l Futreduction being absorbed into the internal movement of the object. And the external “reference” (Basichung) which previously connected determination and determination, and determination and determined object, now gives place to relation (Verhdltnis), where to be the one thing is already co be the other with no immediate residue, It is because of this fluidity of determination, by virtue of which distinctions are both posited and transcended at the same time, that the necessity of “essence” gives place to the freedom of the concept, and the kind of self-containedness sought by Spinoza and attained only negatively with his easa ste’ is now obtained positively. nc can also :understand therefore; certain otherwise: puzaling features of the logic of “the concept.” In the first section, which gocs under the title of “subjectivity,” Hegel firsc goes through the three classical deter- minations of the concept, “universal,” “particular,” and “singular”; then ihrough:the various forias-o€ predlcations ax:recogyilzed in:dastical logic and then further through the forms of syllogistic inferences, also according to classical logic = all this in preparation for the transition to the second section which deals with “obje ivity.” It would seem that in this transition Hegel is moving scandalously from the formal (subjective) determination of the concept to a real (objective) determination. And indeed, Hegel is doing just that. But there need be no scandal, no puzzlement. The point is that, in the development of the concept of an object in general which is the Logic, the object is now the concept itself. That is to say, the Logic is now beginning to turn upon itself and becomes a reflection on the diseur- siveness that has so far implicitly subtended and made possible the process of determining the object in general. Discourse progresses by stating itself. Ik thereby particularizes its original theme and hence establishes the need to restate itself over and over again, But at the same time, by virtue of its original theme, it governs this process of particularization, thereby retain- ing its unity and the capacity to declare normatively when it has become an achieved discourse — a thematic totality, This, I take it, is the point that Hegel is making about discourse in general, formally schematizing its structure as the interplay of “universal,” “particular,” and “singular.” Each determination, when taken as the starting point, freely passes over into the other two and back to itself. This fluidity — again, in the medium of artful schematization — is the fluidity of discourse itself. Whether the language of classical formal logic is the best medium for conveying this discourse about discourse that constitutes at the same time the proto-discourse (God first conversing with himself before the creation of the world, as it were) % CE GW 12, 15.35-16.6.Translators note lxix ¢ terms, is that they give rise to bizarre constructions, as for exam- deriva ple “the proof of God’s thereness.” The dictionary translation of Dasein, and also the one that would spontaneously occur to non-philosophers, is “existence.” I see no reason for not using this term, especially because it is easily inflected as “existent” and “existing.” I have adopted it as the translation of Dasein. If it is objected that the term has acquired special- ized meaning for existentialist philosophers or for Thomists of the Gilson/ Maritain school, then my rejoinder is that it is high time that it be philo- sophically repossessed according to its common meaning. For something “so exist” means in English thar it is simply there to be pointed at — exactly what it means in German. As for the need to differentiate Dasein from the Latinate Existenz, Hegel himself gives us the clue. Existeng is an onto- logical term; it is the counterpart of essentia (Wesen) and the reflective parallel of the more immediate Daseint. As Hegel says, “For being which is mediated, we shall reserve the expression Existenz” (GW 21, 80.11-12; also, 12.130.10—12). But mediation is what gencrates concreteness (GW 21, 1ff.). For this reason I have translated Existenz with “concrete existence,” except in such phrases as “the proofs of God's existence [£xistenz]” where the ontological meaning of “existence,” or at least that “existence” is a product of reflective mediation, is clear from the context. But see also Note 30 to 21.80. Differenz. Occasionally Hegel uses this Latinate form instead of the common German Unterschied (see the discussion of Unterschied below). When Hegel resorts to words derived from Latin, this is normally in order to makea poinc that would otherwise be lost in their German counterparts. In the present case, the point that Hegel wants to stress is that two things, in being different, are not thereby indifferent to cach other — that their difference, in other words, entails a mutually significant relation, whether a comparison or a contast. Difforenz and the adjective different can be ren= dered in English, therefore, with “non-indifference” and “non-indifferent.” (In this I am following a suggestion of Suchting, p. xlvi.) The drawback of this solution is that Jndifferenz and indifferent would then have to be trans- lated as “non-non-indifference” and “non-non-indifferent,” obviously not a happy consequence. But fortunately Judifferenz and indifferent, unlike the common Gleichgiiltigkeit and gleichgiiltig, hardly ever appear in the Logic, and when they appear, they do so in contrast to Differenz and different. And this is a contrast that can be rendered well in English with “indif- ference” and “indifferent” without any loss of meaning or stress. I must, however, call attention to one instance in which Hegel, so far as I can cell, uses Differenz to mean “immediate differentiation,” that is, precisely the