Inspector of the Armed Forces - GISZ 302.4.1634.
Romald W.Gantkowski (Poznan, 14. VII 1908 Hollywood, USA, 17. III 1989) was
Polish director, scriptwriter and actor. His most famous films in the Interwar period
were: Girl Looking for Love (Dziewczyna szuka milosci, 1938) and The Genius of the
Scene (Geniusz szeny, 1939).
Henryk Bigoszta (Kalvaria, 5. V 1895 Cracow, 20. III 1971) was Polish film director. His well-known films were: Kalisz (1918), A Cry in the Night (Krzyk w nocy,
1922) and Kizia-mizia (1922).
Brzoza, Sowa, Historia Polski, p. 432.
Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Izvetaj o radu za 1936. godinu
[Report of annual work for 1936], p. 64.
73
2/2012.
The most interesting film from the propagandistic point of view

in Yugoslavia was made in late 1938. The novelty was introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic (1935-1939) and a special
Party propaganda film On the Path of Restoration Yugoslavia Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow ( ,
, ) was made34 This film was specially prepared for the
pre-election campaign of December 1938.
The movie was produced in co-operation with experts from the
NSDAP and it was edited in Germany with the assistance of personnel
from the government party JRZ. This group was led by Vojin Djordjevi,
an official of the JRZ and the first secretary of the State Film Center. His
presence left a lasting mark because he was the presenter in the film,
but this cooperation was not without difficulty. In his report, Djordjevic
said that Baron Von Wolzogen did things his way and often insisted on
using some effects at the expense of the context.35 The German side
also promised the gift of one million film posters, but there was no
evidence that this promise was kept.36 The film arrived late, more than
month after the election campaign had began mainly due to the fact
that the election campaign had already started when the idea to make
the film was first discussed. 32 copies of the film arrived in Yugoslavia
and during the final two weeks before the elections, the government
propaganda focused its efforts on broadcasting the film in as many
locations as possible. Purposefully, some cities in Croatia were avoided
as no result was expected there and according to some reports, the
greatest impact of this propaganda was felt in Belgrade.37
The Director of Renewal Popzlatev, in his report in May 1935, in
the final days of this propaganda institution, said that the propagandistic role of cinema did not develop due to some internal problems
within the government.38 One of the reasons for that statement was
the fact that control over the cinema remained in the hands of the
Education Ministry and never passed to the Renewal. The Ministry
strongly opposed to idea that control of the cinema should be entrusted
to Popzlatevs institution.
34
35
36
37
38
For the transcript of the movie see , , pp. 319324.

AY, 37-12-388/390, The Report of Vojin Djordjevic sent to Gradimir Kozomaric,
chief of Film Section of JRZ.
AY, 37-12-383, The Letter of Gradimir Kozomaric sent to Milan Stojadinovic from 3rd
November 1938.
AY, 37-12-392.
CDA, 284k-3-42/35-36.
74
B. SIMI

In Bulgaria, as in Yugoslavia, there were films dedicated to the

royal dynasty. Those films were propagandistic by nature and were
intended for all social groups. Naturally these films did not have any
problems with the censors. The most famous Bulgarian films with the
national propaganda topics in the 1930s were: Revolt of the Slaves
( , 1933) Tracks of the Balkan ( , 1934), In front of the Fatherland We Should Forget Hate (
, 1935), Enemies (,
1938), Duke Strahil ( , 1938). During the 1940s,
several new films were released with the help of the foundation Bulgarian Deed ( ). The most well-known films with the
strongest national propaganda messages were For the Motherland (
) and They Won ( ).39
The media played a key role in creating, developing and spreading
the government propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during
the 1930s. The press was the most disperse and the most used tool,
but the use of radio and film increased rapidly, especially in the final
years before World War Two. The film industry was the easiest to
control for the governments of the three countries because censorship
was legalized and constantly present during the period under review.
The government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign
and only those considered acceptable were broadcast in the cinemas.
Domestic production of films in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was
poor in comparison to imported films and the companies owned by
the government, or government institutions, made several short
propaganda films and numerous newsreels in an attempt to influence
public opinion in its favor. Nevertheless, despite its relative lack of
numbers, the impact of film could not be underestimated because it
offered more than the press and radio because it combined the effects
of picture and sound.
39
A. Grozev, Nachaloto. Iz istoriyata na balgarskoto kino 18961956 [The Beginning.

From the History of Bulgarian Cinema 18951956], (Sofia, 1985), pp. 7784 and
pp. 165168.
75
2/2012.

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.48
Summary
Nataa Milievi, M. A.
Nutrition in occupied Belgrade 19411944
Key words: nutrition, food, Belgrade, Nazi occupation, black
market
The paper deals with the issue of providing food and nutrition
in occupied Belgrade during World War 2. The population of Belgrade
had constant problems with nutrition, the food being rationed and
limited. It could be said that provisions and nutrition kept getting
worse. During some periods of the occupation people starved. Not
only was the quantity of meat and bread reduced but there was a
constant increase in the number of days when meat and bread was not
eaten. Different measures undertaken by the domestic government
during the occupation did not alleviate the situation since there was
a constant lack of basic food staples. The analysis shows that the
population of Belgrade did not have bread from September 1941 until
June 1942 for four months, that the bread they did have was made
of wheat flour and potatoes and that they mostly ate corn bread.
The possibility of obtaining food was connected to the populations
purchasing power which was very low and at the end of 1942 it was
less than 10% if we look at the budget of clerical family and compare it
to actual prices. The inhabitants of Belgrade tried to solve the problem
of food by different means: they sold off anything they could sell and
bought provisions at the black market, they raised poultry and pigs in
their yards, cultivated vegetables in their gardens and so on. A great
increase in prices at the end of 1943 brought new problems in nutrition
and even more burdened the almost nonexistent family budgets.
48
, 1115, . , , , 12.
1942; 29. 1942; 22. 1942.
91
314.117-058.65(497.1)1942/1945(083.81)
94:343.819(=163)(481)1942/1945
#
19421945.

: 19411945 1964. .
,
, , - ,
, .
: , , , () , , , (), , , , , , , ,

. ,1 , . ,
,
,
, 1982. , ( : Milan Koljanin, Nemaki logor na beogradskom
Sajmitu 19411944, Beograd, 1992, str. 5).
92
19421945.

.2 , , ,
,3 .
,
, .
, ,

.
,
(
)
,4
, .
a , , , , 2
( ) 2000.
: Jovan Mirkovi, Objavljeni izvori i literatura o jasenovakim logorima, B. Luka Beograd, 2000; : Nataa Mataui, Jasenovac 1941.1945,
Logor smrti i radni logor, JasenovacZagreb, 2003; Slavko Odi, Slavko Komarica,
Zato Jasenovac nije osloboen, (pogovor Milan Koljanin), Beograd, 2005; Spomen
podruje Jasenovac katalog-monografija, ur. Tea Beni Rimay, Jasenovac, 2006;
Antun Mileti, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, knjiga IV, Jagodina, 2007; Jasenovac, zbornik radova, ur. Zdravko Antoni, Banja Luka, 2007; Srboljub ivanovi,
Jasenovac, odabrani radovi, lanci, intervijui, govori i diskusije, ur. Todor Bjelki,
BeogradLondon, 2008; Mario Kevo, Posjet poslanika Meunarodnog odbora Crvenog kria logorima Jasenovac i Stara Gradika u ljeto 1944, asopis za suvremenu
povjest, 2/2008, Zagreb, str. 547585. : Igor Graovac Dragan Cvetkovi, Ljudski gubici Hrvatske 1941.1945. godine:
pitanja, primjeri, rezultati...., Zagreb, 2005, str. 7275, 97; Jasenovac, rtva je
pojedinac Poimenini popis rtava koncetracijskog logora Jasenovac 1941.1945.,
ur. Tea Beni Rimay, Jasenovac, 2007; . , , T , 2007, . 4, .
153168; Antun Mileti, Ubijeni u koncentracionom logoru Jasenovac19411945,
Jagodina, 2011.
, : Logor
Banjica logorai, objavljeni izvori (priredili Evica Mickovi, Milena Radoji, uvodna
studija Ljubodrag Dimi, Milan Ristovi), Beograd, 2009; Stanoje Filipovi, Logori u
apcu, Novi Sad, 1967; Miroslav M. Milovanovi, Nemaki koncentracioni logor na
Crvenom krstu u Niu i streljanja na Bubnju, Beograd, 1983; Mirko Peren, Ustaki
logori, Zagreb, 1966, izmenjeno i dopunjeno izd. 1990; Branislav Popov Mia, Nemaki
zatvori i koncentracioni logori u Banatu 19411944, Beograd, 1992; D. Cvetkovi,
Preglad stradanja stanovnitva Hrvatske u nemakim koncentracionim logorima
van teritorije Hrvatske, Dijalog povjesniara /istoriara, 10/2, (ur. Igor Graovac),
Zagreb, 2008, str. 201222; Isti, Stradanje stanovnitva NDH u logorima numeriko odreenje, Logori, zatvori i prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj / Jugoslaviji 1941.1945.,
1945.1951., Zbornik radova, (priredio Vladimir Geiger) Zagreb, 2010, str. 4157.
Ljubo Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom Viking, Beograd, 1991. :
Radovan Raji, Ropstvo u Norvekoj, Beograd, 1996.
93
2/2012.
.5
, , ,
. 1964. . , , ,
,
.6
597.323 ,7
134.464 (22,51%). 1.318 ,8
0,98% 0,22% .
, 5659%
5

1946. ,
, 505.182 , ,
. (Miodrag Zeevi, Jovan Popovi, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije, Dravna komisija za utvrivanje zloina okupatora i njihovih pomagaa iz drugog svetskog rata, Beograd, 1996, knj. I, str. 42).
1950. (
, ), -
. .

.
11. 5. 1964.
: 1. .

.
... (: I. Graovac, D. Cvetkovi, Ljudski gubici Hrvatske..., str. 53; : Zoran Janjetovi, Od Auschwitza do
Brijuna, Pitanje odtete rtava nacizma u jugoslovensko-zapadnonjemakim odnosima, Zagreb, 2007).
,
o .

1945.
580.981. (rtve rata 19411945 (rezultati popisa), Savezni zavod za
statistiku (SZS), Beograd, 1966, str. 2739)
991 ,
57,08% (rtave rata..., str. 83).
94
19421945.

.9
,
1.706.000,
.
, 1992. , ,10
.
. 19411945 1964. . ,
9
10
rtve rata..., str. 523.

1.016.000 1.066.000 .
() , .
50.000 ,
40.000 ,
1.106.000 1.156.000 , 51,7
54% . ,
,

1.070.000 1.120.000 , 53,3
55,8% .
1.042.000 1.092.000 .

, (), 1995.
.
, , ,
, . 1964.

, , , .
, ,
1964. ( ),
,
, ,
.
.
1999. , 2003. .
657.290
10,04% (59.967 ). (, 179, 19411945;
( ), 19411945. )
95
2/2012.
,
. , , , ,
. ,
, ,
, ,
.
, ( ) , ,
, , .
, ,

.
,
, . ,
,
. 1.373
.11

,
84,27% .

1.373
1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
645
46,98
512
37,29
124
9,03
92
6,70

. 1942. 1943. 1,26:1, ,
1942, 2,52:1.

. 1942.
11
, 19411945. , 19411945.
96
19421945.

