Mackenzie Sepler

3/10/12
Pick Up- Pol S 204 AF
Colonial Legacies and Economic Development
Theorists have long attempted to discover and define the most advantageous
economic policy to instigate growth and development in a given state. This is especially
true in the pursuit of the most expedient approach to the acquisition of economic benefit
by less developed countries. The most popular economic theories in this situation may be
divided into two distinct categories: that of neoliberalism, or the limitation of state
regulation and intervention in free markets, and that of statism, or the selective presence
of state support to boost the competitiveness of national industries on the global scale.
Although some aspects of both statist and neoliberal theory have succeeded in practice,
neither theoretical perspective should claim credit or be blamed for the absence or
presence of economic development in a less developed country. Instead, the history of the
state in question, specifically its colonial legacy, should be the primary factor considered
in the study of said states economic growth and development. Examples of both policies
in action as well as the far-reaching consequences of a colonial history will be provided
by the cases of Brazil and Nigeria.
It is important to clearly define the meaning and boundaries of the term economic
development when concerning the discussion of the effectiveness of policies and the
symptoms of colonial legacies. Economic development concerns the growth in economic
power or wealth of a state. Statistical tools such as the gross domestic product (GDP) or
purchasing power parity (PPP) of a state may be used in order gauge and measure
economic growth over a period of time. (ONeil, Essentials, 97) However, the concept of
economic development should not be limited to the growth of the economy. Other

factors, such as inequality, poverty, and quality of life, must be considered in order to
comprehensively and aptly discuss economic development. (ONeil, Essentials, 100)
In the case of Brazil, both neoliberal and statist strategies have been employed at
various intervals in the 20th century. Both policies resulted in loss in some areas and gain
in others; for example, statist polices resulted in the high levels of economic growth rates
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the same statist polices also produced
incredibly high levels of inflation. (ONeil, Cases, 477) Neoliberal reforms in the 1990s
led to a notable decline in the inflation of the Brazilian real. Yet these same policies did
not produce the expected high levels of economic growth, and did nothing to combat
inequality of income distribution or poverty. (Amann, 953, 957)
If the implementation of both neoliberal and statist economic policies led to
mixed results for Brazilian economic growth and development, a moderate application of
reason could attest that another factor hindered Brazils progress. It can be argued that
Brazils historically tremendous levels of inequality and wealth discrepancy have
inhibited either economic policy from having a true effect, and that these high levels of
inequality can be attributed to Brazils past as a former Portuguese colony.
The Brazilian economy during colonization focused on producing coffee and
sugar to sell in European markets. As such exports were incredibly labor-intensive,
Portuguese colonists and landowners required tremendous levels of slave labor in order to
make a profit in the world market. Brazil was the destination for over 70% of all slaves
coming westward from Africa (Sinkler Lecture, 2/23). Over time, the abolition of slavery
and interracial marriages resulted in roughly 80% of modern Brazils population claiming
some form of African ancestry (ONeil, Cases, 474). However, there still exists a

significant relation between skin color and economic status, connecting lighter skin to a
much higher level of income and economic wealth. (ONeil, Cases, 475)
Brazil, in addition to wealth inequality that is largely related to race, has an
incredibly large segment of the population living in the conditions of extreme poverty.
Despite having the ninth largest economy in the world, over one-fifth of Brazilians live in
poverty, and about one third do not have access to safe drinking water. (ONeil, Cases,
451, 479, 480) As a result of poverty and inequality, hundreds of shantytowns or favelas
have sprung up around cities such as Rio de Janeiro, becoming hives for crime and
corruption. One fifth of Rio de Janeiros population of 11 million reportedly lives in such
favelas (Alfonso). Such inconsistencies between wealth and standards of living have
resulted in making Brazil the most unequal country in the world. (ONeil, Cases, 497)
Brazil, since its establishment as a colony, has always been unequal; for much of its
history, a tiny minority of white Portuguese elites dominated the economy, and a similar
type of domination persists to this day. (Sinkler Lecture, 2/23) These instances and more
show that Brazil has failed to achieve true substantial economic development during
periods of both statist and neoliberal policy: a phenomenon that can clearly trace its roots
back to Brazils colonial legacy.
The economic condition of growth and development in Nigeria has also been
predominantly shaped by colonial legacy. Although Nigeria is nowhere near the
economic status of Brazil, it too has been subjected to both statist and neoliberal polices
in attempts to instigate economic development. Statist polices concerning primary
exports such as palm oil were plentiful during the 1930s and 40s; however, instead of
promoting any real growth, the outcome was a 200% decrease in the worth of the average

