Rido Full Text

RIDO
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RIDO CLAN FEUDING
AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN MINDANAO
WILFREDO MAGNO TORRES III

Editor
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Copyright © 2007 The Asia Foundation
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or
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should be addressed to The Asia Foundation, 36 Lapu-Lapu Avenue, Magallanes Village, Makati City,
Philippines. E-mail: tafphil@asiafound.org.
This product is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United
States Agency for International Development (usaid). The contents are the responsibility of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of usaid or the United States Government or The Asia
Foundation.
The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to the development

of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region. The Foundation supports programs in
Asia that help improve governance, law, and civil society; women’s empowerment; economic reform
and development; and international relations. Drawing on more than 50 years of experience in Asia,
the Foundation collaborates with private and public partners to support leadership and institutional
development, exchanges, and policy research.
With a network of 17 offices throughout Asia, an office in Washington, D.C., and its headquarters in
San Francisco, the Foundation addresses these issues on both a country and regional level. In 2006,
the Foundation provided more than $53 million in program support and distributed 920,000 books
and educational materials throughout Asia.
isbn: 978-971-92445-2-3
Editorial team: Wilfredo Magno Torres III, Charlson Ong, Fidel Rillo
Book and cover design: Fidel Rillo
The National Library of the Philippines ClP Data
Recommended entry:
Rido : clan feuding and conflict management in

Mindanao / Wilfredo Magno Torres III,
editor. — Makati City : The Asia Foundation,
c2007.
p. ; cm.
1. Ethnic confIict—Philippines—Mindanao.
2. Conflict management—Philippines—
Mindanao. 3. Clans—Philippines—Mindanao.
4. Mindanao (Philippines)—Ethnic relations.
5. Culture conflict—PhiJippines—Mindanao.
1. Torres, Wilfredo Magno.
hn711.z9c65 305.8’9921 2007 p074000005
isbn 978-971-92445-2-3
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Contents
Acknowledgement 7
Preface 8
Introduction 11
Wilfredo Magno Torres III
one Survey of Feuding Families and Clans

in Selected Provinces in Mindanao 36
Jamail A. Kamlian
MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology
two Dynamics and Management of Rido

in the Province of Maguindanao 50
Abhoud Syed M. Lingga
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies
three Inventory of Existing Rido in Lanao del Sur (1994 –2004) 71

Moctar I. Matuan
Mindanao State University–Marawi
four Management of Clan Conflict and Rido

Among the Tausug, Magindanao, Maranao,
Sama, and Yakan Tribes 97
Ofelia L. Durante, Norma T. Gomez, Ester O. Sevilla, and Howard J. Mañego
Ateneo de Zamboanga University Research Center
and Notre Dame University Research Center
five Responses to Interkin Group Conflict

in Northern Mindanao 126
Erlinda Montillo-Burton, Moctar Matuan, Guimba Poingan, and Jay Rey Alovera
The Research Institute for Mindanao Culture (RIMCU)
Xavier University
six Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflicts

in North Cotabato and Bukidnon Provinces 164
Guiamel Alim, Jose Bulao Jr., and Ismael G. Kulat
Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
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seven Management and Resolution of Rido
Among Meranao in Baloi, Lanao del Norte: Case Studies 201
Monalinda Emperio Doro
eight Big War, Small Wars: The Interplay of Large-scale

and Community Armed Conflicts
in Five Central Mindanao Communities 254
Jose Jowel Canuday
nine The Celebrated Cases of Rido in Maguindanao

and North Cotabato 290
United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD)
ten Tausug and Corsican Clan Feuding: A Comparative Study 304

Gerard Rixhon
Conclusion: A Personal Reflection 325

Samuel K. Tan
About the Authors 332

Index 335
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Acknowledgement
The Asia Foundation is indebted to the authors, the researchers, and several
individuals who did the legwork in the production of this book. This book
was also made possible by the invaluable insights generated through the
forums organized by our partners and the numerous discussions and con-
versations with people. The Foundation is grateful to the following persons
and institutions for sharing their knowledge and expertise, and for their
constant support and encouragement:
Mindanao State University–Iligan Institute of Technology
Notre Dame University Research Center
Research Institute for Mindanao Culture, Xavier University
United Youth for Peace and Development
Mindanawon Initiatives for Cultural Dialogue
Newsbreak Magazine and Mindanews
Marites Danguilan Vitug, Gemma Bagayaua, Carol Arguillas,
and Bobby Timonera
Gerard Rixhon and Dr. Samuel K. Tan
Fr. Albert Alejo, S.J., Thomas Parks, Dr. David Fairman,
and Prof. Ponciano Bennagen
Datu Ibrahim “Toto” Paglas III and Fr. Roberto Layson, OMI
Dr. Dalomabi Bula, Don Loong, and Major Dickson Hermoso
Howie Severino, David Celdran, Pinky Fadullon, and
Teng Mangansakan II
Vivien Suerte-Cortez, Jenny Lam, Samira Gutoc, and Bianca Altavas
Dr. Wilfredo Arce, Dr. Kim Ninh, and Prof. Miriam Coronel
Dr. Modesta Lugos, David John delos Reyes, S.J.,
and Dr. Madelene Sta. Maria
Scholars of the Mindanao Anthropology Consortium,
especially Alber Hussin, Penelope Sanz, and Rey Lacson
Foundation for Communication Initiatives
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,
the Joint grp-milf Coordinating Committee on the Cessation
of Hostilities, and the International Monitoring Team
The United States Agency for International Development
All the participants of the Davao and Manila rido forums
All the local stakeholders in the communities who generously
shared their knowledge and experience.
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Preface
T HE ASIA FOUNDATION conflict management programs throughout

Asia cooperate with local partners to better understand the nature of
conflict and existing conflict management mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific
region. Addressing fundamental grievances requires a more systematic un-
derstanding of the nature of conflicts and existing conflict-management
mechanisms. Baseline information can also be helpful in assessing the im-
pact of activities aimed at mitigating or managing conflicts. A comprehen-
sive conflict survey developed by Foundation staff has been adapted for
implementation in the Philippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.
In the Philippines, this survey was undertaken in 2002 and, as explained
in this volume, the results led the Foundation to focus additionally on clan
conflicts in southern Philippines. Feuds between clans are known through-
out history—Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet is a tragedy, after all, because
the two lovers come from different families:
Two households, both alike in dignity…

From ancient grudge break to new mutiny
Similarly, clan feuds in the Philippines are not confined to Mindanao.

A famous pre-martial law feud in the Ilocos between the Singsons and the
Crisologos resulted in death and destruction on a wide scale.
Still, data in this volume do demonstrate that clan conflict is more prev-
alent in the southern Philippines. Further, rido interacts with other forms
of conflict, notably separatist insurgencies, and thus makes managing those
conflicts more intractable. Hence, The Asia Foundation launched a series
of coordinated studies of rido in partnership with the institutions and indi-
viduals represented in this book.
The Asia Foundation has incurred many debts of gratitude in the pro-
duction of this book. First of all, we thank the United States Agency for
International Development for the support that made the research and
publication possible. The views represented here, it should be said, do not
represent those of usaid. Secondly, all those institutions and individuals—
the list is in the Table of Contents—who actually undertook the research
and writing of this book, for their willingness to coordinate, do field work,
and edit many versions of their output. Particular thanks go to Samuel Tan
for sharing his insights into the meaning of the final product. To Charl-
son Ong and Fidel Rillo who labored long to shape research reports into
publishable form.
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9 || Preface Introduction || 9
Finally, this book is dedicated to the communities and peoples cov-

ered by the research, in the hope that the work represented herein helps in
managing the conflicts that afflict their lives so that peace and development
may come.
Steven Rood, Ph.D.

Philippine Country Representative
The Asia Foundation
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E
Introduction
Wilfredo Magno Torres III
T HIS VOLUME presents several studies on feuding or clan conflicts,

popularly known in Mindanao as rido. This effort is the result of a
coordinated research conducted by Mindanao-based civil society orga-
nizations and academic institutions with support from the United States
Agency for International Development (usaid) and The Asia Foundation.
The studies variously mapped the incidence of clan conflicts in Mindanao
and conducted in-depth investigations into the root causes of the conflicts,
the parties involved, the conditions for their escalation and recurrence, the
relationship to other forms of conflict, and the potential for conflict reso-
lution. The studies investigated the dynamics of clan conflicts with the
intention of informing and helping design strategic intervention to address
such conflicts.
The studies in this volume deal with a type of violent conflict variously
referred to as feuding, revenge killings, blood revenge, vendetta, inter-tribal
warfare, and clan conflicts. Characterized by sporadic outbursts of retalia-
tory violence between families and kinship groups as well as between com-
munities, this phenomenon frequently occurs in areas where government
or a central authority is weak and in areas where there is a perceived lack
of justice and security. Feuding and revenge killings are common to many
societies throughout human history. Depending on periods in history, this
phenomenon has been documented in places such as the Balkans, Sicily,
Corsica, the Caucasus region, the Middle East, and, in the remoter past,
Scotland and the Appalachian region of the United States,1 as well as in some
1 See “Honour” Killings and Blood Feuds in www.gendercide.org
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12 || Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao
Southeast Asian cultures.2 While there are studies that distinguish between
the concepts of feuding and revenge, in this volume, feuding and revenge
killing is considered part of the same continuum.3
In the Philippines, feuding between families and clans is also preva-
lent. Cordillera in northern Luzon is famous for inter-village warfare and
“revenge raids” caused by land and boundary disputes and competing eco-
nomic interests such as sources of water or firewood.4 Feuding also occurs
among lowland Filipinos, a famous example of which was in the Ilocos in
the early 1970s between the Crisologo and the Singson clans. Depending
on the ethnic group and region, feuding and revenge are known by various
terms such as pangayaw, magahat, or pagdumot among some lumad or in-
digenous groups in Mindanao, and pagbanta, pagbunuh, mamauli, kasaop,
pagbaos, and lido, ridu, or rido5 among some Moro groups. For the purpose
of this book, the conflict under focus is referred to as rido, feuding, or clan
conflicts. Rido refers to a state of recurring hostilities between families and
kinship groups characterized by a series of retaliatory acts of violence car-
ried out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice.
Rido has wider implications for conflict in Mindanao primarily because
it tends to interact in unfortunate ways with separatist conflict and other
forms of armed violence. Many armed confrontations in the past involving
insurgent groups and the military were actually triggered by a local rido. Ex-
amples of such cases are illustrated in detail in this volume such as the feuds
that escalated in Dapiawan (2004) and Linantangan (2005) in Maguindanao
that eventually drew in the involvement of the Armed Forces of the Philip-
pines (afp), the paramilitary Civilian Volunteer Organizations (cvo), and
the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (milf). A more recent case that
demonstrated the interconnectedness of feuds and large-scale conflicts was
the Shariff Aguak incident in June 2006 that sparked a major armed confron-
tation between paramilitary forces under a political clan and some elements
of the milf.6 Such hostilities underscore the potential of local feuds and
2 The subject of feuding has often been subsumed under more dominant themes like maritime
trading, slave-raiding, and head hunting. Some authors have cited the prevalence of feuding and inter-
suku warfare among indigenous communities in Borneo (See King 1993: 83; Singh 2000: 37-38, 53-54).
Torres has encountered a history of inter-island feuding in Semporna and Sulu (2006: 282-283). In
addition, much like the genealogies of Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates, the Sejara Melayu (Malay
Annals) mentions feuding among royal families in the Malay Peninsula (Bastin 1970: 169).
3 Ginat (1997) and Boehm (1986), for instance, distinguish revenge from a feud. Revenge (or
blood revenge) refers to a single killing to avenge a murder, whereas a feud involves a chain of recipro-
cal murders between rival groups.
4 See Barton 1949, Dozier 1972, Rosaldo 1980, Prill-Brett 1987, Goda 1999, Junker 2000.
5 Rido or ridu is a term used by the Meranao, Iranun, and Maguindanao to refer to clan conflicts
or violent retaliations. It must also be noted that rido and the phenomenon of feuding is of pre-Islamic
provenance.
6 On June 23, 2006, a bomb exploded in Shariff Aguak allegedly intended for the Maguindanao
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Introduction || 13
third-party actors to frustrate the peace process between the government

and the milf. Meanwhile, a contrasting incident occurred in January 2006
in the efforts of the milf to mobilize their troops to protect civilians from
a raging rido between warring families in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur.7 Without
a nuanced understanding of local conflict dynamics, such a commendable
effort could have easily been misconstrued as an offensive.
Rido is only one aspect in the complex web of violence in Mindanao
which includes Muslim separatism, communist insurgency, and banditry.
The interaction of these different conflicts has explosive consequences to
the long-running separatist war in Mindanao.8 Given this context, a deeper
understanding of specific conflicts is crucial in disentangling the blurred
lines of conflict and enable communities and the government to effectively
address the problem.
The Mindanao Rido Study

The Process of Engagement
The coordinated study on clan conflicts had its origins in late 2002
when The Asia Foundation supported a household conflict survey in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (armm) and adjacent areas on
the citizens’ perceptions of conflict.9 The survey results showed that while
the Muslim-Christian conflict in Mindanao dominates the attention of in-
ternational and local press, clan conflicts are actually more pertinent in the
daily lives of the people. Citizens are more concerned about the prevalence
of clan conflict and its negative impact on their communities than the con-
flict between the state and rebel groups in Mindanao. These findings, which
were again verified in a more recent survey by the Social Weather Stations
in the armm,10 illustrate the complexity of conflicts in Mindanao and en-
couraged the Foundation to help address the problem. With the assistance
of usaid, the Foundation spearheaded a set of diagnostic activities to help
design strategic interventions that enable communities and government
agencies to prevent the escalation of conflicts.
Governor, killing seven members of his convoy. This incident sparked a major armed conflict that dis-
placed thousands of families and endangered the peace process between the government and the MILF.
This incident became a litmus test for the Joint CCCH-IMT mechanism and civil society groups. To
contain the violence, a buffer zone was jointly established by the GRP and the MILF (Bantay Ceasefire
Report 2006).
7 “Lanao clan war kills 10.” In Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 6, 2006, page A2.
8 See Rood 2005: 4.
9 The survey was conducted by TNS-TRENDS in partnership with the Office of the President,
with support from The Asia Foundation and Hewlett Foundation. See Dayag-Laylo 2004.
10 Social Weather Stations (2005: 2), slide 9-11.
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The coordinated study was done by engaging Mindanao experts in a
series of meetings and group discussions that involved reviewing the exist-
ing studies on rido, clarifying concepts, and setting directions for research
in the area. The discussions revolved around the following questions:
• what constitutes clan conflict and what are the existing formal and
informal mechanisms that people use to resolve these;
• when does clan conflict occur and what kind of issues escalate into
clan conflicts;
• how are young people socialized into attitudes about it;
• what are the variations of clan conflicts among different ethnic
groups;
• how does clan conflict overlap with government and separatist con-
flict;
• to what extent are clan conflicts mistaken by government to be sepa-
ratist conflict;
• what can government and peace activists do to isolate these different
kinds of conflict so effective interventions can be put in place?
The studies in this volume are descriptive studies that employed qualita-
tive and quantitative data collection and analysis. The data-collection tech-
niques used include key-informant and in-depth interviews, focus-group
discussions, participant observation, surveys, and secondary data gathering.
During the research period, the participating institutions conducted regular
meetings among themselves to critique methodologies, discuss findings and
address problems. Methodologies and research questions underwent several
iterations based on new data encountered in the field. Community meetings
were also held to validate the preliminary research findings.
The sensitive nature of the topic was a challenge for the researchers who
often found themselves under suspicion by some locals. It took some time
for the researchers to lay the groundwork and earn the trust of key infor-
mants and families involved in rido. As the data started to come in and make
sense, the researchers realized that there was a real danger that the issue of
rido would be misunderstood or taken out of context, that the data gathered
could be used by unscrupulous groups to reinforce the already negative
stereotype of Mindanao and Muslims, or even utilized to manipulate situa-
tions and affect the peace process.11 Because of this, extra care was taken in
dealing with sensitive data and ensuring the fair treatment of issues related
to clan conflicts. Sensitive and ethical issues were taken into account and
11 There were also initial fears that the issue of rido would distract the peace process. However,
it was later proven that awareness of rido and its dynamics complements the peace process as there is
more nuanced understanding of conflicts which would otherwise be easily misconstrued as separatist
violence.
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Introduction || 15
discussed thoroughly with researchers and the local people, and measures
were agreed upon to ensure that the issues were adequately addressed. At the
heart of this entire effort was the integrity of the researchers—their sincere
and transparent engagement with the local people.
Dissemination of Study Findings, Insights, and Reflections

The results of the coordinated study were presented by the research-
ers in several forums including two major conferences in Davao and in
Manila. Newsbreak magazine complemented the studies through several
investigative articles on rido which also helped increase general awareness
about the phenomenon.
The rido conference in Davao was especially important because it en-
abled Mindanao stakeholders to validate the findings of the studies and
confirm the prevalence and urgency of the problem. Several insights were
generated during the forum such as the importance of culture in under-
standing and addressing rido, the crucial roles played by traditional lead-
ers and processes in resolution, the important role of women mediators,
the potential of harnessing existing local initiatives to manage conflicts, the
need for more nuanced reporting of conflicts by media, and the danger that
rido poses to the peace process and future peace agreements.
The discussions further highlighted several important personal experi-
ences and reflections on rido. Datu “Toto” Paglas, whose family was involved
in a rido, gave a very emotional sharing on how he lost loved ones in a rido
and how he was able to transcend his hatred for his enemies, which ended
the cycle of violence. He tearfully said that: “I also thought of the pain oth-
ers would feel in losing their loved ones, as I and my family felt (when we
lost ours). I felt the pain that the families of those whom we would have
hit back at, their wives and children especially, would feel. I decided to ac-
cept the truth that vengeance is God’s alone, that everything should be up
to His Will.”12 In a similar soul-searching testimonial, Fr. Roberto Layson
expressed very emphatically and very gently his feeling of inadequacy as a
spiritual leader amid this urgent problem: “I am also a priest. Where did we
go wrong? We preach Christianity, it means love. We preach Islam, it means
peace. And yet there is violence among our faithful. Sometimes the violence
is committed in the name of God. What is the role of the religious leaders?
Are we credible? This is a very strong challenge to Islam and Christianity and
probably it should also challenge the lumad religions and spirituality.”
Recognizing the importance of these studies, the Office of the Presi-
dential Adviser on the Peace Process (opapp) endorsed special briefings
12 In “Taking Rido Seriously: Top Level Participatory Analysis of Clan Conflicts and Community
Conflicts in Mindanao.” Unpublished conference proceedings. May 31–June 1, 2005.
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on the rido studies to the members of the Joint Government-milf Coor-
dinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (ccch) and to three
groups of the international monitoring team (imt).13 A briefing was also
given to members of the House of Representatives. These forums were at-
tended by representatives from the government, media, non-governmental
organizations (ngos), the academe, women’s sector, people’s organizations,
traditional and religious leaders, embassy officials, local monitoring teams,
members of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (ahjag),14 and various Minda-
nao stakeholders.
Overview of Findings
The coordinated studies documented a total of 1,266 rido cases that oc-
curred between 1930s to 2005, killing more than 5,500 people and displacing
thousands. Out of the total number of rido cases documented, 64% remain
unresolved. The top four provinces with the highest number of rido inci-
dences are Lanao del Sur (377), Maguindanao (218), Lanao del Norte (164),
and Sulu (145). The rido incidences in these provinces account for 71% of the
total cases documented. The findings also show a steady rise in rido conflicts
in the 11 provinces surveyed from the 1980s to 2004. Fifty percent (637 cases)
of the total rido incidences recorded by the studies occurred in the last five
years (2000-2004), which is about 127 new cases per year.
The actors involved in a rido vary as the conflict can occur within kin-
ship groups15 or involve members coming from different kinship groups
and ethnic groups.
Rido has caused so much untold suffering. Its effects are often subsumed
under the larger separatist conflicts. Aside from numerous casualties, rido-
related armed confrontations have caused the destruction of properties,
crippled the local economy, displaced communities, and fomented fear.
The causes of rido are contextually varied and may be further com-
plicated by a society’s sense and concept of honor and shame. While the
triggers of the conflicts can range from petty offenses like theft and jesting
to more serious crimes like homicide, the studies show that land disputes
and political rivalries are the most common causes of rido. Factors that
13 The Joint CCCH is composed of a team from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Together with the International Monitoring
Team (IMT) headed by Malaysia with members from Brunei and Libya, the Joint CCCH is tasked to
monitor the ceasefire between the government and the MILF.
14 AHJAG is a ceasefire mechanism mandated to go after criminal elements. The AHJAG and
the MILF has been conducting joint operations that have successfully pursued kidnapers and recov-
ered kidnap victims in Mindanao (See MindaNews, November 6, 2005; Business World, May 15, 2006;
Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 6, 2006; Updates on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks, January 12, 2007).
15 Composed of nuclear and extended families.
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Introduction || 17
aggravate a rido include the formation of alliances by the principals with

other families and armed groups or the interaction of rido with state-level
conflicts (i.e. the conflict between the Moro liberation fronts and the state)
and other armed conflicts (i.e. banditry). The proliferation of firearms, lack
of law enforcers and credible mediators in conflict-prone areas, and an inef-
ficient justice system all contribute to rido.
Key Concepts on Feuding and Revenge

Kinship, Self-Help, and Collective Responsibility
Feuding and revenge killing documented in other parts of the world are
surprisingly similar to the endemic clan conflicts experienced in the Philip-
pines.16 Revenge killings and feuds are typical in small-scale societies where
family and kinship ties are the main sources of authority and where there
is a lack of effective state control and authority. In such societies where the
state is weak, decision-making and enforcement become more decentral-
ized and the provision of security is based mainly on self-help.17 This means
that in the absence of a strong state or central authority, the responsibility
and the means for coercion are more widespread, such that governance
and social control usually rests in the local population. Under such circum-
stances, the distribution of responsibility and capacity for the provision of
security are more likely to be organized along the lines of kinship.
Classic ethnographies dealing with revenge recognize that kinship
forms an important basis for social relations and that the bond of kinship
is a significant factor in the provision of security and revenge. In his study
on violence and law in Tausug society, Thomas Kiefer observes that the
sanctions of kinship justify a greater range of everyday behavior for the
Tausug that may cover a variety of political, economic, and military ob-
ligations (1972:28). Roy Barton’s pioneering work among the Kalinga and
Ifugao shows the primacy of preserving family and kinship unity and its
importance in carrying out responsibilities such as providing support dur-
ing times of crisis and revenge-taking (1949:69; 1969:8). The importance ac-
corded to kinship unity may also translate on a wider community level. This
is especially true with regard to maintaining the integrity and autonomy
of more self-sufficient villages. In the Cordilleras, June Prill-Brett (1987:14)
observes that there is a marked solidarity among autonomous Bontok vil-
lages (ili), wherein each village member cooperates for the total welfare of
the community. Strong community ties are especially apparent during times
16 See Barton 1949; Dozier 1966; Prill-Brett 1987; Kiefer 1972; Rosaldo 1980; Hasluck 1954; Ginat
1997.
17 See Philip Carl Salzman in Ginat 1997: vii-viii; Kiefer 1972: 53.
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of conflict. A harm done to a village member is considered a threat to the
security and autonomy of the village itself. On such occasions, the village
is expected to retaliate to assert its strength and defensive capacity and not
lose the respect of other villages (Prill-Brett 1987:15).
Elsewhere, village life and blood feuds in the Albanian highlands, elo-
quently captured in the earlier work of Margaret Hasluck (1954), provide us
with some important insights into the relationship of family and communal
solidarity and revenge:
The community sense was fostered by every art the mountain-

eers knew. Each member of a household was encouraged to regard
everything in it and everything its other members said and did as
his own. The humblest man was encouraged to regard his village
or group of villages as his personal property. If home, village or
group of villages prospered, he rejoiced as if he had himself been
advanced. If they were insulted or injured, he burned to avenge a
personal affront. If they were disgraced by misconduct on the part
of another member, he felt his own honour to be smirched. The
patriotism so bred was narrow, perhaps, but its emphasis on the
need to keep the community’s honour untarnished, a good deter-
rent from crime. (1954: 11)
These communities consisted in the narrower sense of the fam-
ily, and in the wider sense of the tribe. If a person was injured,
the family in most cases, and the tribe in a few cases, by the law
of self-government punished the wrongdoer. Since the individual
was almost completely submerged in his family, an injury to him
was an injury to the whole family and might be punished by any of
its members. When the tribal community was involved, the injury
might again be avenged by any of its members. When the injury
took the form of murder, vengeance generally took the Mosaic form
of a life for a life, but sometimes was achieved by the exaction of
blood money or the imposition of exile. (1954: 219)
This vivid description by Hasluck underscores the obligations of close-

ly-knit groups in providing mutual self-help that covers various aspects of
everyday living including revenge which, in the end, may be necessary for
the survival of a community.
Joseph Ginat (1997), in a more refined explanation of mutual self-help
as a collective cultural response, used the notion of “collective responsibil-
ity”.18 In his study of blood revenge among Bedouins and Arabs in Israel,
18 Barton’s earlier works also proposed the ideas of collective responsibility and collective proce-
dure in Ifugao legal system (1949: 71-72, 82); (1969: 7).
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Introduction || 19
Ginat explains that in a system of collective responsibility, “any act or omis-

sion by one individual reflects on the group as a whole in the sense that the
group is responsible for, and must accept, the consequences of that act or
omission” (1997:2). This means that each member of a group may be held
responsible for the actions of any one member, such that an injury inflicted
on a member of a group would be considered an injury to the whole group,
and thus creating conflict with the injured group. The basis of collective
responsibility is the need to help each other in a hostile environment. As
agricultural and pastoral societies collectively held territory, they also had
shared interests and shared commitments such as security. According to
Ginat, “collective responsibility” is the “defining thread that runs through
blood revenge, family honor, mediation, and outcasting” (1997:1-2).
Security based on collective responsibility is effective because, on the
one hand, the possibility of retaliation from an individual’s group serves as
a deterrent for coming into conflict and, on the other hand, an individual
knows that he is also responsible for the actions of his group members, such
that he can also be a target for reprisal if his group member comes into
conflict. Robert Bates (2001) in his discussion on the development of agrar-
ian societies supports this view. He explains that the numerous risks faced
by agrarian societies from nature and from the conduct of other people
resulted in the development of social arrangements that not only allowed
families to organize production but also provide security and protection
through the private provision of coercion. In such societies, the threat of
retaliation from the private provision of coercion served as a deterrent that
kept a fragile peace (Bates 2001: 46-47).
Honor, Shame, and Reciprocity

The interplay of honor, shame, and reciprocity within the cultural con-
text of a society may serve to regulate relations among its members, de-
termine prestige and political influence, facilitate access to resources and
economic distribution, reinforce social ties, and promote cohesion.
Julian Pitt-Rivers defines honor as the value of a person in his own eyes
and also in the eyes of his society. “It is his estimation of his own worth, his
claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excel-
lence recognized by society, his right to pride” (Pitt-Rivers 1966:21).19 It must
be noted, however, that the conception of honor varies across different social
contexts (region, period, class, cultures, etc.). For instance, honor as under-
stood in European society is quite different in the Arab world. In France
(and somewhat similarly in England), the concept of honor originated from
19 Julian Pitt-Rivers discusses honor, social status, and shame in Western Europe and compares
the range of this notion with modern Andalusian society (1966).
RIDO V2.indd 19 10/4/2007 8:22:33 AM

the ideology of noble military service that later on became associated with
the idea of noble race through reproductive and inheritance strategies in
order to keep wealth intact (Nye 1998). Depending on different periods,
honor in Spanish society was connected to lineage and social class and the
notion of “pure blood” (Baroja 1966). In Arab society, Abhou-Zeid (1966:
256) differentiates the types of honor such as sharaf which can be accumu-
lated or lost according to the man’s behavior, and the ird which is honor
that only applies to female chastity and can only be lost and even affect the
man’s honor. Among some indigenous groups in the Philippines, concepts
of honor locally known as bansa or bantug are recognized through a person’s
capacity to help others or, in the case of village headmen (datus), in the ca-
pacity to settle disputes. Among the Meranao, the maratabat approximate
the concepts of honor, self-esteem, and prestige but is sometimes equated
to lineage or social status in the community.20
Across many societies, when honor is challenged it can be resolved
through an appeal to some form of tribunal such as the court of public
opinion, the monarch (sultan, datu), and other ordeals such as judicial
combat (as in the French duel), which imply an appeal to God.21 Physical
violence is usually the ultimate vindication of honor especially when other
means to settle disputes fail. In Albania, the blood feud is considered the
ultimate sanction in all cases where personal honor is concerned (Hasluck
1954: xii)22 such that failure to seek redress for honor that is violated is se-
verely criticized by society:
Public opinion also spurred the avenger on. A man slow to kill
his enemy was thought ‘disgraced’ and was described as ‘low class’
and ‘bad’. Among the Highlanders, he risked finding that other men
had contemptuously come to sleep with his wife, his daughter could
not marry into a ‘good’ family, and his son must marry a ‘bad’ girl.
(Hasluck 1954: 231-232)
While honor can sometimes be a driving factor in revenge, this same

sense of honor also demands that vengeance is not taken indiscriminately.
20 The maratabat has a universe of meanings which can include honor, status, rank, self-esteem,
dignity, pride, self-respect, etc. For a thorough discussion of maratabat, please refer to the studies of
Abdullah 1982, Bartolome 2001, and to the chapters of Matuan, Burton, and Doro in this volume.
21 See Pitt-Rivers in Persistiany 1966.
22 According to Hasluck, the Albanian blood feud has its roots in the customary laws of the moun-
taineers which evolved as part of the legal framework they devised for every aspect of their life (1954:9).
Administered by a ruling rank collectively known as elders, these customary laws are enshrined in the
kanun of Lek Dukagjini (Code of Lek Dukagjini). The kanun contained methods for dealing with
crimes against property and person, conventions that govern trespass, travel, the administration of
oaths, the imposition of penalties, and conventions that govern the blood-feud (Hasluck 1954:xii).
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Introduction || 21
In many societies (like the communities in this study), revenge and blood
feuds are governed by a multiplicity of rules. The Albanian blood feuds
documented by Hasluck provide many examples of such conventions. For
instance, it is considered dishonorable to kill and not tell, to steal from a
victim, to hide a victim’s body, and to violate the sanctity of the “pledged
word” such as a truce (bese) (1954: 220). There are also practices govern-
ing house guests and women. House guests, for example, are considered
under the protection of the host such that the host is obliged to avenge the
guest when killed under one’s protection, while killing women and persons
who are physically frail, feeble-minded, or not capable of carrying arms is
abhorred.23 Curiously, other conventions exist concerning religious beliefs
that demonstrate the persistence of customary laws despite the influence of
Christianity and Islam. In some parts of Albania, an assailant is expected
to face a dead man’s body to the east if his victim is Christian and toward
Mecca if the victim is Muslim (Hasluck 1954: 229).24
Complementing the concept of honor is the concept of shame. Ginat
says that “just as honor is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also
in the eyes of his society, so should shame be seen not only in how the in-
dividual feels but also in what people will say” (1997: 131). Shame involves
sensitivity to the opinion of others and includes a consciousness of public
opinion and judgment (Pitt-Rivers 1966:52). It is related to a person’s status
in the context of his community—being a source of standards, values, and
validation—and, in a way, recreates volatile hierarchies of moral and social
rank (Miller 1993: x, 134).
The significance of shame and its contextual embeddedness has been
observed by Kiefer in his analysis of Tausug revenge patterns (mamauli).
Kiefer points out that the basic element in shame is “the discrediting of the
self in front of others”(1972: 68). He explains that in Tausug society where
the values of bravery and masculinity are highly expected in adult males,
an offense committed against a man that shames (sipug) him results in a
reduced self-image. This situation creates a state of enmity and has poten-
tial for conflict as society expects the offended person to seek redress for
the grievance so as to erase the shame and sustain his self-image as a brave
man (Kiefer 1972: 53).
23 Among the Kalinga, a host is similarly obligated to avenge the slaying or wounding of his guest
(Barton 1949:83).
24 According to Hutton (in Hasluck): “As a result of the Turkish conquest, several of the Albanian
tribes changed from Christianity to Islam, and there are now many Muslim Albanians as well as both
Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians. The Mirdite, who constitute the biggest tribe, were
perhaps at one time Orthodox, and are now staunch Catholics. But their profession of faith seems to
have affected but little the adherence of the Albanians to their ancient customs.” (1954: xv)
RIDO V2.indd 21 10/4/2007 8:22:34 AM

Meanwhile, the concept of reciprocity cuts across honor and shame,
kinship ties, and collective responsibility. Reciprocity is an exchange rela-
tionship that can unite or divide persons and also serve as means of expres-
sion and manipulation of social relationships and social identity (Seymour-
Smith 1986:240). Gift exchange is an important expression of reciprocity
and a serious business in honor-based or prestige-oriented societies. Among
the Tausug, Kiefer observes that reciprocity is the essence of friendship and
thus, reciprocal gift-giving through commodities, services, and sentiments
is pervasive in Tausug social organization (1972: 65). He adds that a type of
reciprocity called buddi (debt of gratitude) is usually created in a person
who has received a great favor and consequently feels a strong moral obliga-
tion to do something in turn for his friend. These obligations to repay a debt
of gratitude can be observed in the daily village life of the Tausug, but are
especially emphasized during times of conflict when persons in an exchange
relationship can aid each other in providing military assistance, taking re-
venge, and lending out weapons. Conversely, reciprocity can also be applied
during a state of enmity. During such instances, revenge or mamauli can be
seen as a negative form of reciprocity wherein men exchange hostile feelings
that drive them apart instead of bringing them together (Kiefer 1972:67).
However, it must be noted that while conceptions of honor, shame,
and reciprocity are factors in conflict, these must not be reified or seen as
dysfunctions in culture. During the public presentation of the rido study
in the Davao conference, there was a lively discussion among the partici-
pants on the salience of maratabat as a major culprit in clan conflicts. While
many affirmed maratabat as a factor for rido, others pointed out that a
society’s sense and concepts of honor, self-esteem, and dignity also ensure
the integrity and survival of communities. In the end, it was agreed that
there is a need for a deeper understanding of notions of honor such as the
maratabat and the need to harness its positive aspects or transform it in a
positive way.
Turbulent Histories, Transitions, and Negotiated Mixed Systems

The incidence and magnitude of internal conflicts (such as feuding) in
a region may vary across different periods and changing political contexts.
For instance, the effectiveness of a state to provide security and protection
to its citizens and lessen dependence on security based on self-help may wax
or wane depending on a variety of reasons (i.e. legitimacy of government,
distance of the central government from conflict-affected regions, ethnic
plurality, presence of a marginalized community, influence of neighboring
states, insensitive policies, etc). Below are some instances where turbulent
histories and political transitions contribute to endemic conflicts.
RIDO V2.indd 22 10/4/2007 8:22:34 AM

Introduction || 23
The Balkan Peninsula, a natural bridge between Asia and Europe, is

considered a crossroad of different religions, cultures, and civilizations (Za-
gar 2000: 129). Because of this feature, the region experienced frequent wars,
migrations, and displacements which have continually changed the ethnic
composition of the population. The region’s turbulent history coupled with
successively weak central governments led communities to rely more on
kinship for survival and on the private provision of coercion for protection
and social control.25 This situation was similarly observed by Gerard Rixhon
in a comparative study of feuding in Sulu and Corsica (Chapter 10 of this
volume). According to Rixhon, the turbulent histories of Sulu and Corsica
such as numerous military occupations and incursions from foreign pow-
ers and pirates, their (forced) inclusion into the territories of France and
the Philippines, divisive politics, widespread corruption, inadequate justice
system, and government neglect have led the citizens to resort to private
forms of justice called vendetta or vengeance for the Corsicans and mamauli
for the Tausugs.
Transitioning polities and modernization also contribute to the increas-
ing instances of internal conflicts.26 The rise of dueling in France in the 16th
century is said to be the result of internal conflicts caused by religious civil
wars and the expansion of the monarchy’s powers, while its recurrence in
the 1800s was reported during general elections and political crisis (Nye
1998: 24, 185).27 More recently, the collapse of the communist regime in Al-
bania in 1991 and the weak quasi-democratic government that replaced it
is said to be the source of the recent blood feud crisis in the country.28 In
the Philippines, there was a documented rise in inter-tribal feuding in the
Cordilleras during the general unrest that followed the withdrawal of the
Spanish colonizers and the imposition of American authority as well as dur-
ing the end of the Japanese occupation ( Jenista 1987:13; Dozier 1972:74).
Modernization, rapid change, and the encompassing forces of nation-
alism and globalization not only contribute to internal conflicts but also
affect changes in the economic structure and social organization of local
communities. These in turn influence the nature and resolution of such
conflicts. In Israel, education and economic opportunities are drawing rural
25 This is observed in highlands of Albania where customary laws and the institution of the blood
feud are more recognized by communities in governing their lives than the authority of colonizing
governments (Hasluck 1954: 9, 219).
26 An increasing number of studies show that governments in transition, whether toward demo-
cratic or authoritarian direction, are more prone to internal conflicts because of weakened institutions.
See Kim Ninh 2003; Muscat 2002:6; Anderson 1999: 9, 11; Zagar 2000: 129, 143-145.
27 In France, the duel became a social phenomenon that in 20 years between 1589 and 1610, it is
estimated that 10,000 deaths resulted from it (Nye 1998: 26).
28 It should be noted that from 1992 to 1996, the press in Tirana reported more than 5,000 mur-
ders linked to vendettas (See “Honour” Killings and Blood Feuds in www.gendercide.org)
RIDO V2.indd 23 10/4/2007 8:22:34 AM

tribal communities into the larger socioeconomic system.29 As a result, state
and tribal structures are influencing each other resulting in a mixed system.
For instance, while Israel does not recognize blood revenge as a sanction for
homicide, an increasing number of government officials engage in media-
tion and are actively involved in traditional mechanisms like the sulha (peace
settlement) committees to resolve blood disputes. Meanwhile, traditional
mediators are also leading the resolution of blood disputes into state struc-
tures. These changes plus the strong authority of the state have undermined
self-help as a means of social control. Hence, in Israel, it is foreseen that the
resolution of blood disputes will increasingly utilize the legal apparatus of
the state (Ginat 1997:192).
Resolution of Rido Conflicts in the Philippines

The studies in this volume document several conflict-resolution bodies
and mechanisms that address rido and other community-based conflicts
(mechanisms which sometimes compete with each other). Such conflict-
resolution bodies and mechanisms may utilize the more formal legal frame-
work of government, or the various indigenous systems, or a combination
of both.
The government framework generally involves cases that are passed on
to the formal courts, the local chief executives, the katarungang pambaran-
gay (barangay justice), the police, and, in some cases, the afp.
The indigenous means of resolving rido usually involve elders and
leaders of communities affected by conflicts who utilize local knowledge,
beliefs, practices, and their network of personal ties to help repair or re-
store damaged relationships. Among the Meranao,30 such local conflict-
resolution mechanisms include the taritib ago igma and the kokoman a
kambhatabata’a.31 Among the Menuvu, dialogues among the elders (i.e.
timuay and datu) to settle conflicts are common, which eventually lead to
husay (indemnity/settlement) and various peace covenants such as dyandi
and tampuda hu balagon. The studies also mentioned several cases that in-
volve the payment of “blood money” as indemnification for murder, ac-
cidental death, or even injuries. In the Middle East, this payment is called
29 See Philip Carl Salzman in Ginat 1997:x.

30 The words Meranao, Maranao, Maranaw used in this book refer to the same ethnic group just as
the words Manobo and Menuvu, as well as the words Magindanaon, Maguindanaon, and Magindanao.
The editor has retained the spellings used by the individual researchers.
31 The taritib ago igma is an indigenous set of laws while the kokoman a kambhatabata’a is a
mode of conflict settlement based on kinship. Please see chapters of Matuan, Burton and Doro in this
volume.
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Introduction || 25
32
diyya while among Philippine local groups, the term is variously known
as diat, kandiat, bangun, etc.
Like many customary laws, the practice of giving “blood money” or in-
demnifications in reparation for crimes committed goes against the formal
laws of the state. However, such practices should not be misinterpreted as a
simple payment in isolation of more significant processes. Blood money can
be seen as restoration money or settlement money which is only one aspect
in the resolution and healing process that may involve restoring relations
within a community and a dialogue with the spirits or a Supreme Being. The
practice of giving “blood money” should be understood beyond its mate-
rial aspects and be viewed more for its symbolic and spiritual elements that
facilitate forgiveness and healing.33
There are also a variety of innovative or hybrid mechanisms that com-
bine the mainstream or formal government framework with the traditional
ways of resolving conflicts. These include the joint ulama municipal peace
and order council in Barira, Maguindanao; the walay na bitiara in Sultan
Kudarat municipality in Maguindanao; and the Mayor’s Council “tri-peo-
ple” conflict-resolution body in North Upi, Maguindanao. In Sulu, local
government units have integrated traditional conflict resolution processes
and customary laws into municipal and provincial executive policies such
as the Tausug Customary Law Ordinance. Government, religious, and tra-
ditional Moro leaders have also collaborated in resolving conflicts under
the auspices of the Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission
(rruc) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The other conflict-resolution mechanisms documented include the
various “spaces for peace” such as the one found in Pikit, North Cotabato;
the revolutionary courts patterned after the Shari’ah concept of justice in
areas occupied by the Moro National Liberation Front (mnlf) and milf;
the mobilization of ceasefire-monitoring mechanisms such as local moni-
toring teams, Bantay Ceasefire, and the Joint Government-milf ccch and
imts which stood out in effectively responding to armed tensions between
government and Moro liberation forces.
More recently, this author has personally observed interventions initi-
ated by some youth organizations to facilitate the settlement of rido. The
United Youth for Peace and Development (unypad) has successfully helped
the settlement of a celebrated rido case in North Cotabato between the
32 In Ginat (1997: 15)

33 This assertion is also based on the author’s personal experience in Sulu and Semporna, wherein
indemnifications are sometimes given even without the shedding of blood. For instance, a diat can
also be given by a person who only assisted or rescued an injured person. Part of the diat process is the
communal sharing of food and the prayers. The entire process is said to diffuse tensions and facilitate
the quicker healing of injuries (Torres 2006: 315).
RIDO V2.indd 25 10/4/2007 8:22:35 AM

Mangansakan and Tayuan clans. The group did this by conducting research
about the conflict, consolidating and strengthening the council of elders
of both clans, finding an acceptable mediator, and conducting consulta-
tions and information dissemination to grassroots members of both clans.
This settlement culminated in a grand kanduli or thanksgiving celebration
between the two clans. Another youth organization, the Reconciliatory
Initiatives for Development Opportunities, has been trying to resolve rido
through the comprehensive documentation and analysis of genealogies (an
account of relationships of descent) and the use of traditional governance
and authority such as the sultanates of Marawi.
In general, the various community-based initiatives and the peace-
building efforts of the broad network of civil society organizations in pro-
moting dialogues among residents, armed groups, and feuding families have
contributed a lot in defusing armed tensions. More successful examples are
highlighted in the following chapters.
The Rido Studies in Brief

This volume presents nine studies that investigate the dynamics of clan
conflicts or rido in 12 provinces of Mindanao: Bukidnon, Lanao del Norte,
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Zambo-
anga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi.34
Chapters One, Two and Three provide us with a general idea on the
prevalence of clan and family feuds across Mindanao. Three research institu-
tions inventoried rido cases in 11 provinces. This inventory records the num-
ber of settled, unresolved, and recurring cases of rido, as well as the number
of deaths, injured, and jailed in relation to these feuds. The first chapter,
written by Dr. Jamail Kamlian of the Mindanao State University (msu)-Ili-
gan Institute of Technology, surveys the incidences of feuding families and
clans in nine provinces: Basilan, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and
Zamboanga Sibugay. This survey is complemented in the next two chapters
by the studies of Prof. Abhoud Syed Lingga in Maguindanao and Dr. Moctar
Matuan in Lanao del Sur.35 The three studies documented a total of 1,266 rido
cases that killed more than 5,500 people and displaced thousands.
34 When the research was conducted, Shariff Kabunsuan was still under the province of
Maguindanao.
35 It must be noted that three studies have different timelines. Dr. Kamlian’s survey covered a
75-year period, while the studies of Prof. Lingga and Dr. Matuan covered a period of 35 and 10 years,
respectively. The different timelines is due to the varying objectives of the researchers. While a com-
prehensive accounting of rido is not possible, the studies’ contribution is that it shows a reasonable
estimate of clan conflict incidences in Mindanao.
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Introduction || 27
The study of Prof. Abhoud Syed Lingga of the Institute of Bangsamoro

Studies looks into rido incidences that occurred in Maguindanao within a
period of 35 years (1970-2004). It presents several cases of rido caused by
elections, land conflicts, crimes against chastity, theft, jesting, and suspicion.
The study also explains the different conflict-resolution bodies utilized by
disputing parties, including the milf conflict-resolution procedures. This
study asserts that rido is a consequence of the absence of justice brought
about by the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the justice system which is
further aggravated by the existence of competing justice systems that gives
contending parties the opportunity to “forum shop” or to look for a venue
where a satisfactory result can be obtained.
The study of Dr. Moctar Matuan of msu-Marawi shows the scope and
magnitude of rido in the different municipalities of Lanao del Sur within a
ten-year period (1994-2004). It also discusses the significance of the Mer-
anao indigenous political organization (pat a phangampongang ko ranao),
indigenous laws (taritib ago igma), and kinship system (mbatabata’a or
thothonganaya) in the resolution of conflicts. This study asserts that no
single case of rido has been resolved through the formal justice system in
the province. All of the rido settled went through the igma and taritib or the
traditional way of the Meranao, which is influenced by Islam. In looking at
the profile of assailants and victims, the study also discovered that those
involved in rido are more educated and economically well-off.
Collaborative studies by leading academic institutions in Mindanao—
Ateneo de Zamboanga University, Notre Dame University, Xavier University
and Mindanao State University Marawi—are presented in Chapters Four
and Five. The team from Ateneo de Zamboanga and Notre Dame Univer-
sity headed by Dr. Ofelia Durante and Dr. Norma Gomez, investigated clan
conflicts among the Tausug, Maguindanao, Maranao, Sama, and Yakan. The
study confirms that most incidents of clan conflicts in the research areas are
settled through traditional practices, mediation, and amicable settlement.
The study also discusses in detail the conflict-resolution processes, the qual-
ities of mediators, and the different strategies in settling clan conflicts.
The team from Xavier University and msu-Marawi headed by Dr. Linda
Burton and Dr. Moctar Matuan compare the response to conflict situations
of the Meranao of Lanao del Sur and the lumad from three different com-
munities, namely the Matigsalug Manobo of San Fernando, Bukidnon; the
Higaonon of Claveria, Misamis Oriental; and the Talaandig of Lantapan,
Bukidnon. The study discusses how the different groups conceive of conflict,
justice, honor, and pride. The study shows how the communities use tradi-
tional and non-traditional means to maintain social order and harmony.
RIDO V2.indd 27 10/4/2007 8:22:36 AM

Specific conflict cases and instances of conflict management among the Mer-
anao and the lumad are presented.
The study of violent conflict involving families belonging to the Menu-
vu and Maguindanaon communities is highlighted in Chapter Six. Con-
ducted by a team from the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, the
study focuses on communities in North Cotabato and Bukidnon that were
affected by war. The study asserts that the 1970s war in Mindanao, involving
militias such as the ilaga and Blackshirts, disrupted the harmony between
the Menuvu and Maguindanaon communities. The study shows that up to
this day, incursions by illegal loggers, political and business interests, vigi-
lante, and paramilitary groups continue to displace and marginalize both
the Menuvu and Maguindanaon and deepen the prejudices between the
two peoples.
The studies in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine feature in-depth investi-
gations of specific clan conflict cases. Monalinda Doro’s study of rido among
the Meranao of Baloi, Lanao del Norte, highlights six case studies of rido
involving theft, ‘unfavored’ love affair, heated argument, suspicion, envy,
and election fraud. The case studies describe in detail the process of escala-
tion of seemingly simple conflicts and the process of mediated settlement
where the complementary role of men and women mediators is observed,
and the role of the bae a labi (female counterpart of the datu) is highlighted.
The study also discusses the different types of land conflict leading to rido
and the different modes of settlement utilized.
The study in Chapter Eight by Jose Jowel Canuday describes the ex-
plosive consequences of the interplay of community armed conflicts and
large-scale armed conflicts which contribute to the recurring character of
violence in the conflict-prone areas of Central Mindanao. The investiga-
tion presents five cases studies of communities in Maguindanao and North
Cotabato repeatedly affected by both large-scale and community armed
conflicts. The cases include the Linantangan assault in January 2005, the
Dapiawan encounters in August 2004, the armed confrontations in Gli-
gli in 1989, and the contrasting cases of restraint and healing in Buliok in
2003 and in Lebpas in 1987. The study reveals the significant roles played
by paramilitary forces supported by government troops and local militias
aligned to the milf in the outbreak and escalation of violence, as well as the
equally important roles played by ceasefire monitors, civil society organiza-
tions, and the joint Government-milf ceasefire committees in deescalating
such conflicts.
The study of United Youth for Peace and Development (unypad) in
Chapter Nine focuses on three case studies of feuding involving prominent
families in Mindanao which at some point threatened the peace of the local
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Introduction || 29
communities. The study looks into the rido of the Mangansakans and the
Tayuans,36 the Abases and the Sinsuats, and the Bagundangs and the Man-
duyogs. The cases illustrate how political rivalries and land disputes escalate
into rido and how such conflicts become complicated by the involvement of
the military and local militias. The study also analyzed the different stages of
rido, starting from the pre-rido or “cold war” stage to the transformational
stage—where trust and confidence between conflicting parties is gradually
restored. The study asserts the importance of identifying potential conflicts
early on and recognizing when a conflict has reached the “realization” pe-
riod when the feuding families are more open to talks and settlement.
The two concluding chapters in this volume provide differing but im-
portant perspectives to the rido studies. Although not included in the co-
ordinated study supported by usaid and The Asia Foundation, the two
chapters are valuable contributions to the literature on revenge and feuding.
Chapter Ten is an exploration of Tausug and Corsican clan feuding written
by Prof. Gerard Rixhon. As discussed earlier, the study of Rixhon points to
several internal and external factors which contribute to the incidence of
feuding in Corsica and Sulu, significant of which are the turbulent histories
experienced by both islands that eventually forced the locals to rely on pri-
vate justice characterized by revenge killings. In the last chapter, Dr. Samuel
K. Tan shares some of his insights on the rido studies and recommendations,
and offers his prospects on the peace process and a sustained peace in Min-
danao. Drawing from history and trends in the region, Dr. Tan also explores
the relationship of rido to indigenous folk traditions and pre-Islamic beliefs
and practices, and warns of the dangers of how clan conflicts can be trans-
formed with the emergence of advanced weaponry and strategies and the
assimilation of extreme ideologies.
Prospects
Rido is a complex problem that requires a combined set of strategies for
prevention and resolution. Drawing from the experiences of other coun-
tries, we see how the combination of socio-economic benefits, a reliable
justice system, and the use of non-formal local mechanisms such as the
sulha committees (composed of traditional and government mediators)
curbed the incidence of blood disputes in Israel.37 In Albania, a campaign
was mounted to reconcile feuding families by setting up the Committee
of Blood Reconciliation which resolved 756 blood feuds in August 2000.38
36 This is the rido for which UNYPAD subsequently assisted in a settlement, noted earlier.
37 See Ginat 1997.
38 See “Honour” Killings and Blood Feuds in www.gendercide.org
RIDO V2.indd 29 10/4/2007 8:22:36 AM

Elsewhere in Sabah, Malaysia, where a number of indigenous communities
reside, the recognition of the Native Law (based on adat or customary laws)
by the Malaysian Federal Government and the Sabah State and its institu-
tionalization through the native courts has empowered local communities
to use indigenous means in resolving conflicts, thereby ensuring swift access
to justice. 39
In the Philippines, where there is a wide range of community-based
peace initiatives and indigenous or alternative conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms as well as more formal legal approaches, the challenge is to approach
conflicts in a contextual manner and work with the local people on shared
objectives, to harness and strengthen the assortment of existing conflict-
resolution mechanisms, and translate these into strategic interventions that
will promote an enabling environment that will help communities and gov-
ernment address conflicts. Some strategies that can be pursued along this
line include the following:
• Recognizing, enhancing, and supporting the development of
mixed or hybrid institutions or systems composed of formal and infor-
mal structures utilized by communities in managing and resolving con-
flicts. Mainstream or formal legal systems of government can be successful
in resolving conflicts if they are accepted by the people. But sometimes, in-
digenous or traditional ways of resolving conflicts and hybrid mechanisms
are practiced because the formal legal systems do not work or are not appro-
priate to the local context. As previously mentioned, hybridized or mixed
systems combine the formal government framework with the traditional
ways of resolving conflicts. Examples of these may include bodies composed
of a combination of local government and traditional leaders such as peace
councils and council of elders, or practices that integrate formal and infor-
mal conflict resolution approaches like those devised by local governments
in Maguindanao. Such mixed systems and institutions are local innovations
that represent compromises with the formal systems and can be considered
rules-in-use or working rules developed by communities through time as
part of their adaptive strategies to cope with the challenges of daily living.
Enhancing such institutions allows the formal and non-formal practices to
draw strength from each other and strengthen the conflict-resolution pro-
cess.40 This is important especially if the state and its apparatuses are weak.
39 See the works of Phelan 1993; Kitingan 1993.

40 A similar method of hybridization was adopted by American colonial authorities in implement-
ing new policies in the Cordilleras by successfully utilizing existing indigenous systems, an example of
which is the practice of American administrators in using Ifugao customary laws in combination with the
American legal system and in involving elders in assessing and settling disputes (See Jenista 1987:119).
RIDO V2.indd 30 10/4/2007 8:22:37 AM

Introduction || 31
• Building the capacities of recognized and potential leaders and

mediators in managing conflicts. Leaders, whether traditional commu-
nity leaders or formal government officials, have the important function
of bridging societal divides, foremost of which is in conflict resolution and
maintaining peace and order in their respective communities. Building their
capacities to understand the nature of conflicts and a range of conflict-man-
agement techniques (i.e. conflict mapping, mediation, peace and conflict
impact assessment, negotiation coaching, conflict research and documenta-
tion, as well as human rights and paralegal trainings) is important because
these will complement and enhance existing local knowledge and skills and
provide stakeholders with a flexible “toolkit” for addressing conflicts de-
pending on the situation and context. Knowledge of such techniques will
increase the options available to communities when faced with conflict situ-
ations and, in the long run, help prevent abuses from armed elements.
• Establishing networks of community-based, community-initiated
conflict-monitoring and rapid-response mechanisms that will help in the
resolution of ongoing rido and other communal conflicts, and prevent the
interaction and escalation of smaller conflicts. Communities play a vital
role as focal points for conflict management, peace building, and transforma-
tion for various reasons already mentioned. Despite this, a more program-
matic and holistic response to conflicts by stakeholders is lacking. Develop-
ing a network of community-based conflict-monitoring and rapid-response
mechanism provides a framework where stakeholders can engage each other
and work collaboratively to formulate and implement a multi-pronged ap-
proach to monitor, prevent, and respond to security issues in their respective
communities. Similar mechanisms have already existed in the Philippine
experience in various degrees of refinement. Examples include the network
of interlocking peace pact institutions that have controlled feuding and re-
inforced territorial boundaries among villages in the Cordilleras; the various
peace zones and spaces for peace that have sprouted throughout the country,
originally as a response to communist insurgency and government counter-
insurgency, and more recently, the ceasefire-monitoring mechanisms and
buffer zones being implemented in Central Mindanao by the Joint grp-milf
Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, the Malaysian-led
International Monitoring Team, and civil society networks.41 Some strategies
that can further be adopted in developing such community-based mecha-
nisms might include developing community protocols so that people will
know what actions to take in case conflict occurs. In communities where
kinship ties are strong, a comprehensive documentation of genealogies is a
41 For a detailed discussion of peace pacts, see the works of Barton 1949, Dozier 1966 & 1972,
Prill-Brett 1987, Scott 1982. On peace zones, please refer to Soliman Santos, Jr. (2005).
RIDO V2.indd 31 10/4/2007 8:22:37 AM

logical strategy so that in case conflict occurs, it is easier for locals to assess
the lines of descent and find neutral relatives of conflicting parties that
can act as mediators. Establishing mosque-based initiatives in addressing
local conflicts can also be effective since mosques are important centers
for welfare activities and the potential of religious leaders are largely un-
tapped.42 It must be noted that such networks and mechanisms are made
into reality by communities and reflect the genuine desire of the people
aspiring for peace.
The Asia Foundation believes that forging a just and sustainable peace
in Mindanao involves a thorough understanding of specific conflicts and
creating spaces for the active engagement of all stakeholders to discuss is-
sues, generate options, and come up with mutually agreed courses of action
to address problems. The body of work presented in this volume is the prod-
uct of sincere dialogue and engagement of the Foundation with its partners,
the communities, and other stakeholders, and forms an indispensable basis
for moving forward toward peace and development in Mindanao.
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Introduction || 35
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RIDO V2.indd 35 10/4/2007 8:22:38 AM

E ch a p ter o n e
Survey of Feuding Families and Clans

in Selected Provinces in Mindanao
Jamail A. Kamlian
MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology
T HE POLITICAL conflicts between the government and the various rebel

groups in Mindanao have continuously devastated the economy and
hampered the region’s development. Taken for granted are the many minor
wars among fellow Muslims and feuding families that started over a prop-
erty dispute, a dishonor inflicted on a family or a crime committed against
a member of another family. The larger conflict in Mindanao between the
government and forces of rebellion is being aggravated by an escalation of
aggregated rido cases. This database could provide a new angle of approach
to the resolution of the Mindanao conflict.
This project enumerated rido cases and tried to investigate the factors
that contributed to the rido including brief descriptions of the cases, the
circumstances that made the respondents aware of the said conflicts, efforts
at settlement, and status of the cases. It also queried respondents on conflict
management and the impact of conflict on their lives.
Locale of the Study

This study was conducted in nine selected provinces in Mindanao where
rido incidences were believed to have occurred and considerably affected
Bangsamoro families, namely: Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Sultan Kudarat,
North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del
Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay.
|| 36 ||
RIDO V2.indd 36 10/4/2007 8:22:39 AM

Survey of Feuding Families and Clans in Selected Provinces in Mindanao || 37
Brief Socio-Demographic Profile of the Selected Provinces

Basilan is an island province located at the western part of Mindanao on
the waters of Celebes Sea, the Moro Gulf and the Sulu Sea between Zam-
boanga City and Sulu. It has an aggregate land area of 1,379 sq km includ-
ing those of its surrounding 61 islands and islets. It is divided into one city
and six municipalities. It has a population of 332,579 as of census year 2000
among whom 32% are Yakan, 25% Tausug, 15% Chavacano, 13% Sama, 11%
Cebuano, and 4% belong to other ethnic groups. The population is pre-
dominantly Muslim (51%). It is one of the most depressed provinces in the
country. Its socio-economic condition has been aggravated by the presence
of armed extremist groups and lawless elements, particularly the Abu Sayyaf
Group (asg) which has gained international notoriety for kidnapping.
Lanao del Norte is in northern Mindanao, bounded on the north by
Iligan Bay and Misamis Oriental, on the east by Bukidnon, on the west by
Panguil Bay and Zamboanga del Sur, and on the south by Lanao del Sur and
Illana Bay. It has a total land area of 427,845 ha with a population of 758,123.
It is composed of Iligan City and 22 municipalities. When it was made into
a separate province from Lanao del Sur on May 22, 1959 under Republic Act
2228, Iligan City became its capital. On June 24, 1982, under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 181, the seat of the provincial government was transferred to the mu-
RIDO V2.indd 37 10/4/2007 8:22:39 AM

nicipality of Tubod. The population is predominantly Christian. Migrants
from the Visayas have densely populated the north coast while some Mus-
lims live in the interiors. About 65% of the people speak Cebuano, while
some 33% speak the Maranao language.
North Cotabato lies on the eastern part of Region XII and is strategi-
cally located in the central part of Mindanao. It has an area of 656,590 ha
and is bounded on the north by Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon, on the east by
Davao City, on the southeast by Davao del Sur, on the west by Maguindanao
Province, and on the southwest by Sultan Kudarat Province. Kidapawan
City is its capital. As of the 2000 official census, its population is 918,992 of
whom 71% are migrants from Luzon and the Visayas, while 18% belong to
cultural communities composed of Manobo, T’boli, and Maguindanao. The
major dialects spoken are Hiligaynon or Ilonggo (43%), Cebuano (31%),
Maguindanao (16%), and Ilocano (10%).
Sultan Kudarat became a separate province on November 22, 1973.
It has an area of 6,214.49 sq km. It is bounded on the north by North Co-
tabato and Maguindanao, on the east by Davao del Sur, on the west by the
Moro Gulf, on the southwest by the Celebes Sea, and on the south by South
Cotabato. It consists of Tacurong City and 11 municipalities. Its population
is 586,505 as of the 2000 census.
Sulu was made into a separate province through Commonwealth Act
no. 2711 in March 1917. It is situated at the southernmost tip of the Philippine
and lies midway between Basilan and Tawi-Tawi. The Sulu and Mindanao
seas surround the archipelago on the west and north and the Celebes Sea
on the east. Over 157 islands and islets compose the province. The islands
have an aggregate total land area of 167,930 ha. It has 18 municipalities, ten
of which are on the mainland and eight are island municipalities. Its capital
town is Jolo. The total population of the province based on the 2000 census
stands at 619,668. The main ethnic group is the Tausug. The Samal and the
Badjaos are the two other main groups.
Tawi-Tawi islands were part of Sulu until September 11, 1973, when
the province was created through Presidential Decree No. 302. Tawi-Tawi is
located at the southwestern tip of the Philippines and defines the interna-
tional boundary with Sabah, East Malaysia. Its total combined land area is
342,656.10 ha. It is bounded by the Sulu Sea on the north and west and the
Celebes Sea on the south and east. Of its 307 islands and islets, 88 are char-
acterized by extensive reefs. It is composed of 10 island municipalities. The
total population of the province is 322,317, where majority are the Samals
and the Tausugs although Badjaos, Bisaya, Subanon, and Ilanon tribes are
also present.
RIDO V2.indd 38 10/4/2007 8:22:40 AM

Zamboanga del Norte, which spans an area of 720,594 ha, is the larg-
est province in Western Mindanao. It is situated in the northwestern tip of
the Zamboanga Peninsula Region and is composed of two cities—Dipolog
and Dapitan—and 25 municipalities. Its seat of government is Dipolog City.
With more or less 400 km of irregular coastline facing the Sulu Sea, the
province is bounded by Misamis Occidental in the north, Zamboanga del
Sur and Zamboanga Sibugay in the east, and Zamboanga City in the south.
The population, placed at 823,130, is predominantly Christian.
Zamboanga del Sur is situated in the southern section of the Zambo-
anga Peninsula that forms the western part of Mindanao. It is bounded on
the north by Zamboanga del Norte, on the east and northeast by Misamis
Occidental and Lanao del Norte and Panguil Bay, on the south by the Moro
Gulf, and on the southwest by Zamboanga Sibugay. The province is com-
posed of Pagadian City (its capital), Zamboanga City, and 26 municipalities.
It has 4,735 sq km total land area and a population of 836,147.
Zamboanga Sibugay was created through Republic Act 8973 in Febru-
ary 2001 and comprising 16 municipalities. Its seat of government is located
at Ipil, about 134 km away from Dipolog City. It has a land area of 360,775
ha and a total population of 497,239. The province is bounded on the north
by Zamboanga del Norte, on the south by Dumanquilas and Sibugay Bays,
on the east by Zamboanga del Sur, on the west by Zamboanga City and
three other towns of Zamboanga del Norte. The major denominations are
Catholic, Protestant, and Islam. The ethnic groups found in the province are
Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanao, Subanen, Samal, and Yakan.
Data Gathering Procedure

The preliminary survey at the provincial and municipal levels was con-
ducted by the project team through key informant interviews (kiis) with
congressmen, the provincial governor, municipal mayors and council mem-
bers, members of the provincial/city/municipal peace and order councils,
military/police officials, and community leaders.
Research Findings
Incidences of Clan and Family Conflicts
Clan and family conflicts in Mindanao are said to have triggered some
of the skirmishes between the government forces and the separatist groups
in the Bangsamoroland. This survey recorded a total of 671 rido cases in
the areas selected for the study. The data gathered are presented in the fol-
lowing tables.
RIDO V2.indd 39 10/4/2007 8:22:40 AM

Table 1 reveals that a high number of rido cases happened in the prov-
inces of Lanao del Norte and Sulu where there were 164 and 145 incidences,
respectively. These represent 24% and 22% of the total. The lowest number
of rido cases was recorded in Sultan Kudarat at 18 or only 3%. The aggregate
number of family and clan conflict incidences in the Zamboanga peninsula,
however, was the highest at 228 or 34%.
In terms of status, 389 or 58 % of the cases remain unresolved while 275
or 41 % have been settled. Only 1.05% or seven of the cases were recurrent,
i.e., once resolved but ignited anew by recent developments between and
among the conflicting parties.
TABLE 1. Summary of Surveyed Family/Clan Conflict (Rido) Cases
Province No. Status No. of casualties No. of families

of feuds Resolved Unresolved Recurrent Death Wounded Imprisoned Missing that transferred
residences
Basilan 60 21 39 0 377 126 10 45 96

Lanao del Norte 164 72 90 2 626* 135 11 0 870**
North Cotabato 31 7 23 1 263 121 4 0 22
Sultan Kudarat 18 4 11 3 648 1882 3 0 859
Sulu 145 70 74 1 1519 1269 16 0 131
Tawi-Tawi 25 12 13 0 88 26 0 0 55
Zamboanga del Norte 62 28 34 0 93 30 8 11 42
Zamboanga del Sur 91 30 61 0 217 13 1 6 42
Zamboanga Sibugay 75 31 44 0 64 35 6 0 26
TOTAL 671 275 389 7 3895 3637 59 62 2143
*Excluding deaths that cannot be estimated by respondents.

** Does not include those residential transfers not quantified by key informants but only indicated that most of the residents of the communities evac
ated due to the occurrence of a rido. These were cited in four rido cases covered in the survey.
Table 1 also reveals a total of 3,895 deaths in the nine provinces, with
Sulu registering the most number at 1,519. On the other hand, the total
number of wounded persons is 3,637, with the highest number recorded
in Sultan Kudarat at 1,882, followed closely by Sulu at 1,269. A total of 59
persons were imprisoned in rido-related cases with the highest number at
16 reported in Sulu. In Tawi-Tawi, no one was reported imprisoned. There
were a total of 62 persons reported missing in the areas surveyed, mostly
from Basilan.
Internal displacements are among the common results of clan and fam-
ily conflicts. Assets and livelihoods are lost along with the displacement of
people. In the areas surveyed, 2,143 families have transferred residences. This
figure does not include those displacements not quantified by key infor-
mants because they could not determine or recall the exact numbers. The
residential transfers in Lanao del Norte and Sultan Kudarat—870 and 859,
RIDO V2.indd 40 10/4/2007 8:22:41 AM

respectively—are notable as they are much higher than those in other prov-
inces. Homes were burned and lives endangered by the cycle of violence.
Rido cases have occurred in every municipality and city in Lanao del
Norte, Basilan, and Sulu. In the other six provinces though, clan and fam-
ily conflicts happened only in some of the municipalities. In Zamboanga
Sibugay, there were rido cases in 11 of its 16 municipalities; in Zamboanga del
Sur, in 12 of its 26 municipalities and two cities; in Zamboanga del Norte, in
seven of its 25 municipalities and two cities; in Tawi-Tawi, in eight of its 10
towns; in North Cotabato, in 12 of its 17 municipalities and one city; and in
Sultan Kudarat, in eight of its 11 towns and one city.
In Zamboanga del Norte, rido incidences in Siocon account for almost
half or 47% of the total rido cases in the province. Siocon is where part of the
gold panning activity in the province is located. Rido incidences in Zambo-
anga Sibugay were concentrated in the municipality of Buug. In Zamboanga
del Sur, more than 20% of the rido cases happened in Dimataling and Dinas
(20 and 24 cases, respectively). It might be worth mentioning that peace
zones were established in Dinas in the late 1990s.
In Sulu, every municipality recorded at least three rido cases. Except
for Talipao where the highest number of cases was reported (19 out of 145),
the incidences of rido in this province were more or less evenly distributed
across its 18 municipalities.
In Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Norte, and Basilan, the highest numbers of rido
incidences were recorded in the provincial capitols, where 40%, 32%, and
23% of the total cases in each of these provinces occurred in Bongao, Iligan
City, and Isabela, respectively.
The number of rido cases in North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat are
minimal in terms of municipal spread. Pikit and Banisilan in North Cota-
bato had five cases each or 16% of the provincial total. The cases in the rest
of the province and in Sultan Kudarat are more or less evenly distributed
across the other municipalities.
Initial Causes of Clan and Family Conflicts

Table 2 reveals that a considerable number of rido cases in the provinces
covered were caused by property or land disputes. In fact, it is the number
one initial cause of conflict in Basilan, North Cotabato, Sulu, and the three
Zamboanga provinces. Political rivalry is the second most common cause of
rido and obtained the highest percentages in Tawi-Tawi and Sultan Kudarat.
These conflict cases were caused by competition over political posts, elec-
toral defeats, and misunderstanding during elections when even brothers
killed each other.
RIDO V2.indd 41 10/4/2007 8:22:41 AM

TABLE 2. Initial Causes of Conflict (by Province)
Initial Causes of the Conflict

Province Political rivalry Property dispute Violation of Gender-related Physical Injury Other
(Land ownership, pride/dignity offenses inflicted causes
etc.)
Basilan 10 23 4 8 10 5
Lanao del Norte 20 38 25 1 5 66
North Cotabato 10 17 4 0 0 0
Sultan Kudarat 13 5 0 0 0 0
Sulu 27 48 16 25 18 11
Tawi-Tawi 9 4 6 4 0 2
Zamboanga Norte 7 30 2 11 8 4
Zamboanga Sur 25 38 4 11 1 12
Zamboanga Sibugay 15 31 3 13 3 10
TOTAL 136 234 64 73 45 110
(20.6%) (35.3%) (9.7%) (11%) (6.8%) (16.6%)
Note: Some respondents cannot remember the initial causes of rido, which explains the discrepancy in the total feuds and their causes.
In Lanao del Norte, though, other causes such as carabao/cattle rustling,

debts, drug-related crimes, robbery, and damage to property ranked as the
number one cause of rido.
Gender-related offenses like rape, elopement, and love triangles, though
common and scandalous, have not caused as much conflict as have prop-
erty dispute and political rivalry. The same is true of violation of pride and
dignity, even if it ranked second in Tawi-Tawi.
Time Frame for Rido

The year when each of the rido cases began was noted to determine the
duration of the feud.
The earliest rido case recorded took place in Lanao del Norte in 1930.
Sulu, North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur each
witnessed one case erupting in the 1940s.
Looking at Tables 1 and 3, one can see that only a few of the family and
clan feuds had started earlier than the 1970s. Most of the cases occurred
recently, specifically from 2000 to 2004 when a total of 327 cases ensued or
about 49% of the total number of cases. In Basilan, the earliest rido hap-
pened in the 1970s with three cases recorded and most of the other cases
started from 2000 to 2004 which recorded the beginning of 35 or 58% of the
total number of rido cases in the province. About 25% of the cases started in
the 1990s. Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, and Sulu show the same trend.
In Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, and Tawi-Tawi, an average of
about 70% of the cases started from 2000 to 2004.
RIDO V2.indd 42 10/4/2007 8:22:41 AM

TABLE 3. Year When Rido Cases First Started in the Provinces
Year No. of Cases

Basilan Lanao North Sultan Sulu Tawi-Tawi Zambo. Zambo. Zambo.
del Norte Cotabato Kudarat del Norte del Sur Sibugay
2005 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 5
2000 – 2004 35 78 14 4 53 17 11 56 59
1995 – 1999 12 21 3 4 31 5 13 15 7
1990 – 1994 3 18 4 2 16 0 19 5 2
1985 – 1989 2 14 3 4 12 1 4 6 0
1980 – 1984 1 10 3 0 8 0 5 1 1
1975 – 1979 2 8 0 1 12 2 3 2 0
1970 – 1974 3 5 0 3 5 0 2 1 1
1965 – 1969 0 0 1 0 5 0 2 2 0
1960 – 1964 0 4 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
1955 – 1959 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1950 – 1954 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1945 – 1949 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1940 – 1944 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1935 – 1939 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1930 – 1934 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Status of Clan and Family Conflicts in the Surveyed Provinces

The status of the rido cases surveyed are classified into three: resolved, un-
resolved, and recurred. Resolved rido cases were those where conflicting
parties had accepted the terms of settlement and ended the feud. Unresolved
cases were on-going at the time of survey. Recurred cases were resolved
earlier but were triggered anew by some inter and/or intra family/clan mis-
understanding.
More than 50% of the cases were unresolved at the time of survey. The
highest percentage of unresolved cases was in Lanao del Norte where 23%
of the total of provincial feuds were on-going at that time. Sultan Kudarat
registered the lowest percentage of unresolved case at 3% of the total feuds
in the province. Minimal resolved cases recurred in Sulu, Lanao del Norte,
North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat.
Consequences of Clan and Family Conflicts

The survey reveals 3,895 deaths and 3,637 wounded from rido. The highest
number of deaths occurred in Sulu at 1,519, followed by Sultan Kudarat with
648 estimated deaths reported. Lanao del Norte had 626 although the num-
ber may have been higher than that of Sultan Kudarat had the respondents
quantified those deaths that they could not estimate. Inversely, the highest
RIDO V2.indd 43 10/4/2007 8:22:42 AM

number of wounded persons is recorded in Sultan Kudarat (n=1,882) fol-
lowed by Sulu (n=1,269). The highest number of imprisoned persons was
also reported in Sulu with 16, while missing persons was highest in Basilan
with 45.
Some 2,143 families were displaced by conflict in the selected provinces.
However, not all residential transfers were quantified by respondents as some
of them merely said that ‘most of the residents’ of the communities affected
by skirmishes evacuated. Still Lanao del Norte leads in terms of internal dis-
placements, where 870 families transferred homes, representing about 41%
of the total. Sultan Kudarat followed, with 859 families (40%) that trans-
ferred residences. The lowest numbers of residential transfers happened in
North Cotabato and Zamboanga Sibugay at 22 and 26, respectively.
In three of the nine provinces, the highest displacements happened in
Iligan City in Lanao del Norte, with 278 or 32%; Isabela in Basilan, with
25 or 26%; and Bongao in Tawi-Tawi, with 22 or 40%. The municipality
of Tagoloan ranks second in Lanao del Norte with 110, while Lamitan in
Basilan had 23 displaced families and Sitangkai-Sibuto in Tawi-Tawi had 17.
In Sulu, the highest number of residential transfers occurred in Panglima
Estino and in Zamboanga del Norte in Siocon with 18, while in the other
two Zamboanga provinces, the values are more or less evenly distributed
across the municipalities.
Family/Clan Conflict and Ethnicity

This section looks at the ethnicity of the parties involved in the conflicts.
Rido may involve people from the same or different ethnic groups. Although
people of similar ethnicity are supposed to share common values, the study
shows that most feuds are between parties of the same ethnic origins. In
the survey, respondents were asked to identify the ethnicity of the parties
in conflict.
TABLE 4. Ethnic Affiliations of Conflicting Families/Clans
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY NORTH COTABATO

Ethnic Group No. of Cases Ethnic Group No. of Cases Ethnic Group No. of Cases
Tausug vs Tausug 9 Maguindanao vs Maguindanao 30 Maguindanao vs Maguindanao 17
Kalibugan vs Kalibugan 7 Tausug vs Tausug 13 Iranun vs Iranun 4
Tausug vs Maguindanao 6 Maguindanao vs Tausug 5 Iranun vs Maguindanao 2
Tausug vs Kalibugan 6 Kalibugan vs Bisaya 5 Bagogo vs Bagobo 1
Maguindanao vs Maguindanao 4 Subanen vs Bisaya 4 Bilaan vs Bilaan 1
Tausug vs Sama 4 Kalibugan vs Kalibugan 4 Maguindanao vs Maranao 1
Tausug vs Visayan 3 Bisaya vs Bisaya 4 Ilocano vs Maguindanao 1
Sama vs Visayan 3 Tausug vs Bisaya 3 Maguindanao vs Manobo 1
Tausug vs Iranun 3 Kalibugan vs Subanen 2 Iranun vs Ilokano 1
Maguindanao vs Visayan 3 Tausug vs Kalibugan 2 Visayan vs Visayan 1
Subanon vs Subanon 2 Subanen vs Subanen 2 Iranun vs Bisaya 1
Sama vs Sama 1 Subanen vs Tausug 1
Maguindanao vs Kalibugan 1
Iranun vs Sama 1
Visayan vs Visayan 1
RIDO V2.indd 44 10/4/2007 8:22:42 AM

(Cont’d) TABLE 4. Ethnic Affiliations of Conflicting Families/Clans
Sama vs Subanon 1
Kalibugan vs Maranao 1
Sama vs Kalibugan 1
Iranun vs Iranun 1
Iranun vs Visayan 1
Subanun vs Iranun 1
Iranun vs Kalibugan 1
Kalibugan vs Visayan 1
TOTAL CASES 62 TOTAL CASES 75 TOTAL CASES 31
BASILAN LANAO DEL NORTE TAWI-TAWI

Yakan vs Yakan 32 Maranao vs Maranao 118 Tausug vs Tausug 16
Tausug vs Yakan 9 Visayan vs Maranao 30 Sama vs Sama 4
Tausug vs Tausug 9 Visayan vs Visayan 4 Sama vs Sama-Tausug 2
Visayan vs Visayan 4 Higaonon vs Maranao 9 Tausug vs Visayan 1
Chavacano vs Chavacano 2 Maranao vs Iranun 2 Tausug vs Sama 1
Sama vs Sama 2 Ilonggo vs Waray 1 Mapun vs Mapun-Tausug 1
Yakan vs Tagalog 1
Tausug vs Sama 1
SULU ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR SULTAN KUDARAT

Tausug vs Tausug 132 Maguindanao vs Maguindanao 53 Maguindanao vs Maguindanao 15
Sama vs Sama 8 Maguindanao vs Iranun 32 Maguindanao vs Ilonggo 3
Bangingi vs Bangingi 4 Maguindanao vs Ilocano/Bisaya 4
Tausug vs Bangingi 1 Maguindanao vs Maranao 2
Rido and Conflict Management

Conflict does not always lead to negative consequences. In fact, it can be
beneficial to most parties when effectively managed. Consensus can be
reached and the needs of individuals, families, clans, and societies met. On
the other hand, some may benefit from conflict while others pay the cost.
The people who manage the conflict play very important roles in the
settlement of rido cases.
TABLE 5. Institutions Where People Usually Go for Possible Settlement of Conflict
Province LGU Officials Military/Police Elders/Traditional Both LGU Officials

Leaders and Elders/Traditional
Leaders
Basilan 44 7 3 3
Sultan Kudarat 5 - 3 10
Lanao del Norte 77 3 21 46
Taw-Tawi 20 - 1 -
Zamboanga, Sibugay 37 8 20 3
Zamboanga del Sur 24 5 18 10
Zamboanga del Norte 43 - 3 10
Sulu 62 2 12 16
North Cotabato 4 1 14 10
TOTAL 316 (58%) 26 (5%) 95 (17%) 108 (20%)
* Some residents did not give responses.
RIDO V2.indd 45 10/4/2007 8:22:43 AM

Table 5 shows that majority or 58% say that officials of local government
units, including the formal justice courts, are the ones people approach to
resolve feuds. This is also true of specific provinces except in North Cota-
bato where most of the people go to the elders or traditional leaders of their
communities. Only 5% approach the military or the police for settlement of
their conflicts. In Sultan Kudarat, most of the people go to the lgu officials
and the elders or traditional leaders of the community.
Rido cases are usually settled through payment of blood money, court
settlement or allowing the imprisonment of offenders, and agreement on
mutually acceptable terms.
Perceptions on Conflict and Conflict Management

Table 6 presents the perceptions of the respondents regarding certain con-
cepts related to family/clan conflicts. All the respondents in Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur disagree that “family/clan
conflict happens only in prominent/upper class families.” More than 50%
of the respondents in Zamboanga Sibugay, North Cotabato, Basilan, Sulu,
and Lanao del Norte also believe that conflict can involve any family regard-
less of wealth or status. It is only in Sultan Kudarat where opinion on this
matter is split.
As to the idea that “family/clan conflict happens only between or among
Muslim families,” 100% of the respondents in Zamboanga del Norte and
majority of the respondents in Zamboanga del Sur, North Cotabato, Sul-
tan Kudarat Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and Lanao del Norte answered in
the negative. It is only in Zamboanga Sibugay where majority or 59.3% of
the respondents believe that rido happens only among Muslim families. A
considerable number of respondents in Sulu (45.6%) and Sultan Kudarat
(38.9%) also believe rido occurs only among Muslims.
TABLE 6. Respondents’ Perceptions on Certain Rido Management Concepts
Province CONCEPT
Family/Clan Conflict Happens Family/Clan Conflict Happens The Formal Judicial
Only Among Prominent/ Only Between or Among System is Capable of
Upper Class Families Muslim Families Settling Family/ Clan
Conflicts
YES(%) NO(%) YES(%) NO(%) YES(%) NO(%)

Zamboanga del Norte - 100 - 100 57.1 40.5
Zamboanga del Sur - 100 4.2 95.8 48.9 51.1
Zamboanga Sibugay 37.3 62.7 59.3 40.7 39 61
North Cotabato 12.9 87.1 3.2 96.8 30 70
Sultan Kudarat 50 50 38.9 61.1 38.9 61.1
Basilan 4.9 95.1 22 78 68.3 31.7
Lanao del Norte 12.2 87.8 6.2 93.8 51.3 48.7
Tawi-Tawi - 100 6.7 93.3 - 100
Sulu 28.1 71.9 45.6 54.4 57.1 42.9
RIDO V2.indd 46 10/4/2007 8:22:43 AM

Table 6 also shows that majority of the respondents in five of the prov-
inces no longer trust the formal judicial system to settle family/clan con-
flicts. These provinces are Zamboanga del Sur (51%), Zamboanga Sibugay
(61%), North Cotabato (70%), Sultan Kudarat (61%), and Tawi-Tawi where
100% of the respondents do not have confidence in the formal judicial sys-
tem. In the other four provinces of Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, Sulu, and
Lanao del Norte, majority of the respondents still have confidence in the
government’s judicial system. The levels of confidence stand at 68%, 57%,
57%, and 51%, respectively.
Perceptions on the Socio-Economic Impact of Rido

Conflicts including rido are believed to hinder development in Mindanao.
Muslims are often seen as ‘war freaks.’ To validate this perception, the re-
spondents were asked whether or not “family/clan conflicts are influenced
by the Islamic religion?” Table 7 shows that in all the provinces surveyed,
except Sultan Kudarat, residents do not think of rido as influenced by Islam.
More than 50% of the respondents in the provinces of North Cotabato,
Basilan, Tawi-Tawi- Sulu, Lanao del Norte, and the three Zamboanga prov-
inces do not think that Islam influences rido incidences. On the other hand,
68.8% of the respondents in Sultan Kudarat believe that Islam is a factor in
family/clan conflicts.
TABLE 7. Responses to Questions on the Impact of Rido in the Socio-Economic Development of Mindanao
Province Family/clan conflicts Family/clan conflicts Incidence of family/clan

are influenced by the have aggravated the conflicts has affected
Islamic religion Mindanao conflict the economic activities
of the respective
communities
YES(%) NO(%) YES(%) NO(%) YES(%) NO(%)
Zamboanga del Norte 8.9 91.1 2.2 97.8 35 65

Zamboanga del Sur 12.8 87.2 33.3 66.7 76 24
Zamboanga, Sibugay 44.8 55.2 77.6 22.4 55.9 44.1
North Cotabato 19.4 80.6 48.4 51.6 93.5 6.5
Sultan Kudarat 68.8 31.3 61.1 38.9 100 -
Basilan 47.5 52.5 80 20 62.5 37.5
Tawi-Tawi 6.7 93.3 100 - 100 -
Sulu 38.6 61.4 52.6 47.4 87.3 12.7
Lanao del Norte 19.8 80.2 54.3 45.7 69.1 30.9
On whether the rido situations affected the economic activities of the

respective communities, the respondents in eight provinces responded in
RIDO V2.indd 47 10/4/2007 8:22:44 AM

the affirmative. It was only in Zamboanga del Norte where 65% of the re-
spondents believe that rido cases do not affect the economic activities of
their respective communities. Further validation reveals that more than
50% of the respondents in six provinces, namely, Zamboanga Sibugay, Sul-
tan Kudarat, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and Lanao del Norte, believe that
family/clan conflicts have aggravated the Mindanao conflict. On the other
hand, the respondents in the provinces of Zamboanga del Norte, Zambo-
anga del Sur, and North Cotabato do not think that the rido occurrences
have aggravated the Mindanao conflict.
Recommendations
The respondents to this study proposed some measures for the immediate
resolution of clan conflicts. Among these were the strict implementation
of the law and reasonably fast resolution of cases by the courts of justice,
including the Shari’ah courts. They also suggested a continuous peace edu-
cation and values reformation program orientated towards families where
children are taught the right values including patience, self-discipline, and
non-exposure to firearms. One respondent suggested that only those direct-
ly involved in the killings be targeted in feuds. While he abhorred the death
of innocent people in rido, the respondent condoned killing those directly
involved. He also noted that more families now surrender kin who commit
murders so as to end conflicts. Another respondent commented that clan
conflict should be eradicated for people to live peacefully. He added that it
is very hard to resolve conflicts where parties are powerful and influential.
Still another observed that the sultans are no longer as influential today.
Some sultans nowadays use illegal drugs and become abusive especially
when armed.
On the basis of these data, it is recommended that further in-depth re-
search on the roots of family and clan feuds be undertaken to serve as basis
for strategies on peace and development in Mindanao to minimize rido.
The government should provide mechanisms for the effective resolution
of land disputes, the major cause of conflicts among families and clans in
southern Philippines.
List of Readings
Abdullah, Intuas. “Dispute Settlement Among Maranao: Case Studies of Conflict
Resolution in Marawi City.” MA Thesis. Department of Anthropology, Univ.
of the Philippines. 1982.
Baradas, David B. “Vendetta: The Maranao’s System of Social Justice”: Filipino Heri-
tage, II. Manila: Lahing Filipino Publishing House, 1977.
RIDO V2.indd 48 10/4/2007 8:22:44 AM