1943.
,
. 1943.
, .12 ,
- .13
,
,
.
,

,
.
.14
, 50,33%
48,10%, .15
12
13
14
15
,
, 1943. , ,
31%
.
, - 62,86%.
72,72% 82,39%
(Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str. 9395).
53,58% (2.287), 46,42% (Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str. 23).
.
, ( , , , ),
, ,
, ( ,
), .
97
2/2012.
1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
691
293
42,40
289
41,82
57
8,25
52
7,52
50,33
45,43
//
56,44
//
45,97
//
56,52
//
660
345
52,27
211
31,97
64
9,70
40
6,06
48,10
53,49
//
41,21
//
51,61
//
43,48
//
11
27,27
72,73
0,80
0,46
//
1,56
//
//
//
25,00
75,00
0,29
0,15
//
0,59
//
//
//
33,33
66,67
0,22
0,15
//
//
1,61
//
//
50,00
50,00
0,14
0,15
//
0,19
//
//
//
100,0
0,07
0,15
//
//
//
//
100,0
0,07
//
//
0,81
//
//
1.373
645
46,98
512
37,29
124
9,03
92
6,70
* : , , ,
, ,
, ,
, .

,
,
.
, , 1942, 2:1. (53,27%)
1942.16 1,63:1, ,
,
16

, , .

(4.000 1942. ),
98
19421945.

3,26:1.

,
, .17
. 23,44% ,
, 28,03
27,42%.
,

.18

, 93,37% ,
41,54%.19 2,69,
1,75%.20
.21
17
18
19
20
21
. (Lj.
Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str. 24, 3132)
72,73%
75% 1943. .
(4.268)
89,99% , 4,19% , 3,87% , 0,58% , 0,37% , 0,26% , 0,12% ,
0,62% . (Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str.
71)
Vladimir erjavi, Gubici stanovnitva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu, Zagreb,
1989, sstr. 3642, 80.
1941. 23,53%,
7,02% (V. erjavi, Gubici stanovnitva Jugoslavije...., str. 36
42, 80).

, , ,
.
99
2/2012.
1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
1.282
605
47,19
485
37,83
113
8,81
79
6,16
93,37
93,80
//
94,73
//
91,13
//
85,87
//
21,62
37
18
48,65
21,62
8,11
2,69
2,79
//
1,56
//
2,42
//
8,69
//
24
33,33
33,33
20,83
12,50
1,75
1,24
//
1,56
//
4,03
//
3,26
//
57,14
42,86
//
0,51
0,62
//
0,58
//
//
50,00
25,00
25,00
0,29
0,31
//
0,19
//
0,81
//
//
10,53
19
42,10
36,84
10,53
1,38
1,24
//
1,37
//
1,61
//
2,17
//
1.373
645
46,98
512
37,29
124
9,03
92
6,70

,
.
.
, 85,02% , 75% 78,94% , 70,27%
66,67% .
, 21,62%
, 33,33%
. ,
90%,
85,87%,
8,69 3,26%.

.
52,34% 46,33%, .22
(91,89%) .
(42,86%),
22
,
, .
100
19421945.

,23
.24

.
%
1,88
691
671
97,10
0,43
0,43
0,14
13
50,33
52,34
//
8,11
//
//
42,86
//
25,00
//
68,42
//
660
594
90,00
34
5,15
24
3,64
0,15
0,15
0,91
//
48,10
46,33
//
91,89
//
100,0
//
14,28
//
25,00
//
31,58
11
11
100,0
0,80
0,86
//
//
//
//
//
//
50,00
50,00
0,29
0,16
//
//
//
28,57
//
//
//
66,67
33,33
0,22
0,16
//
//
//
14,28
//
//
//
100,0
0,14
0,16
//
//
//
//
//
//
100,0
//
0,07
//
//
//
//
25,00
//
100,0
0,07
//
//
//
//
25,00
//
//
1.373
37
2,89
24
1,75
0,51
0,29
19
1,38
1.282 93,37
, ,
, . 97,10%
89,24% .25
,
26
23
24
25
26
, .

.
3.773.000 ,
3.367.000 , 23.000 , 51.000 , 146.000 ,
102.000 , 66.000 18.000 (Jovan Marjanovi, Ustanak i
narodnooslobodilaki pokret u Srbiji 1941, Beograd, 1962, str. 23).
1942. 1943. ,
,
. (Dragan Cvetkovi,
Bosna i Hercegovina numeriko odreenje ljudskih gubitaka u Drugom svetskom
101
2/2012.

90%, 30,63% .27 , , 52,51 11,14% , 5,15
3,64% ,
.28

,29 . , 15 24
41,22%, .
2534 3544 25,78
22,36% .
0,29% 15 , 1,97% 55 .

.
15 ,
89,57% 15
24 ,
.

55 ,
1944. ,
.
27
28
29
ratu, Prilozi istraivanju zloina genocida i ratnih zloina, Beograd, 2009, str. 94;
Igor Graovac, Dragan Cvetkovi, Ljudski gubici ..., str. 119; Dragan Cvetkovi,
Pregled stradanja stanovnitva Vojvodine u Drugom svetskom ratu, Istorija 20.
veka, 1/2005, Beograd, str. 101)
, ,
, 6.285.000 .
52,51% (3.300.000), 30,63% (1.925.000), 11,14%
(700.000), 2,39% (150.000), 1,19% (75.000), 0,59%
(40.000), 0,48% (30.000) 1,03% (65.000),
(: Fikreta Jeli-Buti, Ustae i NDH, Zagreb,
1977, str. 106).
81,78% , 9,03% ,
8,33% 0,85% (Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod
ifrom..., str. 23).
3%
14 18 , 70% 18 30, 20% 30 40, 5% 40 50 2%
50 (Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str. 73).
102
19421945.

1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
14 .
50,00
50,00
0,29
0,31
//
0,39
//
//
//
4,06
15 24
566
276
48,76
231
40,81
36
6,36
23
41,22
42,79
//
45,12
//
29,03
//
25,00
//
25 34
354
167
47,17
119
33,61
37
10,45
31
8,76
25,78
25,89
//
23,24
//
29,84
//
33,69
//
35 44
307
134
43,65
113
36,81
35
11,40
25
8,14
22,36
20,77
//
22,07
//
28,22
//
27,17
//
45 54
101
48
47,52
37
36,63
10
9,90
5,94
7,36
7,44
//
7,22
//
8,06
//
6,52
//
55
27
13
48,15
22,22
18,52
11,11
1,97
2,01
//
1,17
//
4,03
//
3,26
//
14
35,71
28,57
7,14
28,57
1,02
0,77
//
0,78
//
0,81
//
4,35
//
1.373
645
46,98
512
37,29
124
9,03
92
6,70
,
, ,
24 . 29,63% 55 .
.

.
.
.
14 .
50,00
50,00
0,29
0,29
//
0,30
//
//
//
0,88
15 24
566
349
61,66
203
35,86
1,59
41,22
50,51
//
30,76
//
81,81
//
45,45
//
25 34
354
186
52,54
165
46,64
0,28
0,56
25,78
26,91
//
25,00
//
9,09
//
18,18
//
35 44
307
122
39,74
182
59,28
0,98
22,36
17,65
//
27,57
//
//
27,27
//
45 54
101
21
20,79
79
78,22
0,99
7,36
3,04
//
11,97
//
9,09
//
//
55
27
7,41
24
88,89
3,70
//
1,97
0,29
//
3,63
//
//
9,09
14
64,28
35,71
1,02
1,30
//
0,76
//
//
//
1.373
691
50,32
660
48,07
11
0,80
11
0,80
103
2/2012.

15 24 50,51% ,
26,91%. 61,66 52,54%
. ,

, 11,97% 4554 , 3,63%
55 . 78,22%
4554 , 88,89% 55
.30

.31

81,81% 15 24 .
.

. ,

.

%
.
14
4
4
100,0
0,29
0,31
//
//
//
//
//
//
1,24
15 24
566
526
92,93
20
3,53
1,59
0,35
0,35
41,22
41,03
//
54,05
//
37,50
//
28,57
//
50,00
//
36,84
//
25 34
354
336
94,91
2,54
1,13
0,56
0,28
0,56
25,78
26,21
//
24,32
//
16,67
//
28,57
//
25,00
//
10,53
//
35 44
307
289
94,14
1,63
2,28
0,65
1,30
22,36
22,54
//
13,51
//
29,17
//
28,57
//
//
21,05
//
45 54
101
91
90,10
2,97
3,96
0,99
0,99
0,99
7,36
7,10
//
8,11
//
16,67
//
14,28
//
25,00
//
5,26
//
55
27
24
88,89
11,11
1,97
1,88
//
//
//
//
//
15,79
//
14
12
85,71
14,29
0,94
//
30
31
1,02
1.373
1.282 93,37
//
//
//
//
10,53
//
37
2,89
24
1,75
0,51
0,29
19
1,38
45 15,60%
, 3,33% .
50 16 (Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str. 31).
104
19421945.

, 15
55 . ,
, 78,37
75% 15 34 . ,
35 54
45,84 42,85%.
-
.
, ,
,
. 60,52%
,
16,82 8,52%,
.32 .

10
831
348
41,88
473
56,92
0,60
0,60
60,52
50,36
//
71,67
//
45,45
//
45,45
//
117
87
74,36
29
24,79
0,85
8,52
12,59
//
4,39
//
//
9,09
//
231
149
64,50
80
34,63
0,86
16,82
21,56
//
12,12
//
18,18
//
//
, .
16
50,00
43,75
6,25
1,16
1,16
//
1,06
//
9,09
//
//
. .
54
25
46,30
27
50,00
3,70
3,93
3,62
//
4,09
//
//
18,18
//
. .
12
66,67
33,33
0,87
1,16
//
0,61
//
//
//
11
9,09
81,82
9,09
0,80
0,14
//
1,36
//
//
9,09
//
32

65% , 10% , 8% , 5% 7% (Lj. Mlaenovi, Pod ifrom..., str.
72).
105
2/2012.
10
78
52
66,67
21
26,92
3,85
2,56
5,68
7,52
//
3,18
//
27,27
//
18,18
//
40,00
60,00
0,36
0,29
//
0,45
//
//
//
100,0
0,15
//
0,30
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
. .
16
11
68,75
31,25
1,16
1,59
//
0,76
//
//
//
1.373
691
50,32
660
48,07
11
0,80
11
0,80

(50,36%),
21,56% , 12,59%,
7,52%. 74,36% ,
64,50% , 66,67%
, . 71,67%,
(12,12%),
(4,39%), (3,18%),
1,36%.
, .

, ,
.
10
11
12
13
14
831
806
96,99
0,96
14
1,68
0,36
60,52 62,87
//
21,62
//
58,33
//
//
//
15,79
//
85,47
3,42
1,71
1,71
0,85
6,84
7,80
//
10,81
//
8,33
//
28,57
//
25,00
//
42,10
//
211
91,34
12
5,19
1,73
0,43
0,43
0,86
//
32,43
//
16,67
//
14,28
//
25,00
//
10,53
//
117
100
8,52
231
16,82 16,46
106
19421945.

