1959] TAXATION 291 criminal action for the same should be brought within five years from the viola- tion of the law, or if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.18 D. REMEDIES OF TAXPAYER— I. Claim for refund— Under section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code, no suit in court may be brought for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until a claim for refund has been filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue, and in any case, no such suit may be brought after the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax. Clearly, therefore, the taxpayer must make a claim for refund and bring a court action, A claim for refund not followed by judicial action avails the claimant nothing.*? And the taxpayer is entitled to refund only if he brings the action within two years from the date of payment. In other words, all overpayment or illegal collection made beyond the two-year period may not be refunded.’ Said period should be counted from the date of the court action, and not from the date of the claim for refund. Thus in the case of Panay Electric Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue,* since the court action was brought on August 20, 1952, although the claim for vefund was made on April 16, 1952, under a strict interpretation of the law, the petitioner could get a refund for taxes illegally collected two years from August 20, 1952—i.e., only taxes paid on or after August 20, 1950 would be refundable. Those paid before are not. However, the Supreme Court relaxed the rule due to the peculiar circumstances of the case,*° more important of which was the fact that the Collector was willing to refund all taxes from the date of the claim for refund, This offer on the part of the Collector can be considered an exercise of his power to compro- mise cases involving erroneous collection of taxes paid for a period of two years from the date of claim for refund.** Furthermore, the Court stated, the Col- lector told the taxpayer that steps had already been taken to refund the taxes, which act the Court considered as a waiver of the prescriptive period. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed a refund of all taxes paid since the date of the claim for refund. IL. Doctrine of equitable recoupment— The doctrine of equitable recoupment means that when the refund of a tax illegally or erroneously collected or overpaid by a taxpayer is barred by the statute of limitations and a tax is being presently assessed against said tax- payer, said present tax may be recouped or set off against the tax, the refund of which has been barred, The same thing would be true where the Government has failed to collect a tax within the period of limitation and said collection is already barred, and the taxpayer has to his credit a tax illegally or erroneously collected or overpaid, whose refund is not yet barred, the Government need not make refund of all the illegally or erroneously collected tax, but it may set off nan, 188, 1 Act 3826 as amended by Act $585. Applied in the case of People v. Ching supra, ‘See Panay Electric Co. v. Collector, G.R. No. Tol0S74, May 28, 1068. Tid. % Tid. The petitioner int this case had paid a Sch franchise tax under RA 40 amending sec. 269 gf the Int, "Rev. Code, in spite of the fact that ite charter imposed only a 2% franchise tax. Subseauentiy, the decision of the Supreme Court in the cate of Phil. Railway v. Collector, GR. No. L-13859, March 25, 1962, was released and under this, RA Xi was held’ inavplicable to holders of franchises which fix a specifi rate of franchise tax, Section 309, Int. Rev. Code.292 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [Vou 34 against it the tax whose collection is barred by the statute of limitations? In the ease of Collector of Internal Revenue v. University of Santo Tomas, supra, the Supreme Court was faced with the question whether this doctrine is appli- cable in this jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals, although it had found that the amount erroneously collected from the University of Santo Tomas could not be refunded because the claim was filed beyond the two-year period, applying the doctrine of equitable recoupment, held that the percentage tax and surcharge which where valid charges against the University, may and should be set off or credited against and to the extent of the amount of taxes erroneously col- lected, The Supreme Court however, reversed the Tax Court and held that this doctrine is not applicable in this jurisdiction. To start with, the Court ob- served, this is a common law principle and is not binding on our courts, and there is nothing in our laws, particularly the tax law, authorizing its eccept- ance and application. Said the Court: = We fully realize the advantages of the doctrine both to the Government and to the taxpayer, but we feel and we believe that the drawbacks to the acceptance and enforce- ‘ment of equitable recoupment far outweigh any advantage and benefit to be derived there- from, and unless and untit the Legislature ees fit and finds it beneficial and necessary to introduce this doctrine into this jurisdiction by means of legislation, we are not pre pared, nelther are we inclined to accept and introduce the same as @ legal principle which ‘the courts may invoke and apply in the course of interpreting and applying the tax laws. With this doctrine enforced and available to both parties, the tax collecting gency would be tempted to celay and neglect the collection of taxes within the period set by the Inw, confident that when it finally wakes up from its lethargy, it could still recover the tax it failed to collect by having it set off or recouped from any tax whieh it may have illegally collected from the taxpayer. And this is not without its resulting danger, because a collector, to play safe and have a fund available for said set off and recoupment of a tax which he had failed and neglected to collect, may be tempted to make iltegal assessments and collections, and the taxpayer would he helpless beeause however illegal and unauthorized the assessment may he, the Collector ean always enforce the same by levy and distraint, and the only remedy of the taxpayer would be to file « formal demand for refund, followed by 2 court suit to enforee the demand. As regards the tax. payer, he may also be tempted to delay and neglect the filing of the corresponding suit for refund of @ tax illegally or erroneously collected, trusting that he can always recover or be credited with the sane or part thereof by refusing to pay a valid tax assessed ‘against him and compelling the Government to vet off the same against a tax payment he could no longer recover.” ‘The Supreme Court concluded with the statement that the acceptance and adop- tion of such doctrine should be left to the sound discretion of the Legislature. IIL. Injunction— Under Section 305 of the Internal Revenue Code, no court has authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax, This provision was however modified by section 11 of Republie Act No. 1125, under which the Court of Tax Appeals may suspend said collection, when in its opinion, the collection may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or taxpayer, and may require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a bond for not more than double the amount. In the cases of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Aznars* Chua Joy v. Col- lector of Internal Revenue ® and Collector of Internal Revenue v. Quero,? our Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that when income taxes are sought to be summarily collected by distraint or levy beyond three yeays from the filing S Collector v. UST & Court of Tax Appeals, GIR. No. 11274, Nov. 28, 1958, "GR No. £-10370, Jan. 81, 1958: T-10961, Feb, 28, 1958, 111456, April 28, 19581959] TAXATION 293 of retruns,®! the Court of Tax Appeals may issue an injunction restraining such manner of collection, And in such a case, the injunction may be issued without requiring the taxpayer to file a bond because the summary collection is illegal, it being beyond the period allowed by law.?2 The injunction cannot be granted by any court other than the Court of Tax Appeals. A Court of First Instance therefore has no power nor jurisdiction to restrain collection of taxes, and the mere fact that the complaint asks for dem- ages in addition to the restraint of collection, docs not alter the situation be- cause such prayer is merely incidental to the main case and the Court of Tax Appeals can grant such damages if and when the evidence so warrants.’ The Court of First Instasee may therefore be restrained by the Supreme Court from issuing an injunction suspending the collection of a national internal revenue tax.0 IV. Appeal to the Court of Taz Appeals Under section 7 of Republie Act 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has exclu- sive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue involving disputed assessments In such cases, therefore, the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Collector’s ruling, In the case of Carlos Ledesma v, Court of Tax Appeals & Blaquera, the Su- preme Court stated that one reason why Republic Act 1125 transferred tax cases from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Tax Appeals was that, considering the many cases on different subject matters which the Courts of First Instance had to hear and determine, oftentimes disputed tax assessment cases took a Jong time to decide, and so for the purposes of expediency and prompt collection of taxes, the Court of Tax Appeals was created, and was given a limited time within which to determine said cases.27 The appeal must be filed by the taxpayer within thirty days from the re- ceipt of the Collector's decision, In the case of St. Stephen's Assn. & St. Ste- phen’s Chinese Girls School v. Collector of Internal Revenue,’ the Collector sent an Assessment Notice to the petitioner dated October 15, 1954, A request for the withdrawal and cancellation of the assessment notice was made by peti- tioners on November 13, 1954. The denial of the request was received by the taxpayer on April 21, 1955. On May 5, 1955, another request for reconsidera- tion was made which was again denied. Notice of such denial which was re- ceived on July 25, 1955, stated that: “This decision becomes final thirty days after your receipt hereof unless an appeal is taken to the Court of Tax Appeals within the same period, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 1125.” Within thirty days from receipt thereof, the taxpayers filed a petition for re- view with the Court of Tax Appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that the thirty-day period of appeal should be counted from the petitioner's receipt of assessment notice, and that said period had already expired. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that where the taxpayer questions an assessment and asks the Collector to reconsider or cancel the same because he believes he is not liable therefor, the assessment becomes a “disputed assess- ment?” that the Collector must decide, and the taxpayer can appeal to the Court Seo Sec. 51(d) and previous discussion on means of collection, supra, (The Court cited the eases of Collector v. "A. P. Reyes, GR, Nov L-8085, Ji Gyilector v. Zulueta, GR. L. No. L-8840, Nov. 19, 1058.-and. Collector ©. “Avcino’ 202, Nov. 19, 1956, See also Phil. Law Journal, Vol, XXXII Neo, oA E Blaquera v. Rodriguez, GR. No. L-1110%, April. 16, 1958, BBlaquera v. Rodriguez, GR. Ne. L-11268, March 39, 1938, See Blaquera v. Rodriguez, GR. No. L-1i182, April 16. 1958, HGR. No, L-11943, Jan. 29, 1908, (Thirty days from’ submission. See. 18, RA 1125, “GR. No. L-11288, ‘August 21, 1988.294 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [Vor. 34 of Tax Appeals only upon receipt of the decision of the Collector on the dis- puted assessment, in accordance with paragraph (1) of section 7 of Republic ‘Act 1125, conferring appellate jurisdiction upon such Court to review “decisions of the Collector of the Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assess- ments. . .” Therefore, said the Supreme Court, the period of appeal must be counted from the date the petitioners received the decision of the Collector on the disputed assessment, and not from the time they received said assessment. In this case, the final decision of the Collector was the one received on July 25, 1955. His prior letters were considered by the Court as tentative in character since he had merely held the matter under advisement pending his final deter- mination of the arguments submitted by the petitioner. Consequently, the appeal had been filed within the, time allowed by law. E. Customs Law— Under section 1363 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Collector of Customs is authorized to seize and forfeit any merchandise the importation ov exportation of which is effected by any false declaration or affidavit or false invoice. In the case of Que Lo Pay v. Central Bank, an exporter had stated in his export entry that the shipment in question consisted of 50 bundles of salted dried fish. It turned out however, that among the fish, the exporter had concealed gold bars and US money bills and treasury warrants. The Collector of Customs seized the same on the ground that their exportation was prohibited by law and that the exporter was guilty of making a false statement in his export entry. In an action brought by the exporter for the recovery of the mer- chandise, the Supreme Court held that, although the exporter had been acquitted in a criminal complaint for the expoitation of prohibited merchandise, there was enough justification for the Collector of Customs to order the seizure of the articles for the same were not declared by the exporter in the export entry issued to him, Since the exporter was guilty of a false declaration, there was a proper seizure under section 1368 of the Revised Administrative Code. Under sections 1370-1873 and 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code, ap- peal may be taken from the decision of the Collector to the Commissioner of Customs provided said appeal is filed within fifteen days after notification of the decision. The case of Stonehill Steel Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs 1 involved a claim for refund of customs duties paid about four years earlier. Said duties were paid voluntarily because they were then validly imposed. Sub- sequently, however, a law was passed which the importer claimed to have the effect of exempting him from the customs duties paid by him, the exemption having a retroactive effect. Among others, the question arose as to whether the fifteen-day period of appeal above-mentioned was applicable to the im- porter in this case, The Supreme Court held that it was not. The Court ob- served that sections 1870-1373 and 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code apparently refer to a ruling or decision of the Collector of Customs wherein liability for customs duties is determined, in which case, the party adversely affected by such ruling, after paying the amount of the assessment, may make a protest and the Collector will reexamine the matter, and should he overrule the protest, the party aggrieved is required to appeal to the Commissioner within fifteen days after notice, otherwise the ruling of the Collector becomes final and conclusive. Said sections, according to the Court, referring as they GR. No. L-11019, Nov. 28, 1968. woGentral Bank Circular No. 20 which prohibited importation of the merchandise in question was held inapplicable to the exporter because of failure of its publication in the Official Gazette. WGR No. L-10841, March 24, 1968.1959] TAXATION 295 do to assessments made by a Collector alleged to be illegal, cannot refer to a case of refund of duties which have been validly assessed and the amount volun- tarily paid by the importer, without any objection or protest. Should the importer fail to appeal to the Commissioner after an adverse decision of the Collector of Customs, he cannot sort to the Court of Tax Appeals, because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.#¢? In this connection, the Supreme Court in the case of Sampaguita Shoe & Slipper Factory v. Commissioner of Customs‘! vepeated its previous statement in the case of Lopez & Sons v. Court of Tux Appeals! that the words “Collector of Customs in section 11 of Republie Act 1125 providing for appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals should be read as “Commissioner of Customs,” so that what may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals is the decision, not of the Col- lector of Customs, but of the Commissioner of Customs. F, Exemprions 1 New and necessary industries are exempted from payment of all taxes.1°° In the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Industrial Textiles Co.,°T the respondent was engaged in the manufacture of jute bags and was considered a new and necessary industry. Its exemption certificate provided that all “articles, goods or materials used exclusively in the new and necessary industry” were exempt from taxes. The respondent imported cement for use in the con- struction of its building. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed a com- pensating tax on the cement on the ground that it was not within the exemption, cement not being used in the manufacture of jute bags. In deciding the case in favor of exemption, the Supreme Court declared that the main purpose of the law in exempting new and necessary industries is to encourage the estab- lishment and operation of such industries. The Court observed that materials for the manufacture of jute bags constitute only one of the factors necessary for their production. The same generally requires buildings or structures to house the machinery, equipment, tools and materials necessary to manufacture said articles, goods or merchandise, the production of which constitutes a new and necessary industry. Provided that the cement in question is used exclu- sively in the construction of said buildings and structures, which in turn would be exclusively used for the manufacture of said articles, goods or merchandise, the said cement, according to the Court, is within the exemption; otherwise, the goal of the law could not possibly be achieved. Under the Military Bases Agreement between the United States and the Philippines, it is mutually agreed that: = the United States shall have the right to establish on bases free of all licenses, fees, sales, excise or other taxes, or imposts, Government agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries and post exchanges, messes and social clubs, for the exclusive use of the United States Military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their families, ‘The merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies shall be free of all taxes, duties, and inspection by the Philippine Authorities... .7"8 Does this mean that the income derived by a Filipino concessionaire in the operation of his concession is exempt from income tax on the receipts thereof? 4 Sampaguita Shoe & Slipper Factory v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R, No. L-10285, Jan. 14, 1958 i oid. 168 0G No. 10, p, 8065, See also Phil, Taw Journal, Annual Survey of 1957 cases on taxation, Vol, AKI, "No. bp. 316. ‘Some of the cases dealing on exemption were discussed under the corresponding tax involved, supra : peed mi See Hep, Act No. 901 wer GiR, No, 110956, April 25, 1958, ™ Article XVIII, Par. 1296 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [Von 34 In the cases of Canlas et al v, Republic of the Philippines and Sergio Na- guiat v. J.\Antonio Araneta, this question was answered in the negative. The Supreme Court considered the above-mentioned agreement as limiting exemption from the licenses, fees and taxes enumerated therein to the right to establish Government agencies, including concessions, and to the merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies. The income tax, which is certainly not on the right to establish agencies, or on the merchandise or services sold or dis- pensed thereby, but on the owner or operator of such agencies, is logically ex- cluded. The payment by the latter of the income tax, observed the Court, is perfectly consistent with and would not frustrate the obvious objective of the agreement, namely, to enable the members of the US Military Forces and author- ized civilian personnel and their families to procure merchandise or services within the bases at reduced prices.!t1 Furthermore, the Court pointed out the fact that exemption from the income tax is treated under different provisions of the treaty, under which Filipino citizens are not included, G. Munreian TaxaTion— It is @ well-known and well-settled principle that a municipal corporation has no inherent power of taxation and that its power to tax is derived from express provision of law, and that in case of doubt, it must be resolved against the corporation. The cases of Serafin Saldaita v. City of Iloilo 2 and Santos Lumber Co. v. City of Cebu reiterated this principle. In the first case, the City of Tloilo passed an ordinance imposing a fee for the issuance of a license permit to carry food supply and labor animals outside of the municipality, ‘The fee was fixed per head of animal—for example, P10 per head of large cattle, PO per pig or goat. This amount, according to the Court, was way in excess of the cost of inspection and issuance of the permits and were therefore clearly imposed for the purposes, not of regulation, but of raising revenue, making it a tax and not merely a license fee. Nowhere in the Charter of the City of Ioilo is it authorized to collect taxes for taking out animals, Furthermore, under section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code, a municipal council has no power to impose a tax in any form upon goods or merchandise carried out of the municipality and any attempt to do so shall be void. The Court therefore concluded that the ordinance was ultra vires the city and therefore null and void. In the case of Santos Lumber Co. v. City of Cebu, supra, the defendant passed an ordinance imposing a tax on the first local sale of lumber. The char- ter of the city empowered the. Municipal Board “to tax, fix the license fee for, regulate the business, and fix the location of . . . lumber yards, ship yards, the storage and sale of gunpowder, tar, pitch . . .”1™ The Court held that although the City may tax the sale of gunpowder, tar, pitch, ete., it had no power to tax the sale of lumber but merely the busiacss of uber yards. The ordinance was therefore void. In the case of Zosimo Rojas & Bros. v. City of Cavite, the City of Cavite, in pursuance of a power granted to it by its charter, imposed a license fee of F800 per annum on proprietors of theaters. The City however passed another ordinance imposing an additional tax of P0.03 and P0.05 on tickets for every 3 Git. No. L-11805, May 21, 1958, pe GR. No. 111694, Dee, 2%, 195%, 3 Naguiat v. Araneta, supra. #.G.RO No. L-10470, June 26, 1958, #G:K. No. -10196, Jan. 22," 1958 Pt Section i7(m)_of the City Charter of Cebu. GR No, L-10780, May 26, 1968.1959] TAXATION 297 general admission ticket and every balcony ticket respectively. The Court held this additional tax to be an assessment against the theater business itself and there being no express provision of law granting the City the power to impose such a tax, it was illegal and void as being beyond the power of the City to im- pose. The Court however, refused recovery in favor of the theater owner be- cause the right to such recovery belongs not to him but to the public patronizing the theaters.116 Cited Medina v. Baguio, 48 OG (8) 4769.CONTENTS VOLUME 34 JULY, 1959 NUMBER 3 ARTICLES Page Scope OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY .. Ramon C. Aquino 299 ‘Te Rute MAKING PowER oF THE SuPREME Court . Carlos A. Barrios 315 A SECOND Look AT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ...... Ramon C, Portugal 319 ~OMMENTS ‘THe RIGHT or DiPLoMATIC ASYLUM .... SraruToRY CoNsTRUCTION — 1958. Romulo S. Gatilao, Emerito O. . Arturo EB. Balbastro 343 ‘olentino, Aniceto G. Satudo, Jr. 368 RECENT DOCUMENT Opinion of the Secretary of Justice on “whether or not the Third Secretary of the Argentine Legation may sell his personally owned automobile which entered the Philippines, free of duty and tax, on March 8, 1955, after using it for three years, with- out the payment of duty and tax on his part nor on the part of the buyer who may not be tax-exempt, on ground of recipro- city” and, in the negative, as to “whether an cxecutive agreement could be validly entered into between the two Governments with a view to providing for reciprocal treatment on the matter along the same lines permitted by Argentine law.” (Opinion No. 211, s. 1958) . angag 406 RECENT LEGISLATION An Act to Amend and Revise the Laws Relative to Philippine Civil Service ... sone eee 409) BOOK REVIEWS New York UNIVERSITY SCHOOL oF LAW: 1957 Annual Surevy of American Law .... Ramon C. Aquino 423 J, PAUL DE RIVER: Crime and the Sexual Psychopath .. Alfonso A, Martinez, Jr. 424SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY Ramon C. AQuINO* Introduction.—.The Revised Penal Code ufter defining felonies (delitos) in article 8 clarifies the scope of criminal liability in article 4 which reads: ART. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be in- curred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibil- ity of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of in- adequate or ineffectual means. In the old Code the concept of felonies and misdemeanors (fal‘as) and the scope of criminal liability were found in article 1, Paragraph 1 of article 4 corresponds to the third paragraph of article 1 of the old Code. The second paragraph of article 4 regarding the im- possible crime is a new provision. If the accused accomplished the felony which he had intended to commit, as where he intended to kill X and actually killed the latter, there is no question that he is criminally liable. The resulting wrongful act was that which he intended. But where the accused intended only to inflict injuries on X but the injuries caused the death of the latter, or where he intended to kill X but the fatal blow was inflicted on Y, a doubt may exist as to the criminal liability of the accused. That doubt is dissipated by article 4 which plainly pro- vides that the accused is criminally liable for the resulting wrongful act. The first paragraph of article 4 synchronizes with the disput- able presumption established in section 69 (c), Rule 123, Rules of Court, “that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his vol- untary act.” For example, where the defendant, who was suffering from gonorrhea, raped a 14-year old girl, and three months later the girl died due to peritonitis caused by the gonorrhea infection, the defendant was convicted not only of rape but of the complex crime of rape with homicide Or where the accused struck twice with his fist a pregnant woman and in consequence she had a hemorrhage, abortion and premature delivery and she and her twin babies died, the accused was held liable for the complex crime of homicide with abortion Or where the victim’s wound was infected with tetanus (UP); Professnr of Law, Colleze of Law, University of ty Philippines. 1 People ¥. Acosta Rivers, G0 Phi 158 2 People ¥. Genoves, G1 Phil, 382. 299300 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL Vou. 34, No. 3 and the tetanus infection contributed to his death, the accused is liable for homicide.’ Where the accomplices had conspired with the principal to com- mit forcible abduction, they were held liable as accomplices in hom- icide, the offense actually committed by the principal.* By reason of article 4 the accused may be held liable for the damage caused to a third person by his criminal act. This is in consonance with the rule in article 107 that the indemnification for consequential damages includes those suffered by a third person by reason of the crime.* All punishable acts are presumed to have been performed volun- tarily in the absence of contrary evidence. With respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsi- ble for all the consequences thereof.’ The gravity of the injury is measured not by the means employed but by the result produced. The first paragraph of article 4 is frequently applied in homi- cide cases, where the defendant intends merely to inflict physical injuries but the victim’s death ensues due to (a) the very injuries caused, (b) the weak or diseased physical condition of the victim, (c) his temperament or the complications brought about by the in- juries, or (d) lack of medical care or improper medical treatment. It is also article 4 that applies to mistake as to victim or aberratio ictus. The essential requisites for the application of article 4 are that (a) the intended act be felonious, (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony, and (c) the unintended or graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. In many cases, lack of intent to commit so grave wrong is mitigating. If the defendant's act was lawful and he was not negligent, and the victim’s injuries were due to his own fault or were not the direct result of defendant’s acts, the defendant is not liable” If the defendant performing a lawful act was negligent, he would be liable for the resulting felony committed through culpa.‘ By reason of article 4 a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no intent to kill.? In cases falling under the first part of article 4, it would not be tenable to hold that simply because the defendant had no intex* to kill, his crime should be categorized as homicide through reckless imprudence. As the defendant acted with malice, his crime would * be committed by means of dolo and not by culpa. A deliberate in- 2 Prople v, Cornel, T8 Phil, 458: People Red, 8 ACR OM Penal Cote, ‘meriano Ranios, 28 Phil. 300: People v. Almonte, 168 citing Spanish case of April 3, 1879, People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15. 0 Phil 61. People TU. 8.'v. Andres Villanueva, 31 BU, 8, v. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil. 175, Pico v. U, 8, ST L. ed, 812, 40 Phil, 1127,,15 Phil. 549,JULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 301 tent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Dolo and culpa are incompatible.'° The acts constitutive of reckless imprudence “must be lawful, in them- selves.”!" Rationale of article 4. — The reason for the rule of the first paragraph of article 4 is stated in People v. Quianzon,” as follows: “One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homi- cide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. ‘The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility.” He would still be liable “even if the deceased might have rcovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical opration, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, on that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of the universal application, It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alfer its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which are themselves con- sequences of the criminal act, must in law he deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he must be responsible.” “The rule has its foundation on a wise and practical policy. A different ductrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a sal- utary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of me- dicai men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bod iy ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homi- cide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and th by open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest er might escape conviction and punishment.” In the Quianzon case, supra, it appears that Andres Aribuabo, a sexagenarian, on the occasion of a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a decedent, asked food from Juan Quianzon, also a sex- agenarian who had the victuals under his care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo had approached Quianzon for the same purpose, and the latter becoming annoyed, took hold of a firebrand and applied it to the neck of the man who was pestering him. He also wounded Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. Aribuabo ran to the place where the people were gathered, exclaiming that he was 1 People ¥. Guillen, 8 Phil. 967: People v 7a Phil. 7: rnd Galant 11 People. : e A 51 0G 4182; People ¥, Grande, CA 49 OG 2X02: Almonte, 36 Phil. 34302 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL Vou. 34, No. 3 wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. He died as a result of his wound on the tenth day after the incident. Quian- zon was charged with homicide. It was contended that he was only liable for serious physical injuries because death would not have resulted had not the victim removed twice the drainage which the doctor had placed to control the infection in the wound. Held: Quianzon was guilty of homicide. The possibility that the victim might have survived had he not removed the drainage does not mean that that act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable act of the accused. Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient in removing the drainage had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preser- vation is the strongest instinct in living beings. It must be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological condi- tion and his state of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contact of the drainage tube with the inflamed peritoneum. If to this is added the fact tiat the victim was mentally deranged, it becomes more evident that the accused is wrong in imputing the natural conse- quences of his criminal act to an act of his victim. Lack of in- struction and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong were miti- gating. Same rule in Spanish jurisprudence. — In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court dated April 8, 1879, cited in the Quianzon and Almonte cases, supra, it was held: “Inasmuch as a man is res- ponsible for the consequences of his act — and in this case the phy: ical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counter- act its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be quali- fied as homicide.” Nervousness or temperament of the victim. — Similar to the Quianzon case, supra, is the case of People v. Purificacion Almonte," which applies the rule that the temperament or physical condition of the victim does not alter the criminal liability of the defendant for the resulting felony. It was held in the Almonte case that — When a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor’s orders, not because of carelessness or a desire to increase the criminal liability of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said lant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor was of the opinion that the wound might have Phil 54.JULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 303, healed in seven days. The accused is then liable for all acts contrary to law and their nautral and logical consequences. It appears in the Almonte case that Purificacion Almonte lived maritally with the Chinaman Felix Te Sue, a married man. Because one Miguela Daway, with whom he had also lived maritally, threat- ened to bring suit against him unless he rejoined her, the China- man and Purificacion voluntarily agreed to separate. ‘On October 1, 1930 Purificacion visited her former paramour and found him with Miguela. When he saw Purificacion, he told her to go away at once because her new paramour might get jealous and do her harm. Purificacion insisted upon remaining and on being pushed by the Chinaman and Miguela and feeling that she was unjustly treated, she stabbed the Chinaman in the abdomen with a small pen- knife. “Horrified at her deed, she fled to the street, leaving the blade sticking in her vietim’s abdomen. She took the first bus that chanced to pass and went home. The Chinaman was hospitalized. The wound was not serious but due to the victim’s nervous condi- tion and the fact that he repeatedly sat in bed, got up and paced the room, contrary to the doctor’s orders, a hemorrhage ensued and this caused his death. Purificacion was convicted of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and obfuscation arising from the fact that she was pushed out of the room. Three justices dissented. They opined that Puri cion was guilty only of slight physical injuries and that the victim’s death was due to his own carelessness. Cases where death was due to the injuries inflicted. — Anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his crim- inal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the inju- ries.'* As stated in another case, persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are also liable for all the consequences ing therefrom and inherent therein, other than those due to incidents entirely foreign to the act committed, or which originate through the fault or carelessness of the injured person. Where a person voluntarily and with intent to injure another commits an act which is notoriously unlawful, he shall be held re- sponsible for the consequences of his criminal action, even though when such wrongful act constitutes homicide, he had no intent to kill the deceased.” The physical condition, state of health and tem- perament of the injured person constitute no reason for reducing the responsibility of the aggresor. The gravity of the injury is me- asured not by the means employed but by result produced.'* The fact that the defendant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability 1 People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1098, 10U. S. v, Monasterial, 14 Phil, 891: U. S, ¥. Daccuel, 46 Phil, 781 170. Sv, Montes, 6 Phil. 444 ABT. 8. v. Capaducla, 4 Phil, U.S. v. Numeriane Ramos, 80 Phil. 58; People v. Almonte, 56 Phil. 54, G1: People v. Qui Spanish decision dated April 3, 1879, Phi, 300; People v. Buyco, on, G2 Phil. 162, 168 citing304 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL Vou. 34, No. 3 for the resulting homicide or murder.!” ‘The accused person guilty of maltreatment of another person who died later is responsible for his death resulting from the violent acts of the accused, where it has not been shown that the death was due to natural causes.”” Homicide is committed when death ensues as a result of a wound inflicted by another, whether the death be the precise and necessary consequence of the injuries or the result of complica- tions from such wounds, such a rare fever not imputable to the victim. The aggressor is responsible for all the natural conse- quences of the aggression when these consequences do not owe, their origin to the malicious acts or omissions of the victim. Lack of medical care or improper medical treatment. — Our courts have adopted the following rule in American jurisprudence: “He who inflicts injuries is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of death was erroneous or un- skillful medical or surgical treatment.” ” In other words, “the neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act which might naturally follow in any case must in law be deemed to have been among those consequences which were in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he is to be held re- sponsible.”?5 Or, as stated in another case: “An individual who unlawfully inflicts’ wound upon another person, which result in the death of ihe latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility.” Lack of medical care cannot be attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the wound is responsible for the result thereof.” ‘A person injured in an assault is not obliged to submit to a sur gical operation to relieve the person who assaulted him from the People v, Enriaven, 5% mil. 180 Sv. Candelaria, 2 DPhil 104; Peop Su: People v. Alburqueraue, 4 Phil, 1 People v. Rabav, 7 Phil Pevple ¥. Lunas Phil. 3117, 9) UL Sv Carrere, 9 Phil People ¥. Tatees, CA GR No. 3007-R, VU. S. v, Gabriel Diaz, 19 Phil PS. v. Sornite, 4 Pin 375 Phil Sy z nie Navarre, 7 Phil. 713, ‘Spanish decisions Gated May and 3@ Phil, 11: Pie ¥. U: 4; Peowte v. Baguinda, CA 44 Phil wy 80, 189 People! y. Mokles, 61 Piit, 1, citing 20 CJ, AWSt: 40 CIS 853; Peowle v. Armada, CA 45 OG People v. Altona, CA 46 0% Tn the Molles ease, the aceised wounded the deevascd in tie Heft arm, He contended that the wund woukt mot have been fatal had the deceased scented jieal treatments This contention “vas not sustained, In ah outlying are hte the assault took lacs, proper iodera strzical servive wus wot avatiable, The avsewred was convieted of homicide, ‘Am dur, 183 cited in People vy. Moratles, C Det, Sy, Becalona, 12 PhIL St; CS. y, Berti 14: People ¥. Borbano, 76 Phil, 102: People v. Cornel, 7S Phil An the a ease, ts aed admitted having inflicted the wonnd on one Bernardo Pisions who died Go divs alice no was wounded wound was on the Wrist, A gunitury inspector testified thet ik the we taded man had been propery treated by a surgcon, hoe would not have dicd, The wourst wild nave healed in G0 days, ‘The accusrd was convicted of homfcide, Even if the iniured Demon WouKE not have dick Ind there becw prover medical attendance, the erime wows still the homieide 0 0G 179, 1 Phil 47; U.S. v. Mallar, 29 PhilJULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 305 natural and ordinary results of his crime. The assailant must abide by the consequences resulting from his voluntary act without any aid from the injured party.