Bartolome, Claribel D. “Maratabat and Rido: Implications for Peace and National
Development.” The Mindanao Journal, vol XXVII (2004).
Bentley, George. “Law, Disputing and Ethnicity in Lanao, Philippines.” Ph.D. dis-
sertation. Univ. of Washington, 1981.
Bula, Dalomabi. “The Role of Communication in Maranao Conflict Resolution”
PhD Dissertation. Xavier Univ., 2000.
Canuday, Jowel F. Clan War Behind Maguindanao Hostilities. http://www.cy-
berdyaryo.com/features/f209091_0913_03a.htm (2001).
Elusfa, Rom. RLA urged: Enact Law on Indigenous Mechanism to Resolve Con-
flicts. http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?section=Provincial
&OID=44494 (2004).
Garingo, Ma. Theresa. “Rido As a Factor in Maranao Migration.” Masteral Thesis.
Xavier Univ., 1999.
Gloria, Violeta M. Carolina proposes ‘massive rido settlement’ in Lanao. http://
www.mindanews.com/2002/08/1st/arn27rido.html (2002).
Gowing, Peter. Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines. Manila:
Philippine Federation of Christian Churches, 1964.
Kiefer, Thomas. The Tausug: Law and Violence in a Philippine Moslem Society, New
York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston Publishing, 1972.
Kreuzer, Peter. Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines. www.hsfk.
de/downloads. (2005).
Mansungayan, Noraimah. “The Conceptualizations of Maratabat and Their Per-
ceived Effect on the Educational Advancement of Maranao”. Undergraduate
Thesis. Department of Psychology, Mindanao State Univ., 1999.
RIDO V2.indd 49 10/4/2007 8:22:44 AM

E ch a p ter t wo
Dynamics and Management of Rido

in the Province of Maguindanao
Abhoud Syed M. Lingga
A LTHOUGH conflict between families and between clans is “the most

common source of violence in the country,” it is more prevalent in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Social Weather Stations: 2005).
This makes the people of Mindanao more concerned with rido and its nega-
tive impact on their communities than other forms of conflict.
Methodology
The study employed both quantitative and qualitative techniques of data
collection. The quantitative data were generated through survey. Informants
were asked about rido that they remember from 1970 to 2004. Informants
were chosen through the recommendation of community leaders.
Qualitative data were gathered through interviews with key informants
and focus group discussions (fgd). Respondents to interviews and par-
ticipants in the twelve fgds conducted included politicians, traditional and
religious leaders, women and community leaders, police, and the media.
Locale of the Study

The study was conducted in Maguindanao but covers the chartered city
of Cotabato that lies within the province. Cotabato City is part of the first
congressional district of the province. The city is also the economic, social,
and political center of Maguindanao.
|| 50 ||
RIDO V2.indd 50 10/4/2007 8:22:44 AM

Dynamic and Management of Rido in the Province of Maguindanao || 51
Maguindanao
Maguindanao is located on the west of Central Mindanao. It is bounded
on the north by Lanao del Sur, on the east by Cotabato, on the south by
Sultan Kudarat Province and on the west by Illana Bay.
The province is subdivided into two congressional districts. It is com-
posed of 28 municipalities, and 481 barangays. There are eight municipalities
and one city in the first district and 20 municipalities in the second district.
TABLE 1. Municipalities of Maguindanao
First District Second District
Buldon Ampatuan
Matanog Buluan
Parang Datu Paglas
Sultan Kudarat Datu Piang
Kabuntalan Datu Odin Sinsuat
Upi Shariff Aguak
Barira Pagalungan
Sultan Mastura Sultan sa Barongis
Talayan
South Upi
Gen. S.K. Pendatun
Mamasapano
Talitay
Datu Montawal
Paglat
Guindulungan
Datu Saudi Ampatuan
Datu Usay
Datu Abdullah Sangki
Rajah Buayan
In 2004, the National Statistics and Census Bureau (nscb) recorded

334,287 registered voters in the province. In terms of income, Maguindanao
is classified as a second-class province.
Maguindanao has a total land area of 542,530 ha. With 801,102 inhabit-
ants, it is the most populous province of the armm. Majority of the people
(64%) classify themselves as Magindanaon. The Magindanaon residing in
the upper portion of the Pulangi are called tao sa laya (tao sa raya) and those
in the lower part are called tao sa ilod. The Iranun (14%) are found mostly
in the municipalities of Matanog, Barira, Buldon, Parang, Sultan Kuda-
rat and Sultan Mastura. The Teduray (7.6%), who are classified as among
the indigenous peoples of Mindanao, live in the municipalities of Upi and
South Upi.
RIDO V2.indd 51 10/4/2007 8:22:45 AM

TABLE 2. Household Population by Ethnicity: Maguindanao, 2000
Maguindanao 800,369
Magindanaon 508,302
Iranun 116,283
Teduray 57,296
Hiligaynon/Ilonggo 34,866
Cebuano 28,252
Ilocano 8,106
Others 31,744
Not reported 15,520
Source: NSO, 2000 Census of Population and Housing
Majority of the people of Maguindanao (81.80%) are Muslims. The

Roman Catholics (9.55%) are mostly found in Parang, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buldon, and Sultan Kudarat.
Cotabato City
On June 20, 1959, the then municipality of Cotabato was created into a
chartered city by virtue of Republic Act No. 2364. It became the capitol of
the province of Cotabato after the separation of South Cotabato. Only after
the further subdivision of the former “empire province” into the provinces
of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat, was the seat of the
provincial government transferred from Cotabato City. Today, the city is the
seat of the armm government.
Cotabato City is part of the first congressional district of Maguindanao.
It is also the economic center of Maguindanao. Of the city’s 163,849 inhabit-
ants, more than 50% are classified as Magindanaon; 14%, Cebuano; 10%,
Tagalog; 7%, Iranun; and 19%, other ethnic groups.
TABLE 3. Household Population by Ethnicity: Cotabato City, 2000
Cotabato City 161,517

Magindanaon 81,205
Cebuano 22,590
Tagalog 15,527
Iranun 12,061
Hiligaynon/Ilonggo 9,679
Bisaya 4,448
Others 6,443
Not Reported 1,078
Source: NSO, 2000 Census of Population and Housing
Muslims (61.64%) make up the majority in the Cotabato City followed

by Roman Catholics (33.94%).
RIDO V2.indd 52 10/4/2007 8:22:45 AM

Impact of conflict
The decades-old conflict between the government and the secessionist
movements in Mindanao has killed around 120,000 and displaced more
than two million people (Schiavo-Ocampo and Judd 2005: 5). In Maguin-
danao, as consequence of the 2000 war when government forces attacked
Camp Abubakre of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (milf) in the mu-
nicipalities of Matanog, Buldon and Barira, around 26% of the population
(207,586) were displaced (World Bank, 2003).
Armed and violent conflicts in the province make the delivery of ser-
vices difficult. It has affected the schooling of children and kept local and
foreign investors away. War has also affected farming and “agricultural mar-
keting, thus reducing the profitability of current crop production” (Schiavo-
Ocampo and Judd 2005: 6).
Concept of Rido
Rido is a term commonly used by Meranaos and Iranuns. Among the Mag-
indanaons, the word is understood by people in the lower valley (tao sa
ilud) probably due to their interactions with the Iranuns. Among the tao sa
laya or tao sa raya (Magindanaons in the upper valley), rido is not a com-
monly used term. The term ukag (quarrel) is oftentimes used. Borrowed
terms like kontla or kontra are also current. Among the Tausugs, conflicts
between families or clans are called pagbanta. The Sama say pagbaus, and
the Yakans, kontara.
According to informants, revenge is resorted to whenever a person’s
kanaman is violated, interfered with or denied by the other party. Kanaman,
according to the Maguindanaon Dictionary (Sullivan, 1986), is “a personal
conviction to uphold the integrity of one’s family group, by defending it
by all means.” The term is related to the concept of dignity, honor, and
self-respect. The restorative measure for damaged kanaman is justice. If the
offended party cannot obtain justice through the existing institutions, he
initiates immediate retaliation if capable. Otherwise, he keeps the retaliatory
motive dormant until he is capable or the situation is suitable for him to
regain his self-respect and the respect of the community.
A respondent in the study of Bartolome (2001) explains why other clan
members may be targeted in a rido, thus:
Since you are a part of a whole, whatever ails the whole is also
your own ailment. Since you are a family member, if other mem-
bers have rido, then you become automatically a part of that rido
or vendetta.
RIDO V2.indd 53 10/4/2007 8:22:45 AM

The close family ties among Magindanaon and Iranun partly explain
this sense of collective responsibility and accountability. In most cases, ac-
cording to informants, the head of the family or the leader of the clan is
expected to lead in obtaining justice for the clan member.
Transformation of Rido
At the early stages of conflict, while there is still communication between
contending families or clans, community leaders or family members of ei-
ther the offender or offended party may initiate intervention (see Figure 1).
When the intervention succeeds, the conflict is considered resolved.
Failure or absence of intercession due to lack of a mediator acceptable
to both parties, or because “the time is not yet ripe for intervention,” may
make the conflict dormant or it could escalate into rido. Unresolved con-
flicts breed intense and dangerous suspicions that can erupt into violence
any time. Informants related the story of man who was killed while his
wife was pregnant. The conflict resolution failed. His child was born. His
relatives did not retaliate but when his son grew up and learned about his
father’s murder, the son retaliated.
If there is no immediate retaliation, it can be because the offended party
is not physically or financially capable. It can also be due to pressure from
the family or community leaders.
When the conflict escalates to rido, the families involved move away
from each other and there is extreme antagonism (Figure 2). The relation-
ship is characterized by distrust and disrespect with both parties hardening
their positions. It is at this stage when the cycle of violence starts.
However, even at this stage, interventions by community leaders may
continue and peaceful resolution achieved. In a serious rido, after the settle-
ment, the parties often work to build better ties. Still, there are instances of
rido recurrence after resolution.
Unresolved rido may be settled in the future or become latent due to
“rido fatigue” (physical and financial exhaustion), disinterest of the family,
pressure from leaders or values transformation.
Extent of Rido
Respondents identified 218 rido that occurred in Maguindanao and Cota-
bato City from 1970 to 2004 or a period of 35 years. There may have been
more since most rido were not reported to the police and the interviewees
were going by memory.
RIDO V2.indd 54 10/4/2007 8:22:45 AM

CONFLICT Intervention Peaceful

Resolution
Success
Failure
Unresolved Rido
Escalation
Latent
Suppressed/Concealed
FIGURE 1. Transformation of Conflict Into Rido
Rido Intervention Peaceful

Resolution
Success
Possibility
Failure
Recurrence
Unresolved Escalation
Latent
Suppressed/Concealed
FIGURE 2. Transformation of Rido
RIDO V2.indd 55 10/4/2007 8:22:46 AM

Of this number, 116 cases were
resolved and 102 cases remain un-
resolved. Of the resolved cases,
only eight have recurred as of this
writing.
FIGURE 3. Status of Rido, 1970-2004
Of the 28 municipalities and
one city, Buldon registered the highest number of rido, 35 cases; Matanog,
29 cases; and Parang, 15 cases. These municipalities were not subdivided in
recent years and this fact may have contributed to their high number of rido
cases compared to those of the newly created municipalities. What is strik-
ing is that there is no municipality in the province without rido.
Frequency of Rido
It is observable from the graph be-
low that the number of new rido
cases increased every five years,
except from 1975 to 1979 when it
slumped to ten cases from 14 cases
the previous five years (1970-74),
and during the periods 1985-1989
FIGURE 4. Frequency of Rido and 1990-1994 when it leveled off
to 28 new rido cases.
The highest number of cases registered was in 2000-2004 when it
reached 78, an increase of 33 cases from the previous period (1995-1999)
figure of 48. This increasing trend suggests the seriousness of the problem
and the need to address the factors that trigger rido.
Impact of Rido
Violence in rido injures not only
the protagonists but affects the eco-
nomic and social life of the commu-
nity as well. Precious human lives
are being sacrificed. From 1970 to
2004, the reported deaths related to
rido reached 811. Of these, 742 were
from the major parties involved, 32
were allies, and 37 had nothing to
do with the conflict .
FIGURE 5. Casualties
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The number of wounded per-

sons reached 369. The major par-
ties to the rido suffered high casu-
alty of 309 wounded, their allies,
56 , and other families, four. Sur-
prisingly, there were only 46 per-
sons reported in jail due to their
involvement in rido: 44 from the
major parties, and two allies. Re-
FIGURE 6. Number of families who transferred residence spondents also revealed that there
were six persons reported missing,
five from the major parties and one from their allies. Their fates are not
known until now.
Residential transfer is another consequence of rido. Families moved to
safer ground to avoid being caught in the crossfire. Some 581 families trans-
ferred residences from 1970 to 2004. At an average household size of 5.57,
around 3,236 people were practically displaced. There were more families
(422) from the major parties who transferred residence. Still, 116 families of
their allies and 43 families not directly involved in the rido also moved out.
Informants also revealed cases of homes burned during armed encoun-
ters between the protagonists, crops destroyed, and working animals lost.
Triggers of Rido
Election-related conflicts, land dispute, murder, robbery and cattle rustlings,
and sex crimes are the major causes of rido in Maguindanao and Cotabato
City. These triggered 66.6% of the 218 rido remembered by respondents
from 1970 to 2004. Other causes (33.4%) include: suspicion, business com-
petition, lack of sportsmanship, competition over fishing ground, accident,
non-payment of dowry, extortion, and other minor causes.
The following cases show how some rido in the province started.
Election-related conflicts
Participation in electoral exercises accounts for 19.27% of the causes of
rido in the province. Disputes arise during the whole electoral process from
the registration of voters to proclamation of winners.
The following cases related by respondents illustrate how unhealthy
political competitions can result to rido.
Mr. B, the vice mayor of a certain municipality in Maguindanao, ran
against Mr. A, the then incumbent mayor, during the 1992 local elections.
On election day, the supporters of Mr. B noticed voting irregularities in the
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different precincts, particularly in
barangay Poblacion where Mr. B’s
daughter was assigned as coordina-
tor of poll watchers.
Mr. B’s daughter reported the
presence of “flying voters” in the
precincts to the representative
of the Commission on Elections
(comelec), and accused the son
of Mr. A of being responsible for it.
The son of Mr. A hit Mr. B’s daugh-
ter in the face, causing slight injury.
The family of B did not retaliate at
once. Around midnight, the sup-
porters of Mr. A attacked the sup-
porters of Mr. B, killing Mr. C and
his son. This led to more violence
FIGURE 7. Causes of Rido between both camps. The rido re-
mains unresolved.
Irresponsible statements during campaign period can provoke violence.
In one local election, the group of Mr. M went to campaign in a barangay
where Mr. T, his political rival, was a resident. The speakers took turns ver-
bally attacking Mr. T. Not able to control his emotions, Mr. T ordered his
followers to ambush the Mr. M’s party after the political rally. As Mr. M was
about to leave in his car, he was shot dead. After several weeks, the son of
Mr. M retaliated and shot the son of Mr. T, starting the rido between the
two families.
Another case involved leadership competition. Mr. D claimed that he
had the natural right to lead since their community was named after his
grandparent and their family had been traditional leaders of the commu-
nity. But Mr. E argued that the people should be given the opportunity to
choose their leader through election.
One day in 1982, Mr. D and his followers went to the barangay where
Mr. E was residing. Mr. E. was not around but Mr. D told the people of the
barangay that Mr. E had no right to lead the community because he was
not native to the place. Informed of this, Mr. E ordered his followers to
attack the house of Mr. D, resulting in four deaths. When Mr. D returned
from Manila, he killed five camp followers of Mr. E. Residents afraid of be-
ing caught in the crossfire transferred to other communities. The following
year, provincial leaders intervened and divided the community into two
electoral districts so each camp could have its bailiwick.
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Land conflicts
Conflict over land is another major cause of rido in the province.
Blood relatives Mr. F and Mr. G owned adjacent lots. Mr. F accused Mr.
G of encroaching on his land and they became hostile to each other. There
were efforts to resolve the dispute but both parties were not interested.
One day, Mr. F and his relatives attacked the house of Mr. G, killing
three members of the latter’s family. Mr. G immediately retaliated and killed
one member of the family of Mr. F. After years of hostility, the elders of both
families were able to resolve the rido.
Inheritance can be a source of dispute among siblings. A respondent
related this case: Mr. I was an adopted son of the father of Mr. H. Their
father owned 18 ha of agricultural land and, before his death, gave it to
his daughter Miss J. When Miss J got sick, she sold the land to her elder
brother Mr. H. When Mr. I learned about the transaction, he demanded
his share but Mr. H refused. He said that the land was given to Miss J and
that he and his sister were the legitimate heirs. Frustrated, Mr. I stole the
work animals of Mr. H and the jewelry of Miss J. When Mr. H learned of
the thefts, he shot to death Mr. I. A relative of Mr. I in turn killed Mr. H.
After a year and through the intervention of the family elders, the rido was
resolved in May 2002.
Landgrabbing is another trigger of rido, as in the following case:
When Mr. K planted coconut trees on the land of Mr. M’s father, Mr. M
told the former to stop. When Mr. K ignored him, Mr. M decided to build
a house on his father’s land. When Mr. K learned about this, he went to Mr.
M, carrying a high-powered gun. When Mr. M saw this, he shot dead Mr. K
and took the latter’s weapon. When the family of Mr. K learned about the
killing, they retaliated by killing the father of Mr. M. The violence continued
for seven years, killing five members of the family of Mr. K and three of Mr.
M. With the intervention of community leaders, the rido was resolved.
Respondents revealed that disputes over land titles are another source
of conflict. In some cases, inherited lands were not titled because older folk
were not familiar with land registration procedures. When other people got
title to the land, conflict erupted as in the following case:
When Mr. L secured a title to his land from the Department of Agrarian
Reform, he included the land of his neighbor. When his neighbor found out,
he reported the case to the barangay officials who ruled that nothing could
be done since it was a legitimate title.
One day, Mr. N appeared at the disputed property and shot dead Mr.
L. Next day, the relatives of Mr. L killed some of Mr. N’s kin. The conflict
escalated into rido until it was resolved in 1989.
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Undocumented transactions are another cause of rido. The rido be-
tween these two families is quite revealing:
The father of Mr. A bought half a hectare of land from the mother of
Mr. B. It was a transaction done when Mr. A and Mr. B were still young. One
day, Mr. B went to the house of Mr. A to ask for the return of the land. Mr.
B said he would return the amount paid for the land. Mr. A refused because
the transaction was for sale not mortgage.
One day in 2001, Mr. A went to a gun shop in town to have his gun
repaired. Upon hearing this news, Mr. B immediately went to the gun shop
with the intent to kill Mr. A. But Mr. A first caught sight of Mr. B and shot
him dead. Mr. A went to the council of elders to report the incident and the
council facilitated the resolution of the conflict.
Crimes Against Chastity

Muslims are under obligation to respect and protect a woman’s chastity
under all circumstances, whether she is a co-religionist or not. Illicit rela-
tionship, consensual or otherwise, is forbidden regardless of the woman’s
status and any such act demands retribution.
The following cases involve such relationships:
Case 1: Mr. X had an illicit relationship with his niece. When the com-
munity and religious leaders learned about it, they ordered Mr. Y to arrest
Mr. X for investigation, but he resisted and was killed by Mr. Y. In turn, the
relatives of Mr. X killed Mr. Y. The dispute was resolved through the media-
tion of community elders.
Case 2: Mr. A married his girlfriend without the consent of her parents.
The couple moved to Lanao del Sur. After several years and two children,
they returned to live in Sultan Kudarat. Several years later, it was reported
that Mr. A had an illicit affair with his sister-in-law (Miss C). Mr. A sensed
that his wife and brothers-in-law knew of this relationship and he allegedly
poisoned his wife.
When the relatives of the wife found out, they killed Mr. A and sur-
rendered Miss C to the elders. The relatives of Mr. A retaliated and killed
one of the brothers-in-law of Mr. A. The elders intervened and settled
the conflict.
Cattle rustling
In 2000, Mr. S stole the work animals of Mr. T. Mr. S wanted to return
the stolen animals, but when he heard that Mr. T was bent on killing him,
he transferred residence and brought with him 13 guns of Mr. T which Mr.
S forcefully took from Mr. T’s allies. Because of this, Mr. T attacked Mr. S,
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resulting to feud between the two sides. Five persons died from the camp of
Mr. S and two from the camp of Mr. T.
Suspicion
Sometime in 2001, Mr. A was shot dead by an unknown assailant while
drinking coffee in a public market. His relatives suspected Mr. B as the per-
petrator of the crime. Months later, a relative of Mr. B was killed in the same
public market. The incidents triggered the rido that remains unresolved
until now.
Angyas (Jesting)
The tradition of lighting candles a during wedding ceremony is still
practiced in some places in the province.
Sometime in 1998, a wedding was held in a house of a datu in the mu-
nicipality of Talitay. When the ceremony was about to start, candles were
being lighted and Mrs. B in jest handed Mr. X a bunch of firecrackers rather
than candles. Unaware of the prank, Mr. X lit the firecrackers. When he real-
ized what had happened, Mr. X chose to hold on to the firecrackers rather
than cause injury to others. He lost his fingers in the blast. The husband of
Mrs. B brought Mr. X to the hospital and stayed on until Mr. X recovered.
Mr. Z, the son of Mr. X, could not accept the painful experience of his
father and killed the husband of Mrs. B. The son-in-law of the victim re-
taliated and killed Mr. Z and took his gun and work animals. The prank of
Mrs. B turned into rido.
Resolution
Conflict-Resolution Methods
Dispute resolutions in Maguindanao are done through the formal legal
system (the courts and katarungang pambarangay or barangay justice), the
innovative mechanism of local government executives, the traditional ways
of the datu, and the milf conflict-resolution mechanism. Except for the
courts that employ legal procedures, the other mechanisms use mediation
and arbitration to resolve conflicts.
According to focus group participants, most people involved in feuds
prefer arbitration and mediation because these are less socially disruptive
than the formal legal system. Mediation and arbitration in fact occupy a
very important place under the Shari’ah. These methods dispense justice
quickly and promote peace and harmony in the community.
Mediation is a negotiation between parties involved in the rido, assisted
by an independent and impartial “third party” mediator. The mediator does
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not render judgment or impose solutions but assists the parties to under-
stand their interests and positions as well as the interests of the community.
The mediator helps to explore and evaluate potential agreements.
Arbitration in Islamic law is called tahkim. It is a voluntary procedure
whereby a neutral person is chosen by the opposing parties to settle their
dispute. Barra (1994: 10) explains that in arbitration, “the disputants or par-
ties with conflicting claims or interests submit their case for settlement by
a third party with whom they repose the authority to mediate or arbitrate
between them, and that they agree that the decision of such arbitrator or
arbiter shall be binding upon them.”
Conflict-Resolution Bodies
1. Legal Courts
Informants observed that court litigation is seldom used to settle rido.
This is because the legal proceedings are perceived to be tedious and costly.
Informal mechanisms are preferred as these are perceived to be cheaper and
easier to use. (World Bank 2004: iv).
Katarungang Pambarangay (Barangay Justice). The Local Government

Code of 1991 provides for the creation in every barangay of a conflict media-
tion body called the katarungang pambarangay.
The lupong tagapamayapa (arbitration board), composed of the pu-
nong barangay (barangay chief) as chairman and 10 to 20 members, has the
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of their disputes. In every dispute, a
three-man panel is chosen by the parties in dispute from among the mem-
bers of the lupon tagapamayapa to act as mediator.
Disputes that involve penalties of imprisonment exceeding one year or
a fine exceeding P5,000 are beyond the jurisdiction of the barangay justice.
It has no authority over disputes involving parties residing in other cities or
municipalities or properties in other cities and municipalities. This limits its
capacity to deal with rido that involve parties from different localities.
Innovative Mechanisms of Local Government Units. Given the limita-

tions of the katarungang pambarangay, some local government units initiat-
ed innovative mechanisms to mediate rido. These mechanisms combine the
traditional ways with the municipal justice system. Examples of these are:
• The walay na bitiara or house of court (Municipality of Sultan
Kudarat)
This is organized at the municipal and barangay levels to settle con-
flicts that involve theft, homicide, murder, marriage, maratabat, kaperimbol
(brawls), elopement, land dispute, and mortgage issues.
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Mayor Tocao O. Mastura explained that a complaint is first filed at the

barangay level of the house of court. Before the case is heard, the member
of the municipal council in charge in the barangay forms an arbitration
council composed of influential persons coming from both parties. In case
no amicable settlement is reached, the walay na bitiara hears the case. The
decision of the house of court at the barangay level may be appealed to the
municipal level. In cases that the municipal level of walay na bitiara cannot
resolve the conflict, the dispute is referred to the municipal police chief for
legal action.
• Joint ulama municipal peace and order council (Municipality of
Barira)
This is composed of representatives from the ulama, traditional lead-
ers, local government officials, and the professional sectors. The council is
organized at the barangay and municipal levels. Four adjacent barangays are
organized into a district. The mandate of the council is to address conflicts
ranging from minor cases like simple misunderstanding to serious ones like
land conflicts, marital problems, and political feuds that could lead to rido.
When a complaint is received, the district chairman invites the chair of
the barangay where the parties in conflict reside and other council members
to assist in the investigation of the case. The parties in conflict are invited
to the hearing along with their witnesses. The council hears the case and
makes a decision. If either party is not satisfied with the decision, the case is
elevated to the municipal level. If the council at the municipal level cannot
resolve the conflict, the case is further endorsed to the municipal trial court.
According to council chair Amer Salam Dagalangit, all cases referred to the
council have been resolved.
• Mayor’s council of Upi

In Upi where the Teduray, Muslims, and Christian settlers live together,
the municipal government organized the Mayor’s Council in August 2001
to mediate conflicts. The council is under the office of the municipal mayor
and composed of two Teduray elders, two Muslim leaders, and two Chris-
tian leaders. If parties involved in the conflict are all Teduray, the Teduray
members of the council have to mediate. Likewise, Muslim members medi-
ate conflicts among Muslims while Christian members help resolve con-
flicts among Christians. If conflict involves residents from different ethnic
groups, the council en banc mediates.
The Ways of the Datu. Conflict-resolution mechanism in Maguindanao

dates back to the coming of Shariff Kabunsuan who established the Magu-
indanao Sultanate. The sultanate had a well-organized judicial system. As
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guide in the administration of justice, the luwaran was codified. Although
the provisions of the luwaran were taken mainly from works on Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh) belonging to the Shafi’i schools of law (madhhab), the
judges who codified it selected the laws they thought suited the condition
and social order at that time. The luwaran was not only used as bases for
judgment during formal litigation of cases, but also served as general guide
in mediation and arbitration of disputes. It covered both civil and criminal
offenses. The copy translated to English by Dr. Najeeb M. Saleeby (1905)
contains 85 articles.
The traditional Magindanaon justice system is inquisitorial rather than
adversarial. The accused and the accuser are not considered adversaries. The
hearing is to clarify the facts of the case and figure out how best to serve jus-
tice. In formal resolution of disputes, other than the datu kali (judge), there
is also a wazir, the interlocutor of law and adat. The datu kali and wazir are
learned and most competent expounders of the law and adat. The accused
and the accuser are assisted by wakil (counsel and advocate).
Today although the power and influence of the sultanate is significantly
reduced, in some places the datu is still influential and effective in resolv-
ing disputes. Once a complaint is received, the datu may call the council of
elders to conduct preliminary investigations to find out the following: the
pedtuntut (complainant) and pedtuntutan (defendant); the sabapan (issues);
the kahanda (objectives of the conflicting parties over those issues); the ukit
(the means they use to achieve those objectives); their adaban (orientations
to conflict and conflict handling); and the tandangan (environment within
which the conflict occurs and the efforts to resolve the dispute) (Datumanong
2005). Once these pieces of information are available, the council of elders
calls a meeting of both parties and their relatives. The process of kambitialay
(mediation) starts. There are no formal procedures to be followed. The dis-
cussions are mainly to reach just resolution of the dispute.
In arbitration cases, once complaint is received the council of elders
determines the merit of the complaint. If the council finds the complaint
unjustifiable the case is dismissed. Otherwise, the defendant’s representative
is summoned. Then the council holds pre-trial conference with the parties
in conflict. The arbitration process follows and after hearing the facts and
arguments, the council renders its decision. The parties in conflict and their
witnesses are required to sign “in conforme” the decision of the Council
MILF-Conflict Resolution Procedure. When a complaint or report
is received by the milf, an initial investigation is conducted. Before the
milf takes action, it usually gets the consent of both parties to voluntarily
submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the milf and a commitment to
abide by the decision. Then the central committee or any of its provincial
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or municipal organs organizes a committee composed of influential mem-

bers of both families to act as mediator. The mediator will immediately ask
both parties to declare and observe a ceasefire.
If mediation fails, the dispute will either be submitted to arbitration
or to the milf Shari’ah court. Unlike the shari’ah court, arbitration proce-
dures do not observe specific rules. Arbitration is not a trial but a means to
resolution. Cases submitted to the shari’ah court , however, are decided in
accordance with criminal and civil laws adopted by the milf.
Under arbitration, settlement may take any form provided it does not
violate fundamental principles of justice in Islam. To avoid abuse in the use
of blood money as settlement, the milf set P120,000 as maximum amount
to be paid to the family of the victim.
Party in conflict
submits case complaint
with pleading and evidence
Council of Elders
determines merit of the
case/complaint
Case is invalid/unjusti- Case is valid/justifiable.

fied. Council sends summon
letter to the defendant’s
representative
Council holds pre-trial

conference with the
parties in conflict
Council conducts
arbitration process
between the two parties
in conflict
Council decides on the

case/complaint
Parties in conflict and

witnesses
Figure 8: Steps in Settling a Homicide Case Through Arbitration sign Council’s decision
Process (Datumanong 2005)
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Settlement. Settlement of conflict submitted for mediation and arbi-
tration can be in any form acceptable to both parties. The only limitations,
according to informants, are that the settlement does not violate the fun-
damental principles of Islam and the adat betad (proper order of things) of
society. To heal the wounds of those who are offended, the settlement carries
with it some form of retributive justice and reparation for damages—mate-
rial and psychological—inflicted on the victims.
Diyyat (blood money) is paid to the family of a victim killed by mistake.
This practice is based on the Qur’an:“It is not for a believer to kill a believer
unless (it be) by mistake. He who hath killed a believer by mistake must set
free a believing slave, and pay the indemnity to the family of the slain, unless
they remit it as charity.” (4:92)
Forgiveness has been part of settlement of conflicts. The above Qur’anic
verse shows that even blood money can be given up as charity. This means
that if the victim’s family forgives the killer, then the latter may no longer
be obliged to pay the blood money.
Forgiveness is a prized virtue in Islam. Believers are enjoined to for-
give even if they are angry (Qur’an 42:37). When Prophet Muhammad was
persecuted in Mecca, he prayed, “Forgive them, Lord, for they know not
what they do.” The Qur’anic commandment is for every Muslim to “Hold
to forgiveness “ (7:199).
The traditional way of kadsarakan in Maguindanao is an example of
how the values of humility and forgiveness are practiced. The offender goes
to the house of the offended party. The accompanying relatives and com-
munity leaders tell the offended party that the offender is being submitted
to the offended party’s discretion. The offended party’s response is always
to forgive because the act of going to the house of the offended party shows
humility and remorse. When guilt cannot be ascertained, relatives and lead-
ers will arrange a meeting of the parties involved on neutral ground. For
a serious crime, the offender dons white and brings along a kris which he
offers to the offended party upon arrival at the latter’s home. This is meant
for the offended party to carry out an execution. Before this ritual, however,
mediators will have arranged some form of retribution and indemnity. Even
in grave cases, Magindanaon tradition expects the offended party to forgive
the offender who humbles himself.
Reconciliation. Reconciliation is the best guarantee that the violence
will not recur. Kedsapa (taking oath) may be performed to assure all par-
ties that the peace pact will not be violated. To avoid future disputes, most
peace agreements are written down and witnessed by prominent leaders of
the community.
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To build confidence and trust, intermarriages are sometimes resorted

to, especially in cases of serious rido where many died from both sides. Mar-
riage among Muslims in the province is not just the union of two individu-
als but also a way of building alliances between families. Intermarriages are
one way to prevent recurrence of rido among future generations.
Recurrence
Rido can at times recur after settlement. One of the causes of recurrence
identified by informants is kapanunungka (shaming). For example, a person
who is called a coward for not avenging the death of a family member may
be shamed into seeking revenge despite a settlement.
A family member may be ignorant of a settlement while one who is
excluded from such settlement may choose to ignore the pact. Failure of
any party to comply with the agreement or perception that the settlement
is unfair can also provoke violent reaction.
The Mediator and Arbiter

The fgd participants believed that a mediator or arbiter must have the con-
fidence of parties involved. In one case I witnessed, the community leaders
organized a committee to mediate a rido between two prominent political
families. Before contacts were made with the warring families, the commit-
tee members assessed themselves and those who felt they were not accept-
able to the conflicting parties chose not to participate further.
A mediator or arbiter who has the respect of the parties involved assures
their compliance with the agreement reached. He can also control those
who attempt to spoil the mediation process.
Datumanong (2005) is of the opinion that the council of elders who
mediate conflicts should be composed of “honored and revered individuals
in the community by virtue of their experience and wisdom in upholding
justice, customary laws, and ensuring peace in the community.”
In Maguindanao, both men and women can be effective mediators and
arbiters.
Roles of kin, and political and religious leaders. Kin can either help
resolve or exacerbate conflict. The fgd participants observed that many
conflicts in the province were resolved immediately through the peace ef-
forts of kin on both sides while other conflicts worsened due to the stub-
bornness or unilateral actions of some relatives.
Political and religious leaders usually act as mediators. If they are di-
rectly or indirectly embroiled in the rido, they can organize other mediators.
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They can also source funds to pay for compensation or indemnity if the
concerned parties cannot afford to. Fgd participants said that the religious
should educate the people on the tenets of Islam which teaches mercy and
forgiveness.
Conflict-Resolution Problems. The existence of competing authorities
in the province—like the milf and the government—that have different
systems of addressing rido provides parties to the dispute the opportunity
for “forum shopping”. Sometimes cases already resolved by the milf would
be filed in court by one party while cases being heard in court would be
brought to the milf. Settlements facilitated by datus and community lead-
ers may also suffer a similar fate.
To prevent “forum shopping,” disputants are usually required to with-
draw cases filed in court or to desist from filing court cases if they submit
themselves to arbitration by traditional ways or by the milf. For instance, an
agreement facilitated by community leaders provides that the parties should
“desist filing cases in court and if one or some may have been filed by either
parties in court to cause for the withdrawal of the same.” An milf-mediated
agreement provides “[t]hat all criminal cases filed by both parties before the
Philippine Courts shall be withdrawn by obliging respective complainants
to execute Affidavit of Desistance and seek Order of Dismissal of Cases by
the concern courts.”
Armed encounters between the afp and milf forces complicate media-
tion. The fgd participants observed that when armed confrontation leads
to evacuation of residents, mediation efforts are abandoned.
What makes mediation more difficult is the involvement of relatives
who belong to the police, militia, the afp, or the milf. In some cases, “some
clans would join the Armed Forces, the police and para-military forces to
get back at another clan known to be sympathetic to the Muslim rebels.”
(Hermoso 2005)
The number of leaders who know the art of mediation and arbitration
is dwindling. Authority and influence are not enough, experience is vital.
The young are encouraged to closely observe the settlement of conflicts so
they may learn the ways. Today, young people in the province are less famil-
iar with the art of mediation and arbitration.
Recommendations
To address rido it is necessary to improve the justice system. Judges must
be appointed in every municipaplity and given ample security. More pub-
lic attorneys should be provided to those who cannot afford to hire pri-
vate counsel and paralegals trained to assist those at the community level.
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Government should also consider placing under the jurisdiction of the

Shari’ah Courts all crimes against chastity and other crimes to which Mus-
lims are particularly sensitive.
Law enforcement must also be improved. Police should be better trained
and made accountable for their actions. It is also important to review the
practice of elections where they contradict Islamic teachings or local prac-
tice. There should be sustained effort for clean and honest elections begin-
ning at the grassroots where police and military are kept neutral.
Government must create a special body to address issues pertaining to
land claims and disputed titles. It will help to avoid conflicts if traditional
systems of land ownership are harmonized with the private system of own-
ership. Finally, local community leaders must be provided in-depth training
in conflict resolution and widespread educational campaign on the negative
impact of rido must be undertaken. The Islamic values of justice, forgive-
ness, mercy, and peace must be strongly promoted.
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E ch a p ter t h re e
Inventory of Existing Rido

in Lanao del Sur (1994 –2004)
Moctar I. Matuan, PhD
S OME RESEARCHERS have observed that conflict is more prevalent in

Meranao society than among other Moro groups in the Philippines. As
noted by Bently (1982), the Meranao display extreme sensitivity to personal
threats. They are unwilling to fall under anyone’s power, either individually
or collectively. Because of this trait, inter-family feud, which is known as
rido in the vernacular, occurs whenever a member of the family is offended
verbally or physically.
While the Philippine legal system defines revenge killing as murder or
homicide, the Meranao define the act as retributive justice. Rido among
the Meranao has brought about serious problems in their society. Loss of
lives, destruction of property, economic drift and absence of peace and
order are just some of its crippling effects. Rido is a hindrance to socio-
economic, political, and spiritual development of the people.
Locale of the Study

The study covered Lanao del Sur. The province has one city and 39 mu-
nicipalities. Lanao del Sur is located in Central Mindanao. It has an area
of 3,850 sq km. Its population of 800,162, as of the 2000 census, is the 29th
largest among the country’s provinces while its population density of 207
per sq km is the 43rd highest. The province is bounded on the north by La-
nao del Norte, on the east by Bukidnon, on the south by Maguindanao and
|| 71 ||
RIDO V2.indd 71 10/4/2007 8:22:55 AM

Cotabato, and on the southwest by Illana Bay, an arm of the Moro Gulf. Its
capital is Marawi City. At the heart of the province is Lake Lanao, one of the
17 oldest lakes in the world.
Marawi City is located in the northwestern side of Lake Lanao. With
its 131,090 population (2000 Census of Population and Housing, nso), it
is the smallest among the 16 highly urbanized cities in the Philippines. It
is predominantly Meranao. Government offices, schools, business estab-
lishments, public utilities, and other service-oriented establishments are all
controlled or managed by the Meranao.
In the past (1940-1960), Marawi was at the heart of Mindanao’s travel
route by land. The city then boasted fine hotels and restaurants. But with
deteriorating peace and order and the construction of new road network in
Bukidnon, Marawi’s old role was taken over by Cagayan de Oro City.
The Meranao
The Meranao are among the 13 Muslim ethno-linguistic groups in the Phil-
ippines. They inhabit Lanao del Sur, a large portion of Lanao del Norte, and
some parts of Zamboanga Del Sur, Maguindanao, Misamis Oriental, and
Cagayan De Oro City.
The word Meranao, which is initially pronounced with the peppet vow-
el e, is popularly translated as “people of the lake”, referring to Lake Lanao
(Ranao in the vernacular).
Long before the advent of the Republic, the Meranao already had a rela-
tively well-organized indigenous polity. The nation-state equivalent of this
political organization is the pat a phangampongang ko ranao. The late Dr.
Mamitua Saber translated this term as “Four States or Principalities.” The
territorial jurisdiction of this indigenous political organization includes the
provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, and small portions of the
present Zamboanga Del Sur, Bukidnon, Misamis Oriental, and Maguin-
danao. Although it has become nominal in many aspects, this indigenous
organization is still functional.
While the Philippine Constitution functions as the fundamental law of
the land, in the pat a phangampong (in short), the so-called taritib ago igma
serves as the fundamental law of the community. In the taritib, the pat a
phangampong is divided into four phangampongs (encampments): Bayabao,
Onayan, Masiu, and Baloi. Each phangampong with the exception of Baloi is
further subdivided into suku or sub-phangampong. Bayabao is subdivided
into Poona Bayabao (Where Bayabao Begins), Lumba a Bayabao (Central
Bayabao), and Mala a Bayabao (Greater Bayabao); Masiu into East and West
Masiu; and Onayan into East and West Onayan. It is interesting to note that
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Inventory of Existing Rido in Lanao del Sur (1994-2004) || 73
the first three phangampongs (Bayabao, Masiu, and Onayan) are bound in
the Taritib by the inged or communities of Sawir, Dalama, Bacayawan and
Madamba. Each sub-phangampong is further broken down into several in-
ged (township) and each inged is subdivided into several agama (village
community).
In the taritib, the four panganpong have 15 panoroganans (supported
inged) and 28 mbabaya ko taritib inged. Through consensus-making or con-
sultation process (opakat), these ingeds rule the Pat a Phangampong. How-
ever, because centralized authority structure did not much develop in the
Pat a Phangampong, each inged and, in some cases, each agama functions
independently of all other ingeds and agamas. It is on this score that the Pat
a Phangampong is considered a segmentary society.
Unlike in a centralized sultanate system, where the judicial function of
the government is hierarchically institutionalized, in the pat a phangam-
pong, each inged or agama functions independently in regard to conflict
resolution. Before the advent of the Republic, indigenous and Islamic Law
constituted the substantive and procedural laws of the Meranao indigenous
political system. The indigenous laws are embodied mainly in the Taritib
and igma of the pat a phangampong. Islamic Law, on the other hand, is based
on the Qur’an and Hadith—sayings and practices of Prophet Mohammad
(s.a.w.). It should be noted that Islamic Law functions not through an Is-
lamic Government but through the indigenous political structure of Mer-
anao society. The indigenous laws are themselves continuously influenced
by Islamic Law. In fact, the word taritib and igma are said to be adopted from
two original Arabic terms: tartib and ijma. The former means arrangement
or order while the latter refers to the consensus of jurists about a question
of law at a particular point in history.
With the advent of the Republic, the modern state system was super-
imposed on Meranao society. Consequently, the Meranao live under two
types of political organization simultaneously—the modern state and the
indigenous. Under the modern state, the people are organized into provinc-
es, city, municipalities, and barangays. Under the indigenous system, they
are organized into phangampongs, sub-phangampong, ingeds, and agamas.
Likewise, “modern” or legal mode of conflict settlement, which are primar-
ily channeled through regular courts of justice, co-exist with the indigenous
modes of conflict resolution as well as with the Islamic mode of settlement
that used to be called kitab in Meranao society. Therefore, given a dispute,
there are alternative modes of conflict resolution.
Islam influences virtually all aspects of Meranao life and continues to
transform Meranao society along Islamic lines despite the inroads of secu-
larization. The Qur’an and Hadith provide general guiding principles so
RIDO V2.indd 73 10/4/2007 8:22:55 AM

that the Meranao is still free to define his own Islamic way. Like democracy
that has several variants, Islamic political organization can also take varying
forms. The same is true of other institutions like education; the Meranao
can also have their own system of Islamic education. Islam demands that
its adherents (individually and collectively) live in accordance with Islamic
way. This is one aspect of the Moro armed struggle less understood in Phil-
ippine scholarship.
Competing with Islam in transforming the Meranao are the so-
called Western or American influences. The Philippine systems of pub-
lic administration, civil service, and education are essentially American
in provenance.
Today, the indigenous political system has been supplanted by the mod-
ern nation-state that promotes the free market economy. While the Mer-
anao has been benefited by secular education it has also alienated him from
his traditional culture and religion.
In response to this alienation, the Meranao have set up hundreds of
madaris (singular, madrasah) alongside secular public and private schools.
The madaris teach religion, Islamic Law, Islamic history, and Arabic lan-
guage, among others.
Because the government does not accredit the madaris, their graduates
can not effectively apply for government jobs. Moreover, the madaris do
not offer pure and applied science courses that can be used for gainful self-
employment. In response to this problem, adventurous ulama and some
western educated individuals organized integrated schools in Lanao del Sur
and Marawi City. The most successful of these schools, which earned the
respect of the public and the government, is the Ibn Siena Integrated School
in Marawi City in 1995.
Meranao Kinship System

Owing probably to the isolation of the Meranao in Central Mindanao for
centuries, they have developed a peculiar kinship system. For instance, while
other ethnic groups may have similar kinship ties that require reciprocity of
aid and services within the kin group, the mbatabata’a or thothonganaya (a
group of individuals who are blood relatives) is a separate authority structure
at the village level, which, together with the barangays and the agama, make
the Meranao village a trichotomous authority structure (Sumaguina, 1988).
As an authority structure, the mbatabata’a or thothonganaya is more
effective than the agama or the barangays in conflict management. The
late Dr. Esmail Sumaguina discovered in his “Distributed Political Com-
petence and Stress On Village System: The Case of Three Meranao Village
RIDO V2.indd 74 10/4/2007 8:22:56 AM

Communities in Muslim Mindanao,” which he undertook in 1988, that in

very stressful situations, involving homicide or murder, the agama and the
barangays could not cope. Only the mbatabata’a or thothonganaya was able
to effect resolution.
Another mode of conflict resolution based on kinship is the kokoman
a kambhatabata’a. This mode promotes and maintains harmony among
members of a kinship group. Prof. Intuas M. Abdullah first articulated this
in his article “Two Notes on Meranao Law” published by the Mindanao
State University in 1977. The Merano must often decide whether to apply
the traditional taritib ago igma, kitab or Islamic Law, or Philippine law in
resolving conflicts.
The indigenous political organization of the Meranao, from its nation-
state equivalent down to the agama level, is also largely structured and or-
ganized along kinship principles. Political and religious titles are generally
ascribed and open only to individuals who descend from the original holder
of the title (grar).
Another feature of the kinship system of the Meranao is the awidan.
Literally, it can mean “to carry’”or burden. As a reciprocity system, its scope
is defined by the phrase rido-kapiya’an (problem-benefit or conflict-ben-
efit) that explicitly categorizes two general areas in which awidan operates:
problem and benefit. This shows that reciprocity in Meranao society is far
greater in scope than in other ethnic groups.
The nature of a reciprocity system is often made manifest when an
individual is confronted with a problematic situation. In his book Social
Structure (1969) George Peter Murdock observes:
When a person is in danger or in trouble, when he needs help

in the performance of an economic task or a ceremonial obligation,
whenever in short, he requires a measure of assistance beyond what
his family can provide, he can turn to the members of his larger
kin group for aid and succor. Because extended kinship ties bind
them to him, their obligation to help him is stronger than that of
other members of the tribe or community. He in turn of course is
under reciprocal obligations toward them (Murdock, 1969:45; cited
in Sumaguina, 1988:38).
What Murdock describes above is only a part of the awidan in the Mer-
anao kinship system. The concept of rido-kapiya’an obligates a kinship group
to assist any member in a conflict situation, particularly one that involves
homicide or murder. When death is not involved, the kinship group, particu-
larly the shokodan (those who are related to both parties in the dispute), can
RIDO V2.indd 75 10/4/2007 8:22:56 AM

be effective in settling the conflict. In situations that require payment for
damages, the kinship group is expected to help raise the amount.
In serious disputes that involve homicide, close relatives are expected to
help not only materially but also in bearing arms.
The second half of the rido-kapiya’an concept, on the other hand, obli-
gates the individual or nuclear family to distribute part of whatever benefits
they receive among the larger kin group. In regard to dower or bride gift,
this is called adat.
Meranao Concept of Maratabat

Maratabat is another feature of the Meranao much discussed among both
foreign and local scholars. It is not easily discernible to outsiders. It often
rises to the fore when powerful emotions mix with deeply ingrained cul-
tural values. Researchers differ in their views of this socio-psychological and
cultural phenomenon.
Carlton L. Riemer, in his article, “Meranao Maratabat and the Concepts
of Pride, Honor, and Self Esteem”, believes that the Meranao expanded the
Arabic meaning of maratabat “… from rank to rank sensitivity, status to
status seeking and prestige to prestige seeking and enhancement” (1970:8).
Riemer sees maratabat as occurring in a continuum so that varying amounts
of it exists in different situations. (1970: 3). Saber, Tamano, and Warriner re-
late maratabat to the “folk psychology” of the Meranao and regard it is as an
ideology. “This implies that maratabat is the driving force that guides the
actions of the Meranao as “citizens” of the pat a phangampongan o ranao”
(Abdullah, 1982:32). To contextualize the phenomenon, Dr. Nagasura Ma-
dale suggests that the concept (maratabat) can only be understood by relat-
ing it to the social structure of the Meranao and the social positions in that
structure. Unlike many writers, who equate maratabat with pride, honor,
status, or self-esteem, Melvin Mednick believes that there is no single con-
cept rendered in English that corresponds to it. In the end, he views mara-
tabat as the “affection impulse behind the performance” of duties in relation
to one’s descent line (1964: 187; cited in Abdullah, 1982:31).
In his “Maratabat and Rido (Meranao),” Claribel Bartolome (2004: 32-
106), says maratabat has to do with a universe of cultural and social concerns:
rank, honor, status, self-esteem, pride, sensitivity, ideology, among others.
Suffice it to say, for this study, that maratabat is a reaction to any per-
ceived offense committed against one’s person and/or dignity that must be
vindicated. It is usually a violent reaction. However, not all violent acts are
expressions of maratabat.
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Data Collection
The first phase of data gathering was devoted to the enumeration of rido in
the municipalities of Lanao del Sur from 1994 to 2004. The data gathered
included the causes and parties involved, the year it happened, the media-
tors, and the number of casualties, injured, imprisoned, and other related
information. After enumerating all the known rido in every municipality,
the researchers were then asked to gather more indepth information on five
rido cases in each municipality.
Some Meranao employees (faculty and administrative staff) of msu
Marawi and other colleagues were recruited as enumerators and/or field
researchers in their own municipality/city of origin. The ideal respondents
for the inventory of rido in the municipality were the traditional/religious
leaders or those who ran for an elective office. In selecting the respondents,
the researchers were instructed to choose a friend or relative knowledgeable
on specific rido and not to interview people who were closely related to the
rido, especially the aggrieved party. They were further instructed to allow
respondents to narrate the history of the rido and to emphasize the media-
tion and resolution process. The findings were presented in a validation
seminar/workshop attended by carefully selected participants from the 40
localities studied. The participants, selected on the basis of their knowledge
on the rido in their areas and familiarity with Meranao conflict resolution
methods, were given ample time to critically examine the findings and to
provide additional information on items that were overlooked.
Frequency and Common Causes of Rido

The inventory yielded information on the number of rido; causes of rido;
year of occurrence; number of people killed, injured and imprisoned; status
of the rido, whether or not the aggrieved party filed a case in court; and
other related information.
The study found a total of 337 rido in Lanao del Sur from 1994 to 2004.
It can be gleaned from Table 1 that more than 50% (22 out of the 40 political
units of the province) had 10 or more ridos. Marantao and Butig registered
the highest frequency at 26 and 17, respectively. However, the 26 rido in Ma-
rantao claimed 32 lives while Butig lost 73 lives from the 17 rido identified.
These figures suggest that though Marantao had the most rido, these were
not as violent as those in other places. Marantao ranked sixth in the number
of casualties. Butig, Balabagan, Pagayawan, Kalanogas, and Madalum suf-
fered more casualties in that order.
RIDO V2.indd 77 10/4/2007 8:22:57 AM

TABLE 1. Distribution of Rido by Municipality
Municipality Frequency Percent
Marawi City 15 4.0

Bubong 5 1.3
Buadi-Puso Buntong 5 1.3
Bumbaran 5 1.3
Butig 17 4.5
Balindong 9 2.4
Bacolod-Kalawi 6 1.6
Balabagan 14 3.7
Binidayan 10 2.7
Bayang 5 1.3
Ditsaan-Ramain 5 1.3
Dumalondong 7 1.9
Ganassi 10 2.7
Kapai 10 2.7
Kalanogas 10 2.7
Kapatagan 5 1.3
Lumba-Bayabao 5 1.3
Lumbac-a Unayan 6 1.6
Lumbayanague 5 1.3
Lumbatan 7 1.9
Masiu 10 2.7
Mulondo 10 2.7
Maguing 10 2.7
Marantao 26 6.9
Madalum 16 4.2
Madamba 11 2.9
Marogong 6 1.6
Malabang 10 2.7
Poona Bayabao 10 2.7
Piagapo 5 1.3
Pualas 11 2.9
Pagayawan 15 4.0
Saguiaran 10 2.7
Sultan Gumander 6 1.6
Tagoloan II 10 2.7
Tamparan 12 3.2
Tugaya 8 2.1
Taraka 12 3.2
Tubaran 13 3.4
Wao 5 1.3
Total 377 100.0
Most of the rido happened in 2004 (86 cases), 1994 (46 cases), 2002 (36
cases, and 2003 (33 cases). National and local elections held in May 2004 ap-
parently contributed to the larger number of rido incidents that year.
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TABLE 2. Year Rido Started
Year rido started Frequency Percent
1994 46 12.2
1995 25 6.6
1996 25 6.6
1997 25 6.6
1998 30 8.0
1999 16 4.2
2000 23 6.1
2001 32 8.5
2002 36 9.5
2003 33 8.8
2004 86 22.8
Total 377 100.0
Causes of Rido
The six major causes of rido as found by this study were politics (52 cases),
land disputes (45 cases), pride/maratabat (28 cases), retaliation (27 cases),
accident (26 cases), and drug related cases(25 cases).
According to some key informants and the participants to the valida-
tion seminar, the number of rido created by political rivalry significantly
increased when the barangays were given ira (internal revenue allotment)
by virtue of the Local Government Law. Prior to the granting of ira, few
wanted to run for barangay office. Today, they say, brothers and cousins
fight for these elective posts and even go to the extent of killing their own
relatives due to the amount of money involved.
In the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (armm) to which La-
nao del Sur and Marawi City belong, elections are supposed to be held every
year: (1) national and local elections for President, Vice President, senators,
congressmen, governors and mayors; (2) election for barangay officials, (3)
election for armm governor, vice governor and assemblymen, and (4) the
mid (presidential) term elections for congressmen, provincial and munici-
pal officials. One can just imagine the number of conflicts created by these
“democratic exercises.” When not properly addressed, most of the conflicts
escalate to full-blown rido and deaths for many Moros.
The Meranaos have their own concept of land ownership heavily in-
fluenced by Islam. For this reason, many land owners do not bother to title
their land under Philippine laws. As the old folk pass away and the new gen-
eration inherit the land, disputes over ownership and boundaries increase.
There are cases where an educated family or clan member placed com-
munal land under his own name precipitating intra-clan feud. The conflict
between the Meranao concept of land ownership and that of the Philippine
RIDO V2.indd 79 10/4/2007 8:22:57 AM

government “legal system” was the second major cause of conflict and rido
in Lanao del Sur.
Affront to maratabat as a cause for rido may range from unintended
verbal insult, perceived disrespect, slight injury, and even accident. The as-
sessment of whether or not maratabat was offended lies entirely on the
evaluation of the presumably aggrieved individual, his family or kinsmen.
The problem of illegal drugs (particularly methampethamine chloride
or “shabu”) is sometimes not acknowledged by political leaders. But it is
public knowledge that some Meranos became rich from this illegal busi-
ness and that the number of young drug users is growing. Some of the
field researchers first labeled this cause of rido as “illegal business,” but later
admitted that they were referring to drugs-related activities.
Potential drug-related rido cannot be mediated by the traditional, reli-
gious and political leaders, and friends or relatives because the conflicting
parties are hiding the facts of their conflict. Facts are usually known after the
conflict develops into a full-blown rido or when a member of one party is
killed. These cases often involve non-payment of debt, non-delivery of paid
merchandise, stealing from a business partner, killing under the influence
of drugs, and kidnapping to force delinquent partners to pay or to force a
“pusher” to change “supplier.”
As for “retaliation” as cause for rido, 27 out of the 377 cases happened
prior to 1994. The revenge took place within the time frame of this study
(1994-2004) and was, therefore, listed as separate rido in the enumeration.
TABLE 3. Causes of Rido
Causes of Rido Frequency Percent
Accident 26 6.9
Accusation 22 5.8
Business 8 2.1
Crime Against Women 24 6.4
Drug Related 25 6.6
Extortion 2 0.5
Family Feud 8 2.1
Gambling 9 2.4
Grudge 19 5.0
Kidnapping 5 1.3
Land Dispute 45 11.9
Misconduct 11 2.9
Money Matter 22 5.8
Murder 19 5.0
Politics 52 13.8
Pride 29 7.7
Retaliation 27 7.2
Robbery 18 4.8
Trespassing 5 1.3
Carnapping 1 0.3
Total 377 100.0
RIDO V2.indd 80 10/4/2007 8:22:58 AM

A total of 798 people died in these 377 cases of rido, 104 injured, but only
eight were imprisoned out of the 82 cases filed in court (refer to Tables 4, 5
and 6). Only 64 out of the 377 ridos were settled, 35 inactive, 10 suspended
while the rest remain active.
It can be inferred from these figures that majority of the Meranao (78%)
do not report to the government authorities the deaths of their relatives due
to rido. They prefer to put the “law” in their own hands because: (1) the ag-
grieved families who file cases in court are viewed as “weak and cowardly”
by the community and (2) they do not subscribe to penalties prescribed by
Philippine criminal laws on cases of murder and homicide.
A public prosecutor (fiscal) opined that some Meranao only file court
cases in order to feel that the government is on their side. The filing of the
case also prevents the aggressor from roaming around with his firearms and
makes him easier to locate. Others do not file cases, according to the fiscal,
due to the long and tedious process, distance from the courthouse, and
expense required to pursue the case.
TABLE 4. Number of persons killed
Number of persons killed Frequency Percent
1 232 61.5
2 72 19.1
3 23 6.1
4 20 5.3
5 6 1.6
6 5 1.3
7 4 1.1
8 3 0.8
9 1 0.3
10 1 0.3
11 2 0.5
12 2 0.5
13 2 0.5
14 2 0.5
17 1 0.3
25 1 0.3
Total 377 100
TABLE 5. Number of Casualties by Municipality
Municipality Frequency Percent
Marawi City 20 2.5

Bubong 6 0.75
Buadi-Puso Buntong 8 1.0
Bumbaran 5 0.63
Butig 73 9.15
Balindong 16 2.01
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(CONT’D) TABLE 5. Number of Casualties by Municipality
Balabagan 62 7.77
Binidayan 24 3.01
Bayang 7 0.88
Ditsaan-Ramain 5 0.63
Dumalondong 21 2.63
Ganassi 18 2.26
Kapai 13 1.63
Kalanogas 38 4.76
Kapatagan 6 0.75
Lumba-Bayabao 5 0.63
Lumbac-a Unayan 7 0.88
Lumbayanague 12 1.5
Lumbatan 14 1.75
Masiu 19 2.38
Mulondo 14 1.75
Maguing 19 2.38
Marantao 32 4.01
Madalum 37 4.64
Madamba 18 2.26
Marogong 8 1.0
Malabang 24 3.01
Poona Bayabao 30 3.76
Piagapo 10 1.25
Pualas 31 3.88
Pagayawan 43 5.39
Saguiaran 29 3.63
Tagoloan II 14 1.75
Tamparan 29 3.63
Tugaya 8 1.0
Taraka 26 3.26
Tubaran 20 2.51
Wao 5 0.63
Total 798 100
TABLE 6. Number of Persons Injured
Number of persons injured Frequency Percent
1 24 6.4
2 13 3.4
3 11 2.9
4 4 1.1
5 1 0.3
None 324 85.9
Total 377 100.0
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TABLE 7. Number of Persons Imprisoned
Number of persons imprisoned Frequency Percent

1 8 2.1
None 369 97.9
Total 377 100.0
Findings on the 200 cases studied

Socio-Demographic Profile of the Assailants
The average age of the assailants was 36 years old. The data also showed
that some of the assailants appeared either too young (13 years old) or too
old (73) to have been involved in killings. Three assailants were aged 10-15
while seven assailants were 58 and above. There was only one woman (a wife
that retaliated for the death of her husband) among the 200 assailants.
Most of the assailants had high school and/or college education (Table
8). Majority of them were married, had one to 15 children, and were self-
employed. Around 47% of the assailants had resided in the city. At least 44
out of the 200 assailants were identified with vices like drug use, alcoholism,
and that 35 of them were having other rido.
The Victims
The victims’ average age was 37 years old. Some of the younger ones
were victims of vehicular accidents that respondents believe could turn
into major conflict if not resolved immediately. Eleven of the victims were
women while the remaining 189 were men.
Traditionally, women and children are not appropriate target for retali-
ation. This unwritten code, however, seems to be eroding. Though some of
the children and women victims died from accidents, closer analysis of the
data reveals that they were victims of rape, accusation, robbery, jealousy
and, most importantly, their assailants were illegal drug users.
The victims’ number of children and occupations closely resemble
those of the assailants. There are slight differences in education, marital
status, and experience in residing in cities, vices and involvement in other
rido. Table 8 below indicates these differences.
TABLE 8. Comparative Profiles of the Assailants and Victims
Assailants Victims Difference

Education
Easter/Arabic 5 2 3
Masters Degree 1 1
Some College/College Graduate 34 37 3
Some High School/ H.S. Graduate 65 56 9
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(CONT’D) TABLE 8. Comparative Profile of the Assailants and Victims
Some Elementary/Elementary Graduate 56 62 6

No Schooling 39 43 -4
Marital Status
Married 161 154 7
Single 33 44 -11
Widower/Separated
Occupation
Government Employee 32 30 2
Private Employee 10 8 2
Self-Employed 106 105 1
Unemployed 52 57 -5
Have Resided in the City?

Yes 93 81 12
No 107 119 -12
Other Information
Has Vices 44 25 19
Criminal 2 1 1
Mentally Ill 2 2
No other Information 152 174 -22
Have Other Rido?

Yes 35 26 9
No 165 174 -9
It can be discerned from this comparison that the assailants were more
educated and possibly affluent as indicated by their having spent time in
cities. They seemed to be used to rido and indulged in vices prohibited by
Islam and other religions.
This finding is very disturbing, as it suggests that the more educated and
economically better off are the ones indulging in rido. This phenomenon
can only be explained by the Meranao concept of maratabat. As perceived by
some Meranaos and Riemer (1970), maratabat is related to “status and rank
sensitivity.” As the wealth and education of a Meranao increases, his sense of
his own maratabat also increases. Incidents that a Meranao may not regard
as offensive to his maratabat while he is poor or uneducated may assume
different proportions once the individual goes up the social ladder.
Consequences of Rido on the Family, Clan, and the Community

When a family member kills someone accidentally or otherwise, the other
immediate member of that family automatically becomes a target for re-
taliation and reacts accordingly. Most potential targets prefer to stay away
RIDO V2.indd 84 10/4/2007 8:22:59 AM

from the conflict by changing residence. This is one of the reasons why
every densely populated area of the country has a “pocket” of Meranao
residents (Matuan, 1985). Some prepare for the worst while a considerable
number make their moves for negotiation and settlement. In this study,
those related to both conflicting parties said that they were not affected
while a quarter of the respondents claimed that their economic activities
were seriously affected.
TABLE 9. Consequences of rido to the Assailant’s family
Frequency Percent
Out-migration 63 31.5
Neutral Due to Equal Relation to Conflicting Parties (Sokhodan) 36 18.0
Preparing Defense for Possible Attack 20 10.0
Preparing for Settlement 35 17.5
Provide Support to Family Member in Trouble 21 10.5
Economic Activities Seriously Affected 25 12.5
Total 200 100.0
TABLE 10. Consequences of rido to the clan of the assailant
Frequency Percent
Provide Support to Relative in Trouble 43 21.5
Initiating Settlement 27 13.5
Limited Movements 32 16.0
Out-migration 43 21.5
Economic activities affected 27 13.5
Total 200 100.0
TABLE 11. Consequences of rido to the community
Frequency Percent
Not Affected Due to Distant Relation to Conflicting Parties and not target for retaliation 53 26.5
Trying to help in the settlement 26 13.0
Alarmed 65 32.5
Total 200 100.0
TABLE 12. Comparative Figures on Consequences of Rido to the Family, Clan and Community
Consequences Family Clan Community

F % F % F %
Out-Migration 63 31.5 43 21.5
Sokhodan 36 18 28 14 56 28
Preparing Defense 20 10
Preparing Settlement 35 17.5 27 13.5 26 13
Support Family Member/Relative in Trouble 21 10.5 43 21.5
Economic Activities Affected 25 12.5 27 13.5
Limited Movements 32 16
Alarmed/Not Affected 118 59
Total 200 100 200 100 200 100
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In comparing Tables 10, 11 and 12, it is apparent that a larger percentage
of close relatives were affected and were forced to leave, or voluntarily left,
their hometowns (32%) while only 22% of distant clan relatives chose to
move out. In the community level, majority (59%) claimed that they were
not affected.
It is also apparent in the comparative table that only the immediate
family members of the assailant prepared for defense. More family mem-
bers, compared to clan, helped initiate settlement but more clan members
offered moral support to a member in trouble.
TABLE 13. Moves Undertaken by the Relatives of Assailant When a Conflict Becomes a Full-blown Rido
Frequency Percent
Buy more firearms 68 34.0
Neutral (related to both sides) 23 11.5
Initiating settlement 58 29.0
Migrated to other places 51 25.5
Total 200 100.0
Municipalities, Families or Individuals More Prone to Rido

Some respondents named more than one municipality when asked about
the municipalities more prone to rido. Table 14 below shows that 25 mu-
nicipalities were identified by respondents as more prone to rido. Of these
municipalities, Butig, Masiu, Pualas, Bayang and Lumayanague were at the
apex of the list with frequencies ranging from 21 to 38.
TABLE 14. Places in Lanao more prone to rido
Frequency Percent
Bumbaran 1 0.4
Binidayan 1 0.4
Dumalundong 1 0.4
Ganassi 1 0.4
Madamba 1 0.4
Pagayawan 1 0.4
Saguiaran 1 0.4
Lumba-Bayabao 2 0.8
Kapai 3 1.2
Marantao 5 2.0
Tubaran 6 2.4
Maguing 7 2.8
Malabang 7 2.8
Tugaya 7 2.8
Balabagan 8 3.2
Marogong 9 3.6
Kalanogas 12 4.8
Lumbatan 15 6.0
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(Cont’d) TABLE 14. Places in Lanao More Prone to Rido
Lumbayanague 21 8.4
Bayang 25 10.0
Pualas 27 10.8
Masiu 32 12.9
Butig 38 15.3
Total 249 100.0
When asked about the places that have individuals with more than one
rido, respondents identified 20 municipalities. Two municipalities (Masiu
and Butig) were at the top with frequencies of 13 and 7, respectively. The
other municipalities identified had frequencies from 1 to 3.
TABLE 15. Places of Individuals with More than One Rido
Frequency Percent
Balabagan 1 0.4
Binidayan 1 0.4
Lumba-Bayabao 1 0.4
Maguing 0.4
Pagayawan 1 0.4
Tugaya 1 0.4
Tubaran 1 0.4
Marawi City 2 0.8
Mulondo 2 0.8
Lumbayanague 3 1.2
Lumbatan 3 1.2
Marantao 3 1.2
Marogong 3 1.2
Malabang 3 1.2
Pualas 3 1.2
Butig 7 2.8
Bayang 7 2.8
Masiu 13 5.2
Total 60 24
Respondents, reluctantly, identified 32 families and/or individuals in

18 localities (17 municipalities and Marawi City) involved in more than
one rido.
However, the responses to these three questions (municipalities more
prone to rido, places of individuals with more than one rido, and names of
individuals/families with more than one rido) should be considered highly
subjective. It is possible that the respondents excluded their own munici-
palities and relatives. Still, no municipality was found to have less than five
rido. One may assume that there is at least one family with more than one
rido in every municipality of the province.
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The rising number of individuals or families with more than one rido
is one of the effects of the Moro rebellion (since 1970) against the Philip-
pine government. Some of the young men who joined the rebellion and
became “commanders” through their exploits were considered heroes of
their families, clans, and communities. To maintain their status, these men
keep sizeable amount of firearms and ammunition.
These are the men usually summoned by relatives in times of conflict. Be-
cause big families have more members of this sort, it is not surprising that there
are many casualties when two big families clash especially during elections.
Personalities Involved in Attempts to Settle Rido

The respondents were asked about individuals who tried to mediate/resolve
the conflict, the status of these mediators in their communities, their rea-
sons for interceding, whether other mediators followed when the first me-
diator failed and the reason why no one tried to resolve the conflict. These
questions were addressed to the respondents when the rido was still at the
stage of conflict (no death yet) and when the conflict became a full-blown
rido. Table 16 shows the responses to these questions.
TABLE 16. Comparison of Mediators Profile
Still at stage of conflict Full-blown rido

Are there individuals who tried to settle the rido?
Yes 51 115
No 117 85
Don’t know 32
Mediator status in the community.
Educator 2 14
Politician 27 62
Religious Leader 3 10
Traditional Leader 19 49
Military/PNP 2
No answer 63
Special reason of the mediator to resolve the rido
To stop the feud 8 60
For peace and order 15 45
Related to both parties (sokodan) 18 41
Political reason 8 54
No answer 2
If failed, are there other mediators who interceded?
Yes 2 44
No 49 156
Reason why no mediator tried to resolve the conflict.
Political reason 26
Wanted revenge 28
Big families involved 38 21
Parties involved are close relatives 20 6
No common mediator (that can be trusted by both side) 11
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(Cont’d) TABLE 16. Comparison of Mediators Profile
Aggressor did not cooperate 8

Both parties did not cooperate 34
The case is in court 58
Dormant/inactive rido 29
No answer 77
It can be gleaned from Table 16 that the mediators entered the fray
once a serious rido had erupted. Most of the mediators were politicians,
traditional leaders, religious personages, and educators. In our experience, a
rido cannot be settled by a single mediator. Rather, the lead mediator invites
others to join him. The lead person is acknowledged for his status, influence,
and the money he can contribute to the settlement.
Most mediators intervene in order to save lives—a sacred task under
Islam. Other reasons for mediation given by respondents include politics,
love for peace, and blood relation to both parties in conflict.
Processes and Methods Employed to Settle Rido

Out of the 200 cases studied, 44 were settled. The year 2004 registered the
highest number of settled rido (9) but also recorded the highest number of
rido created. Amicable settlement was pursued by the mediators through
the igma ago taritib, payment of blood money and convincing the aggressor
family to imprison the culprit. Placing the assailant in prison softens the
stand of the aggrieved family and can eventually lead to the beginning of
negotiation/mediation.
With the exception of imprisonment, the other settlement procedures
are inter-related. All negotiations in Meranao society use the igma and taritib
to reach agreement for the payment of blood money. To justify such pay-
ment, the negotiator tries to establish the fact that the killing was accidental
or in self-defense. Otherwise, the Islamic and Meranao rule for purposive
killing (murder) is kitas or killing the assailant with the permission of his
family and relatives.
Despite the payment of blood money by the aggressor family/clan, the
assailant may still have to serve a prison term if so demanded by the ag-
grieved. This is an example of how the traditional and government penalties
can be combined. On the other hand, the victim’s family/clan is forced to
desist from retaliating.
In this study, it is interesting to note that even when the conflicting par-
ties signed a covenant, the details of the terms were kept secret. What was
made public were the promises of the parties to cease hostilities, bury their
RIDO V2.indd 89 10/4/2007 8:23:00 AM

differences, strengthen their blood relationship, and respect the terms of
their “unwritten” agreement. The respondents did not mention intermar-
riages between children of the parties as a means to “seal” the rido. This was
a practice in the past. From the 1950s to 80s several celebrated cases of rido
in Lanao were put to rest by intermarriages. The intermarriage can be done
two ways: (1) the son of the assailant marrying the daughter of the victim
or vice versa and (2) double marriage with each side offering a male and a
female to be married off to their counterparts from the other party.
Participants at the validation seminar pointed out that intermarriages
are still employed to settle rido. However, the families involved no longer
make public such purpose for fear of rekindling past feud. This becomes
a “public secret” shared by the members of the conflicting clans, but un-
known to outsiders.
Conditions and Processes that Make Rido Active, Inactive,

Settled or Suspended
Generally, a rido can only be suspended for weeks or months upon the
intercession of the community leaders or other recognized leaders like the
mayor, governor or congressman. When the agreed time of “ceasefire” lapses
without a settlement, the rido becomes active and the aggrieved party starts
to hunt his enemies. There were cases known to this researcher when a rido
remained “dormant or inactive.” Such cases cannot be deemed “suspended”
since there are no agreements to cease hostilities. However, the parties do
not harm each other because:
• Both sides suffered casualties of at least equal social rank.
• The aggrieved party is less influential, poor, and have fewer firearms.
Retaliating in such case will only do more harm to the family or clan. Some-
times, they invoke “forgiveness” as a means of saving face.
• When the aggrieved party or the recognized leader of the family
truly loves peace and delegates to the mercy of Allah the appropriate
judgment (on certain condition like banishment of the assailant from
the community).
Reasons for Failure in Settling Rido

When the conflict became full-blown rido, 44 out of the 200 cases were
successfully settled. Later the other mediators who entered the scene were
able to settle another 20 rido. For the unsettled rido, the following reasons
were cited:
• Both parties did not cooperate.
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• One or both of the parties had no recognized leader.