10
11
12
13
./.
16
15
93,75
6,25
14
1,16
1,17
//
2,70
//
//
//
//
//
./
.
54
43
79,63
9,26
1,85
3,70
3,70
1,85
3,93
3,35
//
13,51
//
4,17
//
28,57
//
50,00
//
5,26
//
.
.
12
10
83,33
16,67
0,87
0,78
//
//
8,33
//
//
//
//
11
11
100,0
0,80
0,86
//
//
//
//
//
//
/
.
78
66
84,61
7,69
1,28
2,56
3,85
//
5,68
5,15
//
16,22
//
4,17
//
28,57
//
//
15,79
. .
100,0
0,36
0,39
//
//
//
//
//
//
100,0
//
0,15
0,16
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
12,50
. .
16
13
81,25
6,25
1,16
1,01
//
2,70
//
//
//
//
10,53
//
37
2,89
24
1,75
0,51
0,29
19
1,38
1.373 1.282 93,37
,
, .
. ,
32,43% , 16,22% ,
13,51% . 28,57%
, , ,
14,28% , 50%
, 25% .
16,67%
8,33%
.

86,02% . ,
107
2/2012.
, 10,85%
, (1,53%)
(1,60).
1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
1.181
581
49,19
433
36,66
95
8,04
72
6,10
86,02
149
10,85
21
1,53
22
1,60
1.373
90,08
50
7,75
5
0,77
9
1,39
645
//
33,56
//
23,80
//
40,91
//
46,98
84,57
67
13,08
8
1,56
4
0,78
512
//
44,97
//
38,09
//
18,18
//
37,29
76,61
23
18,55
5
4,03
1
0,81
124
//
15,44
//
23,80
//
4,54
//
9,03
78,26
9
9,78
3
3,26
8
8,69
92
//
6,04
//
14,28
//
36,36
//
6,70
(49,19%) ,
(36,66%) ,
. 1942.
1,34:1, ,
1943, 2,68:1. , 90,08%
78,26% . (44,97%)
1943.
18,55% 1944. . 1942. 1943.
0,75:1,
, 1,50:1.
.
1.181 1.107 93,73

%
86,02 86,35
149
10,85 10,53
21
20
%
1,44
32
2,71
19
1,61
0,42
0,08
17
86,49
//
79,17
//
71,43
//
25,00
//
89,47
//
1,34
3,35
1,34
2,01
1,34
//
5,40
//
20,83
//
28,57
//
75,00
//
10,53
//
95,24
4,76
//
//
135 90,60
1,53
1,56
//
2,70
//
//
//
//
22
20
90,91
9,09
1,60
1,56
//
5,40
//
//
//
//
//
37
2,89
24
1,75
0,51
0,29
19
1,38
1.373 1.282 93,37
108
19421945.

( )

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1,75:1.
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.
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0,56%
, .

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0,67%, 0,31%, 0,07% 0,03%
.
,
.
8,49%
, 0,89%
.
109
2/2012.
,
, , .

, , . ,

.
.
Summary
Dragan Cvetkovi
German camps in Norway 19421945 a numerical
analysis of the death toll of Yugoslav prisoners
Key words: Yugoslavia, Norway, occupied Serbia, Independent
State of Croatia (NDH), war, loses, death, Partisan movement
(Partisans) list, camps, territory, regions, national, sex, age
group, professional-structure
The article is an attempt to present the death toll of some

Yugoslav citizens who were in German camps in Norway on the basis
of a partially revised list Victims of the 19411945 War from 1964.
The list identified 1318 people who died in camps in Norway. They
represent 0,98% of people who died in camps and 0,22% of killed
citizens of Yugoslavia.
In their attempt to break the resistance and crush the uprising
using various means of repression, the German occupying forces
decided to send to Norway a certain number of prisoners of war who
belonged to the Partisan movement. The terror they were submitted
to as well as the harsh conditions of life and work in the camps were
responsible for the large death toll among the interned, thus 57,08%
110
19421945.

of them died. The analysis shows 84,27% of all the victims died in the
first two years which were the worst ones for the internees. The first six
months in Norway were especially deadly. The ratio of the number of
deaths during the six months in 1942 and the whole of 1943 is 1,26:1,
but the real ratio due to the twice shorter period of internment in 1942
is 2,52:1. It was planned originally, in order to crush the uprising and
appease the situation, to intern and send to Norway the Partisan POW
from occupied Serbia and partially from the territory annexed by the
Kingdom of Bulgaria but then the decision was expanded to include
the territory of NDH (Independent State of Croatia). Thus, 50,33%
of the interned were from the occupied territory of Serbia, 48,10%
from NDH while the number of dead from the other territories was
negligible. The internees from Serbia were absolutely the largest in
numbers, they made up 93,37% of the dead although they represent
41,54% of the population of Yugoslavia. The age group and professional
structure of the died internees points to the fact that the Germans
sent to Norway from the occupied territory of Serbia members of the
Partisan movement while there was a significant number of civilians
from the territory of NDH. The dominant way of dying for the internees
in Norway during the whole war was to be killed, specially in the first
year of internment (90,08%) while in the later period the numbers of
those who died due to sickness, famine and exhaustion increased.
111
930:316.75(497.11)1942/1944
94(497.11)1942/1944
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2/2012.
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130
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(http://www.hi.sanu.ac.rs/srp/istorijat).
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2/2012.
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132
Summary
Aleksandar Stojanovi
History and historiography in Serbian the civil/
cultural plan
Key words: historiography, Serbian civil/cultural plan, Center for
research of history, Nikola Radoji, Veselin ajkanovi, Sergije
Troicki, Aleksandar Solovjev
Among about 200 problems of Serbian national and every-day

life defined in concept of Serbian civil/cultural plan, preservation of
Serbian national identity, culture, tradition, history and language had
great importance. Faculty of Philosophy, together with Serbian Royal
Academy of Science (SKA) and other institutions of culture, was assigned
to make projects that should have made great breakthroughs in national
history, linguistics and ethnology. Among original documentation of
the plan is a report on state of Serbian historical science made by prof.
Nikola Radoji ph. d, a paper that shows all weaknesses and problems
of inter-war Serbian historiography and historical science. As a part
of solution, Radoji proposed founding of Institute for researching
of Serbian history, an independent institution, with defined priorities
in work: publishing of historical sources, creating an academic youth
circle and publishing important historical synthesis. Among chosen
sources for publishing were Saint Savas Nomokanon, Duans code,
private and administrative documents from Montenegro, Statute of
Kotor, collections of Serbian privileges given by foreign rulers, etc. Two
most important large synthesis chosen for publishing were History of
Serbian people and History of Serbian Orthodox Church. Projects and
instructions were made for all mentioned problems in period 1943
1944. These projects became evidence in trials after the liberation,
since the creators of Serbian civil/cultural plan were charged for
betrayal and fascization of nation by new communist government.
133
2/2012.
Many of prominent Serbian historians that took part in works on

Serbian civil/cultural plan was sent to retirement, sacked or deprived
of civil honors by new government. Some of these projects still came
to life in communist Yugoslavia, while some of them, despite their
objective importance, are still in process of realization.
134
327(497.1:44)1945/1951(093.2)
341.71:929 .(093.2)
341.71(497.1:44)1945/1951(093.2)
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139
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140
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36, 4, . . 44615; Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog

saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije 19411945, priredili Komnen Pijevac i Duan Joni,
Beograd, 2004, str. 146, 404.
, 507/IX, , , , 30/
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142
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O. Vojtchovsk, Anton Rupnik. Pot slovensko-francoskega komunista do kariere
jugoslovanskega informbirojevskega funkcionarja, Acta Histriae, 18, 12, Koper,
2010, str. 151174.
, 507/XIII, , , . 48/7,
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143
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zapisi jednog borca i diplomate, Beograd, 2007, str. 137; Slavoljub era Petrovi,
Seanja i zapisi borca i diplomate, 2. dopunjeno i proireno izdanje, Beograd, 2012,
str. 203.
, 507/XIII, , , . 48/7,
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145
2/2012.
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1946; Slavoljub era Petrovi, Seanja i zapisi jednog borca i diplomate, Beograd,
2007, str. 137.
148
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149
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150
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, 507/IX, , , ,
IX/30, I-53-90, 57; , , . 44. - : . trbac,
Svedoanstva o 1948. Fragmenti za istoriju, Beograd, 1989, str. 6081.
, 507/XIII, , , . 48/7,
7, 16. XII 1947.
151
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Velebit: svjedok historije, Zagreb, 2001, str. 140.
152
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1, 21. XI 1945.
153
2/2012.
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2, 21. XI 1945. : V. Dapevi,
Ibeovac: ja, Vlado Dapevi, Beograd, 1990, str. 89, 90.
154
:
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, , . , 507/IX, ,
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155
2/2012.
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.
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5, 10. IX 1947.
156
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19451951.

23. 1947.
, ,
,
.
.

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1951. .
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1946,

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53
, 507/XIII, , , . 48/7,
6, 23. IX 1947.
Slavoljub era Petrovi, Seanja i zapisi jednog borca i diplomate, Beograd, 2007,
str. 137.
157
2/2012.
.54 ,
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1945.
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3, 9. VI 1946.
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2, 21. XI 1945; 5, 10. IX 1947.
158
:
19451951.
Summary
Slobodan Selini, Ph. D.
Non-communist ambassador and party diplomacy:
Marko Risti in Paris 19451951
Key words: Marko Risti, KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia),
Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Embassy in France, diplomacy
Marko Risti, a Serbian writer, was the Yugoslav ambassador

in Paris from 1945 to 1951. Although he was not a member of the
Communist Party at that time, the new communist government
appointed him to the post for several reasons: knowledge of the
French language, familiarity with French intellectual circles, political
suitability and the lack of experienced and professional personnel
for the diplomatic service in the Party itself. Milovan ilas probably
played a crucial role in his appointment. During his service in Paris
the relations between Risti and the personnel, who were members of
the Communist Party, was very bad. Members of the Party, who were
his associates Yugoslav diplomats in Paris (attaches, secretaries,
councilors) criticized him or came into conflict with him mostly for the
following reasons: firstly, they criticized his concept of diplomacy and
the way he served as ambassador; secondly, they were convinced that
he did not accept the communist ideology; thirdly, they criticized his
personality and character; fourthly, they claimed that it was impossible
to cooperate with him. On the other hand, Risti was not satisfied
because his associates were young members of the Communist Party
who were politically suitable but did not have any diplomatic experience and some of them did not even speak foreign languages.
159
2/2012.
327(497.1:73)1951(093.2)
355.02(497.1:73)1951(093.2)

( 1951)
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17. 1949.
.
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1950.
,
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, .3 1
: . . , : , (19451957), , 2002; D. Bogeti, Jugoslavija i Zapad, 1952

1955. Jugoslovensko pribliavanje NATO-u, Beograd, 2000; D. Beki, Jugoslavija u
Hladnom ratu. Odnosi sa velikim silama, 19491955, Zagreb, 1988; B. Dimitrijevi,
Jugoslavija i NATO (19511957), Beograd, 2003; B. Dimitrijevi, JNA od Staljina
do NATO pakta. Armija u spoljnoj politici Titove Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2006; I.
Lakovi, Zapadna vojna pomo Jugoslaviji 19511958, Podgorica, 2006; L. M. Lis,
Odravanje Tita na povrini. Sjedinjene Drave, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat, Beograd,
2003; A. C. ,
( 40- 50- ), ,
5/1992, . 5979; . ,
, , 12/2003, . 88105.
D. Beki, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi sa velikim silama, 19491955, Zagreb,
1988, str. 159.
L. M. Lis, Odravanje Tita na povrini. Sjedinjene Drave, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat,
Beograd, 2003, str. 128.
161
2/2012.
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.
1988, str. 232233.
, , I-3-b, . . 7. 1950.
1988, str. 230.
162
( 1951)
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, , 2958, 1, 2.
1951.
.
Memorandum by Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planing Staff to the Deputy Under
Secretary od State, April 9 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, volume IV,
part 2, Washington, 1985, p. 1776.
163
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, . 33.
Secretary od State, y 24, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, volume
IV, part 2, Washington, 1985, p. 1792.
, . 1792.
, , 2958, 13,
26. 5. 1951.
, , 2958, 14,
13. 1951.
169
2/2012.

