Académique Documents
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Road map
1. Signaling games review
1. Pooling equilibrium
2. Separating equilibrium
3. Mixed
2. Job-market signaling (short, time permitting)
3. Review
4. Evaluations
Signaling Games
Beer Quiche
2
0
3
1
don
t
don
quiche
beer
{.1}
el
du
1
0
du
el
tw
ts
beer {.9}
quiche
e
du
1
1
don
3
0
0
0
du
el
0
1
don
2
1
Beer Quiche
2
0
3
1
don
t
don
quiche
beer
{.1}
el
du
1
0
du
el
tw
ts
beer {.9}
quiche
e
du
1
1
don
3
0
0
0
du
el
0
1
don
2
1
Types of Equilibria
A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in
which all types of sender send the same
message.
A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium in
which all types of sender send different
messages.
A partially separating/pooling equilibrium is
an equilibrium in which some types of sender
send the same message, while some others
sends some other messages.
A Pooling equilibrium
2
0
3
1
don
t
don
quiche
beer
{.1}
el
du
1
0
du
el
tw
ts
beer {.9}
quiche
e
du
1
1
don
3
0
0
0
du
el
0
1
don
2
1
A Separating equilibrium
0.5
0
3
1
don
e
du
quiche
beer
t 0
{.1}
tw
el
du
1
0
du
el
quiche
1 don
t
ts
1 beer {.9}
1
1
don
t
don
3
0
0
0
du
el
0
1
2
1
A Mixed equilibrium
du
el
don
2
0
3
1
el
du
1
0
t
don
quiche
beer
don
{.9}
tw
ts
beer {.1}
e
du
quiche
1
1
3
0
0
0
du
el
0
1
don
2
1
A Mixed equilibrium
du
.5 el
el
du
1
0
.5
3
1
.5
t
don
e
du
quiche
beer
{.9} 8/9
tw
quiche
1 do
n t
ts
.5 beer {.1}
1
1
don
3
0
0
0
du
el
0
1
2
1
Model
A worker
with ability t = H or t = L (his private information)
Pr(t = H) = q,
obtains an observable education level e,
incurring cost c(t,e) where c(H,e) < c(L,e), and
finds a job with wage w(e), where he
produces y(t,e).
Equilibrium
(eH, eL, w(e), (H|e)) where
et = argmaxe w(e) c(t,e) for each t;
w(e) = (H|e)y(H,e) + (1 (H|e))y(L,e);
(H|e) =
qPr(eH = e)
qPr(eH = e) + (1-q)Pr(eL = e)
whenever well-defined.
)
w (e
e)
,
t
(
y
e*(t)
No need to imitate
, e)
H
(
y
,e)
L
(
y
e*(L)
e*(H)
No need to imitate
w(.)
e)
,
y (H
,e)
L
(
y
e*(L)
e*(H)
want to imitate
w
, e)
H
(
y
,e)
L
(
y
e*(L) e*(H)
A pooling equilibrium
w
, e)
H
y(
qy(
H ,e
(
q) y
1
+(
)
L ,e
,e)
L
(
y
e*(L) e*(H)
A separating equilibrium
w
, e)
H
(
y
,e)
L
(
y
eL=e*(L)
e*(H)
eH
10
e)
,
y (H
,e)
L
(
y
eL=e*(L)
eH
11