Nigerians wages. (Sinkler Lecture, 3/6) In the 1980s, due in part to increased pressure
from international organizations such as the World Bank to repay its tremendous debt, the
Nigerian government pursued a structural adjustment plan to liberalize the economy and
promote foreign investment. This plan was incredibly unpopular, and made slight if any
improvements to the economic development of the country. (Guseh, 144-5)
Nigeria is certainly not known as an economic powerhouse either regionally or at
the global scale. Economic development and growth is dismal: over 70% of Nigerians
live on less than one dollar a day in poverty, and the state is ranked #158 out of 187
countries in the United Nations Human Development Index. (Guseh, 148, ONeil, 531)
Nigeria, however, has the potential to be a much greater force than it is. The most
populous country in Africa, Nigeria boasts incredible mineral wealth, particularly in
terms of its large supplies of natural oil. (ONeil, 532) Thirty percent of Nigerian land is
arable, and much of that land is especially fertile and ripe for agriculture. (Sinkler
Lecture, 3/1) If Nigeria possesses so much potential for economic growth and
development, why hasnt this potential been realized? One answer, and in all likelihood
the correct one, would be the legacy left by the colonial rule of the British.
The British control of Nigeria in essence served one meaningful purpose,
however, this purpose was not to civilize or convert the local population to Christianity,
as was cited at the time to be the reason for colonization. Rather, the primary goal of
British control over the lands controlled by modern-day Nigeria was first and foremost to
increase the profit margins of British companies doing business and extracting resources
in the area. Concern over the benefit of the Nigerian people came secondly, if at all, and
little regard was given to the borders drawn by the British to demarcate the lands of their

control. (Sinkler Lecture, 3/1) This last point has proved to be immensely important in
the study of the progression of the Nigerian state and its political development.
Nigeria is incredibly diverse, consisting of several major and countless minor
ethnic groups and traditional divisions of society. This diversity can be directly linked to
the ignorance of British authorities as they staked out the Crowns claim to land during
the scramble for Africa in 1885. (ONeil, Cases, 537) When the British were claiming
land, they attempted to extend their reach as far inland as possible- thus including ethnic
groups as diverse as the Hausa-populated Muslim Sokoto Caliphate to the north and a
number of predominantly Christian ethnic groups in the south. This inclusion of ethnic
groups with completely distinct traditions, languages, and trends, sometimes with history
of war or conflict between them, has led to immense problems in contemporary Nigeria.
During British rule, posts in the bureaucracy designated for natives were usually
filled by southerners, partly because the British were hesitant to explore more completely
the northern area of Nigeria for fear of disease. This unequal division of position angered
the Hausa-Fulani in the north, and has led to a tug-of-war in the politics of the nation as it
emerged from colonial rule in the 1960s. Instead of viewing issues on a national scale,
politics became hung up on the interests of individual ethnic groups vying for power.
Indeed, Nigerias population has often struggled with the concept of Nigeria-ness:
instead of seeing themselves as a united country, many citizens connect more so with
their ethnic group than with the greater state in which they reside. (Sinkler Lecture, 3/6)
In addition to the incredible ethnic division and tension within Nigeria, the state
has other significant problems to contend with before an economic policy such as statism
or neoliberalism could even hope to be beneficial. One of the most prominent is the

severe level of corruption within the Nigerian government. Nigeria has the distinct honor
of having the third most corrupted government in the world. (ONeil, 559) The primary
center of corruption appears to be located in the states oil industry. Studies have shown
that the profits channeled towards the state from the oil industry should have resulted in
increased size of government; however, this has not been the case, inferring that countless
dollars have been left unaccounted for and in all likelihood in the pockets of select
influential businessmen or politicians. (Guseh, 146) The levels of corruption in the
Nigerian government could be argued as partially due in part to residual elements of
British colonialism, such as the decision of the British to not advise investment in other
areas of industry other than exports profitable to the British. This diversity in economic
resources would have provided more areas in which wealth could be achieved, instead of
solely in the production of oil. (Sinkler Lecture, 3/6)
In the cases of Brazil and Nigeria, various economic strategies and policies,
including both neoliberal and statist approaches, have been used in multiple stages in
attempts to induce economic development and growth. However, neither strategy has had
true opportunity to be successful or to cause critical development because of the residual
legacies of both Brazil and Nigerias past as colonized states. Whether it is extreme ethnic
diversity and tension due to the British in Nigeria or a long history of inequality and
wealth discrepancy based in part on the historical use of slaves by Portuguese colonists in
Brazil, colonial legacies shape a considerable portion of the future of economic
development and growth of a state. Issues caused by colonial history must be addressed
in order to inspire economic growth and development in a less developed country.
Works Cited

Amann, Edmund, and Werner Baer. "Neoliberalism and its Consequences in Brazil." J.
Lat. Amer. Stud. 34 (2002): 945-959. Print.
Daniels, Alfonso. "Taming Brazil's favelas - Telegraph." Telegraph.co.uk - Telegraph
online, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph - Telegraph. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Mar.
2012.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/7414677/Tam
ing-Brazils-favelas.html>.
Guseh, James, and Emmanuel Oritsejafor. "Government Size, Political Freedom, and
Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1960-2000." Journal of Third World Studies
XXIV.1 (2007): 139-165. Print.
O'Neil, Patrick H., Karl J. Fields, and Donald Share. Cases in Comparative Politics. 3rd
ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010. Print.
O'Neil, Patrick H.. Essentials of comparative politics. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 2010. Print.
Sinkler Lectures. 23 Feb. 2012, 1 Mar. 2012, 6 Mar. 2012