* “The fact that a person unlawfully wounded is unable to secure medical attendance because he is unable to pay for such service, for which reason the wounds require a long time to heal, does not in any way modify the responsibility of the aggressor, provided that the injured person does nothing to retard the healing.” This rul- ing was amplified in a later case, where it was held that the per. petrator’s responsibility cannot be lessened on account of the vic tim’s bad state of health or weakened constitution caused, for ex- ample, by his habit of drinking tuba which affected his constitution and retarded the healing of his wounds.? Cases where the victim had a weakened physical condition or was suffering from some disease. — Following article 4, it was held that: “One who commits an act in violation of the penal law is re- sponsible for all the consequences which may result therefrom, whe- ther foreseen or intended or not. Where a trivial assault results in death on account of the abnormal pathological condition of the vie- tim, the act nevertheless constitutes the crime of homicide.” Even though a blow with a fist or a kick does not cause any external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peri- tonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if a blow with the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury wilfully in- flicted. In v. Brobst,*° it was ruled: “One is not relieved from criminal responsibility for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such. conse- quences. Where death results as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death does not re- lieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.” But in such cases lack of intent to commit the graver wrong is mitigating. In the Brobst case, James Brobst and one Mann were engaged in work on a mine. Mann discharged a laborer named Simeon Sal- divar, warning him not to come back to the premises of the mine. Mann told Brobst not to employ Saldivar again because he was a thief and a disturbing element. But Saldivar returned to the pre- mises. Brobst ordered him to leave. Saldivar merely grinned at Brobst, whereupon the latter became enraged, took three steps to- ¥. Filomeno Marasiean, 27 Phil. 504, w. Baoit, 15 Phil, 938, W. Bayutas, 82 Phil. 384 Inciano'2 Phil. 96, where the accused steuck the victim with a hole cane caus ing slight byaises. After walking a short distance the vietini collapsed and died a tow. hours sickly and bud fever and a hyperiropied spleen. Death was due to hemosrhase the ruptire of the spleen, 20.0. S. v. Rosaline Rotiguez, 23 Phil. 22 014 Phil. 310,306 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL VoL. 34, No. 8 ward Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where Sal- divar’s bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered, and without saying a word, went 200 yards away. He died as he reached the door of his sister’s house. It was contended that death might not have ensued from the mere force of the blow but from a physical defect. Held: Brobst was liable for Saldivar’s death. His act was not reckless imprudence since he intended to inflict harm on the victim. Two justices, dissenting, opined that Brobst should be acquitted be- cause there was no conclusive proof that his act was the cause of Saldivar’s death and moreover he acted in defense of his property. ‘A person, who cruelly maltreats one who is sick, is liable for homicide should the latter die as a result of such maltreatment. ‘The circumstance that he did not intend to cause so serious an evil as the death of a person does not exempt him from liability, inas- much as he wilfully executed acts which are notoriously wrongful." “In a ease of homicide resulting from blows received by the victim, the allegation that the deceased, prior to the attack, was suffering from some affection of the heart, even if established, would only tend to show a peculiarly sensitive and critical condition of health in which the blows received were the more likely to prove fatal, but would not change the efficient cause of death.”? The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from incipient tuberculosis does not affect the criminal liability of the defendant who gave him a severe blow, from the effects of which the victim died. For, even if the victim's weakened condition ren- dered the blow more fatal, the efficient cause of the death remains the same.** In U.S. v. Lugo, it was held that where a person previously ill is wounded in a manner that might have proved fatal, his death within a reasonable time thereafter will, in the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, be considered the result of the wounds than of the disease. In the Lugo case, the defendant assaulted a sex- agenarian woman, far gone in consumption, while she was asleep 10a, 15 Phi, 227, In the Samoa case, supra, the defendant st ic om diffrent 1 hour he died. He was suffering from hypertrophy of the he ‘died! of hea distance, where after fant Was convicted of homicide although the doctor test due to mitral insuffieleney. Same holding in U.S. faten waz ick and the hastened his death did not justify People v. Sia Bonkia, 60 Phil. years, who had’ maltreated his children’ by pinchins ono on the nove and pricking in tHe cheeck with a phonosraph needle. Defendant hanzed her from a pulley fastened 10 ‘of his room by means of a rope ed to her wrists, which were crossed al her died later. It was contended that her desta was due to her ill health, She was suffering from nephritis end bronchopneumonia, This contention was not sustained. Defendant was convicted of homicide, Justice Abad Santos opined that the crime was homicide throush reckless imprudence, I. 8. v. Fenix, 11 Phil. 95. 89 People v. Tustre, 54 Phil, 594 348 Phil, $0,JULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 3807 in her house. She sustained seven wounds. She died one month after the assault. The defendants were convicted of murder. Where due to a fist blow inflicted by the accused upon the complainant, the latter’s natural teeth were broken and had to be extracted, the accused is still liable for serious physical injuries, al- though the complainant was suffering from pyorrhea alveolaris. ‘The accused is liabie for all the direct consequences of his malicious acts.3* Even supposing that the blows inflicted by the accused upon the victim caused the latter’s death because he was not in good health, such circumstance does not exempt the accused from liability.’ Even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart, as long as the defendant’s assault was the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the accused would be responsible.‘’ Where the victim in robbery was wounded and the wounds necessitated an operation, but after the operation he contracted mucous colitis, which hastened his death, the offense is robbery with homicide. Where the victim of an assault died fifteen days after being wounded and in consequence of a complication of diarrhea, the crime is nevertheless homicide, unless the evidence disclosed that sickness was due to extraneous causes, It is assumed that the wounds weak- ened the victim’s physical condition and that the diarrhea was a complication of the wounds and hastened his death. Although the victim, a 13-year old child, was suffering from epilepsy, yet it having been proven that the accused had struck him several blows which caused internal hemorrhages and that neither before nor after said maltreatment did the victim have any access of epilepsy, the defendant is responsible for the victim's death.*° Where victim was threatened with bodily harm, — Article 4 is illustrated in the rule formulated by a British court that “if a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate sense of danger which causés such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures him- self, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.”4! Thus, if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for the homicide in case death results by drowning. 85 People ¥. Francisco, CA-GR by Federica Moreno, vople y. Caboniada, People ¥. Grezorio Re BOSLL-R, July 16, 1938, Dally Mirror Case Index compiled Phil, 383. , 61 Phil. 941; People ¥, Aniceto Martin, L-2002, May 23, 1952 the weeused husband ed hig wife who was suffering from a heart disease People v. Piamonte, Jan. 28, 1954. 0 U. 8. v. Vicente 2 Phil. 113, 40 People ¥. Turno, 47 Phil, 490, 41 Reg. v. Hamday, 61 LT. Ren. 420 8. Valdez, » Quiri, 41 Phil, wn 01 People v. Buhay and Basco, 79 Phil, 871,308 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL Vou. 34, No. 3 In the Valdez case, the defendant was in charge of the crew of small boat which was to raise the anchor of a steamer. The work of raising the anchor proceeded slowly. Defendant scolded the men. One of them, Venancio Gargantiel, remonstrated with the defendant, who took the remonstrance as a display of insubordination. Rising in rage, the defendant moved towards Venancio with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. When the defendant was within a few feet from Venancio, the latter, thinking that his life was in great peril, jumped into the water and disappeared beneath the sur- face to be seen no more. For three days, Venancio’s friends kept vigil and watched for the appearance of his body. It never came to the surface. Held: Defendant was guilty of homicide. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was mitigating. Justice Araulo dissented. He said there was no proof that Venancio really died. In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 13, 1882, it appears that upon a certain occasion an individual, after having in- flicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun ai the injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning. The autopsy revealed that only one of the wounds caused by a cut would have resulted in the death of the injured person, supposing that he had received no succour, and that by throwing himself into the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion, Held: Even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which al- mostly completely severed his axillary artery, oceasioning a hemor- rhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless, as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased by de- priving him of all possible help and putting him in a very serious situation, he is guilty of homicide. Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove defendant as responsible for the homicide. Tied up with the question of the responsibility of a defendant for the homicide, though he had no intent to kill, is the quantum of circumstantial evidence necessary to hold him guilty. Wills, on Circumstantial Evidence, says: “In the proof of criminal homicide the true cause of death must be clearly established; and the possibility of accounting for the event by self-inflicted violence, accident or natural cause, excluded; and only when it has been proven that no other hypothesis will ex- plain all the conditions of the case can it be safely and justly con- cluded that it has been caused by intentional injury. But, in ac- cordance with the principles which govern the proof of every other element of the corpus delicti, it is not necessary that the cause ofJULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 309 death should be verified by direct and positive evidence; it is suf- ficient if it be proven by circumstantial evidence which produces a moral conviction in the minds of the jury, equivalent to that which is the result of positive and direct evidence.” When a person is wounded, even if he were sick and he died within a reasonable period thereafter, his death, in the absence of contrary proof, raises the presumption that it was caused by the wounds. When physical injuries are inflicted on a person in normal health and death ensues within a reasonable time, such fatal de- nouement, in the absence of contrary proof, shall be presumed to be the natural consequence of the injuries." “He who is the cause of the cause, is the cause of the evil caused”’ (Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa de mal causado). Cases where article 4 was not applied because death was not mainly due to the injuries inflicted. — Another line of cases illus- trates the rule that the defendant cannot be held liable for homicide if death cannot be directly attributed to the injuries inflicted, if some other circumstance, for which the accused is blameless, was the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Thus, in US. v. Embate,*s it was held that in order to justify a conviction for homi- cide, it must appear that the acts committed by the accused were the cause of the victim’s death. In that case it appears that a child had been seriously ill with fever for three weeks. Defendant told him to lie on the mat and not on the damp floor. As the child did not obey, the defendant struck him upon the thighs with a slipper, pushed and dragged him toward the mat, throwing him heavily on the flor. The child died two days later. All the witnesses attributed the death to the illness from which the child was suffering. The doctor said that the child had a serious affection of the heart and would have died two days later. However, he said that the maltreat- ment inflicted by the accused might have contributed to the death of the child. The Court, through Chief Justice Arellano, disregarded this statement and held that the true cause of the child’s death was not proved The accused was convicted of lesiones leves only, In People y. Palalon,*? the defendant was a foreman on the plantation in charge of a group of small children, among whom was the deceased Roman Megio, gathering and piling sugarcane, Roman, a 10-year old boy, was sitting down resting and did not display the activity expected by the accused and was reprimanded by the latter, and ordered to work. The boy answered in an insolent manner. Defendant lost his temper and struck the boy on the mouth with the back of his hand. The boy continued working until 2 p.m. of the following day, when he was taken sick with fever and was after some delay carried home by his father. Two and half days later he died. A physician testified that he examined the boy on the day Brobst, 14 Phil. $10, 237 Lugo, 8 Phil, 80: People y 45 People v. Luees, CA-GR No. 13011, Ju in dissent, ida, CA 4 OG 2287, 468 Phil. 6: 4749 Phil, 177,310 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL Vou. 34, No. 3 following the commission of the offense and found ecchymosis on the body from which he concluded that hard blows had been inflicted on the deceased and that as a result thereof, there was a congestion of the right lung which was alleged to be the principal cause of death. No autopsy of the body was made, Held: The physician’s testimony was not conclusive. Defendant was acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. He might be convicted of lesiones leves, but he had already served preventive imprisonment for a period exceeding the penalty for lesiones leves. No further punish- ment was imposed. : In People v. Dominguez,** the defendant, a policeman, allegedly gave a detention prisoner several blows with a stick used by police- men, The blows were given on various parts of the body but prin- cipally on the head, causing intercranial hemorrhage which resulted in his death. Held: There was no conclusive medical testimony as to the cause of the death of the deceased. Defendant was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. When the accused is charged with homicide and the evidence shows that the deceased died of nephritis, two months after he was wounded by the accused, which disease was not the direct and im- mediate result of the wounds inflicted upon him by the defendant; and it appearing that the wounds healed after 30 days. Held: That the accused should be convicted not of homicide but for the lesser offense of serious physical injuries.” Spanish cases. — Viada cites similar Spanish cases. In a case decided by the Spanish Supreme Court on April 2, 1908 it was held that, while a person is liable for all justiciable acts contrary to law and for all the consequences thereof, having inflicted physical in- juries from whose direct or immediate consequences death results, either incidentally or accidentally, the offender must answer for the ultimate result of his act, i.e. for the resulting death, yet this prin- ciple is not applicable where it clearly appears that the injury would net have caused death, in the ordinary course of events, but would have healed in so many days and where it is shown beyond all doubt that the death was due to the malicious or careless acts of the in- jured person or a third person. One is accountable only for his own acts and their natural or logical consequences, and not for those which bear no relation to the initial cause and are due to the care- lessness, fault, or lack of skill of another, whether it be the injured man himself or a third person, such as the mistakes committed by the doctor in the surgical operation and treatment of the victim's wound. In a case decided on June 15, 1874, it was held that if the imme- diate cause of the death was traumatic erysipelas complicated with meningoencephalitis arising from the erysipelas itself, and the remote and original cause of the latter was the wound inflicted by the de- fendant in the victim’s parietal bone, the accused would be guilty only of physical injuries and not homicide. 4802 Phil, 61 {People ¥. Panes, CA d4 OG 1506.JULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 311 In another case decided on December 17, 1878, it was held that when a less serious physical injury in the victim's head gives rise to traumatic erysipelas, which in turn produces cerebral meningitis from which the person injured dies in eleven days, and the doctors declare that the erysipelas may have been due to the patient’s care- Jessness in constantly exposing himself to a draft, contrary to the doctor’s orders, the accused is liable only for physical injuries and not for homicide.