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19. 1951. , . 58.
, . 59.
, , -1, . 14, . 7, . . 1/1,
24. 1951. , . 6768.
170
( 1951)
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1951. , . 8586.
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171
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, . 101.
Secretary od State, y 24, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, volume
IV, part 2, Washington, 1985, pp. 17921793.
, , -1, . 14, . 7, . . 1/1, 22.
1951. . 108.
.
, . 111.
172
( 1951)
- ?

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, . 126.
, , 2958, 14,
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, , 2958, 15,
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173
2/2012.
.

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1951. , . 146.
, . 156.
.
, . 157.
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9. 1951. , . 161.
174
( 1951)
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,
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30% , 100% , , 100% .
,
, ,
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,
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.67
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63
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65
66
67
, , 2958, 23, 10. 1951.

: I. Lakovi, Zapadna vojna pomo Jugoslaviji
19511958, Podgorica, 2006.
, , -1, . 14, . 7, . . 1/1,
9. 1951. , . 169170.
, , -1, . 14, . 7, . . 1/1,
11. 1951. , . 180181.
.
175
2/2012.
- .

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, . 253.
: B. Dimitrijevi, Jugoslavija i NATO (19511957), Beograd, 2003; B. Dimitrijevi, JNA od Staljina do
NATO pakta. Armija u spoljnoj politici Titove Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2006; I. Lakovi,
Zapadna vojna pomo Jugoslaviji 19511958, Podgorica, 2006.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, June 18, 1951, Foreign
Relations of the United States, volume IV, part 2, Washington, 1985, p. 1815.
: , , 2958, 33,
18. 1951.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, June 18, 1951, Foreign
Relations of the United States, volume IV, part 2, Washington, 1985, p. 1816.
176
( 1951)
- ?
- .73

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1951. .
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18. 1951. .
177
2/2012.
.76

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19. 1951. .
178
( 1951)
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82
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24. 1951. .
179
2/2012.

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86
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: . , , (19451961), , 2011.
180
( 1951)
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90
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19. 1951. , . 61.
, , 2958, 12, 23. 1951. .
.
181
2/2012.
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.
182
( 1951)
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.
10. 1951. .98
,
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97
98
.
Slavoljub era Petrovi, Seanje i zapisi jednog borca i diplomate, Beograd, 2007,
str. 144; Slavoljub era Petrovi, Diplomatski praktikum, Beograd, 2004, str. 111
113.
.
183
2/2012.
.99
. : ,
,100 , .101
*
*
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, ,
.
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1951.
1957. ,

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100
101
, . 145.
, , 2958, 31, -
- ().
: , , . 14, . 6, . . 1/1,
; I. Lakovi, Zapadna
vojna pomo Jugoslaviji 19511958, Podgorica, 2006.
184
( 1951)
- ?
Summary
Aleksandar ivoti, Ph. D.
Washington negotiations (MayJune 1951)
turning point in Yugoslav-American relations?
Key words: Yugoslavia, the USA, military and economic aid,
Washington, Koa Popovi
The negotiations held in Washington undoubtedly represented

a turning point in the Yugoslav efforts to obtain necessary modern
armament and military equipment for its army. The draft of the future
Yugoslav-American military cooperation was drawn up during the
talks in Washington. The American military aid formerly approved and
delivered in limited amounts up to then turned into an institutionalized
program of military aid of the same kind the USA had already established with a series of other countries and their armies. Although certain
differences, often of conceptional nature were voiced during the talks,
a mutually acceptable solution was reached at the end that provided
Yugoslavia with the flow of indispensible means and the possibility
to lean on one of the superpowers and the military-political block
it led. On the other hand, the USA gained a new ally in Europe that
had at its disposal a strong, ideologically indoctrinated and ready to
fight army on a geographically important territory. The agreement
reached in Washington in June 1951, provided Yugoslavia access to
an institutionally formulated system of military aid that continually
functioned up to the end of 1957. On the other hand, the Washington
agreement enabled Yugoslavia exit form isolation and provided for a
strong foothold in the Western military alliance. Talks on the possible
character of war in Europe, the Yugoslav position in a possible conflict
and the modalities of Yugoslav-American cooperation clearly stated
the American intention to establish its influence on Yugoslav territory
in order to gain certain strategic advantages on the Balkans and the
185
2/2012.
Mediterranean in regards to the Soviet Union and its satellites. During

the month long Yugoslav-American military talks in Washington,
specially important issues were discussed regarding American military
aid to Yugoslavia and strategic options for the defense of Yugoslavia
were developed in case of a mutual attack by the Soviet Union and
its East European satellites; both countries agreed on the exceptional
importance of Albania. General Koa Popovis meeting with Dwight
Eisenhower essentially marked the end of his mission. The Yugoslav
General Staff faced a second round of talks a technical conference
whose primary aim was to operationalize the reached agreement.
186
( 1951)
- ?
327(497.1:47)1956(093.2)
327(497.1:497-664)1956(093.2)
# .

1956. *
:
, , 1956,
XX
-,
.
: , ,
, 1956. ,
1948. -

,
.1 1948.

: / , (
47027), .
- : Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948. godine, zbornik radova, Institut za
savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 1999; Branko Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije, knj. III:
Socijalistika Jugoslavija 19451988, Beograd, 1988; Darko Beki, Jugoslavija u
Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 19491955, Zagreb, 1988; Velike sile i male
drave u hladnom ratu: sluaj Jugoslavije, zbornik radova, Beograd, 2005; Ivo
Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita, Zagreb, 1990; Radoica Luburi, Vrui mir hladnog
rata, Podgorica, 1994; Pierre Maurer, The Tito Stalin Split in historical perspective, Bradford Studies on Yugoslavia, no. 11, University of Bradford, 1987; Barbara
Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. 2: Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 1983, pp.
321335; Bernard Lory, Leurope balkanique de 1945 nos jours, Paris, 1996,
p. 3740; R. West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, London, 1994, pp.
217241; Lorejn M. Lis, Odravanje Tita na povrini. Sjedinjene Drave, Jugoslavija
187
2/2012.
, , , , , , , ,

. ,
,
, - .
1953. 1954.
,
,
. 1955.

,
.
, , 1953.
1955. -

.2 1956.

i Hladni rat, Beograd, 2003, str. 73168; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavias
Great Dictator. A Reassessment, London, 1992, pp. 5457; Hanhimki, O. A. Westad, The Cold War. A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, New York,
2003, pp. 6263; Zbornik radova sa meunarodnog okruglog stola Tito Staljin, ur.
Miladin Miloevi, Beograd, 2007; Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa
Broza Tita, IIII, Rijeka Beograd, 1981, 1984; . ,
19441953, 12, , 19992002; . ,
.
19491953, , 2008.
oko Tripkovi, Uspon i pad jugoslovensko-sovjetskih odnosa 1956. godine,
Istorija 20. veka, 2/1998, str. 130; Ljubodrag Dimi, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski
odnosi 19531956, zblienje, pomirenje, razoaranje, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski
sukob 1948. godine, zbornik radova, Beograd, 1999, str. 279293.
188
. .

1956.
,
.

-

XX . 1955.
, . 25. ,
-,

- ,
.3 ,
, - ,

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.4
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,
29. 1955. ,
,
cum gramo
salis.5 ,
,
.
-
.6 ,
3
4
5
(: ), (:
), I5, , . . , 25.
1955. ; Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 19451956, zbornik dokumenata, Beograd, 2010, str. 829; Narodna armija, 23. februar 1955. godine.
Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 19451956, str. 829830.
, , I2/52, ,
29. 1955. , . 10.
, . 1011.
189
2/2012.
,

.

1956.
29.
1955. . ,

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1955. , .
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1955. , .
, 29. 130; Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 19451956, str. 830.

, 29. 130.
190
. .

1956.
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1956.
: ,
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9
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.
, , I5, , , 29. 1955. , . 130, . 12; Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 19451956,
str. 830831.
.
191
2/2012.
,
,
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-
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( 19451948. )
,
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192
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16
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, , 1956, , . 67, . 1,
, 26. 1956. , . . 422959, . 7.
, . 8.
, . 67.
: Katarina Kovaevi, Yugoslav-Hungarian Relations 19531856,
Velike sile i male drave u Hladnom ratu 19451955 (sluaj Jugoslavije), Beograd,
2005, str. 140158.
, , I5, , , , 20. 1956. , . 1.
193
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, , 1956, , . 53, . 2, - . 27, 23. 1956. , . . 41816.
, , 1956, , . 53, . 2,
. 31, 25. 1956. , . . 41816.
194
. .

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24
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26
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28
, , 1956, , . 53, . 2,
, , 3. 1956. , . . 41816.
, . 2.
Borba, 11. februar 1956. godine.
Borba, 5. februar 1956. godine; Politika, 15. februar 1956. godine.
, , 1956, , . 67, . 1,
, 20. 1956. , . . 422818, . 23.
195
2/2012.
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,
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,
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,
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),
.32

1956. , 29
30
31
32
: Aleksandar ivoti, Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile 19451961,

Beograd, 2011.
, , I5, , , .
. . 4, 9. 1956. , . 1.
, (: 507), , IX, 1/I270, ,
1. 1956. , . . . 42, . 1.
, . 12.
196
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, . 34.
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197
2/2012.
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, 20. 1956. , . . 422818, . 3.
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198
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43
44
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, . 3.
, , 1956, , . 67, . 1,
, 20. 1956. , . . 422818, . 3.
Mita Miljkovi, Burne diplomatske godine. Iz sofijskog dnevnika 19531956. godine,
Beograd, 1995, str. 247; Borba, 7. februar 1956. godine; Politika, 8. februar 1956.
godine.
Mita Miljkovi, Burne diplomatske godine. Iz sofijskog dnevnika 19531956. godine,
str. 250.
200
. .

1956.
,
.
,
1956. , -
.47
,

.
1953. - ( ) ,
, .
,

. , (

,
...)

