Evan Mann

Rachel Fredericks
Philosophy 267 AH
November 22, 2011
The Inductive Argument from Evil
I find William Rowes inductive argument from evil to be the most appealing . In this
paper I will present the argument, explain why I favour it, and give a weakness of the argument .
The version of Rowes argument that I most prefer, and will be referencing in this paper,
is the rationality version of the argument. Rowe starts his argument with a claim that any rational
person would accept: there exists, in the world, intense human suffering. It is difficult to believe
that all of this evil to be justified. For suffering to be justified it must either enable a greater good
or prevent a worse evil from occurring. While it is impossible to know whether a specific evil is
justified or not, since this would require omniscience, we can only legitimately make a claim
about the rationality of believing suffering to be justified . Many times in our lives we may not be
able to know or prove a statement that we rationally believe based on previous experience and
knowledge. From this Rowe takes that it is rational to believe that at least some suffering must
be unjustified based on the on the great variety and multitude of suffering in the world . This
gives rise to the first premise (1): It is rational to believe that there exist instances of suffering
that produce no greater good or prevent no worse evil. The second premise is one that Rowe
feels to be held by both theists and atheists alike, and that is (2) An omnipotent, omniscient,
omnibenevolent God would prevent any suffering that would not produce a greater good or

prevent a worse evil. From these two premises one can conclude (3) that it is rational to believe
that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not exist .
A weakness of this argument lies entirely in the first premise: whether or not it is truly
rational to believe that instances of suffering exist in which no greater good is produced or worse
evil prevented. Snyder certainly believes so and offer 3 arguments to prove this weakness fatal.
The first premise of Rowes argument relies on what Snyder calls Rowe-style noseeum
inferences. These are the inferences that because we cannot see the greater goods arising from
suffering means that they must no exist . However, an absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence. While there are reasonable noseeum inferences, Snyder finds this to not qualify. A
noseeum inference is reasonable only if it is reasonable to believe that we would very likely see
the item in question if it existed (Snyder 354). Snyder finds it unreasonable that we would see
the item in question, the greater good, even if it was there, and he gives three explanations why.
The first explanation is the Alston analogy, which states that it is inadequate to judge one of
great knowledge or skill, God, in a matter, regarding the justification of suffering, when one has
little to no experience in the area. We are so inferior to God that there is no reason for us to claim
to understand his methods. It would be just as inappropriate for a novice to try and follow Bobby
Fischers strategy on the chess board. Secondly, there is the progress argument . Knowledge has
progressed greatly in many fields and shows all signs of continuing in such a fashion. Therefore,
there may be some good that we do not yet recognize that could potentially result from so called
unjustified suffering. Lastly, the argument from complexity argues that truly terrible evils would
need an even greater, more elaborate good to overpower them. These goods might be so complex

that we cannot recognize them, just as a child cannot recognize the literary value of Moby Dick .
All three of these arguments attempt to show that Rowe-style noseeum inference is not
reasonable, and therefore it is not rational to believe instances of unjustified suffering exist .
There are several reasons I prefer Rowes rationality version of the inductive argument
from evil. To me it seems that the logical problem of evil has been essentially defeated by
Plantingas free will defense theorem, so this no longer seems a valid argument to put oneself
behind. I find it hard to take Rowes strong inductive argument from evil, and, as it seems, so
does he. The strong version of the argument has a slightly altered first and third premise that
claim to know that some instances of suffering are unjustified; therefore one concludes that an
omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God does not exist. I feel this argument tries to do too
much as one cannot truly know that a certain suffering does not bring about a greater good or
prevent a worse evil. The rational version of the argument assuages this by instead stating that it
is only rational to believe that some instances of suffering are unjustified . This I can more easily
put myself behind as it reaches out to my inner skeptic. I feel that the rationality argument holds
water well against criticism; Snyders criticisms do not convince me. I believe its sturdiness is
due to its weaker claim, as compared to Rowes strong version of the argument . While an
argument that definitively gave proof would be ideal, I prefer an argument that makes a more
modest claim and is thus easier to defend over an argument that makes a stronger claim but is
more susceptible to critique. Overall I find Rowes rationality version of the inductive argument
from evil to be consistent with my views of what makes a good argument: it holds up well to
criticism and does what is within its means.

In this paper I gave the rational version of Rowes inductive argument from evil, a
criticism of the argument, and explained my preference of this argument of overs.

Work Cited
Rowe, William. The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. Readings in the Philosophy of
Relgion. Ed. Kelly James Clark. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2008. 341-349. Print.
Snyder, Daniel Rowes Argument from Particular Horrors. Readings in the Philosophy of Relgion. Ed.
Kelly James Clark. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2008. 350-359. Print.