• The blood money was not raised.
• The aggrieved party was bent on retaliation.
• The aggressors were hard headed.
• Instigation by a third party for the non-resolution of the rido for
his/their own advantage (e.g. in politics).
• The mediators were biased.
The process and methods undertaken by the subsequent mediators
were similar to those of their predecessors. They pursued amicable settle-
ment by invoking the igma ago taritib and worked for the payment of blood
money and imprisonment of the assailant when demanded and/or accept-
able to the aggrieved party.
Mediation in the Meranao society is purely voluntary. Those who me-
diate do so out of concern for the conflicting parties and the community.
However, there are also mediators who enter the scene due to the request of
either party and those who mediate out of personal interest.
Conditions and Processes That Lead to Retaliation

The different mediators settled a total of 64 rido at different times. But a
considerable number of the 200 rido studied claimed more than one life.
Those who retaliated include:
Son 5
Nephew 1
Cousin 4
Brother 7
Father 1
Wife 1
Brother in Law 1
Total 20
It is a common knowledge among the Meranao that when retaliation

occurs, it is much easier to settle the rido, especially if the casualties on both
sides have equal social standing. In this situation, a kandori (thanksgiving
feast) usually tendered by the community (if the parties are from the same
village) is sufficient to close the rido.
The circumstances that lead to retaliation include the following:
• Kasosongkai, kambobono o mga bae — Women’s quarrel that remind
the aggrieved party why they were not able to retaliate.
• Pride or maratabat — The aggrieved party considers rido as a perma-
nent mark of shame if one is unable to retaliate.
• Daa a phamamasadan — When no one intercedes.
RIDO V2.indd 91 10/4/2007 8:23:01 AM

• Kiambabaan — When the aggrieved family sincerely believe that they
are not a party to the conflict.
• Daon so kazabar — When there is no forgiveness.
• Misinterpretation of Islamic teaching
• Kapangondoi — When somebody encourages the aggrieved party to
retaliate.
• Miakasilai so rido — When the victim is a wrong target.
• Di pakaataon, di pakanganganinen — When the aggrieved party feels
that the aggressor completely ignored the formers’ rights.
• When the time to retaliate becomes appropriate.
• When the economic status of the aggrieved party improves.
• Katopo — Retaliation is committed to involve other relatives in the
rido contrary to their wishes.
• Hopelessness, idleness — When an insignificant member of the fam-
ily decides to retaliate to improve his image and status within the family.
Summary of Findings
This study came up with the following findings:
1. There were a total of 337 rido in Lanao del Sur from 1994 to 2004.
Most of these rido happened in 1994, 2003, and 2004. A total of 798 people
died in these ridos, 104 were injured, 82 cases were filed in court but only
eight assailants were imprisoned. More than 50% (22 out of the 40 political
units of the province) had 10 or more ridos. Marantao and Butig registered
the highest frequency at 26 and 17, respectively. However, the 26 rido in Ma-
rantao claimed 32 lives while Butig lost 73 lives.
2. The six major causes of rido were (1) politics, (2) land dispute, (3)
pride and/or maratabat, (4) retaliation, (5) accidents, and (6) illegal drugs.
3. The youngest assailant was 13 years old while the oldest was 73. Some
of them were identified with vices like use of illegal drugs and alcoholism
and 35 out of the 200 assailants were involved in other rido. In addition,
these assailants were educated and economically well-off as indicated by
their experience of city life.
4. The casualties of these rido were mostly male, 11 women, and
some children.
5. The usual consequences of rido to the family, clan or community
were (1) transfer of residence, (2) economic dislocation, (3) forced support
to the family member in trouble, and (4) involvement in the negotiation for
the resolution of the conflict.
6. A total of 21 municipalities consistently appeared as more prone to
rido. Butig, Pualas, Marantao and Balabagan were on top of the list.
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7. The 32 individuals and/or families identified with more than one

rido were mostly connected to clans competing for the political control of
18 municipalities in the province.
8. Those who try to settle rido were mostly politicians, traditional lead-
ers, educators, and religious leaders. There were also the council of elders
who tried to settle rido in the municipal, city, and provincial levels. Even
the Marines established a peace and reconciliation council in collaboration
with the bodies cited.
9. Not a single rido was settled by the Philippine justice system. Some
assailants were imprisoned on their family’s volition as part of the settle-
ment but not as an act of the state authority. All of the rido settled went
through the igma and taritib or the traditional way of the Meranao heavily
influenced by Islam.
10. Rido among Meranaos is either active or inactive. It can only be sus-
pended for a specified time upon the intercession of influential and trust-
worthy mediators. Rido can be inactive when the casualty on both parties
are of equal number or social standing, when the aggrieved party is eco-
nomically unable to retaliate or when the aggrieved family delegate to the
mercy of Allah the appropriate judgment on condition that the assailant is
banished from the community.
11. Aside from the non-cooperation of the parties involved in the rido,
the reasons for non-resolution includes: failure to raise blood-money, pecu-
liar interpretation of maratabat, insistence on retaliation, and one or both of
the parties have no recognized leader who can represent the family or clan
in the negotiation and serve as guarantor.
Conclusion
1. Lanao del Sur is indeed saturated with rido caused by politics, land
disputes, maratabat, accidents, and drugs. The situation is aggravated by
frequent elections, the proliferation of loose firearms, and the prevailing
belief or “value system” that a family or clan must have a “robust member”
(one who has killed other people) to earn the respect of society.
2. Along with the dearth of economic opportunities in the province,
rido is one of the “push factors” that encourage Meranao to leave Lanao del
Sur.
3. The number of rido and casualties noted by this study suggests that
no municipality in the province is free from rido. They only differ in number
and intensity. Those individuals/families more prone to rido have joined the
Moro Rebellion in the past and earned prestige and status in the process.
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4. The transition from the traditional to legal authority system in
Meranao society also changed the mediation role of the traditional lead-
ers. While the traditional leaders used to be the main mediators, they now
play a supportive role to the politicians who have the monetary means to
settle rido.
5. The indifference of the Meranaos to the Philippine legal authority is
exemplified by the fact that majority of the aggrieved parties did not report
the deaths of their kin to the authorities. In addition, not a single rido was
solely resolved by the Philippine legal system. Even those assailants who
went to prison did so on the volition of their relatives and not due to the
action of proper authorities.
These observations indicate that the Meranao igma and taritib re-
mains the most effective way of resolving rido. However, it is possible to
combine the traditional ways and the Philippine legal system as seen in
the operation of the different councils of elders in the municipal, city, and
provincial levels.
6. Rido in the Meranao perspective is either active or inactive. It can
be suspended for a while upon the intercession of mediators but becomes
active again if a resolution is not reached.
7. The most difficult rido to settle is when one or both parties have no
recognized leader(s) who can be approached by mediators to serve as guar-
antor that his family or clan will abide by the settlement agreement.
8. Retaliations especially on cases of settled rido can be avoided if
Meranao society can refrain from reminding the aggrieved party to “erase
the dirt on his/his face.” This is hard to eradicate in social interaction but
it is possible.
Recommendations
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are
put forward:
1. In Lanao del Sur, police authority does not seem to exist. The national
leadership must monitor the performance of the local government units es-
pecially as regards the proliferation of loose firearms, drug trafficking, and
crimes like murder, homicide, and rape. The prevailing perception that only
the dead are apprehended by the military and police must be changed. It
is also ironic that rewards are being offered and publicized for the arrest of
criminals in Luzon and the Visayas. In Mindanao, similar effort was directed
only to the Abu Sayyaf members.
2. Considering the number of rido and the number of people dy-
ing from election-related incidents, the Congress of the Philippines must
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seriously consider synchronizing national and local elections. If possible,

only one election should be held every three years not only in Lanao del
Sur but all over the country.
3. Since igma and taritib remain the most effective processes in resolv-
ing conflict, the traditional and religious leaders must be supported through
exposure to the mediation ways of other cultures.
4. To avoid land disputes, the government must device a scheme to ac-
commodate the Meranao concept of land ownership, including communal
ownership or stewardship.
5. The Meranao concept of maratabat must be transformed from mere
concern over “saving face,” or protecting one‘s dignity or status to encom-
pass other aspects of social living. While maratabat is usually invoked in the
negative manner of avenging a death in the family, it can also be invoked
in a positive manner. Just as in the case of the Malaysians or Japanese, the
Meranao can also invoke maratabat as a way of improving industry and
work ethic. It is in this regard that secular schools, madaris, ngos, POs, and
government workers can help reorient the pride of the modern Meranao
towards a striving for peace and development.
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Saber, Mamitua, Mauyag Tamano and Charles Warriner. “The Maratabat of the
Maranao.” The Maranao, eds. Mamitua Saber and Abdullah Madale. Manila:
Solidaridad Publishing House. Published in 1960 in Philippine Sociological
Review.
Sumaguina, Ismael B. “Distributed Political Competence And Stress on Village Sys-
tem: The Case of Three Maranao Village Communities In Muslim Mindanao.”
Ph.D Dissertation, Univ. of the Philippines, 1988.
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E ch a p ter f o u r
Management of Clan Conflict and Rido

Among the Tausug, Magindanao, Maranao,
Sama, and Yakan Tribes
Ofelia L. Durante, Norma T. Gomez, Ester O. Sevilla, and Howard J. Mañego
and Notre Dame University Research Center
T HE PROPENSITY of national media to sensationalize stories of vio-

lence in Mindanao has projected it as a “zone of conflict,” despite the
fact that armed hostilities occur mostly in southwestern and central Min-
danao. Since these areas, particularly the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (armm), contain large segments of the Moro population, the
conflict is often attributed to or associated with the Moro secessionist
movement. Gutierrez (1995:129) notes that Muslim Mindanao is known
for its troubled history. Aside from the secessionist movement and feuding
clans, private armed groups and colorful strongmen set against a back-
drop of poverty, underdevelopment, neglect, and national government
manipulation are the other major players in a region that appears to be
perpetually unstable.
Rido is only a part of a complex web of violence inflicted on Mindanao.
Given the differences in history, culture, and religion between Christians
and Muslims and the current armed struggle being waged by the Moros,
the national media—which operate on the principle that “bad news is good
news”—have come to feast on the killings and other crimes committed by
the Muslims. On the other hand, Christians who commit crimes are not
identified by their religion. Cagoco-Guiam (2000) asks: why is that norm
not applied when a Muslim is involved? In the same manner, the term rido
|| 97 ||
RIDO V2.indd 97 10/4/2007 8:23:03 AM

is used only when referring to Muslims, thereby creating the impression that
this is done only by Muslims.
In an interview with Romy Elusfa of Mindanews (10 November, 2004),
Gadzali Jaafar describes rido among Muslim families in Mindanao as a “so-
cial problem” which the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (milf) finds dif-
ficult to solve due to political rivalries and the proliferation of firearms.
The difficulty is compounded by politicians and other groups with vested
interest who exploit these conflicts. The milf vice chair for political affairs
claims that in the past, Muslims usually resorted to rido if heinous crimes
and other offenses would hurt the maratabat (honor) of any member of
their families, especially the women and children. This practice, which is
against Islam, has been very much exploited and has become so rampant
that even politicians consider their political battles as rido.
Today, rido has taken on the features of modern warfare. Large clans
with modern heavy weapons fight each other behind lines, standard trench-
es, and foxholes. The more serious clashes take place among the Tausug
(Gonzales, 1999). As a rule in any conflict, women, the elderly, and children
are treated as neutrals; violence against them is severely censured (Kiefer,
1972). According to Gutoc (2004), however, children and women are no lon-
ger exempt from the usually male-led vendetta these days. And some victims
are not even part of rido. Given the kind of warfare used by feuding families,
“the only ones who got hurt were the innocent and the powerless,” accord-
ing to Toto Paglas, the mayor of Datu Paglas in Maguindanao (Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism, 2002).
Sometimes, as in the incident in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, the mili-
tary and the milf would accuse each other of using inter-family feud for
waging war. Major Dickson Hermoso of the Government Committee on
the Cessation of Hostilities (ccch) says local politics and the dynamics of
paramilitary forces feed into the larger conflict between the government
forces and the milf (Canuday, 2004). In some instances, some rebels are
involved in the fray individually since they are residents of the area or have
relatives living there.
Family/clan feuds call for solutions quite different from those that are
supposed to resolve the centuries-old grievances of the Moros against the
national government. The problem should be viewed separately from the
Moro rebellion. According to Abinales (2004), this means viewing politics in
Muslim Mindanao as more than just a battle between the state and separat-
ists. Datu Zamzamin Ampatuan, executive director of the Office of the Mus-
lim Affairs, warns against linking clan conflicts with the bigger issue of the
Moro secessionist rebellion: “Unless we can look at these things as mere ‘local
RIDO V2.indd 98 10/4/2007 8:23:03 AM

Tausug, Magindanao, Maranao, Sama, and Yakan Tribes || 99
conflict’ and isolate the incident from the peace talks, there is a danger that the
peace negotiations will again be derailed” (Juliet Labog-Javellana, 2004).
Therefore we should try to better understand rido to prevent and man-
age such cases of violence for the sake of genuine peace and development
in Mindanao.
Methodology
One to two focus-group discussions with eight to 18 participants were con-
ducted in each of the municipalities identified in the study. There were 10
municipalities included in the study, selected according to the following
criteria: (1) areas with past or active clan conflicts; and (2) areas inhabited
by the following ethnic groups: Magindanao in Sultan Kudarat, Maranao
in Lanao del Sur, Tausug in Sulu, Yakan in Basilan, and Sama in Tawi-Tawi.
The participants of the focus group discussions were political, traditional,
and religious leaders; clan leaders involved in clan conflicts; and other com-
munity personages.
Interviews with key informants, such as the provincial governors, may-
ors, provincial commanders, members of the peace and order councils, muf-
tis, members of provincial reunification and reconciliation councils, and
other influential persons in the community were also conducted. Twelve to
18 interviews were conducted per province.
The Study Communities

Southern Philippines is home to three major groups of inhabitants referred
to as the island’s tri-people. The latest figures show that the indigenous
peoples or lumad comprise 5%; the Moros 28.23%; and the Christians, the
settlers and their descendants, 71.77% of Mindananao’s 16 million people
(Notre Dame Journal, 1995).
The indigenous peoples make up 18 tribes. These are the Ata, Bagobo,
Banwaon, Dibabawon, Bla-an, Bukidnon, Higaunon, Talaandig, Mamanwa,
Mandaya, Mangguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Subanon, Tagakaolo, T’boli,
Tiruray, and Ubo. Although most of them are Christians, of various Prot-
estant denominations, they seldom refer to themselves in their religious
identities (Rodil, 2001). Their ancestral domain encompasses 17 provinces
and 14 cities in Mindanao.
The term Moro refers to the 13 ethno-linguistic groups of Mindanao,
including the Maranao, Magindanao, Tausug, Sama, Sangil, Iranun, Kala-
gan, Kalibugan, Yakan, Jama Mapun, Palawani, Molibog, and Badjao. The
members of these groups are largely Muslim, except for the Kalagan and
RIDO V2.indd 99 10/4/2007 8:23:03 AM

Palawani who have many non-Muslims among them; the Badjaos are gener-
ally non-Muslim (Rodil, 2001). They are clustered mostly in the provinces
of Lanao del Sur, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Maguindanao, and Basilan. In the cities,
they are found in Marawi, Cotabato, and Zamboanga.
Prior to the occupation in 1913 by the Americans of the Bangsamoro
homeland, 98% of the population was Moro (Kamlian, 1999). Colonization
and migration, along with the later policies and programs of the national
government, have effectively bottled up the Moros to southwestern Mind-
anao (Gomez, 2000). Now, they constitute the majority only in the armm.
Based on official census, the Moro are the majority in the provinces of Sulu,
97%; Tawi-Tawi, 96%; Lanao del Sur, 94%; Maguindanao, 75%; and Basilan,
71% (Teves, 2004).
Sultan Palimbang
Kudarat Columbio
Lanao Kapatagan
del Sur Sultan Gumander
Basilan Lantawan
Sumisip
Sulu Jolo
Indanan
Tawi-Tawi Tandubas
South Ubian
It is in the armm that rido is reported to be widespread, especially
among the Maranao, Tausug, Magindanao, Yakan, and Sama ethno-lin-
guistic groups. Together, these tribes constitute the majority of the Moro
population.
Magindanao. The basin of the Cotabato River (Pulangi River, Rio
Grande de Mindanao) is the homeland of the Magindanao or “people of
the inundated or flooded plains.”
The Magindanao are subdivided into two principal groups: tao sa ilod
(people of the lower valley) and tao sa laya (people of the upper valley). The
tao sa ilod are concentrated in the areas around Cotabato City and extend to
south Dinaig. They are primarily sedentary and agriculturists. Traditionally,
RIDO V2.indd 100 10/4/2007 8:23:04 AM

they constituted the sultanate of Maguindanao based near present-day

Cotabato city.
The Tau-sa Laya are found mainly in the areas of Datu Piang and extend
south to Buluan. They practice semi-sedentary agriculture and grow corn
and upland rice. Traditionally, they constituted the rajahship of Buayan
based near present-day town of Datu Piang.
Gomez (2000) describes Maguindanao as a loose confederation of
independent datuships. The introduction of Islam by Kabungsuan had
not provided the uniting political force. The datus remained relatively
independent, with each datu acting as “sultan” in his own realm and vying
for supremacy in the area. Petty sultanates or datuships have a longer his-
tory in Cotabato and Sulu. Political fragmentation is much more pervasive
in Cotabato.
Maranao. The last major group to be Islamized is the Maranao. The
homeland of the Maranao is in the immediate vicinity of Lake Lanao.
Hence, their name which means “people of the lake.”
About 95% of the Maranao live in Lanao del Sur. The rest are found
mostly in the mountain towns of Lanao del Norte, a few in Bukidnon and
Maguindanao. As the most commercially oriented of all Moro groups, the
Maranao merchants can be found all over Mindanao and in key cities of the
Philippines. Linguistically, they are closely related to the Magindanao.
The Maranao have not developed a central organization similar to that
of the Tausug or the loose confederacy of datus as in the Cotabato river val-
ley. But recent studies on the Maranao reveal a structured and organized so-
cio-political organization. The pat-pa-pongampong ko ranao (the four states
of the lake: Masiu, Unayan, Bayabao and Balo-i) is believed to have been
founded by their traditional ancestors. The descendants of Indarapatra were
the earliest datus who concluded a taritib, a social contract or agreement
providing the bases for claiming rights and obligations by an individual or
groups of individuals within the group. Along with taritib, Maranao society
is said to be maintained by another institution, the maratabat.
All legitimate members of Maranao society must, in theory, be able
to find a place on a salsila/tarsila to indicate descent not only from Sharif
Kabunsuan but also from epical ancestors depicted in folk epics, the Radia
Indarapatra and the Darangen. The pat-a-pongampong is the embodiment
of Maranao society (Gomez, 2000).
Tausug. The term derives from tau meaning man and sug meaning cur-
rent and translates into “people of the current.” It refers to the majority
Islamized group in the Sulu archipelago, their language and culture.
The Tausug, according to Rasul (1979), are the most dominant of the
Moro ethnic groups and perhaps the bravest and the most proud. They
RIDO V2.indd 101 10/4/2007 8:23:05 AM

attained the highest political development of all the Muslims in Mindanao
and Sulu before the intrusion of the Westerners. For nearly 500 years, the
Tausug existed under one government, a sultanate ruled by a royal house
consecrated and recognized by the people. The Tausug are now spread across
Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga, Palawan, and the Davao provinces.
The language spoken by the Tausug is primarily adopted from the vo-
cabulary of the Tagimaha (the party of the protector) in whose locality the
sultan of Sulu lived and established the capital of the sultanate in Buansa/
Jolo. Rasul refers to this language of the inhabitants of Sulu as Bahasa Sug.
Like the Maranao, the Tausug before Islam already had datus or chiefs
with defined rights and privileges. The first sultan and the datus had to
come up with their own taritib or agreement which limited the political
power and right of the sultan over the datus and subjects.
Sulu society is made up of a hierarchy of ethnic groups. At the top are
the Tausug who are the most numerous. Only Tausug can become sultan
and datus. The other ethnic groups—Samal, Badjao, Yakan and Jama Ma-
pun—are at the fringes of the society (Gomez, 2000).
Yakan. The word Yakan denotes Dayak origin. Various Yakan folk stories
indicate that they are descendants of both migrating Dayak from Northeast
Borneo and Sama from Johore a long time ago. Thus, some Yakan identify
themselves as Sama-Yakan.
The Yakans are mostly found in the interior of Basilan island. They do
not normally live in compact villages but build their houses out of sight of
each other, scattered among their plots of farmland. They cultivate upland
rice, corn, and other crops.
Basilan’s history is related to that of the Sulu archipelago. The island
came under the rule of the sultanate of Sulu which became a center of power
in the 1700s. But the sultanate had little influence over the Yakan who lived
in the interior. They speak a language known as Bahasa Yakan which is a
variation of Samal Sinama or Siama and the Tausug language.
Sama. The native inhabitants of Tawi-Tawi call themselves Sama. Their
name is derived from sama-sama which means “togetherness.” Their lan-
guage is called Sinama. This is described by Kurais II (1979) as following the
pattern of the Malay when emphasizing a point or idea or description. A
term is doubled as in Malay jaui-jaui, meaning “far away.” The term eventu-
ally became “Tawi-Tawi,” the official name of the present province.
Tan and Resureccion (2001) distinguish two types of Sama people based
on where they live and their source of livelihood. These are the Sama Daleya,
who live on land, and the Sama Dilaut, who live on water.
The Sama Daleya are described as peace-loving. This nature predis-
poses them to avoid confrontation as a first recourse in resolving conflict.
RIDO V2.indd 102 10/4/2007 8:23:05 AM

However, they can be fierce fighters especially whey they are pushed beyond
endurance. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Sama Bangingi were the
masters of the southern sea who kept the Spanish colonizers at bay. The
Sama are also family-oriented.
The Sama came under the sultanate of Sulu. They had community gov-
ernments headed by datus who enforced local laws and customs and arbi-
trated local affairs. At the close of the 19th century, Tawi-Tawi was governed
by the datus and the officials of the Sultan. The inhabitants paid their taxes,
called hazil, to the sultan, who owned the land and sea resources, through
their datus.
Gowing and McAmis (1974) point to variations in Moro political or-
ganizations. There was no political authority embracing all of the Moro
groups, and each individual group was broken up into one or more princi-
palities. The Tausug were under the sultanate of Sulu which encompassed
North Borneo, Southern Palawan, and parts of the southern Mindanao
coast. The Magindanao were distributed among several sultanates but only
two were important: Maguindanao and Buayan. The Maranao, however,
were extremely segmented. In 1979, Forest listed no less than 33 sultanates
dividing up a population of 61,000 persons. On the other hand, groups such
as Samal, Yakan, and Badjao had no independent political existence and
were subject people.
Rasul (1979) clarifies that, despite their differences, all the Moro groups
are united by Islam, by the Arabic alphabet, and by the Shari’ah or Islamic
law founded upon the Holy Qur’an. They are all proud of their glorious
history; zealous of their hopes, dreams, and aspirations as a people; and
assertive of their politico-religious rights and liberties.
Rido and Development

A peace and development study conducted recently by the Philippine Busi-
ness for Social Progress (pbsp) shows the armm as the poorest region in
the country. Poverty incidence is 57.3% in contrast to the national aver-
age of 31.8%. Per capita annual income is about US$200 compared to the
national average of more than US$1000. In terms of the human develop-
ment index (hdi)—the UN’s standard in measuring quality of life—Sulu,
Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi are at the bottom five
of the country’s 78 provinces. Functional literacy rate in the armm is 61.2%
compared to the national average of 75.4%. In the 2000 nscb Family and
income survey (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 March 2003), Sulu posted the
highest poverty incidence with 63.2%.
RIDO V2.indd 103 10/4/2007 8:23:06 AM

A World Bank report (2003) also finds the armm to have the highest
poverty incidence and the lowest level of human development among the 16
regions in the Philippines. Poverty incidence (63%) is twice that of the nation
as a whole. The average household income is only 57% of the national average
and 85% of the country’s poorest households live in the armm.
In a workshop held in August 2004 in Davao City, the political leaders
and government workers of Sulu listed three major problems of their area
as poverty, unstable peace and order, and poor access to basic services.
Poverty is traced to low agricultural productivity and value addition,
unstable peace and order, and degradation of the environment.
Armed clashes between the Philippine military and groups like the
milf, the Abu Sayyaf continue. These clashes are exacerbated by feuds
between politicians and clans. This situation discourages investment and
entrepreneurship.
Poor access to basic services has resulted in low literacy, high infant
mortality, and lack of skilled manpower.
From the standpoint of the individual, rido limits freedom, destroys live-
lihood, and breeds insecurity. A respondent from Lanao del Norte, in a study
of B.R. Rodil (2000:144), describes rido thus:
Life with rido is being a prisoner in your house.

A person without rido can go anywhere. A person with rido is
like a carabao tethered to a tree. He can only move around as far as
the rope will allow.
When you have rido, you are never stable, you are like a prison-
er. You cannot work, you cannot go out of your house, you cannot
help anybody, because you are afraid your enemy may kill you.
Clan Conflicts/Rido and their Causes

Among the Maranao, Gonzales (2000) states that indigenous culture and
practice, history, current socio-economic issues, and the general violence
that characterizes modern politics in the area constitute the context and
basis for clan conflicts. He attributes the conflicts, especially those recent
clashes in Maranao areas, to land disputes dating back to the 1900s when
ancestral lands were given to the settlers from the Visayas and other parts of
Mindanao. Along with the resettlement program was introduced the Torens
titling system alien to the Maranao in those days. Another cause are the
electoral contests where losing parties or those who suspect foul play de-
clare rido against their opponents. The disputes become bloodier as former
Moro revolutionary commanders who have amassed weaponry and trained
manpower join the fray.
RIDO V2.indd 104 10/4/2007 8:23:06 AM

According to Gowing (1979), the Maranao Muslims are especially sen-

sitive to maratabat (from the Arab word martabbat which connotes rank,
status, and the respect that is due a particular rank or status). They have ex-
panded the meaning beyond the Arabic and have surrounded it with many
sociological and psychological overtones. From “rank,” the word has come
to imply sensitivity about rank; from “prestige,” seeking after prestige; from
“status,” status honor and status enhancement (Riemer, 1976, pp.6-8, as cited
by Gowing, 1979).
It is observed that maratabat is not specific to the Maranao. The other
Moro groups such as the Magindanao and the Tausug also manifest it. In
fact, all human beings practice maratabat in one form or the other. How-
ever, those who have studied the nature and practice of maratabat agree that
it is more valued by the Maranao than by any other group.
A Magindanao professor of Islamic Studies at Notre Dame University in
Cotabato City claims that maratabat is not as strong among his tribe as it is
with the Maranao. The practice of rido, which the Magindanao call lido, is
not indigenous to the group, says the professor, and might have been bor-
rowed from their Maranao neighbors.
Maratabat, according to Bula (as cited in Bartolome 2004), is one of the
major causes of conflict among the Maranao, as well as the cause of the non-
resolution of such conflicts. Baradas (as cited in Gowing, 1979) believes that
adherence to maratabat gives the Maranao the rationale for revenge.
In Basilan, the rivalry between the politically dominant Tausug and the
more numerous Yakan can be traced to disputes over land, election results,
and women (Gonzales, 2000).
Cases of Clan Conflict

The earliest case of rido in the study area dates back to the early 1970s. In
the 70s, around 13 cases of clan conflicts were reported, (Maranao, seven;
Sama, six); in the 1980s, eight cases were reported with six among the Ma-
ranao and two cases among the Sama; in the 1990s, 19 cases were reported
(Magindanao, seven; Sama, six; Maranao, six); and since year 2000, 14 cases
(three among the Magindanao, eight among the Maranao, and three among
the Sama). There were 34 cases with unspecified dates that reportedly oc-
curred among Yakan groups in Basilan. In Sulu study area, 39 cases of rido
were reported.
From these cases of clan conflicts, about 278 deaths were reported
through the fgds and kiis. The figures did not include the number of deaths
from Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu. In those areas, the respondents simply
stated that deaths could “no longer be counted.”
RIDO V2.indd 105 10/4/2007 8:23:06 AM

Of the cases reported, 43 have been settled (Magindanao, two; Maranao,
22; Sama, two; and Yakan, eight; 28 on going (Magindanao, eight; Maranao-
four; Tausug, two; and Yakan, 13); while 25 cases remain suspended/unre-
solved. The status of 30 other cases were unclear or could not be recalled
by respondents.
TABLE 1: Number of Cases, Year of Occurrence, Number of Deaths, and Status
Ethnic Year of Occurrence and # of Cases Number Status

Groups 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Year not of Deaths On-going Settled Suspended Status
specified unknown
Magindanao - - 7 3 - 65 8 2 - -
Maranao 7 6 6 8 - 213 4 22 1 -
Sama 6 2 6 3 1 Many 1 2 10 5
Yakan - - - - 34 Many 13 8 10 3
Tausug - - - - 39 Many 2 9 4 24
Causes of Conflict Among the Magindanao,

Maranao, Sama, Tausug, and Yakan
The causes of conflict among some Moro groups cited by earlier scholars
and researchers (Gonzales, 2000; Gowing, 1979; Bartolome, 2004) appear
to be basically the same as those identified by the respondents of this study.
The fgd participants mentioned outright landgrabbing, disputes over land
boundaries, inheritance, and land ownership. The key informants also re-
ferred to disputes over inheritance but noted that this problem was caused
mainly by the traditional practice of relying only on oral pronouncements.
Since land titles were unheard of in their traditional culture, the absence
of written documents on land ownership among Moros causes misunder-
standing, conflict, and eventually, if left unresolved, violence and rido.
Conflicts arising from political rivalry, prohibited drugs, proliferation
of firearms, and other causes were also reported. While maratabat seems
to be the main reason given by earlier scholars for the acts of vengeance
among the Moro, this factor was not stressed by many of the respondents
in the present study.
Aside from the Sama, all the ethnic groups pointed to politics and land
disputes as causes of conflict. The Maranao and Tausug respondents speci-
fied maratabat as the major cause of conflict in their communities. Other
causes cited were petty crimes (Magindanao and Yakan), possession of fire-
arms (Sama and Yakan), and drug-related crimes (Maranao and Sama).
Table 2 presents the causes of conflicts among the groups studied.
Respondents were not asked to rank these causes in terms of severity
or quantity. The data on the causes of clan conflict/rido were based on
RIDO V2.indd 106 10/4/2007 8:23:07 AM

the respondents’ recollection of events that took place in their respective

communities.
TABLE 2: Causes of Clan Conflict by Ethnic Group
MAGINDANAO MARANAO YAKAN TAUSUG SAMA

· land dispute ·land dispute · family problem (jealousy) · land dispute · political rivalry
· political rivalry · political rivalry · land dispute · political rivalry · business rivalry
· petty crimes · drug related crimes · political rivalry · possession · disgrace/shame
(theft, misunderstanding) · martabbat · petty crimes of firearms · possession
· mistaken identity/ · martabbat of firearms
accidental killing · disagreements “nadamay lang”
· nonpayment of debts /misunderstanding
· affiliation either to · elopement
ASG or to CAFGU
Land Disputes
The fact that only the Sama respondents of Tawi-Tawi failed to mention
any case of conflict involving land must be because the Sama are basically
sea dwellers who often require land only for burial.
Respondents from Basilan attributed land conflict to the absence of
titles. Since the Torens system of land titling was alien to the early inhabit-
ants of Mindanao, most transactions were done orally. Problems arose when
the people who made the agreements passed away. Even boundaries were
not specified, and that compounded the problem for the heirs.
In Lantawan, Basilan, a farmer was killed by another family who laid
claim to the farmer’s land. The victim’s son retaliated, killing several mem-
bers of the family.
Respondents in Indanan, Sulu also reported two cases arising from land
dispute. In one, the problem escalated because of rumors spread by a wom-
an belonging to one family. The other case was made more complicated by
the family of one of the victims killed in the crossfire. Here, two families
joined forces to fight the killer of the innocent bystander.
A Maranao mother in Kapatagan ordered her nephew to kill her own
son—the oldest among several children—who wanted to claim the land
owned by his mother and three sisters. Also, in the same municipality, nine
people lost their lives when one rebel leader tried to grab the land of a fol-
lower of another rebel leader. The problem remains unresolved and many
continue to fear for their lives.
Land dispute also led to a clan conflict in Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
When a man with three wives died, his children by different wives started
fighting over property he left behind. Those of the first and third wives
were the most adamant in claiming their share of the inheritance, alleging
that their father was partial to the children of his second wife who was his
RIDO V2.indd 107 10/4/2007 8:23:07 AM

favorite. Fortunately, the three mothers intervened, averting a conflict that
could have led to a big rido in Palimbang.
The opening of public lands to settlers from Luzon, Visayas, and other
parts of Mindanao has considerably diminished the ancestral domain of
the indigenous people. For this reason, they have become more watchful
and determined in keeping what is left of their land. To illustrate, the B’laan
residing in some parts of the municipality of Columbio, Sultan Kudarat
have complained of harassment by some members of rebel groups. The fgd
participants from the affected areas claimed countless casualties resulting
from this conflict.
In recent decades, as agribusiness became highly profitable, vast tracks
of land have been converted to plantations for export crops like banana,
cassava, and palm oil trees. Landowners who want to partner with multi-
national corporations have grabbed land in Sultan Kudarat, according to
some respondents. One key informant revealed that a local leader wants
to transform close to 1,500 ha into a banana plantation similar to that in
nearby Datu Paglas municipality.
Political Rivalry and Other Politics-Related Issues

Political positions have always been hotly contested in the Philippines.
To win office, many candidates engage in fraud and violence. This explains
the existence of private armies who kill hundreds of people.
In the study area, an infamous rivalry between a Magindanao and an
Ilocano politician has so far caused the death of many family members and
supporters. It has also split the two ethnic populations in the community.
Some respondents in fact suggested banning elections for all the trouble
they cause.
A case in a Basilan town involved a vice-mayor who accused the local
executive of withholding his salaries. The shooting transpired in the munic-
ipal hall itself and killed 19 people from both sides. It required P1.5 million
worth of blood money to settle the kuntara, the Yakan term for rido.
In one Sulu municipality, a clan conflict attributed to political rivalry
resulted in the burning of the whole town and the death of many people.
Other quarrels arose from the distribution of the internal revenue al-
lotment (ira) among the constituents. One barangay official in Tawi-Tawi
alleged that he was not given his share from the ira by the barangay captain.
This provoked a bitter conflict between the two officials. Some Kapatagan
respondents say the ira is the reason why many run for public office and
want to win at all cost. The use of the ira has created a host of problems.
Some fgd respondents in Kapatagan admitted that they use the IRA as a
source for “blood money” to settle feuds.
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The Commission on Elections (comelec), say respondents, has been

unable to ensure clean elections and to settle poll disputes that cause rido. As
in many other parts of the nation, if not the national government itself, lack
of political maturity partly explains why politics has become the “milking
cow” and the private preserve of a few families. Political dynasties dominate
both national and local polls. A family or clan entrenched in office, even at
the barangay level, will give up its turf over, literally, so many dead bodies.
One key informant sums up the state of the nation’s politics by describing
a politician who “is not ready and will not likely give up his new source of
status, personal glory, and livelihood.”
Proliferation of Small Firearms

Perhaps confrontations among political rivals and their respective fol-
lowers would not be as bloody if firearms are not so readily available. The
proliferation of guns was cited by the Moro groups in Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi as a cause of conflict but was not mentioned by the respondents
from Lanao del Sur and Sultan Kudarat.
Key informants in Basilan attribute the proliferation of firearms to the
conflict between the rebel groups and the government forces, which start-
ed during the martial law days. With the creation of paramilitary groups
like the Civilian Home Defense Force (chdf) and Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (cafgu), guns became plentiful. One key informant ob-
served that Basilan was peaceful in pre-mnlf days. Once arms fell into the
hands of irresponsible people, trouble began.
An interesting case in Sulu involved a man who, in attempting to pacify
two relatives fighting over a gun, ended up killing both of them. Two by-
standers were hit by stray bullets and also died instantly. The man himself
was shot dead by unknown parties. These were senseless deaths caused by
the presence of firearms. Fortunately, this incident did not lead to rido since
the family members settled the conflict before it could escalate.
Another case in Sulu saw an armed group in a plantation fire upon an-
other group, killing three men. The group retaliated and felled some from
the other side. It took years to end the feud whose cause remains unclear.
Use of Prohibited Drugs

In recent years, say respondents, prohibited drugs have caused crimes
that lead to death and rido. An fgd participant from Sultan Gumander,
Lanao del Sur, recounted an incident when a 14-year old cafgu member
killed three people in a shooting spree. The people suspected that the boy
(although already married at that time) was under the influence of drugs.
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Respondents in Tawi-Tawi cited indiscriminate firing of guns by users
of illegal drugs that killed innocent bystanders. There were also reported
cases of men “high” on drugs who hacked victims to death.
Fgd participants from Kapatagan also cited the case, mentioned earlier,
of a mother who ordered her nephew to kill her own son. It turned out that
the son was a drug addict who harassed his mother and the rest of the family
every time he was under the influence. Another drug addict killed a child
for no reason at all. “Nakursunadahan” or “tripping” was the term used.
The respondents were one in saying that drug use is now rampant even in
small barangays.
Killing in Defense of Maratabat

Maratabat was identified by two out of the five ethnic groups—the Ma-
ranao, and the Tausug—as a cause of conflict. The Magindanao, Yakan, and
Sama respondents did not refer to the term maratabat, although defense of
honor figured prominently in their narrations. Some of the cases attributed
to maratabat or its equivalent are the following:
• A man entered the house of a married woman who happened to be
home alone. When the husband arrived, he killed the “intruder.” The hus-
band justified his action as defense of his wife’s honor. Similar cases were
cited in the fgds conducted among the Maranao and Sama groups.
• Sama respondents also narrated the story of a stepfather who, un-
convinced of the sincerity of his stepdaughter’s suitor, killed the man. The
victim’s family retaliated. A rido broke out.
• An unmarried Sama woman was molested by a man (a case of katchaw).
This led the relatives of the woman to kill the man in defense of the family
honor. In Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, more than 40 men lost their lives due to
a case of rape. This conflict worsened because one party had the support of the
military while the other had an mnlf commander on their side.
• The relatives of a couple who eloped argued and people ended up
dead. For the Maranao, elopement is a serious breach of maratabat. There
are many stories of women killed by their own relatives because they eloped
with men the women’s parents did not approve of.
• A groom was not able to comply with the terms related to dowry/
bride price as tradition dictated. There was a heated argument, followed by
killing. In one case cited (Sulu), several houses were also burned. The clan
feud became so intense that it took five years to reconcile the two families.
• It is shameful for a family not to avenge a member who is killed. In
Sumisip, Basilan, the brother of a cafgu member was killed by an Abu
Sayyaf. Since the victim’s brother could not find the killer, it was the Abu
Sayyaf ’s brother who had to pay for the crime. At the time of the interview,
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the avenger expressed fear that he could also be targeted for revenge but he
declared his faith in God.
Other Causes of Feud

Other causes of clan feud identified by the respondents were: mistaken
identity, nalinguan/accidental killing, nonpayment of debt, cattle rustling,
affiliation with either the Abu Sayyaf Group (asg) or cafgu, nadamay lang
or people getting involved in the feud by giving or allowing sanctuary to
one of the parties, business rivalry, and misunderstanding. There were also
conflicts that stemmed from marital/family discords. Jealousy was cited as
one of the causes leading to family disharmony.
A key informant in the municipality of Sultan Gumander (now re-
named Picong) in Lanao del Sur narrated a case of rido that lasted more
than 10 years.
A prominent woman of barangay Nunungan was reportedly murdered
by someone from an influential clan in Malabang. Four big clans of the
woman united to exact revenge on the murderer who took refuge in Baran-
gay Liangan. More than 200 armed men attacked the barangay, killing many
innocent residents. In time the murderer settled his feud with the clans in
Nunugan and returned to Malabang.
Fearing reprisal from the Nunugan clans, hundreds of families from
Liangan evacuated to Malabang where they expected to be protected by the
man they had given sanctuary to. Unfortunately, life in Malabang proved to
be very difficult and many of the evacuees ended up as mendicants. Worse,
they had problems with the clan of their former ally. Upon learning about
the peace zone in Sultan Gumander (now Picong) and of the peace com-
mittee chairman, the leaders of the Liangan people approached Anton and
asked that they be allowed to return to their home village. They vowed to
abide by the rules of the peace zone. After more than ten years of “exile,” the
families returned home to live in peace.
Factors Leading to Escalation of Rido

Several conditions can cause the escalation of a rido. Clan conflicts are often
not confined to one area. Families involved in feuds can call on their rela-
tives in other places. Due to the proliferation of firearms in the communi-
ties, minor arguments can lead to murder. The targeting of clan members
not directly involved in the feud expands the circle of violence. Other kin
can also exacerbate conflicts through their words and actions.
Affiliation of clans with armed groups like the milf or cafgu also in-
tensifies certain conflicts.
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The slow response and/or failure of the local police to solve criminal
cases to the satisfaction of the aggrieved party can also lead to retaliation.
Sometimes, the authorities are seen as taking sides.
An aggrieved family is expected to uphold its maratabat by avenging
the killing of any member. After a homicide, the stockpiling of weapons and
calling to arms of relatives and allies begin on both sides.
The most celebrated cases of rido happened in Sultan Gumander in the
1970s when more than 100 people in Maladeg, Liangan, and Dimbawangan
died; in Palimbang, with some 45 deaths recorded in the 1990s; and in Tan-
dubas, with unspecified number of deaths which started in the 70s and is
still on-going.
Clan Conflict and Resolution Process

For generations people have attempted to deal with clan conflicts through
formal courts, violence, leaving the matter to God/Allah, or through ami-
cable or extra-judicial settlement.
Mediation and Amicable Settlement

Mediation is essentially a dialogue with the involvement of a third party
who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but merely as-
sist the involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settle-
ment of the issues in dispute. Apart from addressing substantive issues,
mediation is also a means of building trust between the conflicting parties.
In the mediation process, it is important that the parties involved respect
the mediator.
Islamic culture has a long tradition of mediation. In many pastoral soci-
eties in the Middle East, conflicts were often resolved through a community
meeting of elders. Mediation is very important especially in societies where
honor or pride is given very high regard. Face to face negotiations are often
extremely difficult. An intermediary is needed to separate the parties and
work out an acceptable arrangement that preserves honor for both sides.
Settlement of clan conflicts among the different ethnic groups covered
by this study most often than not made use of mediation. This strategy is
culturally accepted and found to be very effective. It is even recommended
by municipal clerks of court and the military. By presenting to the con-
cerned parties the different implications and consequences of pursuing the
case in court, people are encouraged to settle amicably.
There are, however, those who choose to resolve their conflict using the
judicial approach. A formal body or institutionalized authority (the court)
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intervenes. The judge determines who is right and who is wrong. The par-
ties have to hire lawyers. The outcome produces a winner, and a loser.
Amicable settlement, on the other hand, is done outside the courtroom.
Its aim is not to determine which party is wrong or right but to settle con-
flict in a manner acceptable to the contending parties. The result is a “win-
win” situation. This is the task of the mediator.
The Mediators
Mediators play a critical role in clan conflict resolution. Without them,
the wheels of amicable settlement cannot start rolling. The assistance of a
mediator is called for when the parties cannot communicate directly. Act-
ing as mediator entails great responsibilities. The mediator serves as link,
opener of the communication channel, and facilitator of the dialogue. On
top of this, the mediator is responsible for raising the required blood money,
if the offending party cannot pay. At times, the mediator ends up paying the
whole amount.
Accepting mediation does not imply that the parties would do whatever
the mediator says. It merely signifies their willingness to seriously consider
his/her suggestions. The kind of people needed in mediation has undergone
change in the course of time. In the past mediators were appointed by the
sultan. These were the panglima or religious leaders (maharaja among the
Sama). At present, although there are still religious leaders involved, many
cases are referred to an elected official, the barangay captain.
Mediator(s) can be an individual or a group. They include:
Relatives of conflicting parties. As much as possible, all of the ethnic
groups studied try to settle conflicts by calling on the intervention of family
members before seeking the assistance of an external mediator or referring
the case to the barangay captain. This is especially effective in conflicts be-
tween people related by affinity or consanguinity. The parties usually seek
out a close common relative to serve as mediator.
For the Sama of Tawi-Tawi, having common relatives as mediators is
founded on the concept of common pehak (eggs or gonads of a fish). The
saying da pehak kitam (we are of the same gonad) describes the essence of
communal unity. Family heads (kamattoahan) and senior relatives common
to conflicting parties, preferably those who command respect, are tapped as
go-betweens.
Both parties are advised to calm down and settle the conflict for the
following possible reasons:
• being magdanakan (member of the same nuclear family),
• being da laha (blood relatives),
• being da omboh (descended from same ancestor),
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• being da leod (member of the same clan),
• being da kaoman (belonging to the same community),
• being da pehak (member of the same ethnicity), and
• being magdanakan ma agama (brothers in faith).
Council of Elders. The community’s council of elders may also serve

as mediators. The council, which is organized whenever necessary, is com-
posed of religious leaders, imams, barangay officials, elderly and other re-
spected individuals. In the municipality of Sumisip in Basilan, an ordinance
refers all cases of clan conflict to the council of elders. At the barangay level,
it is the barangay captain that assumes the role of mediator. In some areas
like Maladeg, Lanao del Sur, it is the peace committee that takes the lead in
the mediation process.
Local Chief Executives. Local chief executives at various levels (mayors,
board members, governors) are effective mediators. They are sought out
especially when the parties involved are big and affluent clans. It is believed
that a conflict involving affluent clans requires someone of high office or
influence to resolve. Local executives do not only command respect but also
financial resources.
The involvement of local chief executives as mediators often implies the
use of government funds as blood money. The success of such mediation
also depends on the continuance in office of the executives who are commit-
ted to peace or the election of successors who are similarly inclined. There
are instances when initiatives of mayors to settle feuds were discontinued
by the new administration.
Military. Clan conflicts involving influential and “powerful” families
are very difficult to resolve since the parties are well armed and have many
supporters. In these situations, military intervention is the most practical
and effective way of resolving violent conflicts. This approach is relied upon
and often used in Sulu. Military intervention is deemed necessary to prevent
further bloodshed and restore normal economic activity. The involvement
of soldiers as mediators is premised on the fact that the military is far su-
perior to the feuding clans in terms of firepower, discipline, and combat
training and experience.
Women. Generally, women do not have key roles in clan conflict resolu-
tion. By tradition, they are not and should not be involved in conflict. How-
ever, in some instances, they become involved as members of the barangay
council, wives of the local chief executives who are serving as mediators, or
as heads of lgus themselves. In Sulu, the wives of the contending parties in
a rido were the ones who initiated negotiations.
In instances where women are involved, they serve as:
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• Channels of communication. This role is evident in the pre-negotia-

tion stage. They are sent to find out if the parties are open to negotiation.
• “Human shields.” Being regarded as harmless, women serve those who
need protection. Hurting or attacking women is regarded as shameful.
• Messengers. They are usually the first to be sent to retrieve corpses,
especially if these are found in the territory of the rival party where male
relatives are at great risk of being killed.
• Medics. They attend to the needs of the wounded.
• Consultants. Women, particularly the very old, are consulted by local
leaders on community concerns such as conflict settlement.
Qualities of Effective Mediators

Not everyone can serve as mediator. Given the sensitivity of the media-
tion process and its implications on the lives of the contending parties and the
welfare of the whole community, the mediator must be carefully chosen.
A mediator must possess credibility, fairness, trustworthiness, exper-
tise in the negotiation process, and ability to bring the parties together on
the basis of their respective interests. He must also command respect in
the community. In difficult cases where one of the parties refuses to enter
into settlement, the mediator must identify his own replacement, a person
whom the refusing party is greatly indebted to (pinagkakautangan ng mala-
king utang na loob).
In cases where parties are much agitated, the mediator must be tactful
and avoid making incendiary remarks.
In instances where the offending party cannot afford the required blood
money, the mediator must be able to help raise the amount. In some in-
stances, the mediator must shoulder the entire amount—something local
chief executives can do.
Some Strategies In Settling Clan Conflict

Clan conflict resolution employs several peacemaking strategies. These,
along with the skills of the mediators, lead to successful settlement.
Giving of blood money. It is said that engaging in a rido is very expensive
and only those who have the resources can sustain it. In the same manner,
resolving rido can be costly. Resolution can take years and exact a tremen-
dous price on conflicting parties as well as mediators. The giving of “blood
money” is often, if not always, a part of clan conflict settlement, especially
if the conflict has led to several deaths. Blood money is an accepted means
to exact retribution and appease the aggrieved party.
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The amount of blood money can vary depending on the nature of the
dispute, the number of deaths, and the socio-economic status of the parties.
The amount usually results from the negotiations between the mediator and
the parties involved. In some areas, the amount of blood money is based
on the ordinances enacted by the local government. In one municipality in
Basilan, the prescribed amount is P120,000. The amount can be reduced
depending on the case. Among the Maranao, the usual amount exacted is
P120,000 for every casualty. In Lanao del Sur, any injury that results in blood
loss, even if just a drop, costs P50,000.
The requirement of blood money, however, can also hamper settle-
ment whenever the concerned party cannot pay, especially when huge
amounts are called for. Some mediators prefer settlement without blood
money. According to them, there is no guarantee that violence will stop
with the payment of blood money, especially on the part of those who can
afford to pay.
Lgu officials admit that public funds for development have been di-
verted to help resolve violent clan conflicts. These officials reason out that
without peace in the communities, there can be no development. However,
using these funds for blood money can be a source of corruption.
For conflicts involving moral damages or physical injuries (particu-
larly among the Sama), an amount of money, called diyat, is given to the
aggrieved party as gesture of apology. The gesture also proscribes the use of
a white bowl (pinggan pote), white plate (lay pote), and white saucer (tapak
pote) to signify purity of intention.
Signing of settlement agreements. There are settlements that require
the signing of formal written agreements. Often, these are settlements fa-
cilitated by the military or the local government. This is a common practice
in Sulu.
In most areas, people believe that the presence of witnesses is enough
to seal an agreement. This explains the dearth of documentation on conflict
resolution in Mindanao.
A settlement agreement written in English and translated into the local
language, may contain the following:
• Quotations from the Holy Qur-an. On top of the written agreement,
relevant verses from the Qur-an enjoin the parties to reconcile. An example
is the quotation “Believers are but a single brotherhood: so make peace and
reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that
ye may receive mercy.” (Holy Qur-an S 49, A 10).
• Names of the parties involved. The names of the parties are indicated,
along with their addresses. In some cases, only the names of representatives
of the parties appear. In Lanao del Sur, the names of all immediate members
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of the family are included. Among the Maranao, the names of children still
in their mothers’ wombs are sometimes included. This is to avoid rekindling
of the feud by the unborn child in the future. Parents are given the option
to commit their unborn child to the settlement. Otherwise, upon reaching
the right age, the child must decide whether or not he/she accepts the settle-
ment. A kanduri is held wherein elders explain the issue to the young person
and try to maintain the peace.
• Names of the mediators and negotiators. Mediators and other key person-
alities and organizations instrumental in the settlement are acknowledged.
• Expression to settle voluntarily. Both parties express their consent to
achieve reconciliation between their families and relatives and forget every-
thing related to the conflict.
• Cost of the settlement. The amount of blood money involved in the
settlement may be indicated. Other forms of compensation and arrange-
ments are also included, especially for conflicts that result to damage of
property and physical injury.
• Penalty clause. Sanctions for violations of the agreement are specified.
Violations are to be dealt with accordingly. Military action will be taken
against the party concerned.
• Binding of the agreement with the witnesses. The parties issue a state-
ment binding them to the agreement in the Name of the Almighty Allah.
Through this gesture, the parties are made brothers again in Islam.
• Date and venue of the settlement.
• Signatures of the representatives of the parties, and the witnesses.
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Swearing upon the Holy Qur-an. Rival parties swear by the Holy Qur-
an to make peace. This is done during a ceremony referred to by the Sama
as pagtiparat. This ceremony is presided by a religious leader or imam.
Where there is no formal written agreement, this rite symbolically binds
the parties.
Community celebration. A celebration (called kanduri for the Maranao,
kanduli for the Magindanao, magsapa for the Sama) immediately follows
the conclusion of the agreement. The whole community joins the celebra-
tion as witnesses to the settlement of the conflict.
Intermarriages. Intermarriages between rival parties turn them from
antagonists into relatives. Except for the Maranao, this practice is no longer
prevalent.
Other strategies. In the absence of formal agreements, politicians and
community leaders are often invited to attend settlement rites. Among the
Sama, close family and communal ties—gravesites are extensions of their
homes—are stressed during negotiations. The Sama consider intra-tribal
disputes as shameful.
Clan Conflict Resolution Process

Diagram 1 shows the process observed in the resolution of clan conflicts.
Meeting of the
Mediator Mediator conflicting parties ith
negotiates with facilitates the the mediator and the
the parties terms and witnesses
separately conditions for
the settlement Payment of “blood
money” and other
Con- damage
Dec-
stant
laration of
dialogue with
Ceasefire Signing of written
both parties
agreement
Community Religious Swearing upon the

celebration ceremony Holy Qur’an
When conflict occurs, the mediator meets separately with the conflict-
ing parties to ask if they are willing to settle the case. The Maranao refer to
this as “shuttle diplomacy.” If the parties are amenable, a ceasefire is declared
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and the settlement process begins. Among the Sama, the murder weapon
is at times surrendered to the pnp or local police. During the ceasefire, the
parties are kept apart.
The mediator then figures out the amount of blood money and other
damages to be paid, the time and place of the settlement, and the people
who will be invited as witnesses. Among the Sama, a separate meeting be-
tween the representatives of both parties and the mediator is held on neutral
turf to finalize the terms of settlement.
After they agree on the terms, the parties meet on the specified time and
location for the final settlement. At this point, local government officials
and key personalities from the community are asked to serve as witnesses.
The guilty party pays the blood money and other damages to the aggrieved.
Among the Maranao, part of the blood money is paid in advance of the
meeting as a sign of sincerity.
Payment of blood money is followed by the signing of the peace pact
by the parties and the witnesses. In some instances, the parties are asked
to swear on the Holy Qur-an that they will never again engage in conflict
with each other. In cases where no blood money or written agreement is
required, the religious leader or imam performs a ceremony to bind the
agreement in the name of Allah and make the parties brothers again in Is-
lam. The parties then embrace. The settlement rites end with a community
feast or kanduri/kanduli/magsapa.
In contrast to the Maranao, where settlement process is encouraged to
be open to the public, the Sama prefer that peace talks be carried on only
between the parties involved and witnesses.
It must be noted that clan conflict cases are first referred to barangay
officials. If the cases are not resolved at this level, they are then elevated to
the municipal and provincial levels as necessary.
Conflict-Resolution Initiatives
One basic factor in facilitating settlement of clan conflict is the recognition,
especially by the local leadership, that such phenomenon exists. In all the
areas covered by this study, provincial, municipal, and barangay officials
acknowledge the urgency of the problem and support institutionalizing the
settlement process.
Peace-making Programs and Bodies. At the regional level, particularly
in the armm, former Governor Pangandaman created the Regional Recon-
ciliation and Unification Commission (rruc).
At the provincial level, a special program called Provincial Reconcili-
ation and Unification Program (pruc) was implemented by former Sulu
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Governor Yusop H. Jikiri to help resolve conflict cases in the province. Blood
money is sourced from the Provincial Unification Fund. A similar program,
the Provincial Mobile Group, operates in Tawi-Tawi. At the village level the
Barangay Peace and Order Council (poc) facilitates settlement of conflicts.
Maladeg is unique in proclaiming itself as a peace zone. The Peace Commit-
tee works to prevent clan feuds and to protect those implicated.
Relevant Legislation. Some lgus have enacted local laws to deal with
clan feuds. The municipality of Sumisip in Basilan, for example, passed an
ordinance pegging blood money at P120,000. In Tawi-Tawi, the provincial
government is deliberating on a resolution concerning clan conflicts that
stem from cases of elopement.
Other Initiatives. For clan conflicts rooted in economics, the grant of
livelihood projects, as in Sulu, is becoming part of the settlement. On the
other hand, for conflicts involving land ownership, the local government
may seek the assistance of the Bureau of Land, the Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources, or the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Factors that Facilitate Conflict Settlement

Factors that have facilitated settlement of clan conflict are: willingness of
parties to settle, involvement of common relatives in peace making, avail-
ability of skilled mediators and source of blood money, and the recognition
by local leaders of the problem and their commitment to find solutions.
Reasons for Unsettled Conflicts

On the other hand, failure to resolve cases is often due to several fac-
tors. First is the refusal or resistance of either or both parties to settle. Some
people refuse to settle because they have already filed cases in court. Others
reject the payment of blood money because they want to put their kin’s
murderer in jail. Second is the absence of a mediator because of the finan-
cial responsibility. Third is the unavailability of a credible and committed
mediator. Fourth, either one or both parties have left the area. Those who
cannot fight back usually move away as it is deemed disgraceful not to take
revenge. Fifth, the blood money cannot be raised. Sixth, there is a change in
local leadership and the new administration is not interested in pursuing
the matter. Seventh, one or both parties are involved in other clan conflicts.
Lastly, some conflicts “expire” due to the length of negotiations, military
intervention, or intermarriage.
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Options and Challenges

Rido can only be eradicated or at least minimized through the concerted
effort of various sectors. That this phenomenon impinges on major areas
of concern surfaced in the research utilization workshops in the areas under
study—Sultan Gumander and Kapatagan in Lanao del Sur; Isulan in Sultan
Kudarat; and Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and Sulu. In attendance were 108 partici-
pants. Representatives of the lgus formed the biggest group, followed by
the academe, ngos/POs and military. Other groups represented were the
traditional leaders, ulama and priests, youth, national government agencies,
media, and business.
This highly knowledgeable and well-intentioned group came up with a
list of challenges and recommendations to address the problem.
Education. Participants stressed the role of both Islamic and secular
education in promoting a culture of peace. They called for more enlight-
ened understanding of maratabat and of traditional culture as well as in-
tegration of peace education in schools and training in conflict resolution
for religious and community leaders. Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and Sulu proposed
values formation activities to be conducted in all barangays.
Disarmament. The participants blamed the proliferation of licensed
and unlicensed firearms for intensifying the violence in rido and causing
more death and destruction. Participants from Sultan Gumander proposed
that loose firearms be strictly prohibited. In contrast, those from Tawi-Tawi
wanted a comprehensive campaign against illegal firearms and their subse-
quent licensing. Basilan participants preferred the imposition of a firearm
ban, while others would rather limit the sale of guns.
Economic Opportunities. Lack of economic opportunities and gainful
employment can lead to despair that cause violence. Idleness, poverty, and
an uncertain future can induce people to become rebels, criminals, or par-
ticipants in clan conflicts. Employment must be generated and livelihood
programs provided.
Peace and Order. Since the 1970s, the predominantly Moro provinces
have waged an armed struggle for self-determination which has occasion-
ally caused the national government to adopt an all-out war policy. The wars
against the colonial powers are over. But the Moro people continue to suffer
the neglect of the national government. The persistence of rido indicates a
justice system that is unable to enforce the law. As Muslims, the research
participants expressed the need to strengthen the Shari’ah law. Tawi-Tawi
and Basilan participants said only authorized personnel should be allowed
to carry firearms.
Governance. Poor governance was a major concern. Participants cited
anomalies in the recruitment of police and military personnel; improper
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and ineffective use of the internal revenue allotment (ira); the reactive,
rather than pro-active, orientation of local leaders; and lack of collaboration
between the lgus, the community and the police in upholding the law.
Regarding clan conflict, the participants noted the absence of strong,
comprehensive government intervention on community problems espe-
cially conflict management. They noted the different rates of blood money
imposed by municipal governments in the settlement of cases.
Recommendations include promotion of the traditional way of resolv-
ing conflict; participation of the cvo, pnp, lgu and peace advocates in ad-
dressing clan conflicts; strengthening the council of elders; and advocacy of
peace (People Empowerment Addressing Conflict Escalation).
Clan Conflict Management. To effectively manage conflict, the partici-
pants recommended the following: transparency in the resolution process;
organizing the councils of elders on the provincial and municipal levels;
collaboration between the government and the councils of elders; the par-
ticipation of women, educators and religious leaders; sincerity among the
mediators; indemnification of casualties; the application of paruala (Moro
code); and honing the skills of mediators. The last can be done through
studying the role of royal leaders and the preparation of a manual on clan-
conflict resolution.
For settled cases, there must be strict monitoring of compliance with
agreements. Activities to strengthen family ties, clan rapport, and commu-
nal harmony must be encouraged
Other Concerns. Also mentioned as contributing to clan conflicts are
illegal drugs and the matter of land titling. Participants recommended
that public awareness campaigns be undertaken for both issues. To instill
values like discipline and fairness, sports programs have to be developed
and promoted.
Recommendations
Given the gravity and extent of clan conflicts/rido the following recom-
mendations are offered:
Policies
• The government at all levels must strictly enforce gun laws and con-
fiscate illegal firearms.
• The government must ensure clean, honest, and orderly elections.
Not only the namfrel but other citizens’ groups such as the councils of
elders, as well as traditional and religious leaders of known probity and
moral ascendancy should be accredited to oversee elections including the
proclamation of winners.
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• The government must support the traditional way of resolving clan

conflict in the area. As pointed out by Diaz (2005), the Anglo-American jus-
tice system is anchored on crime, punishment, and retribution. It operates
on a “win-lose” situation. On the other hand, the traditional system erases
crime, cleanses the violator and restores harmony once reparation is met.
As such, it creates a “win-win” situation.
• If blood money is to be sourced, partly or wholly, from the ira or
the mediator, the beneficiary family/clan should be encouraged to use the
amount for infrastructure projects to benefit the community that has been
deeply affected by the conflict. These projects can serve as enduring remind-
ers to the reconciled parties. Moreover, the participation of the residents in
these development projects can deter the reconciled parties from reneging
on their solemn pledge to “bury the hatchet.” Declaration and celebration of
a Peace Day to strengthen social bonds and highlight the quest for peace.
• Being both protected and highly regarded in local Muslim society,
women should be involved in settling rido cases. Women are more patient
and less hotheaded.
Programs
• Promote the culture of peace in schools and other sectors. This pro-
gram must be based on Islamic laws and values, indigenous culture, and the
people’s aspirations. Integral to this program is the prevention and resolu-
tion of local conflicts
• Provide livelihood projects and assistance. To encourage industry,
communities can emulate the practice of some municipalities, notably Datu
Paglas in Maguindanao, of putting up signboards saying: “Bawal ang tamad
dito sa bayan ng _______”.
• Implement sports development programs to keep the young and un-
employed busy. But the facilities have to be provided.
• A manual on clan conflict resolution must be developed to help train
mediators.
• Develop popular reading material like comics that show the negative
side of rido. These must contain quotations from the Holy Qur’an to show
that rido is un-Islamic. Material must be distributed to the grassroots.
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E ch a p ter f ive
Responses to Interkin Group Conflict

in Northern Mindanao
Erlinda Montillo-Burton, Moctar Matuan, Guimba Poingan, and Jay Rey Alovera
The Research Institute for Mindanao Culture (RIMCU), Xavier University
T HERE ARE a number of studies on conflict resolution among the in-

digenous peoples of Mindanao (Schlegel, 1970, Burton, 1991; Bula 2001).
This study focuses on how interkin group conflict may be contained and
resolved at the onset. Its main objectives are to determine the measures or
controls employed to prevent escalation of conflict by concerned kin groups
and the community at large, and to determine when rido occurs.
The study looks at similarities and/or differences in rido/lido practices
between the non-Islamized communities in Bukidnon and Misamis Ori-
ental (Manobo, Higaonon, and Talaandig) and an Islamized community
(Meranao) in Lanao del Sur. In this manner, the results of the study open
up new avenues for research on interkin group conflict.
Data-collection Techniques
Two main data-collection techniques were employed: focus group discussion
(fgd) and key informant interview. Case studies were also done. For each
of the research area, two fgds were conducted among the religious leaders
(e.g. ulama), the traditional leaders such as the datus, and some barangay
officials. Ten key informant interviews were conducted and life histories for
the case studies were collected. The team also interviewed members of the
academe, religious groups, and traditional leaders.
|| 126 ||
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Responses to Interkin Group Conflict in Northern Mindanao || 127
Geography
Bukidnon province is landlocked. It is bounded on the north by Misamis
Oriental, on the east by Agusan del Sur and Davao, on the west by the Lanao
province, and on the south by North Cotabato. The greater part of Bukid-
non is gentle-rolling plateau, which appears to be a high broad unbroken
plain rising gently towards the mountains. Its surface is cut by many deep
canyons, which widen into valleys dominated by grassy plains.
The Bukidnon plateau covers most of Bukidnon province, which is a
broad upland plain between the mountain ranges of central Mindanao and
the northern coast. It measures around 803,840 ha separating the Islamized
communities of Cotabato from the Christianized towns in the north. In the
eastern part, it is bordered by a densely forested mountain range and sepa-
rated from the Agusan River Valley. The western periphery of the province
adjoins the rugged high mountains of Lanao.
Mt. Kitanglad, the highest mountain range in Mindanao, lies in the heart
of the Bukidnon plateau. From here, runoffs flow into several rivers that cut
the plateau into steep canyons and deep gorges. North of Dalwangan divide
are two major river systems—the Cagayan and Tagoloan—which empty into
Macajalar Bay. These rivers flow down south to join the Pulangi (Rio Grande
de Mindanao) and drains into the Cotabato Gulf.
This plateau is inhabited by indigenous communities who speak vari-
ants of Manobo language: the Talaandig, who are mostly distributed in
western Bukidnon from Malaybalay towards Lantapan and Talakag, the
three sub-groups of Western Manobo—Pulanginon of southern Bukidnon,
Tigwahanon, who are distributed along the Tigwa River, and the Matigsalug
along the Salug River that cuts across San Fernando and joins the Davao
River; and the Higaonon of northern Bukidnon who came up the plateau
from the coastal areas of Misamis Oriental.
Misamis Oriental has an irregular coastline indented by two bays:

Macajalar and Gingoog. It is bounded by Macajalar Bay and Bohol Sea, on
the east by Agusan del Norte, on the west by Iligan Bay, and on the south by
Bukidnon and Lanao del Norte. The eastern part of the province consists
of angular hills abutted by streams in deep gorges, while the central region
is characterized by sloping lowlands and river valleys. The western portion
has rough hills rising abruptly from the sea and the coastlands are narrow.
Several rivers cut across the province, which flow from their headwaters in
the prominent mountain ranges down to the bays.
The coastal areas of the province are well developed due to the presence
of industries and heavily populated by the migrant settlers known as the
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dumagat. The uplands are still inhabited by the Higaonon, who still practice
their traditional culture.
Lanao. The Lake Lanao region is the home of the Meranao. The lake,
located in North Central Mindanao, is some 135 sq mi in area and sits at
an altitude of 2,300 feet above sea level. This is one of the potential tourist
and recreation sites in Mindanao. Tropical vegetation covers the mountain
slopes of Lanao. The climate is pleasant and cool, owing to the altitude and
the lake breeze.
The old province of Lanao was created in 1914 with Dansalan City as its
capital. Due to the influx of Christian migrants from Luzon and the Visayas
to the northern part of the province, the territory was eventually divided
in 1959 into Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2228. Today, Lanao del Sur is populated by 95% Meranao Muslims and
5% Christians. Marawi City, Malabang, Balabagan, and Wao are the only
districts with visible Christian populations. On the other hand, Lanao del
Norte is 60% Christian and 40% Meranao Muslim.
The province is bounded by Lanao del Norte on the north, Illana Bay
on the west, Maguindanao on the south, and Bukidnon on the east. Con-
sidered as a fourth-class province, Lanao del Sur is made up of one city and
39 municipalities.
Marawi City, (the new name of Dansalan City) still serves as the capital.
The city is host to many educational institutions, including the Mindanao
State University. It is also the administrative, cultural, medical, and trans-
portation center of the province.
In the south and serving as natural boundaries separating Lanao del
Sur from Maguindanao and North Cotabato are volcanic mountain ranges.
The Maridogao Valley can be found near the Bukidnon boundary.
At the heart of the province is Lake Lanao, the largest lake in Mindanao
and second largest in the Philippines. Draining the lake is the Agus River
which bisects the two Lanao provinces as it flows northward to Iligan Bay.
Seven hydro-electric plants along the Agus River supply electricity to the
whole of Mindanao.
Plateaus are located north of the lake. Deep canyons cut near the edges
of these plateaus where waterfalls provide drainage.
The Indigenous Peoples

Matigsalug Manobo (San Fernando, Bukidnon)
The Matigsalug Manobo are found in the southern parts of Bukid-
non, specifically in the municipalities of Kitaotao and San Fernando. The
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Matigsalug Manobo are a variant of the Manobo-speaking groups referred

to as such as they are found thriving near the Salug River (matig-salug
is a Manobo term meaning “people living along the Salug”). There are
more than 20 communities of the Matigsalug Manobo in San Fernando,
Bukidnon, nine of which belong to the Sinuda ancestral domain of Kitao-
tao. San Fernando was declared a reservation for the Matigsalug Manobo
in the 1970s, but due to the influx of migrant lowlanders, the indigenous
people are scattered in the hinterlands while migrants occupy the center
where they own land acquired from the Manobo, now planted to rice, corn,
and sugarcane.
The Matigsalug Manobo are swidden agriculturists who thrive on
camote (sweet potato). They also plant corn that they sell in the poblacion
(town center). They used to hunt forest game but extensive logging since
the 1970s has greatly reduced the forest. They also plant rice but minimally.
Some tribesmen work as laborers in lowland farms.
Every community is headed by an igbuyag (tribal chief) who is selected
by the people through recognition of his capacity to settle disputes, help in
the payment of indemnity, and defend the people from enemies. As such, an
igbuyag is necessarily a bagani (a tribal warrior). There is no hierarchy in the
Matigsalug Manobo political system. The tribal chief lives similarly as the
other community members, working on his own to feed his family. Being
chieftain is actually an additional obligation one simply accepts. Currently,
the tribal chieftains are elected by virtue of the power of the local governing
units who will not recognize a community whose igbuyag is unelected.
The Matigsalug Manobo are animists. They believe in the diwata (spirit
deities) who live in the trees, rivers, and land. The highest diwata is the ma-
nama who is the creator of the water and the land. The magbabaya is the
diwata who dwells in the sky. Rituals are performed to thank or appease the
diwata for healing, hunting or burial. The rituals are simple. Chicken or pig
is offered to the diwata along with betel nut.
The family is the smallest unit of their social organization. It is nuclear
and extended. The reckoning of relatives is bilateral, i.e., recognition of the
lineage of both parents. They are strictly exogamous (marrying from out-
side the community). A community is composed of related families and
marrying a relative is taboo. They practice matrilocal residency, i.e., the
husband lives in his wife’s community after marriage. The duay (polygyny)
is practiced by those who can afford.
Higaonon (Claveria, Misamis Oriental)

The Higaonon, a sub-ethnolinguistic group of the Manobo linguistic
stock, are distributed in Bukidnon, Misamis Oriental, and in Agusan del Sur
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(referred to as the Banwaon). Higaonon means “shrimps removed from the
water” to connote their displacement from the coastal settlements to the
hinterlands. They are culturally and linguistically related to the Manobo.
They engage in either swidden or sedentary farming, fishing, and
hunting. The family is the unit of subsistence. For clearing, harvesting
or felling trees, the community members work together. This practice is
called hunglos.
The Higaonon community is headed by a datu or chieftain. The lower
datus who lead certain villages (tulugan or family community) in subsis-
tence activities such as trapping, fishing, planting or hunting are called did-
ungkulan. The datu has two main functions, i.e., to judge and arbitrate dis-
putes and to assist the baylan (shaman) in religious ceremonies. The datu,
once chosen, undergoes several ceremonies in his lifetime.
The basic social unit is the family. A group of families is called a gaup
which also serves as the political unit. Most members of a community are
related either by consanguinity or affinity. Kindred are traced bilaterally and
lineage is recognized from both parents. Marriage is construed as an alliance
between families rather than contract between individuals. Polygyny is al-
lowed, although oftentimes, only the datu can afford the practice.
The Higaonon cosmology has four worlds, namely, the langit (heav-
en), kalibutan (earth), didalum ha nanad (underworld) and ulagingan (the
paradise of the Higaonon epic heroes). They are animists who recognize a
hierarchy of spirit deities (diwata) headed by the magbabaya. The rituals are
officiated by the datu and the baylan.
Talaandig (Lantapan and Talakag, Bukidnon)

The Talaandig are a sub-variant of the binukid-speaking groups in
Bukidnon. They are also culturally and linguistically related to the Manobo.
Talaandig literally means “people living in the slopes.” They are generally
found in Lantapan, Bukidnon. Some communities are found in Talakag, an
adjacent municipality to Lantapan. They are distinguished by their tradi-
tional costumes that boast geometric designs with bright colors.
Like other indigenous groups in Bukidnon, the Talaandig are swidden
cultivators. They clear plots mostly on the mountain slopes. Their staple
food is camote (sweet potato), though they also plant banana, cassava, and
yam. Corn and palay are not very popular with the Talaandig. The men
hunt and trap as they live on the slopes of Mt. Kitanglad, a dormant volcano
declared a national park. They supplement their diet by fishing in the rivers
and streams.
The Talaandig live in family-communities called the tuluga headed by
a datu. The customary law (batasan) is the instrument of governance and
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social order. There are several datus in a community: the balaghusay (arbi-
trator) is an expert in customary arbitration, the oralist or historian is called
palagugud, the talamuhat or baylan is the ritualist (shaman), the healer is
called mananambal, the malagbasuk is the expert in agricultural activities,
and the warrior is called the bagani. The functions of the datuship cover
social, political, economic, and religious activities. Women leaders are re-
ferred to as the bai. The datuship is usually inherited and passed on through
informal training. The institutionalization of the datuship is done through
a ritual called panagulambong.
The Talaandig believe that man is only a traveller resting on the earth. A
person comes to the earth as spirit who acquires material existence. Humans
are born indebted to deities. As such, we should make our religious sacrifices
before passing on or else be imprisoned on earth, unable to journey to our
perfection in the ulagingan, said to be the home of the epic hero Agyu.
The Talaandig social organization is patriarchal and the father’s author-
ity is obeyed and respected. The reckoning of lineage though is bilateral,
based on consanguinal relationships. Affinal relationships are also recog-
nized in the kinship system. The family unit is nuclear-extended.
The Meranao
The name Meranao, me (adjective marker) plus ranao (lake) means ap-
proximately “lake shore dwellers.” In the early salsila (genealogy) and still
today, this term refers to the native people living around Lake Lanao.
It is not known when the Meranao started to populate Lanao, but it
is probable that they were migrants from the coast who mixed with earlier
inhabitants in the lake area. They have close cultural and linguistic rela-
tionships with the Ilanun and Maguindanao. The languages of these three
groups indicate descent from a common “proto-Danao” language. The so-
cio-cultural practices, mores, and outlook of the three groups show more
similarities than differences.
In 2000, the Meranao of Lanao del Sur were reported to number 760,154
(95% of total population). This figure does not include those residing in La-
nao del Norte and those who migrated to other places due to the Mindanao
conflict and the Meranao propensity for trade. Meranao traders are present
throughout the archipelago. Some scholars believe that the Meranao are
the largest of the country’s 13 Muslim ethno-linguistic groups, but others
believe that the distinction belong to the Maguindanaon.
In spite of isolation of the Meranao in the interior of Mindanao for cen-
turies, traces of foreign influences, especially Indian, Chinese, and Islamic,
are visible in their material and non-material culture. Chinese influence is
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apparent in the antique porcelain ware. The famous Maharaja Lawana, on
the other hand, is believed to be an adaptation of the Ramayana of India.
Islam is the most prominent influence. As a complete way of life, Islam
provides general principles for the conduct of religious, social, cultural, eco-
nomic, political, and legal affairs.
Socio-Political Organization
One of the most striking characteristics of Meranao culture is their
notion of a distinctive society, pangampong ko ranao (encampment of the
lake), that unites all Meranao speakers under a single structure of institu-
tions, values, and beliefs (Mednick, 1965: 42). Lanao has four pangampong:
Masiu, Unayan, Bayabao, and Baloi. Each pangampong has a system of gov-
ernment handed down from one generation to the next and adhering to a
set of pre-Islamic laws (unwritten) referred to as igma ago taritib (consensus
and code of custom).
Some provisions of the taritib have their origin in legends, codes or
contracts devised by the early leaders/ancestors of the Meranaos. The taritib
and the salsila (genealogies) define kinship groups and the bangsa (status or
rank) based on ancestral family trees. The salsila, therefore, has become the
basis of leadership and authority in Meranao society.
Because each pangampong has its own system of government based on
igma ago taritib, the pangampongs are divided and subdivided in varying
fashion. Consequently, the pangampongs also differ in defining relationships
between ingeds (settlement), set of political leaders, and other aspects of
daily life. The taritib of each pangampong is independent of others. In cases
involving different pangampongs, another set of taritib and the set of leaders
who can execute them are consulted.
Economic Life
Around 70% of the Meranaos inhabit the Lake Lanao shore and river-
banks. The lake is a source of sustenance and livelihood for the Meranaos
who often sell their surplus fish catch in Marawi City. Primitive methods of
catching fish by the use of nets and bamboo traps are still in use.
Fish culture is not feasible in Lake Lanao because of its size and depth.
The introduction of new species to the lake and the construction of a dam at
its outlet, as well as of the Agus Hydro-Electric Plant I by the National Power
Corporation in the 1980s have greatly reduced the fish population.
Agriculture is the principal pursuit of the Meranao. In the basak (low-
land) area, rice is the main crop. Due to the absence of irrigation facilities,
capital, and technical know how, farmers can hardly provide for their fami-
lies. Aside from rice, the upland farmers also plant corn and fruits such as
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bananas, jackfruit, marang, durian, avocado, mangoes, and lanzones. Cab-

bage, eggplant, pechay, onion, carrots, cassava, camote and potatoes are
grown, but not in commercial quantities.
Weaving is also an important economic activity of the Meranao, though
done solely by women. Mats and malong woven in Lanao are sold all over
the country. Brass making and blacksmithing seem to be the monopoly of
the Tugaya people.
The Merano also operate retail outlets, restaurants, and other consum-
er services. Government employment is another major sources of income
in the province, while private sector employment is low because there are
no factories in the area. Only the private schools in Marawi City and some
big stores provide employment.
Concepts of Law and Justice Among the Lumad

Unlike literate societies that practice penal law, non-literate societies follow
the law of wrong or torts (private law) (Maine, 1879), under which relatives
are collectively held responsible for a person’s misdeeds (Hoebel, 1947: 398-
399). The lumad have no indigenous word corresponding to the modern
concept of “justice” in relation to individual “rights.” For the latter idea, they
use the Bisayan word katungod.
In pre-conquest Filipino society, the system of justice was deeply rooted
in religion, magic, and myth. The crucial aspect of their judicial processes
included the swearing of an oath and trial by ordeal. Oath swearing was
supported by the testimony of witnesses and served as the main source of
proof. Since the use of documentary records was non-existent, testimonial
evidence was very significant. Religion provided vital support to the pre-
sumption of justice (Fernandez, 1976: 128).
Trial by ordeal assumed that the spirits or deities had the power to inter-
vene in human affairs. Thus, the wicked was punished while the innocent,
protected. The accused refusing to undergo the ordeal was presumed guilty;
injury suffered through the ordeal was deemed a sign of guilt provided by
the spirits.
Despite the introduction of the penal system to the Philippines, tradi-
tional systems of rendering justice survive in many communities.
Customary Laws
Social order among the indigenous peoples is maintained through the
adherence to their customary laws. These laws serve as the basis of the datus
in settling disputes. The lumad do not have the concept of individual rights,
only that of indemnity through payment for offenses committed. Every of-
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fense carries a corresponding payment. The payments though are highly
negotiable and dependent on the skill of the datu in the art of compromise
and negotiation. It is also important to note that those people who want to
involve themselves in settling conflicts must be willing to contribute to the
payment of indemnity. For the lumad, what is important is that the dispute
is settled and social order is restored as soon as possible. Conflicts that lead
to pangayaw or magahat (retaliation) can disrupt an entire community’s
economic subsistence.
These customary laws are known as gantangan palabian for the Matig-
salug Manobo and sukod (mangalilis ha batu naimi ha batasan) for the Hig-
aonon. The gantangan and sukod are terms that both connote measurement.
These terms are used in the particular areas of research. In the other variants
of the Manobo and Higaonon, other terms are used.
Bansa or Bantug
Bansa or bantug (honor or pride) is highly valued among the Matig-
salug Manobo and the Higaonon. Any act committed against the bansa or
bantug of a person is payable through indemnity ordered by the datu or
igbuyag during settlement. Such offense may also cost the offender his life.
Trial by Ordeal
Both the Higaonon and the Matigsalug Manobo practice trial by ordeal
to determine the offender in cases wherein accusations without evidence
are brought to the datu or igbuyag. The Matigsalug call their trial tigi-an
while the Higaonon call theirs bala. It is believed that both the tigi-an and
bala are guided by the diwata and thus can never render wrong decisions. It
is advisable not to undergo such ordeal as the guilty will always be caught
and penalized. Better to admit the crime as the ordeal may cause one’s death
(especially in the Matigsalug). The Matigsalug trial by ordeal is much more
dangerous compared to the Higaonon way.
Tigi-an
There are four ways by which the trial is conducted.
• Hindang. The accused person holds a branch of hindang (a tree that is
itchy to touch) then immerses himself in the river. If the person is innocent,
nothing will happen to him and he may stay underwater for several hours.
If the person is guilty, water and sand will enter his nose, mouth, and ears.
This may cause death.
• Bagyang. Bagyang is an itchy leaf chopped into seven pieces and
eaten by the accused piece by piece. If the person is not guilty, nothing will
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happen. If the accused is guilty, his throat will expand and his tongue will
shorten or retract.
• Gabi. The gabi stalk and leaf is placed in boiling water. If nothing
happens, the accused is innocent. If the leaf and stalk wilt, the accused is
guilty. If there are several accused, several leaves are put on boiling water
representing each of the accused. If a leaf wilts, the person represented by
the leaf is guilty.
• Pinabagang puthaw. A piece of metal is heated on fire till it glows red.
The accused is ordered to hold the metal. If the accused is guilty, the red-hot
metal will be welded with his hand till it is cut off. Otherwise, the metal will
not harm him or may even leap off his palm.
If the accuser’s contention is unfounded, he must pay the accused in-
demnity for false accusation. If accuser refuses to pay, he is killed.
Bala
There are four ways of trial by ordeal for the Higaonon:
• Bangkaw. A spear is handed to the accused to measure his arms’
length. The length is marked. The accused measures the length of his arms
again. If result of the second measurement falls short of the first, the accused
is found guilty and penalized.
• Say-og. A thread with a weight on the other end is handed to the
accused who is ordered to keep the thread still. If the weight moves, the ac-
cused is considered guilty.
• Tunglo. This literally means “to curse.” In cases where the offender
is unknown, the datu performs a pamalas and implores the help of the
magbabaya (supreme deity) to inflict pain on the unknown offender. For
instance, the datu may curse the offender to fall from a tree. Any member of
the community who falls from a tree is considered the guilty party.
• Tagna. Divination. The baylan performs a ritual and pinpoints the
offender. This is often conducted when the accused is branded as a bul-
uyanon (witch).
Pangayaw, Magahat And Lido

Pangayaw and magahat are two related concepts among the lumad.
Pangayaw refers to a retaliatory act by an offended person intended to kill
the offender. This is more of a spur-of-the-moment decision to retaliate to
redeem one’s honor. The target of a pangayaw is, generally, the offender.
Magahat is more organized and premeditated. It generally refers to a raid
and is usually headed by the datu or the bagani (warrior). The purpose of
the magahat is also retaliatory, although the other community is informed
by sending a rattan with knots to indicate the number of days before the
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raid is conducted. This gives the community time to rid itself of all women
and children who may not be spared. While there is the option for the men
to evacuate as well, doing so is considered cowardice and not very good for
the bansa or bantug. A pangayaw does not require any warning be sent to
the other side as the object is to kill the offender. If the offender cannot be
found, anyone in the community first seen by the retaliator is killed. This
can lead to magahat.
Among the Higaonon, the term used for conflict is lido. Conflict that
involves killing is referred to as lido hu katangkawan (the highest form
of conflict).
Kumanaytay un sa Alimaong ta balukan hu Datu

Literally, this means that the mabalaw or alimaong (tribal warrior) is
allowed to “walk down the arms” of the datu. This means that the war-
rior is ordered by the datu to kill an offender. The mabalaw is given three
days to carry out the order. This happens when the offense is so great that
settlement will not suffice. Disobedience to the order of the datu especially
during settlements may cost one his life. As a rule, only the datu can order
anyone to be killed. There are instances though that the offended person
kills the offender in a moment of anger. In such cases the datu interferes
immediately to prevent pangayaw (retaliation). This is a practice among
the Higaonon.
Panabud
This is a unique practice of the Matigsalug Manobo. This literally means
that an offended person challenges anyone (but usually a bagani) to kill the
offender. The challenge may take any form. The most common and honor-
able way is to offer the bagani a tangkulok. The tangkulok is the headdress of
an igbuyag and a symbol of honor. In this case, it is assumed that an igbuyag
is making the challenge to the bagani as only an igbuyag can own a tangku-
lok. The tangkulok shall be used by the bagani when he accepts the challenge.
Another way is to spit on the face or the hands of a person or bagani and
challenge him to kill for you. Some would throw a chicken on the feet of a
bagani with words to challenge his bansa (honor/pride). Still others would
hit the bagani with a branch to challenge his bansa. Some women would
throw themselves on the feet of several men and shed tears while calling
upon them to avenge her. Sometimes, according to accounts, shedding a
tear in front of a bagani is enough to challenge him. Challenging a bagani to
perform an act that may bring him harm is a way of honoring his bravery.
When a bagani refuses to accept the challenge, he must return twice the
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amount of what was given him like the tangkulok or chicken or pig. Aside
from this, he is branded a coward or someone “who wears skirts.”
Challenging the bagani to kill someone does not mean that the chal-
lenger is a coward. It means that the challenger cannot commit the act as he
is not a bagani or that the person to be killed is a friend or kin.
When the bagani accepts the challenge, he goes on a pangayaw—to run
amok. He seeks out his target. Anyone who crosses his path is likewise killed.
If the bagani fails to carry out his mission in three days, it is believed the
talagbusao will inflict harm on him. If in case the bagani cannot find the
person marked for execution, he must find a substitute to appease the ta-
lagbusao (deity).
When the mission is over, the bagani returns to the challenger and the
latter may honor the warrior with another tangkulok or any item of value.
The challenger then takes full responsibility for the act. The bagani is ab-
solved of any responsibility for the killing. The challenger shall pay the of-
fended party indemnity for the killing. Or if the offended party refuses to
settle the dispute, they can opt to perform pangayaw, not on the bagani but
on the challenger.
Common Causes Of Conflict That Lead To Pangayaw

The conflicts cited in this section are actual events. Among the Matigsalug
Manobo, pangayaw is still prevalent. Among the Higaonon, the practice
has waned; in fact, the elders cannot recall any major conflict that occured
during the past 30 years. Some of these incidents happened in the distant
past while others are recent.
Matigsalug Manobo
Panalusow. This marital conflict was incited by jealousy. During a quar-
rel, the wife expressed regrets for marrying her husband. She said she’d been
better off marrying another man she loved. The angry husband searched for
the man described by his wife, killed him, cut off his head and brought it to
his wife. The relatives of the murdered man retaliated and the conflict grew.
Pangayaw started and all the relatives and community members became
targets. The igbuyags were alarmed and summoned the couple’s relatives.
The igbuyag ordered a lebut. Lebut means “to end the source of the problem.”
The husband was handed over to the relatives of the wife and the wife to the
relatives of the husband. Both were tortured and were beheaded by a bagani.
The bodies were chopped into pieces and scattered. The killings stopped.
Ahow/Ahawey. This conflict resulted from a case of wife grabbing.
A man’s wife was abducted by another man from another village. The
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aggrieved husband approached a bagani to do a panabud. The bagani ac-
cepted and the pangayaw started. The warrior went to the abductor’s vil-
lage and slew the first person he saw. This is called suha-suha, i.e., during a
pangayaw, any person can be killed to remind the people not to break the
customary law. The conflict was settled on neutral ground by a datu who
was not from either community. Five horses were paid as indemnity.
Balo-balo. This conflict arises from non-payment of bugay (dowry/
bride price) for remarriage. The customary law dictates that a widow/wid-
ower who wants to remarry repay the parents or relatives of the deceased
spouse the dowry or bride price (samblag) given to the live partner. When
the surviving partner refuses to pay, a pangayaw can ensue. The surviving
partner who refuses to pay is killed. This is very common in the area.
Lebogoy/Panlibug. This conflict was caused by adultery between neigh-
bors. The wife of the first neighbor had an affair with the husband of the
second neighbor. The husband and other neighbors suspected the affair
but had no evidence. The husband brought the case to the igbuyag who
performed the tigi-an (trial by ordeal). The other man admitted to adultery.
Since there was no evidence, he was penalized one horse to be slaughtered
to appease the relatives of the offended party. The horse could not be kept
by the husband because it was payment for the deed.
Peg-imatey/Peg-imateyey. This is an on going conflict caused by mur-
der. A bagani involved in a land dispute killed his opponent and took the
man’s wife. The man’s relatives threatened a magahat (ritual mass killing) if
the bagani failed to indemnify the relatives with five horses. The bagani ap-
proached his brother for help to pay the indemnity. His brother refused and
was killed by the bagani in anger. The conflict is still going on as his relatives
refuse to accept his offer of three horses instead of five. He is now an igbuyag
and ought to resolve the problem himself. The barangay council and other
groups in the tribe refuse to interfere. The law dictates that anyone who gets
involved must be ready to help pay the indemnity. The intra-family nature
of the discord makes it difficult to settle. Meantime, the family members
avoid each other.
Dampas. This is a form of conflict resolution wherein stealing is re-
sorted to with the consent of the igbuyag. The stolen good (usually an
animal) must be brought to the igbuyag for the conflict to be resolved.
Bringing the animal elsewhere means there is intent to steal and therefore
punishable. A lumad man borrowed money from another with the promise
of paying back two horses after two years. The borrower failed to honor
his debt. The creditor sought intervention of the igbuyag but the debtor
still refused to pay. The creditor asked the igbuyag for permission to do the
dampas. The igbuyag allowed it. The creditor, however, mistakenly took the
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horse of another person. The owner was angered and magahat ensued. The
conflict led to the killing of two people and others stayed away from their
farms. The conflict was eventually settled by the igbuyag who happened to
be related to both parties. Payment was made and the case was resolved.
Oripon. Kidnapping of children, though no longer practiced, was ram-
pant in the past. According to accounts, pangayaw and magahat usually
occured when children were abducted to be sold or as payment for debt.
The children were made slaves. A certain bagani, whose child was taken,
has vowed not to step foot on the land of the Salug nor drink from the river
because he believed that it had been sullied by the deeds of the Matigsalug
Manobo. He wanted a tampuda tu balagon to be performed in order to
cleanse the deed. The problem was, nobody knew who took his child.
Pugos. The Matigsalug Manobo are very protective of their women. In
the past, rape was common and caused tribal wars. Proven rapists were tor-
tured and killed. Some say the memory of past wars is the reason why male
and female adolescents are still prohibited from being seen together. A sala
(cultural penalty) is imposed by the elders on those who violate the taboo
and the offenders are immediately wedded to each other. This practice was
adopted to prevent tribal wars.
Other potential causes of pangayaw are:

· Panlemet. Ridiculing, criticizing, mocking or insulting another person.
· Panakew. Stealing someone else’s goods such as beehive or game.
· Taleseb/Tampulo. Bearing false witness against another.
· Bagwal. Disobeying parents-in-law.
Higaonon
Bul-uyanon. A bul-uyanon is one who practices witchcraft, a common
cause of conflict in olden times. For instance, a healthy person who fell sick
after the visit of another person may suspect the latter of hexing. If the bay-
lan confirmed that the visitor was a witch, the latter, and his relatives, would
be put to death immediately.
Panagat sa Lasang. In the past, stealing was a grave crime. For instance,
when a person was caught taking honey from another’s beehive, he could
have his head forced into the beehive still teeming with bees. Lido could
ensue from this. The same was true with stealing wild boar from someone
else’s trap.
Abduction. This is still part of pangayaw, where the offender kidnaps
children to be sold as slaves. This is no longer practiced, but in the past it
was a major cause of lido. The people point to the umayamnon—who live
along the Umayam Riven—as the culprits.
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Wife Grabbing. There is a case of a wife who left her husband because
of constant beatings and went to her father’s house. The husband believed
that his wife was having an affair and killed his father-in-law. The relatives
retaliated and lido ensued. The husband was imprisoned. The remaining
relatives had to perform the tampuda ho balagon to appease the spirits and
prevent them from inflicting sickness throughout the tribe.
Among the Meranao

The Meranao, like some other tribes in the Philippines, have to live
with three concurrent legal systems: the traditional customary law known
as the taritib ago igma, the Islamic Law or Shari’ah, and the Philippine legal
system.
Unfortunately, in most cases, these three legal systems contradict each
other, making it difficult for a Meranao to decide which of these systems to
follow. Choosing to abide by any of the three systems could make him an
outcast or infidel. Every time a Meranao has a legal problem, he must weigh
the three systems and choose the one most favorable and convenient to him
in a given situation. Hence, a Meranao is constantly worried and confused
by these different sets of regulations. This may partly explain, if not to jus-
tify, the violent character of Meranao society.
The taritib ago igma is an indigenous set of rules and regulations with
corresponding procedures and sanctions promulgated by traditional au-
thority before the coming of Islam and the Spaniards. It covers the political,
social, and economic life of the Meranao. Despite rejection by Islam and
by the present republic, the taritib ago igma remains part of Meranao life.
In fact, Meranao society remains comparatively traditional especially as
regards marriage, burial rites, the sultanate system, social mobility, family
structure and ties, and the concept of rido including the modes and mecha-
nism of settling disputes. Our findings reflect the traditional perspective on
settling disputes and conflict management.
The Nature of Rido

Rido are classified into big or grave and small or light. Big or grave rido
involves murder (bono), serious crimes against women or against chastity,
public offense against individual/family honor. Small or light rido includes
accidental killing, altercation, grave or light threats, slander, grudges, etc.
However, when a small or light rido is not resolved during the initial stage,
it can escalate to a big or grave rido. A light rido can, however , be considered
grave if it is difficult to settle.
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The common causes of rido are:

• Superiority complex, display of arrogance (kibr), domination of one
party over another, lack of regard for others, enmity, envy, or jealousy.
• Land disputes, mostly brought about by the lack of land titles or tax
declaration of real properties, and unmarked boundaries; absence of testa-
ment or last will of the deceased parents; usurpation by the rich heir of the
entire or greater part of the inherited land in gross disregard of the legiti-
mate rights of the poor or illiterate co-heirs; absence of written contract
or agreement on land transactions like sale, barter, lease, rent, donation,
usufruct, collateral, land borrowing, or lending, etc. There is a popular belief
among Meranao that when the causes of a rido are land and women, they
are hard to settle and involve much loss of lives and property.
• Cases involving illegal drugs, addiction, habitual drunkenness, gam-
bling, and other vices.
• Robbery and theft.
• Elopement, abduction, kidnapping, acts of lasciviousness, rape (in-
cluding statutory rape), illegitimate pregnancy, other crimes against women
and chastity, juvenile delinquencies, etc.
• Graft and corruption in the government bureaucracy, misappropria-
tion or malversation of public funds like the internal revenue allotment
(ira) funds most especially in the local government units.
• Electioneering and election-related anomalies and irregularities.
• Maratabat (offense to honor)
• Ignorance and disregard of ethics and religious law.
• Some people serve as brokers of rido by trading information—real or
fabricated—to ignite the anger of both sides of the conflict.
Among Meranao, justice is attained and preserved if the reward or pen-

alty given is commensurate to the good done or wrong committed. A kali
(local judge) or a jury plays a vital role in every case. The kali or jury must
not only be fair and just but also knowledgeable on the substantive and
procedural aspects of the taritib ago igma. The character of the judge must
be beyond reproach.
The cardinal principle in the judicial dispensation of justice is saksi
ki modai sapa ki modalai which means that the complainant/plaintiff is
entitled to present witnesses while the defendant/respondent is entitled to
swear before God in the presence of the Qur’an. At the outset, the com-
plainant has the prior right and the responsibility to present at least two
competent and credible witnesses. If the complainant cannot produce the
required witnesses or his witnesses are either incompetent or not credible
or both, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent who can swear before
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God in the presence of the Qur’an that he is innocent of the charges. Un-
der the law, one male witness is equivalent to two female witnesses. In the
course of the trial, the engaged wakil or counsels assist the parties in every
stage of the proceedings.
In the case of amicable settlement, the negotiator performs the func-
tions of the kali or jury but the procedure is abbreviated and simplified and
the approach is inquisitorial. Still, minimum due process must be observed.
The conduct of the judicial trial or the amicable settlement may be facili-
tated by the sultan or datu , the negotiators, or concerned relatives and com-
munity members. These facilitators also ensure the effective implementa-
tion of whatever decision made by the kali, jurors or negotiators which may
involve: kitas (execution), diat (blood money), sapa (swearing), sapot (wear-
ing white cloth), letakan, lephad (lashing), rajam (stoning), kandori, thoma
(reprimand), rila (forgiveness), taog (deportation or excommunication or
exile), dorog (compensatory damages) and pamamanikan (offender goes to
the residence of the offended as sign of repentance and/ or surrender).
The Maratabat
Operationally, maratabat can mean honor, pride, ego, and sense of
shame or amor propio. It is associated with the Meranao’s extraordinary
zeal in protecting his name and that of his family, clan, or group. Sometimes,
maratabat is also equated or intimately related to lineage (bangsa) or social
status in the community. People belonging to royalty or ruling classes have
higher degree of maratabat than commoners. Offenses against the marata-
bat of woman are deemed more serious than those committed against male
maratabat. A Meranao can easily forgive or forget physical injuries but not
an offense against his maratabat. There are many rido which are caused
by offense to maratabat and many rido that cannot be settled because of
maratabat. Retaliation is often regarded as the only means to vindicate the
offended party in the eyes of the public.
Conflict Management and Resolution