( , ...)
. 1956.
,
,
. - XX -

, .
47
201
2/2012.
Summary
Vladimir Lj. Cvetkovi, Ph. D.
Yugoslavia and the neighboring peoples democracy
countries at the beginning of 1956
Key words: Yugoslavia, peoples democracy countries, normalization of relations, the year 1956, the USSR
Since 1953 the process of normalizing relations between Yugoslavia on one side and the USSR and the peoples democracy countries (including neighboring countries) on the other side was marked by caution,
tactical moves, mistrust and small steps. The reason being extreme
confrontation of the two sides regarding the final goal of the process, which
for the Soviets meant the return of Yugoslavia into the socialist camp
but for the Yugoslavs a normalization of relations with a public apology for
the political and economic damage done during the years of conflict which
would be a precondition for the development of its new foreign policy
strategy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and equidistance
from the two blocks. Various factors were at work in Yugoslavia in such
circumstances, the political ones (fear of an ideological rapprochement
with the countries it wanted to distance itself from, a wish to retain good
relations with the West that was developed in the previous few years,
) directed the country towards a cautious rapprochement with the East
and the economic ones (new markets for Yugoslav goods, favorable
investment loans ) towards establishing stronger connection with the
countries it had been in conflict with a short time ago. The beginning of
1956 marked in that sense the moment when the development of relation
was at its high peak in circumstances when neither side gave decisive
concessions to the other. The break of USSR with Stalinism at the 20th
Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the
signing of the Moscow Declaration opened new opportunities and created
preconditions for the normalization of political relations whose high point
was the reestablishment of interparty cooperation.
202
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- (19541965)
327(510)1954/1965(093.2)

:
- (19541965)*
: , ,
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.
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(), ( ),

*
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( 47027), .
(Niu Jun) Dongfang lishi
xuehui .
203
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,
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,
.1
- , ( 1976)
( 1959) ,

1
: Chen Jian, Bridging Revolution

and Decolonization: The Bandung Discourse in Chinas Early Cold War Experience,
Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945
1962, Christopher E. Goscha, Christian F. Ostermann (eds), (Washington, Stanford:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Stanford University Press, 2009), str. 137171.
204
:
- (19541965)
. - .
, , ,
,
,
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,
,

(, , , ),
()
(). , ,

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1949,
- ,
, . ,
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,

. , ,
.
( 1949. 1950)
2
: Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), str. 211237.
205
2/2012.

.3
,
, , ,
, ,
.
, ,
,
.4 , 1952, ,
,
, .5
,
(19461947), - , ,

. ,
, ,
, , ,
: Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform: Leadership Transfer
in the Asian Revolution, Maos China, Non-Communist Asia, and the Global Setting, 19491976, University of Hong Kong,
2012. .
: Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, tom 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), str. 5051, 176177.
: Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, September 3 1952, CWIHP
Bulletin 67 (winter 1995/1996), str. 1417.
206
:
- (19541965)
, , .6 ,
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,
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1954. .9
, , ,
, ,
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6
7
8
: Mao Zedong xuanji, tom 4 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), str. 1192
1193.
: Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, tom 1, str. 160169.
: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,
1990), str. 5254, 59.
: Shu Guang Zhang, In the Shadow of Mao: Zhou Enlai and New Chinas
Diplomacy, Gordon A. Craig, Francis L. Loewenheim (eds), The Diplomats, 1939
1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), str. 359361.
207
2/2012.

.10
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,

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10
11
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13
Zhongguo waijiaobu danganguan ( - , ZWD), danghao

203-00005-06, , 13. 1954.
: Mao Zedong zhuan 19491976, tom 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), str. 562563.
ZWD, 203-00007-01, , 23. 1954.
: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,
1994), str. 159.
208
:
- (19541965)

. , , , ,
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.15

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.
,

.17
, 14
15
16
17
: Sophie Richardson, China, Cambodia, and

the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010), str. 520.
: Wang Junyan, Da waijiaojia Zhou Enlai (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe,
1998), str. 6168.
( ), 0100,
52, 494, 111, , 6.
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209
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, ,

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. 1954.
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,

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1955. , ,
,
,
18
19
20
21
22
ZWD, 203-00006-01, , 26. 1954;

203-00007-03, , 28. 1954.
The National Archives ( TNA), Foreign Office ( FO) 371/112002, , 7. 1954.
: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, str. 163173, 177191.
-a , .
ZWD, 107-00008-05, , 1955.
National Archives of Myanmar ( NAM), 15/3 (3), 081,
, 1954. ,
,
.
210
:
- (19541965)

.23

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,
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,
23
24
25
26
27
National Archives and Records Administration ( NARA), Record Group ( RG)

59, 670.901/1-255, , 3. 1955.
ZWD, 207-00004-01, - ,
5. 1955.
ZWD, 102-00055-02, , 25. 1956.
NARA, RG 59, 670.901/2-2555, , 25.
1955.
: Zhou Enlai nianpu, tom 1, str. 464.
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-, , .28
, , , .29
,
,
, ,
, .30
,

,
,
.31

,

.32

:
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...

28
29
30
31
32
: Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of
Soviet Influence in the Middle East, (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), str. 5759.
ZWD, 207-00015-01, - , 16. 1956.
: Zhou Enlai zhuan, tom 3 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998),
str. 11711176.
( ), ( ),
1955, -54, 49047, , 16. 1955.
NARA, RG 59, 670.901/5-455, , 4.
1955.
212
:
- (19541965)
, ,
,

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,
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. (
)
.
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, .

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, , , , , . ,

(, , , .) - , 54. 1960. (2,5% , 10 ),
, , , , , , ,
150 .36
,
,
33
34
35
36
: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, str. 121125.

( ), 837, (
), I-4-, .
: Wang Junyan, Da waijiaojia Zhou Enlai, str. 9095.
, . 100, . 48, . 203, . 37, . 9597, , 24. 1961.
213
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,
,

.

,
1956.
,
.37
,
.
,
,
,
,
-.
.38
, ,
,
.39 -- 1956,
, , ,
20
. , ,
-
.40
37
38
39
40
ZWD, 107-00049-01, , 17. 1956.

ZWD, 107-00060-01, , 18. 1956.
ZWD, 107-00048-03, ,
, 1956.
ZWD, 107-00057-05, -
, 1956.
214
:
- (19541965)
,

. .
,
.41 ,
1956,
, ( )
, , . ,
.

,
,
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19571958. , , ,
, , ,
.43 ,
20 ,
, 36 ,
.44
,

41
42
43
44
, , 1955, -25, 49017, , 30. 1955.

, , 1956, -34, 418207, , 23.
1956.
: Ragna Boden, Die Grenzen der Weltmacht: Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik
von Stalin bis Brenev (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), str. 197209.
ZWD, 105-00366-01,
, 26. 1958.
215
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.45
.
- ,
,
,
. ,

,
.46 ,

, ,
,
.47

, , , , , ,
,
,
.48
,
,
.

,
,
. ,
45
46
47
48
ZWD, 105-00867-01,
(19491958), 1. 1958.
: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, str. 403413.
: Yang Kuisong, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jianguo shi, tom 2 (Nanchang:
Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 2009), str. 219.
( ), . 5, .
30, . 120, . 136138, - , 12.
1955.
216
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- (19541965)
,
,
.49

,
, ,
, 1957.
- -, .50
1957,
,
, , ( ), .51
, ,

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,
.52
,
(, , ,
), ,

,

1957.53

,
- .
1956. (,
, , , , , )
49
50
51
52
53
: Mao Zedong zhuan 19491976, tom 1, str. 507544.

: Shen Zhihua, Zhongguo xuanfeng: Zhou Enlai 1957 nian 1 yue de chuansuo waijiao jiqi yingxiang, Ershiyi shiji Zhou Enlai yanjiu de xin shiye, tom 2, Yu
Xing (ed.), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2009), str. 10321054.
: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, tom 7, (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian
chubanshe, 1992), str. 384385.
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2/2012.

.54 ,

, e
, -
- ,
a ,

.55
,
.56

,
,

.
. , ,
, , -

.
, : , .
, . ...
, .57 ,
.
54
55
56
57
: Zhou Enlai nianpu 19491976, tom 1, str. 650651.

: Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Second Series), tom 36 (New Delhi:
Nehru Memorial Fund, 2005), str. 583638.
, , 1957, -78, 44482, , 22.
1957.
, , 1957, -53, 4332, , 6.
1957.
218
:
- (19541965)

, , - ,

. - 1956,
,

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,
, .58 ,
-
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,
1957.
- ()
.59
1955, , . ,

,
,
, ,
.60 ,

(qiu tong cun yi),
,
, ,
58
59
60
, , 1956, -72, 43014, -

, 29. 1956.
NARA, RG 59, 670.901/2-1857, , 18. 1957.
( ), . 9540, . 1, .
11, . 1124, , 24. 1958.
219
2/2012.
.61 ,
,
,
.62

- ,
, -
- , . ,
, ,

. 1958. , , ,
,
.63
, , , , ,
.
,
. , ,
- , () -
.64
,

.65
,
61
62
63
64
65
: Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian Peoples
Solidarity Organization (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1970), str.
1137.
ZWD, 109-00822-01,
, 20. 1958.
, . 5, . 49, . 131, . 161,
-, 7. 1958.
ZWD, 109-00860-01, -
, 16. 1958.
, . 5, . 49, . 131, . 169170, , 9.
1958.
220
:
- (19541965)
, ,
,
.66
, ,
1958, - . 1959. , ,
,
.
, ,

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.67 ,
,

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.
.68
, , ,
,
,
, - ,
.69
,
66
67
68
69
, , 1958, -132, 412344, , 24.

1958.
ZWD, 105-00389-03, , 12. 1959.
, . 5, . 30, . 302, . 7798, , 1959.
, . 0100, . 53, . 463, . 78, . 3153, - 1959. .
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, ,
,
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- ,
,

(, ).

, 1960.
, ,
.

,
, post-festum
.
,
,
.71
1962,
- ,

,
. ,
,
-
.72
70
71
72
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: Wang Hongwei, Ximalaya shan qingjie: Zhong Yin guanxi yanjiu (Beijing:
Zhongguo Zang xue chubanshe, 1998), str. 182194.
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1966), str. 330351.
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,

. ,

.
,
.73
,
, ,
-
. ,
,
,
.74
, ,
,
,
(, , , )
.75 ,
60-
,

, .76
, ,
, 73
74
75
76
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Working Paper, no. 48 (2005).
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kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), str. 366370.
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, . 9540, . 1, . 80, . 212, , 22. 1962.
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: , ,
, ,
,
,
.
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-, , - ,
, , ,
,
- - . , ,
1955.
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,
- ,

.78 ,
,
- , , ,
.79

, , ,

,
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1961.
, ,
77
78
79
80

: Jovan avoki, Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 19591962, Beograd,
2009, str. 236239, 250253.
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AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/40-4,
, 25. 1962.
224
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, ,
-
.81
, , , . -
,
.82

.

. - .
1963. (, , , , ,
, , , ), (,
, ), .

, ,
, (, ),
. ,
, ,
,
. ,

.83
, - - 81
82
83
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the Third World (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), str. 174193.
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225
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( ,
).84
, , ,
.85
.86

,

.

:
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, , . , .
.
, , .87
- ,
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, .88
,
,

,
.89 ,
84
85
86
87
88
89
, . 100, . 51, . 218, . 29, . 131139,

, 22. 1964.
, 837, , , I-5-b, , 1. 1964.
: . . , 19561964 (:
, 2008), . 261285.
: Gopal Chaudhuri, China and Nonalignment (New Delhi: ABC Publishing
House, 1986), str. 43.
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, 30. 1964.
226
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- (19541965)
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, , ,
, , ,

, , , .90
,
1964.
,
, ,
,
. , -
, .

.91

,
( ).92

,
29. 1965. .93
,
(, ,
, ), ,
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90
91
92
93
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: 1964: (: , 2007), . 357362.
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227
2/2012.

, .94 ,
-
,
,
.95
,
, .96
,
, ,
, (, ), ,
,
- .97
,
.
,
, ,
- ,
.98
, - .
, 19. .

