Translators note lxix ¢ terms, is that they give rise to bizarre constructions, as for exam- deriva ple “the proof of God’s thereness.” The dictionary translation of Dasein, and also the one that would spontaneously occur to non-philosophers, is “existence.” I see no reason for not using this term, especially because it is easily inflected as “existent” and “existing.” I have adopted it as the translation of Dasein. If it is objected that the term has acquired special- ized meaning for existentialist philosophers or for Thomists of the Gilson/ Maritain school, then my rejoinder is that it is high time that it be philo- sophically repossessed according to its common meaning. For something “so exist” means in English thar it is simply there to be pointed at — exactly what it means in German. As for the need to differentiate Dasein from the Latinate Existenz, Hegel himself gives us the clue. Existeng is an onto- logical term; it is the counterpart of essentia (Wesen) and the reflective parallel of the more immediate Daseint. As Hegel says, “For being which is mediated, we shall reserve the expression Existenz” (GW 21, 80.11-12; also, 12.130.10—12). But mediation is what gencrates concreteness (GW 21, 1ff.). For this reason I have translated Existenz with “concrete existence,” except in such phrases as “the proofs of God's existence [£xistenz]” where the ontological meaning of “existence,” or at least that “existence” is a product of reflective mediation, is clear from the context. But see also Note 30 to 21.80. Differenz. Occasionally Hegel uses this Latinate form instead of the common German Unterschied (see the discussion of Unterschied below). When Hegel resorts to words derived from Latin, this is normally in order to makea poinc that would otherwise be lost in their German counterparts. In the present case, the point that Hegel wants to stress is that two things, in being different, are not thereby indifferent to cach other — that their difference, in other words, entails a mutually significant relation, whether a comparison or a contast. Difforenz and the adjective different can be ren= dered in English, therefore, with “non-indifference” and “non-indifferent.” (In this I am following a suggestion of Suchting, p. xlvi.) The drawback of this solution is that Jndifferenz and indifferent would then have to be trans- lated as “non-non-indifference” and “non-non-indifferent,” obviously not a happy consequence. But fortunately Judifferenz and indifferent, unlike the common Gleichgiiltigkeit and gleichgiiltig, hardly ever appear in the Logic, and when they appear, they do so in contrast to Differenz and different. And this is a contrast that can be rendered well in English with “indif- ference” and “indifferent” without any loss of meaning or stress. I must, however, call attention to one instance in which Hegel, so far as I can cell, uses Differenz to mean “immediate differentiation,” that is, precisely the