Although the traditional ways have been largely supplanted by modern
judiciary process, the tribal communities have preserved their manner of
conflict resolution, though adapted to changing times.
The Lumad Way

It is imperative for the subsistent lumad to settle any dispute before it
escalates into a lido or a magahat that disrupts economic activity. The lido
can be quite disruptive since, in the absence of the marked individual, others
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can be killed in his stead to appease the bloodthirsty talagbusao or the man-
dalangan (warrior guardian spirit).
Initial Stage and Escalation of Conflict

Among the lumad, the distinction between major and minor conflict is
not very clear. A conflict that can be settled with a ritual offering of chicken
and a manggad may be considered minor, while stealing may be considered a
major offense. Any offense among the lumad is potential cause of magahat or
lido. When the bansa or bantug is offended, lives could be lost. It is also hard
to determine an initial stage of conflict. A simple offense can lead to killing
while a major offense may not directly lead to magahat or lido. Generally,
a magahat or a lido requires a tampuda tu balagon to be completely settled,
after the payment of indemnity. In some cases, conflicts are not settled un-
less someone is killed. In cases of adultery, the datu might not intervene un-
less the offended person has killed the other man. Adultery is a major crime
against the bansa that must be restored before dispute settlement.
Some lumad opt to go to the datu immediately to settle the conflict.
Others retaliate immediately. As a matter of practice, a dispute is settled
immediately through payment of indemnity or perhaps killing those who
committed the initial crime. The lumad are generally pacifists. Their sur-
vival requires early conflict resolution.
Resolution of Conflict
Traditional modes of resolution are unwritten and may be modified
to suit particular cases. Among the methods that have survived from olden
times are the following:
Tampuda ho balagon/Tampura to balagon. This means cutting the vine
of discord. A thin rattan vine is placed on a table or log or any wooden sup-
port. Both ends are tied to the heads of chicken. Both parties then cut the
vine simultaneously. Failure of one side to cut its end of the vine means
that party is still holding a grudge against the other side or that the diwata
(spirit) does not want the conflict to be resolved. This could lead to violence.
The warriors or kin of both parties may commence battle at once. For the
Higaonon, the party who fails to cut his end of the vine is deemed guilty and
may be killed by the other party without interference from others. Anyone
who interferes is not spared. The tampuda may only be performed if the
conflict involves killing.
Payment of manggad or bahandi or hahum. Before any tampuda is
done, exchange of goods (manggad, bahandi, or gahum) takes place in cases
where lido or pangayaw has already occurred. The one who started the con-
flict must pay more. For the Matigsalug, a human life is equivalent to five
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horses, although this is negotiable. For the Higaonon, payment is negotiated
among elders. For both the Higaonon and the Matigsalug, manggad and
gahum involve goods such as animals or cloth/clothes or gong. Bahandi is
only for the Higaonon. This involves use of antique jars or porcelain ware
as payment.
Pamalas or singampo. Aside from the payment of manggad, bahandi
or gahum, a pig is ritually slain by use of a new bolo. The pig represents the
life of the offending party. The life of the pig is exchanged for that of the of-
fender. The slaughtered pig is eaten to appease the relatives of the slain. The
offender cannot eat the pig as it represents him. The pamalas or singampo
binds both parties. It is believed that the diwata will bring illness to the party
(including his family) who breaks the pact. If only one side breaks the pact,
the community can kill him to prevent the curse of the diwata from harm-
ing the rest of the community. For the Higaonon, a pact breaker’s blood is
stained and, therefore, anyone who shares his blood, including family and
even in-laws, is likewise slain to prevent contagion.
Smearing with pig’s blood. This is only practiced by the Matigsalug
Manobo. When an offended person does not want to settle a dispute but
to kill the offender (pangayew), the igbuyag/datu may resort to a ritual of
smearing with pig’s blood. The offended party is tricked to leave his house.
Once the person is gone, the igbuyag and his aide slaughter a pig outside
the house and smear the inside with the pig’s blood. The pig represents the
life of the offender. This ritual brings a conditional curse upon the offended
person that should he pursue his planned revenge, the talagbusao will be
angered and will cause his death. The offended person desists from pursuing
revenge for fear of the consequences and agrees to settle.
Avenging with the datu/igbuyag’s consent. For the Matigsalug, an of-
fended person may go to the igbuyag to report a crime and ask permission
to kill the offender. The igbuyag gives the offended person three days to kill
the offender. If the offended person fails to do so in three days, the case
goes to the datu for settlement. The offended person may no longer kill the
offender. Doing so is considered disobedience to the igbuyag. The igbuyag
reserves the right to kill the avenger. For the Higaonon, an offended person
must directly go to the datu to report an offense. If the datu deems it neces-
sary for the offender to be killed, he sends the alimaong or mabalaw (tribal
warrior) to carry out the execution. Only the datu has the power to order
an execution.
Settling disputes without the datu. Minor disputes may be settled with-
out the datu/igbuyag. The two parties may simply agree on payment of
manggad. Pamalas is done by offering a chicken to the diwata. In case of
intra-familial conflict, a chicken offering may suffice.
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Dampas. This is practiced only by the Matigsalug. When a person re-

fuses to pay his debt, the igbuyag may order the creditor to steal an animal
or anything of value from the debtor. The stolen animal or good must be
brought to the igbuyag for settlement to start. Failure to bring the stolen
animal or good to the igbuyag is interpreted as stealing and the creditor is
penalized.
Lebut or bake. The source of the conflict is eliminated or killed to stop
further aggravations. The relatives of opposing parties are summoned by
the igbuyag. Each party is delivered to the relatives of his opponent to be tor-
tured and killed. For the Matigsalug, killing the source of conflict is vital.
Non-traditional Mechanisms
In some instances, the lumad also seek the intervention of the barangay
justice system, under the Local Government Code, to settle dispute. In San
Fernando, Bukidnon, disputes between the Matigsalug Manobo and the
Dumagat (lowlanders)—who are not subject to Manobo customary law—
are settled by the lupong tagapamayapa, an arbitration committee created
by the barangay council whose members are appointed by the barangay
captain. The barangay council respects the authority of the datu in settling
disputes among the lumad.
In the case of the Higaonon in Minalwang Claveria, where the popula-
tion is 95% lumad, the lupon is the sole arbitrator. The barangay council is
composed mainly of lumad. Cases that require traditional ways, such as the
tampuda hu balagon, may be referred to the supreme datu.
The Merano Way
The Initial Stage of Conflict

The Meranao have a number of conflict avoidance mechanisms or
conflict prevention strategies. Conflict prevention refers to management of
conflicting goals in the community to avoid violent confrontation. Institu-
tion building is one form of conflict prevention. Among the Meranao, the
institutionalization of the taritib ago igma is one such mechanism. Both
the Meranao’s traditional political system and religion advocate peace. The
sultanate system mandates the use of the sultan’s vast power and resources
to promote peace and harmony. Islam, a term derived from the Arabic word
salam (peace), teaches the upholding of peace. It is a means to attain justice
and deter violence and oppression.
The Meranao try to resolve conflicts at their onset.
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People Involved in Conflict Management
In any conflict situation, the first step is to inform the sultan or datu,
ulama (religious leaders), government officials, politicians, common rela-
tives or go-betweens or any members of the community or any persons
who are experienced and interested in settling disputes, regardless of tribe,
religion, sex, profession, or occupation. These people may then consider
the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the probable facilitators/
mediators.
Identifying the parties involved draws the line between allies and ad-
versaries. Relatives up to the fifth civil degree of either party are considered
legitimate targets of reprisal. Identifying relatives can also mean finding the
best go-betweens.
After knowing the nature and dynamics of the conflict, negotiators de-
cide whether or not it is helpful to try to resolve the dispute immediately,
because there are cases of rido where settlement is best delayed. In this case
the disputants are separated by “buffers” who may be common relatives,
ulama, sultan and datus, politicians, or government law enforcers, to pre-
vent escalation of the conflict. Even women are encouraged to take active
role in the initial stage of conflict resolution. The elders who are knowledge-
able of the genealogy of the conflicting parties also play important role by
explaining to both sides their blood relationships and intermarriage ties.
This helps reduce enmity.
Conflict Escalation
When killing takes place, the most concerned members of the com-
munity, especially common relatives, may organize a team of mediators to
intervene. There are a number of options available to the negotiators/me-
diators. First, if possible, to bring the assailant to the safe custody of the
government authorities, perhaps to the mayor, governor, congressman or
to any influential politician or traditional leader like the sultan or datu or
to the nearest pnp or army detachment or prison detention center, pending
negotiation. If the assailant or his family does not agree to this or if he goes
into hiding, the mediators may try to persuade or pressure the offending
party to move to where they can be safe from the avenging family. After
the parties are separated or the assailant is detained, the negotiators then
establish separate contacts with the parties.
It is important for the facilitators/negotiators to be sensitive to the feel-
ings, interests, and needs of each side. During the preliminary discussion,
the facilitators/negotiators must not offend the maratabat and honor of
the parties or appear biased. Among Meranaos, shame often leads to anger.
When one is shamed in front of people, the tendency is to get angry and
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retaliate against the aggressor. The Meranao can also display an overween-
ing arrogance (kibr). This is why the conflicting parties should be dealt with
by the facilitators/negotiators separately to avoid confrontation. Even at the
end of negotiations, the conflicting parties are not allowed to talk in each
other’s presence so as to avoid the utterance of words that one side may
deem offensive.
Before any talks can commence, well-chosen emissaries (maongangen-a-
sogo) are sent to both sides to ascertain their willingness to talk.
In the discussion of the central issues, it is always helpful for the fa-
cilitators/negotiators to show respect and personal concern for the parties
because a Meranao becomes more violent when he feels that he is not re-
spected or his worth is not recognized. He becomes cooperative when he
feels that he is treated as partner of equal importance to the process. He
must believe that his interests are being protected and that negotiators are
impartial. That is why it is helpful that the aggressor be put in detention or
custody before talks begin.
After thorough discussion of the conflict, possible solutions are offered
to both parties. The solution must be mutually acceptable and beneficial to
both sides. Making both parties feel happy about the expected outcome of
the process is an art form. The hope is to reach a win-win solution.
Traditional Mechanisms
As provided for under the taritib ago igma, the solutions/interventions
that can be resorted to by the facilitators/negotiators include the following:
Kakitas. Death penalty in case of murder, whether or not there are miti-
gating circumstances.
Kandiat. Blood money to be paid to relatives of the victims in case the
killing is accidental or through reckless imprudence, the amount of which
varies depending upon the attendant circumstances of the victim like status,
profession, income, number of dependents, etc.
Kashappa. Denial by the accused, and sometimes by his relatives as well,
before God in the presence of the Qur’an of the charges against him. This
can be resorted to when the issue of the conflict is offense against person,
property, or chastity.
Kashapot. Wearing of white clothing by the aggressor, and sometimes by
some of his relatives, on demand of the aggrieved party, while walking to the
residence of the offended party as a sign of admission of guilt and surrender.
This solution is appropriate for grave rido involving offense against person or
chastity like rape, abduction, elopement, acts of lasciviousness, etc.
Kapheletakan. This penalty requires the offender to carry a piece of bam-
boo with two holes through which his two hands protrude. The duration of
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the penalty depends upon the attending circumstances. This is resorted to
when the offense is against chastity of an unmarried woman, regardless of
the civil status of the male offender.
Kalephad. Eighty lashes or beatings on the back of the unmarried of-
fender in the case of adultery and fornication.
Perajamen. Stoning to death in case of adultery by a married individual
Kakandori. Offender or go-betweens call for a gathering and offer food
and money to those in attendance. There are also prayers to seek blessings
for conflicting parties. This is resorted to in case of light rido involving do-
mestic quarrel or slight injuries. Kandori is also considered as an accessory
penalty for grave rido because it is usually tendered during the gathering
for the final settlement of the rido. The money is provided by the sultan or
datu, politicians, and the people in the community.
Kapangetoma. Offender is seriously reprimanded and warned that a
similar offense in the future will be dealt with strictly using customary law.
Associated with the reprimand/warning is a sermon to the offender on
good manner and right conduct based on the Meranao culture. Applied
for slight rido.
Karila. Pardon by the offended party of the offender in a slight conflict
where no damage or injury is suffered. This is based on the belief that God
loves the forgiving person.
Kataog. Exile or banishment of the offender. This can be imposed on
the offender, regardless of the issue of the conflict.
Dorogen. Offender must return twice the value of what he had stolen
from aggrieved party. Part of the penalty goes to the facilitators/negotiators
as reward.
Ka-salk. Disputed property like land is divided equally among the
disputants.
Kapamalo. Male offender, who denies the charge, is required to give
certain amount of money to a woman who accuses him of offense against
chastity.
Kapamamanikan. Offender is accompanied by his relatives, the sultan
or datus, facilitator/negotiator, and the community members to the resi-
dence of the offended party to ask for pardon.
After a solution is identified the next step is to get the conflicting par-
ties to agree to it. They will do so if both feel that they are winners and their
maratabat, honor, and pride are upheld. It is only when agreements are
implemented that healing and reconciliation can begin.
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The Kandori
The usual manner of culminating the settlement process is the holding
of the gathering known as kandori, attended by respected leaders, politi-
cians, government officials including the pnp provincial director, the Army
brigade commander or detachment commander, the ulama, the disputants,
and their designated representatives. It is on this occasion that the dispu-
tants confront each other for the first time during the process, but none
of them is allowed to speak to avoid offense to anyone’s maratabat,. The
holding of kandori is largely ceremonial because the substantive parts of the
agreement are fulfilled beforehand. But the most important activity in the
kandori is the oath-taking ceremony, where all the parties swear before God
in the presence of the Qur’an to end their rido without reservation. This is
the last stage of the settlement process. The rido is resolved. But to keep the
peace, the parties are encouraged to inter-marry. In case of recurrence of
conflict, the offender starts a new and different rido without reference to
the one resolved.
Some Cases Among the Lumad
The Noble Act of Datu Pinaluay: Changing a Traditional Law

This incident happened in the Higaonon settlement in Minalwang. Ac-
cording to accounts, a conflict ensued between the supreme Datu Pinaluay
and another datu in another community. This led to the conduct of pan-
gayaw between the two communities. Datu Pinaluay was a peaceful man. He
initiated the settling of the dispute between the two communities. After the
exchange of gahum (goods), the tampuda hu balagon was performed to seal
the peace deal. The customary law dictates that when the two parties face
each other in a tampuda, the vine must be cut on both ends. The one who
fails to cut his end of the vine is deemed to be maintaining his grudge and
may be killed by the opposing party without interference from relatives.
During the tampuda, Datu Pinaluay was able to cut his end of the vine
while the other party failed to do likewise. Seeing the uncut vine, Datu
Pinaluay raised his sundang (bolo) and cut the vine in half. According to
accounts, Datu Pinaluay refused to follow the customary law so as to end
the conflict. The incident is seen by many as the first move among the
Higaonon to end the practice of punishing an offender by death. The act
of Datu Pinaluay changed an ancient law. For the past 30 years, the tribe
has not put to death anyone and has not experienced any major conflict
among its people.
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Husay
In the late 60s or early 70s, Kalagangan in San Fernando, Bukidnon,
was already home to majority of the Matigsalug Manobo in the municipal-
ity. This was by virtue of an order of then President Ferdinand Marcos to
declare the area a reservation for the Matigsalug Manobo. They were given
14,000 ha lumad reservation. It was also during that time when the dumagat
(the Bisaya, specifically the Ilonggo) moved into the area to buy or rent land
from the lumad, who were willing to trade their land for food, clothing or
even alcohol. In this manner, the lumad gradually lose their land to the
dumagat. This phenomenon prompted Datu Panuda to rebel against the
barangay governance in Kalagangan which was controlled by the dumagat
who were considered “educated” enough to run the local governance unit.
Datu Panuda wanted the area to be controlled by the lumad but the
dumagat refused to move out. Datu Panuda led a pangayaw against the
dumagat that caused several deaths. The military were detailed in the area
to prevent more bloodshed. The plaza in Kalaganagan used to be a killing
field for both sides.
Datu Panuda was considered a skilled bagani and it was difficult to cap-
ture him in the dense forest. Allegedly, some soldiers and civilian dumagat,
who could not find Datu Panuda, attacked the remote community of Malu-
nasay, razing the village, and killing 12 people, including the village datu’s
son. The raid was considered unjustified which calls for a pangayaw or
magahat. The community prepared to retaliate.
The government, through then Presidential Assistance for National Mi-
norities (panamin) Commissioner Manuel ‘Manda’ Elizalde, acknowledged
the mistake committed by the military and the dumagat civilians. The tribal
leaders were summoned to resolve the conflict and prevent a pangayaw. As
husay (payment of indemnity), a parcel of land along the road was given to
the Malunasay community. The leaders agreed to the husay and immedi-
ately ceased their preparations for the pangayaw.
After some years, the lumad went back to their community. The Malu-
nasay community, together with nine other sitios, became part of the cadt
of the Sinuda Claim. Makopa, the area given to the Malunasay commu-
nity as husay, was in time, inhabited by some dumagat. The lumad allowed
the dumagat to stay on at Makopa on the understanding that the dumagat
would move out once the lumad decide to use the land. However, in a recent
land survey, Makopa was made part of the local government territory. The
Malunasay community which had transferred to Simsimon, objected to this
claim as the area was given to them as husay for the massacre that occurred
in the 1970s.
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At present, two groups are claiming the land as it is technically part of

the Kalagangan Domain, since the Sinuda cadt only extends as far as the
Salug River. Makopa is situated on the other side of the river. The Simsimon
Community, by virtue of their ownership of the land as husay, is asking the
present inhabitants of Makopa to leave as soon as possible. Failure to do so
will lead to pangayaw.
The issue is currently being deliberated in the municipal governance. The
conflict is not so much over land ownership but the fact that the land was
indemnity for the death of lumad kin. It was husay that prevented pangayaw.
Taking away the husay could rekindle the old grudge between the Matigsalug
Manobo of Malunasay and the dumagat migrants of Kalagangan.
The Talaandig Experience: Partisan Politics Breeds Enmity

This is a case of conflict between two related kindred in a Talaandig
community in Lantapan, Bukidnon. The conflict is so old, no one remem-
bers how it all started. To date, the conflict has taken many lives. One com-
munity says the dispute started three decades ago, another says five.
According to an informant from a third community, the two groups are
related. The conflict stemmed from the introduction of electoral politics to
the area. The ancestors of the two kindred, Nawahag and Wingagaw, were
very close cousins. The two families were so tight that whenever one side got
into a fight in a nearby barangay during the tabu (market day), on the next
tabu, the two kin groups would join forces to avenge their common kin. The
fights were usually between them and the dumagat.
When the area was declared a barangay sometime in the 1960s, the
two kin groups alternately held the office of the tiniente del barrio (now
barangay captain). During those times, the heads of the barrios were not
elected but appointed by the gobernadorcillo. The arrangement proved to
be effective as the community lived in harmony. Then came the time when
elections were enacted by virtue of the Constitutional mandate. At first,
the two cousins alternately ran uncontested for barangay captain during
elections. But once Wingagaw decided to run against his cousin, Nawahag,
conflict began. The community was split.
Recently, the barangay secretary, a Wingagaw kin, secretly filed his can-
didacy for barangay captain—running against the incumbent, his uncle, a
Nawahag kin. The uncle had decided to withdraw his candidacy, but was
unable to do so officially. He lost to his nephew. The secret filing of candi-
dacy was seen by the Nawahag side as an insult. Tension between the two
kin groups was rekindled.
It is difficult to trace how the killings started. Some say it started when
two members of the opposing kin got into a brawl during a bayle (community
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dance). A member of the Wingagaw kin reprimanded a drunken Nawahag for
beating his nephew. This started the brawl in which the Nahawag was badly
hurt. There were more scuffles during the next few years but no killings yet.
Later, a Nawahag kin known as a potential challenger of the incum-
bent Wingagaw barangay captain was shot by unidentified gunmen. He was
hospitalized for a few months before he died. The suspects for the killing
were the two nephews and son of the barangay captain who was accused
by the Nawahag kin of masterminding the murder. Despite testimony to
the contrary, the Nawahag insisted on their charge and trouble between the
sides erupted.
Another possible cause of the killings was the accidental death of a
member of the Nawahag kin who tried to stop the fight between two mem-
bers of both families. Apparently, a Nawahag kin was expelled from the
land he tilled by the landlord, a Wingagaw. From then on, the Nawahag,
whenever drunk, would challenge the landlord to a fight. A member of the
Nawahag kin interceded in one incident and was struck in the neck by the
bolo of the landlord. He died and the Wingagaw member admitted the
crime and served a jail sentence.
There were many more killings and brawls that worsened the conflict
between the two kindred groups. The death of a political supporter of one
side would be blamed on the other group. Any tiff between distant rela-
tives of the two sides, no matter how trivial, would be considered an act
of vengeance. So far, more than 30 people have reportedly died from these
incidents.
Some years back, after a New Year incident in the Manupali River which
led to the partial disability of a member of the Wingagaw kin, a tampuda hu
balagon was conducted after the payment of indemnity by the Nawahag kin.
The tampuda ritual was conducted by a datu respected by both kin groups.
The ritual was witnessed by the provincial governor and the municipal trial
court judge.
Still, the killings continued, the most recent of which happened on Feb-
ruary 2005. This may be because the tampuda ritual conducted was specific
to a particular incident. It was not a tampuda for the drawn-out conflict
between the two kin groups. Thus, while the specific conflict may have been
resolved, the bigger one remains.
Currently, the provincial government is trying to end the conflict. In
October 2004, a planned amicable settlement was postponed due to anoth-
er killing. Another attempt was made in November, but to no avail. Both
parties remain suspicious of each other. Military units are posted in the area
to maintain order. Meanwhile, the violence and finger pointing continue.
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Tampuda Hu Balagon
Two young men—Manobo and Talaandig—were very good friends
since they were schoolmates and worked for the same employer. It was the
birthday of the Manobo boy and he invited his Talaandig friend to celebrate
in one of the carinderias of the town. After a few drinks, they went home
for it was already late at night. On their way home, the Talaandig, who was
carrying a knife, stabbed his Manobo friend to death and fled. However, a
witness reported the incident to the Manobo’s family who then consulted
their datu. The initial reaction of the Manobo kin group was to search for
the assailant, to kill him in retaliation, and perform a pangayaw. However,
their datu advised them to wait until he was able to see the Talaandig datu,
who was also the relative of the offender and known for his prowess in ar-
bitration. This matter was also reported to the police, who, along with the
datu, were able to persuade the offender to surrender. Due to the serious-
ness of the offense, several datus from the Manobo and the Talaandig com-
munities were called to investigate. The Talaandig assailant himself could
not explain his motive and felt that he was made to kill his friend by an evil
power which the datu believed was the talabusao/tagbusao (an evil diwata,
also the patron diwata of baganis or warriors).
The datus decided to hold a tampuda hu balagon/baegon to prevent a
full-scale inter-tribal conflict. In the process, the Talaandig group offered in-
demnity in terms of cash, sacks of rice, two carabaos, and a horse. The horse
was returned to the Talaandig because it was puny looking; the Manobo
wanted a healthier mare. This delayed proceedings since a replacement had
to be found.
The tampuda was slated to take place on the night of a full moon, with
the hope that there would be no omens, such as the sound of the limokon
(omen bird). Prior to the tampuda, in the morning of the same day, all the
datus from the two communities who were invited to arbitrate and mediate
the case in the Talaandig tuluga (tribal community), met at the residence of
one of the Talaandig for a ritual. The gathering called upon the intercession
of the diwatas. They shared the mam-on (betel chew), a symbol of respect for
each other, and said their prayers to magbabaya (supreme deity). This was
followed by killing of five chickens, as offerings to the spirits, and the blood
smeared on the feet of those in attendance. Two pigs were killed by stabbing
with a spear and likewise offered as a sacrifice to appease the spirits.
Before noon, the relatives and supporters of the two parties, the datu
mediators, observers, and some members of the police force transferred to
the ceremonial grounds of the tuluga for the tampuda ritual. A small bam-
boo platform was erected four feet above the ground, and decorated with
young coconut fronds. On the platform were a plate containing slices of
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bunga (betel nut), some buyo leaves (pepper leaves) which were sprinkled
with apog (lime from burnt seashells). A young rattan vine (one inch in
diameter) about four feet long was laid across the platform. Near the rattan
was a sharp-looking bladed weapon to be used in cutting the balagon or
vine. Under the platform were a pig and two white-feathered chickens, to
be offered again to the spirits.
The main datu arbitrators from the two tribal communities officiated
the tampuda ritual. Each one took turns in calling on Magbabaya to help
guide them in the ritual that they were to conduct for the resolution of
conflict between their communities. The two chickens were killed first and
the blood smeared around the platform. This was followed by the spearing
of the pig by the participating datus. The cutting of the baegon/balagon by
the two datus took place thereafter. The kin group from each warring party
stood on each side of the platform, while the police watched from a distance.
All held their breath as the vine was cut. The warriors—alimaongs of the
Talaandig and the baganis of the Manobo—held on to their weapons (bo-
los/sundang); the police had their firearms. At one stroke of the weapon by
the datus, the vine was cleanly cut. There was jubilation among both groups;
the women wept and made a sign of the cross (since some were Catholics);
the men embraced each other; and observers applauded. The datus shook
hands and embraced.
In some cases where tampuda is used, the offender may be exonerated
and goes scot-free. However, in this case the offender was required to live
with the family of the victim and assume the responsibility of the dead, such
as farm work. In some cases, the sister of an offender may be the one made
to live with the victim of the family.
Some Cases Among the Meranao
Murder
Hadji Ali, Mama, and Cairod were all natives of Marantao, Lanao del
Sur. Like many Meranaos, they lived and did some trading in a municipal-
ity of Western Visayas. Hadji Ali, who had savings from his employment in
Saudi Arabia, extended loans to Mama and Cairodin. Failure by the debtors
to repay their loans on time soured the ties among the three.
One day, Hadji Ali went missing. His dismembered corpse was found
two days later in a banana plantation. His relatives immediately sent for his
remains. Mama and Cairodin also went missing. Police arrested Mama who
confessed to the crime, but cleared Cairodin who was still at large.
While Mama was serving his sentence in prison, a group of mediators
met the aggrieved relatives of Hadji Ali and negotiated for the freeing of
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Cairodin from the rido on account of Mama’s confession. The mediators

suggested that Cairodin perform a sappa to deny any hand in the crime.
Among Meranao, sappa or denial by swearing before Allah in the presence
of the Holy Qur’an is the most effective mode of settling disputes. After
several attempts, the relatives of Hadji Ali agreed to the sappa provided that
20 of Cairodin’s qualified relatives join him in doing the sappa. This con-
dition was accepted, the ritual performed, and Cairodin exonerated. This
settlement was honored by all parties as it was guaranteed by the group of
mediators who were all respected leaders in Marantao.
As Mama served out his prison term, another group of mediators ne-
gotiated for the settlement of his case. Diat, or blood money was offered
to the relatives of Alli. The amount fixed by the mediators was accepted
and received by the aggrieved party. It was further agreed that upon his re-
lease, Mama would be surrendered to the relatives of Hadji Ali. The purpose
of this temporary settlement was to prevent the spread of the conflict by
shielding the immediate relatives of Mama from vendetta.
Years later, after his release, Mama, instead of returning to Marantao,
stayed in the adjacent municipality. Mama’s release was known to the rela-
tives of Hadji Ali. About a year later, Domaob, the adolescent son of Hadji
Ali, shot to death Esmayatin, the father of Mama, in the adjacent barangay.
Esmayatin died defenseless because he thought their rido had been settled.
The tension heightened once again. Another group of mediators moved to
prevent escalation of the conflict.
When the mediators confronted Domaob about his action, the young
man replied that the other side failed to comply with the agreement to sur-
render Mama to Ali’s family once the former was released from prison.
Months later, Mama took hostage Farouk, the maternal uncle of
Domaob and demanded Domaob as ransom. For a while, there was a stale-
mate. Some elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (milf) were
involved in the negotiation for the release of Farouk. One influential com-
mander of the milf was a relative of Farouk, who took hold of Farouk while
he was in milf hands.
After several attempts at mediation, it was agreed that the blood money
paid by Mama for killing Hadji Ali would be returned and Farouk would be
released without ransom. With the strong influence of the composite team
of mediators, especially milf, the rido was finally settled. Domaob is now a
trader in the Visayas while Mama is a farmer in the adjacent municipality.
Adultery
This conflict involved two Meranao couples living in Davao City, name-
ly, Mr. Ibra and his wife, Sauda; and Mr. Ali and his wife, Bae. Ibra and Sauda
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have five minor children. They had been residing in Davao for over 15 years.
Their marriage was a peaceful and happy one. On the other hand, Ali, a
Meranao, and his wife, Bae, a Maguindanaon were childless.
The two couples had been good residential and business neighbors for
sometime. Ali, however, became suspicious of the seeming intimacy be-
tween his wife and their neighbor, Ibra. Ali was known to their community
as a jealous husband, while Bae was seen as an attractive lady whose gestures
could be easily misunderstood by others. One day, a rumor was circulated
that Ibra and Bae were caught in a compromising position by Ali in a beach
resort. This rumor was fueled by the disappearance of Ali and Bae. The in-
cident was formally reported by Ali to the elders of the community.
During investigation, only Ali was heard as Ibra and Bae went missing.
Later on, it was found out that immediately after the alleged incident in the
beach, Ibra fled to Lanao del Sur via Kidapawan, while Bae also fled to her
hometown in Maguindanao. Upon inquiry by the mediators, Ali made the
following account of the incident:
For several months, I had noticed that my wife and Ibra had
unusually close relationship and I became suspicious of them. I
closely observed and monitored their interactions. On Dec. 15, 2003,
noon, both my wife and Ibra were not in our respective stalls in the
market. I immediately drove my motorcycle to the beach and there
I saw my wife and Ibra having illicit sex. I exchanged blows with
Ibra, but he was able to escape half-naked and my wife was able to
escape also.
There were, however, no witnesses to corroborate Ali’s testimony.

On the other hand, when Ibra was confronted by the mediators in
Marawi City, he disclosed the following information:
It is true that Bae and I had a close relationship but that was
only as neighbors and friends. It is also true Ali saw us together
at the beach on Dec. 15, 2003, but our meeting there was purely
accidental. Bae was there to swim and I was breaking in my new
motorcycle. We did nothing immoral or illicit but only exchanged
the usual greetings between friends. I never exchanged blows with
Ali at the beach or elsewhere. I went to Lanao del Sur to allow Ali
time to cool-off and reflect so he may realize the truth.
Again, there were no witnesses to corroborate Ibra’s testimony. There

were no witnesses to the commission of the alleged crime. Bae gave no state-
ment but wrote a letter denying her husband’s charges and reiterating that
his excessive jealousy had been a source of marital problems.
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The first attempt at settlement in Davao did not prosper. The venue
of the case was transferred to Lanao del Sur per request of the parties. Ali
reported the case to the milf, which immediately assumed jurisdiction. Two
aleem and one commander, all of the milf, who were all related by blood
to the parties, served as mediators to settle the dispute amicably outside of
the milf judicial processes.
Adultery is a capital offense in Islam and the penalty is stoning to death.
To avoid this measure, a three-man team of mediators offered to settle the
case through the traditional taritib ago igma by way of pamalao where the
accused gives money as a means of denying the charges against him.
After series of negotiations and critical judicial consultations, the me-
diators decided on a pamalao or denial money of P50,000. This amount was
given by Ibra to Ali for use as dowry should Ali decide to marry another
woman. The case was settled.
Ibra and Sauda continue to reside in Davao City while Ali has trans-
ferred residence though he and Bae are, reportedly, back together.
Breach of Contract
After the 2000 local elections in Palapa, Lanao del Sur, the newly in-
stalled mayor, Datu Hamis, called for a special meeting of all winning can-
didates in his town. After the meeting, the mayor invited his vice mayor,
Salik Alimoden, for a confidential meeting. The other officials present
were municipal treasurer Malonzo Makir and barangay chairman Lorenzo
Musa. The mayor arranged this meeting with his vice mayor, who belonged
to a rival political party, for reconciliation and effective governance. The
mayor supposedly offered the vice mayor P60,000 every month on condi-
tion that the latter would not question the disbursement of local funds like
the internal revenue allotment (ira). However, this agreement was not put
in writing and after one disbursement, no more funds were given to the
vice mayor.
Whenever the vice mayor would complain to the mayor, he would be
referred to the treasurer who, for his part, would insist on a written order
from the mayor for disbursement of the money.
After many months of being given the go-around, the vice mayor was
able to convince some local officials to file a criminal case against their may-
or before the Ombudsman in Davao City. The mayor was suspended and
faced a possible jail term. In this situation, mediators negotiated with the
vice mayor to withdraw the case and prevent a serious rido. When the vice
mayor refused, the mayor, through negotiators, promised the vice mayor
P80,000 a month in the presence of influential leaders as witnesses to the
new agreement. The vice mayor consented but the agreement was again
RIDO V2.indd 157 10/4/2007 8:23:31 AM

not put in writing. Again, after three releases, no more funds were given the
vice mayor.
One day, while the vice mayor was on his way to Iligan City with his fam-
ily, he met Makir, the treasurer, who was also with his family. Both of them
stopped at the Marines checkpoint. Immediately the vice mayor parked his
car and got off with his son and his brother-in-law, Ali. The treasurer also
left his car to meet the other party. The conversation turned heated and both
sides came to blows. The daughters of the treasurer called for help. The vice
mayor’s son punched one of the girls in the face. To the Meranao, assaulting
a woman verbally or physically is a grave offense against maratabat, so both
parties went home to prepare for the worst. The relatives of the vice mayor
and his wife all went to Pasada, Palapa. Even their relatives residing in the
neighboring municipalities and cities left, fearing a shooting war.
A group of mediators intervened, namely, Judge Ambong Ractum,
sultan of Palapa; Mayor Ramsi Datu Hamis; Mayor Abdul Kilala, sultan
of Pasada; and mayor of Palaos. At first, the offended side refused to talk,
insisting on death for the offender. Eventually, the offended party agreed to
receive money from the offender as penalty for committing grievous ta’azir
of the highest order. The offending party was also required to wear white
cloth as a sign of surrender to the aggrieved party. After series of talks with
religious leaders, a kanduri was held and a prayer ended the rido aspect of
the conflict. However, the vice mayor insisted that trouble would recur un-
less the mayor honors his promise. The mayor, vice mayor and treasurer
finally sat down to settle the matter.
Case of Aborted Rido

Numer wanted to buy ten loaves of bread from the bakery of Edward
that was being minded by his daughter. Unfortunately, the bakery was sup-
plying many retailers as it was the month of Ramadhan and sold no more
than five loaves to each buyer. The girl was hesitant to sell ten loaves of bread
to Numer on suspicion that he might resell them to other customers.
The young lady was unaware that Numer had recently built his own
mosque inside his compound. He needed ten loaves of bread to serve the
members of the jama (those praying on his mosque) at the time of break-
ing fast (iftar).
Numer was angered by the young lady’s refusal to sell him ten loaves.
He had been involved in several past rido and was supposed to be a “feared”
personality. There was a verbal exchange and the girl’s elder brother inter-
vened to ask Numer’s pardon. But instead of being appeased, the customer
slapped the young man, who retaliated. Edward came to his son’s aide and
RIDO V2.indd 158 10/4/2007 8:23:31 AM

beat up Numer. Upon realizing who the customer was, Edward apologized
but Numer would not be mollified.
Numer left the scene but returned after 20 minutes with two vehicles of
armed men who broke into the bakery and took away Edward, his wife, and
son. The family was reportedly brought to a secluded place, described by
some residence as the “killing field” of Numer’s group. Some say the family
was saved by a phone call from Numer’s brother.
Moments later, a nephew and a cousin of Numer led another armed
group who abducted five Christian bakers from the store. Next day, it was
rumored that the baker’s family, as well as four of the bakers, were released
but one remained missing. The TV station abs-cbn Cagayan de Oro cov-
ered this incident but failed to name the individuals involved.
The following day, the bakery was closed the whole day but some Ma-
rines and abs-cbn staff were seen in the vicinity. The involvement of the
military and the media probably influenced the early release of the abduct-
ees. The fifth baker’s fate is still unknown. The bakery reopened the fol-
lowing day. The vice mayor of Marawi City and a provincial official had
reportedly helped to settle the matter.
The above incident illustrates the effectiveness of Meranao indigenous
mechanisms for preventing grave rido. At the first instance, it was the rela-
tives present in the scene who tried to pacify the conflicting parties. Later,
Numer’s sister and brother intervened to prevent the murder of Edward’s
family, and lastly, the recognized leaders who are also related to one or both
sides, helped settle the conflict.
Today, Meranao conflicting parties and negotiators often avail of the
traditional methods of conflict resolution before resorting to the Shari’ah.
Without these methods, up to three times the number rido presently on-
going may have erupted in the past years. These indigenous methods are
mostly observed in the remote areas and least observable in population
centers such as in Marawi City and in the more urbanized municipalities.
It is unfortunate that the oldest of these indigenous methods have been
gradually disappearing, probably due to the deaths of those learned in the
substance and mechanics of these methods.
In the past, sapa and settlement of rido were accompanied by the cut-
ting of a rattan, breaking of a chicken egg, and lighting of a lantern (suga or
sulo) to symbolize the end of conflict and perpetual peace between parties.
With Islam, only the oath-taking portion of the ritual has remained. Other
practices like letakan, lephad, and rajam have also largely disappeared.
With various influences continuing to impinge on Meranao life, includ-
ing the introduction of the cash economy and illegal drugs to an increasing
RIDO V2.indd 159 10/4/2007 8:23:32 AM

number of Meranaos, it is quite possible that present modes of conflict
management will likewise evolve.
Conclusion
Interkin group conflict is common among different ethnic groups—the
lowland Christian communities, the indigenous communities, and Mus-
lim Filipinos. Among the lowland Christians, politics and land disputes
seem to be the main cause of conflict wherein vendetta is perpetrated over
generations. Feuding among the indigenous communities exists also but is
regulated by customary laws. The Muslim Filipinos—Meranao, Tausog, Ira-
nun, and Maguindanao—on the other hand, practice the rido. It is however,
more pronounced among the Meranao of the Lanao region.
Among the Matigsalug Manobo, the customary laws are still very much
observed. Only in cases of conflict involving dumagat and lumad is the non-
traditional mechanism (barangay justice) applied. Among the Higaonon of
Minalwang, Claveria, the barangay justice system is followed but adminis-
tered by the lumad themselves who occupy the barangay offices since nearly
the entire population of the area is indigenous. This is not true though to the
entire Higaonon communities who are still following the traditional way.
The Meranao employ a mix of customary, Islamic, and Philippine laws.
Thus, while a trial may follow Islamic procedure, the resolution may be
based on customary dictates. On the other hand, which among the three
systems of law is employed depends on the specifics of each case. However,
only Philippine legal court decisions are enforced by the police and the
military. As a consequence, the parties who are defeated in these courts may
view the judgment as biased and unjust, and resort to rido
Kin conflict in all three societies is quite damaging and must be pre-
vented at the initial stage. Among the lumad, it is difficult to determine
when a conflict starts or when it escalates. To prevent escalation of conflict,
the offended party may opt to report the matter to the datu. However, once
pangayaw is committed, negotiations are commenced to prevent the maga-
hat which disrupts the subsistence of the communities.
Among the Meranao, the prevention of the escalation of conflict is done
through mediators who may be relatives of both parties, close allies, politi-
cians, the ulama or the sultan. Vital to the settlement of feud is the reckoning
of the genealogical ties between the two conflicting parties. When negotia-
tions at the initial stage fail, rido takes place. Relatives up to the fifth civil de-
gree or second cousins of the conflicting parties become targets for reprisal.
These days, Meranao families are willing to suspend retaliation for as long as
the offender is in jail. Negotiations can involve the offering of blood money
RIDO V2.indd 160 10/4/2007 8:23:32 AM

or giving up the assailant for kitas (death by execution). Intermarriages be-

tween conflicting clans may be held to bring about long-term peace.
The maratabat, bansa and bantug play vital roles in the speedy resolu-
tion of conflict. Among the lumad, while an offense of the bansa or bantug
may lead to pangayaw, the payment of manggad or gahum can appease the
offended. Among the Meranao, an offense to the maratabat is considered
grave and is a usual cause of rido. Thus, in settlements, the maratabat of the
conflicting sides is upheld and respected. The maratabat may also pose as
hindrance to the settlement of conflicts.
Common to the indigenous practice of the Meranao, the Matigsalug
Manobo, and the Higaonon is the tampuda hu balagon—the ritual cutting
of the vine of discord to end all enmity between parties. This is still per-
formed among the indigenous peoples although only for graver conflicts.
Some accounts point out that it used to be done among the Meranao.
Among the Meranao, in the past, settling rido was also accompanied by
the cutting of a rattan, breaking of a chicken egg, and putting out a lamp-
light (suga or sulo) to symbolize the end and non recurrence of the rido.
This indigenous practice, however, was “overshadowed” by the teachings of
Islam and disappeared.
Vine cutting, egg breaking, and extinguishing lamp light was also prac-
ticed by the Higaonon of Minalwang. This shows the cultural similarities
between both people. Other manifestations of this relatedness are the use of
bantug and bantugan to mean “honor” or “pride”; the terms lido and rido to
mean conflict that involves killing and retaliation.
Finally, in all three societies, traditional and non-traditional means of
conflict resolution and management are employed at the outset of conflict
to prevent escalation. The important thing is to settle dispute and restore
social order and harmony.
Recommendations
Matigsalug Manobo and Higaonon
· For the indigenous peoples, the recognition and integration of their
customary laws as means for resolving and managing conflicts at the ba-
rangay governance level is imperative. The laws adhered to by the barangay
governance are appropriate for disputes among the dumagat and may not
be suited to the customs of the lumad.
· Customary laws should be codified for integration into the barangay
justice system.
· A special body or committee at the barangay level must be created for
the lumad and to be administered by them.
RIDO V2.indd 161 10/4/2007 8:23:32 AM

· The research must be expanded to other Lumad communites for fur-
ther comparative studies on conflict management and resolution.
· The study reveals similarities in conflict resolution and management
among the Higaonon and the Meranao as manifested in the terminologies
(rido and lido, bantug and bantugan) and the practice of the tampuda hu
balagon. It is recommended that further studies of both societies, espe-
cially on the indigenous practice of conflict resolution and management,
be pursued.
· The conflict among the Talaandig persists. It is difficult to explain why
such deviation from the lumad norms occurs in this society. The violence
in the area hampered research. Further studies should be conducted after
tension subsides.
Meranao
· Government must conduct comprehensive land surveys and land
titling, adopt certain Islamic rules, and make sure all transactions are
in writing.
· Strict enforcement of accounting and auditing laws, rules and regula-
tions in the different local government units from the armm government
to the barangays, especially in the disbursements of the internal revenue
allotment (ira) and the 20% development funds.
· Premarital and marital guidance counseling seminars on the rights,
duties, and responsibilities of spouses and children; child care; and family
planning. Family management must be institutionalized and required for
the issuance of marriage contract and live birth certificates.
· Integration or incorporation of mandatory 5% reserve funds for ar-
bitration services out of the 20% development funds over and above the
existing funds in all levels of local government units in Lanao provinces
and the Marawi City.
· Integration of Islamic peace education into the curricula in all lev-
els of education and the publication of peace and conflict management
modules for use in seminars, radio-TV programs, Friday sermons (jumah
khutba), and other extension programs.
· Strengthening the arbitration services in all levels of local govern-
ments e.g. Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission (rruc) of
armm, provincial arbitration committees of the provinces, municipal/city
arbitration committees of the municipalities/city and the barangay justice
by providing sufficient funds for salaries and allowances of commissioners
and arbiters.
· Gaining the trust and confidence of the Meranao by strengthening
the criminal justice system in Lanao provinces and the city of Marawi: the
RIDO V2.indd 162 10/4/2007 8:23:33 AM

judicial courts, including Shari’ah courts and the katarungang pambarangay,

the prosecution, the investigation and the custodial services.
· Promotion of the institution of taritib ago igma by its codification
and incorporation into the legal system and the establishment of the agama
court of justice equivalent to barangay justice.
· Strict imposition of laws and ordinances on drugs, alcohol, gambling,
juvenile delinquencies, etc.
· Strict imposition of election laws, rules and regulations and the pros-
ecution, conviction, and imprisonment of the violators.
References
Barton, Roy F. Ifugao Law. California: University of California, 1919.
Burton, Erlinda M. “The Concept of Justice Among the Indigenous Communities of
Northeastern Mindanao: A Comparative Study of Customary Laws and Resolu-
tion of Conflict.” Research Institute for Mindanao Culture Papers, (1991)
Cole, F.C. “The Tingguian: Social, Religious and Economic Life of a Philippine
Tribe.” Field Museum of Natural History, Anthropological Series, 14, 2 (1963).
The Bilaan. In F. Lebar: Ethnic Group of Insular Southeast Asia
Dozier, Edward. The Kalinga of Northern Luzon, Philippines. New York: Holt,
Rhinehart and Winston, 1967.
Ember, Melvin and Carol Ember. Cultural Anthropology. New York: Appleton
Century, 1985.
Garvan, John. The Manobo of the Agusan Valley. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Eth-
nology Series, 1985.
Fernandez. Perfecto. Custom Law in the Pre-conquest Philippines. Diliman: UP Law
Center, 1976.
Hoebel, Adamson. Anthropology: The Study of Man. New York: McGraw Hill Book
Company, 1974.
Lebar, Frank M. Ed. Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia. New Haven: Hu m a n
Relations Area Files Press, 1972.
Maine, Henry. Ancient Law. Every Man Edition, 1959.
Melvin Mednick. “Encampment of the Lake: The Social Organization of a Muslim-
Philippine (Moro) People.” Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago, 1965.
Moore, Grace. “The Tiruray.” In F. Lebar: Ethnic Group of Insular Southeast
Asia, 1963.
Schlegel, Stuart. Tiruray Justice. Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1970.
RIDO V2.indd 163 10/4/2007 8:23:33 AM

E ch a p ter s i x
Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflicts

in North Cotabato and Bukidnon
Guiamel Alim, Jose Bulao Jr., and Ismael G. Kulat
T HIS RESEARCH is about the rido or recurring inter-ethnic conflict

between the Menuvu and Maguindanaon tribes, particularly those in-
habiting the municipalities of Carmen, Kabacan, and President Roxas in Co-
tabato, and the municipalities of Damulog and Kadingilan in Bukidnon.
The Menuvu and Maguindanaon tribes used to be good neighbors. Be-
fore the 1970s, most members of both tribes were fluent in each other’s lan-
guages. They traded and inter-married among each other. They often shared
food and helped build each other’s homes. Property and animals on both
sides were safe from theft. They helped each other in farm work and land
was free for anyone to cultivate. People were free to worship as they please.
During the 1970s, settlers—later to be known as the ilaga—attacked
and killed many Maguindanaon, burned their homes and occupied their
lands. To defend themselves against the ilaga, the Maguindanaon orga-
nized the so-called “Blackshirts.” This conflict was followed by the war be-
tween the Moro National Liberation Front (mnlf) and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (afp), a war that dragged on for many years.
These conflicts soured the ties between the Menuvu and the Maguindan-
aon. Some Menuvu tribesmen were recruited by the mnlf to fight the Mar-
cos regime. After the mnlf-led revolution faded, the Moro Islamic Libera-
tion Front (milf)—which had largely Maguindanaon members—took over
leadership. Many among the Menuvu organized their own armed groups
or joined the paramilitary organizations of the afp—the Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (cafgu) and the Civilian Volunteers Organization
|| 164 ||
RIDO V2.indd 164 10/4/2007 8:23:34 AM

Understanding Inter-Ethnic Conflicts In North Cotabato and Bukidnon || 165
(cvo)—to fight the milf. These events started the rido between the two tribes
which became bitter enemies.
Recently, both sides have felt the need to make peace with each other
and some groups have negotiated peace pacts. However, they realize that
a deeper understanding of the problem is needed for longer lasting solu-
tions. This research is an attempt to help in that understanding. Ordinarily,
relief, rehabilitation, and peace and development programs by both gov-
ernment and non-government agencies are centered on direct victims of
armed conflicts. Victims are assisted to rebuild their lives and communities.
But little of such assistance reaches the remote villages populated by Moro
and indigenous peoples such as the barangays in the municipalities of Car-
men, Kabacan, and President Roxas in Cotabato and the municipalities of
Damulog, and Kadingilan in Bukidnon.
Communities Involved in the Research

Thirteen barangays were included in the research on rido. Four are in Bukid-
non, three in the municipality of Damulog, and one in the municipality of
Kadingilan. Nine communities are in the province of Cotabato. Six of these
are in the municipality of Carmen, two in the municipality of Kabacan, and
one in the municipality of President Roxas. Most of the residents of the ar-
eas covered in the research earn their livelihood from farming, poultry and
livestock, small-time logging, and traditional crafts.
Angga-an
Barangay Angga-an is on the southern part of Damulog, Bukidnon,
along the boundary with Cotabato which is separated from Bukidnon by
the Turonan River. The barangay is 18 km from the town center of Damulog.
Its population of 1,300 (637 male, 663 female) include Menuvu (56%), Ma-
guindanaon (34%), and Bisayan (Ilonggo/Cebuano/Ilocano, 10%). Some
58% of the residents, mostly Maguindanaon, have been displaced. Only 2%
of Angga-an’s 5,152 ha of land is agricultural, the rest are hills and forests.
Cabadiangan
Cabadiangan is 17 km from the municipality of Kadingilan, next to the
boundary of Cotabato. Its population of 3,729 (2,709 male, 1,020 female)
include Bisayan (Ilonggo/Cebuano/Ilocano, 66%) and Menuvu (34%).
Only 2% of the barangay’s 3,861 ha of land is agricultural, the rest are hills
and forests.
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Cadiis
This barangay of Carmen is also the last of Cotabato’s before one enters
Bukidnon to the north. It is 33 km from its town center. Its population of
1,581 (955 male, 626 female) includes Bisayan (Ilonggo/ Cebuano/Ilocano,
58%), Menuvu (24%), and Maguindanaon (18%). Thirty percent—Magu-
indanaon and Menuvu—are displaced. Its land area is 5,464 ha, of which
89% is agricultural, 10% grassland, and 1% forest.
High Point, Macabenban

This sitio (village) of Macabenban is where the Menuvu live. Maguin-
danaon and Iranun used to live here but are now afraid to return.
Kimadzil
Kimadzil is in the middle of Carmen, between barangays Liliongan and
Kibudtungan. It is 15 km from the town center and has a population of 1,520
(621 male, 899 female) of Menuvu (47%), Maguindanaon (30%), and Bi-
sayan (Ilonggo/Cebuano/Ilocano, 23%). Twenty percent of this population,
mostly Maguindanaon, is displaced. It has a land area of 4,664 ha but almost
all are hilly and mountainous.
Kisupaan
This barangay is 30 km from the town of President Roxas, Cotabato.
It is east of Kabacan, Cotabato, along the Pulangi River. Its population
is 2,465 (1,545 male, 920 female), composed of Menuvu (64%), Maguin-
danaon (20%), and Bisayan (Ilonggo/ Cebuano/Ilocano, 16%). Internally
displaced persons (Maguindanaon and Menuvu) comprise 23% of the
population. The land area is 3,710 ha, 33% of which is plain, 41% hilly, and
26% mountainous.
Liliongan
This barangay is 18 km from Carmen, northwest of Kimadzil. Its popu-
lation is 4,322 (1,976 male, 2,346 female), composed of Bisayan (Ilonggo/
Cebuano/Ilocano, 54%), Menuvu (37%), and Maguindanaon (9%). Seven
percent of the population is displaced, and these are Maguindanaon. Its
land area is 12,029 ha, 30% of which is plain, 40% rolling and cultivated,
20% forest, and 10% unspecified.
Macabenban
This is the northernmost barangay of Carmen. It is eight km from the
highway which passes barangay Malapag, along the boundary with Bukid-
non. Its population of 1,788 (885 male, 903 female) include Menuvus (95%)
RIDO V2.indd 166 10/4/2007 8:23:34 AM

and Bisayan (Ilonggo/ Cebuano/Ilocano, 5%). The Maguindanaon and Ira-

nun, who used to live here, have all been relocated. The land area is 3,000 ha,
20% of which is plain, 50% rolling, 30% hilly or mountainous.
Malapag
This barangay is 27 km north of Carmen, below Macabenban and Ca-
diis. Its population is 7,080 (3,254 male, 3,726 female), composed of Bisayan
(Ilonggo/ Cebuano/Ilocano, 54%), Maguindanaon (43%), and Menuvu
(3%). Internally displaced persons compose 15% of the population, mostly
Maguindanaon. Its land area is 8,545 ha, 41% of which is plain, 20% rolling,
39% hilly or mountainous.
Omonay
Omonay is on the southwest part of Damulog, Bukidnon, next to the
boundary of Cotabato. It is 14 km away from the town proper. Its popula-
tion is 1,749 (830 male, 919 female), spread among the Bisayan (Ilonggo/
Cebuano/Ilocano, 48%), Menuvu (35%), and Maguindanaon (17%). The
displaced persons (mostly Maguindanaon, but some Menuvu also) are 46%
of the population. Its land area is 5,709 ha but only 2% of this is agricultural,
the rest consists of forests.
Simbuhay
This barangay is 27 km northeast of Kabacan, Cotabato. Its population
of 1,440 is split between Menuvu and Maguindanaon. Internally displaced
persons comprise 34% of the population. Its land is area 2,566 ha, 70% of
which is plain and 30% hilly or mountainous.
Tamped
Tamped is the northern barangay of Kabacan, the last before the bound-
ary town of President Roxas. The barangay is about 60 km from Kabacan
proper. Its population of 1,320 is composed of Menuvu (65%), Maguin-
danaon (25%), and Bisayan (Ilonggo/ Cebuano/Ilocano, 10%). Displaced
persons in this barangay are 37% of the population, mostly Maguindanaon
and Menuvu. Its land area of 1,290 ha is comprised of 25% plains and 75%
hills or mountains.
Tangkulan
Tangkulan (officially, New Rizal) is on the southeast part of Damulog,
Bukidnon, next to the boundary of Cotabato. It is 24 km from the town
proper. Its population is 1,028, composed of Bisayan (Ilonggo/ Cebuano/
RIDO V2.indd 167 10/4/2007 8:23:35 AM

Ilocano, 52%) and Menuvu (48%). Its land area is 14,345 ha but 25% of this
is forestland, the rest are hills or mountains.
Findings and Analysis

Profile of the Communities
TABLE 1. Population Distribution by Tribe/ Ethnic Group
Maguindanaon Menuvu Bisayan Total

Communities % % % Population
Angga-an 34 56 10 1,300
Cabadiangan 09 33 57 3,729
Cadiis 18 24 58 1,851
High Point (included in Macabenban)
Kimadzil 30 47 23 1,520
Kisupaan 20 64 16 2,465
Liliongan 9 38 54 4,322
Macabenban 51 46 03 1,788
Malapag 43 03 53 7,080
Omonay 17 35 48 1,749
Simbuhay 33 67 - 1,440
Tamped 25 65 10 1,320
Tangkulan - 48 52 1,028
Total 29,592
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Table 2 shows there are 7,609 internally displaced persons in these com-
munities, out of a population of 29,322. The idps indicated in the table
below are those that moved out of their respective communities.
TABLE 2. Ethnicity and Percentage of Internally Displaced Persons
Place % Mostly affected

Angga-an 58 Maguindanaons
Cabadiangan 09 Maguindanaons
Cadiis 35 Mag. and Menuvus
High Point (included in Macabenban)
Kimadzil 20 Maguindanaons
Kisupaan 20 Mag. and Menuvus
Liliongan 25 Mag. and Menuvus
Macabenban 65 Maguindanaons
Malapag 15 Maguindanaons
Omonay 46 Maguindanaons
Simbuhay 34 Maguindanaons
Tamped 37 Maguindanaons
Tangkulan _0 .
Total Population 29,322
Total Displaced 7,609 (26%)
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History and Cause of Inter-ethnic Rido

Fifty-three percent of the respondents (91 out of 172) say there was harmony
between the Menuvu and Maguindanaon in research areas before the 1970s.
The 47% who did not mention this peaceful co-existence were either born
after the 1970s or were too young to remember those times. The fluency of
the older Menuvu and Maguindanaon in each other’s languages, the com-
mon histories and traditions as well as past intermarriages between the two
groups show that the tribes had lived in peace for many generations before
troubles between them erupted. As to the causes of inter-ethnic rido, the
communities gave a total of 161 responses. These were grouped into nine
categories, as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Frequency and Percentage of Causes of Inter-ethnic Rido as Given by the Communities
Responses Frequency %
1.The activities of the ILAGA in the 70s and 80s 45 27.95
2. Unresolved political boundary between
Cotabato and Bukidnon Provinces 21 13.04
3. Loss of culture and traditions 18 11.18
4. Land disputes 17 10.56
5. Only implicated in big wars 16 9.94
6. Third party intervention 15 9.32
7. Killings, ambushes, massacres, intrusion 12 7.45
8. Begun with settlers 11 6.83
9. Others 6 3.73
a. Ideological conflict;
b. Cattle rustling;
c. Globalization and modernization;
d. Lack of respect to other tribe’s culture;
e. Divide and rule tactics;
f. Lack of communication among the tribes)
Total 161 100.00
Most respondents point to the activities of the ilaga in the 1970s as the
cause of inter-ethnic rido. It is strange that while the ilaga was composed
mostly of Bisayan (refers to all settlers including Ilonggo, Cebuano, etc.),
that group is no longer involved in the present conflict. It would seem that
the Bisayan ignited a conflict that the Menuvu and Maguindanaon have
sustained. This realization should be enough for the conflicting sides to
end their enmity.
The acronym ilaga has come to mean Ilonggo Land Grabbers Associa-
tion. The ilaga was founded in Cotabato City in September 1970 by seven
municipal mayors of the then Cotabato empire province. Although almost
all the leaders and members of this group were Ilonggo, there were some
Cebuano and Menuvu who joined for personal gains or to avoid troubles
with the Ilonggo. It must be noted, however, that not all Ilonggo in central
RIDO V2.indd 169 10/4/2007 8:23:35 AM

Mindanao belonged to this group. The group had relatively few members
but they were armed and tolerated, if not encouraged and helped, by some
national and local officials. The purpose of this group was to grab lands by
intimidating the people, usually Maguindanaon. Some ilagas were able to
acquire legal titles to lands occupied by Maguindanaon or Menuvu.
The ilaga burned down the homes of the original land owners, forced
them to flee, then occupied the land and obtained titles to the property. If
the original owners did not come back, the intruders would eventually own
the land. If the owners came back, they had to negotiate with the ilaga to
avoid further violence. After some years, the group disbanded but much
lands had changed hands. The entire former Cotabato province (divided
now into Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato,
and Sarangani) was infested by the ilaga (which means “rat” in the local
language). When the ilaga came to the communities, the people fled. Some
Menuvu were recruited by the ilaga as guides in attacking the Moro com-
munities. The Moro felt betrayed by these Menuvu.
In some communities, both Maguindanaon and Menuvu fled, leaving
their lands to the ilaga. In other communities, only the Maguindanaon or
the Menuvu fled. When the Maguindanaon fled, some Menuvu occupied
the abandoned lands. This was the situation in the 1970s when the ilaga
sowed terror among the inhabitants.
The second major cause of inter-ethnic conflict, according to respon-
dents, is the unresolved boundary issue between Cotabato and Bukidnon.
Going north, Carmen is the last town of Cotabato before one enters Damu-
log, Bukidnon. Kadingilan is a town next to Damulog but borders Cotabato
province. Some barangays or villages of Carmen, Damulog, and Kadingilan
are located side by side, particularly the barangays of Angga-an, Cabadian-
gan, Cadiis, Macabenban, Omonay, and Tangkulan. Residents of one ba-
rangay may sell their products and pay their taxes (e.g., community tax) in
another barangay which is more accessible. Conflicts arise when local offi-
cials demand that these transactions be made in the proper places. However,
residents are often confused because the boundaries are unclear.
The third perceived cause of conflict is the loss of culture and traditions.
The fourth cause is land dispute, since the ilaga had driven many peo-
ple from their original property. Often, whenever Menuvu or Maguindanao
return to the homes they fled from, they find the land occupied by others.
Sometimes the land would be titled under other people’s names.
The fifth cause of inter-ethnic feud, according to respondents, is the
fact that they are often dragged into the war between government and the
Moro secessionist groups.
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The sixth perceived cause is third-party intervention. People in the

communities say some politicians and business people like rido so that
they can buy up the goods and animals from fleeing residents and resell
these at higher prices elsewhere. Politicians also benefit from the violence
since most of their enemies flee while those who remain must support the
incumbent leaders.
The seventh cause of conflict—killings, ambushes, massacres, intru-
sion—is a result of the previous causes. This is rido proper: killing as
retaliation.
The eight cause of conflict are settlers who exploit the lack of formal
schooling among the Menuvu and Maguindanaon. These settlers would
buy lands from the original owners at below market value but would obtain
titles to more property than what they actually bought. There were also
cases where the settlers would ask permission to till lands owned by one
tribe only to mortgage them to another tribe. The settlers would abscond
with the money and leave the tribes fighting over ownership of the lands.
Ideological conflict happens when one group forces another group
or person/s to join in the struggle for self-determination or self-rule. The
mnlf—and later, the milf—had to recruit members from outside the Ma-
guindanaon tribe or Moro people. Some Menuvu and a few Bisayan joined
these armed groups and came in conflict with the local authorities.
Cattle rustling is another source of conflict, as well as the widening gap
between rich and poor tribes as a result of the modern methods of agricul-
ture employed by some tribes.
From 1972 to 1975, more displacements took place as the Menuvu felt
themselves victimized by the Marcos regime and so joined the mnlf to
fight alongside the Maguindanaon against government soldiers who were
considered allies of the Bisayan. Thus, more Maguindanaon and Menuvu
lands were occupied by the ilaga.
In the 1980s, some political leaders armed local leaders—mostly Bi-
sayan—to fight against the mnlf. In the 1990s, the milf gained more power
and set up perimeter defenses in its areas. There were massacres and am-
bushes. The boundary dispute between the two provinces arose. There were
legal and illegal land disputes. There were instances when Menuvu and Ma-
guindanaon were claiming same areas. Leaders of the indigenous peoples
were armed by local executives to go against the Maguindanaon and Iranun.
The Pentagon, a kidnap-for-ransom group, based itself in the area. All these
contributed to heightening inter-tribal conflict.
Since 2000, the proliferation of firearms, illegal occupations of lands,
and displacement of peoples have continued unabated. Although the Menu-
vu and Maguindanao are the principals in the conflict, Bisayan involved
RIDO V2.indd 171 10/4/2007 8:23:36 AM

with government and multinational corporations, as well as politicians and
business people, are also perceived as indirectly involved in the conflict.
Factors That Prolonged Inter-ethnic Rido
TABLE 4. Frequency and Percentage of Factors which Prolonged or Aggravated Rido
Elements/Dynamics Frequency %
1. Ideological conflict (AFP vs MNLF or MILF wars) 36 23.08
2. Vendetta killings, massacres, harassment, ambushes 34 21.79
3. Land disputes 26 16.67
4.“Third-party” intervention (Pentagon, SARCOM, politicians, businessmen, etc. 16 10.26
5. Loss of culture and traditions 14 8.97
6. Rampant cattle rustling 11 7.05
7. Recruitment of either group into armed groups (AFP/CAFGU, MILF, MNLF, etc.) 7 4.49
8. Others:
a) cultural discrimination
b) No concrete solutions given to problems
c) Establishment of MILF perimeter defense
d) Political boundary conflict between North Cotabato and Bukidnon
e) Rumors 12 7.69
Total 156 100.00
Almost one-fourth of the 156 responses consider “ideological conflict

(afp vs. mnlf or milf wars)” as the major factor that has prolonged rido.
The ilaga is no longer mentioned. The next most frequently mentioned fac-
tor is “vendetta killings, massacres, harassment, ambushes.” This shows how
rido is self-perpetuating. The third is “land disputes” (16.67%) followed by
“third parties” like the Pentagon group which is perceived to be fomenting
rido to make it easier to continue its kidnapping activities. Sarcom (Sariling
Command), another armed group, is also seen as interested in prolonging
the rido since their services and weapons can be sold to conflicting sides.
Respondents also believe that some politicians and business people want
rido to continue to advance their political and business interests.
The fifth cause of rido prolongation is the “loss of culture and traditions”
where conflicts can no longer be resolved through the traditional ways but
are brought instead to government officials like the barangay chairperson
or the lupong tagapamayapa (arbitration board). This process is alien and
tedious to those involved and thus often fails. The next factor, “rampant
cattle rustling,” is committed by lawless elements who take advantage of
the situation. “Recruitment of either group into armed groups” is number
seven on the list. Most of the Menuvu prefer to join the afp/cafgu while
the Maguindanao usually join the milf or mnlf where they gain firearms
to use against tribal enemies.
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“No concrete solution given to problems” means that persons in au-

thority, both traditional and constitutional, have not come up with definite
solution to end rido. They may apprehend individuals and extract promises
from them to stop the violence, but usuallly very light or no sanctions at all
are given and the fighting continues.
The perimeter defenses of the milf, that usually include military camps,
are also perceived as prolonging rido. When the milf declares an area as a
perimeter defense, it becomes off limits to all non-milf members who may
be presumed to be enemies. Problems arise when the areas for such defenses
include Menuvu farms. Even if the Menuvu gain permission to work their
land, they can be caught in the crossfire should fighting erupt. They often
also have to give the milf a share of the harvest.
The conflict over provincial boundaries is also perceived as an aggravat-
ing factor.
Effects of Inter-ethnic Rido on the Communities
TABLE 5. Frequency and Percentage of Effects of Rido on the Communities
Effects of Rido Frequency %

1. Evacuation 23 19.01
2. Damages to crops and properties 19 15.70
3. Sickness, hunger and death 18 14.88
4. Burning of houses 13 10.74
5. Misunderstanding and shattered relations 13 10.74
6. Trauma 11 9.09
7. Civilians are implicated in wars 8 6.61
8. Others: 16 13.22
a) Loss of respect of both tribes towards each other
b) Poverty
c) Loss of farm animals
d) Discrimination
e) Widened gap between the two tribes
f) Children’s schooling stoppedg)Unstable peace and order
Total 121 100.00
Most respondents point to evacuation as the major effect of rido

(19.01%). People were driven from their homes to live in evacuation shelters
or with their relatives. Damage to crops and property is second in frequency
as people have to leave behind crops, livestock, and agricultural implements
which would eventually be lost.
The third most frequent effect is “sickness, hunger, and death,” due
to cramped and unhygienic conditions in evacuation centers. Burning
of homes also created much pain as people lost everything they owned,
RIDO V2.indd 173 10/4/2007 8:23:37 AM

including precious possessions. Burning of homes was intended not only
to drive people away but to keep them away permanently. Still, those who
had nowhere else to go eventually returned to rebuild their lives despite
the hardship.
Misunderstanding and shattered relations between the two tribes ranked
number five. Because of the trauma, ranked number six, people have lived
in constant fear and many have taken up arms. Responses show that the two
tribes have lost respect for each other. Many of them have been reduced to
poverty by war. Their children had to give up school as classrooms became
shelters and teachers fled. To the rural folk, their children’s education is seen
as a way out of poverty.
Role of Land Ownership in Rido

Land plays a significant role in this conflict. For the Maguindanaon, land
is the third principal side in the symbolic triangle that makes their lives
meaningful, with Allah—who governs everything—being the first, and the
people who worship God being the second. When land is taken away from
the worshippers, it is tantamount to taking away their religion.
For the indigenous people, life is a circle where their land, identity, and
survival are enclosed. Taking away their land means taking away their life,
identity, culture, and survival. Land is connected to their tribal governance
and has political significance and economic value.
Relation of Rido to Ideological Conflict

At a deeper level, this conflict has to do with ideology. The Maguindanaon
believe in their right to self-determination; the Menuvu in their right to
tribal governance, to live by their own culture. For the Maguindanaon, the
ideological aspect of the conflict is accentuated by the liberation groups
like the mnlf and milf, while for the indigenous peoples, this is accentu-
ated by the fact that they have yet to agree on a collective name—lumad,
or highlander, or cultural communities. While peace pacts made by Ma-
guindanaon communities are subject to approval of “higher” authorities
like the milf, the indigenous peoples’ communities are free to chart their
own course to peace.
Traditional/ Indigenous Systems of Resolving Inter-ethnic Rido

Most respondents mentioned the bangon system as a means of settling vio-
lent conflict. Bangon literally means “to raise” or “to restore.” It is believed
RIDO V2.indd 174 10/4/2007 8:23:37 AM

that violence degrades the victim, the community, as well as the aggressor.
Bangon raises them up or restores them to their original state and relation-
ships before the commission of violence.
In the presence of the aggressor, the elders and community members
discuss the reasons and extent of the violence and the proper reparations.
The discussion usually ends with the aggressor offering his animals for the
symbolic cleansing of the community and repairing his ties with the vic-
tim. For instance, three carabaos or horses—one for having committed the
crime, one for healing the community, and one for restoring good rela-
tions with the victim—may be offered by the aggressor. The bangon is done
through a ritual called pamaras.
The second method of resolving rido is called sapa, where the culprit
agrees not to repeat the offense under pain of incurring curses and sanctions.
The third method is “elders dialogue,” where elders of the Menuvu
(timuays) and elders of the Maguindanaon (datus) meet to talk over instances
of violence committed between members of their respective tribes. This is
generally the way cases brought before the community is settled.
Every tribal village has a council of elders. Whenever trouble occurs in
a community, the offender is often related to one or more members of the
council who will want to see the matter settled. The elders arrive at a com-
promise. The council can also resort to bangon.
The fourth method of conflict resolution is through the application of
husay or settlement. This is the indigenous court of justice that is presided
by a village leader who is so acknowledged because of his wealth, education,
wisdom, bravery or any other outstanding trait, or a combination of these. The
offender and the victim are brought before this leader who will ask them the
facts of the case and their views on how justice may better be served. If the three
agree on the manner of rendering justice, the agreement is implemented. Sanc-
tions are usually imposed. In cases of stealing, restitution of what was stolen
is required. A penalty may also be imposed. If the conflict caused injury, the
costs of medical treatments are asked to be paid and a possible penalty im-
posed. If killing is involved, bangon may be resorted to.
TABLE 6. Frequency and Percentage of the Traditional Systems Mentioned as Methods of Settling Rido
in the Communities
Traditional Systems Frequency %

1. Application of bangon system 19 15.20
2. Sapa 15 12.00
3. Elders’ (timuays and datus) dialogue 15 12.00
4. Application of husay system 14 11.20
5. Customs and Traditions (adat) system 9 7.20
6. Application of umpongan policy 9 7.20
7. Signing of covenants 8 6.40
8. Tamped 7 5.60
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(CON’D) TABLE 6. Frequency and Percentage of the Traditional Systems Mentioned as Methods of Set-
tling Rido in the Communities
9. Others:
a) Bametara
b) Diande
c) Kukuman
d) Pamarase Bagkes
f) Daway
g) Lindero
h) Shari’ah court
i) Tempura te balagen
j) Putlanan 29 23.20
Total 125 100.00
Recommendations
Three traditional systems of settling violent conflicts were mentioned in the
recommendations. These include all the general processes. Table 8 gives the
comparison of these same or similar items.
TABLE 7. Frequency and Percentage of the Recommendations of the Communities for Settling Rido in
the Communities
Recommendations Frequency %
1. Revival of the old people’s system 17 13.49
2. Peace dialogues by the tribal elders 16 12.70
3. Covenant signing (diande) 14 11.11
4. Unity of the tri-people 13 10.32
5. Coordination and consultations 12 9.52
6. LGUs/NGOs support to tribal systems and programs 12 9.52
7. Avoid 3rd-party interventions 10 7.94
8. Settlement of political boundary of North Cotabato and Bukidnon 10 7.94
9. Others 22 17.46
a) Intermarriages
b) Reconciliation programs
c) Determine leaders of each tribe
d) No return of Moro in High Point
e) Back to history (researches)
f) Mediation by LGUs/NGOs
g) Strengthening and implementation of peace covenants
h) Moro-IP youth peace assemblies
i) Moro-IP promotion of understanding
j) Minimize luxuries
k) Immediate return of IDPs
l) Rehabilitation supports to returning IDPs
m) Survey of ancestral domains
n) Assistance to remote schools
o) Respect of other tribe’s culture
Total 126 100.00
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TABLE 8. Similar Items in Traditional Systems and in the Recommendations for Settling Rido in the
Communities
Traditional Systems Recommendations

3. Elders’ (Timuays and Datus) Dialogues 5. Coordination and consultations
3. Elders’ (Timuays and Datus) Dialogues 2. Peace dialogues by the tribal elders
5. Customs and Traditions (adat) system 9.o) Respect of the other tribe’s culture and traditions
7. Signing of Covenants 3. Covenant Signing (Diande)
Although bangon is a specific method, it is used in most cases where

violence has been inflicted. In that sense, it is a general method.
Since the questions raised in the workshops were open ended and the
traditional methods were not presented to the communities as specific
choices for their recommendations, it is remarkable that the respondents
recommended the same general methods. This shows the shared values and
perspectives of the community that was present in the various workshop
groups.
Recommendations
• Promote and strengthen mediation and peace dialogues among
timuays and datus of conflicting parties.
• Provide relief and rehabilitation assistance, including psycho-social
services, to returning internally displaced persons (idps),
• Form and strengthen mechanisms like the council of elders to imple-
ment peace pacts.
• Conduct research projects on Menuvu and Maguindanaon culture,
and the customary and traditional systems of resolving conflict.
• Settle with finality the boundary issue between North Cotabato and
Bukidnon.
• Form Moro-indigenous peoples youth peace assemblies and consul-
tations.
• Expedite applications for ancestral domain claims of the Moro-in-
digenous peoples.
References
Hyppolyt A. S. Pul. Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and Triggers in
Northern Ghana’s Konkomba-Dagomba Wars. www.ethnonet-africa.org/
p95pubs.php - Internet. Accessed 30 September 2004.
Kauffman, Stuart J. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies. highbeam.com/library/doc0.asp?docid=1G1:
120190127&refid=ink_tptd_mag. Accessed 26 September 2004.
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Kownslar, A. O. and T. L. Smart. People and Our World A Study of World History.
New York: Holt and Rinehart and Winston, 1981.
Llorca, Raymond. “Maratabat Society and the Non-Maranao.”The Technician (July
1986): 108-129.
Obioha, Emeka E. A. Ethnic Conflicts and the Problem of Resolution in Contempo-
rary Africa: A Case for African Options and Alternatives. www.eldis.org/static/
DOC10376.htm. Accessed 24 September 2004.
Rodil, B. R. “The Indigenous Peoples’ Quest for Homelands.” Notre Dame Journal,
30, 2 (2001): 98-109.
Sakili, Abraham P. “Muslim Perspective of the Mindanao Problem.” Kasarinlan 11,
3 & 4 (1996): 116-129.
Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life. www.alibris.com/search/search.
cfm?qisbn=3001001321
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|| 179
Cheap Guns, Costly Feuds

By Carolyn O. Arguillas in Jolo, Sulu of Siasi, for instance, clans shoot each other
using mortars. “They don’t use small firearms.
S ETTLING CLAN feuds doesn’t come
cheap in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). When govern-
They use mortars, machine guns,” priest Jose
Ante of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate says.
ment and rebel forces get dragged into the He has been in Sulu for 24 years.
conflict, it can trigger a full-blown war and In the ARMM areas of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
cost taxpayers millions of pesos. Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and
The feuds almost always end up bloody the Islamic city of Marawi, there are around
because guns are affordable and available in 35,000 loose firearms as of the first week
the ARMM. Senior Supt. Suaibon Jalad, the of November 2004, says ARMM regional po-
provincial police chief, says reports reach- lice chief Supt. Sukarno Ikbala. This figure
ing him indicate that in the black market, an includes the 9,000-10,000 firearms of the
M-14 costs P50,000 while an M-16 Armalite Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
costs P35,000. In Lanao del Sur, an M-14
reportedly costs P60,000, an M-16 Armalite, Unreported Crimes
P40,000. In Maguindanao, both firearms are Jalad acknowledges that the threat posed
reportedly available for P25,000 each. by the Abu Sayyaf has declined. These days,
Normally, branded firearms cost P90,000 “most of the crimes here are purely on per-
to P100,000 each. sonal feuds and personal grudges” or what
Because guns are cheap in the area, bul- is commonly referred to as family or clan
lets are cheap, too: P18 for an M-14 and feuds or rido in Maranao and Maguindanao.
P12 for an M-16 in Sulu. In Lanao del Sur, Jalad, a Tausug, says it is called kontra-
an M-14 bullet is cheaper at P10 while an kontra here. Ikbala, also a Tausug, says an-
M-16 bullet costs between P11 and P12. In other term for it is banta-banta.
Maguindanao, an M-16 bullet costs P16. The regional trend is similar to Sulu’s. In
Usually, bullets cost P50 each. fact, Ikbala takes pride in saying that ARMM
(Several reports have indicated that the has “the lowest crime rate” in the entire
firearms and bullets are bought from the country. “Robbery and theft cases are few.”
Armed Forces of the Philippines, a claim Based on reported cases, perhaps ARMM
the AFP denies, or from soldiers who want may, indeed, register the lowest crime rate.
to earn extra cash. In the July 2003 failed Many crimes, however, end up unreported in
Oakwood mutiny, this was among the com- this region where guns can easily snuff out
plaints aired by junior military officers.) the lives of witnesses.
Jalad estimates that some 10,000 loose Ikbala says there have been no recent
firearms are spread across Sulu’s 18 towns. kidnappings in the ARMM. The Abu Sayyaf
The figure may even be low, he says. “Be- is now “playing hide-and-seek,” and many
fore, each house had a gun. People up there of them have surrendered.
in the mountains, almost every household There have also been very few skir-
had a gun.” mishes between the government and the
The guns are not licensed because MILF as the ceasefire forged July last year
“there is no license for long firearms and is still holding.
these are all long firearms.” “What we have now are the rido,” Ikbala
The M-14s and M-16s are not the only says.
firearms used in clan feuds. In the island town In Sulu, “almost every month, you can
RIDO V2.indd 179 10/4/2007 8:23:38 AM

expect an encounter or firefight between a banta-banta or kontra-kontra eats such a

two factions. Almost every weekend we in- huge chunk of the meager budget pie. From
troduce a solution to this through peaceful the main headquarters in Jolo, going to the
means, through amicable settlement,” says conflict areas—whether in the mainland or
Jalad. Every month, “you can expect two or in the islands—already requires a huge ex-
three incidents” of family feuds, but “some pense in transportation.
other months, zero.” He says, “But if you get “Houses could burn down during the
the average, it [happens] once a month.” firefight, so the provincial government gives
At the time of the interview in Septem- a little amount in order that these victims
ber, Jalad and his team had just arrived from could rebuild their houses,” Jalad says. To
Luuk town “to pacify” the armed groups respond to the relief and rehabilitation of the
involved in a kontra-kontra. He doesn’t affected villages, the municipal and provin-
remember a kontra-kontra that ended in a cial governments draw from their calamity
full-blown war in Sulu. funds.
Ikbala says that, in some instances,
Blood Money when talks between the warring parties are
But in Maguindanao, rido has repeatedly in danger of collapsing because one party
threatened the peace talks, especially when has not raised the blood money it has to pay
warring clans seek the intercession of clan to the other, the LGU helps put up the blood
members who are either in the military or money.
the MILF. Moro clans are huge because a
man can have four wives. Western vs. Traditional Laws
Jalad says they put themselves in the Ikbala says the regional police have un-
middle of the warring parties so a cease- dergone seminars on conflict resolution.
fire can be declared. They also tried out an Recently, they listened to North Upi Mayor
experiment: they got the warring parties to Ramon Piang deliver a lecture on tapping
sign a covenant in English and Tausug. The traditional ways in resolving conflicts. Ik-
understanding was that if one side started bala says the first phase was identifying
making trouble, government forces would the feuding families and the stakeholders,
help the other side. and identifying as well whom the warring
But clans, especially those that are in- forces will listen to. The second phase was
fluential, apparently are well aware that the seminar.
government forces—the police or the mili- For Governor Loong, focusing on a “mas-
tary—have inferior arms. Jalad says that 20 sive livelihood program” is one way of solv-
percent of police personnel nationwide have ing these feuds. “Sometimes, the conflict
no firearms. In fact, he adds, a former ARMM stems from economic problems.”
police chief made it a requirement for police Ante says he wanted former Mayor
applicants to buy their own firearms. Ibrahim “Toto” Paglas of Datu Paglas, Ma-
Jalad says they succeeded in settling a guindanao, to “give a testimony or influence
kontra-kontra in Luuk town with the help people here because his father was killed by
of Mayor Abdurahman Arbison, the mayor’s the other clan, but he did not institute a re-
son Rep. Munir Arbison, and Gov. Benjamin venge. His brother was also killed, but he did
Loong “whose office is taking charge of not seek revenge in spite of pressures from
the expenses incurred during the amicable his relatives. So he is a kind of hope. People
settlement.” can change if they really want to.”
But for a province that relies heavily on Ante, former president of the Notre Dame
internal revenue allotment to survive, settling University, also notes how governance or the
RIDO V2.indd 180 10/4/2007 8:23:39 AM

|| 181
lack of it impacts on the clan feuds in the ar- got the vice governor, congressmen, and
eas. “I think one of the other reasons for the town mayors to attend a seminar on bridge
rido is the lack of governance. Criminals are leadership in cooperation with the Asian
not punished and caught, so [there is a ten- Institute of Management-Mirant Center for
dency to think that] in order to protect your Bridging Societal Divides and the Asia Foun-
family, you have to take up arms, otherwise dation. At the end of the seminar on August
the whole family will be eliminated.” 8, they signed a “Sulu Leaders’ Covenant for
The “non-integration of Western laws Collaborative Action for Sustainable Peace
and the traditional laws” also contributed to and Prosperity.”
the problem, Ante points out. Acknowledging the problems collectively
Even in the 1960s, he says, even if the in the nine-page covenant signed by elec-
courts decided to free an accused because tive officials from different political parties
he was found to be innocent under our is a giant leap forward for Sulu. Although it
criminal law system, the accused would be would take some time to turn around things,
killed by the complainants once he was out the challenge now is how they would col-
of the courtroom. “There was no acceptance lectively ensure that the action plans in the
[of the criminal law system]. It had not been covenant are implemented.
really integrated into their mindset that this “I told our mayors, we are all CEOs [chief
is justice,” he said. executive officers] of our localities. When
In Siasi, where Ante is based, classes are you’re a CEO, you should be innovative, you
suspended when clans start shooting each should be creative. If you don’t know, send
other. someone to study or study yourself or get a
In the past, a rido would be “settled” with consultant,” Loong said.
military troops arriving in the area. But this But the first thing a CEO must do is to
year, Ante says, “the new mayor stepped in be present in his turf so he would know the
and talked to the warring parties.” problem, understand it, and solve it. In Sulu,
The previous mayor, he says, was often the days of governing by remote control from
out of the island town and governance was either Jolo or Zamboanga should, hopefully,
practically nil. “Now the mayor is around. be over. • Originally published in MindaNews.
That is definitely an improvement. See [what] Reprinted in Newsbreak (January 3/17, 2005)
the mere presence of the mayor [can do]?”
Since martial law, absenteeism among This article was submitted to NEWSBREAK in
town officials has been plaguing Siasi and early November 2004, before the author, togeth-
the rest of Sulu and other ARMM areas. In- er with photojournalist Gene Boyd Lumawag, went
stead of governing their towns, some may- back to Sulu for another assignment, this time for
ors choose to stay in the nearest cities or Mindanews. It was on the second assignment that
provincial capitals. Lumawag was shot dead in downtown Jolo by still
Sulu’s newly elected governor, however, unidentified assailants.
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Women Who Dare