94
95
96
97
98
, . 5, . 30, . 480, . 122126, -

- .
ZWD, 107-00636-02,
- , 23. 1965.
ZWD, 105-01318-05, - , 2. 1965.
ZWD, 203-00651-02, , 31.
1965; 203-00652-02, , 1.
1965.
ZWD, 204-01395-01, - ,
25. 1965.
228
:
- (19541965)

.
,
.99

- .
, , , ,
.
,

.
, , ,
,
.100
,
.101

-
,

.102 -
.
, .
, 30. , ,
,
.103
, -
99
100
101
102
103
, , 1965, -2, 423265, ,

21. 1965.
ZWD, 107-01081-09, - , 23. 1965.
NARA, RG 59, 1964-1966, POL 8, 1826, , 2. 1965.
ZWD, 107-00937-01, , 1965.
, . 5, . 30, . 480, . 135141,
30. , 10. 1965.
229
2/2012.
, , ,

.104
,
,
.
- .105
,
-

. , -

, ,
,

. ,
, ,
,
.
-
, ,
,
70-
,
, , , .

.
104
105
ZWD, 107-00934-01,
1965.
: eng Tao, Di
aoguan zai Feizhou, Li
chubanshe, 2005), str.
- , 10.
er ci Ya Fei huiyi weihe meiyou kaicheng, Zhongguo waijiTongcheng, Li Boxiong (eds), (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin
419.
230
:
- (19541965)
Summary
Jovan avoki, M. A.
The emergence of a global strategy: PR China and
Afro-Asia (19541965)
Key words: PR China, Asia, Africa, diplomacy, Cold War
By using newly declassified documents from the most relevant

world archives, particularly the Chinese ones, as well as relevant
international literature, this article deals with the history of Chinas
relations with different Asian and African countries and their regional
organizations during the first two decades of the Cold War. In essence,
this is a general treatment of the emergence, development, and failure
of Beijings Third World entanglements, particularly focusing on the
issue of the rise and fall of the so-called Afro-Asian Movement that
developed between the 1955 Bandung Conference and the unsuccessful conference in Algeria a decade later. The ideological and political
background of Chinese domestic issues, as well as Mao Zedongs
world perceptions, are also meticulously analized as the overall setting
against which Chinas Afro-Asian policy evolved. Without the proper
understanding of Chinas major role in Third World issues, one cannot
fully grasp the importance of certain developments among Asian and
African nations during the Cold War period.
231

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262

Historiography
V. BOINOV

A VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE
323(497.1)197/198
# Voin Boinov, Ph. D.

ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to present another point of
view on the causes that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It
briefly traces the political and economic reasons which catalyzed
the Yugoslav collapse.
Key words: Kosovo, Serbs, Tito, Yugoslavia
Years ago there was a proverb about Yugoslavia which said

that it was the western country of the East and the eastern state of
the West. This phrase illustrated well the ambivalent situation of the
so-called Titos Yugoslavia in international relations at a time when the
world was divided into two opposing halves.
In the context of the serious ideological conflict between the
USA and the USSR the experienced leader Josip Broz Tito won for his
country a due place on the big political scene, which brought some
privileges to Yugoslavia and turned it into an important factor on the
Balkans. Titos actions during the clash between him and Stalin (1948)
also contributed. It turned out that Tito was the only communist leader
from Eastern Europe who dared to oppose the Kremlin master and to
come out of this conflict as a winner.1 So, the firmness showed by Tito

: / , (
47027), .
.
.
Lampe J. R., Yugoslavia as History, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 241
254.
265
2/2012.
increased its prestige in the West, where the political circles began
to see Yugoslavia as an opportunity to destroy Soviet influence in the
eastern part of Europe.
Washington supported Belgrade with financial and military aid to
overcome the blockade imposed by Moscow and the Soviet satellites.2
The goal of the United States was not only to help Tito in this difficult
position, but also to encourage the other socialistic countries to develop their own way, which would distance them from the influence of
Kremlin, and undermine the Soviet monopole in Eastern Europe.3
Stalins death (1953) and the beginning of Khrushchevs era
led to the normalization of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations, but Tito did
not intend to return under Moscows wing and began his own policy of
neutrality, which became Titos patent. Meanwhile Yugoslavia created
some unfamiliar practices in the economic system of socialism. Some
reforms were undertaken which increased the significance of private
property in the economy of the country and reduced government
intervention in state enterprises.4 At the same time special investment
funds from various budgetary items provided billions of dinnars for
the development of the economy and agriculture.5 The fact that western goods, like Coca-Cola or tasty chocolates could be found in the
commercial chains was also symptomatic for Yugoslav socialism. Moreover young people could easily listen to decadent western music
and travel to the West without problems, thus it was not difficult to
establish the link with Western culture. That logically improved the
lifestyle of the Yugoslavs considerably raised their self-confidence
and caused the unconcealed envy of many citizens of other socialistic
countries, where the shortage of products and the lack of contacts
with the West was a routine.
However, this peculiar improvement of the Yugoslav economy
could not conceal the problems in market socialism. From the middle
of the 60s the experiment got stuck. Inflation was increasing; the
unemployment rate was alarming, the external debt increased. The
amplitude in the living standards in the various federative subjects
became more visible. The country was divided. On one side were the
2
3
4
5
Benson L., Yugoslavia, Palgrave Macmillan. 2004, pp. 9596.

Mitrovic G., Undermining the Kremlin, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 38.
Zukin S., Beyond Marx and Tito, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Pejovich S., Market-planned economy of Yugoslavia, University of Minnesota, 1966,
p. 48.
266
V. BOINOV

rich republics and regions (Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina); on the

other side were the poorest parts of the state (Macedonia and Kosovo).6
This raised the important question who would pay for the economic
unification of Yugoslavia. Obviously, the bitter cup had to be drunk by
the wealthy federal entities and this was not met with enthusiasm by
them. That is why in some republics and regions the national feelings,
blurred for some time by the Brotherhood and Unity policy, awoke.
In Croatia these processes led to the so-called Zagreb Spring (1971)
an attempt to reach an agreement for a looser federation.7 At the
same time in Kosovo, where the Albanians have been a majority for
decades and maybe centuries, the voices to leave the federation
became louder because of the national discrimination, which came
from the center.8
These events were a clear signal that in this form Yugoslavia
could not breathe anymore. Therefore, Tito decided to undertake a
major reform and in 1974 a new constitution was adopted, which
replaced the one form 1963. The intention of this new basic law was
to prevent separatist tendencies, giving more freedom and autonomy
to the republics and the regions.9 But the hope that the cure was found
was in vain.
After the death of Tito (1980) the centrifugal forces increased
again. In 1981 the riots in Kosovo took alarming proportions and the
Yugoslavian police and army used considerable forces to crush the
rebellion.10 But the spirit from the bottle was already released. Over
the next few years the ambition of Ljubljana and Zagreb to delimit the
two republics from Belgrade, became clearly visible.11 This desire was
catalyzed by the difficult economic situation in the country and the
awakened national emancipation. Moreover, the situation in Kosovo
became more dramatic with each day. Two cases of violence against
the Serbs overfilled the cup of patience and led to the strengthening of
Serbian nationalism, which found fertile soil for rapid development.12
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
., , , 1978, . 105149.
Wilson D., Titos Yugoslavia, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 197207.
Clark H., Civil resistance in Kosovo, Pluto Press, 2000, pp. 4041.
., (19181992), , 1999, . 219223.
., , , 2005, . 396398.
., , , 2005, . 161164.
Djordje Martinovic (a inhabitant of the city of Gliljane in Kosovo) was (self) injured
in the delicate place of the body. He said that the attack against him was made by
an Albanian gang. Clark H., Civil Resistance, p. 16. A young Serb girl was raped by
267
2/2012.
This nationalistic explosion was channeled at the end of 1986 when

the famous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts was promulgated, often taken as a watershed in national relations
inside the country. This document examined the situation of the Serbian nation in Yugoslavia in the past and in the present. The main
accents in it were:
genocide against the Serbs was committed in Kosovo;
Slovenia and Croatia had seized the Serbian economy;
The Serbs in Croatia were subjected to repressions by the
Croats.
In other words, according to the authors of the Memorandum,
in the middle of the 80s, Yugoslavia became an anti-Serbs state.13
The response to the work of SANU was extremely negative,
even in Serbia, where it was seen as an opportunity to strengthen
the anti-Serb moods and not without a reason. In the following
year 1987, the Slovenian monthly magazine dealing with culture Nova
Revija published The Contributions to the Slovenian National Program
indicating the way to the independent Slovenian state.14 Once again
the foundations of Yugoslavia were undermined.
Accidentally or not, the emergence of the Memorandum was
linked with the rise of Milosevic to power. He found solid support for
his actions in this academic document. More precisely, the Serbian
nationalism proclaimed by the Memorandum was the weapon that Miloevi used to oppose to the separatistic affinities (also lined with an
overdose of nationalism respectively) in Kosovo, Slovenia and Croatia.
The result was notorious.
13
14
Albanians and this crime received wide resonance among the local Serbs; cf. Burn
this house, Duke University Press, 2000, p. 86.
Bennett C., Yugoslavias Bloody Collapse, New-York University Press, 1995, p. 81.
Rizman R., Uncertain Path, Texas A&M University Press, 2006, p. 46. Something curious the publications in Nova Revija caused negativ emotions in
Skopje, where the ruling elite was fanatically loyal to Belgrade, combining this with
saturated hate against Bulgaria. The reason for the discomfort was that, without
denying the existence of Macedonian nation, the Slovenian magazine turned into
a question its ability to sturdiness and accused Skopje of abuse with the common
Yugoslav financial funds; cf. , ., , . 404405; Independent
Slovenia, St. Marrins Press, 1996, p. 187. Here is the place to mention that until
the last moment the political elite along Vardar will show reverence to their northern
neighbor and will demonstrate the frantic desire to preserve Yugoslavia; cf. J
., J, , 1995, . 263.
268
V. BOINOV

