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A motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioner in an expropriation case filed by the NPC. The trial court denied the motion inasmuch as the issues raised therein should be dealt with during the trial proper. The Supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But it characterized the order of dismissal as a nullity and referred the case back to the trial court.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioner in an expropriation case filed by the NPC. The trial court denied the motion inasmuch as the issues raised therein should be dealt with during the trial proper. The Supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But it characterized the order of dismissal as a nullity and referred the case back to the trial court.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioner in an expropriation case filed by the NPC. The trial court denied the motion inasmuch as the issues raised therein should be dealt with during the trial proper. The Supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But it characterized the order of dismissal as a nullity and referred the case back to the trial court.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioner, in an expropriation case filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC), alleging certain jurisdictional defects as well as issues on the impropriety of the expropriation measure being imposed on the property. The trial court in that denied the motion inasmuch as the issues raised therein should be dealt with during the trial proper. On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts denial of the motion to dismiss. Issues: Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss is the responsive pleading to the complaint in eminent domain. Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but declared that under the amended provisions of Section 3, Rule 67, which were already in force at about the time the motion to dismiss had been submitted for resolution, all objections and defenses that could be availed of to defeat the expropriators exercise of the power of eminent domain must be contained in an answer and not in a motion to dismiss because these matters require the presentation of evidence. Accordingly, while the Court in that case sustained the setting aside of the motion to dismiss, it nevertheless characterized the order of dismissal as a nullity. Hence, it referred the case back to the trial court and required the NPC to submit its answer to the complaint within 10 days from the finality of the decision. When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had already taken effect. Statutes regulating procedure in the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time those statutes were passed. New court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their effectivity. On April 8, 1997, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that the revisions in the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997. Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground authorized by this provision.