By Gemma B. Bagayaua in Maguindanao had long retired from politics.
“K ATI-I AKO! Si Babu iyo!” (I am here,

your aunty!) These words, spoken by
Tarhata Lucman, a slightly built woman of
Why Women
Princess Tarhata is not the only woman here
royal blood, could barely be heard amid the who is known for intervening in conflicts
sound of gunfire that morning in Tugaya, a between families. Paradoxically, in a soci-
remote town in the neighboring province of ety where females often take the backseat,
Lanao del Sur. women, particularly those who are regarded
This was sometime in 1987, and the highly in the community, are often called
scene was not a shootout between soldiers upon to help resolve rido cases.
and rebels. It was a fight between young In Matanog town, this province, 54-year-
men belonging to two distantly related fami- old Hadji Sitti Imam is known to have helped
lies, which have been in conflict with each settle at least 10 rido cases. She once set-
other for decades. Princess Tarhata, in her tled a case involving the family of her uncle
50s and governor of Lanao del Sur at the (her father’s brother) who was killed by her
time, was herself related to both families. uncle-in-law (her husband’s uncle).
Bad blood between the two families— By tradition, the family of the murdered
known in these parts as rido—started in the man would have considered it their duty
‘50s, the result of rivalry between two suit- to retaliate. It is all part of defending the
ors over a girl. This turned into a full-scale family’s maratabat, loosely defined as fam-
war when one of the suitors murdered the ily pride.
other after they attended a local gathering. To prevent more killings, Imam decided
Their families were soon locked in a war that to intervene.
lasted three decades and killed many of the “I did not want any more trouble because
town’s promising young leaders. they are neighbors,” she said. She asked her
Earlier that morning in 1987, another husband’s family to have the culprit jailed
member of one of the families had been killed and give the family of the dead man blood
by members of the rival family. The victim’s money. After the victim’s family received the
relatives were bent on getting back at his kill- blood money, a ritual gathering of the two
ers. Blood could have flowed once again had clans—called kanduli—was held in Maran-
Princess Tarhata not positioned herself physi- tao, the village in Matanog where the fami-
cally in between the warring camps. lies live. During the ceremony, the heads of
Regarded highly among her people, she the two families were made to swear upon
managed to calm down the combatants the Koran that no further hostilities would
enough to enable the victim’s killers to seek ensue.
refuge in her Marawi City home. She then At the moment, Imam is mediating a con-
prevailed upon the other family not to re- flict between her uncle, the former mayor of
taliate anymore, stressing that the cycle of Matanog, and the incumbent mayor who is
violence had to end. the nephew of her husband.
To this day, Princess Tarhata remains As in other aspects of governance and
a regal and commanding presence. When politics here, women are often given the
NEWSBREAK interviewed her in September, backseat when it comes to official conflict
she was still involved in resolving at least mediation. But they play crucial roles in set-
10 ongoing rido cases in Lanao even if she tling conflicts between families because,
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|| 183
as locals point out, families here are often For instance, people in her town listen to
matriarchal in nature. Imam because not only is she the daughter
“On the surface, the men make the de- of a datu; she has been selected as the local
cisions. But at home, they always consult bai alabi—a rank equal to princess in the
their wives,” says Tarhata Maglangit, head Christian world. Keeping the peace is one
of the Regional Commission on Bangsamoro of the traditional responsibilities of a bai al-
Women. abi, says Princess Tarhata—who has been
asked but refused to serve as bai alabi. Her
Losing Manly Pride father, the late Senator Alauya Alonto, was
Women are both protected and highly re- a Maranao sultan. Tawagon, on the other
garded in local Muslim society, explains Ze- hand, is the wife of a sultan in Marawi.
naida Tawagon, leader of a nongovernment The mediator must be able to show the
organization in Marawi City and herself parties involved that she is impartial, Imam
involved in settling rido cases. A woman’s says. “She must be fair. Not the sort who
murder during a rido, she says, commands betrays.”
a higher price in terms of blood money. Thus, Education, particularly knowledge of the
unless the rido started with the murder of a Koran, is also important because Koranic
woman, a man is considered a coward if he teachings are often cited by mediators in
retaliates by killing a woman. persuading combatants to reconcile with
Perhaps for this reason, women are able their rivals, says Linda Burton, a professor
to penetrate places where nobody would at the Xavier University who is studying rido
go because there is an existing rido, says cases. “Islam is peace,” explains Princess
Tawagon. In one case, she recalls, women Tarhata. “This is because our prophet is a
were sent by the family of a man killed dur- trader. You can’t trade if there is war.”
ing a rido to get his body. Princess Tarhata, whose family owns the
Aminah Paglas of the Alliance of Con- Jamaitul Philippine Al Islamiyah—the first
cerned Women for Development in Buldon, Islamic school in Marawi where both English
Maguindanao, says that women are sent as and Arabic subjects are taught—is consid-
emissaries in conflict resolution because ered very highly educated, Burton says. On
they are often more patient and less hot- the other hand, while Imam may not have
headed than men. Paglas recalls that her been schooled in the national education
mother had played peacemaker in conflicts system, she is considered highly learned in
between their own relatives. Islamic teachings. As a young maiden, her
What makes women crucial in peace- daughter recalls, Imam was champion of a
making is the concept of maratabat, says Koran Reading Contest in the former town
Koko Lucman, a son of Princess Tarhata. of Bugasan (now divided into the towns of
“It is an insult for the family of a man if he Parang, Buldon, Matanog, and Barira).
is the one to initiate peace talk,” Lucman
says. “It’s like losing your manly pride.” It No Easy Task
is a lot easier if a woman initiates the talks, Playing the mediator is not for the weak of
he explains. heart. If one fails to handle matters well, one
can invite trouble or unwittingly get caught
Qualifications in the crossfire. Yet these women dare to
Not everybody can play peacemaker, break through the barriers between combat-
though. One has to be highly esteemed in ing parties in order to wage peace.
society to be able to intervene in a rido, says It has not been easy. Young men nowa-
Maglangit. days are much more hotheaded, says Imam.
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184 ||
And, she adds, guns are much easier to ac- between the family of the injured and the
quire now, unlike before when men fought family of the other party in the accident. She
using only their bolos. Which is why Prin- also hosted the kanduli between the two
cess Tarhata, who shares Imam’s views on parties at her own house. Tawagon was a
the matter, is campaigning for a general relative of one of the parties in the case.
disarmament. Another case that Tawagon resolved
To be an effective mediator, one also has involved a land dispute. To settle matters,
to be a person of means because sometimes she had to buy the property in order to give
the mediator is called upon to chip in for the it to the other family. That family later paid
blood money required to appease an ag- her in installment but at a much-reduced
grieved party. price. But Tawagon considers it money
Tawagon recalls having to spend for the well spent. “This is how we help each
hospitalization of somebody injured in an other.” • Newsbreak (December 20, 2004)
automobile accident to prevent hostilities
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|| 185
It’s All About Power

By Gemma B. Bagayaua in Maguindanao Simeon Datumanong, who was justice sec-
Newsbreak Staff writer retary at the time of Abdulkadir’s murder, and
now Maguidanao congressman once more.
As his routine would have it, Abdulkadir Another is Zamzamin Ampatuan, head of the
Candao, 65, drove his two young children to Office on Muslim Affairs, a government unit
school on the morning of Feb. 3, 2003. On directly under the Office of the President.
that particular Monday, however, the family The President’s victory in Maguindanao in
didn’t reach Notre Dame University, which the 2004 election is largely attributed to the
was around 30 minutes away from their support of the Ampatuans.
house in Cotabato City. Armed men riding a For his part, Zacaria Candao doesn’t hold
motorcycle intercepted their car and opened any government position now, but his family
fire. The children, aged 10 and 9, were un- remains a force to reckon with in the local
harmed, but their father died. political scene. In 1976, President Ferdinand
The Candaos are convinced—and have Marcos appointed Candao as Maguindanao
openly said—that the brains behind the governor. From 1990 to 1993, he served as
murder is Maguindanao Gov. Andal Ampat- governor of what would become the fore-
uan. There’s been bad blood between their runner of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
families for some time. Mindanao (ARMM). From 1995 to 2001, he
In the gubernatorial race two years ear- was the governor of Maguindanao, but lost
lier, Ampatuan defeated Abdulkadir’s young- to Ampatuan in his reelection bid in 2001.
er brother, Zacaria Candao. The latter filed a Candao has openly accused the mili-
protest before the Commission on Elections, tary in Maguindanao of partisanship and
alleging that he was cheated. At the time of of orchestrating his loss in the 2001 elec-
his death, Abdulkadir was his brother’s chief tions. Government troops, he claimed then,
security officer. The principal suspect in his refused to allow his poll watchers into the
murder, a certain Boy Bangkuri, was report- precincts of some towns. Candao was the
edly Ampatuan’s chief of security. legal counsel of the now-mainstream Moro
Vendetta killings resulting from family National Liberation Front, and has been
feuds, locally known as rido, are common tagged by the military as a supporter of the
in these parts. Rido can be ignited by any rebel MILF.
affront to a family’s pride or maratabat. It
could be anything from a verbal slight or a More Casualties
quarrel over women and property. Abdulkadir Candao is not the only casualty
The Candaos and Ampatuans are a par- of this feud; two nephews were also killed
ticular concern, however, because govern- before him. On March 17, 2002, Murad Ba-
ment soldiers and Muslim rebels, particular- junaid was abducted and was later reported
ly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), by locals to have been killed with a chain
have been dragged into their feud. There saw. His body was never found. On Jan. 19,
have been times when clashes between the 2003, Abdullah Datumanong was abducted
two groups were rooted in the dispute be- and, eyewitnesses reported, was burned
tween the two families. This has hampered alive. The two Candao nephews were last
the peace process involving the government seen in the town of Shariff Aguak, Ampat-
and the MILF. uan’s bailiwick.
Governor Ampatuan is related to two key The Ampatuans also lost relatives. In
figures in the Arroyo government. One is September 2001, MindaNews quoted a
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186 ||
statement from the office of Governor Am- according to Unas, is the fact that he won
patuan that said Ashgal Ampatuan, a neph- as governor despite having no bailiwick
ew of the governor and brother of Mayor of his own. “He enjoys popularity due to
Akmad Ampatuan of Mamasapano town, the MILF.” Maguindanao, Unas said, is the
was killed in a clash between government breeding ground of the MILF. “They are all
troops and the MILF in Barangay Tatapan in over the place.”
Shariff Aguak. Convinced of the MILF threat, Ampatuan,
On Dec. 24, 2002, a homemade bomb who now moves about in a Humvee, called
exploded during a party inside the house on the military to increase its presence in
of Saudie Ampatuan, mayor of Datu Piang the area. The military obliged. Worse, a
town and son of the governor. Saudi and 12 military official says, the Army in the area
persons were killed. allowed the governor to maintain a virtual
The governor himself claims to have sur- private army of at least 500 civilians.
vived a number of ambush tries. A military source privy to the operations
In an interview with NEWSBREAK, Norie of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Unas, provincial administrator and spokes- Unit (Cafgu) told NEWSBREAK, however, that
person of the governor, denied any feud be- there are two companies that receive orders
tween the Ampatuans and the Candaos. “We from the governor. Each Cafgu company, the
do not mind them now,” he said, referring to source said, has at least 88 personnel. The
the Candaos. “You can say that they are now Cafgus were originally deployed to provide
politically irrelevant.” security for a Philippine-Malaysian venture
Bangkuri, according to Unas, was not that was supposed to establish a tapioca
personally connected to the governor, but and cassava plantation in Talayan town, but
was assigned to the latter officially from they were never disbanded when the project
his mother unit in the military. “When we didn’t push through.
learned that he was a suspect, we let him The source said the governor and the
go.” mayors allied with him also maintain a total
Previously, however, Unas invariably of about 300 armed civilian volunteers. Con-
blamed Governor Ampatuan’s political rivals sidered part of the government’s territorial
and the MILF as those behind the attempts defense system, civilian volunteer organi-
on the governor’s life. zations (CVOs) are supposed to gather vital
In the case of the clash that resulted in information on peace and order concerns
his nephew’s death, the governor noted in within a locality and pass this on to proper
a statement that the MILF elements who authorities. Under the Local Government
attacked Shariff Aguak were led by Ustadz Code, they are supposed to remain un-
Ameril Umbra Kato, reportedly an ally of for- armed. CVOs organized by the local govern-
mer Governor Candao. In the death of Saudie ment officials in Maguindanao, however, are
Ampatuan, reports quoted Zamzamin Am- fully armed.
patuan as saying that the MILF targeted
Saudie because the latter was pro-military. Private Army
During the interview, Unas took pains to Maintaining such an army requires resourc-
point out the links between the Candao and es. A confidential AFP memorandum on the
the MILF. He said Candao was responsible effects of the family feuds in Maguindanao,
for the creation of the MILF. “It was an open issued in November 2004, noted that the Na-
secret here at the time that he was funding tional Police and the military have been pro-
the MILF.” viding the CVOs with guns and ammunition.
Another proof of Candao’s MILF links, The families of those recruited into the
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|| 187
CVOs and the special Cafgus are housed in many of the unit’s personnel have gotten
“core shelters built by the DSWD (Depart- “deeply involved in the rido system.”
ment of Social Welfare and Development).” Another proposed solution is to impose
Governed by unclear links to the military penalties on military commanders who pro-
chain of command, members of the CVOs vide logistical support to the armed CVOs,
and special Cafgus, according to the memo- and to implement more stringent measures
randum, have pillaged and looted communi- in controlling the special Cafgu units.
ties that are supposedly sympathetic to the These are short-term solutions. The fi-
MILF. It added that communities affected by nal solution to the problem is obviously to
these atrocities often seek the protection of resolve existing family feuds. But since the
the MILF because they perceive the military Candao-Ampatuan feud is rooted in political
to be partial to the Ampatuans and his politi- rivalry, it’s not easy to solve.
cal allies. In the ARMM, clashes resulting from
Making the situation worse is the fact electoral conflicts have been avoided by
that a number of CVO and special Cafgu dividing local government units between
members—and even the Ampatuans them- major clans. This meant carving new mu-
selves—have separate feuds with members nicipalities from the existing ones. This is
of the MILF or their relatives. In a number particularly true in Maguindanao, where
of instances, sources both from the military seven new municipalities have been cre-
and the MILF said, skirmishes that brought ated since 2001.
the military to MILF camps were actually Unas said that by partitioning the munic-
sparked by personal feuds between mem- ipalities between the main, “deserving” con-
bers of these civilian units and some MILF tenders, the time and efforts that otherwise
members who were trying to protect their would have been spent to “heal” problems
relatives. In many instances, the MILF is resulting from the tight contest can be used
unable to control its members, the military for other purposes.
source said. A bill seeking to divide the province of
Unas denies that the military has no con- Maguindanao is pending before the Regional
trol over the Cafgus in Maguindanao. They Legislative Assembly (RLA). Locals say this
do take commands from the governor, he is being floated as a solution to the Candao-
says, but only because “they can’t possibly Ampatuan feud. The proposal seeks to carve
get their orders from the MILF.” from Maguindanao the new province of the
As for alleged abuses committed by the Iranons. The Iranon tribe occupies the towns
Cafgus, Unas says that people are just out that are close to the boundaries of Magu-
to smear the reputation of the civilian units indanao and Lanao del Sur. Sultan Kudarat,
because they can’t attack the government the hometown of Candao, is one of those
while the Cafgus are there. towns.
People are also hurling accusations at Unas denies that the proposal is linked to
Ampatuan, Unas says, because “we are the Candao-Ampatuan feud. He said that the
pursuing reforms in a non-violent way.” proposal to split the province stemmed from
The memorandum presented several the Iranons’ desire to find their identity, and
solutions to this situation. One is to replace that Ampatuan, during the 2001 campaign,
the 37th Infantry Battalion, which has been promised to work on this. Unas said it was
assigned in Maguindanao for almost four Candao who vetoed the bill when he was
years now. Members of the battalion have still governor.
apparently become friends of local officials. In an interview with NEWSBREAK, Candao
As a result, according to the memorandum, said he favors the creation of the Iranon
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188 ||
province. President Arroyo is receptive to the will be carved out of Maguindanao continue
idea, he said. During his term as governor, to hamper the bill’s progress. At present,
Candao said he thumbed down the proposal sources say, the bill is gathering dust in the
because the new province would cut across RLA dockets.
boundaries of legislative districts, and the Whether it passes the legislative mill
RLA was supposedly not empowered to al- remains to be seen. And even if it does, it
low that. is doubtful that creating too many fiefdoms
A new province will give Candao his will bring peace and progress to this troubled
own turf. But questions on which towns province. • Newbreak (February 28, 2005)
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BOBBY TIMONERA
A marine contingent was stationed in this ghost village in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, where scores of houses were burned
because of rido.
BOBBY TIMONERA
Because loose firearms are aplenty in Lanao del Sur, ridos have become more violent.
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BOBBY TIMONERA
Real cannons and grenade launchers are like toys for children inside the former Camp Abubakre of the MILF in Butig,
Lanao del Sur.
BOBBY TIMONERA
They teach them young in Lanao del Sur, like this girl getting firing lessons from an MILF combatant in what used to be
Camp Abubakre in Butig town.
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JOSE JOWEL CANUDAY
BOBBY TIMONERA
With the police headquarters abandoned, nobody is there to help control rido in a village in Bayang, Lanao del Sur. A
Maranao boy (inset) contemplates his future in a rido-ridden village in Bayang, Lanao del Sur. His family’s house, which
is facing Lake Lanao, has several holes like those on the right because of enemy fire.
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BOBBY TIMONERA
A once beautiful two-storey house in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, is now abandoned, its walls riddled with machine gun
bullets.
JOSE JOWEL CANUDAY

Residents flee a Maguindanao village where warring clans engage in a rido.
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BOBBY TIMONERA
Iligan Mayor Franklin Quijano listens to a bereaved Maranao, whose son was killed in a rido in the hinterlands of Iligan.
This photo was taken in 2000.
JOSE JOWEL CANUDAY
An elderly Maguindanawon thanks MILF leader Benjamin Midtimbang (right) and Army Maj. Dickson Hermoso (in vest)
for stopping armed clashes in her village.
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JOSE JOWEL CANUDAY

(Top and right) Members of a ceasefire
committee help settle rido in the municipality of
Datu Saudi Ampatuan in Maguindanao.
JOSE JOWEL CANUDAY
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Introduction || 195
THE ASIA FOUNDATION
Researchers present findings on rido to the members of the Joint GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee on the Cessation
of Hostilities and the IMT during their 7th Tripartite Meeting.
ATENEO DE ZAMBOANGA UNIVERSITY & NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY

One of the researchers bringing back to the communities the results of the rido study.
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NOTRE DAME OF JOLO COLLEGE
Staff of the Notre Dame of Jolo College prepare to conduct mediation and conflict mapping training among seaweed
farmers and fisherfolk in Sulu. Competition over marine resources is often a cause of conflicts among locals.
WILLY TORRES
Traditional leaders of Sulu conducting strategic planning with Tulung Lupah Sug for a mosque-based intervention to
address feuding in local communities.
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UNYPAD
Consultation meeting in Kudarangan, Midsayap to disseminate information about rido settlement among grassroot clan
members to ensure everyone is in agreement.
UNYPAD
USAID official Mr. Robert Wuertz addressing reunited clan members during a Grand Kanduli in Paidu Pulangi, Pikit,
North Cotabato.
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WILLY TORRES
A common neutral relative of Mangansakan and Tayuan clans stands by the grave of a common ancestor to enjoin the
clans to support the hard-earned peace.
WILLY TORRES
Kanduli (thanksgiving) ritual proper led by traditional religious leaders (panditas).
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WILLY TORRES
Feuding clans end their feud by paying respect at the grave of a common ancestor.
WILLY TORRES
After the kanduli, everybody is happy.
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RIDO, INC.
Rido settlement in Marantao, Lanao del Sur.
BOBBY TIMONERA
Maranao families swear on the Qur’an that they will end clan wars.
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E ch a p ter s even
Management and Resolution of Rido

Among Meranao in Baloi, Lanao del Norte:
Case Studies
Monalinda Emperio Doro
L IKE OTHER communities, the Meranao of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del
Sur have their share of conflict. In his study, Bentley (1982) observes that
the prevalence of inter-family feud or rido among the Meranao results from
their extreme sensitivity to personal slights and their refusal to be individu-
ally, or collectively, dominated.
Rido has caused much death and destruction and retarded the econom-
ic, political, and spiritual development of the Meranao. The most affected
are the young who are raised into a life of violence and conflict.
Caris (1992) points out that the typical consequences of rido are crimi-
nality, violence, and disrespect for law and order. These effects tend to in-
crease illiteracy and poverty.
Maratabat or honor/pride is the main reason why the Meranao persist
on avenging real or perceived grievances and often refuse to submit to judi-
cial processes. Legal sanctions alone often fail to assuage offended marata-
bat. Maratabat has to do with an individual’s honor and esteem, rank and
position, as well as the nobility of one’s family and kin. Any offense against
maratabat such as the murder or molestation of one’s kin, landgrabbing, or
insult justifies killing the offender. This can lead to a cycle of violence.
In documenting several cases of rido among the Meranao, this study
hopes to help find a solution to this social problem. It explores the dynamics
between the traditional and modern ways of conflict resolution.
|| 201 ||
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Conflict Resolution Among Indigenous Groups in the Philippines
Manobo
Yumo (1988) observes that vengeance is a common way among the
Manobo for settling conflicts. In fact, it is the custom of the Manobo to
plant a tree or bamboo as a symbol of their hatred for their enemies that
will remain as long as the plant lives.
However, the kind of resolution provided by vendetta is only tempo-
rary. Arbitration and compensation are also practiced for disputes involving
blood debt and deceit. Sometimes, conflicting parties agree to diminish or
end their feud. Another way of resolving serious conflict is exile or flight.
However, peacemaking is often the more permanent solution to feud
since it seals all grievances unless renewed with the commission of a new
crime by the other party. In most cases, it is the datu who mediates. A party
may send a bolo to his enemy as a token of peace. If the bolo is accepted,
peace talks can begin; if returned, there is a need for further arbitration
usually by a neutral party. The most common rite of peacemaking is called
tampoda sa balagon (vine cutting). After both sides have agreed on the terms
of peace, they come together to each cut off the opposite ends of a vine to
symbolize the end of their dispute.
Higaunon
According to an undergraduate study conducted by Ambos and Chavez
(1999) among the Higaunon in Rogongon, Iligan City, an individual act of
murder can ascend into rido or family feud. Researchers have identified ritu-
als related to how the murderer pays the family of the aggrieved party to end
the feud. These are giving lugbak or pangiloban, bakos ho balokan, agaw ho
balaw, padumol, bangon, pangangawid, and tampuda ho balagon.
Giving of lugbak or pangiloban is performed by the datu or by any
family member of the offender who brings coins and pieces of cut clothes
(henibilis) to the aggrieved party. This indicates offender’s acceptance of
his crime.
In the bukos ho balokan, the offender is obliged to pay P500 for his
crime. The money ties the hands of the aggrieved party who can no longer
make revenge.
Agaw ho balaw also requires P500 as reparation. Payment implies rec-
ognition of the aggrieved party’s strength, and peace is bought.
Padumol obliges the offender to pay P500. Once payment is received,
the offended party bows upon seeing the murderer.
Bangon can range from P12,000 to P20,000 depending on what the
murderer can afford to pay in exchange for the life he has taken. The life
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Management and Resolution of Rido Among Meranao in Baloi, Lanao del Norte || 203
of an ordinary victim has a lower price than that of a person of high social
standing.
In pangangawid, aside from cash, a cow and four sacks of rice are given
to the aggrieved party. The victim’s family vents its anger on the cow by
lashing and slaying it. After the ritual, the cow and the rice are cooked and
shared by those present.
After the above rituals, both parties perform a peace ceremony called
tampuda ho balagon to restore good relations. A rattan vine is cut, a coin is
dropped in the center of the cut vine, and a dance ensues. The case is con-
sidered closed after this performance.
Another undergraduate study by Crispo and Daayata (2004) among the
Higaunon in Hagpa, Bukidnon, lists the conflicts usually submitted to the
tribal council for resolution as theft, land dispute, marriage conflict, and
murder. The tribal council resolves these cases using traditional laws and
procedures. Theft is resolved through mediation, arbitration, and concili-
ation. Land conflicts are solved through negotiation and mediation. Mar-
riage conflicts are resolved through mediation and arbitration. Murder is
resolved though bangon, wherein the culprit gives a carabao to the victim’s
family. It is believed that the spirit of the victim enters the animal. The ca-
rabao is also useful for the victim family’s livelihood. The culprit also gives
a certain amount of money to the family of the victim. After the bangon, the
victim’s family no longer insists on imprisonment for the killer. The penalty
is enough for the Higaunon who believe that humans are good by nature
and, if given the chance, can mend their ways.
The Higaunon in barangay Hagpa impose penalties or sala on those
proven guilty of wrongdoing. The fine varies according to the gravity of the
offense based on customary laws and traditions. In case of grave offenses,
the tribal leaders consider the matter and decide on the type of sala . In the
past, murder was punishable by death, depending on the circumstances and
the motive. Now, the datus have abolished the death penalty.
The resolution of conflicts by the Higaunon tribal council is free from
intervention by the local government.
In conflicts involving a Higaunon and an outsider who does not recog-
nize the tribal council, the barangay justice system applies.
T’boli
Among the T’boli, the datu is empowered to intercede in disputes and
adjudicate justice based on customs and tradition. The datu may help a
defendant pay a fine that he cannot afford. Generally, most of the cases are
settled by asking the offending party to pay a fine (Kadil, 1988).
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Iraya
Among the Iraya, any criminal act or offense is corrected with the use of
either the pangaw (Iraya’s version of a detention cell) or the tige, a punish-
ment wherein the suspects are ordered to immerse their right hands in a pot
of boiling water to pick up the white stone at the bottom of it. The one whose
hand gets burned is considered the guilty party (Katutubo Directory, 1996).
Yakan
Among the Filipino Muslim such as Yakan, their astana (palace) serves
as a judicial court where family conflicts involving land and theft are de-
liberated upon. Both the Islamic and Yakan native laws are applied in the
amicable resolution of feuds and community problems (Jundam, 1978).
Sama
The Sama also use both the adat (customary) and legal code to ad-
judicate family conflicts and cases involving immorality. At present, the
traditional leaders remain influential. Most of the elected barangay cap-
tains are either the village heads or candidates backed by them. The datu,
who has higher maratabat (prestige), usually acts as an arbiter of conflicts
and counselor on marital problems. His duties include settling conflicts
( Jundam, 1983).
Tausug
Among the Tausug, leadership resides in the tau-maas (headman). Un-
der a royal decree, he is called a panglima and is vested with political, judicial
and, at times, religious powers. He also fulfills the duties of a sara (lawman)
in resolving conflicts. He imposes fines, penalties, and other legal prescrip-
tions in accordance with community interests. In spite of the decline of the
Sulu sultanate, adat laws are still widely used in settling local disputes and
still prevail on cases brought to judicial attention even in the urbanized
areas of Sulu ( Jundam, 1978).
Maguindanaon
The Maguindanaon sultanate discharges its function in accordance with
the adat or customary laws as embodied in the oral traditions and in line
with the Luwaran Code. This code contains extensive provisions on mar-
riage, slavery, divorce, murder, sale, and family relations. These are all based
on the Qur’an and the customs, traditions, and practices known as sunna
(sacred tradition) and the ijma. A council elder gives advice on important
matters. The kali (law consultant) serves as arbitrator. He is also the chief
pandita of the district and is supposed to be the most knowledgeable man
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in the community. He is regarded as the best person in the community to

act as judge. The wazir is also the pandita who is a well-informed and wise
man (Buat, Saleeby and Sinsuat,1977; Glang and Condovar, 1978).
Meranao
Among the Meranao, there are three methods of settling cases in ac-
cordance with the adat: the kambatabhata’a, or invoking kinship; the idma,
or settlement in accordance with the customary practice; and the kambalay,
or the settling of disputes through intermarriage (Buat, 1977).
Dispute processing in traditional Meranao society was generally char-
acterized by mediation. Meranao usually call this process “amicable settle-
ment,” and it is still the most common means of settling Meranao disputes
(Bentley, 1982; Abdullah, 1996). Mediators who control information flows be-
tween disputants can subtly define issues, shape argument, emphasize points
of agreement, disguise points of difference, and otherwise influence both the
probability of resolving a dispute and shape any resolution it may take.
Once a dispute arises, both parties begin quietly to assess possibilities
for amicable settlement. However, they maintain a belligerent pose until
settlement terms are agreed upon. One or more mediators, possibly at the
instigation of one of the parties, begin to explore possibilities of arrang-
ing a settlement. If there is agreement on terms, the mediator arranges a
celebration at which the actual settlement takes place. In this ceremony,
compensation for injury, if any, is publicly handed over as all parties to the
dispute, and the community as a whole, bear witness to the settlement and
lend their weight to the peace it produces (Dumarpa, 1983).
Unresolved disputes pose dangers for everyone in the community. Be-
cause bangsa affiliations, friendship, and links of obligation are dispersed
widely, all disputes carry a risk of involving other community members.
Hence, datus who are responsible for maintaining the peace often initiate
mediation. If datus can agree among themselves about proper settlement
terms, they can collectively exert pressure on the disputants to settle.
Settlement may or may not include compensation or fine. When a dis-
pute erupts among affinal or consanguinal kinsmen, datus will push for a
settlement according to kokoman a kambhatabata’a (law of kinsmen). Such
settlement emphasizes the reciprocity and solidarity that ought to exist
among kinsmen and requires no fines. This mode of settlement assumes
that because kinsmen share social rank, offenses against each other cannot
alter the disputants’ rank in the society (Abdullah, 1997).
Intuas M. Abdullah (1982) notes that cases involving miakamaolika
(grave offense) necessitate the use of taritib-igma, regardless of the kinship
relation between the disputants and that of a go-between and/or members
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of the kokoman (Meranao traditional court) who can neutralize the ten-
dency of the offended party to retaliate.
On the other hand, conflicts involving slight offenses or da makamaolika
may be settled according to the taritib-igma even in the absence of the of-
fended party. The go-between resolves the conflict based on the kokoman a
kambhatabata’a.
It should be noted that rido is not present in all Meranao areas. In fact,
the people of Maladeg, Lanao del Sur, have declared it a zone of peace under
the leadership of Bob Anton who is part Meranao and a Catholic Christian.
Maladeg residents swear by the Qur’an that they will not harm or drive
away their enemies or the relatives of their enemies from Maladeg. All their
relatives within the zone of peace are prevented from participating in any
warfare. If they choose to fight, they have to leave the zone of peace and stay
away as long as they cannot accept the idea of peace.
The committee responsible for establishing a culture of peace in this
area is the peace and order committee or council of leaders. The committee
has settled long standing feuds in the municipalities of Nunungan, Mala-
bang, Calanugas, and Karomatan. Committee members use persuasion and
understanding rather than coercion. Asking people to swear by the Holy
Qur’an is very effective. Strong faith and religious belief contributes to the
cessation of conflict (Anton, 1998).
Women and Conflict Resolution

Literature on the participation of women in resolving conflicts is limited.
However, the Darangen, a Meranao epic, describes women as conflict me-
diators. Mangorsi (2004), in her study of Meranao proverbs, shows the in-
volvement of women in peacemaking. A proverb says:
Aya rumba o bae na mosawira o datu ka apiya so korang a tig

na inamber o ongangen, di mangondas sa seleg ka magontawar sa
rinao.
(“ A woman is a man’s sage; his poor statement is toned down
by her understanding; she changes grim words into words of still-
ness.”)
As Meranao women are highly regarded in the community, they can

serve as peace advisers.
Mangorsi observes that “the Meranao is opinionated and what the bae
says is very much respected and obeyed. Oftentimes, the woman gives advice
and the man executes the orders.” The men make brief statements that the
women elaborate on because “the Meranao women are more eloquent…”
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Mangorsi also points out that Meranao women are title-conscious. The
customary law gives Meranao women the right to be equal to men in some
cases, for they can be installed with gerar (titles or positions) equivalent to
that of their male counterparts. Some of the bae’s titles are bae a labi, bae
a dalomangcob, bae a cabugatan, and potre maamor. Bae a labi is the most
powerful among these titles. This titleholder takes part in policy and deci-
sion-making, settling disputes, enforcing Muslim laws, promoting the rights
of women, and many others functions.
In a study of conflict resolution in selected barangays of Misamis
Oriental, Escalante (SY 2002-2003) observes that cases typically handled
by women leaders are those which may not otherwise be assigned to male
conflict managers, such as rape, battering of women, child abuse, and mar-
ital problems. However, women leaders also handled cases of attempted
murder/homicide, land disputes, physical injuries, and theft.
The cause of conflict in these cases include lack of concern for others,
misunderstanding, miscommunication, pride, jealousy, envy, instability of
income, addiction to vices, and gossip. The study notes, however, that none
of the women leaders mentioned anything related to structural violence as
a cause of conflict.
Women have a role to play in conflict management. Women leaders
serve as facilitators, counselors, and advisers. There are some women lead-
ers, however, who still consider themselves as mainly pacifiers and secretar-
ies with only minor roles in conflict resolution (Escalante, 2002).
The women consider patience as well as consultative, collaborative
and participatory approaches useful in conflict management. Some of the
women leaders from low-income municipalities, however, tend to voice out
personal opinions regarding cases, and give outright advise to the parties
whose problems were referred to them (Escalante, 2002).
The Setting
This study was conducted in the municipality of Baloi, Lanao del Norte,
where there are informants known to have been involved in or observed
the resolution of rido.
Baloi (formerly Momungan) is located in the eastern part of the province
of Lanao del Norte. It is bounded by Iligan City on the north, the municipal-
ity of Pantar on the south, the municipality of Tagoloan on the east, and the
municipality of Pantaoragat on the west, and on the southwest by the mu-
nicipality of Munai. (Municipal Profile, 2002). Baloi, traversed by Agus River,
is located approximately 1,000 feet above sea level. It has an aggregate area of
about 13, 975 ha. At present, Baloi is politically divided into 21 barangays.
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The total population of Baloi as of May 1, 2000 was 38,534. Among the
22 municipalities of Lanao del Norte, Baloi contributed 8.15% of the total
provincial population. Of the 472,646 household population in Lanao del
Norte, 35.80% classified themselves as Meranao. Majority of the population
in Baloi are Meranao (83.4%) while Cebuano constitute 8.9% of the total
population. Islam is the most dominant religion in Baloi.
Baloi is strategically located in terms of trade development and agri-
cultural growth. It is a crossroad of Iligan City and Marawi City and is
surrounded by five interior municipalities. Because of this, Baloi serves as
commercial center for these municipalities. Commercial activity is domi-
nant in the West and East Poblacion and in barangay Maria Cristina. Usually
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays are market days wherein traders and
vendors come all the way from Iligan City and Marawi City. Retailing is the
prevailing undertaking of small business.
Crop, livestock and poultry, and fishery production are the agricultural
undertakings of the populace. Farming, however, is the major activity with
rice, corn, and coconuts as the main products of Baloi. Communal irriga-
tion system is implemented in barangays Dariat, Adapun Ali, and Mamaa-
nun-Lumbac as alternative method of rice cultivation especially during the
dry season. Chicken and ducks are among the poultry production in the
town. Production of horses, carabaos, cows, goats, and swine is another
source of income.
Fishery is also one of the means of income in Baloi. There are private
wharves which contribute to the total fishery production of the municipal-
ity. The man-made lake in barangay Nangka also serves as fishing ground
aside from those found in some barangays. These fishing grounds and
wharves are suitable for the production of dalag, tilapia, carp, and shrimp
(Municipal Agriculture Office, 2002).
Traditional Socio-Political Structure of Baloi

Social Organization
Family. The Meranao family is closely-knit and collective responsibility
is stressed to prevent members from committing acts that tarnish their kin-
ship group (Disoma, 2000). The homeless are accommodated by their rela-
tives as extended family and married children may stay with their parents.
At the first stage of rido, it is the family of the disputants that initiates
the search for a peaceful resolution
Kinship System. Kinship is quite important in Meranao society. “Kin-
dred relationships are traced bilaterally and descents are traced according
to generation. To the Meranao, even fourth cousins are considered as first
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cousins or as close as first cousins and are entitled to similar treatment and
support, whether they be from the agnatic line or from the uterine line.
This support for any cousin, distant or close, is always expected to pay off
in times of crisis” (Briones, 1985).
Katatabanga or the reciprocity of aid and services is manifested in di-
verse occasions, such as death, marriage, investiture, and resolution of con-
flicts (Briones, 1985).
The family and kinship network is the primary source of personal se-
curity. An individual expects to be aided, abetted, and protected by every
one of his/her kin. The kinship group is also responsible for the illegal acts
committed by its members against members of other groups. Therefore, if
a man commits murder, vengeance may commonly be exacted on any male
member of his kinship group (Briones, 1985).
Marriage. Marriage among the Meranao, according to Warriner (1985),
“is primarily an affiliation between lineages, rather than between persons.
Marriages are contracted in the interest of lineage groups and agamas to
facilitate political power, to ensure a body of supporters, and to resolve
feuds”.
Marriage among the Meranao is usually endogamous—one is mar-
ried preferably within his/her clan to a social and economic equal—and
arranged by parents or close relatives (Disoma, 2000). Exogamous mar-
riage, or marriage outside one’s clan or tribe, is frequently frowned upon
by the Meranao.
Endogamous marriages are preferred in order to maintain the close-
ness of the clan. For example, second cousin or fourth cousin marriages
are arranged so as not to lose the kinship ties. Intra-clan marriages further
ensure that family wealth remains within the clan structure. Endogamy is
also preferred because there is a high chance that the suit will be accepted.
The Meranao emphasize kinship from which they derive aid and security.
Socialization and Personality Formation. The family is the first envi-
ronment of socialization and the mother, the first agent. She determines
the child’s personality (Hunt, et al., 1987). In Meranao traditional society,
women and mothers are the early educators and most men prefer that their
wives stay as full time homemakers. In Baloi, there are many madaris (Arabic
schools) where children begin learning Arabic and read from the Qur’an by
the age of five. Some ustadz or Arabic teachers are hired to teach the children
at home before they are enrolled at the madrasah. In some cases, children
aged 6-12 years are sent to a hadana or toril, an Arabic boarding school where
they learn to read and write Arabic and recite the Qur’an. Aside from these
religious schools, women’s organizations also conduct seminars on Islam
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among women. Through their mothers, the youngest children of Baloi learn
about the teachings of Islam on peace.
Political Organization
The Pat a Pangampong ko Ranao or the Four Federations of Lanao
In his Pangampong: An Ancient Confederation (1975), Saber observes
that the Meranao is under the sway of both the modern Philippine state and
the indigenous socio-political system or pangampong.
Pangampong is derived from the word kampong (settlement) and may
refer to both small and large communities. In terms of the indigenous po-
litical system, pangampong refers singly or collectively to four principalities
(or states) into which the Meranao divide themselves, politically and ter-
ritorially, within the Lanao region—aside from the modern provinces of
Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte (Saber, 1975).
The “Principalities of Lanao” (pat a pangampong ko ranao) are Bayabao,
Masiu, Unayan, and Baloi. Their boundaries can be traced along the mod-
ern map where the two Lanao provinces and a part of Misamis Oriental
have been superimposed over the traditional pangampong .
A single pangampong is divided into smaller units and sub-units called
soko (section, district, or region), inged (township or town settlement), and
agama (village community). Baloi is not divided into soko (a group of in-
geds), but its old territorial claim starts from the border of Mala a Bayabao
and stretches north to Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, where Sharif Alawi, a
Muslim missionary, is said to have introduced Islam to northern and central
Mindanao, particularly around the Lake Lanao region.
The four principalities are co-equal in power and prestige. They are
bound together in a sort of confederation or alliance governed by an ancient
order or law called taritib that defines the relationships among the commu-
nities and their members. The four principalities are not bound by a cen-
tral government, but each principality and its sub-units of soko, inged, and
agama respect the seemingly “sacred” traditional alliance (made by found-
ing ancestors) which the Meranao term as kanggiginawai (Saber, 1975).
The Sultanate System in Baloi

Baloi has two sultanates: the sultanate of Baloi and the sultanate of
Pangampong sa Baloi. The former is ruled by the pito a maruhom while the
latter is under the sapolo ago dowa dyonan datu sa momungan.
The sapolo ago dowa a ayonan datu sa momungan is independent from
the sultanate of Baloi and from the sultanate of phangampong a baloi. It is
called the sultanate of Momungan which is one of the two superordinate
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sultanates in Baloi known as the panoroganan sa baloi. The other superor-

dinate sultanate is the sultanate of Balut. These two superordinate sultan-
ates in Baloi are traditionally called the dowa a alongan sa baloi meaning
“the two suns of Baloi.” The sultanate of Momungan is also one of the 15
superordinates in Ranao known as the sapolo ago lima a pagawidan sa ranao
(Doro, 1993).
The traditional structure of the sapolo ago dowa a ayononan datu sa
momungan is patterned after that of the pat a phangampong sa ranao. The
sultanate of Momungan is different from the new, multiple sultanates in
Lanao which have many “non-functional” titles. New grars were created
in some new sultanates in order to win the support of individuals for the
sultan’s programs.
Titles have even been given to government and military officials.
Branches of Government of the Sultanate of Momungan

The Executive. The sultanate is headed by a sulutan. He is the chief
executive whose task is to implement traditional and certain Islamic laws,
agreements, policies, and to represent the sultanate in the meetings of the
sultans and leaders whether initiated by traditional or legal institutions.
The Legislative. The sapolo ago dowa a ayonan datu sa momungan has a
legislative body composed of the datus, baes and other untitled persons in the
sultanate headed by the sulutan. Sometimes the sulutan alone performs legis-
lative functions. The cali advises the sulutan on Islamic and customary laws.
The body has three sources of laws: taritib, igma, and kitab. The taritib
is the customary law while the igma refers to those laws promulgated by the
datus that became traditional. Kitab refers to the Islamic laws based on the
Qur’anic verses and the Hadith, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad
(Sallallahu Alayhi Wa Sallam).
Another set of laws operating in the sultanate is called tardas. Some da-
tus call it kapasadan or agreement. The taritib, according to some, is called
atoran in Maranao.
The igma has a counterpart called adat that includes laws pertaining to
individual behavior. Sometimes adat is referred to as the proper conduct
and formal behavior of the people while taritib is the code or pattern for
organization of the sultanate.
According to Sheik Abdullah C. Magayoong, the most widely used codes
of law in the sultanate are the taritib and the igma. The kitab is used only for
minor cases due to its harshness. Although the people in the sultanate are all
Muslims, the kitab is not used as much as the taritib and igma. This implies
that most people are inclined towards Meranao tradition.
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The Judiciary. The sultanate has a traditional court called phangoku-
man. The sulutan heads the court and is referred to as the pangongokum or
chief justice. Sometimes, the sulutan acts as pamimitiyara (mediator). He is
assisted by the cali, datus, and some learned men particularly the ulama. The
venue of the phangokuman is usually the house of the sulutan and some-
times the mosque.
The court settles disputes or crimes committed within its jurisdiction.
The court proceedings are based on the taritib and igma. Trial by jury is
practiced with the jury composed of the sulutan, the cali and other title-
holders in the sultanate. The contesting parties are represented by their
wakil whose role is similar to that of the modern lawyer. Some disputes are
settled by the sulutan and other datus, and sometimes through the coop-
eration of public officials. Kapamitiyara or mediation is the main mode of
settling disputes and frequently results in intermarriages.
The traditional forms of punishment are enslavement (kapamimisaya-
an), retribution, compensation, and fine. Retribution and enslavement were
applied to high crimes of murder, adultery, and rape, while fines and com-
pensation were rendered under the terms of the kapangangawidan, some-
times called kapanginsalaan. The punishment of death penalty does not
exist under the laws of the sultanate or in the igma.
Case Studies
These cases are considered typical of the various cases of rido in the locale
of the research. The informants from the conflicting parties and some of the
mediators narrated these facts. To protect the identity of the respondents,
pseudonyms of persons and places are used in all the cases.
Case Study 1: Cattle Rustling

This case illustrates a kind of rido that emanated from sale of stolen
cattle complexed with disrespect for the family lineage of one of the parties
as well as conflict over ancestral domain. The relatives of the conflicting
parties were interviewed.
One morning of 1985, Jamal, a farmer, found a cow roaming his corn
farm. The cow had damaged Jamal’s crop. After several days of waiting in
vain for the animal’s owner—whom he intended to charge for the crop
damage—Jamal sold the cow to his cousin Bato. They agreed on a puka-
sowa, that is, no liability would arise from the sale and no warranty was at-
tached to it. They agreed further that as long as no other Meranao claimed
the cow, the puka-sowa was binding, otherwise the seller must reimburse the
agreed amount to the buyer. This is a kind of oral contract among Meranao
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that often involves the sale of commodities or properties of which the real
owner is unknown.
Later, it was learned that a Christian resident from a distant barangay,
within the same municipality, owned the cow which was stolen by a group
of cattle rustlers. The Christian owner of the cow approached Hadja Samera,
the wife of the sultan of Lumabao and an influential officer in the municipal
government, to recover the lost animal. Consequently, Hadja Samera sought
the help of Rumampad, the cousin of her husband and the barangay captain
of Lumabao. Rumampad spoke to Bato about the matter. Rumampad, Bato,
and the sultan of Lumabao are second cousins or relatives by consanguinity
within sixth civil degree of Jamal.
However, Bato had already sold the cow to a comprador who in turn
sold it to a matansero (butcher) in Iligan City. Since then, Rumampad sus-
pected Jamal as one of the cattle rustlers. Jamal resented this. The two men
were known to have axes to grind against each other as Jamal’s family was
not given the parcel of land in barangay Lumabao that was left to them by
their great grandparents.
Some weeks later, Rumampad declared that he would purge his baran-
gay of cattle rustlers. He even sent word to Jamal to stay away from barangay
Lumabao unless he was willing to recompense the owner of the cow. Jamal
reportedly replied:
Kapitan does not own the place. He should not prohibit any
native from entering the barangay. Surely, he is falsely accusing
me for the loss of that cow. I was constrained to sell the cow since
it damaged my crop and its owner never showed up. Who should
I charge?
Jamal’s response implied that Rumampad was not a native of the place.
This response soon reached Rumampad. Upon leaving the mosque after the
Friday congregational prayer, he asked his cousin: “Can anyone prevent me
from killing him?”
Jamal was then in Lumabao. While Rumampad was still at the yard of
the mosque, he was told that Jamal was in the house of a relative living near
the ricefield. Immediately, Rumampad went home for his Garand rifle and
.38-cal. revolver and sought out Jamal. Relatives were able to warn Jamal but
Rumampad arrived before Jamal could flee. Rumampad fired eight rounds
at Jamal but the latter hid in the canals and escaped injury.
Thinking that he hit Jamal, Rumampad went to a waiting shed near the
mosque about 400 meters away to the north. He was with Kamar, Akob,
and Amanodin, the eldest among the children of Bato. Rumampad said he
had shot Jamal but was not certain if the latter was killed. The waiting shed
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was overlooking the houses near the ricefield and was visible from there.
Minutes later, Mingka, a 12-year-old boy tending the family carabao, ran to
Rumanpad’s group to report seeing someone in soiled clothes fleeing across
the ricefield toward the western part of Lumabao.
Amanodin said he would verify the report, but Rumampad gave Amano-
din the pistol and ordered him to kill Jamal on sight. Amanodin went to the
eastern part of Lumabao and pretended that he was there to fetch Jamal and
accompany him to Arasi. Since he was the son of Bato, the cousin of Jamal,
people believed Amanodin and pointed him to the nipa hut where Jamal
was hiding. Amanodin found Jamal and told the latter:
Let us go home. If they catch you here they will finish you off.
Do not be afraid, I am with you.
Jamal was relieved to see Amanodin but then Amanodin shot Jamal
six times. Some of their common relatives, who were neutral, arrived at the
scene and brought Jamal to a hospital in Iligan City where he was operated
on successfully.
It was later confirmed that Rumampad did not hit Jamal since no bullet
from a Garand rifle was removed from the latter’s body. Jamal only dis-
located his left leg when he dove into the irrigation ditch. He jested that
Rumampad was a bad shot.
Almost all their common relatives visited Jamal at the hospital except
Bato and his children who feared retaliation. Bato scolded Amanodin and
banished him from home because he’d brought a curse on their family for
trying to kill a relative. Amanodin was said to be the most silent and head-
strong among the sons of Bato. He apparently tried to help Rumampad kill
Jamal because he wanted to impress Rumampad whose daughter Amano-
din was in love with. Months after the incident, Amanodin in fact married
a daughter of Rumampad.
After 14 days in the hospital, Jamal was transferred to his home in Arasi
where his medical treatment was continued. The zukudan (neutral common
relatives) shouldered Jamal’s medical bills and household expenses while he
recuperated, and also provided security.
When Jamal had fully recovered, most of their common relatives ne-
gotiated for the settlement of the rido between Jamal and Rumampad to
prevent its escalation. At first, it was their bashier, a regional director of a
government agency and a relative by affinity to both Jamal and Rumampad,
who led the talks. However, Rumampad did not heed him and kept resetting
the date for settlement. The last group who approached Rumampad was a
delegation of woman relatives headed by Hadja Samera. She was designated
by the sultan of Lumabao to negotiate on his behalf as the sultan did not
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want to meet with Rumampad and likely scold him for what he did to their
cousin Jamal. Hadja Samera was also chosen because of her previous suc-
cesses in settling disputes. Some say she could say the strongest words to the
disputants because she was both brave and wise.
They approached Rumampad and appealed to him:
So long as you declare willingness to settle your rido, we will

work for it, and shoulder the expenses, because it is not good for us
who belong to one mother to be exterminating one another.
In the talks, Rumampad appeared harder to convince, while Jamal, the

victim of aggression, showed less hostility. Jamal’s brothers and cousins did
not show hostility because they had received a patoray (order) from the
sultan of Lumabao that while he was negotiating to settle the rido, no retali-
ation should take place. The sultan asked for a three month truce.
The sultan convened the zuku-zukudan and they appealed once more
to Rumampad to declare willingness to settle his rido with Jamal. Instead of
acceding, however, Rumampad tried to provoke Jamal’s relatives by saying:
“As long as you do not intervene, who are these relatives of Jamal?”
Disparaging one’s lineage, known as di-i paka-aatawon or di pakaru-
rupungen, is a taboo among the Meranao. To belittle a Meranao’s ances-
try/clan is tantamount to saying that he is a slave with no standing in the
community, less than a dog, and can therefore be exterminated (along with
his clan) anytime.
Such insult can trigger the maratabat of a Meranao. Some say that this
is a ta-azir (grave offense) and whosoever insults another in this manner
must compensate the offended party. Otherwise, offended party may inflict
physical injuries on the offender. Some Meranao even consider the killing of
the offender as proper satisfaction for the maratabat of the offended.
After three months, with Rumampad still showing unwillingness to
settle, some would-be mediators felt insulted by his attitude and gave up.
Despite the rising tension in Lumabao, Rumampad felt safe because
an Army platoon was deployed in the neighboring barangay. No armed
Merano would roam the barangay due to the Army patrols.
Unknown to all, Karis, the younger brother of Jamal, had planned to
kill Rumampad. He was known as a religious person, a community youth
leader, and a good farmer. Karis resented the statement of Rumampad about
their line of descent. Some noted that Karis’ religiosity was overshadowed
by his self-esteem and anger.
Karis found an ally in Beruar, a known mercenary from the neigh-
boring municipality. A few weeks after Ramadhan (the Muslim month of
fasting), Karis and Beruar shot dead Rumampad with M16 rifles near an
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abandoned Army outpost in the adjacent barangay of Inusar. (The Army
troops in the area had earlier withdrawn following the downfall of former
President Ferdinand Marcos). Rumampad, who was armed with a Garand
rifle and a .38-cal. pistol, was on his way to a meeting at the municipal hall
with his 11-year-old son Mohandis when he was waylaid. His two older
sons, who usually escorted him and carried firearms, were harvesting corn
in their farm at Lumabao. The assailants fled. Mohandis, unarmed, was
unable to retaliate.
Subaida, the wife of the cousin of Rumampad whose house was just
100 meters from the ambush site, witnessed the incident. Upon hearing the
gunfire, she looked out the window and saw Rumampad lying in the canal
while two armed men fled toward the coconut grove in the eastern part of
Lumabao. She shouted: “What happened to Rumampad, why is he on the
ground? There are armed men fleeing!”
Mohandis was spared because of his tender age and because he was
unarmed. In the past, it was taboo to kill women and children for revenge.
Any family who did so was looked down upon by the community. Even
old people, who were not the perpetrators of rido, may not be targetted.
However, these unwritten laws are no longer observed by all Meranao. The
deaths of women, children, and old folk in vendetta are simply dismissed
as accidental nowadays.
Upon hearing the gunfire, Rumampad’s cousins rushed to Insuar with
their firearms. Before they could reach the coconut grove, however, the
cousins met high-powered gunfire from the blocking force of the ambush-
ers who as soon withdrew safely.
While the ambushers were retreating to the hills, some of them passed
the cornfield where one of Rumanpad’s sons was harvesting with friends.
The young man was still unaware of his father’s murder but already had a
bad feeling upon hearing the gunfire. Still the son’s group was unable to
retaliate as they were outnumbered and had less firepower than Karis’ side.
Rumampad’s son was not able to identify any of the armed men who were
all wearing bonnets.
Relatives unaware of Karis’ plan remained in Insuar while Rumampad
was killed. However, after learning of the incident, the male cousins and un-
cles of Karis immediately sought refuge in the homes of their relatives who
were zukudan. Subsequently, the cousins and sons of Rumampad searched
the houses of Jamal’s relatives in Lumabao and Inusar to avenge Rumampad
but only female relatives of Karis and Jamal stayed home.
After Rumampad’s burial that same day, Jamal’s close relatives fled the
area. They were not able to bring with them any cattle. Some of the relatives
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sought asylum in Cotabato and Davao provinces while others who were well
armed moved to nearby barangays like Arasi and other municipalities.
Those cousins of Jamal and Karis who stayed in Arasi lived miserably.
Aside from raids on their enclave, farming was difficult. Males feared snipers
from Rumampad’s side, so women and children had to farm. Children had to
quit school. Fighting occurred even on Muslim holidays, e.g. Eid El Fitr (Day
of Festivity), Eid El Adha (Day of Sacrifice), Ashura (Thanksgiving Day).
For some years, the situation in Inusar, Lumabao, and Arasi was volatile
but no one was murdered because the zukudan were quick to intervene.
In order to win the sympathy of those relatives who sided with the sons
of Rumampad, the zukudan agreed to attack those who helped Karis kill
Rumampad, like Beruar and his companions. They believed that without
these people, Karis could not have executed his plan.
Later, the zukudan together with the sons of Rumampad raided the
place of Beruar in nearby municipality of Mainot. It was early morning
when Beruar’s neighbourhood was showered with bullets. A woman was
killed and Beruar’s relatives were wounded. Beruar’s and his relatives’ cattle
were destroyed.
Attacking mercenaries, like Beruar, instead of Jamal’s kin eased the ten-
sion in Inusar, Lumabao and Arasi. The tactic united the common relatives
of Jamal and Rumampad. One day, a feeler reached the sultan of Lumabao,
through Rocaya, asking for the negotiation on the return of Jamal’s neutral
relatives to Lumabao and Inusar:
Your brothers send a message requesting you to negotiate for

their return to Lumabao and Inusar as soon as possible as our
women and children live miserably. Pity your sisters. Your broth-
ers promise that upon return, they will not help Jamal and Karis
and will not harm the family of Rumampad. You know that your
brothers had never participated in action or thought in the killing
of Rumampad.
The sultan promised prompt action. Rocaya, cousin to both Rumam-

pad and the sultan and mother-in-law to Jamal’s sister, served as go between
to the Sultan and the cousins of Jamal. A male person was not employed
as middleperson for fear that he might be suspected and killed by Rumam-
pad’s sons. Among the Meranao, the chance of a female kin being harmed
in a dispute is remote. Therefore, women often make good negotiators.
After sending feelers, the sultan finally sent his wife, Hadja Samera, to
Lumabao to convince Rumampad’s family to allow the return of the neutral
relatives of Jamal and Karis to Lumabao and Inusar. She told them:
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I am here before you because your uncle, the sultan, is sending a
message. Our relatives who were displaced ask that they be allowed
to return safely to their respective homes. They have been living in
misery since fleeing our area. You know for a fact that Karis alone
planned the killing of your father. Even Jamal, the first victim, did
not know of it. Beloved children, please heed the sultan because we
are hacking our own body. Now we know the real assailants. Do not
hesitate, please. Let us leave this matter to your uncle, the sultan;
he has been sick since the death of your father. Do we want to lose
another leader? Let us be patient, as we will surely see the day when
Allah asks for retribution from the assailants for what they did. I
am not feeling well but seeing how your uncle was so bothered, I
did not hesitate to come. You know very well that the sultan will not
leave in oblivion the killing of your father.
The sons of Rumampad concurred out of respect and love for the sultan
and Hadja Samera.
Among the Meranao, it is always a good strategy to send the wife to
convey a proposal to her husband’s family. Relatives who reject the proposal
may still count on the assistance of their male kin (the husband) despite his
displeasure. However, these relatives may be less keen to displease the wife
who holds the family’s purse strings.
Among the first to return to Lumabao and Inusar were women and
children. They arrived on the first day of Ramadhan. Days later, males re-
turned in batches. However, instead of going straight to their barangays,
the men stayed first in the poblacion of the municipality. When the sultan
learned of this, he announced at the mosque in Lumabao after the Friday
congregational prayer that those who wish to must come home. At last, the
barangays returned to life. Children played in the streets and in irrigation
canals. Farmers sprouted like mushrooms across the fields.
The first congregational prayer participated in by the returned relatives
of Jamal and Karis was on Eid El Fitr because the sultan and his brother who
won in the mayoralty election also prayed at the mosque.
After some months of peaceful co-existence between the two sides, ten-
sion erupted anew when Samad, a son of Rumampad’s cousin, shot dead a
returnee named Monib. Monib was not related to Jamal but his family was
among those who evacuated to Davao a day after the death of Rumampad.
Monib had reportedly agreed to inform Samad of the whereabouts of Jamal
and Karis in Davao. However, after months of shuttling between Davao
and Lumabao, Monib had given no information. Samad was irked and sus-
pected collusion between Monib and Jamal/Karis.
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In 1993, due to the escalation of the rido to the other clan, the sultan
called to meeting all who held grar in his sultanate. In the meeting held
in his residence at the poblacion, the sultan called for an end to the rido
between Jamal’s family and the children of Rumampad. He talked of the
importance of peace and development for the survival of the sultanate. The
sultan urged the clan leaders to help insulate their respective kin from fur-
ther destruction.
The sultan’s brother, the municipal mayor, promised to send feelers to
the family of Jamal. The family was elated by the news. They missed their
home village.
However, Ramal, the eldest son of Rumampad reacted differently. He
brought out his M14 rifle and fired 20 rounds into the air. His aunts imme-
diately pacified him. The relatives of Jamal were disturbed by the gunfire
and left the ricefields in fear of attack.
The following evening, many male relatives of Jamal were seen in the
poblacion (town center). They were advised to temporarily evacuate their
homes as it was rumored that Ramal and his brothers were out to kill Karis
or Jamal or any of their male kin before their rido is finally settled. The
cousins of Jamal and Karis avoided even the mosque.
The sultan summoned Ramal and his brothers to the house of the mu-
nicipal mayor but the brothers refused to go. The mayor ordered police into
Lumabao and Inusar but the officers said they did not want to be embroiled
in the rido.
Often, among the Meranao, when a rido may be approaching settle-
ment, the aggrieved family tries to inflict some more casualties before for-
mal talks begin. Sensing trouble, the sultan sent his wife to Lumabao to fetch
Ramal and his brothers. The brothers tried to avoid Hadja Samera but she
caught up with them and said:
Children, believe the sultan and me as we have never done any-

thing to harm you. Come with me because I was sent by the sultan
and the mayor who give you much importance. I will not leave until
you come with me.
At his home, the mayor spoke to the assembled kin thus:
You are all sons and brothers to me. If your father is precious to
you, then you are more precious to me than him. You are pillars of
our clan. This rido has blemished my reputation as I cannot even set-
tle it. I am your leader next to the sultan. We are the ones in trouble.
Let us settle this among ourselves. So let me handle this case.
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The sultan then said:
I am old. Your father has gone ahead of us. Certainly, all of us

will follow him. Those who live peacefully on this earth are worthy
of Paradise in the Hereafter. What is harmful to you is also harmful
to my children, and what is harmful to my children is harmful to
you. I do not want to see on my last day on this earth that you are
killing one another. That is not the tradition that was left to us by
our ancestors. So let me choose what is best for you because I was
born ahead of you. I beg you, in the name of our ancestors, to follow
me. We lost your father and I cannot afford to lose you as well.
Ramal and his brothers tearfully embraced their uncles. Ramal declared
to them:
You are father to us as well as brother. We leave this to you. Our

only request is not to see Karis in town.
When Jamal and Karis heard what happened, they sent their sister in
Davao to the sultan to inform him that they were willing to give any amount
as pangensalaan (an object or money to compensate the offended party).
They offered to surrender an M16 rifle to the family of Rumampad in lieu
of that used by Karis to kill Rumampad which had been sold.
The sultan again sent his wife to the children of Rumampad to ask
if they were amenable to the inclusion of Karis in the settlement, and a
pangangawedan in the amount of P100,000. The children of Rumampad
appealed to Hadja Samera that Karis should not be allowed to go home.
They also asked that compensation be increased to P300,000, since both
Jamal and Karis were paying for it and that the two men waive their claim
over a portion of the land in Lumabao that Rumampad had titled under
his name.
The sultan conveyed the counter terms through Rocaya. Five days
later, Rocaya returned to the Sultan and requested that the compensation
demanded be reduced because Karis was robbed while was on his way to
Davao City from General Santos City to buy a 6-wheeler truck hauler and
his youngest son was killed.
When they heard of the death of Karis’ son, Rumampad’s family felt
vindicated. They considered this as the workings of karma. After appeals
from Hadja Samera, Rumampad’s heirs settled for P100,000.
A month later, the families and kin of Jamal, Karis, and Rumampad
were gathered at the municipal hall of the town by the mayor and the sultan
for final settlement of the rido. It became a sort of clan reunion. First came
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the women and children followed by the mayor and the sultan, then the
male kin of each family.
The sultan presided over the settlment in accordance with the kokoman
a kambatabataa (law on kinship) which involves no retribution, compensa-
tion or any form of damages as no party is declared aggrieved. However, the
sultan imposed the surrender of an M16 rifle and the turn over of P100,000
by the family of Karis to Rumampad’s family. The mayor, reportedly, gave
another P50,000 to the family of Rumampad in secret. After reading the
Qur’anic injunction regarding kinship and the salsila (genealogy of clans)
to those present, the families of Rumampad and of Jamal (except Karis and
his family) swore before the Qur’an that they were brothers and would re-
main as such, and would not harm one another. They declared that the rido
is tiyotupan sa wator, that is, “sealed with a hard stone.” This meant as well
that the decision of the mediators and other datus was final and executory.
A kanduri (thanksgiving) followed with food, e.g. rice, carabao meat, and
Meranao pastries served.
The settlement ended with the words from the sultan, followed by a du’a
(a short prayer or supplication). He said:
Verily, the Lord said: the believers are the true brothers. We
belong to different wombs but he made us brothers. And if we re-
ally believe Him, let us love our brothers as we love ourselves. What
happened serves as a lesson for us and the next generation. This
rido is now settled and will never be resurrected. We understand
that the penalty for Karis is that he is prohibited from living in this
place for life. He can visit but cannot stay long; he must be escorted
by relatives. The family of Rumampad shall not harm him, and he
should not harm them also.
Subsequently, the families of Jamal and Rumampad embraced one an-

other and shared tears of peace and joy.
Case Study 2: Unfavored Love Affair

This case shows a kind of rido that emanated from an intense affair
between two lovers that was opposed by the family of the woman and later
caused the killing of the father of the man by the brothers of the woman.
The informants from the disputants and some of the mediators narrated
these facts. Pseudonyms are used to protect identifies of those involved.
Khalil was a popular Meranao singer often invited to sing in wakes,
weddings, post harvest festivities, and even on two-way radios or the so-
called “icom.”
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He was the youngest among the eight children of a poor old widower
farmer and attained only a secondary school education. Khalil hated farm-
ing and fishing and often stayed away from their home in barangay Ranon,
municipality of Barasi, to avoid his elder siblings who always scolded him.
He was the favourite of his paternal aunt not only because he resembled
his paternal grandfather but also because he was a loving nephew. Khalil
helped his aunt do the house chores and seemed to see in her the mother
he had lost as a baby.
Khalil spent most of his time in his aunt’s rice farm in Kamala, a baran-
gay about five kilometres away from Khalil’s home village. The neighbours
used to request Khalil to sing for them.They claimed that his voice could
“quench the thirst of the farmers.” Through the operators of two-way ra-
dios, Khalil befriended Jalila, also a high school graduate from a well-to-do
Meranao family.
Jalila’s family was also into politics—her paternal uncle, Abdu Rashid,
was an elected municipal official. One of her uncles was a known warlord
in barangay Ulowan in the municipality of Barasi. Their kinsfolk called
him Datu (leader). The family supposedly possessed the so-called “3-G’s”
(gold, goons, and guns). Jalila’s family vehemently opposed her relation-
ship with Khalil.
Khalil was unconsolable upon learning of Jalila’s bethrotal to another
until he heard that the marriage was unconsummated as Jalila refused to
live and sleep with her husband. This refusal of Jalila, called di tahnor in
Meranao, annoyed her male relatives. Meranao women used to resort to
this practice whenever their dowry was incomplete or if they disliked their
marriage partners.
When confronted by the women folk, Jalila admitted that she preferred
Khalil and refused to change her mind.
Some of her male kin suspected that Jalila had already become intimate
with Khalil. This suspicion was deepened by the discovery of the cellular
phone of Jalila in the possession of Khalil. They demanded that Khalil re-
turn this to Jalila but Khalil claimed to have sold it.
Jalila’s folk sent word to Khalil to stop communicating with Jalila but
the two continued to send letters and sms messages to each other. Angered,
Jalila’s husband left the house of Jalila’s parents without permission. Some
close relatives of Jalila secretly informed the family of Khalil that in the
event that her husband formally divorced Jalila, the relatives would work for
marriage between Jalila and Khalil. Khalil’s family said in advance that they
could not afford a dowry since they did not own any real estate but were
tenants on the land they tilled. They had reportedly sold their property to
pay the medical bills of Khalil’s late mother.
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Since then, Khalil stopped frequenting his aunt’s place in Kamala for
fear of reprisal from Jalila’s kin. However, rumor, likely instigated by provo-
cateurs, began spreading that Khalil’s side was mocking Jalila’s kin thus:
Where is their datu? Perhaps he is distancing himself from the

problem.
On the late full moon night of January 8, 2004, sixteen armed men,
including two brothers and a paternal uncle of Jalila, on board a van from
Ulowan arrived in Badar, adjacent to Ranon. At dawn of the following day,
right after the people had performed their fajr (Muslim early morning
prayers), four armed men entered Ranon in search of Khalil. When they
entered the house of Khalil’s family, they found only his father as Khalil
had hid under the btal (thick bed mat made of kapok) and pillows while
the other family members bathed in the river.
Khalil leaped out the window and fled. He had on his briefs and malong
(tubelike silk or cotton body wrap). As Khalil moved towards the river, he
was sighted by some armed men who chased and shot at him. Allegedly, they
had not planned to kill but only disable Khalil. However, a nine year-old girl
was hit by stray bullets while Khalil crossed the river to safety.
The armed men heard a woman cry out:
You hit my child! Why did you shoot us? May you all be mur-
dered!
The girl was slightly wounded. However, thinking that there was now
“collateral damage,” the armed men decided it was better for them to kill a
kin of Khalil as well. They returned to Khalil’s home, killed his father, and
escaped to Ulowan.
Khalil’s father was reportedly shot eight times. On the same day, the
old man was buried at the nearby Muslim cemetery but Khalil could not
be present. The Christian members of the cafgu and Army men who used
to secure the electric transmission towers of the National Transmission
Corporation in the area advised Khalil’s folk to report the incident to the
police.
The police, however, said they could not run after the culprits since it
was a case of rido. There were only five police officers left in the municipal-
ity; the rest had transferred elsewhere to avoid involvement in clan feuds.
After the burial of the old man, Rocaya, the female barangay captain
and putri maamor (crown princess) of Ranon, appealed for calm among
the family of Khalil who had arrived for the wake, supposedly, carrying
high-powered firearms. A cousin of Rocaya was married to one of the
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cousins of Jalila while her brother was married to one of the cousins
of Khalil.
Some cousins of Khalil who were local members of the milf expressed
their support for the plan of Khalil’s brothers, who were unarmed, to avenge
their father.
Two weeks later, Rocaya brought a paloklokesan (community elder) to
Khalil’s family in order to dissuade them from taking rash action. Other
datus thought it would be futile to try to talk the victim’s family out of
avenging their father. This paloklokesan told Khalil’s kin about how their
father came to Ranon, and called for peaceful resolution to the conflict in
the following manner:
Please be reminded my beloved sons that your father chose

to live in this place because he avoided the rido that his cousins
brought to their clan in Sabarang. Your father hates conflict. We,
your elders, would like you to live peacefully. If you have plans to
go on with this conflict confronting you, then I appeal to you not
to proceed.
The family told the paloklokesan that they were uncertain what to do
next. They said they were waiting for their elder brother from Sabarang and
that their father was not an animal who could be so brazenly killed.
Next day, Rocaya met Abdu Rashid at the municipal hall. Rashid said
that the killing was accidental and asked Rocaya to mediate. She agreed.
Upon her return home, Rocaya told her brother about her plan to settle
the rido of Khalil’s family. She sent an sms message to her cousin who was
married to Jalila’s cousin and asked for help in settling the dispute. The
cousin replied that Jalila’s family was willing to make peace and did not
wish to have a rido.
Upon learning that some of Khalil’s cousins were local milf members,
Rocaya went to Commander Post, the battalion commander of the milf in
the municipality. She persuaded him to neutralize Khalil’s cousins and in-
vited him to be one of her partners in settling the rido. The commander as-
sured Rocaya of his support but declined to be among the mediators due to
his position. He recommended instead Abdu Samad, the barangay captain
of Aluyudan, the neighbouring village to Ranon, as mediator. Abdu Samad
has a grar and used to be a warlord.
Commander Post wired all his men in Ranon, including the cousins of
Khalil, to keep the peace in their communities. He told them not to involve
the milf in the clan feud.
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On the other hand, Datu, the warlord uncle of Jalila, who apparently dis-
agreed with the conciliatory stance of his brother, Rashid, reportedly said:
Why are you in favor of settlement? What happened to them

is not enough punishment. Ever since birth, I have not allowed
settlement of any rido which involved me. What has happened to
him (Abdu Rashid)? Is he turning into a woman? They started this
conflict! For mocking me I shall send four Datus (four of myself)
as angels of death against them.
Rocaya approached as well the uncle of her son-in-law, the Radia Muda
of Sarta, a sultanate in the neighbouring municipality. This Radia Muda
initially talked with the sultan of Ulowan but was discouraged by the sultan
because of Datu’s stance. The Radia Muda tried in vain to see Datu. Finally,
Rocaya met Abdu Samad in Aluyudan to discuss this problem in their tiny
sultanate and barangay.
Abdu Samad said that in return for the help that Rocaya’s kin gave him
during the last barangay elections, he would try to convince Datu to talk
peace. Samad went to the sultan of Samanaya, a warlord and staunch sup-
porter of Datu, who reportedly supplied Datu with weapons and men. It is
said that one warlord cannot refuse a request from another.
The sultan of Samanaya delegated his nephew, Mikael, a barangay cap-
tain in the neighbouring barangays of Aluyudan, to help Abdu Samad get in
touch with Datu. Among the Meranao, it is more acceptable to turn down
a request directly made rather than one made through a third party since
denial of the request will be known to the third party and will be more hu-
miliating to the one making the request. By sending his nephew, the sultan
of Samanaya made sure Datu could not refuse the sultan’s request. The
sultan knew that accepting the request to talk peace could be insulting to
Datu’s maratabat as people will later know that Datu agreed to settle a rido
his side initiated by killing another Meranao. During the settlement process,
the party who committed the murder will have to do the kapangangawid
(act of begging for pardon); the family of the killer/killers concedes that
they violated the honor of the other party and accepts the consequences of
such violation.
The family doing the kapangangawid does not actually approach the
aggrieved family. It is the mediator/mediators who propose the amount of
blood money to the aggrieved party. The success of the talks depends on
the skill of the mediator.
Mikael approached Datu and conveyed to him the request of the sultan
of Samanaya for peace talks. Datu agreed at once to the request like “boiling
water that suddenly cooled.”
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Later, Abdu Samad met Abdu Rashid who eagerly put up the amount of
P100,000 as blood money. Rashid proposed to the family of Khalil that the
M16 rifle used to kill their father would be turned over to them along with
the blood money. At first, Khalil’s brothers were hesitant, but agreed after
Abdu Samad approached each of them personally. It is said that once Abdu
Samad acts as mediator, the parties involved do not turn him down for fear
of earning his ire. Some say that Jalila’s relatives did not agree at first to the
amount for blood money, but it was Abdu Samad who imposed it on them
thru Abdu Rashid.
Abdu Samad mediated for one month. On April 3, 2004, a month be-
fore the national and local elections, the rido was finally settled inside the
mosque in Mangawan. The ceremony was presided over by the sultan of
Mangawan. The site was chosen by Abdu Samad as it was neutral ground.
The ceremony started with a recitation from the verses of the Holy
Qur’an about forbearance and the brotherhood of all Muslims. This was
followed by a recitation from the salsila where an elder mentioned past links
between the two families. Then the sultan of Aluyudan spoke briefly on the
virtues of patience and acceptance of one’s mistakes.
The mediation initially ended with the reading and signing of the agree-
ment between and among the conflicting families based on the taritib ago
igma that required the family of Jalila to give blood money in the amount of
P100,000 to the family of Khalil and to surrender to the same family the rifle
used to kill their father. Jalila’s kin reiterated that the killing was accidental
as the armed men were novices with firearms.
The elder brother of Khalil in Sabarang did not show up at the settle-
ment but sent word that he left the matter to Abdu Samad, Rocaya and
Commander Post.
Finally, the parties swore upon the Holy Qur’an that they forgave one
another; that from now on, they were brothers; and no rido shall happen
between their families out of the rido that was settled. They pledged obedi-
ence to Allah. Those present shared a kanduri as a sign of the acceptance of
the pact.
Case 3: Blood for Spit

This case happened in 2002 during the Ramadhan in October. The rela-
tives of the conflicting parties narrated the events. Datum, a businessman
and the grandfather of Mangoda, who witnessed the beginnings of the rido
and Bae, a high school teacher and the grandmother of Bagoa Mama, were
interviewed. The mediator of this case was also interviewed.
The rido started when the spit of Binaning, grandson of Datum, ac-
cidentally hit Ali and resulted in a fistfight. This was followed by another
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incident when Bagoa Mama, brother-in-law of Ali insulted Mangoda, a

first cousin of Binaning that resulted in a heated argument. This led Bagoa
Mama to assault Mangoda with an iron bar. The relatives of Bagoa Mama
retaliated that same day and killed two young men who were standing out-
side Mangoda’s house.
One afternoon, while shopping for fruits at the market, Datum’s grand-
son, Binaning spat. Unfortunately, his spit went toward Ali, the son of the
“feared person,” Marangit, in barangay Mawaraw. Ali did not accept any
apology but instead, along with his friends, beat up Binaning who did not
defend himself even though he suffered injury. Immediately after the inci-
dent, Binaning and his cousins went home and kept out of sight for a week
in fear of further attacks.
Two weeks after this incident, Datum and his other grandson, Man-
goda, were loading sacks of corn onto their vehicle in front of the bakery
owned by Bae. Bagoa Mama, grandson of Bae told Datum to move their
vehicle. Mangoda replied, “Enari ka di bo kami sii matiy. Malugar aya a
karsada ini.” (We will not stay long. The road is wide enough.) Bagoa Mama
insisted and said: “Mangararata kano i adat. Di kano bo magato.” (You have a
bad attitude. You’re a coward.) Datum and others present tried to pacify the
two young men who had fisticuffs. According to Datum, the two bore each
other grudges. Bagoa Mama was also present during the fistfight between
his brother-in-law, Ali and Binaning, Mangoda’s first cousin.
Bae, who just arrived, tried to break up the scuffle and told Mangoda,
“Look Mangoda, Bagoa Mama is your brother. Your grandmother is my
sister in Islam. Hadja Amina who is my first cousin is your mother’s sister-
in-law. That means you have to be friends with Bagoa Mama and should
help each other for good.” Bae also advised Bagoa Mama, “My child, today is
Ramadhan, do not let your fasting go to waste by quarrelling.” According to
Bae, she also approached Datum to discuss how to settle the enmity between
their grandsons but Datum ignored her.
When Datum and Mangoda arrived home, Datum advised Mangoda
not to get involved in any more fights. The older man said: “My children,
especially you Mangoda, what happened to you is enough. Just be calm and
patient. We don’t like trouble. Rido is sweet at first but later on turns bitter
until someone is killed.”
At 5:45 in the afternoon, unknown to Datum, Mangoda went back to
the pharmacy where Bagoa Mama was working and assaulted him with an
iron bar. Bagoa Mama’s words—“You are a coward”— echoed in Mangoda’s
mind as he beat up Bagoa Mama. “You really have a loose lip,” Mangoda
shouted. Bagoa Mama had no chance to retaliate and collapsed. At that
time, Bae was home and heard a child shouting, “Oh Mother, Bagoa Mama
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is dead! He was beaten with an iron bar.” When Bae saw his grandson un-
conscious, she asked the people to carry Bagoa Mama to her house where
she applied first aid. After Marangit received an sms message saying that
Bagoa Mama had died, he hurried home angry and shouted, “Bagoa Mama
almost died. He has not offended anyone yet someone came to kill him.”
Marangit wanted to avenge Bagoa Mama but Bae calmed him down saying
it was just a tiff between young people. Bae said the text message to Marangit
aggravated the situation.
Meanwhile, the armed men of Marangit had gone to Datum and Man-
goda’s home. They believed the text message that Bagoa was dead. At around
7:00 in the evening, they proceeded to Poblacion, 10 km away from barangay
Mawarao.
On that same evening, Datum and approximately 40 men who came
from the mosque after the tarawi (a sunnah or non-obligatory prayer dur-
ing the Ramadhan after the last or fifth obligatory prayer) were discussing
outside the house of Datum about what had happened between Mangoda
and Bagoa Mama. Unfortunately, the gate was open when the armed men
arrived. The people did not expect that Bagoa Mama’s side would retaliate.
While still inside the vehicle, two armed men fired at the crowd. The ba-
rangay captain was then on his way to Datum’s house to negotiate the rido
when he heard the shots. Marangit’s men killed two young men who also
came from the tarawi prayer. The two died on the spot. Datum’s family was
not harmed.
The next day, Bagoa Mama’s kin researched their family lineage to find
out who they might approach to help settle the matter. They learned that
the two dead men’s families hailed from the municipalities of Pagapon and
Bato. Their kin wanted to retaliate but the datus and the mayor intervened
for a negotiation. The mayor was a second cousin of Marangit and also
related to Datum by affinity because his nephew was married to Datum’s
daughter. The mayor’s ties to both sides allowed him to negotiate the case.
This case became quite complicated because the conflict between Man-
goda and Bagoa Mama had to be settled first then the one between Bagoa
Mama’s side and the kin of the two slain men from Pagapon.
To settle the case between Mangoda and Bagoa Mama, a former mu-
nicipal councilor and a sultan of barangay Alongan, Sultan Dima mediated.
Diat or blood money was offered to Bagoa Mama’s clan but it took them a
year to agree to a settlement. Because of the negative effects of rido on their
clan, Bae and other relatives decided to accept the diat but Marangit at first
refused so the money was returned to Datum.
After more negotiations, Datum’s kapangangawidan or act of seeking
forgiveness from Bagoa Mama and his relatives was accepted. Datum’s side
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gave P150,000 as blood money, P50,000 of which was paid for by the mu-
nicipal government. The settlement rites held at the municipal hall was
witnessed by the conflicting parties and their relatives, the mediators (the
sultan and other municipal councilors), and the mayor. There was no writ-
ten agreement. This was followed by a kanduri wherein those in attendance
were given an amount of money in lieu of food.
Though Datum perceived the settlement as unfair, he concurred with it
for security reasons. He said, “The judgment is unfair. Ali beat up a member
of my family but they did not retaliate. They just ignored the offense be-
cause of their forbearance. But the other side mocked us for being cowards.
Perhaps Bagoa Mama paid for his offense in insulting us. But why was my
grandson beaten up for his spit unintentionally hitting someone? And how
can it be that a non-fatal blow against a person is avenged by massacre? We
are the offended yet we must pay. The judgment is contrary to the facts.
But we must forbear. Even though the settlement is unfair, I concur with it
because I don’t like rido. Anyway, Allah knows who transgresses. We accept
the settlement even if it means selling our land and our corn shellers, just
so my family is safe.”
After settlement of the feud, Bae turned her attention to helping solve
the case between Bagoa Mama’s kin and those of the two slain men from
Pagapon and Bato. The case had caused her much worry. She said, “Not
even medicine from America can make me feel at ease while this feud re-
mains.” She approached Sultan Hadji Aminollah, the sultan of Bandar a
Inged, Lanao del Sur to handle the case. He was known in Baloi as a very
good mediator because of his sincerity in settling rido. As a sultan’s son, he
was experienced in resolving feuds and he was also a zukudan. The sultan
was a relative by affinity of the two slain men who were the nephews of his
brother-in-law. On the other hand, Marangit was a second-degree uncle
of the sultan who was married to an influential family to which Datum’s
daughter was also married.
Sultan Hadji Aminollah went to Pagapon to appease the maratabat of
the victims’ kin by proposing the payment of diat and to explain how the bul-
lets that killed the two men were really meant for the family of Datum. The
Pagapon people said that they would agree to settle if those in Bato did so as
well. The relatives in Bato wanted “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” They
even filed a case in the milf court but Sultan Hadji Aminollah convinced the
relatives to withdraw the suit in lieu of settlement according to taritib ago
igma. The sultan urged the judges of the milf court not to pursue the case
filed against Bagoa Mama. During the negotiation, Sultan Hadji Aminollah
approached the grandfather of one of the two slain, who was a respected
person in their community, to convince his relatives to settle. During the
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meeting, some of the relatives in Bato did not want blood money but kitas
(execution of the killer). Others, however, spoke of forgiveness.
After a month of talks, the offended party of Bato opted for diat and
an end to hostilities. Bae’s clan agreed to pay P300,000 and an Armalite or
P150,000 for each of the bereaved families. Since the offending party could
give only one Armalite, Sultan Hadji Aminollah volunteered another. He
said, “For us Meranao, it is our obligation as leader of the community or
sultan or datu to settle conflicts within our territory. If you hear of trouble
in the community do not wait to be approached but look into it. If the con-
flict is over money, then you must contribute if you can.”
After eight months of talks and fund raising, the case was finally settled
at the municipal hall witnessed by the relatives of the conflicting parties,
the local datus, and local politicians. The conflicting parties swore that the
rido was over.
On the day of the settlement, the vice mayor welcomed the conflicting
parties. Sultan Hadji Aminollah explained that nobody from the conflict-
ing parties would be allowed to talk to avoid further arguments. The mayor
gave his speech and the parties swore upon the Holy Qur’an to abide by
the settlement. Any side that violates the agreement becomes an enemy of
the local datus and politicians. A written agreement was then signed by the
conflicting parties which read in part:
Praise be to Allah. The best can never be achieved without His

mercy and guidance. We pray that peace be with Prophet Muham-
mad (S.A.W.) and his followers until the end of the world.
Allah (S.W.T.) says in the Holy Qur’an: “O ye who believe! Re-
taliation is prescribed for you in the matter of the murdered; the
freeman for the freeman, and the slave for the slave, and the female
for the female. And for him who is forgiven somewhat by his (in-
jured) brother, prosecution according to usage and payment unto
him in kindness. This is an alleviation and a mercy from your Lord.
He who transgresseth after this will have a painful doom.” (2.178)
Abu Sorayh Al-Kazaie narrated that the Prophet (peace be
upon him) said: “Anyone who is killed or injured may choose one
of the three (1) qisas (killer/injurer be killed/punished), (2) pardon
the killer/injurer, or (3) accept blood money. But if he chooses the
fourth option, then hold his hand to stop him from doing so. (Nar-
rated by Ahmad).
We, who are accused of shooting (killing) firmly believe that
what happened was a mistake or an accident. Therefore, we ex-
pect the datus and ulamah concerned to do their best in reaching
a just and appropriate settlement of the case which satisfies both
parties most especially our brothers, elders, and relatives from
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Sogod-a-Bato. Pursuant to the custom of the people of Lanao and

in accordance with the Law of Allah as mentioned in the Holy
Qur’an, all of us agree and abide by whatever decision reached
by all concerned parties including these datus present and most
especially the ulamas of the Shari’ah Court.
With our belief in Allah, following the teachings of Prophet
Muhammad and endeavor to implement what has been agreed
upon by both parties of representatives, recognize and support for
the sacrifices and sincerity of ______________and ____________
for having accidentally injured/killed _____________ at the place
of ______________ at _____________who have paid the agreed
blood money in accordance with the Holy Qur’an and hadith. This
amicable settlement has been met and agreed by all parties con-
cerned due to the unselfish efforts rendered by those involved datus,
baes, and ulamas.
In witness thereof, representatives of all concerned parties, da-
tus, baes, and ulamas, who have witnessed these proceedings, have
affixed their respective signatures hereunder.
As of now, the conflicting parties are at peace with each other. All of
them are free to conduct their business but caution is still observed to avoid
another incidence of rido.
Case Study 4: Suspicious Villagemate