The foregoing allows us to answer the question why Yugoslavia

broke up giving several categories of reasons:
Economic reasons: During the years of existence as a multinational country, Yugoslavia faced severe economic problems of
uneven development of the republics and the autonomous regions.
The redistribution of the assets to take from the rich entities in the
federation and to give to the poor subjects produced dissatisfaction
among the first and wish among the second to take more and more
form the mutual pie. This led to conflict between the ruling elites in
the country and increasing difficulties in forming a common economic
policy. Hence the increase in national debt of Yugoslavia, which filled
the huge holes in the state budget. Due to its geopolitical location,
Belgrade had no problem to obtain credit from the Western countries.
The centre used the money to maintain deceptive economic stability in
the country for years which was swept away by the massive inflation
and unemployment in the mid 80s. It would be no exaggeration to say
that economic issues are the major cause for the failure of Yugoslavia
to survive.
National reasons. The economic realities in Yugoslavia awoke
feelings stifled by propaganda. The reluctance of the developed republics to be endless donors of the Yugoslav economy turned into a
desire for separation from the center and for freer federation. Over
time, to these affinities had to be added the sense of national identity
that you were a part of another nation, other then the failed Yugoslav
nation.15 The feeling of belonging to the Slovenian or Croatian nation
from one side and to the Serbian from the other side, further increased
the tension and caused alienation and hatred, so characteristic of the
time of the Second World War, on the territory of the former Kingdom
of Yugoslavia.
Demographic reasons. There were two the most visible demographic causes for the destructive processes in Yugoslavia. The first
was the huge population growth of the Albanians in Kosovo and hence
the reduction of the Serbs in the area. If the last in 1948 were 27%
of the population in the countryside, then in 1981 they were 15%
and on the eve of the wars in former Yugoslavia only 10%.16 The
15
16
Sell L., Slobodan Miloevi and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Duke University Press,
2002, p. 34.
., , , 2000,
. 176.
269
2/2012.
demographic boom among the Albanians gave them the confidence

of a dominating ethnicity in Kosovo. The problems in Kosovo were the
major contributor to the trigger of Serbian nationalism, skillfully guided
by Milosevic. If the first demographic problem can conditionally be
called Albanian, the second should be called Serbian. At the end of the
existence of Yugoslavia the Serbs were about 8.5 million (Yugoslavia
was 23 000 000). So, they were the largest nation in the country
(hence the desire for domination). About 2 million of them lived outside
the administrative borders of Serbia.17 In other words, in the late 80s
and the early 90s the Serbs were faced with the issue of preserving
national unity when the disintegration of Yugoslavia started. But the
road that the Serbian leaders took to solve this problem, compromised
the Serbian idea and led to a national catastrophy comparable to the
Bulgarian in 1918 and the Greek in 1922.
Public and social reasons. Yugoslavia was a group of nations
and ethnic groups Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims (Bosniaks),
Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Hungarians, Germans, Bulgarians, Jews, Italians, Romanians, Slovaks, Gypsies, etc. Each of them
had its own culture, customs, worldview, mentality. It can not be
overlooked that the poorest parts of the country let us call them
conditionally the South, had been a part of the the Ottoman Empire
a disintegrated state, that had left lasting historical and political
problems behind. On the contrary the richest parts in Yugoslavia, or
the North had been a part of the Habsburg monarchy thus having
the chance for greater contacts with the European civilization, and
hence a wider opportunity for better social development.
Geopolitical reasons. No doubt that since the conflict between
Stalin and Tito, Yugoslavia gained strategic importance for the West.
The courage of the Yugoslav leader to stand against the Kremlin
chief caused leading Western countries to support the Yugoslav
path of development, making it an alternative to other Eastern Bloc
countries. The uncompromising Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956)
and Czechoslovakia (1968) showed that Titos model could hardly be
repeated (only Ceausescu tried to establish closer ties with the West,
but he was put into certain frames). The attempt to undertake reforms
in the USSR by Gorbachev showed the weaknesses of the Soviet Union
and literally disintegrated the communist colossus. Therefore, his op17
., ..., . 49.
270
V. BOINOV

ponents decided to strike directly at the center, than in the periphery.

In this line of thoughts the example of Yugoslavia, turned into costly
and unnecessary tool in the fight against the socialist system. There is
no need for Yugoslavia in the unipolar world.
So, would it be fair to say that the Yugoslav experiment has
failed? Maybe yes! And we must remember that it had a second
chance. Taking note of the mistakes of monarchist Yugoslavia, which
was ruled by a cruel dictatorship, Tito wanted to create a mild form
of state structure in which none of the Yugoslav peoples would prevail. However, this option appeared to be a chimera because it was
confronted by the different views on the nature of the country that the
different nationalities in it had. This reminds us that the Yugoslav idea
remains an utopia.
Rezime
Dr Voin Boinov
Zato se Jugoslavija raspala?
Pogled spolja
Kljune rei: Kosovo, Srbija, Tito, Jugoslavija
Dugi niz godina je politiki ugled Tita obezbeivao narodima

Jugoslavije relativnu ekonomsku sigurnost koja je potiskivala ozbiljne
nacionalne probleme zaostale iz prolosti. Ali nakon smrti voe ekonomski i etniki problemi zemlje su se dramatino poveali to je u
krajnjem ishodu dovelo do raspada zemlje.
271
2/2012.
94:796.332(497.1)19(093.3)
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1
I. orevi, Umeju li antropolozi da igraju fudbal? Sport i identitet u savremenoj

Srbiji, Antropologija, br. 9, Beograd, 2009, str. 8990.
D. Kokovi, Sociologija sporta razvoj i podruja prouavanja, Gledita, br. 56,
godina XXVIII, Beograd, 1987, str. 6.
273
2/2012.

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K. Petrovi, Kritiki osvrt na dosadanji razvoj sociologije sporta, Fizika kultura,

br. 5/1983, str. 346.
274
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Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, str. 232238.
279
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Summary
Dejan Zec, . .
Memoirs as source for the study of Serbian and Yugoslav
football analysis of Danilo Stojanovi,
Mihailo Andrejevi and Jovan Ruis memoirs
Key words: football, memoirs, Danilo Stojanovi, Mihailo Andrejevi, Jovan Rui
The importance of researching development of sports has

been acknowledged by Yugoslav and Serbian scholars in the late 70s
and early 80s. Since then many sociologists, anthropologists and
historians have been trying to implement existing theoretical models
and to create new ones in order to fully understand the history and
background of sports in Yugoslavia. The biggest obstacle in this
process is the lack of valid historical sources. The press articles are
often incomplete and out of context and the archival materials are
very poor considering documents that can shed more light on the
history of sports. Thus, the most important sources considering this
topic are the narratives written by participants and witnesses of the
events. Three most important writings in Serbian language are the
memoirs of Danilo Stojanovi, Mihailo Andrejevi and Jovan Rui, who
were all famous footballers, football officials and respected members
of the society. Their memoirs present the glue that holds all the other
information, gathered from other sources, together, and the fabric
that contextualizes other data and creates a firm and understanable
corpus. All who wish to investigate the history of Yugoslav and Serbian
sports and football must not avoid to read the presented memoirs.
293
2/2012.
94:341.485(=163.41)(497.5)1941(049.32)
930:316.75(497.5)1941/1945(049.32)
# -

Glinska crkva Presvete bogorodice, 29/30. srpnja 4/5. kolovoza
1941.: svjedoanstva i kultura sjeanja
Znanstveni kolokvij u organizaciji Sveuilita u Zagrebu (Filozofski
fakultet Odsjek za povjest), Hrvatskog dravnog arhiva u Zagrebu,
Documenta Centra za suoavanje s prolou u Zagrebu i Srpskog
narodnog vijea u Zagrebu. Mjesto odravanja Filozofski fakultet Sveuilita u Zagrebu, etvrtak i petak 29. i 30. lipnja 2012. godine*
:
1941, ,
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294
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(19181941), (19411945), (19451992), (19922012).
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: ( 18441878), ,
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; Todor Kulji,
Kultura seanja. Teorijska objanjenja upotrebe prolosti, igoja tampa, Beograd,
2006, posebno videti u II DELU: Izmiljanje prolosti na Balkanu (str. 190210) i
III DEO, KRITIKA KULTURA SEANJA: PRIMENA, posebno delove pod brojem 6, 8,
9, 10, 12, 14, 16.
296
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2
John B. Allcock, Rural-urban differences and the break-up of Yugoslavia, (Lopposition villecampagne et la dissolution de la Yougoslavie), Balkanologie, Revue
detudes pluridisciplinaires, Vol. VI, n 12, dcembre 2002, p. 101125.
,
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1990. .
(Max Bergholz)
(Concordia University),
, 1941.
298
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Znanstveni kolokvij to se uistinu dogodilo u glinskoj srpskopravoslavnoj crkvi
izmeu 29/30. srpnja i 4/5. kolovoza 1941.: svjedoanstva i kultura sjeanja,
Filozofski fakultet Sveuilita u Zagrebu, etvrtak i petak, 28. i 29. lipnja 2012, str.
18. (broura sa skupa).
299
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.
Glina. Glinski kraj kroz stoljea, ur. Drago Roksandi, Glina, 1988, posebno str.
183369.
305
2/2012.
Slavko Goldstein

29.
8. 1941. . . 1/44, 16, ,
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Slavko Goldstein , ,
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godina koja se vraa (Zagreb, 2007), . 81, 82, 85, 9097,
117, 290332.
,
(uro Aralica, Ustaki pokolji Srba u glinskoj crkvi, Beograd, 2010;
Rade Bulat, Svedoanstva iz Petrove gore, Zagreb, 1981; Miljkan Masli, Poetak i
razvoj ustanka naroda IV. rajona Korduna, Zagreb, 2010).
306
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307
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300 , 12
13
1941. . J. Tomasevicha S. Pavlowitcha.

(Alexander Korb)
(Leicesteru),
(Stanley Burton Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies).
.
308
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14

: dr Marice Karaka Obradov (Institut za hrvatsku povjest u Zagrebu)
Novi mozaik naroda u Novom poretku. Doseljavanje Slovenaca u NDH s posebnim
osvrtom na podruje Banije i Korduna, dr Filipa kiljana (Institut za narodnosti i
migracije u Zagrebu) Organizirana iseljavanja Srba sa Banije u ljeto 1941. godine,
mr Danijele Stijepi (sa Univerziteta u Tibingenu) Glina 1941. godine u pismima i
dnevnicima vojnika Wehrmachta.
309
2/2012.
(, : 1918
1941), (
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.
,

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, Documenta:
,

19411945.
15
16

20. .
. .
310
. -
Summary
Gordana Krivokapi-Jovi, Ph. D.
Old and new Memory Cultures,
Church of the Holy Virgin in Glina 29/30 July 4/5
August 1941: Testimonies and Memory Culture
Key words: Glina, Banija, Kordun, ustasha, NDH (Independant
State of Croatia) massacre, (mass murder), the church of the
Holy Virgin, shaping of memory culture
The focus of this research is a limited but specific event: the

massacre of Serbs from the regions of Banija and Kordun, specially
the one that took place in the church of the Holy Virgin in Glina. The
incentive and starting point was the extensive contents of the scholarly
colloquium held in Zagreb on 28th and 29th of June 2012. The Catholic
Churchs denial of the crime committed in the Serbian Orthodox Church
in Glina was the direct motive for the scholarly community from ex
Yugoslavia to react. The spokesman for the Catholic Church in Croatia,
the priest and historian Stjepan Razum based the denial of the crime,
on the factographical level, on the testimonies that were recorded
and analyzed by Karlo Lipak. He was close to the Ustasha ideas and
movement all his life and also close to the Croatian community in
Glina to which he belonged by descent. So these are the basis on
which the new memory culture is built in the local community of Glina
although it is not in tone with the new political and social trends in
Croatia. This new memory is in sharp contrast with the one which
was cultivated in the socialist epoch, no matter how clumsy it was,
but which arose from and was based on antifascist foundations. Its
main achievement was the building of memorial complex which consisted of memorial house and monumentally designed plateau that
was constructed directly on the spot where the destroyed Orthodox
Church in Glina stood. Who created the policy of controlled memory
of the victims is not completely clear: did it arise spontaneously from
the local circumstances and behavior of the local communists or did
311
2/2012.
it come from the higher structures of the League of Communists of

Croatia. The memorial center in time was degraded due to different
forms of inadequate use and was far from the cultural centre it was
originally intended to be. Anyhow, the idea for and design of the
memorial complex itself was the source of controversy. Neither did
the revisionist trends in ex Yugoslav national histories, nor the writing
of new histories, nor the comparative history of forming new opposed
memory cultures lead to one common resultant if only in the core of
having the same starting point.
312
IN MEMORIAM
IN MEMORIAM

(19362012)

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315
2/2012.