‘? Accidental killing may or may not be justified. — The cases on accidental killing, which is not justified, also fall under the first paragraph of article 4. But there may be accidental killings where- in the killer is exempt from criminal liability under article 12(4). It seems that if the accidental killing occurred in the course of the performance of a lawful act and the actor was not negligent, he would not be criminally liable; whereas, if the accidental killing was perpetrated while the actor was committing a felonious act, he would still be criminally liable. The case would fall under the category of aberratio ictus. In People v. Bindoy,'' the defendant, who was acting in self- defense, accidentally Killed a bystander. He was held exempt from criminal liability. “He acted without criminal intent. “The incident was simply one of these things unfortunate happenings” which may occur in the life of anyone anytime." In People y. Florencio An. royo, the accused, while defending himself against the unlawful aggression of his father-in-law and brother-in-law, wounded his wite, who had sandwiched her body between the accused and his aggres. sors. The aggression stopped when the wife was wounded. The accused, on seeing that his wife was wounded, left the scene of the encounter and surrendered to the authorities. It was held that he was not criminally liable for the wounding of his wife. The Bindoy and Arroyo cases should be distinguished from People y. Nocum,:! where it appears that the defendant, to stop a fistie encounter bet- ween two persons, fired his pistol twice into the air. As the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground but the bullet rico. cheted and hit an innocent bystander who died soon thereafter The defendant was found guilty of homicide through reckless im. prudence known as involuntary manslaughter in American law. But where the accused, in trying to defend himself against the assault of an aggressor, did not aim his revolver at the aggressor but fired it indiscriminately at the risk of the lives and limbs of in- nocent persons when he knew were in the place of the oceurrence and, in consequence, he accidentally wounded his ister-in-law and brother-in-law, his act of self-defense was not exer ised with due care. He was convicted of light physical injuries.+ Following the a0 Dissent, People ¥, Almowte, 56 Phil, 54, 50) Phil, 15, reonle v. Simeon ‘Trinidad, CA OG 4887. 47 OG S151; CF. People v, Mendoza, CA a4 OG 2007 57 Phil, 1018. Sre ai Abad Santos, J, People v, Sia Bonkia, 60 Phil. 1112, FA Feople v. Galagac, CA 1027.312 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL. Vou. 34, No. 3 Nocum case, it may be argued in this case that he acted only with reckless imprudence. Where in an affray between several men, one of the combatants, in attempting to wound his adversary, accidentally wounded a girl who was behind the latter, he is not exempt from liability but is guilty of homicide because he is responsible for all the consequences of his acts.’ The case is different from the Bindoy case because the accused acted with malice. Where in the course of the killing in the cockpit of two intended victims, a bystander was killed and four others were wounded, it was held that, since there was reasonable doubt as to who killed and wounded the said bystanders, the persons responsible for the killing of the two intended victims cannot be held criminally liable for the killing and wounding of the bystanders.* Mistake as to victim is not a defense. — Under article 4, mistake as_to victim or aberratio ictus is not a justifying exempting nor mitigating circumstance. It is mistake of fact without dolo or culpa that is excusable. So the fact that A murdered B, believing him to be C, is no defense. That he made a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously. cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility” Or the fact that* the wrongful act was committed upon a person other than the one against whom it was directed does not excuse the offender from criminal liability for the resulting felony." In the Maisa case, supra, while Anastacio Maisa and Jose Machon were fighting, Isaac Mon- rayo tried to separate them and he gave Maisa a push which. caused the latter to fall to the ground. On getting up, Maisa struck Mon- rayo in the face, hitting him in the right eye, which became com- pletely disabled. Maisa alleged that the blow was aimed at Machon and not at Monrayo. This defense was not sustained. Maisa was convicted of physical injuries. The same rule was followed in U.S. v. Zamora," where it was held that one who performs a criminal act should be held liable for the act and for all its consequences, although the victim was not the person whom the felon intended to injure. In that case the accused intended to injure his sweetheart but in his anger at not finding her he killed one Custodio Pisan. He was convicted of homicide although the victim of his homicidal intent was a different person. In US. v. Diana,® the rule was formulated in this wise: “The nature and circumstances which determine the definition of a crime 55 People . and Nieclas, CA 45 « People v. Mendoza, ©JULY, 1959 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 313 according to the consequences thereof are not altered because its perpetrator may have intended to assault one person, but inflicted the mortal wound upon another. The crime is the same, whoever may be the victim deprived of life by the criminal assault of another.” In the Diana case, there was a quarrel between Dionisio Legara and Cayetano Gomez, While Legara and Gomez were grappling, Leon Diana, the uncle of Gomez, intervened and delivered blow which hit his nephew Gomez in the forehead. Gomez left the place bleeding and he died later. Diana claimed that he intended to hit Legara but hit instead his nephew. He was nevertheless held guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and obfuscation but not lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong because the records revealed that he might have really intended to kill his nephew. The peculiarity of the case is that the Attorney- General asked for its dismissal because there was doubt as to whether Diana committed the homicide, since there were two wounds found on the body of the deceased and Diana inflicted only one wound. However, the Supreme Court disregarded the prosecution's plea for the dismissal of the case. ‘The most sensational case on mistake as to vietim is People v. Guillen,' where the accused threw a grenade at President Roxas but killed one Varela and wounded others. His crime was the com- plex one of murder with assault and multiple attempted murder. The Guillen case cites a Spanish case where A, intending to kill B, a storeowner, fired at B from the street, but the shot killed not only B but also C who was also in the store. It was contended that the killing was homicide as to B and homicide through reckless im- prudence as to C. Held: The killing was double murder treated 2 complex crime, there being only one shot. Another remarkable case on mistake as to victim is People v. Oanis and Galanta,®® where two peace officers were ordered to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and as escaped convict, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, the residence of a bailarina named Irene, the two peace of- ficers entered a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, fired at him without first making an inquiry as to his identity and thinking that he was Balagtas. The victim turned out to be Serapio Tecson, an innocent man, who was Irene’s paramour, The peace officers were convicted of murder. Impossible crime. — The second paragraph of article 4 deals with the impossible crime. It follows the positivist theory. ‘The purpose of the provision is to express criminal tendencies. The penalty for the impossible crime fixed in article 59 is arresto mayor GL85 Phil, 307, Analozons situation in People y. Balatol, 84 Phil 6375 Phil, 257 CF, People vy. Mamoslaya Rulalakao, 50 OG’ 1104; Vietor L-G189, Nov 19, 1034 Calderon ¥. People,314 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL VoL. 34, No. 3 or a fine ranging from P200 to P500, depending on the “social danger and degree of criminality shown by the offender.” Examples of the impossible crime are trying to kill a person already dead, robbing an empty safe, trying to shoot a person with an empty revolver. It should be noted that not all impossible crimes are punished Only impossible crimes which would be offenses against persons or property (Title 8 and 10 of Book II, such as homicide, theft, estafa or robbery) ave punished. Rape of a dead woman may not be a Bunishable impossible crime because rape is not a crime against persons. 03 People v, Balmores, CAGR No. 12455-R, May 17, 493; People v, Omar, L-7197, April 30, 1955; People v. Casate,