This case happened in 1994 in barangay Malintad between Puro, a thief,
and Cadar, a businessman whose parents are well-known school adminis-
trators. Both relatives of the conflicting parties were interviewed. The rido
started when Puro who suspected that Cadar reported him for theft, shot
dead Cadar. This led to retaliation from Cadar’s kin.
Puro was known to steal not only cattle but horses, ducks, and other
domesticated animals. He became a resident of Malintad when he married
his second wife. They had five children. Cadar, like Puro, also married into
the village.
Cadar was killed one afternoon outside a sari-sari (retail) store some 50
meters from the mosque where people often lingered after prayers.
After shooting Cadar with an Armalite, Puro was heard saying, “Better
for you to die and stop talking.” The bullet that hit his heart killed Cadar
on the spot. Puro went away nonchalantly. Cadar’s death was conveyed to
his parents and relatives who lived in the next municipality. His cadaver
was brought to his parent’s house and buried in the family cemetery that
evening.
According to a resident of Malintad, Puro suspected that it was Cadar
who reported Puro’s theft of a cow from another barangay to the cattle owner.
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Puro believed that only Cadar, who had recently moved into the community,
would dare do such a thing as the others were too afraid of Puro.
On the following day, Cadar’s kin met to plot their revenge. It was decid-
ed that the paternal relatives would attack Puro while the maternal relatives
would give financial support. A policeman relative also lent his Armalite to
Cadar’s family. Three days later, Cadar’s side attacked and wounded a first
cousin of Puro. However, the relatives of Cadar were not satisfied. They
wanted Puro to surrender to them.
Twenty days later, a second assault killed a second-degree cousin of
Puro. The following day, Puro’s kin retaliated, wounding two relatives of
Cadar. A month after the death of Cadar, the relatives of Puro who were
married to the relatives of Cadar initiated talks to end the violence. Cadar’s
kin demanded justice. Puro’s relatives offered blood money of P100,000,
Armalites, and carabaos, but Cadar’s people wanted Puro.
Three years into the murder of Cadar, Puro’s relatives sought the may-
or’s help in settling the feud. The mayor who was also victim of Puro’s theft
and in conflict with him, sent Bailabi, an educated female first cousin of
Puro and whose husband was first cousin of Cadar, to negotiate. Bailabi was
experienced in settling rido and was a zukudan .The negotiation was done at
the house of Cadar’s cousin who was also related to Puro by affinity. How-
ever, talks broke down as Cadar’s side insisted on the surrender of Puro.
In 1998, after four years of conflict, relatives on both sides arranged for
another meeting. This time, Cadar’s kin concurred with the settlement to
end the killing. Cadar’s side accepted the peace offering of Puro’s relatives of
P100,000 and five M16 Armalites but maintained their prerogative to hunt
down Puro. Cadar’s kin insisted that the only way to appease their injured
maratabat was through kitas or execution of Puro. Eventually, Puro’s kin
agreed to this condition so as to end the feud that had disrupted so much
of their lives. For the next five years, there was no more violence between
the two camps.
Ten years after the death of Cadar, Puro was killed near his house by
a group hired by Cadar’s kin. The relatives of Cadar made it known to the
whole community that they had avenged his death. Many of Puro’s relatives
were saddened but accepted that it was time for Puro to pay for his mis-
deeds. Some of his relatives believed that it was Puro’s own kin, rather than
Cadar, who had reported Puro’s theft as they were disgusted with him.
During the first month after the death of Puro, Cadar’s clan was wor-
ried and kept an eye on Puro’s people. The common relatives and elders,
however, helped keep the peace.
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Puro has been dead for ten years now, and his relatives have made no at-
tempt to retaliate. Still, Cadar’s family and kin are wary that Puro’s children
may eventually try to avenge their father.
Case Study 5: Brothers at odds

This case happened in 1989. The mediator and the relatives of the con-
flicting parties of this case were interviewed. The conflict started between
Ombra and Zacaria who were half-brothers on the father side and resid-
ing in barangay Malibuteng. Ombra was a businessman with two wives,
while Zacaria, also married, was a farmer. Through Ombra’s hardwork, his
family’s standard of living improved. They were able to buy furniture, appli-
ances, and ten hectares of land. Five hectares of their property were planted
to coconuts.
On the other hand, Zacaria did not work as hard as Ombra. His family
was not as well off as Ombra’s. Because of this, Zacaria’s wife was always
complaining and this irritated the husband.
The informants say that, out of envy, Zacaria laid claim to a piece of
land that Ombra inherited from his own mother. Ombra argued against the
claim since the land was not from their father, but Zacaria insisted and the
two were at odds. To avoid trouble between his sons, their father sold his
own inherited land to Hadji Usman who in turn sold it to the late governor
of Lanao del Norte, Ali Maporo. Neither of the brothers dared question the
claim of strongman Maporo who held the land title.
The conflict of the brothers over property was exacerbated by the ill
will between their wives. Once, some coconuts fell on the boundary between
the brothers’ respective properties. Zacaria’s wife insisted that the fruits be-
longed to them and this triggered a fight between the siblings that caused
injuries. From then on, enmity between the brothers deepened and came to
a head because of politics. At some point, Ombra’s house was burned down,
Zacaria was shot, and Ombra’s son, Isay, kidnapped. The sequence of events
that led to these occurrences is as follows:
The mayor, their first cousin, wanted to appoint Kadim, the elder
brother of Ombra and Zacaria as barangay captain. Kadim said he would
accept the position only upon concurrence of the people of Malibuteng.
Kadim consulted with his brothers who protested saying they too were filing
their candidacies for the post. Kadim declined the mayor’s offer and Ombra
won the elections. Just as he was declared winner, Ombra heard that his two
carabaos had been stolen. Usually, in cases of cattle rustling, the community
helps to find the lost animals but since people knew of the ill will between
the brothers, they kept away from the matter. Only Kadim, who hoped to
resolve the conflict between his brothers, went looking for the carabaos.
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Kadim believed that his younger brothers would not dare kill him. He found
the carabaos around Apo Hill, three km from his house.
From then on, stealing of chicken and even steel pipes (for a water sys-
tem project of the provincial government) became rampant in barangay
Malibuteng as some on Zacaria’s side refused to recognize Ombra’s victory.
Things began to spin out of control.
Two weeks after the elections, on a Saturday morning at 9:00, Ombra’s
home was razed while Ombra was at the market selling his carabaos. With-
out a fire station in the area, little could be saved. Ombra suspected Zacaria,
but according to an informant it was their younger brother, Samid, who was
guilty. After two days, Ombra burned Zacaria’s ricefield which was ready
for harvest in a week’s time. Zacaria filed a case at the fiscal’s office against
Ombra. However, the sultan of barangay Malibuteng convinced the broth-
ers to settle their conflict according to the kokoman a kambhatabataa. The
case was withdrawn but no settlement came about.
When Kadim and his wife Raya saw what happened to Ombra’s house,
they immediately hired a jeepney and transferred to Raya’s home municipal-
ity, Malaa Inged where she owned land. Still, the family had to start anew.
Two days later, Kadim returned to Malibuteng to convince Ombra to
join him in Malaa Inged. At that time, some of Ombra’s younger brothers
came looking to kill him but seeing other people around, the would-be kill-
ers backed off for fear of igniting a rido.
When Ombra went to Baloi on a market day, Zacaria found out and
tried to assault his brother. Relatives sheltered Ombra who went home at
around 5:30 p.m. and told his family what happened.
Unknown to Ombra, his son Biladen was planning a vendetta against
his uncle, Zacaria. Early next morning, Biladen went to Baloi and hid near
the bridge to wait for his uncle whom he later stabbed and shot in the chest.
Fortunately, Zacaria was not killed but only hospitalized. The sultan of Mal-
ibuteng paid the medical bills as Zacaria was broke. Though Kadim was dis-
appointed with his brothers, he still requested his wife Raya to visit Zacaria
at the Mindanao Sanitarium Hospital and help foot the bills.
A group of armed men from Zacaria’s family went to Malaa Inged the
next day to ask Kadim if he and Ombra conspired with Biladen. Kadim said
Biladen acted on his own. Still, the men refused to leave until the mayor of
Malaa Inged intervened.
After his release from the hospital, Zacaria stayed with the sultan of
Malibuteng in Iligan. One month later, Zacaria kidnapped his nephew Isay,
a 17-year-old son of Ombra, and held him captive for one month.
Isay was tied to a guava tree in Malibuteng for eight consecutive market
days—Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. Nevertheless, he was given the
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same food to eat as Zacaria’s children and was brought to the river by his
uncle every morning to bathe. Informants say Zacaria just wanted to force
Ombra to ransom Isay.
The brothers communicated through two-way radio. Zacaria would
urge Isay to cry and beg his father to pay ransom: “Father, release me from
Zacaria. Give him an Armalite or he will shoot me.” But Ombra called Za-
caria’s bluff.
Isay’s mother-in-law Mataid urged Ombra to ransom Isay but Om-
bra told her instead to sell her cow and pay Zacaria if she pitied Isay that
much. Mataid sold her two cows for P20,000. She did not want any rido
for her children.
To help settle the feud, relatives summoned home Ombra’s son, Alim,
who was employed in Saudi Arabia. Being well off, Alim was a target so in-
stead of staying in his family’s home, he moved among his relatives.
As his kin refused to intervene, Alim sought the help of the milf which
arranged a meeting between Alim and his uncle.
During their meeting, Alim saw his other uncle, Abu who hugged Alim
and said, “Zacaria is there. Go to him as he is looking for you. Just be care-
ful because he might kick you.” Alim approached Zacaria, hugged his uncle
and cried: “Uncle, I was not here when Biladen shot you. You can shoot me
where Biladen shot you.” Alim took off his shirt for his uncle to stab or shoot
him but instead his uncle cried, “It is true that I was looking for you but I
will not kill you.” Alim then replied, “I searched in vain for someone to join
me in meeting with you so I approached the milf. Since you refuse to kill
me as I am your nephew, then neither will I kill you because I do not want
rido. Please consider the amount that I must give you.” Zacaria demanded
the gun Biladen used on him but Alim said that it was a pawned weapon
and the owner had redeemed it. Zacaria also demanded to be reimbursed
the expenses he incurred during hospitalization which he said amounted to
P100,000. However, Alim had only P50,000 to offer.
Alim apprised his father, Ombra, of the agreement but Ombra would
not agree to pay Zacaria. Ombra said, “Not even the toughest guy in town
can appease me, they have been provoking me.” Alim insisted, “The truth
is that they are provoking you because we have achieved our purpose. We
have drawn the blood of Uncle so we have to pay him blood money. Can
you dare sip your brother’s blood?” Ombra still refused so Alim sought help
from Matara and Maporo, a board member and the governor of Lanao del
Norte, respectively, both relatives of Ombra.
When Ombra realized that so much effort was exerted by his son to
initiate the settlement, Ombra offered his two-hectare lot worth P60, 000.
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Finally, after one year of hostility, Ombra and his relatives agreed on the
kandiyat of P100,000 which was given to Zacaria aside from the two-hectare
land. Only Biladen was not allowed to attend the final settlement rites at the
municipal hall. “Don’t let Biladen come because I am angry with him.” said
Zacaria. The whole of barangay Malibuteng and relatives of the conflicting
brothers witnessed the settlement. The mayor, a first cousin of Ombra and
Zacaria, was also present.
Alim requested that Ombra and Zacaria no longer be made to swear an
oath to brotherhood before the Holy Qur’an—as is often the case in such
settlements—since the two were in fact blood brothers. Instead, the datus
swore before the Holy Qur’an that the brothers would not betray each other
and would not create another rido.
After the settlement, a kanduri was prepared as a sign of thanksgiving.
Some of those displaced by the feud returned to barangay Malibuteng.
Ombra’s family remained in Malaa Inged to avoid rekindling the tiff with
Zacaria who still held a grudge against Biladen.
Kadim decided to finish building his house in Malaa Inged before re-
turning home to Baloi. But after Ramadhan in March 1990, while on their
way to attend the graduation of their sons, Usman and Kota, Raya and Kad-
im along with their children and a brother of Kadim were ambushed by four
masked men from the municipality of Ladian. Kadim and his brother were
killed. The killers would have cut off Kadim’s head but for Raya’s plea. It was
said that Kadim had killed many and his enemies had hunted him for ten
years. This murder turned into another rido between Kadim’s sons and kin
and their enemies in Ladian. Kadim’s sons are grown up now and capable
of avenging their father.
An informant said that Kadim’s younger brothers who are wary of fur-
ther retaliation have reconciled to form a united front. As of now, there has
been no further violence but relatives in Iligan have been forced to stop
schooling to avoid the enemy. A 15-year-old high school student said he
stopped schooling in Baloi because his mother feared that the enemies in
Ladian might discover her son’s blood relation to the family of Kadim. As
long as no formal settlement is made between the conflicting parties, rela-
tives of Kadim keep ready for retaliation.
Due to the endless rounds of violence, barangay Malibuteng, says its
sultan, is now a “no man’s land.”
Case Study 6: Election Fraud

This conflict started during the barangay elections of May 9, 1994. The
relatives of the conflicting parties were interviewed. At around 10:30 in the
morning, election day, Ansary and eight companions arrived at the precinct
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to vote. However, Galo, whose cousin was a candidate for barangay captain,
protested that Ansary and company were not valid voters of the precinct but
“flying voters.” Ansary denied the charge and said that Galo was not a resi-
dent of the barangay. The two nearly came to blows but for cooler heads.
The following day, while the votes were being canvassed, Ansary, bearing
his M16, along with his cousins, planned to waylay Galo in a waiting shed.
Ansary entered a nearby building where his second cousin, Mapasang, was
staying to confer with the latter. Galo, also armed, spotted his enemies and
fired first. In the melee that ensued, Galo escaped. Ansary was unharmed
but Mapasang was shot dead.
The elder relatives of Ansary kept him safe as they awaited the reac-
tion of Mapasang’s paternal relatives. Mapasang was a maternal relative of
Ansary. Junaid, a paternal cousin of Mapasang, wanted to take revenge on
Ansary whom he found responsible for the death of Mapasang. Junaid was
restrained by his family who advised him to await the decision of the pa-
ternal relatives. They reminded Junaid that his wife was a second cousin of
Ansary.
Ansary’s relatives exerted every effort to settle the matter between An-
sary and Junaid’s side (the paternal relatives of Mapasang) who wanted to
kill Ansary.
After six months of talks between the two sides, Mapasang’s people killed
a brother of Galo, instead. The mayor, a close relative of Ansary, helped in
the talks. Mapasang’s family was initially reluctant to release Ansary from
responsibility in the death of Mapasang but Kadi, an uncle of Ansary, and
a close relative of Mapasang’s paternal relatives convinced Mapasang’s kin
to forgive Ansary. The uncle said they had killed Galo’s brother in order
to release Ansary from responsibility in the death of Mapasang. Some of
Mapasang’s kin had insisted on Galo’s death as a prerequisite for settlement
with Ansary.
Ten months after the death of Mapasang, the settlement between An-
sary and Mapasang’s kin was again delayed by the killing of another Mapa-
sang cousin in another rido.
During the negotiation, some paternal relatives of Mapasang came to
the barangay disguised as peddlers on board an old van. When the “ped-
dlers” went to pray at the mosque during noontime, leaving behind the
driver who fell asleep, a suspicious resident inspected the vehicle and found
four Armalites. He alerted Ansary’s relatives. The mayor quickly ordered the
armed men to leave the village and prevented bloodshed.
While talks were ongoing, Ansary’s movements were restricted. He
could move freely only in his home village. Mapasang’s relatives said they
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could not vouch for the actions of their kin. They demanded P300,000 from
Ansary as blood money.
The negotiations took a year and a half. Finally, in 1995 the paternal
relatives of Mapasang accepted the surrender of the Armalite carried by
Ansary on the day of the incident, P150,000, and a kanduri (exclusive of the
blood money). The settlement took place at the house of the zukudan and
witnessed by the political leaders, traditional leaders, and all relatives.
The women, Ansary’s maternal and paternal aunts, played a key role in the
talks. Most of the menfolk limited their movements in fear of retaliation.
Even after killing Galo’s brother, Mapasang’s kin continued to hunt for
Galo. He was slain in another province, four years later.
Galo’s relatives also hunted for Ansary. They said that Mapasang’s death
was accidental. During the negotiation between Ansary and Mapasang’s pa-
ternal relatives, Ansary’s safety was secured from both the relatives of Mapa-
sang and of Galo. Galo’s relatives blamed Ansary for the death of their kin
and wanted him dead. Again, through the mayor’s intercession, Ansary’s
side offered five Armalites, P100,000, two carabaos and two sacks of rice for
the kanduri. These were accepted by Galo’s relatives and the case was finally
settled in 1998. To prevent further retaliation, Galo’s younger sister was mar-
ried to the first cousin of Ansary.
Despite the settlement between the clans of Ansary and Galo, Ansary’s
family remains cautious. Ansary is always armed and travels with armed
companions when he travels far.
Common Causes of Rido and the Nature of Offenses that Result in Rido
Case Study 1 is complex since the rido did not stem from a single cause. It
started with a sale of stolen cattle by Jamal that barangay captain Rumam-
pad deemed illegal and which he criticized. Jamal’s retort that Rumam-
pad was not a native of Baloi so offended Rumampad’s maratabat that he
thought it justified to kill Jamal. Rumampad’s failed attempt to kill Jamal
started the cycle of violence.
In Meranao culture, it is taboo to bring up genealogy as this may reveal
the fact that a family descended from slaves. This could severely affect the
family’s standing in the community. Any investigation into family lineage is
considered a serious offense and an affront to the family’s maratabat. This
may invite retaliation.
A Meranao always claims royal descent no matter how poor he is at
present. This is one way of uplifting one’s maratabat. On the other hand,
no Meranao would admit descent from slaves and such matters are never
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openly discussed. However, if anyone, in a fit of anger, should call someone

else a descendant of slaves, the consequences could be fatal.
The cattle rustling issue aggravated the tension between the two men
that had stemmed from previous dispute over land.
Case 5 also started from a land dispute between half-brothers.
In Case 2, the maratabat of Jalila’s husband was hurt when he realized
that his wife was still in love with her former suitor, Khalil. The husband’s
act of leaving Jalila illegally was humiliating to the maratabat of Jalila’s fam-
ily who went after Khalil. The rido escalated when Khalil’s father was killed
in his stead and an innocent child was killed as well.
In Case 3, the accidental dropping of Binaning’s spit on Ali was deemed
intentional and led to serious feud between the two. This feud was further
aggravated by the fighting between their respective kinsmen, Mangoda and
Bagoa Mama. Bagoa Mama’s actions caused the deaths of strangers and
triggered a separate rido. The intervention of the datus prevented further
bloodshed.
The rido in Case 4 was caused by mere suspicion. Puro killed Cadar
whom Puro believed had informed on him for stealing. Cadar’s kin retali-
ated by killing one of Puro’s relatives.
In Case 5, the rido was caused by Zacaria’s envy of his half brother Om-
bra that was aggravated by tension between their wives. The conflict was
intensified by dispute over land and political rivalry that resulted in cattle
rustling, arson, stabbing and shooting of Zacaria by Talib, and kidnapping
of Isa by Zacaria.
Case 6 depicts a rido that stemmed from election fraud.
Land conflict is the most common cause of rido among the Meranao.
Such conflict could arise from conflicting claims and titles, double sale, or
disputed boundaries according to Amer Hassan E. Doro, a legal researcher.
To Moner (1987), “the most common legal cases among Muslims are
those that relate to land sale and land ownership. Considering the trust
(amanah) nature of transactions in Islam, reinforced by the rural and per-
sonalized relations of Moros, most of their transactions are not reduced to
writing. The Muslim have up to now relied on their traditional and Islamic
concepts of land ownership. To them, as it is in Islam, no better proof of
ownership should challenge their continuous, adverse, open, notorious and
exclusive possession, occupation, and cultivation of the land which they
had for so long a time, in fact beyond reach of memory and before their
predecessors-in-interest.”
According to the kali of Baloi, Hadji Abdullah “Mamaodang” Magayo-
ong, conflict over a land could fall under the following categories: miya-
gagaw sa gapa or conflict over a small piece of land, miyagagaw sa kawali
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or conflict over large landholdings, and miyagagaw sa tamanaan or conflict
over boundary.
Focus-group discussion (fgd) participants ranked land conflict as the
most common cause of rido. These conflicts could involve heirs who dis-
pute the property left behind by deceased parents, land grabbing by people
holding fake titles, or people who refuse to give up their mortgaged property
after the loan repayment period has lapsed.
Election-related conflict was ranked as the second most common cause
of rido. According to an fgd participant, “Today, big rido is caused by elec-
tion fraud. Kin are killing one another over dirty politics. Fifty percent of
rido is caused by this.”
Another cause of rido, according to an informant, is the fraudulent sale
of personal property or real estate. The aggrieved buyer or his relatives will
usually go after the vendor. If no one intervenes and if the family of the ven-
dor refuses to return the purchase price, the arresting family could execute
the vendor. This kind of action does not depend on the amount of money
involved. A fraudulent sale is considered an insult against the defrauded
family who must uphold its honor by executing the cheater unless a settle-
ment is reached.
Fraud is a very sensitive cause of rido among Meranao and those who
have been involved in such conflicts often refuse to talk about it. Meranao
consider it shameful to earn a living through deceit although deceit shrouds
every election for office among the Meranao.
The fgd came up with the following causes of rido : land conflict; elec-
tion-related problem, i.e., political rivalry, election fraud; arrogance of those
in power; drug addiction; carjacking, kidnapping, armed robbery; theft (of
domesticated animals and household property); fraudulent sale of personal
property or real estate; murder; heated argument; rumbles/fistfights among
male youths; gambling; rumor-mongering attributed to women; enthrone-
ment of traditional leaders; elopement; rape; envy; and suspicion.
The respondents stressed that in real life situations, maratabat should
not be viewed as separate from the causes mentioned above. In every situa-
tion the individual Meranao defends his maratabat by retaliating to the per-
ceived “prejudice, aggression, insult, insinuation, provocation, and defama-
tion” (Bula, 2000) behind or highlighted by the causes mentioned above.
Consequences of Rido for the Disputants and the Community

In all the cases studied, disputants typically experienced financial burdens,
property loss, transfer of residency, non-performance of religious obliga-
tions due to constant hiding, disruption of children’s academic life, and
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emotional instability resulting from constant fear and tension. These fac-
tors are strong incentives to resolve the dispute and return to a normal
existence.
In Cases 1 and 5, disputants had to stay away for many years before
they were allowed to return to their homes. In case 1, displaced residents
migrated to as far as Manila. Many displaced farmers had to sell their land
to wealthy residents of other municipalities.
In Case 5, burning of the homes and fields of the brothers, Zacaria and
Ombra affected them financially.
Amer Hassan E. Doro explains:
Having a rido is good only for a few months as the family in-
volved, specially those who resort to killing, feel that they have vin-
dicated their family or clan honor. Support in the form of money,
weapons, personnel, as well as moral support is abundant early on
when the rido is still fresh. The unity of the family/clan is manifest.
However, as time passes and it is never certain when and how the
enemy will retaliate, the resources of the family or clan will gradu-
ally diminish. This happens as family members who are govern-
ment employees are forced to go on leave or resign, farmers and
traders have to limit their area of activity and male students must
stop schooling.
A participant to the fgd involving disputants pointed out that:
Religious activities are also affected as male clan members can

only attend a secured neighborhood mosque. They perform only
daytime prayers and avoid the mosque at dawn or in the evening.
Those who wish to preach (tabligh) can not do so in places acces-
sible to their clan enemies.
Another participant observed that:
Males are discouraged to visit sick relatives in other localities to

avoid being waylaid by clan enemies. Usually, in wedding ceremo-
nies held far from home only female relatives are allowed to attend
since clan enemies may also be present at the event.
Another confided:
It’s very difficult when we have a rido because we are always

tense and nervous. What’s worst is we do not sleep well for fear of
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attack. We also worry about our children who go to school. We are
never at peace.
A 17-year-old student revealed:
I was escorted to school by an armed relative. I avoided public

places for fear of being seen by my cousin’s enemies. I went home
immediately after class. Later, I stopped schooling since I couldn’t
concentrate and may fail.
Rido also destroys social and kinship ties. Participants to the fgd ex-
plained that relatives who do not support their kin involved in rido are
often disowned by the latter. While it is true that collective responsibility is
observed among Meranao kin, there are cases where kanggiginawai (friend-
ship), katatabangai (cooperation), and kapririspitoa (respect) cease to be
observed among the kin. It seems that maratabat takes precedence over
blood ties and as shown in Case 5, rido can occur even among siblings. Cases
1 and 6 involved cousins.
Rido also damages clan honor and can affect marriage prospects of clan
members. According to an fgd participant from the religious sector, fami-
lies who dislike rido do not want their children to marry into families that
are known to be conflict prone. Marriage proposals can be turned down for
this reason. Women may be disallowed from marrying their fiancés who
belong to families involved in rido.
In general, rido retards development in the communities. In Case 5,
failure to build a water system in barangay Malibuteng was attributed to the
rido and perceived hostility of residents as the builders and the provincial
government withdrew the project. Because of this the whole municipality
of Baloi still has no water system. Considering that Iligan City gets it water
supply from Abaga spring in Baloi, this lack of water service is quite unfor-
tunate for the local people.
Rido also drives away traders and entrepreneurs from the community.
The study of Garingo (1999) shows that rido is one of the main reasons why
Meranaos migrate to Christian areas to do business.
Finally, communities where rido is prevalent do not provide healthy
environments for raising children. Fgd participants said many families leave
rido-ridden areas so that their children do not grow up to be violent and
impulsive.
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Characteristics of Persons Involved in Resolving Rido

In the cases studied, those involved in the settlement of rido were the heads
of the families or clans, the zukudan, the local datus, the religious group
as in the case of the milf, the traditional title holders (such as the sultan,
kali, baelabi), barangay captains, municipal councilors, mayor and other
lgu officials.
According to fgd participants, the following are the characteristics
of one entrusted to resolve a rido: a respected head of the family/clan or
the community, aden a gees iyan (must possess power); has influence and
considerable following in the community, tatamoken (moneyed), maon-
gangen (wise), montol (honest), masabar (patient), kasarigan (trustwor-
thy), mawarao (brave), malai paratiya ko Allah (religious/faithful), and da
a pagampilan iyan (neutral)
The mediator, according to a sultan, should be committed to his work.
He must endure all the difficulties of shuttling between the conflicting par-
ties and must not give up until a settlement is reached. He must also be will-
ing to contribute in raising the blood money. This requires that a mediator
be wealthy or have access to funds.
Another fgd participant noted that the mediator should have good
communication skills. He should choose his words carefully and should not
relay inflammatory words from one side to the other.
Bula (2000) describes three types of mediators. The first is sincere,
committed, and responsible. The second is one who is hired to mediate
because of his wisdom and prowess in speech and persuasion. And the third
is one who mediates out of personal interest.
In Case 3, although the terms of settlement between Mangoda and
Bagoa Mama were perceived by Datu as unfair, he acceded for security
reasons. This says something about the quality of the mediator. Another
mediator claims that the blood money paid by Mangoda through Datu was
too high. The case mediator reportedly received a commission from the
blood money since the amount that Bagoa Mama’s family actually received
was less than P100,000. The mediator in this case seems to fit the third type
described by Bula.
In contrast, Sultan Hadji Aminollah who settled the case between Bagoa
Mama and two men killed in the crossfire, gave his own Armalite as part of
the settlement. His efforts led to peace.
In Case 5, the mediator who was the sultan of Malibuteng withdrew
from the case upon learning that the disputants who were his relatives did
not want to end their enmity. The sultan’s impatience led to the escalation of
the rido as the parties started retaliating against each other after the sultan’s
withdrawal.
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As for gender, the case studies show that women make effective media-
tors. In Case 1, aside from her kinship ties with the conflicting parties, the
fact that she was a woman allowed Rocaya to mediate the settlement. Rocaya
served as go between to the Sultan and the cousins of Jamal since Rumam-
pad and the Sultan are her cousins while Jamal’s sister is her daughter-in-
law. A male person, on the other hand, could not have done this for fear of
being killed by the sons of Rumampad who might suspect him of feeding
information to Jamal’s relatives. Among the Meranaos, the risk of female
mediators being harmed is low since it is taboo to harm female disputants.
Another woman mediator in Case 1 was the wife of the sultan. She
is known for her poise under pressure and her ability to transform harsh
words into conciliatory statements so that even angry datus listen to her. In
an interview, she said that a woman must be brave enough to endure the
difficulties in settling a rido. Though it is risky to interfere in rido, a woman,
said the sultan’s wife, must show that she fears no one. No wonder that she
has even handled cases outside Baloi, Lanao del Norte which involved kid-
napping, carnapping, and robbery.
In Case 2, the settlement was mediated by Rocaya, the female barangay
captain and potri maamor (crown princess). But aside from her positions,
Rocaya is also related to the conflicting parties by affinity. Her cousin was
married to one of the cousins of Jalila while her brother is also married to
one of the cousins of Khalil. Rocaya appealed for calm from Khalil’s family
and brought the elders to Khalil’s home to convince them to settle.
In Case 3, Bae tried to talk to Datum to resolve the tiff between their
respective grandsons but Datum ignored her. This led to escalation of the
conflict. In an interview, Bae said that she approached all the traditional
leaders to help settle the feud. She also represented Bagoa Mama’s kin in
talks with the family of Datu. Through her conciliatory ways, she gained
the sympathy of the datus especially Sultan Hadji Aminollah. Bae told the
sultan how the conflict was affecting her health. This is one of the ways by
which a woman can make male leaders act on her requests.
A woman’s power to interfere in rido is reflected in the following re-
sponse of a councilor during the fgd: “Women are pacifiers of conflict.
When women pacify, the disputants should not oppose or else the wom-
an’s relatives could also interfere in the rido and cause escalation. Meranao
women are highly regarded. Any woman who tries to pacify a rido should
be respected. But sometimes women are also initiators of conflict.”
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Methods and Strategies Employed in Resolving Rido

The method employed in settling rido in all the cases studied was payment
of kandiat as stipulated in the taritib ago igma. By tradition, when blood is
spilled as a result of violence or murder, it must be paid for. Since five out
of six cases studied resulted in deaths, taritib ago igma was resorted to as a
mode of settlement. Intermarriage was also used to end the enmity between
the conflicting parties.
Usually, kokoman a kambhatabataa is used in cases of conflict between
kin but it could also be used where the parties are not related. Cases 5 and
6 show, however, that even in conflicts between brothers and cousins, koko-
man a kambhatabataa may no longer be applied when blood has been shed.
Since injury was not equally inflicted on both sides, payment of fines could
not be dispensed with.
An informant narrates the settlement process thus:
a) Conflicting parties are asked if they want their rido to be

settled by the leaders, b) Disinterested parties are interviewed re-
garding the cause of the dispute, c) The leader analyzes the infor-
mation, d) People respected and feared by the conflicting parties
are approached to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.
Factors that Facilitate the Settlement of Rido

In all the six cases studied, the important factor in resolving the rido is the
commitment of the mediator and his/her influence over the conflicting par-
ties. It is important that the mediator be related to the conflicting parties. For
their part, conflicting parties must sincerely want peace. Regardless of kin-
ship ties, blood money is very important in settling conflict. An informant
notes that “money can suppress maratabat, kinship, and everything else ex-
cept fate.” Unlike in the past, observes the informant, the many Meranao
today have become materialistic and no longer value kinship as much.
The burden of rido on the conflicting parties is the main reason why
they choose to settle.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions and Implications
This study found out that in Meranao society, maratabat is a contribu-
tory factor to the occurrence of rido. The connection between these two
social phenomena is one of quality rather than quantity, maratabat being
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a trait that resides in the value system, and rido, being expressed in the
behavioral. In Meranao society, disrespect of the individual’s maratabat, or
that of his kin, is a very serious offense. Therefore, even the slightest insult
(intentional or perceived) is provocative. Once someone gets hurt or killed,
severe injury is inflicted on one’s maratabat, which escalates to killing if not
resolved immediately.
A version of the cultural theory (Magdalena, 1990), which states that
“conflict behaviors are imposed on the individuals by the strength of cul-
tural factors, norms, values and traditions,” gives essence to the findings
that maratabat is a cultural recipe of conflict and revenge among the Mer-
anao. The practice of kasaop (retaliation) is justified within the Meranao
tradition and customary law in defense of one’s injured maratabat. Since
it is sustained by social coercion and not by individual’s choice (Saber and
Warriner, 1960), rido functions positively in the promotion of cohesion
within the members of the kin group. Rido fosters group kinship unity as
its members are exposed to attacks during conflict. Hence, they have little
or no recourse but to band together and support the kin group in conflict,
right or wrong.
The proliferation of loose firearms in the Meranao society can be at-
tributed to the rampant rido in every Meranao locality. However, rido in
affected Meranao localities cannot be attributed alone to the proliferation
of loose firearms, because rido is an ancient practice that antedates the in-
troduction of firearms. Rather, it is the wrong belief in, or application of,
maratabat that may be causing rido.
On the one hand, the influx of loose firearms into the Meranao society
is an apparent manifestation of the unstable peace and order, and the in-
efficient administration of justice. Possession of such firearms emboldens
many who, in turn, violate the law with impunity. As if touting the authori-
ties, they freely roam around the village without anyone apprehending them
or tipping them off to the police. Law enforcers, such as the Philippine Na-
tional Police, are hesitant to arrest the violators of law, especially so if these
uniformed men are Meranao themselves. Like the murderers and other law
breakers, the police also fear that their family might be involved in the rido
by the simple act of catching one.
On the other hand, illegal possession of firearms within the Meranao
society also appears to function as a form of deterrent itself. Meranaos who
own guns use them for defense against their enemies, but more so deter a ri-
val family or clan from retaliating during the course of a rido. They say they
cannot rely on the authorities for protection, hence must do it themselves.
Kinship is also what involves mayors, and even governors and congress-
men (representatives), directly or indirectly, in a rido situation. While they
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cannot escape it, they usually have the upperhand because of their large
following and access to government resources.
Once they are directly involved in rido, their family or close relatives
have more reasons to protect the family honor or maratabat simply because
of the high position of someone who needs protection. If they are indirectly
involved in rido, they may provide firearms or logistics to one of the feuding
for reason of political affiliation or debt of gratitude as a result of past favors
given in times of elections. Thus, the other party in conflict loses confidence
with the police authorities, because the government officials involved in the
rido exercise control and supervision over them.
Further, the undeniable presence of gun smugglers from within the
ranks of the afp and the Philippine National Police (pnp) as well as their
civilian counterparts who may be Meranao and non-Meranao is another
factor that contributed to the proliferation of loose firearms. They said that
gun smuggling is one of the profitable businesses next to illegal drugs in the
underground market. Furthermore, Meranao civilians have easy access to
firearms owned by members of the milf. These milf members who con-
sented to the use of their firearms in rido may also be the relatives of the
parties in rido; they may even be the aggrieved party or the aggressors, in
some remote instances.
Accordingly, the proliferation of firearms in Meranao society has con-
tributed to the balance of power. On the micro level, the Meranao elite or
tribal leaders capitalize on their close family ties and possession of firearms
to perpetuate their prestige, and influence others to keep them in their cov-
eted position. To them, firearms symbolize power or might.
Five out of six case studies show that the aggrieved party demands the
confiscation of the weapon (usually an Armalite) used in the killing. Thus,
the problem on the proliferation of firearms in the Meranao society is still
not solved, prompting anybody from the clan to continue the rido. Since a
weapon is a sign of power among the Meranao, anybody whose maratabat
is trampled upon can use it to avenge himself and his kin.
Moreover, there appears to be a “saturation point” (when many lives
are lost and the families experienced financial setbacks) during the rido
process. Leaders then make a crucial decision to end further violence.
Among the disputants themselves, this saturation point is also critical in
their decision to seek a mediator to end the conflict. It seems also clear that
unless this saturation is reached, both leaders and disputants do not want
to end the rido. Once the saturation point, however, comes around, all the
parties to the conflict and the community leaders decide to put an end to
the rido or hostility.
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The desire to live in peace is a very important factor in the settlement of
the rido. If both parties to the conflict feel the need for it, rido consequently
stops. Rido can be settled when both parties decide that they must put an
end to it.
Financial burdens and losses in the community and among the dispu-
tants in a rido is also a critical factor that turns the situation around to a
search for peace and resolution of the conflict.
In all settled cases, a considerable amount of money, or its equiva-
lent amount in the form of goods, passes hands among the disputants. As
to who receives or gives an amount is not always predictable; it depends
largely on who is defined as “aggrieved” party. That is, one who can present
the most convincing argument of having incurred material losses during
the conflict and has suffered the greatest insult to their maratabat. The
party who succeeds in presenting itself as having suffered and lost more,
financially or maratabat-wise, therefore, gets the money as “punishment”
to the offender.
Adjudicating a conflict among the Meranao always calls for a mediator.
Here, the role of influential leaders in putting an end to the rido is quite
critical as this study has pointed out. Without these leaders, rido could not
be resolved. To be effective, such mediators must possess an arsenal of power
and influence in the community in terms of material resources and follow-
ing. In addition, all disputing parties are bound to respect them and their
decision that results from the mediation process.
Aside from influential leaders, Meranao women also take on the role as
mediators. At the first occurrence of rido, they serve as shields, because they
are spared from retaliatory attacks. Women in this society are respected and
not to be hurt, according to custom. At the end of the day, people find them
serving as pacifiers because of the unique role they play in the sobering dis-
putes. They are the first ones to initiate the settlement of conflict since they
are among the most affected whenever rido breaks out. Men would usually
hide when there is rido, and so women are forced to take over the roles of
men as negotiators and financial providers of the family.
Relationship to the disputants either by ritual kinship or blood kinship
is another plus factor in the leader’s ability to resolve conflict. Such tends
to promote confidence in the leader, who is not afraid to be accused of bias
or favoritism, and may be excluded from any retaliatory attack when things
get out of hand.
Swearing before the Qur’an by the feuding families is given particu-
lar emphasis in the rituals of conflict resolution. It makes them aware of
the sanctity of the process, that Islam enjoins its followers to show under-
standing, patience, and tolerance. The appeal to religion is itself a powerful
RIDO V2.indd 248 10/4/2007 8:24:20 AM

mechanism that renders this indigenous process of conflict regulation ef-

fective, at least on the village level.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are advanced:
• An in-depth study must be done to understand why community lead-
ers do not immediately intervene to resolve conflicts at their outset. Among
the questions that need to be answered are: (a) Why do leaders wait for
the rido to take its toll before they work to end it? (b) How much of this
delayed reaction can be explained by the cultural norm which allows an
injured maratabat much leeway before being reined in? (c) What child-
rearing practices make the Meranao so sensitive to the slightest provocation
and so violent in reacting to such provocation? (d) Can education help the
Meranao abandon the violent culture of rido?
• Community leaders should be trained, through seminars, on peaceful
ways of conflict resolution.
• Peaceful means of resolving conflict in the context of Islam should
be taught to Meranao children as early as in kindergarten. Should this not
prove feasible, peace education should be conducted among families. An ed-
ucational program stressing non-violent ways of resolving conflict should
be pushed in Meranao areas where rido is prevalent.
• A study on women as both pacifiers and initiators of conflict should
be undertaken.
• Include both peer mediation and conflict management curriculum
as part of the plan to equip students with better or more effective conflict-
resolution skills geared towards peaceful means.
• Educational institutions should develop partnerships with parents
and leaders of organizations to explore ways in which conflict-management
concepts and skill can be infused into the youth and adults alike.
• Since most of the Meranao do not submit their rido cases to the Phil-
ippine court, it is encouraged that local government units must organize
and empower the council of elders and other respected and credible com-
munity leaders to settle the rido in accordance with the taritib ago igma.
• Study ways of utilizing or empowering the shari’ah to participate
more widely in conflict regulation rather than be confined to domestic
problems (divorce, inheritance). It is believed that formalizing this system
will introduce new concepts of Islamic justice not previously done in Moro
societies in Mindanao.
RIDO V2.indd 249 10/4/2007 8:24:20 AM

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E ch a p ter e i g h t
Big War, Small Wars:

The Interplay of Large-scale
and Community Armed Conflicts
in Five Central Mindanao Communities
Jose Jowel Canuday
“L ARGE-SCALE WAR has its effects on persistent and pre-existing lo-

cal conflicts,” observes a World Bank social assessment on conflict-
affected areas in Mindanao (The World Bank 2003:21). “One consequence
of this is that parties to localized conflict often had occasion to bring mili-
tary resources of secessionist movements and of the government to descend
upon their enemies,” concludes the World Bank report.
This study, on the other hand, shows that the reverse of the World Bank
observation also manifests in certain situations in Central Mindanao. At
times, local conflicts trigger large-scale armed confrontations between gov-
ernment and rebel forces. In these events, parties to localized conflicts are
able to exploit, deliberately or not, the military resources of both forces. In
certain cases, however, parties to localized armed conflicts are themselves
part of the military resources of both government and rebel forces.
Localized armed conflicts impact large-scale armed conflicts because
of the ability of parties in local conflicts to employ the military resources of
both state and rebels against perceived enemies. On other occasions, local
armed groups are employed by government and rebel forces in large-scale
armed engagements.
Broadly, the major protagonists of the armed conflicts in Central Min-
danao are the forces of the state composed of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (afp) and the Philippine National Police (pnp); and the forces
|| 254 ||
RIDO V2.indd 254 10/4/2007 8:24:22 AM

Big War, Small Wars || 255
of resistance/rebellion represented by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

(milf) and the Moro National Liberation Front (mnlf). On the ground,
these forces are augmented by an array of community-based armed groups
who effectively represent the forces of the state and of rebellion and who
provide a community character to the large-scale armed conflict. Paramili-
tary formations like the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (cafgu),
Special cafgu Active Auxiliary (scaa) and the Civilian Volunteers Orga-
nization (cvo) back the state’s armed forces. On the other hand, the milf
maintains area base commands that include armed local militias.
By 2001, the government’s armed forces had a combined active-duty
strength of 106,500 personnel. The Philippine Army boasted 68,000 per-
sonnel, followed by the Navy, the Marines and the Coast Guard with 23,000
personnel and the Philippine Air Force (Quitoriano and Libre 2001:26). At
least five Army battalions were deployed in North Cotabato in 2001 (Qui-
toriano and Libre 2001:26).
As of 2002, the strength of the Philippine National Police stood at
118,326 personnel (http://www.pnp.gov.ph/about/organization.html). The
pnp organizational structure is composed of the central office or the na-
tional headquarters and 17 police regional offices (pros) nationwide cor-
responding to the regional subdivisions of the country. Six of these regional
offices are in Mindanao.
On the other hand, the strength of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed
Forces (biaf), the armed wing of the milf, stands at 15,000 fighters (Philip-
pine Star, January 17, 2000).
The cafgu, the paramilitary forces organized through Executive Order
264 signed in 1987 by then President Corazon Aquino was estimated at
around 75,000 persons in 1992 (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 March 2000).
During the war in March 2000, an additional 35,000 cafgu members were
mobilized by then President Joseph Estrada (Philippine Star, March 3,
2000) and around 10,000 were deployed in Mindanao (cf. Quitoriano and
Libre 2001:28).
Quitoriano and Libre refer to the cafgu, the scaa and cvo forces as
“secondary actors” while the milf and the afp are the “warring parties” in the
armed conflicts in Central Mindanao. The study notes that paramilitary forc-
es, in particular the cafgu, are perceived as “adjunct” to government forces.
The interplay of all these armed groups, however, brings forth an ex-
plosive situation that blurs the line between “secondary actors” and “war-
ring parties;” and is significant in understanding the recurring character
of violence in the conflict-prone areas of Central Mindanao. Against this
backdrop, the interplay between pre-existing community conflicts and
large-scale armed confrontations is apparent especially in the case of five
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conflict-prone multi-cultural communities in Maguindanao and North Co-
tabato covered by this study.
Framework
In exploring the tension between state and rebellion as well as among com-
munity-based armed groups, this study follows political theorist Hannah
Arendt’s suggestion of raising the question of violence in the political realm
and dealing with the issue of violence as a “phenomenon in its own right
(Arendt, 1969/2004: 236).” Arendt’s position appears to be echoed by other
analytical works on the meaning of violence which take into account the
vital role of “socially rooted and historically formed relations of power, force
and dominance in defining social relations, effected through violent action
(Abbink, 2000:xi).”
Locating Culture and Violence

Abbink’s emphasis on relations of power in explaining violence is a reaction
against viewing culture—however defined—as in any way explanatory of
violence. In a collection of essays by historians, sociologists and anthro-
pologists which he co-edited in 2000, Abbink notes that “violent actions
are much more meaningful and rule bound than reports about them lead
us to believe” (cf. Abbink 2000: xii). The essays’ critique of a reductive view
of culture as the root cause of violence is highly crucial at this time when
much of the violence in contemporary society from conflict in Sulu and
Lanao del Sur to the murder of journalists nationwide is being attributed to
the supposed “culture of violence” or “gun culture” of certain ethnic groups.
1
(Mindanao Peaceweavers, Disoma 2000:60, 2005:6, nujp: 30 January 2005).
Given the state of the nation as well as current world affairs, it is simplistic to
regard the higher incidence of armed conflict in certain areas as well as the
propensity of some groups to stockpile weapons as a matter of “culture.”
Does the fact the wars have featured significantly in European history or
that national liberation movements continue to thrive across parts of Asia
and Africa mean that residents of these areas are “culturally violent”? Were
the anti-colonial heroes of the Philippine Revolution “prone to violence”?
In 1992-1998, most of the firearms—M16s, M14s, M1911 or 115 A-1 automatic
1 The Sulu Solidarity Mission noted in their March 28-30, 2005 fact-finding report that Col.
Nehemias Pajarito, commander of the Army’s 104th Brigade based in Sulu, sees the problem in Sulu as
one of asserting the law. In Pajarito’s view, the people there “respect the law only when force is behind
it.” He points to what he calls the Moro or particularly Tausug “culture of violence” or “culture of the
gun” (Sulu Peace and Solidarity Mission and the Mindanao Peace Weavers 2005).
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rifles—that entered the country came from the United States (Libre and
Quitoriano cf. 2001:31) Can we then conclude that Americans are a “cultur-
ally violent” lot? Rather than label any particular culture as violent, it is more
constructive for us to examine violence as a “phenomenon in its own right,”
as well as power and social relations “effected through violent action.”
Arendt and Abbink’s positions are, to some extent, reflected in Thomas
McKenna’s ethnographic observation on the paradoxical nature of the Moro
nationalist-oriented resistance against Philippine government rule over the
province of Cotabato in the 1970s. McKenna notes that the notion of a
Bangsamoro nation, supposedly the central symbol of Mindanao’s “Muslim
separatist movement,” had little or no resonance among the movement’s
rank-and-file adherents (Mckenna, 1998:2).” His findings counter assump-
tions that adherence to nationalist movements is “motivated by the reso-
nant force of elite-generated nationalist ideas.” In the context of the Central
Mindanao experience, McKenna’s observation highlights the problematic
nature of assessments that tend to assume that persons or groups affiliated
with the so-called “Muslim separatist movement,” a term he as well as other
scholars and the media often use in reference to Moro resistance groups like
the mnlf and the milf, are a homogenous lot who share similar objectives
that define their actions. Similarly, one would be naïve to assume that all
members of paramilitary forces like the cvo and cafgu affiliated with the
afp support the national government. What role does nationalist ideology
play in these alignments?
McKenna suggests that the armed conflict may only be adequately un-
derstood “by means of wide-ranging and multilayered analysis of domina-
tion, accommodation and resistance.” He adds that explaining these para-
doxes, “demands the analysis of power relations operating in two political
arenas—the external and local domain” where the configurations of culture
can be situated. These suggestions, to a large extent, echo Arendt’s posi-
tion that the question of violence be raised to a political realm as well as
Abbink’s position that relations of power, force and dominance be consid-
ered in examining social relations punctuated by violence. This study keeps
track of the “complex conjuncture” (cf. McKenna 2000:5) of political forces
and power relations at play in the areas covered by the study and locate the
configurations of culture in these relations. In terms of alignment of forces;
government soldiers, the police, local chief executives, and paramilitary
forces like the cafgu, cvos and scaas tend to gravitate to one side of the
political divide while the milf and their armed militias occupy the other.
There are many approaches to understanding violence in a multi-cul-
tural environment complicated by armed engagements between the forces of
the state and of resistance. This study factored in the dynamics of competing
RIDO V2.indd 257 10/4/2007 8:24:23 AM

political formations—with all their trappings of power, strength, force
and authority—in creating tension and escalating violence within and
among communities.
Conceptualizing Power, Strength, Force, and Authority

In the context of state building and resistance, Arendt posits a model for
understanding violence vis-à-vis the concepts of power, strength, force, and
authority. Although these key words are often held to be synonyms, Arendt
draws paradoxical meanings from their usage. She suggests that if one ceases
to “reduce public affairs to the business of dominion,” the “original data in
the realm of human affairs will appear, or rather, reappear in their authentic
diversity (Arendt 2004:239)”
For Arendt, “power corresponds to the human ability not just to act
but to act in concert.” She explains that power is “never a property of an
individual” but belongs to a “group and remains in existence only so long
as the group keeps together.” “When we say of somebody in “power’ we
actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act
in their name (p. 239).”
Strength, according to Arendt, is “the property inherent in an object or
person and belongs to its character, which may prove itself in relation to
other things or persons, but is essentially dependent of them.” “The strength
of even the strongest individual can always be overpowered by the many,
who often will combine for no other purpose than to ruin strength precisely
because of its peculiar independence,” Arendt notes (p. 239).
Force is often associated in daily speech as a synonym for violence es-
pecially if violence serves as a means of coercion, observes Arendt. She sug-
gests, however, that in terminological language, force should be reserved to
indicate the energy released by physical or social movements.
Authority, for Arendt, can be vested in persons or in offices and its hall-
mark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey—“nei-
ther coercion nor persuasion is needed.” Authority requires respect for the
person of the office. Its “greatest enemy,” however, is “contempt, and the
surest way to undermine it is laughter.”
Finally, Arendt distinguishes violence by its “instrumental character.”
She notes that phenomenologically, violence is “close to strength, since the
implements of violence, like all other tools, are designed and used for the
purpose of multiplying natural strength until, in the last stage of their de-
velopment, they can substitute for it (Arendt 2004:239).”
This study locates the relations and distinctions of power, strength,
force, authority, and violence in several Central Mindanao communities in
RIDO V2.indd 258 10/4/2007 8:24:23 AM

order to understand the interplay between community-based conflicts and

large-scale armed conflict involving state and rebellion—the small wars and
big wars.
In locating the relations and distinctions of power, strength, force, au-
thority, and violence, this research takes note of the alignment of major
political and armed forces in Central Mindanao. These forces include the
afp, the pnp, the paramilitary scaa, cafgu and cvos, local government
executives who influence the maintenance, deployment and mobilization
of paramilitary forces; the milf, the mnlf and their militias.
Conceptualizing “War”
A notion left unsettled in this framework, however, is this work’s use of
the term “war” in describing the interplay of large and community armed
conflicts. Is the term justifiable or a mere attempt at sensationalizing the
armed tensions examined by this study? Mary Kaldor, in a groundbreaking
comparative study of wars from the birth of nations to the era of global-
ization, describes war as an armed conflict “intimately bound up with the
evolution of modern state” based on the discourse of Karl von Clausewitz
(Kaldor 2001:13, 15, 17-25). Kaldor notes Clausewitz’s definition of war as
an “act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will”
(cf. Kaldor p.15). Clausewitz sees war as a social activity between states
characterized by the mobilization and organization of individual men,
“almost never women,” for the purpose of inflicting violence. For Kaldor,
Clausewitz’s argument implies that war has a definable end that could be
in accordance with state interests. Kaldor refers to Clausewtiz’s (“On War,”
Clausewitz 1892/1968:1-202), argument that war involves three actors—the
state, or political leaders; the army, or the generals; and the people—who are
all linked through “reciprocal actions.” (cf. Kaldor 21). Kaldor outlines the
logic of these reciprocal actions: at a political level, the state always meets
resistance in achieving its objectives and therefore has to press harder; the
military must aim to disarm its opponent to achieve its political objective
and avoid counterattacks, while the strength of will to wage war depends
on popular sentiment as war unleashes passions and hostility that may be
uncontrollable. Kaldor claims that the problem with this notion of a war
is that it is no longer in consonance with present reality. Clauzewitz, notes
Kaldor, is describing the “total wars” of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury that require “vast mobilization of national energies both to fight and
to support the fighting (cf. Kaldor 25).” In a “total war,” the public sphere
tries to draw the whole society into the act of war, and in the process elimi-
nates the distinction between the private and public domains. Yet, as war
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involves more and more people and breaks down the distinction between
the military and the civilian, the justification of war in terms of state inter-
est becomes suspect. People go to war for different reasons—ranging from
adventure to patriotism—that are not necessarily in consonance with the
aim of the state.
By the World War II, other forms of modern warfare such as resistance
and guerrilla movements as that led by Chinese communist leader Mao
Zedong had broken out. It was the Cold War, Kaldor points out, which kept
alive the idea of “total war” as the two competing superpowers continued
to mobilize vast armies and upgrade war technologies even while they tried
to avoid a shooting war. Kaldor argues that more lives have been lost in the
wars following WWII “but because these wars did not fit our conception
of war, they were discounted (p.29). Other forms of wars apart from those
involving states have emerged out of the cracks of modern warfare and pro-
vide “new ways of socializing violence” (Kaldor, p. 30). The term civil war
describes these other forms of war. European war historians Thaithe and
Thornton observe that the difference between war and civil war is “some-
what spurious, for even if a civil war does not directly address the pre-emi-
nence of a state, it deals with the structure of society within itself ” (Thaite
and Thornton 1998:4). The duo adds that historians obsessed in factoring
in the state in describing wars “have only recently broadened their hori-
zons to include the diversity of society constructs” (cf. Thaite and Thorn-
ton). Thornton argues that “even small-scale communities can be shaped
or even made through the organized and purposeful violence we call war”
(cf. Thaite and Thornton).
Communities torn by armed confrontation in Central Mindanao are
not isolated, independent or inaccessible. Some villagers in Pikit, North Co-
tabato and in the towns of Mamasapano and Dapiawan in Maguindanao
have been armed since their cafgu and cvo units were brought under afp
command with support of local government units. Under such a relation-
ship, armed villagers became inextricably linked with the forces of the state.
In the same vein, villagers contesting state forces have also joined non-state
armed groups in an effort to arm and organize military structures capable
of countering the afp. The structures and resources for warfare are effec-
tively established at the level of the communities building the condition for
the interplay of community and large-scale armed conflicts, the small and
the big wars.
Research Questions
The question that this research strives to investigate is how exactly the state
and rebel forces are drawn into community conflicts and how community
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conflicts draw state and rebel forces into armed confrontations. Corollary
to the main question, this research post the following queries:
• How do we distinguish the various shades and layers of local-level

conflicts in a social milieu where clans, state, and rebellion interplay in com-
munities repeatedly affected by armed conflicts? How do clan, inter and
intra community conflicts complicate the positions, movement, and actions
of the state and rebel forces in conflict affected area? How does the more
expansive state and rebel conflict complicate clan, inter- and intra-com-
munity conflicts?
• How do conflicts start and escalate? How are these conflicts addressed,
averted and resolved? Who are involved in conflict-resolution efforts? What
are the factors that contribute to the success or failure in averting the escala-
tion of conflicts? What are the roles of the clans, community and religious
leaders, local government units, the military, rebel forces, and civil society
groups in conflict-resolution process?
• Do local-level conflicts deter persons displaced by major armed

conflicts between state and rebellion from returning home to rehabili-
tate their strife-torn communities? What, if any, efforts were initiated by
displaced communities to deal with local-level conflicts and facilitate the
return of people to their communities? What spelled the success or failure
of these efforts?
• Do traditional social organizations of displaced communities con-

tinue to function or is there a general breakdown of that organization in the
course of large-scale armed conflict and the subsequent magnification of
pre-existing local conflicts? Were they able to recreate, refine or reinstitute
the community-based social organizations in the course of repeated armed
conflicts and displacements?
• How do the state and other groups aiding the evacuees view security?
How does the evacuees’ view of security conform to or differ from the state’s
definition of national security and the notion of human security of civil
society groups?
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Methodology
Case Study
In observing the interplay of small and big wars, this work looks into
five communities repeatedly affected both by large-scale and community
armed conflicts to build on a case study. These communities cover the fol-
lowing areas: Linantangan in Mamasapano, Maguindanao; Dapiawan in
Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao; Buliok in Pagalungan, Maguindan-
ao; Nalapaan and Gli-gli Pikit in North Cotabato; and Lebpas in President
Roxas, North Cotabato.
Locations of the case studies reflect the ethnic, religious, and political
affiliations of villages repeatedly affected by armed conflict. Linantangan,
Dapiawan and Buliok are villages dominated by Maguindanaoan Moro.
Ilonggo, Ilocano and Bisaya Christians, and the Maguindanaoan share the
villages of Gli-gli and Nalapaan in Pikit, North Cotabato. Erumanen ne
Menuvu Lumad and the Maguindanaoans occupy the village of Lebpas and
its neighboring areas along the Pulangi River in President Roxas and Car-
men town, North Cotabato. These areas, viewed as a whole and examined
based on their particularities, provide for an illuminating contrast of the
interplay of small and big wars.
Probing Interconnected Conflicts: Case Studies

Case Study 1: A Runaway Family Feud in Linantangan
Shortly before daybreak on January 9, 2005, a band of milf guerrillas
assaulted the patrol base of the Alpha Company of the Army’s 37th Infantry
Battalion at a two-hectare coconut grove along the main road of baran-
gay Linantangan in Mamasapano town, Maguindanao. The attackers, led
by Abdul Rahman Binago, a field guerrilla leader of the milf’s 109th base
command, killed seven of the soldiers and overran the base. Immediately,
government forces responded with sustained massive ground and air attack
that preceded troop deployment.
The assault and the corresponding government response displaced an
estimated 3,500 civilians in Linantangan and surrounding villages. As the
skies thundered and the ground shook with artillery and aircraft bombing,
the government stepped up its media offensive against the milf by charg-
ing that the attacking rebels executed government soldiers captured alive.
(Philippine Star, January 12, 2005).
Benjie Midtimbang, then chair of the milf side of the Coordinating
Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (ccch), denied the news report.
He said the false account was meant to portray the milf as not respectful
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of human rights. The government side of the ccch did not openly raise the
issue of the reported summary executions.
Instead, they took to task their milf counterparts for the breach of the
ceasefire agreed upon during the joint ccch meeting at the Marco Polo
Hotel in Davao City on February 2004. The meeting, however, ended on
a positive note with mutual assurance of cooperation and a shared view
that the incident would not undermine the 1997 ceasefire. In the meeting,
milf ccch, in turn, released a Central Committee statement that “openly
disowns any responsibility in the flare up of fighting” in Mamasapano (milf
Central Committee, 2005).
Gadzali Jaafar, milf vice chair for political affairs (Jaafar, 2005) claimed
that the assault was never sanctioned by the milf Central Committee and
was an “independent decision of few that is totally outside the realm of the
milf(cf. Jaafar).”
The January 9 incident, however, underscored the tension among feud-
ing members of the family owning the land where the Army set up a patrol
base. This tension was complicated by the social and political alignments
that divided the family members.
Before the January 9 assault, the civil society-led Bantay Ceasefire re-
ported the following violent incidents:
August 27, 2004. A milf member was shot dead by a cvo member
while patrolling the highway from Libutan to Linantangan and Tuka na
Lipao Mamasapano (Bantay Ceasefire, August 2004).
August 28-29, 2004. Armed clashes between milf and scaa/37TH ib
–paafp at Brgy. Linantangan and Tuka na Lipao, Mamasapano, Maguin-
danao (Bantay Ceasefire, August 2004).
October 04, 2004. A certain Sgt. Molita of the 37th IB Intelligence Unit
was shot dead at Linantangan (Bantay Ceasefire, November 2004).
October 15, 2004. Two corpses, later identified as those of milf mem-
bers, were seen floating at the Kabulnan River at Brgy. Old Maganoy, Ma-
masapano. (Bantay Ceasefire, November 2004 report)2.
Linantangan, an area thriving with copra, rice, corn, and fresh water
fishing production, is an economically vibrant Maguindanaon village.
2 Maj. Dickson Hermoso, head of the government CCCH secretariat, says in an interview at
Cotabato City in October 2004, for this study that based on their investigation the two MILF members
were cousins and slain by members of a rival family. The slaying prompted a large gathering of the
victims’ relatives, a number of them also members of the MILF, to plot their moves in relation to the
attack. Retaliation have been debated on but the elder members of the family prevailed in opposing a
violent response and in recommending to end the conflict through a peace negotiations with their rival
family. Hermoso says the gathering, however, alerted government soldiers who initially thought the
mass up was a provocative act by the MILF. A joint CCCH investigation, however, clarified the context
of the gathering avoiding military deployment in the area.
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Stores, cellphone account reloading shops, coconut and corn crop ware-
houses, concrete and wooden single and two-storey houses line the village’s
main road. The village is only about 20 km from Shariff Aguak town, cur-
rently the seat of the provincial government of Maguindanao.3 Several
young women in the community have gone to work abroad, particularly
in the Middle East. The revenues they send home are invested in businesses
and farms. Though far from opulent, Linantangan thrives with farming
and trading. Educational institutions, in particular a mahad or a high-level
Arabic school and a public elementary school are present in the village that
is typical of a vibrant, well-populated though less developed rural com-
munity in Mindanao.
Power Relations, Strength, Alignment

Linantangan’s prospects, however, have been dimned by political conflict.
Linantangan has been without an official leader and a functioning barangay
government due to frequent feuds among village leaders. In 2004, Linan-
tangan barangay chair Kempen Bangadan stayed away from the village as
tension between him and his nephews, Daotin Gandang Palaguyan and Kagi
Faizal Gandang Palaguyan, turned bloody.
While the barangay government remained weak, the Army deployed
two companies from the 37th infantry battalion in the village and neigh-
boring areas since mid-2004. Meanwhile, on the fringes of Linantangan, a
myriad of armed groups are positioned to challenge government forces. The
milf and the mnlf have maintained separate base commands in the area ef-
fectively dispersing the centers of power and authority in that small village.
Aside from deploying their regular forces, the armed groups also distrib-
ute firearms and ammunitions to members of the community aligned with
them. The Army employs the cafgu, scaa and cvo to assist in controlling
the area. These paramilitary forces are supported by town and provincial
government executives. The milf and the mnlf, on the other hand, have
established armed militias to strengthen their position in the area.
Ahmad Ampatuan, a son of Maguindanao Governor Andal Ampatuan,
is town mayor. Mayor Ampatuan’s authority is strengthened by the local
police and by the scaa and cvo contingent supported by the Maguindanao
provincial government.
3 Remarkably, the location of the seat of the provincial government of Maguindanao has been
shifting depending on who becomes governor of the province. The provincial capitol used to be lo-
cated in Cotabato City but during the governorship of Zacaria Candao, it was transferred to Crossing
Simuay in Sultan Kudarat town. When Governor Andal Ampatuan wrestled control over the province,
he transferred the provincial capitol in his hometown in Shariff Aguak.
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Against the backdrop of competing armed strengths and complex align-

ment of forces emerged a highly emotional land-related dispute between
Bangadan and his nephews. As disagreements persisted, the opposing sides
took more aggressive stances that later became alarmingly violent.
Clashes
The following account is based on a series of interviews from residents and
community leaders in Mamasapano as well as documents.
On June 14, 2004, Daotin Gandang Palaguyan, along with a retinue of
armed supporters, stormed the house of his uncle, barangay chair Kempen
Bagandan, to confront him about the charges that Bangadan allegedly made
against Gandang and his brother Paisal Palaguyan, also known as Faisal
Sumakwel. Gandang did not meet Bangadan who was away at that time.
Instead, Gandang confronted Bangadan’s supporters and took with him
three rifles—two M1 Garand and an M1 Carbine—held by the barangay
official’s men. It turned out, however, that the firearms were “owned” by
Mamasapano Mayor Ahmad Ampatuan who had issued them temporarily
to Bangadan. Immediately after the incident, Mayor Ampatuan wrote and
informed then milf ccch chair Benjie Midtimbang of the situation and
warned of possible violence if nothing is done to address the situation. His
letter was diplomatically crafted as he sought for the committee’s interven-
tion. Part of the letter reads:
I respectfully bring to your attention for immediate interven-

tion an incident that had happened a couple of days ago, which we
believe an absolute demerit to our exerted effort in obtaining the
success of our noble objective. We further believed that this inci-
dent will even turn into a brewing issue or scenario that endangers
life and property among our civilians populace…
Finally, being responsible partners and instrument in succeed-
ing our objectives for long lasting peace and order in pursuit of
public interest, I may again reiterate to ask and request your im-
mediate intervention for an acceptable mitigating solution and
likewise I take part to do all my best in expense of my capability to
do same.
The letter, dated June 16, 2004, attached two separate spot reports sent
by the Delta company of the Army’s 37th IB to their commanding officer at
8:35 a.m. and 4:35 p.m.. The first report partly reads:
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Certain Rotin4 Gandang ransacked the residence of Kempen
Bangadan, Barangay chairman of Barangay Linantangan, Mamasa-
pano, Maguindanao. After which carted away with him one carbine
and one cal. 30-M1 Garand rifle. Action taken 0635 Hours same day.
One platoon from Delta company Led by Lt. Beharin take pursuit
operation tracking down the route of withdrawal of the suspect.
The second report linked the attack to the heightening feud between the
uncle and his nephews, as it partly reads:
Initial investigation made by this unit revealed that Rotin Gan-

dang who carted away one carbine and two cal. 30-M1 Garand rifle
was identified by Tuks Kempen, son of Kempen Bangadan, Baran-
gay chair of Linantangan Mamasapano, who was actually present
during the incident. Motive of his action is that Rotin Gandang
is hiding an old grudge and to make even with barangay chair-
man Bangadan and to his family who gave consent in installing
company CP (command post) of delta company, 37th IB, 6th ID, PA
(Philippine Army) on the lot owned by the former. The perpetrator
took refuge to milf rebels at sitio Tatapan, barangay Kitango, Datu
Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao. One platoon from the company
led by 2nd Lt Bejarin jumped off from company CP to Southwest
direction at 15305 June 04 ( 3:05 a.m. of June 15, 2004) to conduct
search and rescue operation to recover firearms which was carted
away by the perpetrator… result of operation – negative and no
enemy contact.”
On June 17, the Mamasapano police station drafted its own report on
the incident that revealed similar findings.
Both reports illustrate how family and community-level conflicts com-
plicate the positions of government and milf rebels. From an intra-family
conflict involving an uncle and a nephew, the armed tension drew the milf
into the fray as the nephews sought refuge in the rebels’ lair. In reaction,
the Army also geared up in search for Palaguyan, Gandang and their fol-
lowers who hid behind milf lines. At that point, the milf did not engage
the Army’s search team. About two months later, however, the situation
was complicated by the Army’s establishment of a patrol base right at the
disputed property of the warring family members.
4 Rotin Gandang is identified as Dautin by Linantangan folk and as documented by the Bantay
Ceasefire team. Army and police reports available at the Mamasapano town hall, however, variably
spelled Gandang’s name as Rotin, Dotin and Dontin.
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The situation worsened when tension between the uncle and his neph-
ews intensified following Palaguyan’s issuance of a two-page letter to a
group of farmers working on Bangadan’s coconut farm. Palaguyan’s letter,
dated June 22, 2004, warn the workers of dire consequences if they continue
their work.5 Paluguyan signed the letter, Paisal Sumakwel. The letter, written
in Maguindanaoan, prohibits the farmers from working on the farm for
Bangadan. Paisal claims that his uncle owed him, Paisal, damages worth P1.7
million. He based his damage claims on the following incidents:
• The destruction of their house by Bangadan’s forces.

• The cutting of trees and coconut on their farm on Bangadan’s
behest.
• The destruction to their livelihood caused by Bangadan and the losses
that he, Paisal, incurred in terms of time.
• An incident wherein he, Paisal, was fired upon by Bangadan’s men
following Bangadan’s orders.
• The shooting of his brother, Dontin, by government soldiers on
Bangadan’s orders.
• An incident where Bangadan forces chased him, Paisal, and his forces
out of Linantangan.
Palaguyan emphasizes in the letter that he wants these issues tackled

by a Shari’ah court, a judicial body whose members are associated with the
milf local command in Mamasapano. The letter reveals the deep disagree-
ment between the uncle and his nephews over the utilization of a family-
owned coconut grove along the Linantangan highway. The same property
was used as the patrol base of Delta and later on the Alpha Company of the
Army’s 37th IB, an arrangement resented by brothers Dotin and Paizal. The
brothers blamed Kempen of maneuvering to have the Army base on the
family property.
The reported raid at Bangadan’s house and Palaguyan’s letter alarmed
elders in Linantangan and in neighboring communities. Barangay officials,
the elders, ulama, and other traditional leaders in the village and neighbor-
ing areas convened in adjacent barangay Libutan. In the gathering, officials
from neighboring barangays were concerned that Gandang’s carting away
5 The letter was turned over to the Mamasapano police staff and then to Mayor Ahmad. He had
the letter photocopied and personally handed Midtimbang a copy when he and government CCCH
secretariat chair Maj. Dickson Hermoso met the chief executive at the Mamasapano town hall to in-
vestigate the circumstances behind the August 28, 2005 dawn attack and the subsequent government-
MILF firefight.
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of Ampatuan’s issued firearms inadvertently dragged the mayor and his
family into the conflict. The milf reportedly failed to act on Ampatuan’s
June 16 letter to Midtimbang. The village elders and leaders feared that if
the firearms were not returned, the Ampatuans would likely mobilize the
cvo against Gandang Palaguyan and expand the conflict. Some barangay
leaders proposed that Linantangan folk and neighboring communities take
responsibility for Gandang’s action and pledge before Mayor Ampatuan
that they would raise the money for firearms to replace those taken away
by Gandang.
One of the barangay officials suggested that they “buy” the peace from
Mayor Ahmad by paying for the three rifles. The barangay official offered
P15,000 and challenged other community leaders to contribute. Majority of
the Linantangan elders, however, were not willing to shell out money. The
gathering adjourned without agreement. At that time, the conflict between
Bangadan and his nephews had already drawn the attention of milf local
base command, the paramilitary forces controlled by the Ampatuans, and
the Army.
On August 28, 2004, Kempen Bangadan, supported by about a hundred
scaa and cvo members under the provincial government’s command, moved
to Linantangan. Witnesses to the scaa and cvo troop movement noted that
the group assembled and jumped off from Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao’s
capital town and passed through the road connecting barangays Libutan and
Linantangan. On the road, however, a cvo member recognized a road hiker
as a member of the family with whom the militia member’s family had been
at odds with due to years of retaliatory killings. The cvo took his weapon and
shot the man who turned out to be an milf member. The incident exacer-
bated tensions in the area as the family of the slain man wanted vengeance.
A barangay official, involved in conflict-resolution efforts in the town, noted
that the tiff between Bangadan and his nephews sparked other complicated
armed tension in their area. The official claimed that a cousin of the slain
milf man was the one responsible for the October 4, 2004 killing of Sgt. Of
Molita of the 37th IB Intelligence Unit. He observed that the motive for the
killing was more personal than political because the killer viewed the soldiers
who are allies of the cafgu and the cvos as fair target. An Army officer at the
Linantangan patrol base, however, rejected the barangay official’s view. The
officer maintained that the killing was perpetrated by an milf member. The
two milf members and Army Sgt. Molina are among the casualties of the
many-sided conflicts in Linantangan and environs.
At dawn on August 27, 2005, Bangadan forces assaulted a group of
armed men in the forested part of the village where they thought Pala-
guyan and Gandang’s forces had encamped. The armed men turned out
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th
to be members of the milf’s 108 base command whose forces repulsed
Bangadan’s assault. As the firefight escalated, Bangadan’s forces withdrew
and sought refuge at the patrol base of the Army’s 37th IB, the military fa-
cility established at the property disputed by Bangadan and his nephews6.
Milf forces pursued the scaa forces but Army troopers at the patrol base
were alerted early on and took defensive position to repulse the attacking
milf forces. As the fighting raged, government soldiers called for reinforce-
ment. This prompted aerial and artillery bombardment and ground assault
on suspected milf positions.
At about 3 a.m. of August 28, the feud had turned into a battle between
the Army and milf forces. The afp employed heavy artillery and at around
1:30 p.m., OV10 aircraft bombed milf positions. Sporadic shelling contin-
ued to about 8 in the evening—the small war involving an uncle and his
nephews had turned into a big war between the afp and milf guerrillas.
As the battle raged, the scaa, the cvos and other armed groups occupied
strategic positions in the community.
Bantay Ceasefire monitors, including this researcher, caught up with
the scaa and cvo members, fully equipped with high-powered firearms like
M16 and M14 rifles, occupying a public elementary school in Linantangan.
In front of the school was an armored vehicle mounted with two machine
guns controlled by the scaa and cvo. As observed in a Bantay Ceasefire re-
port, the armed men “covered their faces, some were in civilian clothes and
some of those in uniform have no nameplates or insignia to identify their
units (cf. Bantay Ceasefire: August 2004).”
At the sight of Bangadan’s heavily armed forces and Army reinforce-
ment, residents in central Linantangan immediately evacuated, grabbing
and loading as many possessions as they could on their carabao-drawn carts
or tricycles. I took photographs of a fleeing family who tied up their six-cu-
bic feet refrigerator to a small rickety tricycle fully loaded with kitchen uten-
sils and other household belongings. Others loaded their belongings onto
carabao-pulled carts. The more affluent families used six wheeler trucks.
Evacuees told the Bantay Ceasefire monitors that families bring along ev-
erything they can because looting follows armed conflicts. Families without
transport means, however, were forced to leave most of their possessions
behind. An August 30, 2005 Bantay Ceasefire report also recorded “looting
of various home appliances (TV sets, CD players, radio cassette record-
ers, karaoke sets), stocks in stores (softdrinks, copra), and fowls (ducks and
chickens) as complained by civilian residents of Linantangan (cf. Bantay
Ceasefire: August 2005).”
6 The patrol base was the same facility attacked by MILF Commander Binago on January 9, 2005,
killing seven soldiers.
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Eventually, the armed confrontations displaced thousands of fami-
lies across 11 barangays, namely Linantangan, Daladap, Pimbalakan, Ba-
gumbong, Tuka na Lipao, Duguengen, Liab, Dabenayon, Dasikil, Pagatin,
and Pusao.
When the Bantay Ceasefire team reached central Linantangan on August
28, the village was abandoned. Villagers fled and sought refuge at schools,
mosques or the homes of their relatives in the neighboring communities of
Manungkaling, Mamasapano poblacion, Libutan and Tuka na Lipao.
The firefight ended after the joint ccch intervened. Consequently, cvo
members withdraw at around 2 p.m. on August 28 after the Army and the
local milf commands agreed to a ceasefire called by the ccch. I and other
members of the Bantay Ceasefire team saw the men board a 10-wheeler
truck for Shariff Aguak.
Case Study 2: War and Peace in Dapiawan

About a hundred milf guerrilla forces swooped down the busy market
place of barangay Dapiawan in Datu Saudi Ampatuan town, Maguindanao
province at mid-morning of August 17, 2004. The Army’s 601st Brigade im-
mediately responded to contest the milf presence in the area by deploying
more than a hundred men armed with high-powered weapons and machine
gun-equipped armored personnel carrier.
The standoff triggered street gun battles which spilled over to the sur-
rounding coconut grove. The military called in two assault aircraft that gave
cover to government ground troops. The fierce firefight left three persons
including an Army sergeant dead, blasted a food stall, and forced the evacu-
ation of thousands of civilians from the market place, the main commercial
and residential area of barangay Dapiawan.
Barangay Dapiawan is a rural but vibrant trading village along the
highway connecting the Maguindanao provincial capitol in Shariff Aguak
and a string of towns and villages upstream of the Maguindanao section of
Pulangi River and the westerly portions of the sprawling Liguasan Marsh.
Based on a 2000 government census, only about 349 families or a total of
1,633 persons populated the area (Medco 2004). On the ground, however,
the scene at Dapiawan’s market place showcases a commercially active area
where eateries, food and dry goods stalls, farm products purchasing cen-
ters, and general merchandise shops abound. Residents interviewed for this
study shared that the village’s marketplace was teeming with farmers and
traders when gunfire ripped the air.
The fighting stemmed from the fatal shooting of two middle-aged men,
Mohammad Ali Kahal and Ibrahim Udtog, at the market around 7 that
morning by members of the paramilitary cvo. A Dapiawan cvo leader, who
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agreed to be interviewed for this study, admitted responsibility to the killing,

but said the slaying of Udtog was “accidental” as he was hit by a stray bullet.
The cvo leader said their real target was the 60-year old Kahal who was a
relative of a group of armed men who killed their cousin, Barodi Zacaria,
five days earlier. He admitted that they have no firm information linking
Kahal directly to Zacaria’s killing but considered Kahal a legitimate target
because he is an milf commander based in Sarangani. The cvo leader noted
that Zacaria himself was never involved in the family feuds.
It turned out that Kahal’s son and other relatives were ranking leaders
of a local milf command. Market vendors claimed that Kahal’s sons asked
some relatives residing near the Dapiawan market to retrieve his body. The
cvos, however, refused to give up the body on the grounds that a police team
was coming to investigate and that Kahal was an milf commander from
another place. Udtog’s relatives, on the other hand, were allowed to pick
up his remains. Kahal’s kin were humiliated by the cvos’ move and by the
fact that Kahal was left sprawled on the pavement for hours. The situation
prompted the milf’s local commanders to mount an operation to retrieve
Kahal’s body. The cvos detected the milf’s movement and immediately
withdrew from the area, leaving Kahal’s body behind.
As milf forces moved in at around 9:30 a.m., three policemen escorted
by three soldiers also arrived at the scene of the killing. The presence of
milf and government forces in the village immediately triggered an armed
confrontation, prompting the soldiers to call for reinforcement. The Army
immediately deployed troops and military hardware. Soon the Army and
the milf guerrillas in Dapiawan were exchanging gunfire, transforming
the family vendetta into a confrontation between government and milf
rebel forces.
As the fighting raged, milf forces were able to snatch the body of Kahal.
They carried the corpse through the labyrinth of narrow passageways and
houses at the market. The guerrillas left a trail of blood at the scene as they
withdrew towards a coconut grove. As the milf retreated, the Army sent for re-
inforcement and called in fighter jets broadening the arena of confrontation.
Reports of the escalating clashes quickly reached the members of the
joint government-milf ccch, and civil society-led ceasefire monitoring
groups who, at the time of the clashes, had rendezvoused in Tacurong City
en route to S.K. Pendatun town in Sultan Kudarat to investigate an Air
Force bombing operation some days earlier. Members of the joint ccch de-
cided to postpone the investigation in S.K. Pendatun and proceed instead
to Dapiawan in an effort to pacify the warring forces. Then Sec. Teresita
Deles, presidential adviser on the peace process, also advised the govern-
ment ccch team led by Maj. Dickson Hermoso to immediately intervene
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in the Dapiawan incident. The Bantay Ceasefire team decided to join the
joint ccch in its Dapiawan mission.
The ceasefire-monitoring teams reached Dapiawan by noon. Sporadic
exchange of gunfires could still be heard from where the teams were posi-
tioned. Immediately, Hermoso and Midtimbang approached government
field commanders led by Col. Romulo Ocfemia, commander of the Army’s
37th infantry battallion, and discussed the situation. After a brief talk, Her-
moso and Midtimbang agreed that they would communicate to the chain of
commands of their respective organizations and push for a ceasefire.
Amid the sound of gunfire, Hermoso took his satellite phone, dialed
and briefed his superior, then government ccch chair Brig. Gen. Alexander
Yano, of the situation and informed him of the agreement with Midtimbang.
Gen. Yano quickly worked his way up the chain of command of the afp in
an effort to clinch a ceasefire. Within arms length of Hermoso, Midtimbang
spoke to local milf commanders via two-way radio and advised them to
hold their fire. After a few minutes of exchanging radio messages, Midtim-
bang approached Hermoso telling him that the milf commanders on the
field were reluctant to cease fire because of the presence of two OV-10 as-
sault aircraft in the sky.
“Di aalis ang mga pwersa hangga’t nandyan iyong mga eroplano. (The
milf forces on field will not leave until the planes leave),” Midtimbang told
Hermoso.
Hermoso communicated with his superiors and in about 15 minutes the
planes were gone. The guerrillas stop firing and moved out.
As the guns fell silent, Hermoso suggested to Midtimbang that they
check out the Dapiawan market. As the two men arrived, an elderly wom-
an approached them and embraced the milf ceasefire committee chief. In
tears, the woman profusely gave her thanks to both men and their team for
stopping the conflict.
About two months after the incident, however, tension started rising
again following reports reaching the cvos that the relatives of Udtog, the
man they “accidentally killed,” had joined forces with Kahal’s family to
avenge his death. In late June 2005, a member of the Dapiawan cvo was shot
dead—another victim in the unending tale of armed conflict in the area.
Case Study 3: From Shooting Hoops to Shooting War: The Pikit

experience
At the entrance of sitio San Roque, a farming community in barangay
Nalapaan of Pikit, North Cotabato, is located the patrol base of a cafgu
unit. The scene is nothing unusual in Pikit, the site of frequent gunbat-
tles between warring government and Moro armed groups except for the
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interesting composition of the cafgu’s membership. Almost all of the

cafgu members as well as the residents of the area are related by blood
or through affinity.
Some 10 km away from the cafgu-fortified sitio San Roque, uncultivat-
ed farm lands and decaying remains of burnt houses dominate the sprawl-
ing landscape of barangay Gli-gli, also in Pikit.
The contrasting scenes of might and destruction, however, link the fate
of the villagers of San Roque and Gli-gli. In 1989, the San Roque cafgus
were among the hundreds of soldiers and paramilitary men who trooped
to Gli-gli and fought an milf contingent which occupied the area. A three-
day gunbattle ensued that displaced thousands of farmers in Gli-gli and its
neighboring barangays.
A cafgu member who joined the 1989 encounter claimed that they
fought fiercely to repel the milf and prevent them from using the area as a
springboard to occupy more villages including San Roque. In a focus group
discussion, the cafgu member confessed how he later learned that the milf
had not planned to occupy Gli-gli. The incident actually stemmed from
a rumble between teams of teen-age Ilonggo and Maguindanaon youths
who played each other in a basketball game. After the fight, the teen-agers
complained to their relatives who were either members of the cafgu or the
milf. Local members of the milf intervened immediately while the cafgu
called in military reinforcement.
When the milf moved in, both the Maguindanaoan and Ilonggo villag-
ers moved out fearing for their security. A research informant said that as
the villagers left, they noticed that the occupying milf forces were actually
relatives of their Maguindanaoan neighbors. Many Christians felt betrayed
by their Moro neighbors who failed to stop the entry of the armed group.
When military reinforcement came, the milf were forced to take de-
fensive positions as tanks rolled in and artillery and aerial bombs rained
down. After the bombings, the Army moved in and clashed with milf forces.
The fighting, however, spread far beyond the boundaries of Gli-gli, forcing
thousands of residents from surrounding areas to flee. As more military rein-
forcement came, the milf gradually withdrew. The soldiers and paramilitary
forces took control. When the fighting subsided, some residents returned to
check the area. They found their village in shambles as houses, particularly
those owned by the Maguindanaoans, were either burned or looted. Dis-
placed Maguindanaoans blamed their Christian neighbors for failure to stop
the looting and destruction of property following the military attack.
“Nawad-an na og pagsalig ang mga magsilingin. Ang uban nagdinumu-
tay na ug di na gusto magkita-ay pa (The neighbors lost each other’s trust.
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Others were consumed by enmity and did not want to see their neighbors
anymore),” said an informant.
The fighting, which lasted less than a week, destroyed several genera-
tions of peaceful relations between the Maguindanaoan and settler families.
Sixteen years after the incident, much of Gli-gli is still abandoned.
The few families who opted to return to Gli-gli following the 1989 con-
flict had to shuttle between the evacuation centers and their village during
the wars of 1997, 2000 and 2003. The three wars deterred many from return-
ing home to restore their farms and friendships.
Bebot says his ties with former Maguindanaoan neighbors who he
sometimes bump into in Pikit are no longer as warm. “Almost two decades
after that basketball game-generated war, we still feel awkward seeing each
other,” Bebot says.
Bebot, who now works for intercommunity dialogue and rehabilitation
program of the Immaculate Conception Parish in Pikit, has related the story
of his community to other villages and paramilitary personnel.
During the cafgu focus group session Bebot helped organize, the para-
military men in Nalapaan said they realized the long-lasting damage caused
by the 1989 incident.
Paradoxically, however, the Nalapaan cafgu claimed that the principal
reason they joined the cafgu was to protect their families and community.
A senior member of the cafgu, in his fifties, said the community organized
an armed group in the 1970s as communal violence between Moro and
Christian armed bands spread across several towns of Cotabato. Ilonggo
armed men held village meetings to warn of marauding Moros. Bands of
Ilonggo Christians, numbering about a hundred men, known as the ilaga,
launched pre-emptive strikes against Moro groups whom they believe were
planning to raid Christian villages.
To acquire arms and ammunition, several of the men of sitio San Roque
joined militias. When the military organized the Integrated Civilian Home
Defense Force (ichdf) following the 1972 declaration of martial law, the mi-
litia in Nalapaan came under Philippine Constabulary command. The San
Roque ichdf joined government forces in operations as far as North Cota-
bato, Bukidnon, and Davao City. When the ichdf was disbanded in 1987,
paramilitary forces in Nalapaan were advised by the military to register as
cafgu members. Through the past three decades, the young men of sitio San
Roque have joined government militias in a bid to protect their community
from such misfortune as befell Gli-gli. They felt threatened by rival militias.
But the years have only witnessed more violence and pain as families of
cafgu as well as milf members continue to flee from intermittent warfare.
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In 1997, the Nalapaan cafgu were among the forces mobilized to aug-
ment Army regulars in a massive assault against suspected kidnapers and
criminals reportedly hiding in barangay Rajah Muda and surrounding com-
munities like Gli-gli. Fighting in the area escalated when soldiers encoun-
tered milf positions. At the height of the all-out war campaign launched
by then President Joseph Estrada against the milf, the cafgus in Nalapaan
were again tapped to serve as blocking force against any milf move to-
wards Nalapaan. Nalapaan cafgus were also mobilized as part of blocking
teams along the Pikit highway in support of government forces which lay
siege the milf base in Buliok, Pagalungan town. To capture the milf base,
government engaged milf forces in the sprawling fields of Gli-gli and its
neighboring areas.
These series of “big wars” continue to deepen the distrust and animos-
ity among Maguindanaoan, Bisaya, and Ilonggo residents of the conflict-
affected areas.
Toto Gamboa, also a staff of Immaculate Conception Parish in Pikit,
said the high level of distrust generated by repeated armed confronta-
tions between government and milf forces transformed their villages into
a “minefield” of community armed conflicts. Neighbors are not taking
any chances and opt to align with either government troopers or the milf
in case of trouble. Believing that they have the support of armed groups,
neighbors sometimes escalate minor altercations into shooting wars by call-
ing on armed relatives.
Gamboa says animosity among neighbors can persist even during reha-
bilitation work. Disagreements over the choice of the site for a shallow tube
well or even elementary schools in post-conflict rehabilitation effort have
generated tension. Promenzo Cedeño, Nalapaan barangay chair, conceded
the high degree of distrust among neighbors who suffered the horrifying
experience of repeated armed conflict.
For their part, barangay leaders and peace advocates like the Pikit par-
ish workers have been organizing neighborhood dialogues to rebuild com-
munities. In 2002, residents of barangays Nalapaan and Panicupan declared
their villages as “spaces for peace” and therefor off limits to armed conflict.
Barangay officials negotiated with the military’s 6th infantry division and
sought an audience with ranking members of the milf to recognize and
respect the declaration that prohibits both armed groups from bringing
their war into the two barangays. During the war in February 2003, soldiers
and milf rebels used parts of Panicupan and Nalapaan as their entry and
exit points to the battlefields of Pikit and the adjacent town of Pagalun-
gan. Gamboa notes that while the entry of milf and government forces
in both villages prompted evacuations in the area, both forces held on to
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their pledge not to use Panicupan and Nalapaan as their battlefield. As a
result, houses and other properties in the area were not as damaged as in
previous wars. Residents were able to return to their farms two weeks after
the fighting.
The example of Panicupan and Nalapaan emboldened officials in five
other barangays in Pikit to similarly declare their respective areas as “spaces
for peace.” In November 2004, the Pikit spaces for peace expanded to seven
barangays namely Ginatilan, Nalapaan, Panicupan, Lagundi, Dalengaoen,
Takepan, and Kalakakan. In these areas, barangay officials pledged to help
each other in addressing the slightest signs of disagreement among neigh-
bors in their respective communities.
Case Study 4: Buliok: Family Secrets, Communal Deaths