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150 , 500 .
: 18711878,
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316
IN MEMORIAM
. .
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317
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318
IN MEMORIAM
PROF. DR MIRJANA GROSS

(19222012)
Moj prvi susret sa tekstovima Mirjane Gross bio je itanje
njene velike studije Vladavina hrvatsko-srpske koalicije 19061907
(Beograd, 1960, Institut drutvenih nauka: Odeljenje za istorijske
nauke, serija 1, monografije). Ve tu se mogla videti, uoiti glavna
odlika njenog istoriografskog opusa, a to je sveobuhvatnost istraivanja na postavljenu temu, punoa uvida u grau i literature. U toj
njenoj prvoj monografiji ona je minuciozno istraila vie nivoa svoje
teme. Prvo, najire drutvene i politike okolnosti trenutka u kome
se nalazila Austrougarska monarhija na prelomu 19. u 20. stolee;
drugo, posebne okolnosti poloaja teritorije tzv. Trojednice (Kraljevine
Hrvatske sa Slavonijom i Dalmacijom koja uopte nije bila obuhvaena
autonomnim poloajem) i odnosa sa Maarima; tree, ue okolnosti
uspona koalicije do vlasti i samu njenu kratkotrajnu vladavinu. Zatim
sam itala njenu veliku monografiju Povijest pravake ideologije (Zagreb, 1973, Monografije, Sveuilite u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku
povijest, 4), koja je imala znaajnih delova o pravakom pokretu i
uopte aktivnostima, kao i odjeku te ideologije kod Srba u Vojnoj
granici i Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji. (Iako je u svojim osnovnim delovima
koji su se odnosili na poreklo pravakih ideja bila na izvestan nain
intelektualni promaaj.)
Jedan od najupeatljivijih dogaaja iz vremena mog studiranja
bio je velika rasprava koja se otvorila izmeu Mirjane Gross i Milorada
Ekmeia na stranicama Jugoslovenskog istorijskog asopisa (JI br.
12/1975, br. 3/1975, 12/1976) a povodom knjige Istorija Jugoslavije (Beograd, 1973, gde je M. Ekmei dao jednu od svojih prvih
zaokruenih istorija uih jugoslovenskih nacionalizama). Oni su tada
pokrenuli sva bitna pitanja jugoslovenske istoriografije i uih jugoslovenskih nacionalizama novijeg doba. Kljuna pitanja oko kojih se
vodio spor su bila poreklo pravakih ideja, priroda pokreta koji je poivao na tim idejama, kontinuitet trajanja i upotrebe pravake ideologije do ustatva, priroda, bit jugoslovenstva, profil znaajnih istorijskih linosti prostora. Naalost, disput je naglo prekinut. Moda bi mi
danas bili bolji ljudi, koji bi bolje razumevali svoje postojanje na ovim
319
2/2012.
prostorima, ono to nam se dogaalo i ono to bi moglo da nam se

desi, da se to nije dogodilo.
Zatim je dola Mirjanina knjiga Historijska znanost: razvoj,
oblik, smjerovi (Zagreb, 1973, posebna izdanja, Sveuilite u Zagrebu,
Institut za hrvatsku povjest, 3) kojom je napravila znaajan prodor u
jugoslovenskoj istoriografiji. Ta knjiga je brzo postala, i dugo ostala, vrlo
itana studentska literatura. U njoj su predstavljeni svi vani teorijski
i metodoloki pravci u modernoj istoriografiji. Knjiga Drutveni razvoj
u Hrvatskoj: od 16. stoljea do 20. stoljea (Zagreb, 1981), koju je
najveim delom napisala i uredila Mirjana Gross, takoe je bila vrlo
upotrebljavana meu studentima i postdiplomcima.
Kada sam 1982. godine, kao postdiplomac profesora Vasilija
Krestia, otila u Zagreb na istraivanje za magistarsku temu Srpska narodna samostalna stranka u Kraljevini Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji
19031914 imala sam prilike da se i lino upoznam sa profesorkom
Gross. Nije tu bilo nikakve preporuke, poele smo da komuniciramo
spontano, sedei u uvenoj maloj itaonici Dravnog arhiva Hrvatske,
boni ulaz, ispred prozora itaonice lipe, pogled na Zubnu ordinaciju
Vidoni. Kada je videla koju grau gledam, koliko i kako, poela je da
se zanima za moj rad. Naravno i ja za njen. Imala je obiaj da kae,
kada bi mi donosili kutije Plaanske arhive iz magacina sa Gornjeg
grada, pranjave, nesreene: Vreme je da se malo proluftamo. Tada
je ve uveliko istraivala za svoj projekat Poeci moderne Hrvatske u
civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji. Knjiga pod istim naslovom pojavila se u
Zagrebu 1985. godine i imala je podnaslov Neoapsolutizam u civilnoj
Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 18501860. Jednom prilikom mi je pokazivala tek
fotokopirane dokumente izale iz pera bana Josipa Jelaia, uz komentar da mora to paljivo da uva, da su to ba izuzetni dokumenti.
Jednoga dana u maju mesecu 1982. godine, u itaonici Arhiva,
pozvala me je na proslavu svog 60. roendana. Slavila ga je u Institutu
za hrvatsku povjest pri Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu. Topla, fina
proslava, gde su bile prisutne njene kolege, studenti, postdiplomci,
doktoranti, njen profesor i mentor Jaroslav idak. Seam se njene
reenice koja je govorila da joj mnogo znai proslava 60. roendana,
da je to za nju veliki dan, da je mnogo puta u logoru i tokom teke
bolesti matala da bi bilo lepo da doeka i taj dan. Pozvala me je
par puta na aj (bio je to ledeni aj sa limunom) u svoj dom, soba
sa kupatilom, improvizovana kuhinja, u nekada porodinoj zgradi.
Otmeno na neobian nain, kao to je to bila i sama Mirjana Gross. Sem
svakodnevnog vianja u arhivu te 1982. i 1983. godine, videle smo se
jo par puta na promocijama knjiga i izlobama po Zagrebu, jednom
na ruku sa kolegom Dragom Roksandiem. Ona je bila veliko ime
naunog i drutvenog miljea Zagreba. U nekoj prilici na Gornjem gradu
320
IN MEMORIAM
u Zagrebu, u blizini njene nekadanje Prve enske realne gimnazije,

obratila mi se i rekla: znate, Gordana, koja je tema zavrnog pismenog
iz hrvatskog bila na maturi u prolee 1940. godine u mom razredu?
Bila je neto kao kako vidite, zamiljate vau budunost?
Nisam znala da se ona te 1982. godine penzionisala kao profesor
sa Filozofskog fakulteta Sveuilita u Zagrebu, kako je posle bilo oito,
da bi radila dugo punom snagom i realizovala nekoliko velikih projekata. Tako su nastale knjige Prema hrvatskome graanskom drutvu:
drutveni razvoj u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji esdesetih i sedamdesetih godina 19. stoljea (Zagreb, 1992, sa Agnezom Szabo, Plava
biblioteka, Globus); Suvremena historiografija: korijeni, postignua,
traganja (Zagreb, 1996); Vijek i djelovanje Franje Rakoga (Zagreb,
2004).
Poslednji put sam je videla 1988. kada je bila u punoj naunoj,
intelektualnoj aktivnosti. Kada sam ponovo poela da odlazim u Zagreb
na neki normalan nain, ona je ve bila u dubokoj starosti, ali jo uvek
aktivna. Imala sam prilike da je nekoliko puta pozdravim po gospodinu
Slavku Goldsteinu.
Odlazak Mirjane Gross je sigurno odlazak najvee hrvatske
povjesniarke u dubokoj starosti, u Drenju Brdovekom (nedaleko
od Zapreia u Hrvatskom Zagorju), 23. jula 2012, u porodici svoje
velike ljubavi verenika Stanka Topola, porodici koju je smatrala svojom,
budui da je pravu izgubila u traginim dogaanjima Drugog svetskog
rata.
Dr Gordana KRIVOKAPI-JOVI
321

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2/2012.

Voin BOINOV, Ph. D.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War.

gress,The 8th Congress,Aftermath: Resistance and Rankovi,To Brioni: The

AJ, . 507, IX. 119/ I-277. : 119/ I-282.

AJ, . 507, IX. 119/ I-284. : . Tripkovi, n. d., str. 141.

, . 495, . 277, . 67, . 61.

, . 495, . 277, . 67, . 5152.

, . 495, . 277, . 67, . 110.

Dokumenta CIA o Jugoslaviji, str. 230.

AJ, Kabinet predsednika Republike, I-3-a/SSSR, Teme za koje sovjetski sagovornici

, . 495, . 277, . 21/2, . 103104.

AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Beleka u vezi sa programom boravka Leonida I. Brenjeva,

, 15. 1968, . 1; , 20. , . 5; . . , - .

: 1966. , 1/2010, str.

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

meunarodnim poloajem Jugoslavije, te stanjem u JNA godine 1968,

1966. godine u hrvatskoj politikoj javnosti, asopis za suvremenu povijest, br.

Vladimir Bakari i njegova frakcija

Neke openite napomene o samupravnoj reformi u razdoblju 19661979. mogu se

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

bio na elu hrvatskih komunista (u razdoblju 19451953. bio je i

Za Bakarievu politiku djelatnost v.: Mujadevi, Bakari.

Naravno, i sam koncept frakcije nalazi se pod upitnikom jer

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

kroz samoupravne reforme tj. decentralizaciju svih oblika upravljanja,

Otpor centralista Privrednoj reformi

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

je neminovno vodio do daljnje stvarne devalvacije. S druge strane,

i reakcionarne tendence, osobito meu mladima koji su smatrali da

Jaanje centralista i Bakariev protuudar (1968)

HDA, OFVB, kut. 68, Izlaganje dr Vladimira Bakaria na VI kongresu SK Hrvatske 5.

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

otvoriti jednu diskusiju, ime je dao Novaku zeleno svjetlo da Vjesnik

Kao to je nagovijestio u intervjuu Borbi 1967, Bakaria je sve

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

javno izrazio bojazan zbog prevelikog utjecaja direktora banaka koji

Sukobi izbijaju na vidjelo: prijepori oko bilanca federacije

trenutku. Ti projekti nisu poeljni jer dugo ne donose nita i potiu

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

je rasprava prijetila da se pretvori i u javni sukob izmeu Hrvatske i

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

ne u Saveznom sekretarijatu za vanjske poslove jer Hrvatska ima

iz Brazila ili istone Afrike. Primijetio je da se unutar vrha SKJ lako

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

dokumentima saveznih organa prenose obavjetajni podaci o tome

vosti.31 Primjerice, beogradski satiriki list Je ismijavao je hrvatsko

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

Between 19661969, Vladimir Bakari top party leader of SKH

STAVOVI VLADMIRA BAKARIA O CENTRALISTIKOJ

same time preferred a cautious and balanced discussion with them

# Bojan SIMI, Ph. D.

Film was probably the most powerful propaganda tool between

FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE 1930s,

General situation in the film industry in the three countries

Polish films in the 1930s

Source: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538

Polska Niepodlegla, (Warsaw, 2008), p.469.

This data illustrated that the number of films was decreasing,

CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538.

FILM IN THE SERVICE OF STATE PROPAGANDA DURING THE 1930s,

Commerce allocated a symbolic figure of 100,000 zlotys in its budget