On a rainy day at the evacuation site in Pagalungan, Maguindanao town
center in October 2003, a gunman killed 18-year old Ismail Sanday, a son of
a local milf commander, Butu Saiyona. The alleged gunman, Walid Pen-
datun, also an 18-year old, is the son of Datu Tin Pendatun, a scion of the
influential Pendatun family who was killed by Butu Saiyona, Ismail’s father,
about 15 years earlier.
Few months later, Buliok barangay chair Datu Mohammad Pendatun,
an uncle of the alleged gunman, was ambushed on his way to their village
in barangay Buliok. He and a follower survived the attack. Residents and
Buliok barangay officials interviewed for this case suspected that the am-
bush was initiated by the followers and relatives of Butu in retaliation to the
killing of his son. Since then, Datu Mohammad stayed away from Buliok
for security purposes, a move that dramatically punctuated the uncertain
security situation of his village which at that time had been largely aban-
doned by its residents. Ismail’s shooting and Datu Mohammad’s subsequent
ambush happened about six months after fierce gunbattle between govern-
ment and milf forces in the village. Buliok, then the base of milf chair
Salamat Hashim, was the center of the armed clashes following the February
11, 2003 assault of government forces. Hashim and milf forces were forced
to abandon their base in Buliok, but the attack triggered massive civilian
displacements and the destruction of their houses, crops, farm tools and
animals, and other properties.
Buliok residents, initially, were scattered in various evacuation camps
along the national highway in Pikit and Pagalungan towns of North Cota-
bato and in S.K. Pendatun town of Sultan Kudarat province. Later, many of
the evacuees from Buliok stayed at government-run schools, on side streets,
at relatives’ homes, and on empty lots in Pagalungan. Amid the adverse
condition of life in evacuation camps, Ismail was gunned down.
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Buliok residents and a senior woman member of the Pendatun fam-

ily explained that the incident is being addressed by intermediaries from
the Pendatun family and the milf. They stressed that these series of vio-
lent retaliatory incidents should not be interpreted as an organized armed
encounters between the Pendatun family and those of Butu and the local
milf command.
The execution of Datu Tin in the 1980s was actually not Butu’s or the
milf’s unilateral decision. At that time, Datu Tin’s family disapproved of his
affair with a niece because it was viewed as incestuous and a grave violation
of Islamic tenets. The family tried to break off the relationship, but Datu
Tin held firm. The family consulted milf Chair Salamat Hashim, a kin of
the Pendatuns, whom they respect as an important member of the family.
Collectively, the family decided that the affair brought shame to the fam-
ily and that the offense warranted capital punishment under Islamic Law.
They left the matter of punishing Tin to Hashim who objected strongly to
the affair. Initially, the family urged Tin to discontinue the relationship and
repent. Tin refused and the Pendatuns passed on the case to an milf circle
of religious. The religious, in consultation with the clan, decided to impose a
death penalty and ordered Butu to execute Tin in the mid 1980s, when both
the sons of Butu and Tin were only about six years old.
The incident remained a family secret but several versions of the story
leaked to the community. During the 2000 and 2003 wars, the family of
Butu was among those who evacuated to the Pagalungan town center where
Datu’s Tin children also live. During idle moments at the evacuation sites,
the story of Datu’s Tin execution by Butu was retold and passed on to the
younger generation, including the teen-age children of Butu and Datu Tin.
Pagalungan evacuees described Walid, the son of Datu Tin, as with-
drawn and uptight while Butu’s son was outgoing. The two were reportedly
not friendly to each other. Butu’s son, according to witnesses, often taunted
Tin’s son. After a confrontation in October 2003, shots rang out from the
evacuation site. Tin’s son, Walid, shot dead Butu’s son, Ismail. The Penda-
tun’s immediately took Walid away from Pagalungan.
Butu, on the other hand, demanded that the Pendatuns surrender Walid.
Complicating the situation, however, was the ambush of Datu Mohammad
Pendatun while on his way to meet with some residents in Buliok in late
2003. Datu Mohammad survived the ambush but he told some barangay
officials that he believed the incident was in retaliation for the killing of
Butu’s son. Since the ambush, Pendatun has not returned to Buliok which
remains largely abandoned despite the deescalation of armed tensions be-
tween government and milf forces.
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A Pendatun scion says their family has started talks with Butu and the
milf command regarding Ismail’s death. The parties have reportedly agreed
to desist from further violence.
Col. Benjamin Dolorfino, commander of the Marines brigade deployed
in Buliok in 2004, said they knew about the feud but he restrained his men
from joining the fray. Dolorfino said he is aware that discussions are being
held by traditional leaders to resolve the conflict and that he will abide by
that process. The Marines occupied strategic locations in Buliok at the time
of the ambush. Dolorfino, however, confined the troops to patrol operations
around their detachments. The afp may have overrun the Islamic Center
in Buliok but the milf’s base command has reportedly re-grouped at the
nearby Liguasan Marsh and along the Pulangi River. The milf has, however,
similarly kept away from the Butu-Pendatun affair.
Dolorfino and the milf local commander’s decision to stay away from
a local conflict were crucial in preventing a “big war” similar to those that
struck Dapiawan and Linantangan.
Nevertheless, the standoff between Butu and the Pendatuns kept many
displaced civilians from returning to Buliok. Around June 2003 or three
months after the afp declared control over Buliok , only a handful of resi-
dents have heeded the military’s call for them to re-occupy their village.
The villagers chose to remain in evacuation sites they thought safer than
villages still occupied by some Marine and Army troops. To encourage resi-
dents to return home, the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(dswd) built 241 “rehabilitation houses” in November 2003. Social workers
also distributed rice, canned goods, and noodles. Many returned for the
food aid but as soon as the distribution ended they went back to evacua-
tion sites in Pikit and Pagalungan, leaving many of the newly constructed
houses empty.
Some evacuees from barangay Buliok and Pagalungan insisted that
their security remains compromised by the presence of the afp in Buliok.
On the other hand, residents of nearby barangay Buliok, Pikit town, along
the Pagalungan bank of the Pulangi, began returning home since June 2003
despite the presence of Marines, Army and police detachments, and fewer
government-built new homes.
Col. Dolorfino speculated that it is the fear of rido that has kept resi-
dents away from Buliok, Pagalungan. Interviews with evacuees, however,
reveal that it is not the fear of rido per se—since warring parties do not
target those outside the conflict—that discourages people to return home
but the fear of afp and milf involvement in any escalation of conflict.
Zamsudin, an evacuee, said some residents who returned to Buliok
after the 2003 war have set up camps along the marsh and in other parts of
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the village where they feel more secure. In sitios Sapakan II and Buliok I,
two of the Buliok communities partly occupied since late 2003, three to four
families sleep together in a single government-built house to facilitate flight
should fighting break out.
Menandang Mamolindas, a barangay council member of Buliok, said
residents were wary of afp and milf forces still moving around the area as
well as of the feud between milf commander Butu and the barangay chair
due to the killing. Although these are separate issues, things could still get
messy, Mamolindas cautioned.
So far, however, there have been no clashes new between milf and Army
troopers in the area. The repositioning of afp and pnp forces following a
peace accord between government and the milf in 2003 has encouraged
more residents to return home. In March, 2005, Mamolindas and his wife
finally returned to Buliok two years after fleeing for their lives.
Case Study 5: Healing and Resolution in Barangay Lebpas

Since the outbreak of the communal violence across the Cotabato
plains, the Erumanen Menuvu residents of Barangay Lebpas in President
Roxas town have experienced countless evacuations. Some of them joined
the mnlf in the 1970s in an attempt to protect their village from assaulting
soldiers and paramilitary forces whom, the Erumanen claim, do not distin-
guish between rebels and Erumanen villagers.
Lebpas folk, however, started returning to their village when peace
reigned in the northern areas of Cotabato in the 1980s. They recultivated
their farms and rebuilt their homes, worship places, and a public elemen-
tary school. By 1985, the village had become a vibrant trading center in the
northern Cotabato section of the Pulangi River. By 1997, several stores, one
of which was equipped with a kerosene-powered refrigerator, opened for
business in the once strife-torn village. The following year, however, their
road to recovery was blocked by a new war not between state and rebellion
but among the actors of the armed resistance.
Lebpas folk were displaced again as armed confrontation between
members of the mnlf and the milf escalated.
The mnlf-milf tension in Lebpas and its neighboring areas began
around 1984, following a split within the central leadership of the mnlf.
The division also affected the mnlf’s unity in the northern Cotabato area.
Erumanen folk in Lebpas claimed that the deepening split prompted some
of their relatives to quit the mnlf. The Erumanen said that they decided not
to take sides because the parents and grandparents of the warring Maguin-
danaoan commanders were long-standing allies of the tribe’s ancestors and
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live practically as neighboring communities along the northern section of
the Pulangi River in North Cotabato.
Local mnlf and milf commanders at first managed to deal peacefully
with their ideological differences, restrain their forces, and prevent large-
scale confrontation. The milf was able to expand and consolidate its forc-
es. Later, a leading local milf commander proposed a reconciliation and
possible unification between the local commands of the milf and mnlf
whose members were all Maguindanaoans. Lebpas folk claimed that the
pro-reconciliation milf commander started talks with the leadership of the
mnlf local command. The commanders of the rival Moro armed groups are
linked by affinity and by blood. Erumanen leaders were invited to some of
these meetings out of respect for the tribe. Other commanders of the milf
local command, however, opposed the initiative because of ideological dif-
ferences. Distrust and tension came to fore.
In 1988, the commander, who favored reconciliation, was killed by a
rival milf commander as the former crossed the Pulangi River with his men
to dialogue with the mnlf. The incident immediately triggered retaliation
from the family and the followers of the slain milf commander. His son led
the assaults which escalated into heavy firefights.
The fighting spread to Lebpas, forcing the Erumanen villagers to flee. The
fighting destroyed their farms, houses, schools, shops, and community struc-
tures that they had painstakingly built during the seven years without war.
Margate Pontongan, the leader (timuay) of Lebpas’ Erumanen commu-
nity, said their people have olden ties to the Maguindanaoan, and tribal el-
ders decided to talk to the families of the warring parties. They joined other
Maguindanaoan community leaders in mediation. Eventually, the warring
sides pledged to end the conflict and instead establish a united front against
their common enemy—the government.
Pontongan, at the time I did fieldwork in Lebpas in late 2004, said that
the peace agreement was holding despite armed confrontations between
government and milf forces—the big war. Due to repeated big wars, how-
ever, both Erumanen and Maguindanaoan villagers in Lebpas and neigh-
boring areas are often forced to evacuate. Maguindanaoan and Erumanen
often evacuate to separate sites settled by their respective ethnic groups. But
once conflict subsides, the villagers would return home and live once more
as neighbors.
Tracing the Interplay : Ties That Bind, Ties That Kill

The five case studies illustrate an empirical diversity in the interplay of
community and large-scale armed conflicts. The relations of power and
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armed forces in these communities are significantly diverse so that in

certain cases, community-level conflicts do not interplay with large-scale
armed conflicts.
The events of Linantangan, Dapiawan, and Gli-gli, however, clearly
mark the significant roles played by paramilitary forces supported by gov-
ernment troops and of local militias aligned to the milf in the outbreak
and the escalation of violence. In these cases, families or neighborhoods in
conflict were able to mobilize the military resources of both government
and rebels mainly because these family groups are also part of these larger
military resources.
At the outset, the Lintangan conflict involved members of only one
family. But these conflicting family members were linked to networks of
armed groups. The Linantangan barangay chair, Kempen Bangadan, and
his followers were associated with Mayor Ampatuan whose family controls
armed scaa and cvo in the area. The scaa and the cvo are structures linked
to the local Army command. Bangadan’s enemies and nephews—Dautin
Gandang Palaguyan and Hadji Paisal Gandang Palaguyan—were aligned
with the milf’s local base command. When tension between the uncle and
the nephew heated up, they drew the larger armed forces into what should
have remained an internal family squabble. In the course of the assaults, the
conflict was further complicated by a new episode of killing between mem-
bers of other families aligned with either the government or the milf.
Formal and informal alignments similarly drew government and milf
forces into a conflict triggered by two feuding families in Dapiawan.
Armed confrontations in Gli-gli started from a basketball rumble be-
tween Maguindanaoan and Ilonggo-speaking teen-agers. The brawl would
have ended on the play court if not for family ties to paramilitary and guer-
rilla units. Once these armed groups were mobilized, the forces of the state
and rebellion came into play.
The pattern of the interplay of community and large-scale conflicts
in Linantangan, Dapiawan, and Gli-gli illustrates the multi-positioned and
multi-layered character of these armed confrontations. In the context of this
study, multi-layer conflicts mean that these armed confrontations involved
not just two but several families forming alliances. Multi-positioned refers
to the nexus of the political, social, and cultural positions of actors involved
in the conflicts. Some of those involved in the conflict are family members
who are in control of various fields of power such as the traditional leader-
ship structures, the local government units, and paramilitary forces in the
conflict areas. Some powerful politico-traditional leaders maintain strong
ties to the Philippine national government leadership by affinity or political
connections. On the other hand, forces challenging families holding various
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fields of power in the conflict areas are also relatives of, or are embedded in,
the leadership structure of armed groups like the local government, para-
military forces or the milf. Typically, the interplay of small and large-scale
wars may start from armed confrontations between warring members of a
family or of different families. These family members could also be mem-
bers of the cvo, cafgu, scaa or local rebel-based commands and their
militias. When they fight, they can draw in the military resources of the
afp and the milf. Once all forces move to confront each other in the battle
zones, the community conflict escalates and expands into large-scale war.
The diagram below illustrates this interplay:
Family 3
Family 1/MILF
Politician 1
Family 2/CVO
MILF/MNLF
Command 1
CVO/Cafgu
Military
Parties at odds often call on larger forces due to the failure of existing
conflict-resolution mechanisms in the community to settle local disputes. In
Linantangan and Dapiawan, the warring parties differed on which conflict-
resolution body should settle the case. One side favored bringing it to the
traditional leaders who are also officers of the local government units. The
other side wanted their case submitted to a Shari’ah court dominated by
religious and learned persons associated with the milf. Each side suspected
that the judgment in either conflict-resolution body would favor their rival.
Their suspicions discredited both conflict-resolution mechanisms.
None of the political or armed forces in these three areas covered by
this study seem to have achieved power as defined by Arendt—that is, the
“human ability to act in concert” and something that belongs to a group. In-
stead, these groups try to impose authority from a position of strength and
apply force through violence. No entity or individual representing either the
state or the resistance or their respective allies possesses “belligerent power”
as defined by Arendt. Existing relations are based on competing strengths
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between the forces on both sides. Those representing the state include the
afp and local executives who exercise some control over cvo, scaa, cafgu
and other allied families. The resistance is primarily represented by the milf
and certain factions of the mnlf which exercise influence and leadership
over their regular armed contingents, local base commands, uztadzes, and
religious members.
The fact that contending forces seek not only to assert territorial control
over the conflict areas but also political and judicial authority shows how
both sides are trying to build the apparatus of a working state. Whenever
parties in conflict disagree on which conflict-resolution mechanism to em-
ploy, violence often ensues. This situation manifests the inability of any en-
tity to persuasively enforce its authority without use of military resources.
In contrast, the restraint shown by the Marines and the local milf lead-
ership in Buliok and Lebpas indicate that small-level conflicts can be ef-
fectively contained even as the actors in these conflicts are also part of the
military resources of either belligerent force. The interplay of small and big
wars is effectively reversed, deescalating brewing armed confrontations.
As soon as the decision of belligerent forces to steer clear of local con-
flicts becomes apparent to the community, displaced residents start return-
ing home to rebuild their ravaged communities.
Contrasting Views and Practice of Security

Security appears to be the prime concern in the interplay between commu-
nity-level and large-scale armed conflicts. Kempen Bangadan, the barangay
chair in Linantangan, firmed up his alliance with the Ampatuans, the afp,
and their armed militias as Bangadan’s nephews sought the protection of
the local milf. Security concerns also prompted farmers in sitio San Roque
in barangay Nalapaan, Pikit, to join the paramilitary ichdf in the 1970s and
later on the cafgu organized in 1987. In the same vein, Maguindanaoan
teenagers in Gli-gli sought milf intervention after a basketball altercation
with Bisaya and Ilonggo youth who called on paramilitary and afp protec-
tion. Lebpas folk in North Cotabato firmed up their alliance with the mnlf
in the 1970s in a bid to defend against the ilaga.
Security, too, prompted residents to flee from their villages. Lebpas folk
claim that had they not fled from previous wars, they would have had to
fight to the end and cause more bloodshed. Lebpas barangay leader Daniel
Pontongan says evacuation is an act of preserving the lives of both villagers
and invaders. It is an act of sacrifice.
Intervention of church, human rights, and civil society groups have
provided residents of strife-torn communities more means to protect their
RIDO V2.indd 283 10/4/2007 8:24:32 AM

villages. The community-based Bantay Ceasefire was able to monitor and
contain the situation in Pagalungan. The establishment of spaces for peace
in select barangays of Pikit also contributed to the reduction of community
tensions that could trigger larger wars.
Other communities, however, independently established their own se-
curity mechanisms as in the case of the displaced villagers who decided to
return to Sitio Buliok I. By staying three to four families in a single govern-
ment-built house, the residents improved their ability to evacuate at the
first sign of trouble.
Security is not an abstract ideal for displaced communities but some-
thing they have continually worked at and attained through years of re-
peated armed conflict and evacuation. The people of war-torn communities
have survived three decades of strife by planning for their protection and re-
fining their alliances with other groups. The actions taken by communities
illustrate the marked difference between the idea, and practice, of security
on the ground and the state’s notion of “national security.”
Families locked in armed conflict with rival clans are concerned for
their own security rather than that of the “nation” but they often draw in
armed groups whose mobilization impacts broader security issues. Compli-
cating the situation are the armed groups’ responses to community and clan
security threats. Often, the afp and opposing armed groups, like the milf
and the mnlf, bring in the might of their firepower in response to a com-
munity and clan-level conflict. This can escalate violence and consequently
elevate the incident into a “national security concern.” By nature, commu-
nity and clan conflicts are small-level conflicts that can be well handled by
credible and respected law enforcement agencies or through creative means
of conflict resolution rather than armies.
Reversing the Interplay of Small and Big Wars

Small and big wars are not inevitable events. The armed confrontations in
Linantangan and Dapiawan in August 2004 were effectively de-escalated
through efforts involving the government, the milf, civil society, and the
communities.
If wars, displacement, and devastation characterized central Mindan-
ao in 2003, the events of 2004 demonstrated how armed conflict could be
nipped in the bud. The joint government-milf Coordinating Committee
on the Cessation of Hostilities stood out in preventing armed conflicts in
the contested wetlands of the Liguasan Marsh and along the highways of
Maguindanao from escalating into full- blown wars.
RIDO V2.indd 284 10/4/2007 8:24:32 AM

Of equal importance is the role of grassroots, civil society-led Bantay

Ceasefire who conduct independent investigative missions on armed con-
flicts. The Bantay Ceasefire network can provide key members of the joint
ccch crucial information about looming tensions and heightening armed
confrontation within or near their respective communities. ccch represen-
tatives travel together in the same vehicles as they chase looming or running
gunbattles between government and milf forces that may be complicated
by their allied forces.
Ccch was organized based on the February 10, 1999 agreement between
the government and the milf peace panels at the Dawah Center at Cross-
ing Simuay in Maguindanao. The Dawah Center accord grants the ccch
a broad mandate to “strengthen and enhance” the implementation of the
September 12, 1997 government-milf general ceasefire agreement.
The ceasefire collapsed following President Estrada’s declaration of an
all-out war in the summer of 2000. Following an uprising that ousted Presi-
dent Estrada, the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo re-
sumed peace negotiations with the milf and subsequently reorganized the
government’s ccch. Ceasefire monitoring work of the ccch, however, was
again grounded following massive government assault at the milf’s base
at Buliok, Pagalungan in February 2003. When the government and milf
peace panels initiated a March 27 to 28, 2003 exploratory talks and signed
commitments to “undertake appropriate steps” (Government-milf peace
panel: March 2003) that would pave the way for a resumption of formal
peace negotiations, the ccch immediately resumed ceasefire-monitoring
work. This time, the joint committee took a more pro-active stance in cease-
fire work by anticipating, intervening, and swiftly dousing brewing armed
conflict among their forces on the ground.
During a joint ccch meeting at The Tower Inn in Davao City on Febru-
ary 8, 2004, then government ccch chair Lt. Gen. Rodolfo Garcia and his
then milf counterpart, Benjie Midtimbang, highlighted their concern over
possible escalation of armed confrontation among their forces in conflict-
prone areas in the run up to the May 11, 2004 elections. The government
side also expressed concern that the reported presence of criminal groups in
some areas occupied by milf local commands could complicate the cease-
fire especially if the Army and the police decide to move in and confront
these criminal groups. The meeting ended with both sides agreeing to set
up a joint interim action team that will “quickly respond and address con-
frontational incidents arising from government operations against crimi-
nal elements.” Both sides also agreed, among others, to initiate “concrete
conflict deterrence, prevention” and other mitigating measures by map-
ping “problem areas,” the conduct of visits and dialogues among residents
RIDO V2.indd 285 10/4/2007 8:24:32 AM

of conflict-prone communities, and jointly set-up “preemptive” measures
against possible violence in areas considered as election “hotspots.” In this
meeting, the joint ceasefire committee also acknowledged the “supportive
role” of non-government organizations like the Bantay Ceasefire.
Less than a month after the joint ccch signed the agreement, their com-
mitments were put to a test. By early March, Bantay Ceasefire members
called the attention of the ccch to the evacuation of hundreds of residents
in conflict-prone Pulangi river banks along barangay Buliok in Pagalungan,
Maguindanao and Pikit, North Cotabato.
Displaced residents in Buliok, Pagalungan informed Bantay Ceasefire
coordinators through the mobile phone short message service (sms) that
hundreds of armed milf fighters trooped to the area, prompting Marine
soldiers holding camp to take counter offensive positions.
Immediately, the information was relayed by Bantay Ceasefire coordi-
nators to the Midtimbang and Maj. Dickson Hermoso who serves as gov-
ernment ccch secretariat head. Within minutes, the information travelled
through the chain of command in both sides. As it turned out, milf guer-
rillas started moving towards the Islamic Center, the compound occupied
by the late milf chair Salamat Hashim before it fell to military hands in the
2003 war, because they had not received word on the postponement of their
scheduled meeting with the Malaysian advance survey team (ast) of an
international monitoring team (imt) on the ceasefire agreement.
Rexal Kaalim, Bantay Ceasefire coordinator, said without the timely in-
formation from their members in the community and immediate action of
the joint ccch in restraining ground forces, the incident could have sparked
another war. The nine-day ast-imt mission jointly coordinated by the ccch
proceeded without incident from March 23 to 31. The Malaysians, accompa-
nied by Garcia, Midtimbang, and staff from both sides of the ccch visited
military camps and milf formations in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur.
In a meeting at the Islamic Center in Buliok, Garcia and a contingent
of government military officials and their aides were warmly welcomed by
Midtimbang and the milf field commanders, prompting Malaysian Brig.
Gen. Zulkefili Bin Mohammed, who headed the ast-imt, to comment that
he was more than hopeful in seeing an end to the 32-year armed conflict in
Mindanao. By June, the ccch started setting up a joint monitoring outpost
in barangay Bagoinged in Pikit, North Cotabato. The outpost, which was
run by soldiers, milf guerrillas, and monitors from the Bantay Ceasefire
members residing around the village, is complete with radio equipment
and cellular phones for fast and easy communication with the ccch heads
in case of trouble on the ground.
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The joint ccch also played a critical role in de-escalating the interplay
of community and large-scale conflicts in Dapiawan on August 17, 2004. As
it turned out, the soldiers and milf guerrillas were dragged into the gunbat-
tle following an armed confrontation involving warring clans with strong
ties either to the afp or the milf. Members of the joint ccch led by Maj.
Hermoso and Midtimbang immediately rushed to Barangay Dapiawan, on
board the same van, after learning about the fighting. Upon arrival at the
battle zone, Midtimbang radioed milf field commanders to hold their fire
while Hermoso communicated to his superiors the joint ccch’s recommen-
dation for a ceasefire. Their actions ended the battle.
The ccch success earned the appreciation of civil society groups.
“Thanks for the great job u did today. Twas inspiring watchng u standing
in betwin ur forces to stop d fighting. Peace is indeed possible. Cheers!”
noted an sms message sent by lawyer Mary Ann Arnado, secretary general
of the Mindanao Peace Caucus, to Hermoso, Midtimbang, and her network
of peace advocates.
On August 28, a week after the Dapiawan armed confrontation, Midtim-
bang and Hermoso were on the road again sending sms and radio messages
to their superiors and field commanders to restrain their forces and observe
a ceasefire in barangay Linantangan, Mamasapano town in Maguindanao.
The Linantangan firefight stemmed from armed confrontation among
members of a large family with afp and milf ties.
On November 3, Midtimbang and Hermoso travelled to villages along
the highway cutting across the boundaries of Mamasapano and Shariff
Aguak towns where they again defused armed tensions between the para-
military forces and the milf in the area. The showdown was also spawned
by inter-family conflicts.
Hermoso said their efforts in “nipping conflicts in the bud” is gain-
ing headway but noted that there are formidable challenges ahead with the
alarming rise in afp-milf incidents that stem from clan conflicts. He said
these conflicts, if not addressed, could undermine the peace process.
Success and Opportunities

The success of the joint ccch can be traced to its membership. The pres-
ence in the ccch of representative officers with direct access to their re-
spective central leadership as well as to ground forces confers authority that
defuses tension. The conduct of joint ground investigations also built up
trust on both sides. The joint committee’s withholding of judgment during
investigation and their non-confrontational nature in eliciting informa-
tion from concerned parties earned the respect of the public. The ceasefire
RIDO V2.indd 287 10/4/2007 8:24:33 AM

committees’ exercise of transparency also boosts the integrity of the body.
The joint ccch did not only allow civil society-led ceasefire-monitoring
teams to independently and simultaneously investigate incidents but also
informed these groups of impending investigations and of joint committee
meetings. Civil society ceasefire-monitoring teams are also able to directly
communicate with the leaders of the joint ccch over reports of unfolding
armed confrontations. These reports are often acted upon positively by
both sides. The quick response of the ccch was crucial in de-escalating the
interplay of community and large-scale armed conflicts in 2004.
On the ground and apart from the ceasefire mechanisms set up by the
warring forces, the establishment of grassroots-based ceasefire-monitor-
ing teams with links to a web of civil society groups, journalists, and other
sectors holding stakes to the peace process is also critical. Grassroots-based
ceasefire monitors are people directly affected by armed conflicts. They have
the most to gain from peace. The Bantay Ceasefire monitors in Buliok pro-
vided the critical information on troop movements in their community to
civil society groups. The information eventually reached the joint ccch and
the leadership of the milf and afp. Continuous grassroots monitoring and
active multi-level network response can be replicated in communities with
a history of interkin, community-related, and large-scale armed conflicts.
Given the success of the ccch, it may be possible to set up an inclusive,
non-confrontational, non-judgmental, and transparent body that can put
in a place an institutional (government, rebel groups, lgus, communities)
quick-response and resolution mechanism modeled on the Guinapalad Ta
Ka Spaces for Peace in Pikit. Those who have suffered most from decades of
war have learned how best to survive. Perhaps, it is time that those respon-
sible for the big war heed the smaller voices from below.
References
Arendt, Hannah. “On Violence.” Violence in War and Peace: an Anthology. Eds. Nan-
cy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois. Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell
Publishing, 1969/2004.
Abbink, Jon. “Preface: Violation and Violence as Cultural Phenomena.” Meanings
of Violence. A Cross Cultural Perspective. Eds. Aijmer Goran and Jon Abbink.
Oxford and New York: Berg, 2000.
“Bantay Ceasefire.” Bantay Ceasefire Preliminary Field Report: General Salipada K.
Pendatun, Maguindanao Military Operations. Aug. 13, 2004.
“Bantay Ceasefire.” Bantay Ceasefire Investigative Mission Report. August 30, 2004.
Clausewitz, Karl von.. On War. London: Pelican Books, 1968.
Disoma, Esmail R. The Role of Violence in Social Organization: The Case of the Meranao
and their Maratabat. Marawi City: Mindanao State University Main, 2000.
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Government-MILF Peace Negotiating Panels. “Joint Communique.” Mar. 28, 2003.

Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge
and Oxford: Polity and Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001.
International Federation of Journalists and National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines. “Violent culture behind journalist killings.” Jan. 30, 2005.
Jaafar, Gadzali. “MILF disowns recent fighting in Maguindanao.” Press statement.
Moro Islamic Liberation Front Central Committee. Jan. 10, 2005.
McKenna, Thomas. Muslim Rulers and Rebels. California, Manila: The Regents of
the University of California and Anvil Publishing Inc., 1998/2000.
Philippine National Police. PNP Organization. http://www.pnp.gov.ph/about/or-
ganization.html. Accessed on April 2005.
Quitoriano, Ed and Eric Libre. “Reaching for the Gun: The Human Cost of Small
Arms in Central Mindanao, Philippines.” Kasarinlan. 16, 2, (2001).
Sulu Peace and Solidarity Mission and the Mindanao Peace Weavers. “Sulu: State
of War, Calls for Peace.” Report of the Sulu Peace and Solidarity Mission of the
Mindanao PeaceWeavers. Mar. 2005.
Thaite, Bertrand and Tim Thornton. “Identifying War.” Themes in History: War,
Identities in Conflict 1300-2000. Eds.,Bertrand and Thronton. Thrupp, Stroud,
Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998.
RIDO V2.indd 289 10/4/2007 8:24:34 AM

E ch a p ter n i n e
The Celebrated Cases of Rido

in Maguindanao and North Cotabato
United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD)
T HIS RESEARCH focuses on three case studies of conflict resolution in

Maguindanao and North Cotabato. Maguindanao is the main compo-
nent province of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (armm)
while North Cotabato is within the region of Central Mindanao. Both prov-
inces are considered the home of the Maguindanaon, one of the 13 major
Moro ethno-linguistic peoples of Mindanao.
The Mangansakan and Tayuan clans predominate in North Cotabato,
though they have their roots in Maguindanao, the former heartland of the
Sultanate of Maguindanao, after which the island of Mindanao was named.
The Abas and Sinsuat clans are from the municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat
(formerly Dinaig) while the Manduyog and Bagundang clans predominate
in the municipality of Kabuntalan in Maguindanao. This study seeks to put
the conflicts in proper perspective to enhance the peace efforts in central
Mindanao.
Case 1: The Tayuan-Mangansakan Conflict

Geography
Barangay Paido Pulangi in Pikit, North Cotabato, is known as the origi-
nal home of the Mangansakan clan. Situated along a river and surround-
ed by marsh, the village is amidst three other barangays:Kalembog to the
north, Punol to the east, the Rio Grande de Mindanao (Pulangi) and the
municipality of Datu Piang—the boundary between North Cotabato and
|| 290 ||
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The Celebrated Cases of Rido in Maguindanao and North Cotabato || 291
Maguindanao—to the southwest, and the Pikit side of Macasendeg to the

northwest.
The place is abundant with natural resources but is not industrial-
ized. Most of the residents are engaged in traditional farming and fishing.
However, the perennial floods, particularly during rainy season, often hurt
farmers. The residents are mostly related by blood or affinity to the Man-
gansakan family and are all Maguindanaon.
The Mangansakan Clan

During the time of Grand Old Man Bitol Mangansakan, their renowned
datu, the clan lived in peace. Datu Bitol was a World War II veteran and
who became chief of police of Datu Piang,
RAJAH BUAYAN MULAW Kabacan, and Maganoy, all of the former
empire province of Cotabato. He was a re-
DATU BULAWSAN spected leader and settled conflicts in his
area according to the Maguindanaon adat
DATU DALUMEDTENG betad and the principle of luwaran.
According to the Tarsilan, Mangan-
DATU KAPITAN DATU TANTU sakan was the son of Pendulugong, datu of
the Makaturuganan, and cousin of the datu
DATU ABUK from Zapakan (sultan sa Barongis, Maguin-
danao) named Datu Manguda Timan from
DATU ANGKAL
Silik, Pikit in North Cotabato. Pendulugong
DATU intermarried with the Kabalukanan, a sub-
BANINGEN
DATU tribe of the Maguindanaon.
DATU BASAGEN
LANGALEG
DABPLAK The Tayuan Clan
DATU ADUWI
The Tayuans are based in barangay
MANGANSAKAN Kudarangan, Midsayap in North Cota-
bato, about 10 km from Paido Pulangi, on
MAAGEM
DATU BITUL the western part of Macasendeg, Midsayap
DATU KAPITAN
side. West of Kudarangan is Ulandang and
north is Mudseng. South of the barangay
FIGURE 1: Mangansakan’s Royal Lineage runs the Rio Grande de Mindanao.
The Tayuans are dominant in these ar-
eas. Ustadz Daud Tayuan, a product of Al Ahzar University in Cairo, Egypt,
is the leading figure and the present titular head of the family.
The Tayuans trace their ancestry to Shariff Aduk.
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Old Ties
The two clans, who are third-degree blood relatives, were on good terms
up to the 1980s. They were both with the Moro liberation movement from
1970 to 1980 and collaborated militarily. Prior to the declaration of martial
law in 1972, the so-called Blackshirts were reportedly organized by the Min-
danao Independence Movement (mim) to counter the ilaga (later dubbed
the Ilonggo Land Grabber Army by their victims) which was formed by
Christian politicians.
As the ilaga became entrenched in Paido Pulangi, Datu Bitol allied with
the Tayuans to drive away the intruders. This led to the organization of the
Moro National Liberation Front (mnlf) that waged war against the Marcos
regime. Ten young Tayuans were among those recruited to train abroad as
mnlf cadres. The most senior of them was Ustadz Daud Tayuan.
In 1972, Pendatukan Bila or “Big Boy,” one of the Tayuan cadres, was
assigned in Paido Pulangi as commanding officer of Bravo Company of
the Bangsamoro Army (bma). He was welcomed by the Mangansakans as a
comrade-in-arms. Ustadz Daud Tayuan also established a training base in
the area of the Mangansakans as part of the effort to consolidate the mnlf.
The datus welcomed the entry of Big Boy’s outfit that defeated a Philippine
Army unit in Paido Pulangi and the surrounding areas.
Big Boy was recognized as a leader in the area and people turned over
to him the organizational taxes/fees that were formerly given through Datu
Bitol. In time, the Tayuans became politically dominant in the area. This was
the situation until both Datu Bitol and Big Boy declared allegiance to the
Philippine government in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the rise of the Tayuans in
the area ruffled the maratabat of the Mangansakans and created animosity
between the two sides. Bitol, however, was able to control his younger kin
and prevented them from breaking the peace with the Tayuans.
The Rido and its aftermath

Things came to a head, however, when a female relative of the Mangan-
sakans—who had been charged with “acts of lasciviousness” by the mnlf—
was arrested by the Tayuan group without the consent of Datu Bitol. Bitol
was offended and declared withdrawal of cooperation with the Tayuans.
The simmering animosity between the clans erupted into violence when
Rambo, a messenger of the Tayuans to the Mangansakans, figured in a fight
with Tungan Mentang and another Mangansakan kin. Rambo and Tungan
Mentang were killed in that incident.
This rido, which stretches back to the 1980s, has caused much death
and destruction. The involvement of the Philippine Army, the local militia
(cafgu), and some elements of the mnlf in the dispute has fueled more
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hostility. This resulted in many casualties and displaced thousands of fami-

lies across four municipalities.
When the Mangansakans asked help from the Philippine Army, the Ta-
yuans saw this as a betrayal of the earlier commitment of the clans to fight
a common enemy. The Tayuans had commanders like Asraf, Wadjidi, Rasul
(Big Boy), Dabid, and Ronnie Malagiok who fought against government
foreces at the height of the mnlf rebellion. With the involvement of other
actors, the feud worsened. From then on, any altercation between the two
sides would always lead to gunbattles.
Datu Bitol and four of his seven sons (Alison, Edsrafil, Datu Malambed
and Guttierez) led the Mangansakans, while Ustadz Daud Tayuan and his
younger brother Ali, and cousin Nasser headed the Tayuans in encounters
which took place in barangays Kudarangan, Macasendeg, Paido Pulangi,
Binandal, Tapudok, Kalembog, Kulambog, Langayen, Dungguan, Bakay-
awan, Ulandang, and Kadigasan, all in North Cotabato. It was Macasendeg,
Midsayap, however, which became the major zone of conflict. Seven families
who left Macasendeg to avoid the violence have yet to return home.
Based on reports, the Mangansakans always initiate the fighting and
carry out hate campaigns against the Tayuans. The Mangasakans believe
their old power base has been undermined. Some attribute the absence of
major encounters during the past years to the deaths of Datu Bitol and
Ustadz Daud. It is more likely, however, that the Mangansakans have gained
some satisfaction from the thought that they have somehow humiliated the
Tayuans and have therefore ceased their attacks.
Several Moro leaders, including those from the mnlf, have tried and
failed to restore the peace between the two clans. The last major encounter
happened in 1996 when the Mangansakans reportedly requested the sup-
port of the Army.
Case 2: The Sinsuat-Abas Conflict

Geography
The town of Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao is home to two feud-
ing clans: the Sinsuats and the Abases. Both clans are Maguindanaoan and
their kin have also settled in the neighboring towns of Kabuntalan, North
Upi, South Upi, Talayan, Talitay, and Guindulungan, where they have inter-
married with other families.
The Sinsuat Clan

Datu Sinsuat was born to the clan of the Balabaran Ayunan who lived
in the lower valley of Cotabato, now Maguindanao. He was born in the
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municipality of Dinaig (later renamed after Sinsuat’s son, Odin). Sinsuat
was first married to Sendig from the clan of Sumampao from the western
part of Dinaig called Dimapatoy, and they lived at Lelambayan together
with the Abas clan.
Sinsuat had a son named Pidtukasan. Sinsuat’s second wife was a Ma-
ranao woman from Ramain, Lanao (now Lanao del Sur) who bore him a
son: Datu Odin. In his latter years, the Grand Old Man Datu Sinsuat mar-
ried other women from neighboring clans and sired other Sinsuat branches
who inhabited the lower valley of Maguindanao. The Sinsuats became rivals
of the older Maguindanao and Ranao clans.
The Abas Clan

The Abas clan originated from the old district of Tampakan in the center
of Dinaig. At present, Tampakan covers most parts of Bugawas, Dulangan,
Kurintem, Makir, and Kapiton and all the outlaying communities of western
Butilen marsh. The Abases prefer to be called “Tampakanen” to remind oth-
ers of their history as warriors who defended their land against colonizers.
The Tampakanens are headed by an elected datu whom they highly respect
but who can be removed from office should he break the law.
The Grand Old Man Abas was more dominant than the Grand Old Man
Balabaran. Abas was well loved by his people. He was powerful but gener-
ous. He shared his land and granted favors to Balabaran. Abas had vast land
holdings in the area where the two clans coexisted. He owned an estimated
300 ha in Bugawas as well as property in other barangays.
At present, Sinsuat land covers the boundary of Talayan and Dalican, the
magelco area, Kurintem, and barangay Daiwan. The Abases own some 300
ha in Bugawas and the barangays of Makir and Bunged in Datu Odin Sin-
suat. Like the Sinsuats, the Abas clan is into farming, fishing, and trading.
Old Ties
The two clans used to be good neighbors. Balabaran, the father of Sinsuat,
and the old Abas were friends and confidants. The two clans intermarried
and helped each other. Originally, the old Balabaran was from Taviran (for-
merly Zubidan) and Abas were from Tampakan. Taviran and Tampakan were
neighboring villages in Dinaig. Later, Balabaran moved to Gapt in Maguin-
danao (now Cotabato City) due to severe economic crisis. Balabaran urged
Abas to join him in Gapt but Abas, concerned about his constituents, stayed
on and instead urged his sister Maisula to go with Balabaran. When the area
recovered, Abas joined Maisula and Balabaran. Eventually, Balabaran’s son,
Sinsuat, married Sendig and they lived in Lembayan with Abas, while Maisula
lived separately at Kulong-Kulong with her husband Dalinding. Sinsuat and
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Sendig were blessed with a son named Pidtukasan. Sinsuat married a second
wife, a Maranao, and their son grew up to become Datu Odin. However, due
to marital conflict, the Maranao wife of Sinsuat went back to Ramain, Lanao.
Abas helped to negotiate for the return of Sinsuat’s wife, further enhancing
ties between the clans.
For several years, the two clans intermarried. Pidtukasan, the eldest son
of Sinsuat (who became the first elected mayor of Dinaig), was married to
the eldest daughter of Abas named Sauda. The son of Pidtukasan named
Datu Kused was married to Guianipa, a daughter of Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Pidtukasan’s half brother.
The genealogy shows the dominance of the Sinsuats in the local politi-
cal arena.
BALABARAN
ABAS HAMSA
AYUNAN
SINSUAT
BAGKU SAUDA HADJI MOKAMAD MADALI BRAHIM
BALABARAN
(Appointed (OIC Mayor)
Senator)
DATU ODIN DATU MAMA DATU MANDU DATU BLAH

SAUDA PIDTUKUSAN DATU
Married (DATU SINSUAT SINSUAT SINSUAT
ABAS to Abas (First Mayor of MANGODA
MALAMBEG) (Former (Former Cotabato (Con-Con
DOS) SINSUAT
(Former Mayor) Commissioner) City Mayor) Delegate)
DATU PUTI
SINSUAT
(Former North
Upi Mayor)
DATU KUSED DATU DATU BIMBO DATU JERRY
BAI
(Grandson of Married GUIANIPA OMBRA (Incumbent RUSMAN
to Sinsuat (Former Vice. Gov. of (Incumbent YASMIN
Abas and Sinsuat)
Board Member Mayor) Maguindanao) Board Member)
DATU LESTER
(Incumbent
Mayor)
FIGURE 2: Abas-Sinsuat Clans’ Intermarriages and Political Power
The Rido and its aftermath

The “cold war” between the two clans started during the years before
World War II. While the Abases owned much land in the area, it was the
Sinsuats who registered more property under their name when the Land
Registration Act and the agrarian reform program came about. This was
seemingly a result of differing attitudes and beliefs: while the Abases were
devout Muslims, the Sinsuats were more secular and traditional leaders and
had better access to the bureaucracy.
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During the war, the Abases reportedly sympathized with the Americans
while the Sinsuats allegedly sided with the Japanese. Still, what sparked the
feud between the clans was a misunderstanding in the 1980s between youths
from the Guialon and Maliga families in Bunged. The Guialons sought help
from the Abases while the Maliga went to the Sinsuats, specifically, Darry
Sinsuat. At first, the Abases and the Sinsuats did not want to be involved in
the dispute and tried to broker peace.
When President Corazon C. Aquino came to power in 1986, she de-
clared a revolutionary government that rendered vacant all national and
local posts. She appointed Hadji Mokamad Abas, the son of the old Abas,
as officer in charge of Dinaig to replace Datu Odin Sinsuat.
The Sinsuats could not accept the abrupt turn of events and tried every
means to regain their political power. Hadji Mokamad Abas held office for
only a few months before losing a hotly contested mayoralty elections to
Datu Odin Sinsuat. Unfortunately, the elections rekindled past ill will be-
tween the two clans and ignited violent encounters.
The first major encounter was reported the following year in Makir,
where Datu Darry Sinsuat was killed. The incident happened at the Pilot El-
ementary School in the northern side of the town’s poblacion Dalican. The
second major encounter was along the national highway at the boundary of
Dalican and Makir, and the third one took place once more at the upper part
of Makir. The fighting claimed the lives of three on the side of the Abases.
On the other hand, two Sinsuat grandsons were killed in an ambush that
the Sinsuats blamed on the Abases.
The Sinsuats were accused of slaying a member of another powerful
Dinaig clan, the Ambolodtos, who allegedly sided with the Abases. The Am-
bolodtos had allegedly helped organize the ambush on the Sinsuats in Ma-
kir. In retaliation, the Sinsuats razed the house where the ambush occurred.
Reportedly, when the Sinsuats realized that some of the attacks against them
were initiated by another party other than the Abases, the Sinsuats tempered
their actions and the violence subsided.
Aside from deaths, the conflict caused evacuations and damage to prop-
erty, crop, and livestock. Students had to forego schooling at the Mindanao
State University (msu) campus in Dalican, Datu Odin Sinsuat. Battles oc-
curred in Bunged, Dalican, Makir, Kakar, and Kurintem while barangay Sa-
palan and Dulangan witnessed ambuscades.
Several people tried to reconcile the feuding sides. The final effort was
facilitated by the Abas clan itself. They requested the help of Col. Rudy So
Chio of the afp in setting up a meeting attended by Datu Bimbo, Datu Om-
bra and Bai Yasmine from the Sinsuats and Ust. Brahim, Hadji Mokamad,
Commander Tungan, and Mr. Madale from the Abas clan. The two sides
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sealed a peace pact that culminated in the holding of a kanduli. The parties
swore before the Holy Qur’an to discard any animosity between them.
The settlement was not documented, but so far, the peace is holding.
The policies of the incumbent mayor, Datu Lester Sinsuat, are reportedly in
accord with Islam, which is favorable to the devout Abases.
The national government is often seen as perpetuating the colonial
strategy of “divide and rule” by exploiting the differences among local clans
like the Abases and the Sinsuats, especially during elections. Before the ad-
vent of post-1986 elections, the two clans treated each other like saka kuden:
siblings sharing the same pots, plates, and land. However, personal interests
now often overcome peaceful coexistence.
Case 3: The Manduyog-Bagundang Conflict

Geography
In Maguindanao tradition, Kabuntalan is the land across which the
Pulangi River forks through the tribal heartland towards the Moro Gulf
and Illana Bay. Inhabited originally by the Nagtangen, Kabuntalan eventu-
ally emerged by the 16th century as one of the three sultanates in the tribal
heartland along with the Maguindanao and Buayan.
In northeast Kabuntalan is barangay Gambar, a self-sustained com-
munity of farmers and fishers. The area boasts of fertile plains and marsh
watered by the Pulangi River that overflows its banks annually.
The Bagundang Clan

The prominent Bagundang clan of Maguindanao traces descent to a
member of the royal family of Brunei who came to Mindanao at the close
of Spanish rule in the Philippines in the 19th century.
A man of no great means, Karnain of the Bagundang clan married
Gapas Watamama of the Watamama clan of Gambar, Kabuntalan, The
couple had eight children: Ahmad, Oting, Blah, Manan and Macmod, all
surnamed Bagundang.
The diagram on the opposite page shows that both Karnain Bagundang
and Hadji Alim Manduyog have the right to claim over the ancestral land
of the Watamama Tubotubo.
The Manduyog Clan

On the other hand, the marriage between Hadji Alim Manduyog to the
sister of Watamama saw the intermarriage between the influential Buayan
and Kabuntalan clans. The marriage bore at least seven children including
Datukon, Asgar, and Adrie.
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WATAMAMA
TUBOTUBO
BAGUNDANG MANDUYOG
(Focal person of (Half brother of Usi
Watamama) and Dilangalen)
TAHIR MARRIED TO GIDAY AMPOK MARRIED TO

HADJI RAUF
1st COUSINS
BAGUNDANG MANDUYOG
2nd COUSINS
GAPAS HADJA
KAMAIN HADJI ALIM
MARRIED TO WATAMAMA 2nd COUSINS LATIPA MARRIED TO
BAGUNDANG MANDUYOG
WATAMAMA
BLAH 3rd COUSINS

DATUKON
BAGUNDANG MANDUYOG
FIGURE 3: Bagundang-Manduyog Clans’ Relationship
Old Ties
Historically, the three Moro sovereign powers at times forged a confed-
eration to resist foreign incursion. In the mid 1970s, the people of Gambar,
Kabuntalan rallied behind the call for an independent Muslim Maguin-
danao homeland. The Bagundang and Manduyog clans, closely related by
blood and affinity, were both staunch supporters of the Moro liberation
movement.
The Rido and its Aftermath

Conflict between the clans broke out in 1982. Reportedly, the Bagundangans
were more powerful during the height of the conflict. The rido that erupted
during the administrations of barangay captain Adtong Utto of Gambar
and Mayor Johnson Lauban of the municipality of Kabuntalan started as a
dispute over land.
The Watamamas, the clan whom both the Bagundangs and Manduyogs
had intermarried with, possessed an estimated 120 ha of land in Gambar,
the largest landholding in the village. The land of the Watamamas was di-
vided equally among the siblings. Karnain and Hadji Alim, both married to
Watamama women, were among the beneficiaries.
Each beneficiary family inherited about one hectare mainly for residen-
tial use. Traditionally, the Maguindanao did not document their land hold-
ings, but when land titling was started in the 1980s, Karnain allegedly claimed
more land than he owned. With the help of his son Ahmad Bagundang, an
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agriculturist who had access to the local office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (dar), Karnain registered 14 ha under the name of his brother- in-
law, Mohammad Sangki. As expected, the other heirs were outraged.
Karnain discovered that Hadji Alim was building a house on land that
Karnain had registered under his name and was mortgaging to the Devel-
opment Bank of the Philippines (dbp). Karnain confronted Hadji Alim
who refused to vacate the lot. During the encounter, Alim’s son, Datukon,
shot dead Karnain with an M16 rifle. The neighbors fled the area in fear
of violence.
The clans, whose mothers Giday and Ampok were first cousins, were
now at war with each other. Two months after Karnain’s death, Asgar, the
brother of Datukon, was slain in Campo Muslim, Cotabato City, allegedly
by the Bagundang clan. Later, two of Karnain’s sons, Manan and Macmod,
and two of his brothers-in-law, Hadji Abas Salim and Hadji Latip Ukay,
were also killed. The Bagundang side lost seven men.
On the side of Manduyogs, eight were killed, including Asgar, Batua
Minidal, Tua Kapid, Macmod Agong, and Guimaludin Agong. All of them
were closely related to Hadji Alim who was himself killed by Karnain’s son,
Blah, at a supermarket in Cotabato City.
Leaders of Kabuntalan and other towns, including the late mayors Su-
karno Samad and Bai Unggi D. Abdullah and Assemlyman Arafat Abdullah,
tried but failed to reconcile the feuding clans. Later, prominent personali-
ties from the feuding clans worked to end the rido. Hadji Salim from the
Bagundangs and Mando Macacua from the Manduyogs requested the in-
tervention of regional trial court judge Ismael Bagundang and Samsudin
Macacua, the most influential members of the two clans.
These two personalities arranged a dialogue between the clans that was
held at the residence of Sumampao Bagundang in Cotabato City. As a result
of the talks, the feuding clans agreed to enter into a traditional peace cov-
enant through the holding of a kanduli.
At the kanduli, the Bagundang clan was headed by Judge Ismael Ba-
gundang, who was joined by Sammy Bagundang, municipal auditor of the
armm; Col. Esmael Daulog; Abdulrahman Bagundang, among others. The
Manduyogs were led by Samsudin Macacua with barangay captain Adtong
Utto, Hadji Latip, Mando Macacua and some other influential members of
the clan. Both sides agreed to disregard all previous casualties and prop-
erty damage. Clan members were advised not to respond in haste to any
perceived future provocation. The two men who led the talks assumed re-
sponsibility for any violation of the truce that may be committed by their
respective clan members.
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In 1989, the rido was finally settled after 12 years of conflict and seven
years of violence. There was, however, no formal document signed by the
two sides. It is noteworthy that the negotiators rendered void the disputed
land title that caused the conflict and restored the property to their rightful
owners. Since then, the two clans have lived in peace.
Without a written document, there is no guarantee that this rido will
not recur after the passing of the elders who brokered the peace. Although
the original land title that caused the dispute has been rendered void among
the clan members, the property has not been re-registered under a rightful
owner. This could cause future problems.
Stages of Rido
Based on the above rido case studies, the following pattern can be observed:
1. Pre-Rido/ “Cold War”

Misunderstanding/miscommunication. Commonly, a rido starts with
an intense misunderstanding.
Lack of communication and respect. When misunderstanding is not
resolved right away, the conflict may deepen because of lack of communica-
tion and absence of mutual respect.
Verbal threats and confrontation. Misunderstanding can lead to ver-
bal provocation between clans (usually fanned by rumor) that can trigger
a rido.
Socio-political and economic domination. When rich and powerful
individuals or families in an area become oppressive, the stage can be set for
animosity or “cold war” between clans.
Opening stage of a rido

When animosity leads to homicide, the maratabat and territoriality of
the clans are ignited and the violence escalates.
Escalation
Revenge and property damage. A rido can be said to have escalated when
retaliation has resulted to several casualties and much property damage.
Involvement of third party and powerful groups. Rido can be exacer-
bated by “third parties” who support or arm the principals.
Neglect by authorities. Rido can be become unmanageable when au-
thorities do not nip it in the bud.
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Settlement and Resolution

• Pre-Settlement
Realization and bargaining . It is the stage of repentance and realization
of the clans about the negative impact of the rido.
Draining of resources. Both parties are no longer capable of sustaining
the conflict materially.
Fatigue. Both sides are psychologically drained.
• Settlement Proper
Intervention of peacemakers. Prominent lay or religious individuals or
groups in the community try to broker peace.
Participation of clan leaders and members. Any move to settle a rido
must involve clan members.
Nonverbal arrangement. At this point, both sides share a desire to end
the conflict.
Dialogue. The parties agree to settle through mediation of peacemakers.
• Process of Dialogue
Communication between mediators and feuding clans
– Consent of clans to talk peace
– Covert negotiations between mediators and feuding clans
– Evaluation of conditions and possibilities
– Actual talks
Agreement
Terms for peace are spelled out. It may be written or verbal so long as
approved by both conflicting parties.
Transformational Stage
It is the stage where trust and confidence between parties are gradually
restored.
Conclusion
Rido may involve any family or clan, anywhere at anytime, given the right
conditions. The prevalence of rido among the Moro may be due to the con-
cept of maratabat that obligates every clan member to do everything within
his power to defend the clan honor once this is perceived as having been
desecrated. The Moro say that “what ails the little finger, the whole body
feels,” so the individual must always share the clan burden.
Attempts to settle rido while emotions are high and resources are still
intact may be futile. However, when the conflict has taken its toll and parties
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begin to feel drained, then the chances for resolution increase. The parties
may cease their attacks or even seek formal talks as in the case of the Man-
gansakan and Tayuan clans.When this happens, it is best to start a dialogue
that will lead to a formal agreement.
During the settlement period, it is important to determine the individu-
als for whom both sides have the utmost trust. The peacemaker should bear
in mind that both parties have committed extreme offenses and completely
distrust each other. The mediator must be cautious and fair. Rido is best
prevented when community leaders are keen to detect animosities between
individuals and between families and move early to restore good will.
Recommendations
There is a need to conduct more peace education seminars/trainings on rido
and conflict resolution among concerned local government units (lgu) and
community leaders, and a deeper study on the concept of maratabat and
traditional conflict resolution among the Moro.
Postscript
After undertaking an in-depth investigation of the Mangansakan-Ta-
yuan conflict, and upon the request of the clans involved in the rido, the Co-
tabato-based United Youth for Peace and Development (unypad) initiated
a series of dialogues between the feuding clans to help settle the conflict.
With support from The Asia Foundation and the United States Agency for
International Development (usaid), the youth group used the study results
to organize and empower the council of elders of both clans, find an accept-
able mediator, and conduct consultations with and information dissemina-
tion to grassroots members of both clans.
Throughout the resolution process, unypad faced several obstacles. The
families initially doubted the sincerity and capability of the youth in helping
resolve the problem. The untimely death of a Tayuan clan council member
also affected the dialogues. In addition, the Shariff Aguak incident in June
2006, which killed a Mangansakan leader and triggered a major armed con-
flict in Maguindanao, further complicated the resolution process. However,
through persistence, hard work, and sincere engagement with the people,
unypad was able to overcome these challenges and help the families reach
a final settlement.
On March 11, 2007, a grand kanduli or thanksgiving celebration was
held in Paido Pulangi, Pikit, by the two clans to formalize the settlement and
mark the end of their 21-year old rido. The kanduli also commemorated the
14th death anniversary of Datu Bitol Mangansakan who was patriarch to
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both clans. The kanduli was a very emotional event for all the families. For
many of them, it was their first time to meet again after a very long time. The
successful kanduli became a manifestation of their genuine commitment to
finally end any future conflict between the clans. It is also an affirmation of
their conviction that hatred, conflicts, and misunderstanding are retrogres-
sive and have no more space in either of the clans.
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E ch a p ter ten
Tausug and Corsican Clan Feuding:

A Comparative Study
Gerard Rixhon
H ALFWAY THROUGH the first decade of the second millennium,

people in many places across the world continue to suffer from the
violence leftover from the 20th century. The cries of “Never Again!” heard
at the end of World War II continue to resound in vain. Perhaps the oldest
form of feuding is that between families or clans.1
Interfamilial feuds are the most common precipitates of violent crime
in the Philippines, according to a 2004 Social Weather Stations (sws) survey
on “Conflict Resolution and the Participation of Women in Peace, Gover-
nance and Development.” Most survey respondents across the country say
violence in their neighborhood result mainly from family and clan conflicts.2
It is a national issue and one that is especially significant in the South3.
1 For greater simplicity and clarity, I will henceforward use the term “clan feud” as I consider fam-
ily (pamilya) and clan (angkan) feuds to be the same phenomenon. The dynamics and character of the
blood feuds are the same in both cases.
2 Social Weather Stations, 2005: slide 12.
3 The country as a whole has not come to terms with clan feuding. At the national level, some 16%
of the respondents admit having experienced family/clan violence in their community; and, second,
40% of Filipinos still approve of taking revenge as acceptable behavior. What was believed to be a
unique southern Mindanao phenomenon is not.
|| 304 ||
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Tausug and Corsican Clan Feuding || 305
TABLE 1. Conflict Resolution and the Participation of Women in Peace Governance and Development:
An Integration of Three Surveys, SWS 2005:12
SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: ARMM vs. RP
RP ARMM
Conflict between families/clans 16% 28%
Conflict between Muslim rebels and AFP 1 20
Crime 4 9
Conflict between Muslims and Christians 0.2 5
Conflict betweem tribes 0.5 2
Conflict between farmers and landowners 3 2
Conflict between NPA and AFP 4 1
Conflict between laborers and employers 1 1
Conflict between other groups 0.4 0.3
The figures speak for themselves but it should be noted here that, con-
trary to popular perception, the most number of violent deaths in the armm
is not due to the war between Moro rebels and government troops but is
the result of inter-family feud. This fact is further supported and qualified
by another set of figures on the “Vengeance Factor,” as found in the same
sws Survey Summary:
If a family member is hurt/murdered/raped, 60% in RP dis-

approve (both women and men) of taking vengeance, but 70%
in ARMM approve (both women and men) of it.4 (Underlining
mine)
These large approval numbers in southwestern Mindanao and Sulu for

clan feuding added to those for the secessionist civil war do not augur well
for the return of a comprehensive peace to Mindanao and Sulu. It is there-
fore important to examine this aberrant and damaging behavior.
My purpose is twofold. It is first an attempt to understand the nature
and structure of family feud and its impact. From this analysis, I aim to
identify the basic Tausug cultural elements that may remedy and transform
this phenomenon.
4 Ibid:18, a summary of slide 19. The question was: “To what degree do you agree or disagree
with the following statement: “IT IS RIGHT TO AVENGE MY FAMILY IF ONE OF ITS MEMBERS
GETS HURT, IS MURDERED OR IS RAPED?” (SHOW CARD”) (STRONGLY AGREE, SOMEWHAT
AGREE, SOMEWHAT DISAGREE,OR STRONGLY DISAGREE)
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Family feuding, which is as old as humankind, was best defined some 120
years ago by Mark Twain in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn through Huck’s
new friend, Buck, who had lost three older brothers in a 30-year-old feud:
“Well,” says Buck, “a feud is this way: A man has a quarrel with
another man, and kills him; then that other man’s brother kills him;
then the other brothers, on both sides, goes for one another; then
the cousins chip in—and by-and-by everybody’s killed off and there
ain’t no more feud. But it’s kind of slow, and takes a long time.”5
Buck admits that he doesn’t know how the row started “long ago” save
that the families’ honor were at stake. According to the anthropological lit-
erature on revenge, the term “feud” is ascribed to a cycle with at least three
successive killings of members on both sides.6
What Mark Twain describes in his novel fits perfectly with what the
Tausug call mamahuli 7. In Meranao society it is called rido, the Higaonon
use the term lido and the Magindanaon use kontra or kontla. Nowadays,
most writers and researchers use the Meranao term rido to describe all clan
feuds in the South but I rather use the English term “clan feud.” I limit my
study to the Tausug because of my greater familiarity with Sulu. In any case,
there are strong similarities between Tausug clan feuds and those of other
ethnic groups in western Mindanao.
Although it is not my primary purpose, this paper will help dispel the
misconception that family or clan vengeance occurs only among Muslim
groups of Mindanao and Sulu.8 Non-Muslims in Mindanao, like the Higa-
onon, peoples of the Luzon highlands, as well as lowland Christians, all
engage in clan feuds. Such feuds are also well known in southwest China,
the eastern and southern United States during the 19th century—as de-
scribed in Twain’s novel—and in the Mediterranean Basin.9 In fact, it was
5 Mark Twain, 2003: 120.

6 See Otterbein 2000: 231-2
7 The term “clan” (liyuuran) includes people issued from the same lineage and their allies while
“family” (tawtaymanghud) refers to members of a nuclear family and kin such as uncles, aunts, and
cousins. Revenge killings between two clans or two families differ only in the size or membership of
groups involved where the same patterns of conflict and the same cycle of murderous behavior obtain
8 One major Muslim ethnic group inhabiting the Sulu Archipelago is the Sama people (including
the Sama Dilaut; see Nimmo 2001:128-131 and 162-164). They generally abhor violence and settle
disputes peacefully through arbitration. Most of them are located in Tawi-Tawi and along the coasts
of Sulu, Basilan, and the Southern Zamboanga Peninsula; there are also large Sama populations in
Eastern Sabah, Malaysia and in Eastern and Southern Sulawesi where they are known as Orang Bajo.
One exception among them might be the Balangingi Sama, west of Jolo Island, who fought alongside
the Tausug in piracy raids in the 19th century.. .
9 In Yunnan (southwest China). In the United States, some of the Appalachian families in Kentucky
and Western Virginia were notorious for their long string of murders between competing families until
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the Corsicans, notorious for their family/clan feuds during the 19th century
and famous for Napoleon Bonaparte, who gave the world the term vendetta
(from the Latin vindicta or vengeance).
I chose Corsica for this comparative study because the clan feuding
behavior of its people shows striking similarities to that of the Tausug.
Many parallels can be drawn between the Corsican vendetta and the Tausug
mamahuli which show the impact of their respective political histories on
the psyches of both peoples. This study will hopefully help in understanding
the clan violence in both cultures and find ways to remedy feuding through
a conflict-transformation approach.
The first part of the paper starts with a case study of a family feud in
Sulu in which the author was part observer and part actor or participant
observer. It is supplemented by literature on vengeance in Sulu, mainly from
Kiefer and Hussin.10 In the second part, I look at the Corsican vendetta in
its historical and cultural context. In the third part, I consider the common-
alities in both cultures that foster clan violence. Finally, in the last section,
the possibility of a council for peace and justice is discussed along with a
program toward conflict transformation and the role of the government in
bringing back peace and justice in southern Philippines.
Clan Feud in Sulu
In Sulu, the traditional term for inter-family or clan revenge is mamahuli

from pahuli, to take revenge. Some people use the generic term nagbanta
(from banta, an enemy11) which means literally “to fight or oppose.” The
following case is based on the author’s personal experience in Sulu12
(pseudonyms are used).
The case of Ibnu
Some 40 years ago, I was director of a high school in the Sulu Archipel-
ago. One of my fourth year students, Ibnu, was a very bright student from a
poor family barely subsisting on coconut farming in the gimba, the interior
of the island. Because his family found it difficult to fully pay for his studies
and his stay in town, I took him in and paid for his school fees in exchange
they were stopped at the end of the 19th Century. In the Mediterranean Basin, among the most noto-
rious were and still are those in Corsica (France), Sardinia, Sicily, and Calabria (Italy); the Balkans,
Greece and Egypt, among others.
10 Kiefer, Thomas M., 1986 and Hussin, Alber, 2005.
11 See Hassan and Ashley, 1994: 81.
12 This was personally reconstructed from memory.
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for light work in the school library. I was quite relieved to know that he was
accepted by the Mindanao State University (msu) in Marawi City.
Most school days ended after dinner with the pasiyal (strolling) hour
at dusk which I enjoyed with a few students, Ibnu among them. A frequent
topic of our conversations was family feud. Ibnu recounted how his family
was embroiled in an old feud with the Abdullah family that caused several
deaths on each side.
He narrated how his mother and sisters could hardly make ends meet
due to the vicious cycle of revenge killings. Ibnu’s father was slain due to
a land boundary dispute with their neighbors, the Abdullah family. A few
years later, Ibnu’s older brother who became head of the family and the
main defender of his family’s honor and interests, ambushed and killed old
man Abdullah. Again, some years later, Abdullah’s son, Mr. Bin Abdullah,
returned to the island as a public school teacher and killed Ibnu’s older
brother. Ibnu—then a teen-ager—thus became his family’s last hope in vin-
dicating their honor.
At this time, Ibnu was about to graduate from high school and looking
forward to attending msu. But the expectations of Ibnu’s family weighed on
him. We often talked about the ethics of revenge. He agreed that the cycle
of vengeance was destroying his family. If he were to kill Mr. Bin Abdullah,
Ibnu knew he would lose his scholarship and endanger his future. Yet he was
constantly reminded of his duty to redeem the family honor by his mother
and sisters. In our last conversation, Ibnu agreed that revenge was not a
solution and that despite his misgivings about the system, justice should be
obtained through the courts.
A week later, just past 7 a.m., as we were singing the Philippine National
Anthem to start the new day, I noticed Mr. Bin Abdullah standing at atten-
tion on the road fronting our school. I immediately scanned the ranks of
the fourth year students. Ibnu was not among them. As we were singing the
last line, Ibnu suddenly darted out from behind a huge acacia tree opposite
the school and fired his .45 cal. pistol pointblank at Mr. Bin. Bullets were
flying in our direction and kids were screaming. To protect the students
and faculty members, I ran after Ibnu, shouting at him to go away until he
disappeared from sight.
Fortunately, there was only one student whose shoulder was grazed by a
bullet. However, Mr. Bin was sprawled on the ground, bleeding but still alive.
I and two male teachers brought Mr. Bin to the public health clinic. Mr. Bin
recovered and was eventually arrested and convicted of the murder of Ibnu’s
brother. Meanwhile, Ibnu, his dreams shattered but his family’s honor in-
tact, went into hiding as an outlaw and remained so for a few years.
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This case of Ibnu and Mr. Bin is typical of family or clan feuds among
the Tausug as shown by the gripping revenge patterns witnessed and de-
scribed by Hussin13 last year. It bears the same pattern as that of the Meranao
rido and other clan feuds in the Philippines.
To understand what happened to Ibnu and other mamahuli cases, it is
important to discuss salient cultural elements which Tausug society shares
with other societies that have a similar history of political instability (which
includes the lack of an effective formal justice system).
Internal Factors That Shape Clan Feud

Strong kinship and fierce family bonds. In attempting to kill Mr. Bin, Ibnu
acted as the male head of the family in lieu of his late father, following the
example of his late brother, and based on strong kinship and family bonds.
As in most families in the Philippines, the Tausug trace their descent from
both the father and mother; in Tausug this tradition is called usba-waris. As
in most western Mindanao groups, however, the Tausug father is the main
authority figure and family symbol. The loss14 of a father in a family feud
is a very serious matter. Therefore, Ibnu’s mother insisted that Ibnu avenge
his father and brother in order to redeem the family honor.
As in most Filipino families, the Tausug mother remains in the back-
ground but has a strong say on matters affecting the family. In Tausug soci-
ety, family ties are passionately respected and defended. Land owned by the
family is defended with equal ferocity as it is viewed somewhat mystically
as an extension of the family.15 Therefore, any encroachment of a family’s
property can lead to deadly conflict. As in any family feud, Ibnu’s com-
mitment to defend his family was unequivocal and, yet, mixed with other
motivations.
Bravery: the maisug factor. Ibnu manifested in his behavior one of the
key values of the Tausug male: bravery, from isug which means valor, intre-
pidity, and also fierceness and violence. The word also connotes “mascu-
linity”16 and, according to Hussin, fearlessness (2005:117). Kiefer succinctly
defines it thus: “A maisug person is combative and not deterred by physical
danger and risk, one who has strong feelings and is not afraid to express
them.”17 Motivation for maisug action is complex. In his case, Ibnu may
13 See Hussin’s Thesis, 2005, passim

14 Mamahuli’s root is pahuli which literally means “to repair what was broke,” according to a pri-
vate contribution by Mr. Talib Sangogot whom I gratefully acknowledge
15 For a description of the relationship of land, house, and family, see Jainal, Rixhon and Ruppert,
1972: 88-92, 113/2003: 148-150, 170
16 See Hassan and Ashley, 1994:200
17 Kiefer, 1986: 53
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have feared being branded a sissy or a coward for not avenging his family.
A Tausug proverb says:
“Gam muti’ in bukug, ayaw in tikudtikud”

(Literally: “Better the white bone than the heels”)
“It is better to die than be dishonored.”18
To redeem one’s family is to redeem one’s self.

Ibnu’s violent action was facilitated by the easy availability of firearms.
Handling a .45-cal. pistol—borrowed from a relative—enhanced his deep
sense of machismo and personal power. In Tausug society, a man’s firearm
is said, albeit often in jest, to be more “precious than his wife.” As Hussin
points out, the kalis of the past and the Armalite of today are more than
mere weapons, they are prestige symbols. There is “fusion” between weapon,
even one that is borrowed, and its bearer.19 According to Hussin, Sulu counts
an average of four weapons per household (2005).
In clan feud, bravery overcomes the sense of shame, or sipug, inflicted
on one’s family by an offense. Shame means the loss of martabbat or honor
and self respect. Ibnu and his family suffered the dishonor caused by the act
of the accused, Mr. Bin Abdullah. Young Ibnu had to erase this shame by
taking revenge at some propitious time. I subscribe to Kiefer’s definition of
“honor” as the awareness “of the self in relation to society. … It is not only
something to describe an inner feeling, but it is also used as an ideal which
serves to justify the individual’s enmity.”20 In a society where people own
little that is tangible outside of a simple home and a small piece of land, the
family’s intangible honor or self-respect counts as the most precious matter
to defend even at the cost of one’s life.
As the last adult or quasi-adult in the line of succession, Ibnu had the
burden of repaying his debt of gratitude, buddi, to his dead father and
brother. He had the powerful sense of obligation to get even with the Abdul-
lah family by eliminating Mr. Bin. Revenge, as Kiefer notes, is a form of
“negative reciprocity” 21 also called at times “the debt of a soul.”
In the early stage of feuding, customary law (adat) recommends a peace-
ful settlement between the two families through arbitration by a neutral and
18 Hassan and Jainal, 1973:221.

19 Hussin 2005: 106 ff. and 126. This insight into what I would call a “mystical” fusion between
bearer and weapon could be related to the unity between a piece of land and its owner and the rela-
tionship of a house built on that land according to specific body directions. This is an idea that may
inspire further research.
20 Kiefer, 1986: 68 .
21 Ibid.: 67.
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22
highly regarded head man or panglima. Usually, this process results in the
aggressor compensating the victim. It is followed by an agreement between
both sides, who swear by the Holy Qur’an, to refrain from killing each other.
However, this process is seldom resorted to during the early stage of feuding.
For the Tausug, including Ibnu’s family, formal court proceedings are only
a means to temporarily imprison a crime suspect. Such processes do not
resolve the conflicts between clans or prevent further violence.
The preferred way for the majority of the aggrieved parties throughout
Mindanao and Sulu is to follow their own private sense of justice and take
the law into their hands. Incidentally, figures gathered by the Asia Founda-
tion-supported research on clan feuding in southern Mindanao show that
out of 1,220 rido cases in Mindanao “40 % are resolved, 3% have recurred,
57% remain unresolved”23
Though deeply shaped by his culture, Ibnu’s actions were also strongly
influenced by political events he might not even be aware of. In fact, Ibnu
grew up during the years that presaged the turbulent 1970s.
External Factors That Induce Clan Feud

Sulu’s travails and instability can be traced with a broad brush to the tur-
bulent events of the past three centuries. It started in the 18th century when
a brisk trade in spices, pearls, and sea products marked the height of the
Sultanate of Sulu’s commercial success. This caught the attention of the
English and other European traders. These foreign merchants slowly and
aggressively displaced the center of the spice trade to their warehouses else-
where in East Borneo and along the coast of the Malay Peninsula. The com-
mercial decline of the Sulu Sultanate during the 19th century brought about
unrest across the Sulu Archipelago. To recoup their losses and to keep away
the Spanish colonial troops from the North, some Tausug and Balangingi
Sama launched piracy raids. However, the glory days were past and this was
a terrible blow to Tausug pride. Worse was to come; first with the establish-
ment of Spanish colonial forts and enclaves in Zamboanga and Jolo; then
the American occupation and colonial regime. When the colonial masters
left, they turned over power and administration to Manila with its distant
and “neocolonial” attitudes toward Mindanao and Sulu.
22 For a detailed description of feud settlement according to the customary law of the Meranao,
see Bula, 2000: 15ff.
23 The Asia Foundation: 2005. From the same study, here are some of the figures on another
province of Mindanao. In the past ten years (1994-2004) alone, Lanao del Sur had 284 cases of clan
feuds (or rido in Meranao), with 542 dead and 79 injured; 44 cases only were settled with 4 perpetrators
jailed; this leaves 244 cases unresolved up to now.
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Economic decline and political turmoil slowly gnawed at the people’s
sense of security in their homeland. There were varied arrangements. Many
among the elite were loyal to Manila, others were critical of the Philippine
government while serving it; there were rebellions (as that led by Kamlon);
most people coasted along indifferently, and a minority still showed loyalty
to the usa. An example of this situation is highlighted by a visit I paid, some
45 years ago, a panglima in the interior of Ibnu’s home island with one of my
students as guide. When the chief of the area saw me, he shook my hands
warmly and proclaimed for all to hear: “Ha, sir, when are you Americans
coming back to lift independence from us?” My protestations that I was
Belgian did not seem to register with the chief.
At the other extreme, there were, in 1961, former Sulu Congressman
Datu Amilbangsa calling for an Independent State of Sulu, and, in 1968,
former Cotabato Governor Udtug Matalam launching the Movement for
Independent Mindanao (mim). The peace and order situation grew worse
with the birth of the Moro National Liberation Front (mnlf) in 1969, the
imposition of martial law, and the ensuing war between the Philippine gov-
ernment and the Moro rebellion. Manila symbolizes a distant and uncaring
government that neglects the people of Mindanao and Sulu. This neglect is
exemplified in the absence of an effective and honest justice system. It is no
wonder the rural Tausug with a deep sense of personal justice shy away from
the courts in settling their disputes. The formal court system was seen as a
Manila-imposed institution good for locking some people away but with
no relevance for dispute settlement. Ibnu was raised during this period of
Tausug insecurity and mistrust of government.
The times have not changed as clan feuding still flourishes as reported
by Alber Hussin and his research colleagues in western Mindanao. The past
30 years have seen a full blown civil war led earlier by the mnlf and, later,
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (milf). More recent times have seen
the emergence of the extremist Abu Sayyaf group. The splintering of the
two rebel fronts into various factions has not helped the peace situation as
families and clans realigned themselves not for ideological reasons but in
opposition to rival clans. Shifting alliances have made peace negotiations
trickier and narrowed down the number of effective and neutral mediators.
This environment continues to encourage clan feuds and private wars.
This situation is such that many of us, social scientists, search for com-
parisons with similar feud patterns elsewhere that might help us gain in-
sights toward an action program. The Corsican vendetta compares well with
the Tausug variety.
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The Vendetta in Corsica

Corsica is an 8,680-sq km island of France in the western corner of the
Mediterranean Sea, southwest of northern Italy and southeast of France.
Its 270,000 inhabitants live for the most part in the rural areas where they
are wheat farmers and sheep producers. Corsica has been part of France for
the past 240 years. The Corsicans are proud to count Bonaparte Napoleon
as one of their own but they are also notorious for their vendetta skills.
Before becoming part of France—it was not their choice—the island was
governed for 600 years from afar by the Genoa and Pisa principalities that
are now part of northern Italy. The local people are of Tuscan (Italian) ori-
gin and speak Corsican, a Tuscan/Italian language enriched by many accre-
tions that reflect the island’s turbulent past. French, however, is the official
language. The Corsicans are Catholics at least nominally with a few small
Greek Orthodox Christians communities and a sprinkling of Muslims in
the southern coastal towns.
Corsica has been occupied by Romans, Greeks, Byzantines, Pisans, and
Genovese. Because of its strategic position in the Mediterranean, the island
also had to contend with numerous incursions by the Etruscans, Saracens,
Austrians, and British. North African pirates often raided the Corsican coast.
After 600 years under Genoa and Pisa, a Corsican, Pasquale Paoli, succeeded
in rallying his people to form a democratic government that lasted 15 years
under their own constitution. This new state brought about political stabil-
ity and peace among the warring clans and ushered in economic growth.
Corsican democracy ended when the island was annexed by France in
1768 and badly neglected. The French language and school system began
taking root only around 1850.24 Corrupt or ineffective government officials
from the mainland were often “exiled” to Corsica as administrators and
judges. To survive foreign occupation and economic malaise, the Corsicans
had to constantly shift alliances. This in turn created more political and
social unrest, a climate of suspicion, and a “culture of silence.” Moreover, up
to the 1950s, the justice system was inadequate and corrupt. Vendetta, or acts
of vengeance for obtaining justice, became more widespread. This explains
why throughout the centuries “the Corsican man was always armed, ready
to attack or to defend himself against many potential enemies.”25 And he will
never give up the pistol or rifle which has become a symbol of his liberty as
well as an affirmation of his machismo.26
24 Wilson, 2002:4.
25 Andreani 2002: 42, my translation from the French.
26 Ibid.
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Corsican society is anchored strongly on the family. However, the Cor-
sican family goes beyond the nuclear and encompasses other relatives and
close friends in a familial network or clan under the leadership of the male
family head who exercises a strong paternalistic authority. There is pas-
sionate attachment to the family and a strong sense of ethnic identity to the
point of clannishness. 27 As expected in such a system, there is a strong cohe-
sion among members expressed through solidarity, reciprocity, and honor
with the latter to be defended at any cost. On the other hand, every clan
member feels equally valued and protected.
In Corsica as well as Sicily, Sardinia, and other Mediterranean Basin
cultures, the typical vendetta scenario is as follows:
Once someone is murdered in the village, the victim’s family

mourns, listens to rumors in order to identify the killer if he’s not
yet known...The inquiry takes the time needed, sometimes even
years. When the evidence is deemed conclusive, the family (rela-
tives and friends) gather to plot their revenge. The decision must
be unanimous. The ‘executioner’ is then chosen from among the
closest male relatives of the victim or the ablest among them. In
hatching the plan, plotters try to ensure that the ‘executioner’ can
flee the scene without being identified. The preferred weapon is
an automatic rifle or machine-gun pistol. The target may be felled
in a public place, or inside his home, his face or body mutilated.
After the deed, the killer disappears and if he is sought by the law,
he hides in the forest (the maquis, the underground) and becomes
an outlaw. 28.
An external threat rallies all members of the Corsican family against the
attacker or an outsider perceived as a potential enemy. This attitude is
inculcated early in life as the following lullaby shows:
“Dodo … dodo … dodelinette …

Go to sleep, oh my child!
When you come of age,
You will carry a gun
And police and soldiers
Will not scare you.29
27 Tillard 2003::3/12.
28 Summary based on Bella’s article (translated from the French by the author.
29 Andreani 2002: 42 (my translation).
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An actual, or perceived, offense committed against one’s family chal-

lenges an individual’s sense of worth and equality and is a pernicious way to
sever his family’s ties with the community.30 These familial and communal
ties are inscribed in “blood” according to Andreani:
… [I]n the Mediterranean region the honor of a group depends

on a state of equilibrium between, on one hand, the blood that is
genealogically pure, and, on the other, the reputation or a good
name. … Within a group, care is taken to assure this equality: The
male gender is to control the other in full respect of the traditions,
for instance, men are to ensure that women protect their chastity or
modesty so as not adulterate their blood, and women are to pres-
sure men to safeguard the family’s honor or good name. In effect,
the loss of honor is the source of shame. To retrieve it, the group
is obliged to restore the equilibrium lost …The soul of the flesh
is in the blood; the substance of the soul of a man resides in his
name. Thus the members of the same family are doubly united by
the fact that they share the same blood—consanguinity—and carry
the same name; hence, they must preserve the name by which they
become part of the collective memory.31
Historian Wilson, in concluding his monumental study of feud in Cor-

sica in the 19th century, points out an important factor that might explain
the uneven incidence of clan feud throughout the island:
… demographically buoyant communities making extensive use of

resources over a wide area can tolerate levels of violence that would
be difficult to live with in more restricted habitats. It also suggests
that conflict may be intensified where land and resources are re-
duced or access to them limited, or where population increases in
proportion to resources. The cultural stress on honor, moreover,
militated against the peaceful settlement of disputes, which were
inherent in the system of land use.32
If vendetta cases were at their highest in the 19th century, they decreased
during the 15-year governance of Pasquale Paoli. Paoli was firm against loose
weapons, violence, and vendetta. When the French took over, Paoli was
exiled to London and the Corsicans were pretty much left to themselves.
Troops and police were sent from the “metropole,” the mainland, but few of
30 See Tillard: 4/12.

31 Bella 2001: 7-8/12.
32 Wilson 2002: 416.
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the locals spoke French and few of the officials spoke Corsican. In fighting
the vendettas, the state police made use of local interpreters who manipu-
lated the system to their and their relatives’ own ends.33
The second time, through the past several centuries, when the number
of Corsican vendettas decreased was during the past 50 years. For once, the
justice system is less corrupt and more effective than before World War II.
Tillard cites other factors for this decrease: modernization and “the disloca-
tion of family ties and the evolution of the status of women.” Although at
times Paris still appears distant, relations between the capitol and Corsica
have improved greatly because of better transportation, communications,
and living conditions. Higher education has also allowed a good number
of young Corsicans to obtain high level posts in France. These younger
people return home for brief visits and give long sermons against vendettas.
However as of 2001, there was disappointingly no significant group action
by Corsican women against violence.
On another front, fed up by preferential treatment for new settlers from
Algeria in the 1960s, a group of Corsicans rebelled by occupying a large
vineyard owned by a settler. This was the start of a separatist movement
in the 1980s, the Corsican National Liberation Front (flnc). Since then
the flnc splintered into various factions. At present, the top militants are
negotiating for peace and better services with Paris which has responded
more liberally and wisely. Currently, the situation is relatively peaceful but
still volatile in the interior of the island.
Lessons From the Comparison Between Tausug and Corsican Feuds

Their differences notwithstanding, much of the revenge patterns in Sulu
and Corsica bear significant similarities from which some conclusions can
be drawn. For greater clarity, this section distinguishes between internal
factors—local culture and psyche—and external factors that emanate from
outside the culture.
Internal Factors
Family and Alliances
Both Tausug and Corsican cultures follow general bilateral kinship pat-
terns with a fierce loyalty to the family. Both societies are centered on fami-
lies that provide support and security to individuals in a hostile environ-
ment. The father is revered as an authoritarian figure in both cultures but as
the “boys grow into men,” they are allowed certain prerogatives necessary to
33 Wison, 2002: 267ff..
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foster alliances. A certain degree of equality is observed among male family

members so the young may learn the virtues, such as bravery, and the politi-
cal skills to pursue clan interests.
In both cultures, an individual’s loyalty is to the family and clan before
nation. Many Tausug profess support for the Bangsamoro nation but the
level of commitment still depends on the clan patriarch’s relation to any
of the mnlf factions. On the other hand, hardly any Tausug will declare
prime loyalty to the Philippine state. Relations between Corsica and France
may be better than those between Tausugs and Philippine state and many
urban Corsicans profess allegiance to Paris, but in the rural areas, Corsican
children are still raised to champion their respective clans.
In both cultures, the mother, who falls under her husband’s authority,
has a strong influence in child rearing and in other family matters such as
revenge taking. Traditionally, she stands foursquare behind her husband
and the clan.
In Sulu, however, women are now getting together to oppose the mama-
huli practices. They have suffered too long the anguish of losing husbands
and sons to clan violence. They are looking for ways to mediate conflicts
and achieve peaceful solutions through dialogue. A group of Tausug women
successfully lobbied the Sulu provincial board to pass the “Sulu Provincial
Ordinance on Tausug Customary Law” which aims to prevent and settle
serious disputes.
In their peace advocacy, the Tausug women are joined by Magindanaon
and Meranao women who have formed organizations as the PeaceWeavers.
On the other hand, as far as I know, there has not been a similar movement
among Corsican women. Those in the islands’ rough interior have remained
very traditional in their views on vendetta. This may be due to their low
status in the family and lack of education.
It is also imperative for development planners to consider the relation-
ship, as per Wilson, between agricultural and natural resources and inter-
clan violence. Provincial and local governments must support innovative
land reform programs that suit the varying conditions in the armm. There is
a need for more research on the correlation between land resources, popula-
tion, and conflict.
Honor and Shame

In both societies, individual honor and shame are tied up with one’s
loyalty to family and clan. Personal identity can hardly be separate from that
of the clan. In most clan feuds, the points of contention are economic: land,
financial rivalry, animal rustling, theft of farming implements or machinery.
The second main cause of clan feuds is politics and the third, attempted rape
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or molestation of women and competition over marriage prospects. How-
ever, in all conflict situations both personal and collective honor is involved
and defeat means “loss of face” for self and family.
Most of the time, self respect and self-interest intertwine. The world of
both the rural Tausug and Corsican is limited to that of family and kin al-
liances. Their social behavior is always segmented or fractious (segmentary
opposition) and too often exposed to patron-client relationships in order
to win favors and protection.
Although neither mamahuli nor vendetta is motivated by religion, both
Tausug and Corsican avengers pray and use religious rituals incidental to
the revenge act. In fact, through the centuries, Islamic teachers and leaders
as well as Catholic priests have strongly condemned violent acts of ven-
geance as grievously sinful but largely to no avail. However, as Muslims, the
Tausug also see themselves as part of the umma—Islamic brethren—that
transcends race and gender. This religious identification may be worth ex-
ploring in relation to mamahuli.
Bravery and Firearms

In both European and Asian societies, bravery is highly valued. How-
ever, the value of forgiveness and dialogue are generally ignored outside
the negotiation or mediation activities. Earlier in the first section, a Tausug
proverb was quoted that valorizes revenge. This is counterbalanced by the
following proverb that gives a ray of hope:
Salaggu’laggu’ dusa No matter how grave the offense

Malaggu’ pa ampun Greater is forgiveness! 34
The proliferation of firearms is a problem in both Sulu and Corsica

which have long, porous coastlines. The “culture of the gun” is now so em-
bedded in the Philippine South that it cannot be ignored by peace advocates
or transformed by pure military and police means. Comprehensive solu-
tions are needed.
External Factors
Foreign Occupation
During the course of their respective histories, both Sulu and Corsica
were once prosperous trade and maritime centers. However, as either ar-
chipelago came under the suzerainty of far away rulers, they both came to
be seen as unimportant and troublesome places. Both places came to be
34 Rixhon 1974:45/2003:227.
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wracked by conflict between pro-metropolis forces and “liberation fronts”

while most people took intermediate positions.
Elsewhere in Mindanao, the general disaffection with the central
government was exacerbated by the entry of settlers from Luzon and the
Visayas who occupied land without regard for the local adat system and
without due consultations with original landowners. The Maguindanao,
the Meranao, and the lumad or non-Islamized indigenous peoples of main-
land Mindanao suffered the most from this process while the Tausug of
Sulu were threatened by the small Edcor resettlement in Tawi-Tawi. These
events deeply affected Ibnu and his Muslim contemporaries. Corsica, for
its part, was forced by Paris during the 1970s to accommodate thousands of
French settlers who had been expelled from Algeria after the latter obtained
independence from France. By 1977, Corsica had made room for 70,000
“pieds-noirs” settlers in a population of 190,000! In Corsica as well as Sulu
(and mainland Mindanao), imposed resettlement programs fuelled seces-
sionist movements. However, after some initial success, both the mnlf in
Mindanao, and the flnc35 in Corsica splintered into various factions and
contributed to social instability.
I believe the turbulent histories of both Sulu and Corsica is at the heart
of the instability in either society. Corsicans and Tausugs have been betrayed
by foreigners as well as by their own. Napoleon drafted many of his fellow
Corsicans into his wars and yet as emperor of France did little to uplift his
native island. Such sad experiences reinforce the insular or parochial at-
titude in both societies. Both Tausugs and Corsicans have learned to trust
only in themselves and their clans and to fend for themselves, especially
when it comes to internal, inter-family and inter-clan rivalries.
One interesting development in 18th century Corsica was the indepen-
dent and democratic governance of Pasquale Paoli who, in even handed
manner, kept a tight control over the island for 15 years. It brought prosper-
ity (which attracted the French to take over the island from Genoa) and
peace. For the past 250 years, Sulu has suffered from the intramurals in the
centers of power in the West and in Manila. The manipulation of electoral
results in Sulu by national officials and military officers during the 2004
presidential elections is the latest injury committed by Malacañang against
the people of Sulu. All that is needed for peace in the Philippine South is a
stable government that is sensitive, helpful, open, honest, and firm.
An example of such enlightened leadership is that of former Gover-
nor Jikiri, a former mnlf chief of staff and governor of Sulu until 2004.
35 FLNC stands for le Front de Liberation Nationale Corse or the Corsican National Liberation
Front
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According to Hussin,36 Jikiri proved his commitment to peace by travel-
ing across barangays unarmed and without armed escorts and by ending
inter-clan feuds through provision of blood money. However, he lost the
2004 elections. Jikiri’s successor, the current Governor Benjamin Loong,
attempted to continue Jikiri’s work and conceived a plan for economic
recovery of Sulu in collaboration with the mayors. However, his efforts
were aborted when the Philippine military unilaterally bombarded areas
of Jolo in response to provocation from a small band of disgruntled mnlf
partisans in February 2005.
Definitely, political stability is crucial to the development of a peaceful
and just society. Clan feud grew out of a rough terrain lashed by politi-
cal storms that favor only the weeds of hate. Only a central authority (not
necessarily Manila) with a charismatic and democratic leadership that is
just, respected, respectful, and innovative can transform the situation in
cooperation with the people.
Lack of an effective justice system

Justice administration was poor in both Sulu and Corsica with many
corrupt judges. Both islands were places of exile for inept officials who knew
little of the local culture. In Corsica, some of the judges selected from the
local population failed to show neutrality in carrying out their work. Still, a
marked improvement in the ranks of municipal court judges is considered
a major cause of decreased incidence of inter-clan feud.
In Southern Philippines, the relatively recent creation of Shari’ah courts
in the armm and in cities with a large Muslim population is a step in the
right direction. This provides one more avenue in solving intra-family and
clan feuds.
Exploring Ways Toward Peace and Justice

The following observations are offered to the readers for their own com-
ments or for group discussions.37
Toward A Council for Peace and Justice, Inc.

In my mind, whatever the scale of the conflict, the key to peace and
order in a community has to come from within that community. A home-
grown solution empowers the community. The locals will probably seek
36 Hussin, 2005: 123ff.

37 I’ll appreciate receiving comments, suggestions and criticisms at the following email address:
gerard.rixhon@gmail.com.
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the assistance of outside nongovernmental organizations (ngos) and the

government in carrying out these solutions. Outsiders, however, should ac-
cept their limitations and be sensitive to the needs and sentiments of the
local population.
I suggest the creation of a peace and justice council to help train local
people as community facilitators or mediators. These facilitators/mediators
should be known for their neutrality, intelligence, humility, and sensitiv-
ity to the local culture. Besides their intelligence (IQ), mediators should
have high EQ, or emotional quotient (i.e. emotional stability) and should
be properly trained for the purpose. These facilitators/mediators must be
provided knowledge of Islam, especially its tenets on peace and forgiveness,
the local culture and value system (such as the Tausug values of ispug, sipug,
maratabat, buddi, etc.), and some local oral literature (to enhance discus-
sion of moral issues with the community).
After their training, these facilitators will work at the community level
(during a ceasefire period) to dialogue with warring factions separately then,
later, together, to discuss reconciliation. Meanwhile, over a period of time,
they will train other mediators/facilitators. Whenever communities are con-
fronted with feuding, locals can invite such a peacemaker to assist them.
These trained peacemakers can also help communities find solutions to
such problems as the proliferation of loose firearms. The solution here re-
quires both collection and control. Collection is the government’s preroga-
tive and is often done through coercion or, more diplomatically, by giving
incentives for the surrender of firearms. Past experience show, however, that
most weapons surrendered are mere tokens or are easily replaced by more
high-powered weapons. Control, on the other hand, is something people
themselves can carry out with the help of an able peacemaker and a reliable
and neutral local government official.
Local “arms control” programs should be carried out over the long haul
since decades of violence and animosity between clans cannot be ended by
a few meetings. Even as the first positive results show, facilitators should
continue meeting with feuding sides. If peace finally holds, then the facilita-
tors could suggest, funds permitting, a common project to be undertaken
by the feuding sides for them to attain reconciliation. In doing such work,
the trained peacemakers will achieve the greatest honor and also exhibit the
highest form of bravery.
These peacemakers will work with local and provincial government of-
ficials as private individuals but will not be controlled by government. Quite
often, elected officials cannot guarantee continuity of programs over the
long haul or show neutrality at all times. The independence and autonomy
of the council should be safeguarded.
RIDO V2.indd 321 10/4/2007 8:24:46 AM

Private foundations and ngos can provide start up funds for the pro-
gram and help the council for peace and justice become self-sustaining.
Mindanao social scientists who investigate rido have come up with in-
teresting suggestions on how to mediate clan feuds. I would like to empha-
size the role of religion, more specifically the role of religious instruction
at the madaris that stress respect for life, forgiveness, peace, humility38. The
religious schools teach students the value of “living together.” Cooperation
between researchers and religious teachers in the work of “conflict transfor-
mation” will do much in fostering peace.
Conflict Transformation
The approach to conflict varies depending on the nature of the offense
and circumstances surrounding it. In the case of clan feud, emotions run
deep and psychic wounds take long to heal. The transformation approach I
recommend aims not to “solve” a particular clan conflict but to transform it
at the community level. The process may begin in an informal setting where
the people feel at home and where the facilitator gains trust. Subsequent
meetings allow participants to better communicate their cultural, religious,
and ideological positions. During the third phase, participants discuss com-
monalities and begin to build consensus. In the last phase, the participants
consider once more their differences but with new perspectives and insight.
As each understands the other side better and learns to communicate better,
the conflicting sides plan a collaborative project.
While the pain of conflict may linger after the sessions, participants may
begin to transcend their pain and transform these into positive action. The
antagonists can plan together for a shared future. Two institutions in Zambo-
anga City, Silsilah and paz (Peace Advocate of Zamboanga) and PeaceWeav-
ers of Cotabato, among other regional institution, are ready to advice and
assist those interested in experimenting with “conflict transformation.”
The Role of Government

Much remains to be done by provincial and local government units in
bringing about a comprehensive peace in the Philippine South. The histo-
ries of Sulu and Corsica show how the turbulence of the past and the insin-
cerity of present government—as shown in its talks with the Moro rebel-
lion—impact the local peoples’ psyche. The national government should
seriously reform the justice system, especially in the troubled South, and
sincerely engage the secessionist movements in talks to end the hostilities. I
38 In the choice of ulama and the development of religious instruction, the group of researchers
on rido will be equally helpful in identifying the proper persons and materials to avoid extremes.
RIDO V2.indd 322 10/4/2007 8:24:47 AM

am profoundly disturbed by the government’s attitude that allowed for the

inhumane bombing of Jolo villages by the Philippine military in February
2005 where disgruntled mnlf elements, who have formerly made peace
with government, attacked an Army camp and ignored calls for negotia-
tions. A strong but balanced statement from the members of Pagtabangan
basulta39 that urged restraint was ignored by the President’s cabinet. This
does not bode well for the future. However, such a behavior should not
deter those committed to work for peace. Politicians come and go, but the
people remain.
Retributive justice as so harshly handed down, not only in Mindanao
and Sulu but the world over, is based on a high value system where reciproc-
ity, honor, love for family, responsibility, and justice interplay with cultural
symbols that link land and body, the past and the present. The neglect of the
periphery due to distance from the political center reinforces this form of
grassroots justice. The terrible loss of life notwithstanding, one cannot deny
the presence of certain principles at play in the act of feuding. However, one
has to remember that these principles are simply pushed to their extremes.
After all, human virtues are the result of a balance between extremes and
public morality is built upon a similar but broader and more difficult equi-
librium. That equilibrium cannot be achieved unless all people—from both
the public and private sectors—consult openly with each other and work
together and on an equal footing for peace and justice.
References
Andreani, Jean-Louis. Comprendre la Corse. Paris: Gallimard, 1999.
Bella, Maria Pia di. Question de vie et de mort: La vendetta en Méditerranée. Chimères:
Revue des Schizo-analyses. www.revue-chimeres.org/pdf, 1987
Bula, Dalomabi Lao. “The role of communication in Meranao conflict resolution.”
Dansalan Quarterly, 20:1-4: 5-113 (2000).
Hassan, I. U., S. A. Ashley, and M.L Ashley. Tausug-English Dictionary:
Kabtangan iban maana. Quezon City: SIL and Jolo: CISC-NDJC, 1994.
Hassan, Irene and T. I. Jainal. “A selection of proverbs and riddles.” Sulu Studies 2.
Ed. Gerard Rixhon. Jolo, Sulu: CISC/NDJC, 1973.
Hussin, Alber A.. “‘Kalis’ and ‘Armalite’: Symbols of weapons and meanings of vio-
lence in Tausug society.” M. A. Thesis. Mindanao Anthropology Consortium
Xavier Univ., 2003.
Jainal, T. I., G. Rixhon and D. Ruppert. “Housebuilding Among the Tausug.” Sulu
Studies 1. Ed. Gerard Rixhon. Jolo, Sulu: CISC/NDJC, 1972. Also reprinted in:
39 For “Help for Basilan Sulu and Tawi,” a private gathering of NGO officers committed to assist
these three provinces amidst the poorest of the Philippines.
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People of the Current: Selected papers from Sulu Studies. Manila: National Com-
mission for Culture and the Arts, 2003.
Kiefer, Thomas M., 1972/1986. The Tausug: Violence and law in a Philippine Moslem
society. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc; Prospect Heights, Ill.:Waveland Press.
Nimmo, Harry Arlo. Magosaha: An ethnography of the Tawi-Tawi Sama Dilaut.
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2001.
Otterbein, Keith F.. “Five feuds: An analysis of homicides in Eastern Kentucky in the
late nineteenth century.” American Anthropologist, 102/2: 231-243, (2000).
Rixhon, Gerard. “Tausug literature: An overview.” Ed. Gerard Rixhon. Sulu Stud-
ies 3. Jolo, Sulu: CISC/NDJC, 1974. Also reprinted in: People of the Current:
Selected papers from Sulu Studies. Manila: National Commission for Culture
and the Arts, 2003.
Social Weather Stations (SWS). Conflict resolution and the participation of women in
peace governance and development: An integration of. three surveys. PowerPoint
presentation. Quezon City: SWS.
The Asia Foundatiom. The big and silent killer: Getting to the bottom of rido. A compi-
lation of papers and PowrPoint presentation, Mandarin Oriental, Manila, 2005.
Tillard, Delphine. L’île de Corseface au droit Français: L’opposition
culturelle en question. Anthropologies et Sociétés, .27/1. Accessed (6/16/05)
from www.erudit.org/revue/as/2003/v27/n1/007007ar.html on June 16, 2005.
Twain, Mark. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. New York: Penguin Books
(USA), 2003.
Wilson, Stephen. Feuding, conflict and banditry in nineteenth-century Corsica. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
RIDO V2.indd 324 10/4/2007 8:24:47 AM

E
Conclusion: A Personal Reflection

Samuel K. Tan
B EING A NATIVE of Sulu with a mixed Tausug-Sama-Chinese ancestry,

I took the self-imposed mandate of studying the roots and prospects
of the centuries-old armed conflict and violence in the Muslim South. My
endeavors inevitably have gone beyond the limit of classroom work and
significantly touched on the more enriching field of research. My quest for
more knowledge and insight included also the search for truth and justice
for a people whose struggle for freedom has been misunderstood, misinter-
preted, and, even distorted. My research involved surveys of existing studies
and other sources eventually leading to the barely touched archival materi-
als in the country and abroad.
My desire and purpose, which ultimately evolved into a mission and
continuing advocacy, has been to seek a more meaningful understanding
of the worsening armed struggle of the Muslim South and its tragic effects
on the lives and future of both the innocent and the guilty. My concern for
what the future holds for the southern frontier has remained vibrant espe-
cially as I continue to dream of spending my remaining retirement years
on the white sandy shores and blue waters of Sulu. It had taken me in the
past 30 years to many seminars, conferences, workshops, festivities, rituals,
dialogues and other endeavors participating in various significant capacities
both in the country and outside. After the long and costly involvement to
both health and resources, I have seen in recent times more frustrations bor-
dering on hopelessness in the quest for peace and prosperity in the southern
region. I could only feel the ebbing optimism and hope that once propelled
a young and curious mind from Muddas (Siasi), Sulu 30 years ago to pursue
higher education in the country’s premier university.
|| 325 ||
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Somehow, reading the published and unpublished reports and studies
in recent times, including those on rido, have reinforced fading optimism
but it has also, in a sense, opened a door to renewed search for a people’s
destiny in waiting. Laboring through the rido surveys, reports, and studies
has given impressions that cannot be ignored and might be helpful in the
meaningful resolution of conflict. First is the impression that the coordi-
nated research project on rido, covering the period from 2003 to 2005, had
attained the desired methodological level of objectivity and credibility. This
was more or less achieved through the comprehensive spread of participa-
tion from various individuals, institutions, and agencies in the public and
private sectors, with important roles given to appropriate ethnic, profes-
sional, and sectoral representation apportioned to the 12 provinces covered
by the survey project except Palawan. The unexplained exclusion of Pala-
wan somewhat left a point for clarification considering historico-politically
that the province has been home to Tausug, Sama, and Yakan from Sulu,
Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi and the residential center of the sultanate of Harun
Al-Rashid (Narrassid), 1886-1893. In fact, armed conflicts including rido had
been reported and documented in the past. But more than rhetorics, the
following somehow brought reassurance from the survey results that the
frustrations and failures of the past may not be necessarily the pattern for
the future:
1. The comparative aspect, largely drawn from various published stud-
ies of known scholars and institutions on armed conflicts in selected areas
of the world, has given the impression that there is a parallelism between
other conflicts in the world and the family or clan rivalries, conflicts and
wars in Mindanao. Although dealt with in a general fashion, the compara-
tive analysis points to a causal commonality and therefore, the imperative
of a broader approach along the higher level of conflict resolution beyond
the narrow perspective of the contemporary peace processes in Mindanao.
In effect, it appears that the various types and forms of human conflict, in-
cluding rido, are merely specific, contextual, and superficial manifestations
of ethnic, local, sectoral, or socio-economic differentiation. It suggests an
etiological similarity of rido to other clan or family conflicts traceable to the
human need and search for freedom, honor, integrity, dignity, and security
which are sine qua non and vital to the good life. This makes the Muslims
and lumad of southern Philippines no different from other peoples experi-
encing similar problems regardless of race, color, culture, or religion.
In addition, the comparative dimension of rido studies implies a ratio-
nale for increased involvement of institutions, people, and agencies from do-
mestic and global sectors in a kind of regional development project or pro-
gram with a new global paradigm of conflict resolution. The new framework
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Conclusion: A Personal Reflection || 327
is based on the belief that development must lead to the ultimate attainment
and preservation of cherished universal human values regardless of religion
or ideology. It must offer in the case of southern Philippines, especially the
Muslim and lumad communities, the prospect of lasting peace and progress
by enabling the marginalized to enjoy meaningful freedom and to exercise it
with real dignity of labor in a truly just and equitable distribution of wealth
and benefits. But more than words, the new paradigm needs a significant
and altruistic measure of foreign assistance in all aspects of development to
complement the inadequate domestic resources for the depth of develop-
ment that includes the serious and realistic recovery of ancestral lands, espe-
cially those related to rido. This sensitive issue, which was underlined in one
of the survey recommendations, recalls the impasse in the current grp-milf
peace negotiations or talks precisely caused by the difficult and complicated
issue of ancestral lands and domains. It is not a surprise that the negotiations
or talks have bogged down over the issue as had earlier been anticipated in
the revised edition of my “Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Strug-
gle” (2000). There is no doubt that the resolution of conflict in the Muslim
South, including rido, is contingent partly if not decisively on the resolution
of claims to ancestral lands and domains involving, in a sense, families, clans,
and parties in rido. In fact, the alienation of a lot of the lands and domains to
non-Muslims or non-Christians has further complicated the issue.
The recovery of ancestral lands is not as simple as just relinquishing by
law certain areas of the public domain to Muslim political jurisdiction and
control. It also involves the recovery of lands lost to outside individuals,
groups, and entities by coercion or questionable purchase from Muslim
perspective. This point may not have been accorded the attention it de-
serves, but it continues to haunt the Muslim or lumad consciousness as they
think of ancestral lands long gone to modern subdivisions, business edifices,
factories, public structures, and multinational enterprises. As it appears in
contemporary realities, recovery of lost ancestral lands is a physical futil-
ity beyond the equitable sharing of the benefits of growth and production
through a just distribution of income and resources. It is in this regard
that the loss of ancestral lands and domains must be compensated by (1) a
system of just compensation for labor often not implemented by landlords
and/or corporate entities and (2) an altruistic commitment and habit on
the part of the owners of production to empower the marginalized sectors,
dependent solely for living on just the meager returns of compensation un-
der a flawed legal scheme, as well as the unemployed poor surviving below
poverty level, to attain the desired quality of life.
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2. The local, ethnic, and regional perspective of the rido studies reveals
both the advantages and disadvantages of indigenous and external mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution. Resort to traditional modes was encouraging
in the case of Maranaw rido, but the inter-tribal conflict between the Ma-
guindanaon and Manobo was more receptive to external intervention espe-
cially by the government. In other rido cases described, it appears that the
integration of the indigenous systems and external mechanisms from both
governmental and non-governmental sectors worked more successfully in
the reduction or resolution of conflict.
Consequently, there is sense in contemporary efforts to bring all pos-
sible sectors, private and public, into the search for effective resolution of
rido as endemic phenomenon in southern Philippines. But while this com-
prehensive approach is a practical alternative to the divisive and strictly
ethnic and sectoral mode of settlement, the apparent impact of religion in
cases involving the Muslim communities cannot be ignored. The frequent
outbreaks of rido in cases where the integration of local political struggles
into the electoral process had occurred, unavoidably led to dynastic con-
solidation. Interests and groups have moved around certain traditional or
neo-traditional families and clans. Very often, as in recent years, dynastic
struggles have been complicated by outside patronage.
Unfortunately for the Muslims, it is the search for outside economic
and armed support that has exposed them to exploitation and adverse in-
fluences of external forces and interests not really sensitive to their basic
values and ideals. As integration of outside interests, especially armed com-
ponents, develops toward institutionalization, rido in all its aspects cannot
remain unaffected. The transformation and shift of rido into something
else, depending on what external forces are involved, is what seems to be
emerging in Muslim Mindanao where rido has remained entrenched in lo-
cal culture and tradition. The possibility of Islamic radicalism coming into
the process and its implication to peace cannot be overlooked. A party in
rido may be perceived as an enemy of Islam due to compromise with out-
side interests prejudicial to Islam. This may be speculative than real, but
the possibility cannot be ignored considering that the Abu Sayyaf founder,
Ustadz Abdulrajak Janjalani, in one of his eight recorded hutbahs (sermon)
entitled “Pagbaugbug Sin Qur’an Ha Ummat Sin Akhir Jaman” (Uphold-
ing the Qur’an in Present Day Muslim Community), identified one of the
three enemies of Islam as Muslims who, instead of studying the Qur’an, read
publications such as comics, books, magazines, etc.
The preservation of the Islamic local tradition has checked the advance
of militant or political Islam in its extremist form. The great majority of
Muslims who practice the local form of Islam tend to be “moderate” in
RIDO V2.indd 328 10/4/2007 8:24:48 AM

outlook, accommodate people of other faiths, and are willing to co-exist

peacefully. Allowing radical Islam to purge local traditions of indigenous
non-Islamic elements is to unnecessarily disrupt the dynamic equilibrium
that can bring internal harmony and peace to the Muslim South. Unlike
colonialism, local Islam has been the unifying element of Muslim com-
munities when faced by outside threats. Purging is counterproductive to
the otherwise phlegmatic and practical observances of Islamic rituals and
holidays usually done with Qur’anic and hadithic fervor not contrary to the
Five Pillars of Islam.
Muslims can also adapt as a minority to a numerically dominant ma-
jority. But in no other area has the impact of liberal democratization been
more felt than in the socio-economic aspect of the Muslim South. Local
elites have yielded more and more traditional power and dignity to outside
interests in return for economic progress and prosperity. Consequently,
control over traditional economic domains such as the centuries-old barter
trade and the development of ancestral lands had been co-opted a long
time ago.
Hence, in underlining the paramount importance of research in the
ultimate resolution of rido conflict, it is imperative to give priority to the
etiology of conflict. The research process must begin from the Jawi and
Kirim traditions of local culture. The Jawi and Kirim are Arabic-derived
and otherwise known as the Old Malay. The Jawi is used in Tausug, Sama,
and Yakan communities and the Kirim in Maguindanaon, Maranaw, and
Iranun areas to preserve the intellectual heritage of the Muslim South. The
khutbahs and lectures of Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani in Tausug and written
in Jawi, are good illustrations of the etiological origin of the Abu Sayyaf.
The messages of Janjalani reveal the root causes of the series of violence
and conflict involving the Abu Sayyaf and government troops as a result of
kidnapping of Filipinos and foreigners for ransom and beheading of some.
Rationalization and justification of conflict can only be understood from
thorough analysis of the messages.
After viewing the complex world of rido, the question that ultimately
arises is what the future holds for those who long for peace and progress in
the southern region. Despite the excellent policies and programs declared
by government, the prospect of development for Muslim Mindanao has re-
mained contingent on the extent to which the recommendations of the sur-
veys are taken seriously and implemented. Unrest and conflicts can worsen
if population growth in the region is not effectively checked by both the
government and the people themselves. The inevitable pressure on economic
resources may be aggravated by the pluralistic orientation of the various eth-
no-linguistic groups that constitute the fabric of Mindanao society, despite
RIDO V2.indd 329 10/4/2007 8:24:49 AM

the state educational promotion of Filipinism and nationalism as basis of
regional unity and consciousness. The problem of a unified effort to resolve
socio-economic problems is confounded by endemic graft and corruption
which had weakened the capacity of both the state and private sector to bring
about the desired level of regional progress and prosperity.
One of the recommendations of the coordinated surveys to end rido and
other forms of violent conflict is through disarmament and gun control. In
effect, it recalls the historic campaigns of Gen. John Pershing (1909-1913)
the last governor of the Moro Province, who ended his term with the Battle
of Bud Bagsak on June 15, 1913 that wiped out the old generation of Tausug
warriors. The confiscation of hundreds of weapons marked the transition
to an era of peaceful civil government that lasted for two decades.
The recurrence of armed conflicts in Sulu in 1927 and in Central Min-
danao in 1924, 1927, and in the 1930s do not discredit or negate the value of
disarmament but indicate the extreme difficulty of enforcing such policy
without the use of overwhelming military power and the staggering loss
of human lives and resources in the Muslim South. Gun control often runs
counter to Muslim warrior traditions. Muslim men are attached to their
weapons as symbols of pride and courage. This attachment is reinforced by
easy access to modern weaponry.
Lasting peace in the Muslim South requires new thinking among the lo-
cal people. The final battleground is the mind of the Muslim and the lumad
where democratic ideas must be nurtured and allowed to triumph. Islam
too values liberty and freedom based on the Qu’ran and the Hadith just as
Western democracy rests upon Judeo-Christian tradition.
Rido’s meaningful resolution rests ultimately on the capacity of the Fili-
pino people, especially the national leadership, to truly understand the com-
plexity of the regional conflict. The depth of insight cannot be realized from
the narrow and, often, biased perspective of the dominant national majority,
but from a panorama of the multi-ethnic history and culture of the region’s
indigenous inhabitants, especially the Bangsamoro people. Their difficult
and long struggle for freedom refuses to die and their only aspiration is to
enjoy the fruits of their labors and the riches of their lands without threats
from the outside world. But, equally important is the universal belief that
the senseless pursuit of extremist violence in the name of freedom and God
is contrary to the meaning of human existence and Divine purpose.
Perhaps in the contemporary discourse on regional prospects, the on-
going grp-milf peace negotiations, with significant support from the Asia-
Pacific powers, can consider the realistic establishment of two federated
Muslim States on the basis of historico-political criteria. First is the Islamic
State of Sulu which includes Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan, and
RIDO V2.indd 330 10/4/2007 8:24:49 AM

anchored on the ancient foundations of the Sulu Sultanate as developed

during the reign of Sultan Salah ud-Din or Karamat Baktiar following in-
dependence from Brunei in 1675 AD. Second is the Islamic State of Muslim
Mindanao based on the territorial and political foundations of the ancient
Maguindanao Sultanate during the reign of Sultan Dipatuan Kudarat. The
federal option comes as a timely reminder that the grant of autonomy to the
Muslims under the Autonomy Act of 1989 (as amended in 2001), as well as
the 1991 Local Government Code, is short of Muslim expectations. However,
under the foregoing federal model, only nominal ties to Philippine sover-
eignty remain, through Philippine control of foreign affairs, currency, and
national security. Consequently, under the two federal states, the Muslims
can adopt the Qur’an as their Constitution, the Shari’ah as their legal sys-
tem, and the Hadith and sunna as complementary source of guidance for
Muslim public and private affairs.
The creation of two Muslim Federal Islamic States in Southern Philip-
pines brings two great benefits. One is the emancipation of the national
government from the quagmire of protracted armed confrontations with a
militant sector seeking freedom at all costs. The burden of sovereignty and
its responsibilities are assumed by the new Islamic leadership. The other
benefit is the profound sense of true freedom for both the Christian and
Muslim communities with the accompanying feeling of security from ex-
ternal threat. For the Muslims in particular, the problem of national identity
finally rests not on Filipinism but solely on the new Bangsamoro national-
ism and its distinct place in the world community.
RIDO V2.indd 331 10/4/2007 8:24:49 AM

The Editor
Wilfredo Magno Torres III is an anthropologist working for The Asia

Foundation’s conflict management program. Prior to his work with the
Foundation, he served on the faculty and as director for research and exten-
sion of the Notre Dame of Jolo College in Sulu. A grant from the Nippon
Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals Fellowship allowed him to study Ba-
jau Laut ethnicity, leadership, and conflict-resolution mechanisms in Sem-
porna, Sabah, Malaysia. He received his M.A. in Anthropology from the
Ateneo de Manila University under a fellowship from the Ford Foundation.
The Contributors
Survey of Feuding Families and Clans in Selected Provinces in Mindanao

Jamail A. Kamlian is a professor of history at the Mindanao State Uni-
versity-Iligan Institute of Technology (msu-iit) in Iligan City. He has pre-
sented papers on understanding the Mindanao conflict in universities in
Asia, Europe and the USA, and in different forums in the country. Kamlian
holds a Ph.D. in Philippine Studies from the University of the Philippines.
His publications and research interests are mainly focused on Bangsamoro
history, society and culture, and peace and development.
Dynamics and Management of Rido in the Province of Maguindanao

Abhoud Syed M. Lingga is the executive director of the Institute of
Bangsamoro Studies in Cotabato City. He was an associate professor at
the Mindanao State University in Maguindanao and a lecturer at Cotabato
City State Polytechnic College and Sultan Kudarat Islamic Academy. His
research interests are on Bangsamoro right to self-determination, conflict
management, human rights, sustainable development, Islamic education,
and Bangsamoro affairs.
Inventory of Existing Rido in Lanao del Sur (1994 –2004)

Moctar I. Matuan is a sociologist and holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Devel-
opment Studies from Notre Dame University. Matuan joined in 1992 the
Sociology-Anthropology Department faculty of the Mindanao State Uni-
versity in Marawi City. He served as executive director from 1992 to 1997
and then from 2001 to 2006 of the msu Muslim-Christian Center for Peace
Studies, now known as Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao.
This research was conducted with the help of Dr. Intuas Abdullah, director
of the Mamitua Saber Research Center of msu.
|| 332 ||
RIDO V2.indd 332 10/4/2007 8:24:49 AM

Contributors || 333
Management of Clan Conflict and Rido Among the Tausug, Magindanao,

Maranao, Sama, and Yakan Tribes
Ofelia L. Durante, Ph.D., is the director of the Ateneo Research Center,
Ateneo de Zamboanga University. She is a visiting professor at the adzu
Graduate School and a consultant at the Ateneo Peace Institute. Durante
conducts research and peace education workshops for teachers and school
administrators, members of the civil society, civil servants and members of
local government units, and has assisted a number of educational institu-
tions in developing their peace education programs.
Howard J. Mañego is a research associate at the Ateneo Research Center,

Ateneo de Zamboanga University.
Ester Sevilla is a research associate at the Notre Dame University Re-

search Center. She holds a Ph.D. and is a full-time faculty member of Notre
Dame University.
Norma T. Gomez is the executive director of the Notre Dame University Re-
search Center. She holds an M.A. in Economics and a Ph.D. in Education.
Responses to Interkin Group Conflict in Northern Mindanao

Erlinda Montillo-Burton obtained her Ph.D. in Anthropology from the
University of Pittsburgh. The director of rimcu for three terms, she cur-
rently serves as director and curator of the Museo de Oro (Xavier University
Museum).
Moctar I. Matuan. See entry above.
Guimba Poingan, Ph.D., is on the faculty of the Mindanao State University

in Marawi.
Jay Rey G. Alovera finished his M.A. in Anthropology in Xavier Univer-

sity under the Mindanao Anthropology Consortium Program. Aside from
teaching in the College of Arts and Sciences and the College of Agricul-
ture, he is also a researcher for the Research Institute for Mindanao Culture
(rimcu) and the Museo de Oro in Xavier University.
Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflicts in North Cotabato and Bukidnon Provinces
Guiamel M. Alim is the executive director of the Consortium of Bangsam-

oro Civil Society. He has spent most of his life in Mindanao advocating
peace and sustainable development for Mindanaons.
RIDO V2.indd 333 10/4/2007 8:24:50 AM

334 || Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao Contributors || 334
Jose Bulao Jr., ocds, is the dean of Ignatian College where he also teaches
research. He is a member of the board of directors of Kadtuntaya Foun-
dation, Inc. (kfi) and the formator of the secular Discalced Carmelites in
Cotabato City and Tacurong City.
Ismael G. Kulat is the program manager and research coordinator of the

Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society.
Management and Resolution of Rido Among Meranao in Baloi, Lanao del

Norte: Case Studies
Monalinda E. Doro obtained her M.A. in Anthropology under the scholar-
ship of the Ford Foundation through the Mindanao Anthropology Consor-
tium at Xavier University. She co-authored “Survey of Indigenous Peoples’
Access to and Utilization of ecd Services in Region XII”.
Big War, Small Wars: The Interplay of Large-scale and Community Armed
Conflicts in Five Central Mindanao Communities
Jose Jowel Canuday is an anthropologist and a journalist based in Mind-
anao. As an anthropologist, his current focus of inquiry is the production of
social and cultural relations in migration and forced migration experiences
of peoples in Mindanao. He also lectures anthropology at the University of
the Philippines Mindanao and works with the Mindanao News and Infor-
mation Cooperative Center.
The Celebrated Cases of Rido in Maguindanao and North Cotabato

The United Youth for Peace And Development (unypad) is a peace
and development institution that envisions a just, peaceful, and humane
society. It was formed to help alleviate the plight of the people in Mindanao
and other marginalized sectors of the society.
Tausug and Corsican Clan Feuding: A Comparative Study

Gerard Rixhon is a Belgium-born Filipino citizen who spent 20 years with
the Oblate priests in Tawi-Tawi and Sulu. He holds an M.A. in Anthropol-
ogy from the Ateneo de Manila University.
Conclusion: A Personal Reflection

Samuel K. Tan, Ph.D., was born in Siasi, Sulu of Chinese-Tausug-Sama par-
entage. As an educator and scholar, Dr. Tan held several important positions
in the government for which he received numerous distinctions and awards.
He served on the faculty of history at the University of the Philippines at
Diliman for more than 30 years. He is now enjoying his retirement.
RIDO V2.indd 334 10/4/2007 8:24:50 AM

Index board. See lupong tagapamayapa
Arendt, Hannah, 256, 257, 258, 282
37th infantry battalion, 262, 264, 265, 272 Armed Forces of the Philippines (afp), 12,
6th infantry division, 275 24, 68, 164, 254, 260, 269, 287
armed robbery, 240
Abas Arnado, Mary Ann, 287
clan, 29, 293, 294 arrogance, 141. See also kibr
Hadji Mokamad, 296 Ashley, S. A., 307
Abbink, Jon, 256, 257 Ashura, 217
abduction, 139, 141 Asraf, 293
Abdullah, Arafat, 76, 205, 299 astana, 204
Abdullah, Bai Unggi D., 299 at-a-pongampong, 101
Abdullah, Intuas M., 75, 205 Ata, 99
Abinales, Patricio N., 98 Ateneo de Zamboanga University, 27
Abu Sayyaf Group (asg), atoran, 211
104, 110, 111, 312, 328 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
accidents, 92, 93 (armm), 13, 51, 52, 79, 97, 100,
adaban, 64 103, 104, 119, 162, 290, 305,
Adapun Ali, 208 317, 320
adat, 30, 64, 76, 204, 205, 211, 310, 319 Autonomy Act of 1989, 331
adat betad, 66, 291 awidan, 75
addiction, 207 Ayunan, Balabaran, 293
Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (ahjag), 16
Aduk, Shariff, 291 B’laan, 108
adultery, 138, 155, 157, 212 Bacayawan, 73
agama, 73, 75, 209, 210 Badar, 223
agaw ho balaw, 202 Badjao, 99, 102, 103
Agusan del Sur, 127, 129 bae, 206
Agus River, 128, 207 a cabugatan, 207
Agyu, 131 a dalomangcob, 207
ahawey. See ahow a labi, 28, 207, 243
ahow, 137 bagani, 129, 131, 135, 137, 138, 153
Al-Rashid, Harun, 326 a tangkulok, 136
Alawi, Sharif, 210 Bagobo, 99
alcoholism, 92 Bagoinged, 286
alimaong, 136, 144 Bagumbong, 270
all-out war campaign, 275, 285 Bagundang, 298
Aluyudan, 224 Abdulrahman, 299
amanah, 239 clan, 29, 297
Ambolodto family, 296 Ismael, 299
Amilbangsa, Datu, 312 Sumampao, 299
Aminollah, Sultan Hadji, 229, 244 bagwal, 139
Ampatuan, Ahmad, 264 bagyang, 134
Ampatuan, Andal, 264 bahandi, 143, 144
Ampatuan, Datu Zamzamin, 98 Bahasa
ancestral domain, 212, 327 Sug, 102
Andreani, Jean-Louis, 313 Yakan, 102
Angga-an, 165 Bakayawan, 293
angyas, 61 bake. See lebut
Anton, Bob, 206 bakos ho balokan, 202
Aquino, Corazon C., 255, 296 Baktiar, Karamat, 331
Arabic schools. See madaris bala, 134, 135
Arabic teachers. See ustadz Balabagan, 77, 128
arbitration, 61, 67, 202, 203 Balabaran, 294
|| 335 ||
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balaghusay, 131 91, 115, 116, 119, 120, 122, 123, 155,
Balangingi Sama, 311 225, 232, 238, 243. See also diat
balo-balo, 138 blood revenge, 11, 19, 24
Baloi, 28, 72, 101, 132, 207, 210 Boehm, Christopher, 12
sultanate system in, 210 Bongao, 41
Bangadan, 268 bono, 140
bangkaw, 135 Borneo, 12, 311
bangon, 174, 175, 177, 202 bravery, 21, 136, 309, 310, 318
bangsa, 142 Briones, Samuel M., 209
Bangsamoro Army (bma), 292 Brunei, 297, 331
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (biaf), btal, 223
255 Buat, Musib M., 205
bangun, 25. See also diyya, diat, kandiat Buayan, 101, 103
Banisilan, 41 Buck, 306
bansa, 20, 134, 136, 143, 161 buddi, 22, 310, 321
banta, 307 Bugawas, 294
Bantay Ceasefire, 25, 263, 269, 270, 284, bugay, 138
285, 286, 288 Bukidnon, 26, 27, 28, 72, 99, 126, 127,
bantug, 20, 134, 136, 143, 161, 162 128, 130, 145, 150, 151, 164, 165,
bantugan, 161, 162 203, 274
Banwaon, 99, 130 bul-uyanon, 139
Barangay Peace and Order Council (poc), Bula, Dalomabi, 105, 126, 240, 243
120 Buldon, 51, 52, 53, 56
Barasi, 222 Buliok, 28, 262, 275, 276, 278, 283, 286
Barira, 25, 51, 53, 63 Buluan, 51, 101
Barra, Hamid Aminoddin, 62 Bunged, 296
Bartolome, Clarivel D., 53, 76, 105, 106 Burton, Erlinda M., 27, 126
Barton, Roy, 12, 17 business rivalry, 111
basak, 132 Butig, 77, 86
Basilan, 26, 36, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, Butilen marsh, 294
47, 48, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, Buug, 41
107, 108, 109, 110, 120, 121, 306,
326, 330 Cabadiangan, 165
batasan, 130 Cadiis, 166
Bates, Robert, 19 Cagayan de Oro City, 72
Bato, 228 Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa, 97
Battle of Bud Bagsak, 330 Calabria, 307
Bayabao, 101, 132, 210 Calanugas, 206
Bayang, 86 cali, 211, 212
baylan, 130, 131, 135 Camp Abubakre, 53
bayle, 151 Campo Muslim, 299
Bentley, George, 201, 205 Candao, Zacaria, 264
Bently, Carter G., 71 Canuday, Jose Jowel, 28, 98
bese, 21 Caris, Amroussy, 201
Bila, Pendatukan, 292 carjacking, 240
Binago, Abdul Rahman, 262 Carmen, 164, 165
Binandal, 293 cattle rustling, 42, 60, 111, 171, 172, 212,
Bin Mohammed, Zulkefili, 286 213, 233, 239
Bisaya, 150, 275 Cebuano, 52
Bla-an, 99 Cedeño, Promenzo, 275
Blackshirts, 28, 164, 292 Central Mindanao, 71, 254, 255, 257,
blood debt, 202 290, 330
blood feuds, 21, 24 Chavez, Nialyn Chrysa T., 202
blood money, , 18, 24, 25, 46, 66, 89 Christians, 273, 306
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Introduction || 337
lowland, 160 Cotabato, 164, 165, 170, 217, 257, 279, 322
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit Cotabato City, 50, 52, 54, 57, 100, 105,
(cafgu), 109, 111, 164, 172, 223, 299
255, 257, 259, 260, 264, 273, council for peace and justice, 307, 320
274, 292 council of elders, 67, 114, 175, 177, 249
Civilian Home Defense Force (chdf), counsel. See wakil
109, 274 court
Civilian Volunteers Organization (cvo), house of. See walay na bitiara
12, 164, 255, 257, 259, 260, 268, courts
269, 270, 281 legal, 62
clan conflict, 11, 13, 98, 122, 304 native, 30
and ethnicity, 44 Philippine, 68
causes of, 41, 42, 105, 107 crimes against chastity, 60
incidences of, 39 Crisologo clan, 12
perceptions on, 46 Crispo, Christine, 203
reasons for unsettled, 120 Crossing Simuay, 285
settlement of, 45, 115 culture, 256
status of, 43 and violence, 256
Clausewitz, Karl von, 259 gun, 318
Claveria, 27, 129, 160 of peace, 206
collective responsibility,
17, 18, 22, 54, 242 daa a phamamasadan, 91
Commission on Elections (comelec), da a pagampilan iyan, 243
58, 109 Daayata, Jessamine, 203
Committee of Blood Reconciliation, 29 Dabenayon, 270
Condovar, Manuel M., 205 Dabid, 293
conflict Daiwan, 294
-management techniques, 31 da kaoman, 114
election-related, 57 Daladap, 270
escalation of, 146 da laha, 113
etiology of, 329 Dalama, 73
ideological, 171, 172, 174 Dalengaoen, 276
inter-island, 12 da leod, 114
inter-tribal, 11, 23 Dalican, 294, 296
kin, 160 damage to property, 42, 173
management of, 146 da makamaolika, 206
mapping, 31 dampas, 138, 145
people involved in management, 146 Damulog, 164, 165
resolution, 143 Dansalan City, 128
bodies and mechanisms, 24, 62, 142 da omboh, 113
methods, 61 daon so kazabar, 92
transformation, 322 da pehak, 114
Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, da pehak kitam, 113
28 Dapiawan, 12, 260, 262, 270, 271, 272,
Coordinating Committee on the 281, 284, 287
Cessation of Hostilities (ccch), encounters in, 28
262, 270, 271, 287 Darangen, 101, 206
Cordilleras, the, 12, 17, 23, 31 Dariat, 208
corruption, 116 Dasikil, 270
Corsica, 11, 23, 29, 307, 313, 314, 318, Datu Abdullah Sangki, 51, 52
319, 320, 322 Datu Bitol, 292
clan feuding in, 29 Datu Hamis, 157
Corsican National Liberation Front (flnc), datu kali, 64
316, 319 Datu Kused, 295
RIDO V2.indd 337 10/4/2007 8:24:52 AM

Datumanong, 64, 67 dowry, 138, 222
Datu Montawal, 51 Dozier, Edward, 12
Datu Odin Sinsuat, 51, 52, 293, 294, 296 drugs, 93, 106, 109, 110, 122, 141
Datu Paglas, 51, 108 addiction to, 240
Datu Piang, 51, 101 cases related to, 79
Datu Pinaluay, 149 crimes related to, 42
datus, 20, 24, 101, 126, 130, 131, 133, 134, illegal drugs, 80, 92
135, 142, 143, 175, 202, 203, 211, trafficking of, 94
212. See also timuays users of prohibited, 80
Datu Saudi Ampatuan, 51, 262, 266 duay, 129
Datu Usay, 51 Duguengen, 270
Daulog, Esmael, 299 Dulangan, 294
Davao, 15, 22, 102, 127, 217 dumagat, 150, 161
Davao City, 104, 155, 157, 263, 274 Dungguan, 293
Dayak, 102 Durante, Ofelia, 27
debt of gratitude, 247, 310. See buddi dyandi, 24
debts, 42, 80, 138, 145
non-payment of, 111 Eid El Adha, 217
deceit, 202 Eid El Fitr, 217, 218
Deles, Teresita, 271 elections, 122, 226, 285, 296
Department of Agrarian Reform (dar), anomalies and irregularities,
299 28, 141, 236, 239, 240
Department of Social Welfare and Elizalde, Manuel ‘Manda’, 150
Development (dswd), 278 elopement, 42, 110, 141, 240
deportation. See taog Elusfa, Romy, 98
di-i paka-aatawon or di pakarurupungen, enmity, 22, 151, 227
215 enslavement, 212
diat, 25, 142, 155, 228, 229, 230. See envy, 28, 207, 240
also diyya, kandiat, bangun Erumanen, 279
Diaz, Patricio, 123 Escalante, 207
Dibabawon, 99 Estrada, Joseph, 255, 275
didalum ha nanad, 130 ethnic affiliations, 44, 45
didungkulan, 130 ethnicity, 52
dignity, 53, 326 excommunication. See also taog
Dimataling, 41 Executive Order 264, 255
Dimbawangan, 112 exile, 18, 202. See also taog
Dinaig, 100, 294, 296 extended kinship ties, 75
Dinas, 41
di pakaataon, 92 fajr, 223
di pakanganganinen, 92 family
disarmament, 121, 330 and alliances, 316
Disoma, Esmail R., 208, 209, 256 bonds, 309
disputes conflicts, 326
affinal, 205 feuds, 306. See also rido
unresolved, 205 honor, 19
di tahnor, 222 lineage, 212, 228, 238
divorce, 204 love for, 323
diwata, 129, 134, 144, 153 relations, 204
diyya, 25 Fernandez, Perfecto, 133
diyyat, 116. See also diyya, blood money feuding, 11, 17, 160, 232
Dolorfino, Benjamin, 278 inter-family, 305
Doro, Monalinda, 28, 211 fiqh, 64
dorog, 142 firearms, 122, 256, 265, 318, 321
dorogen, 148 control, 321, 330
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Introduction || 339
loose, 94, 246 Higaonon, 99, 126, 129, 134, 137, 139,
proliferation of, 106, 109, 111 144, 149, 160, 161, 162, 202, 306
smugglers, 247 cosmology, 130
flight, 202 Higaunon. See Higaonon
forgiveness, 66, 322. See also rila High Point, Macabenban, 166
Four Federations of Lanao. See pat a Hiligaynon, 52
pangampong ko ranao homicide, 24, 207
honor, 16, 19, 20, 21, 53, 76, 105, 142,
gahum, 144, 149 148, 161, 225, 310, 315, 317, 323,
Gambar, 297, 298 326
gambling, 240 among indigenous peoples, 134
Gamboa, Toto, 275 concepts of, 134
Gandang, Rotin, 266 Hunt, Chester L., 209
gantangan palabian, 134 husay, 24, 150, 175
Gapt, 294 Hussin, Alber A., 307, 309, 310, 312
Garcia, Rodolfo, 285 hutbahs, 328
Gen. S.K. Pendatun, 51
genealogy, 26, 146, 238 idma, 205
gerar, 207 iftar, 158
gimba, 307 igbuyag, 129, 134, 145
Ginat, Joseph, 12, 18 igma, 27, 89, 95, 211
Ginatilan, 276 igma ago taritib, 89, 91, 132
Glang, Sahid, 205 ijma, 204
Gli-gli, 28, 262, 273, 274, 281 ilaga, 164, 169, 170, 171, 274, 292
Goda, Toh, 12 Ilanun, 131
Gomez, Hilario, 100, 101 ili, 17
Gomez, Norma, 27 Iligan City, 41, 44, 202, 207, 208, 213, 214
Gonzales, Francisco, 98, 104 Illana Bay, 297
gossip, 207 Ilocano, 52
government Ilonggo, 52, 274, 275
role of, 322 Indanan, 107
war with Moro secessionist groups, 170 indemnity, 152, 153
Government Committee on the Cessation land as, 151
of Hostilities (ccch), 98 indigenous peoples, 99, 128, 177
Gowing, Peter, 103, 105, 106 inged, 73, 132, 210
grar, 219, 224 inheritance, 106
grave offense. See ta-azir Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 27
Guialon family, 296 insult, 201
Guinapalad Ta Ka Spaces for Peace, 288 integrity, 326
Guindulungan, 51, 293 intermarriages, 67, 90, 118, 205
Gutierrez, Eric, 97 internal displacement, 44, 276, 280
Gutoc, Samira, 98 areas with, 270
victims of, 168
hadana, 209 internal revenue allotment, 79, 108, 122,
Hadith, 73, 211, 330, 331 123, 141, 162
Hagpa, 203 international monitoring team (imt),
hahum, 143 16, 286
Hashim, Salamat, 276, 277, 286 Inusar, 216, 218, 219
Hasluck, Margaret, 18, 20, 21 Iranun, 12, 51, 52, 54, 99, 166, 329
Hassan, I. U., 307, 310 Iraya, 204
hazil, 103 ird, 20
heated argument, 28, 240 Islam, 21, 27, 73, 328
Hermoso, Dickson, 68, 98, 263, 267, 271, Islamic Center, 286
286, 287 Islamic jurisprudence. See fiqh
RIDO V2.indd 339 10/4/2007 8:24:53 AM

Islamic local tradition, 328 Kaldor, Mary, 259, 260
Islamic peace education, 162 Kalembog, 293
Islamic radicalism, 328 kalephad, 148
Islamic State of Muslim Mindanao, 331 kali, 141, 142, 204, 239, 243
Islamic State of Sulu, 330 Kalibugan, 99
ispug, 321 kalibutan, 130
Isulan, 121 Kamala, 222
kamattoahan, 113
Jaafar, Gadzali, 98, 263 kambalay, 205
Jakiri, Yusop H., 120 kambatabhata’a, 205
jama, 158 kambobono o mga bae, 91
Jama Mapun, 99, 102 Kamlian, Jamail A., 26, 100
Janjalani, Ustadz Abdulrajak, 328, 329 Kamlon, 312
Jawi, 329 kampong, 210
jealousy, 111, 137, 207 kanaman, 53
Jenista, Frank Lawrence, 23 kandiat, 25, 147, 245. See also diyya, diat,
jesting. See angyas bangun
Jikiri, 319 kandiyat. See kandiat
Johore, 102 kandori. See kanduli
Joint CCCH-IMT, 13 kanduli, 26, 118, 119, 142, 149, 158, 221,
Joint Government-milf Coordinating 226, 229, 236, 238, 297, 299, 302
Committee on the Cessation of kanduri. See kanduli
Hostilities (ccch), 16, 25, 31 kanggiginawai, 210, 242
joint interim action team, 285 kapamalo, 148
Joint ulama municipal peace and order kapamamanikan, 148
council, 25, 63 kapamimisaya-an, 212
Jolo, 306, 311, 323 kapamitiyara, 212
Judd, Mary, 53 kapangangawid, 225
Jundam, Mashur Bin-Ghalib, 204 kapangangawidan, 212, 228
Junker, Laura Lee, 12 kapangetoma, 148
jury. See also kali kapanginsalaan, 212
justice system kapangondoi, 92
barangay, 24, 145, 160, 203 kapasadan, 211
Kapatagan, 107, 108, 110, 121
ka-salk, 148 kapheletakan, 147
Kaalim, Rexal, 286 Kapiton, 294
Kabacan, 164, 165 kapririspitoa, 242
Kabalukanan, 291 karila, 148
Kabulnan River, 263 Karomatan, 206
Kabungsuan. See Shariff Kabunsuan kasaop, 12, 246
Kabuntalan, 51, 293, 297, 298 kasarigan, 243
Kadigasan, 293 kashapot, 147
Kadil, Ben J., 203 kashappa, 147
Kadingilan, 164, 165 kasosongkai, 91
kadsarakan, 66 kataog, 148
Kahal, Mohammad Ali, 270 katarungang pambarangay, 61, 62, 163
kahanda, 64 katatabanga, 209
kakandori, 148 katchaw, 110
Kakar, 296 katopo, 92
kakitas, 147 kedsapa, 66
Kalagan, 99 khutbahs, 329
Kalagangan, 150, 151 kiambabaan, 92
Kalakakan, 276 kibr, 141
Kalanogas, 77 Kidapawan, 156
RIDO V2.indd 340 10/4/2007 8:24:54 AM

Introduction || 341
kidnapping, 139, 141, 240, 329 laws
Kiefer, Thomas M., 17, 21, 98, 307, customary, 21, 25, 130, 133, 134, 160,
309, 310 161, 203
Kimadzil, 166 indigenous, 73
kinship, 17, 205, 245, 248, 309 Islamic, 73, 75, 140, 211
system, 27 native, 30
ties, 22, 242 Philippine, 75
Kirim, 329 Layson, Roberto, 15
Kisupaan, 166 lebogoy, 138
kitab, 73, 75, 211 Lebpas, 28, 262, 279, 283
Kitango, 266 lebut, 137. See also bake
Kitaotao, 129 legislation, 120
kitas, 89, 142, 161, 232 lephad, 142, 159
kokoman, 206 letakan, 142, 159
kokoman a kambhatabata’a, 24, 205, 206, Liab, 270
221, 234, 245 Liangan, 112
kontara. See rido Libre, Eric, 255, 257
kontla. See rido Libutan, 263, 268
kontra. See rido lido. See rido
Kudarangan, 291, 293 lido hu katangkawan, 136
Kudarat, Sultan Dipatuan, 331 Liguasan Marsh, 270, 278, 284
Kulambog, 293 Liliongan, 166
kumanaytay un sa alimaong ta balukan hu limokon, 153
datu, 136 Linantangan, 12, 262, 263, 266, 268, 269,
kuntara. See rido 270, 281, 284, 287
Kurais II, 102 assault, 28
Kurintem, 294, 296 lineage. See bangsa
Lingga, Abhoud Syed, 26, 27
Labog-Javellana, Juliet, 99 Lintangan
Lagundi, 276 family feud in, 262
Lake Lanao, 72, 101, 128, 132, 210 liyuuran, 306
Lanao, 127, 128 Local Government Code, 145, 331
Lanao del Norte, 16, 26, 28, 36, 37, 40, local government units
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 72, innovative mechanisms of, 62
128, 201, 207, 210 local judge. See kali
Lanao del Sur, 13, 16, 26, 27, 71, 72, 77, 7 local monitoring teams, 25
9, 80, 92, 93, 99, 100, 101, 103, 1 Loong, Benjamin, 320
09, 116, 121, 126, 128, 131, 154, looting, 273
156, 157, 206, 210, 229, 256, 286 loss of culture and traditions, 170, 172
land, 174, 204 loss of face, 318
alienation of, 327 love affair, 221
conflict, 59, 240 unfavored, 28
disputes, 41, 79, 92, 93, 95, 104, 105, lugbak, 202
106, 107, 138, 141, 170, 172, 203, Lumabao, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219
207, 239 lumad, 12, 27, 28, 133, 134, 135, 142, 143,
recovery of, 327 160, 161, 326, 327, 330
titling, 122 concepts of law and justice, 133
landgrabbing, 59, 106, 201 some cases among, 149
Land Registration Act, 295 Lumayanague, 86
Langayen, 293 Lumba a Bayabao, 72
langit, 130 lupong tagapamayapa, 62, 145, 172
Lantapan, 27, 127, 130, 151 luwaran, 64, 291
Lantawan, 107 Luwaran Code, 204
lashing. See lephad Luzon, 108, 306
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mabalaw, 136, 144 Mamanwa, 99
Macabenban, 166 Mamasapano, 51, 98, 260, 262, 263, 265,
Macacua, Samsudin, 299 266, 267, 287
Macapagal Arroyo, Gloria, 285 mamauli, 12, 21, 22, 23
Macasendeg, 293 manama, 129
Madale, Nagasura, 76 mananambal, 131
Madalum, 77 mandalangan, 143
Madamba, 73 Mandaya, 99
madaris, 209, 322 Manduyog clan, 29, 297, 298
madhhab, 64 Mangansakan, Bitol, 291, 302
madrasah, 74, 209. See also madaris Mangansakan clan, 26, 29, 290, 291
magahat, 12, 134, 135, 138, 139, 142, Mangawan, 226
150, 160 manggad, 143, 144
Magayoong, Hadji Abdullah ‘Mamaodang’, Mangguwangan, 99
239 Mangorsi, Asnia B., 206
Magayoong, Sheik Abdullah C., 211 Manobo. See Menuvu
magbabaya, 129, 130, 153 Mansaka, 99
magdanakan, 113 maongangen, 243
magdanakan ma agama, 114 maongangen-a-sogo, 147
Magindanao. See Maguindanao maquis, 314
Magindanaon, 52, 54 Maranao. See Meranao
magsapa, 118, 119 Marantao, 77, 154
Maguindanao, 12, 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 50, maratabat, 20, 22, 62, 76, 79, 80, 91,
51, 52, 54, 57, 61, 63, 72, 98, 99, 93, 98, 101, 105, 112, 121, 141,
100, 101, 103, 106, 108, 131, 170, 142, 146, 148, 158, 201, 204, 215,
256, 260, 262, 264, 266, 270, 276, 225, 229, 232, 238, 240, 245, 248,
284, 286, 287, 290, 293, 297, 302, 249, 292, 301, 321
319, 331 and socio-economic status, 84
Maguindanaoan, 131, 164, 204, 275, 290, as a factor for rido, 22
328, 329 killing in defense of, 110
harmony with Menuvu, 169 Marawi City, 72, 74, 79, 100, 128, 132,
Maharaja Lawana, 132 162, 208
Mainot, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 150
Makaturuganan, 291 marital conflict, 137, 203, 207
Makir, 294, 296 marriage, 204
Makopa, 150 martabbat. See maratabat
Mala a Bayabao, 72, 210 martial law, 292, 312
Malaa Inged, 234, 236 masabar, 243
Malabang, 128, 206 Masiu, 72, 86, 101, 132, 210
Maladeg, 112, 120, 206 Mastura, Tocao O., 63
malagbasuk, 131 Matalam, Udtug, 312
Malagiok, Ronnie, 293 Matanog, 51, 53, 56
malai paratiya ko Allah, 243 Matigsalug Manobo, 27, 128, 129, 134,
Malapag, 167 136, 137, 143, 145, 150, 151, 160,
Malaybalay, 127 161
Malay Peninsula, 12, 311 Matuan, Moctar, 26, 27
Malaysia, 30, 306 mawarao, 243
Malibuteng, 234, 236 Mawaraw, 227
Maliga family, 296 mbatabata’a, 27. See also kinship system
Malintad, 231 McAmis, Robert, 103
Malunasay, 150, 151 McKenna, Thomas, 257
mam-on, 153 mediation, 19, 24, 27, 31, 60, 61, 91, 112,
Mamaanun-Lumbac, 208 155, 203, 205
mamahuli, 317, 318. See also rido mediators, 24, 67, 91, 113, 120, 157, 221,
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Introduction || 343
225, 243, 245, 247, 248 molestation, 201
men and women, 28 Molibog, 99
profile of, 88 Moner, Nagamura T., 239
qualities of effective, 115 montol, 243
traditional, 24 Moro, 99, 100, 165, 170, 177
Mediterranean Basin, 306, 307, 314 code, 122
Mentang, Tungan, 292 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (milf),
Menuvu, 24, 28, 126, 127, 130, 134, 153, 12, 13, 25, 53, 65, 68, 98, 104,
164, 202, 328 111, 155, 165, 171, 224, 229, 235,
harmony with Maguindanaon, 169 243, 247, 255, 257, 259, 262, 264,
Meranao, 12, 20, 24, 27, 28, 93, 104, 269, 270, 271, 274, 277, 281, 287,
105, 106, 107, 110, 117, 119, 126, 312
128, 131, 132, 140, 160, 161, 162, as mediators, 157
201, 205, 212, 218, 230, 319, 328, Central Committee, 263
329. See also Maranao conflict-resolution mechanisms,
economic activities of, 133 27, 61, 64
family, 208 Shari-ah court, 65
indigenous mechanisms, 159 Moro National Liberation Front (mnlf),
kinship system, 74, 75, 208 25, 109, 164, 171, 255, 257, 259,
marriage, 209 264, 292, 312, 319
endogamous, 209 Movement for Independent Mindanao
political organization of, 27 (mim), 312
political system of, 145 Muddas, 325
proverbs, 206 Munai, 207
rights of women, 207 murder, 138, 154, 201, 203, 204, 212
socialization and personality formation, attempted, 207
209 Murdock, George Peter, 75
social organization, 208 Muslims, 326, 327, 328
some cases among, 154
traditional court, 206 nagbanta, 307
women, 206 Nagtangen, 297
miakamaolika, 205 Nalapaan, 262, 272, 274, 275
miakasilai so rido, 92 nalinguan, 111
Midsayap, 291 National Movement for Free Elections
Midtimbang, Benjie, 262, 265, 285, 287 (namfrel), 122
Minalwang, 149, 160 Nangka, 208
Mindanao, 12, 13, 14, 26, 36, 97, 101, Nawahag, 151, 152
108, 255, 305, 311, 319 negative reciprocity, 22
1970s war in, 28 negotiation, 203
prominent families in, 28 coaching, 31
Mindanao Independence Movement neutral ground, 138, 226
(mim), 292 New Rizal, 167
Mindanao Peace Caucus, 287 Newsbreak, 15
Mindanao State University (msu), Nimmo, Harry Arlo, 306
75, 296, 308 North Cotabato, 25, 26, 28, 36, 38, 41,
Mindanao State University Marawi, 27, 77 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 127, 170,
Mindanews, 98 255, 256, 260, 262, 272, 274, 276,
Misamis Oriental, 27, 72, 126, 127, 129, 280, 286, 290, 291, 293
207, 210 North Upi, 25, 293
miyagagaw Notre Dame Journal, 99
sa gapa, 239 Notre Dame University, 27, 105
sa kawali, 239 Nunungan, 111, 206
sa tamanaan, 240 Nye, Robert A., 20
modernization, 23, 316
RIDO V2.indd 343 10/4/2007 8:24:56 AM

Ocfemia, Romulo, 272 pangayaw, 12, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 143,
Office of the Muslim Affairs, 98 149, 150, 151, 153, 160, 161
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the causes of, 139
Peace Process (opapp), 15 common causes that lead to, 137
Old Maganoy, 263 pangensalaan, 220
Omonay, 167 pangiloban, 202
Onayan, 72 panglima, 113, 204
opakat, 73 pangongokum, 212
oral contract, 212 Panicupan, 275
Orang Bajo, 306 panlemet, 139
order. See potoray panlibug. See lebogoy
oripon, 139 Pantaoragat, 207
Otterbein, Keith F., 306 Paoli, Pasquale, 315
outcasting, 19 Parang, 51, 52, 56
paruala, 122
padumol, 202 pat-pa-pongampong ko ranao. See pat a
Pagalungan, 51, 262, 275, 276, 277, phangampongang ko ranao
278, 286 pat a pangampong ko ranao. See pat a
Pagapon, 228, 229 phangampongang ko ranao
Pagatin, 270 pat a phangampong. See pat a
Pagayawan, 77 phangampongang ko ranao
pagbanta, 12, 53 pat a phangampongang ko ranao, 27, 72
pagbaos. See pagbaus patoray, 215
pagbaus, 53 peace
pagbunuh, 12 process, 13, 14, 29, 287
pagdumot, 12 settlement, 24
Paglas, Datu “Toto”, 15, 98 spaces for, 25, 31, 275, 276, 284
Paglat, 51 zone of, 31, 120, 206
Pagtabangan basulta, 323 Peace Advocate of Zamboanga, 322
pahuli, 307 pedtuntut, 64
Paido Pulangi, 290, 291, 292, 293, 302 pedtuntutan, 64
palagugud, 131 peg-imatey, 138
Palaguyan, Daotin Gandang, 265, 268 peg-imateyey. See peg-imatey
Palapa, 157 pehak, 113
Palawan, 102, 326, 330 penalties
Palimbang, 107, 108, 110, 112 sala, 139
paloklokesan, 224 Pendatun
pamalao, 157 clan, 276
pamalas, 144. See also singampo Datu Tin, 276
pamamanikan, 142 Walid, 276
pamaras, 175 Pentagon, 171, 172
pamimitiyara, 212 perajamen, 148
panabud, 136, 138 Pershing, John, 330
panagat sa lasang, 139 phangokuman, 212
panagulambong, 131 Philippine Air Force, 255
panakew, 139 Philippine Army, 264, 269, 278, 292,
panalusow, 137 293, 323
pandita, 204 Philippine Coast Guard, 255
pangampong, 210 Philippine Constabulary, 274
pangampong ko ranao, 132 Philippine Constitution, 72
Pangandaman, 119 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 103, 255
pangangawedan, 220 Philippine government, 257
pangangawid, 202, 203 Philippine Marines, 159, 255, 278
pangaw, 204 Philippine military, 320, 323
RIDO V2.indd 344 10/4/2007 8:24:57 AM

Introduction || 345
Philippine National Police (pnp), 247, 254 Reconciliatory Initiatives for Development
Philippine Navy, 255 Opportunities, 26
Philippines, 12, 23, 30, 72, 101, 104, 309 Regional Reconciliation and Unification
Philippine Star, 255, 262 Commission (rruc), 25, 119, 162
physical injuries, 207 religion, 318
Picong, 111 role of, 322
Pikit, 25, 41, 260, 272, 276, 286, 288, religious beliefs, 21
290, 302 religious instruction, 322
Pimbalakan, 270 reprimand. See thoma
pinabagang puthaw, 135 Republic Act No. 2364, 52
Pitt-Rivers, Julian, 19 retaliation, 54, 91, 94, 142, 216, 231, 236
political rivalry, 41, 42, 79, 106, 108, retribution, 60, 212
239, 240 retributive justice, 323
politics, 79, 92, 93 revenge, 17, 21, 232, 237, 304, 314
electoral, 151 killings, 11
partisan, 151 patterns, 21
polygyny, 130 raids, 12
Poona Bayabao, 72 rido, 11, 12, 13, 14, 39, 40, 44, 50, 71, 77,
potri maamor, 244 90, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100,
Presidential Assistance for National 105, 109, 121, 126, 135, 136,
Minorities (panamin), 150 139, 155, 157, 159, 161, 164, 171,
President Roxas, 164, 165, 262, 279 214, 219, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226,
prestige, 19, 20, 76, 105 227, 228, 230, 231, 234, 237, 246,
pride, 76, 142, 161, 207 292, 295, 298, 300, 306, 326
Prill-Brett, June, 12, 17 “fatigue”, 54
protection, 22 “cold war” stage of, 29
Provincial Reconciliation and Unification “realization” period of, 29
Program (pruc), 119 a case of aborted, 158
Provincial Unification Fund, 120 agreement, 301
Pualas, 86 and conflict management, 45
pugos, 139 and development, 103
puka-sowa, 212 cases of, 56, 83
Pulanginon, 127 case studies of, 28
Pulangi River, 100, 270, 278, 280, 297 casualties in, 56, 81
punishment, 212 causes of, 27, 77, 80, 104, 141
Pusao, 270 classifications of, 140
communities prone to, 86, 87
Quitoriano, Ed, 255, 257 concept of, 53
Qur’an, 66, 73, 103, 116, 118, 119, 141, consequences of, 43, 84, 201, 240
149, 204, 206, 221, 226, 230, 248, effects of, 16, 201
311, 328, 330, 331 effects on communities, 173
escalation of, 300
Radia Indarapatra, 101 extent of, 54
Rajah Buayan, 51 external factors that induce, 311
Rajah Muda, 275 factors leading to, 111
rajam, 142, 159 factors prolonging or aggravating, 172
Ramadhan, 215, 218, 226, 236 factors that facilitate the settlement of,
Ramayana, 132 245
Ranon, 222, 223, 224 failures in settling, 90
rape, 42, 139, 141, 207, 212 fear of, 278
Rasul, 101, 103 frequency of, 56, 77
reciprocity, 19, 22, 74, 75, 205, 323 impact of, 56
katatabanga, 209 indigenous means of resolving, 24, 174
reconciliation, 66 inter-ethnic, 169
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frequency of, 169 San Roque, 272, 274
inventory of, 26 sapa, 142, 159, 175
number of persons injured in, 82 sapolo ago lima a pagawidan sa ranao, 211
persons imprisoned in, 83 sapot, 142
processes and methods to settle, 89 sara, 204
profiles of assailants and victims of, 83 Sarangani, 170
recurrence of, 26, 54, 67 Sardinia, 307, 314
settled, 26, 106 Sariling Command, 172
settlement of, 301 Saudi Arabia, 154, 235
socio-economic impact of, 47 Sawir, 73
stages of, 29, 143, 300 say-og, 135
opening, 300 Schlegel, Stuart, 126
transformational, 301 security, 22, 283, 326
strategies in resolving, 245 and protection, 19, 22
transformation of, 29, 54 Sejara Melayu, 12
triggers of, 57 self-esteem, 20, 53, 76
unresolved, 26 self-help, 17, 22
victims of, 83 Semporna, 12
violence in, 56 settlement, 66
rido-kapiya’an, 75, 76 agreements, 116
ridu. See rido amicable, 112, 113, 205
Riemer, Carlton L., 76 mode of, 205, 328
rila, 142 process, 225
Rio Grande de Mindanao, 100. See Seymour-Smith, Charlotte, 22
also Pulangi River Shafi’i schools of law. See madhhab
Rixhon, Gerard, 23, 29 shame, 16, 19, 21, 142, 146, 310, 317
robbery, 42, 141 kapanunungka, 67
Rodil, Rudy, 99, 100, 104 sharaf, 20
Rogongon, 202 Shari’ah, 25, 61, 69, 103, 140, 231, 282,
Rosaldo, Renato, 12 320, 331
rumor-mongering, 240 law, 121
Shariff Aguak, 12, 51, 264, 268, 270,
S.K. Pendatun, 271, 276 287, 302
Sabah, 30, 306 Shariff Kabunsuan, 63, 101
sabapan, 64 shokodan, 75. See also zukudan
Sabarang, 224, 226 Siama. See Sinama
Saber, Mamitua, 72, 76, 210 Sicily, 11, 307, 314
Saiyona, Butu, 276 Silik, 291
saksi ki modai sapa ki modalai, 141 Silsilah, 322
sala, 139 Simsimon, 150
sale, 204 Sinama, 102
Saleeby, Najeeb M., 64, 205 singampo. See pamalas
salsila, 131, 132, 221, 226. See tarsila Singson clan, 12
Salug River, 129, 151 Sinsuat
Sama, 27, 99, 100, 102, 105, 106, 107, 119, -Abas conflict, 293
204, 306, 325, 326, 329 clan, 29, 205, 293
Sama Bangingi, 103 Datu Darry, 296
Samad, Sukarno, 299 Datu Lester, 297
Sama Daleya, 102 Datu Odin, 290, 296
Sama Dilaut, 102, 306 Pidtukasan, 294, 295
Samal, 102, 103 Siocon, 41
Sanday, Ismail, 276 sipug, 21, 310, 321
San Fernando, 27, 128, 145, 150 So Chio, Rudy, 296
Sangil, 99 social rank, 205
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Introduction || 347
Social Weather Stations (sws), 13, 50, 304 swearing. See sapa
soko, 210 symbolic rituals
South Cotabato, 170 planting a tree or bamboo, 202
Southern Palawan, 103 vine cutting, 202
South Upi, 51, 293
Special cafgu Active Auxiliary (scaa), T’boli, 99, 203
255, 259, 264, 268, 269, 281 ta-azir, 215
status, 76, 105 taboo, 139, 215, 238
stealing, 138 Tacurong City, 271
stoning. See rajam Tagakaolo, 99
Subanon, 99 tagbusao. See talagbusao
suga, 159 Tagimaha, 102
suha-suha, 138 tagna, 135
sukod, 134 Tagoloan, 207, 210
suku, 72 Takepan, 276
Sulawesi, 306 Talaandig, 27, 99, 126, 127, 130, 151, 153
sulha, 24, 29 talabusao. See talagbusao
Sullivan, Robert E., 53 talagbusao, 137, 143, 144
sulo, 159 Talakag, 127, 130
sultan, 20, 101, 142, 243 talamuhat, 131
of Aluyudan, 226 Talayan, 51, 293, 294
of Bandar a Inged, 229 taleseb, 139
of Lumabao, 213, 214 Talipao, 41
of Malibuteng, 243 Talitay, 51, 61, 293
of Mangawan, 226 Tamano, Mauyag, 76
of Samanaya, 225 Tampakan, 294
of Sulu, 102 Tampakanen, 294
of Ulowan, 225 Tamped, 167
sa Barongis, 51, 291 tampuda ho balagon, 24, 139, 143, 149,
sultanate, 212 152, 153, 161, 162, 202, 203
in Buansa, 102 tampulo. See taleseb
of Balut, 211 Tan, Samuel K., 29, 102
of Maguindanao, 290 tandangan, 64
of Marawi, 26 Tandubas, 112
of Momungan, 211 Tangkulan, 167
of Sulu, 103, 204, 311 tangkulok, 136, 137
system, 145 taog, 142
Sultan Gumander, 109, 111, 112, 121 Tapudok, 293
Sultan Kudarat, 25, 26, 36, 38, 40, 43, tarawi, 228
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 62, 99, taritib, 27, 89, 95, 101, 102, 132, 210, 211
107, 108, 109, 110, 121, 170, 271 taritib-ago-igma, 24, 27, 72, 75, 140,
Sultan Mastura, 51 141, 145, 157, 163, 205, 226, 229,
Sulu, 12, 16, 23, 25, 26, 29, 36, 38, 245, 249
40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 99, tarsila, 101
100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, Tarsilan, 291
107, 109, 110, 121, 204, 256, 305, tatamoken, 243
306, 307, 311, 312, 318, 320, 322, tau-maas, 204
325, 326, 330 Tausug, 17, 21, 27, 29, 98, 99, 100, 101,
Sulu Archipelago, 306, 307, 311 105, 204, 305, 306, 309, 311, 325,
sulutan, 211, 212 326, 329, 330
Sumaguina, Esmail, 74 Tausug Customary Law Ordinance, 25
Sumisip, 110, 120 Taviran, 294
sunna, 204, 331 Tawi-Tawi, 26, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45,
suspicion, 28, 240 46, 47, 48, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105,
RIDO V2.indd 347 10/4/2007 8:24:59 AM

107, 109, 110, 120, 121, 306, 319, usba-waris, 309
326, 330 ustadz, 209
Tayuan
-Mangansakan conflict, 290 vendetta, 11, 23, 98, 160, 172, 202, 216,
clan, 26, 29, 290, 291 234, 307, 312, 313, 315, 318
Ustadz Daud, 291, 292 vengeance, 18, 20, 106, 202, 209, 268,
Teduray, 51, 52 305
Teves, Magno, 100 violence, 257, 258
The Asia Foundation, 11, 302, 311 structural, 207
theft, 28, 141, 203, 204, 207, 240
thoma, 142 Wadjidi, 293
Thornton, Tim, 260 wakil, 64, 142, 212
thothonganaya, 27. See also kinship system walay na bitiara, 25, 62, 63
tige, 204 Wao, 128
tigi-an, 134, 138 Warriner, Charles, 76
Tigwahanon, 127 Watamama, Gapas, 297
Timan, Datu Manguda, 291 wazir, 64, 205
timuays, 175. See also datus western Mindanao, 306
Tiruray. See Teduray wife grabbing, 137, 140
tiyotupan sa wator, 221 Wilson, Stephen, 313, 315, 317
Torens titling system, 104, 107 Wingagaw, 151
toril, 209 women, 21, 114, 146
Torres, Wilfredo Magno III, 11 as initiators of conflict, 244
trial by ordeal, 133, 134, 138 as negotiators, 217, 244
Tubaran, 13 as pacifiers of conflict, 244
Tugaya, 133 battering of, 207
Tuka na Lipao, 263, 270 leaders, 207
tuluga, 130, 153 retaliated, 83
tunglo, 135 World Bank, 53, 104, 254
Turonan River, 165 World War II, 260, 316
Twain, Mark, 306
Xavier University, 27
Ubo, 99
ud-Din, Sultan Salah, 331 Yakan, 27, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 204,
Udtog, Ibrahim, 270 326, 329
ukag, 53 Yano, Alexander, 272
ukit, 64 Yumo, 202
ulagingan, 130, 131 Yunnan, 306
ulama, 74, 121, 126, 146, 212, 231, 267
Ulandang, 293 Zacaria, Barodi, 271
Ulowan, 222, 223 Zagar, Mitja, 23
umayamnon, 139 Zamboanga, 102, 311
umma, 318 Zamboanga City, 100
Unayan, 101, 132, 210 Zamboanga del Norte, 26, 36, 39, 42, 44,
United States Agency for International 46, 47, 48
Development (usaid), 11, 13, 302 Zamboanga del Sur, 26, 36, 39, 41, 42,
United States of America, 11, 257, 306, 312 45, 46, 47, 48, 72
United Youth for Peace and Development Zamboanga Sibuguey, 26, 36, 39, 41, 44,
(unypad), 25, 28, 302 46, 47, 48
Upi, 51 zukudan, 214, 215, 216, 229, 232, 238, 243
RIDO V2.indd 348 10/4/2007 8:25:00 AM

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RIDO

RIDO V2.indd 1 10/4/2007 8:21:19 AM

WILFREDO MAGNO TORRES III

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The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to the development

The National Library of the Philippines ClP Data

Rido : clan feuding and conflict management in

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one Survey of Feuding Families and Clans

two Dynamics and Management of Rido

three Inventory of Existing Rido in Lanao del Sur (1994 –2004) 71

four Management of Clan Conflict and Rido

five Responses to Interkin Group Conflict

six Understanding Inter-ethnic Conflicts

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eight Big War, Small Wars: The Interplay of Large-scale

nine The Celebrated Cases of Rido in Maguindanao

ten Tausug and Corsican Clan Feuding: A Comparative Study 304

Conclusion: A Personal Reflection 325

About the Authors 332

RIDO V2.indd 6 10/4/2007 8:22:23 AM

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T HE ASIA FOUNDATION conflict management programs throughout

Two households, both alike in dignity…

Similarly, clan feuds in the Philippines are not confined to Mindanao.

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Finally, this book is dedicated to the communities and peoples cov-

Steven Rood, Ph.D.

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T HIS VOLUME presents several studies on feuding or clan conflicts,

1 See “Honour” Killings and Blood Feuds in www.gendercide.org

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third-party actors to frustrate the peace process between the government

The Mindanao Rido Study

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Dissemination of Study Findings, Insights, and Reflections

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aggravate a rido include the formation of alliances by the principals with

Key Concepts on Feuding and Revenge

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The community sense was fostered by every art the mountain-

This vivid description by Hasluck underscores the obligations of close-

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Ginat explains that in a system of collective responsibility, “any act or omis-

Honor, Shame, and Reciprocity

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While honor can sometimes be a driving factor in revenge, this same

RIDO V2.indd 20 10/4/2007 8:22:33 AM

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Turbulent Histories, Transitions, and Negotiated Mixed Systems

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The Balkan Peninsula, a natural bridge between Asia and Europe, is

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Resolution of Rido Conflicts in the Philippines

29 See Philip Carl Salzman in Ginat 1997:x.

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32 In Ginat (1997: 15)

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The Rido Studies in Brief

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The study of Prof. Abhoud Syed Lingga of the Institute of Bangsamoro